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Beliefs, dispositions anddemonstrativesEric Russert Kraemer aa The University of Wisconsin CentersPublished online: 02 Jun 2006.

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Australasian Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 63, No. 2; June 1985

BELIEFS, DISPOSITIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVES

Eric Russert Kraemer

The analysis of belief is a troublesome problem. On the one hand, there is clearly something right in the view that beliefs are dispositions. For otherwise sense cannot be made of beliefs held but not continuously entertained. On the other hand, there is also something persuasive in the view that beliefs are a certain sort of occurrent mental state. For else it seems we cannot adequately explain the special epistemic and active status that many of our beliefs enjoy. Any adequate account of belief should do justice to both views. But how? In this discussion I shall attempt to show how such an account might be given. The strategy that I will follow will be to show how we might modify D. M. Armstrong's recent account of belief (in Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge, 1973) for just this purpose. 1 F. P. Ramsey urged that beliefs 'of the primary sort are maps by which we steer', but general beliefs are to be regarded as, among other things, 'habits of singular belief'. 2 Following these remarks of Ramsey's, Armstrong develops a 'mixed' theory of belief according to which some types of belief are dispositions and some are not. It seems to me that Armstrong's insight here is correct. Where we differ is with respect to which types are to be analysed dispositionally. My discussion will consist of three parts. (I) I shall begin by presenting Armstrong's view and then arguing that the reasons he gives for not extending the dispositional analysis more widely than he does are not adequate. (II) I shall then suggest how an important extension of Armstrong's dispositional analysis of belief is to be made. And, (III) I shall end by discussing some concerns about my proposal, meeting some objections to it, and explaining some of its advantages.

1. Singular Beliefs

Given the history of the philosophical discussion of the topic, Armstrong's claim that some beliefs are dispositions and some are not requires clarification on at least two important points. The first of these concerns is the notion of a disposition. Many philosophers, including Armstrong, take dispositions to be determinate in that they licence only a single nomological conditional. 3

All page references in the text are to this work. Armstrong also defends his view in A Materialist Theory of the Mind (Humanities, 1968) and 'Consciousness' in, The Nature of Mind (Cornell, 1979), pp. 55-67.

2 F. P. Ramsey, 'General Propositions and Causality' in Foundations, D. H. Mellor, ed., (Atlantic Highlands, N. J., 1978), pp. 133-151, p. 134.

3 For a representative sample of philosophical opinion on this topic see R. Tuomela, ed., Dispositions (Reidel, 1978).

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168 Beliefs, Dispositions and Demonstratives

For Arms t rong , the appropr ia te parad igm for dispositions is brittleness. To say o f something that it is brittle, he claims, is to licence only the conditional that the thing will break when struck with a modera te amoun t o f force. Following Ryle, let us call a disposition of this sort a 'single-track' disposition. By contrast , o ther philosophers, such as Ryle, hold that some dispositions (called 'mult i - t rack ' ) may licence an indeterminate number o f conditionals. 5 To call an object hard, Ryle says, is not to licence only a single and characteristic condit ional , but rather it is to licence an indefinite number of such condit ionals . Ryle has asserted that mental states such as beliefs are mult i- track dispositions. 6 Armst rong ' s claim should not be confused as a variat ion o f Ryle's. For Armst rong , no belief is a mult i - t rack disposition; rather, some beliefs are single-track dispositions, and some are not.

The second point which needs clarification concerns dispositional analyses o f belief. Tradit ionally, such analyses have been unders tood as analysing beliefs in terms o f dispostions to act, where the action in question is a specific, overt bodily behaviour. On Armst rong ' s dispositional analysis, however, beliefs o f one sort are analysed as dispositions to have beliefs o f another sort. 7 In particular, Arms t rong distinguishes two types o f belief: (1) general beliefs, and (2) singular beliefs. 8 General beliefs, which include, for example, someone 's believing that arsenic is poisonous, are

habits of inference which dispose us to move f rom a belief about some particular matter o f fact to a further belief about some part icular matter o f fact. (p. 5)

Arms t rong describes singular beliefs, which include, for instance, someone's believing that the earth is flat, as

beliefs concerning things at part icular times and p l aces -be l i e f s o f a historical/geographical sort in the widest sense o f 'history' and 'geography' which ranges over all t ime and all space. (ibid.)

He holds that singular beliefs, however, are not plausibly construed as single- t rack dispositions. (p. 16) It is to this claim that I now turn.

There are several ways one might argue for the view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. One strategy would be to point out that there are certain special features which singular beliefs have but which single-track dispositions (such as brittleness) lack. Arms t rong notes that philosophers other than he have maintained that beliefs can be known by privileged access but that

4 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London, 1949) pp. 43-45; pp. 116-118. Selections from this work are reprinted in Tuomela (1978), pp. 339-357.

5 Ryle, ibid. 6 Ryle, in Tuomela (1978), p. 341. Ryle's case for multi-track dispositions has been persuasively

challenged by W. Lyons, 'Ryle and Dispositions', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. (1972), pp. 326-334.

7 Thus, Mellor's characterisation of Armstrong's view as an 'action theory' of belief is somewhat misleading. (See Mellor's 'Consciousness and Degrees of Belief', in D. H. MeUor, ed. Prospects for Pragmatism, (Cambridge, 1980). pp. 139-173, p. 142.)

s The term 'singular' is Ramsey's (op. cit.). Armstrong uses the more cumbersome locution, 'beliefs concerning particular matters of fact'. (5) I will not here consider a further category of beliefs, existential beliefs (discussed by Armstrong in Ch. 7).

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Eric Russert Kraemer 169

dispositions such as brittleness can not (p. 19). 9 Further, he asserts that the attribution of beliefs, since beliefs may be interrelated, requires the postulation of a special structure, but the attribution of brittleness does not. (p. 18) This strategy, however, is not very convincing, lO For even if singular beliefs had such special epistemic and structural properties, it would not of course follow that singular beliefs were not single-track dispositions. We would still need further reason to believe that single-track dispositions could not have such properties.

A more profitable approach for establishing the claim in question would be to produce features of single-track dispositions not possessed by beliefs. We should note that Armstrong does present two interesting and related problems of this sort. Let us first consider the feature of 'stimulus- dependence'. Armstrong argues:

One point of distinction between dispositions such as brittleness and singular beliefs, is that the concept of the former involves the notion of an initiating cause of a certain sort which triggers off the manifestation. The brittle glass is brittle because it breaks when hit. A piece of sugar is soluble because it dissolves when placed in water. But the concept of beliefs seems to involve no notion of a class of initiating causes which in turn bring about the manifestation or expression of the b e l i e f . . . (thus) the manifestation of expressions of belief are similarly stimulus-independent. But the manifestations of dispositions like brittleness are stimulus- dependent. (p. 16)

Now if one could give further reasons to suppose that manifestations of particular beliefs were stimulus-independent, then we should indeed grant that this last argument (call it 'D') would be conclusive. But Armstrong's present remarks, of course, do not establish this. All he really points out is that it may n o w seem to us that particular belief manifestations are not stimulus-dependent. We may turn out to be wrong about this. 11 In fact Tuomela has argued against D as follows: lz

But consider a man who believes that the earth is flat. I think that we must say that it is conceptually true that the man is then disposed, under normal circumstances, to answer the earth is flat when questioned about the form of the earth. Does this not show that even singular beliefs are to some extent stimulus dependent? If so . . . . beliefs are stimulus-dependent.

Tuomela's remarks express considerable philosophical optimism in holding that 'normal circumstances' are, by definition, those in which people answer questions put to them fully, correctly and truthfully. Even granting this and assuming also that stimulus-dependence admits of degree, Armstrong might

9 See, for example, H. H. Price, Belief, (London, 1968), pp. 60-61. ~0 See, for example, R. Tuomela, 'Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation', reprinted in Tuomela

(1978), pp. 42"7-448, pp. 440--441. H Compare Armstrong's defense of central-state materialism in 'The Headless Woman Illusion',

Anaysis, Vol. 29, (1973), pp. 48-49. Jz Tuomela, op. cit.

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170 Beliefs, Dispositions and Demonstratives

reply that at best Tuomela ' s claim shows that some beliefs are stimulus- dependent . Since Arms t rong argues (in Chapter III) that the possibility of non-language-using animals having (singular) beliefs should not be ruled out he is free to reject Tuomela 's argument as establishing the stimulus dependence o f all singular beliefs.

More impor tant ly , we should note that Arms t rong does not let D prevent him f rom holding that general beliefs are (single-track) dispositions. So we need some addit ional reasons to suppose that there is a difference between general and singular beliefs with respect to st imulus-dependence. (In part II I argue that we have as good a reason for taking singular beliefs to be single- track dispositions as we do to take general beliefs to be such.) Since D seems inconclusive, let us turn, instead, to the second and more serious problem Arms t rong raises.

He remarks

single-track dispositions, if manifested, are manifested in only one sort o f w a y ; . . . [singular] beliefs, if manifested, are manifested in indefinitely many ways. (p. 21)

This object ion (call it 'M' ) , unlike those previously considered, does seem to present an impor tan t challenge to singular beliefs' being single-track dispositions.13 For if we reflect on such dispositions as brittleness, we observe that if an object does not break on being struck we are no longer inclined to call such an object brittle. But the case with singular beliefs appears different. There is no crucial behavioural feature which is such that its failure to appear in the presence o f appropr ia te st imulat ion indicates the absence o f a given singular belief. 14 Nevertheless, I do not take M to be decisive.

To help establish my point let us begin by distinguishing between two different kinds o f manifestat ions o f beliefs. By basic manifestat ions I will mean those manifestat ions which logically involve only that belief. By conjunctive manifestat ions I will mean those which involve that belief and at least one other specific belief. (As an analogy one might think of a certain symptom which requires only one specific disease on the part o f the victim, as opposed to a complicated sort o f symptom which requires that two specific diseases be present.) By appealing to this distinction one can demonstrate that the case for M is indeed weak.

Let us now recall Armst rong ' s examples. His example o f a general belief is a person's believing that arsenic is poisonous. One o f his examples of a part icular belief is S's believing that the earth is flat. (pp. 16-17) Armstrong maintains that, with respect to S's believing that arsenic is poisonous,

there is a single, logically-central manifes ta t ion o f S's belief. (p. 18)

By contrast , he claims, S's belief that the earth is flat has no such logically-

13 Other philosophers, such as Ryle (op. tit.), Price (p. 292) and Mellor (in Mellor (1980), p. 140) take feature M to apply not only to singular beliefs but to all beliefs.

14 Notice that Tuomela's appeal (with respect to D) to 'normal circumstances' will not help here. For the variability M refers to is itself normal.

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Eric Russert Kraemer 171

central manifestations. (ibid.) Thus, he contends, particular beliefs, unlike general beliefs, fall prey to objection M.

Using the distinction between basic and conjunctive manifestations I think one can show that Armstrong's examples are not conclusive. What is the logically-central manifestation of S's belief that arsenic is poisonous? According to Armstrong it is: S's coming to believe that some portion of stuff is arsenic brings about his acquiring the further belief that the stuff is poisonous. (p. 16) This manifestation is basic in the sense defined above, in that it does not logically require that S have any particular belief other than the belief that arsenic is poisonous. A conjunctive manifestation of S's belief that arsenic is poisonous might be one such as the following: S's coming to believe that some portion of stuff is arsenic brings about S's acquiring the further belief that he would be very happy if his stingy rich uncle happened to consume a large quantity of that portion of stuff. Here not only the belief that arsenic is poisonous but also other beliefs such as the belief that ingesting large doses of poison usually causes death are also required. Or, again, suppose that S believes that arsenic is poisonous and that poisonous substances are expensive. A further conjunctive manifestation of S's belief that arsenic is poisonous might then be: S's coming to believe that some portion of stuff is arsenic brings about S's acquiring the further belief that the portion of stuff is expensive.

Now let us consider Armstrong's example of a particular belief: S's believing that the earth is flat. He claims that there is no logically-central manifestation of this belief, that this belief may be manifested in indefinitely many ways. Armstrong mentions only one possible manifestation, ffttering the sentence 'the earth is fiat' if an English speaker. (p. 17) Two other manifestations might be: S's refusing to sail with Columbus, and S's joining the Flat Earth Society. If we make use of the distinction introduced above, then it seems that we should call all three of these manifestations conjunctive manifestations of the belief. For they all require that S have some specific belief in addition to the belief that the earth is flat. (This might be questioned in the case of uttering the sentence 'the earth is flat' if an English speaker. But uttering this sentence would presumably also require having some other belief such as that one had been asked the shape of the earth.) But what would be the basic manifestation of S's believing that the earth is flat? I suggest that its logically- central manifestation, following the form provided earlier for general belief, would be: S's believing of something that it was the earth bringing about S's acquiring the additional belief of that thing that it was flat. Such a basic manifestation is indeed present in each of the 'indefinite' manifestations that Armstrong says that one might find for this belief. Now it seems that we are generally inclined to cite only basic manifestations of beliefs such as arsenic's being poisonous, and only conjunctive manifestations of beliefs such as the earth's being flat. But once it is clear that there can be conjunctive manifestations of what Armstrong takes to be general beliefs as well as basic manifestations of singular beliefs, some ground besides M must be found to support Armstrong's rejection of the (single-track) dispositionality of

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172 Beliefs, Dispositions and Demonstratives

par t icu la r beliefs. In the absence o f fur ther serious ob jec t ions , let us now consider what sort of disposi t ional analysis might be given for singular beliefs.

1I. Demonstrat ive Beliefs

A r m s t r o n g has c la imed tha t the logical ly-central man i fes t a t ion o f S 's general bel ief that arsenic is po i sonous has the fo rm: S acqui r ing the bel ief that X is arsenic br ings abou t S coming to believe tha t X is po i sonous . I have suggested that one might offer a s imi lar analysis for the logical ly-central mani fes ta t ion of S 's par t icu lar bel ief that the ear th is flat: S coming to believe tha t X is the ear th br ings abou t S acqui r ing the bel ief tha t X is flat. It seems to me that one can also give such an analysis of the other example of a singular bel ief cited by A r m s t r o n g , namely S bel ieving o f some A that his head is cut off. The central man i fes ta t ion o f this bel ief would be: S coming to believe that X is A ' s head brings about S 's acquiring the belief that X h a s been cut off.

One po in t which needs to be exp lored is wha t sorts o f things the X ' s may range over in the above fo rmulae . In the case o f the genera l belief mani fes ta t ions , it seems tha t X m a y range over p rope r names , definite descr ip t ions , and (perhaps) demons t r a t i ve e lements such as ' th is ' and ' that ' . W h a t o f the X ' s in s ingular bel ief man i fes t a t ions? Here the most plausible cand ida te for the sorts o f things tha t m a y be subs t i tu ted for X are demons t r a t i ve elements .

In c la iming tha t S 's bel ieving tha t the ear th is flat is jus t as good a (single t rack) d i spos i t ion as S 's bel ieving tha t arsenic is po i sonous , it seems that I have made use of a different sort of belief f rom that ment ioned by Armstrong. One might call beliefs such as 'S believes tha t this is the ear th ' demonstrative beliefs.~5 It should be clear tha t I am in agreement with A r m s t r o n g ' s general view that some beliefs are (s ingle- t rack) d ispos i t ions and others are not. But I p ropose that general beliefs and singular beliefs bo th be const rued as single- t r ack d i spos i t ions , and tha t it is demons t r a t ive beliefs which are not to be

so ca tegor ised . Now some m a y be incl ined to doub t whether there real ly are any such

beliefs as demons t r a t ive beliefs . But , as P e a c o c k e has convinc ingly argued, wi thout such beliefs one canno t sa t i s fac tor i ly expla in h u m a n act ion. ~6 For example , it is m y bel ief tha t this bot t le conta ins the po i son which explains why I pour its contents into my despised rich uncle's tea instead o f the contents o f some o ther bo t t le be fo re me. So there is compel l ing reason to ho ld that there are such beliefs . ~7

But, one m a y ask, wha t a rgumen t can be given for the c la im tha t these

ts See, however, note 17 below. For a detailed discussion of such beliefs see C. Peacocke, 'Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation', Synthese, Vol. 49 (1981), pp. 187-217.

~6 See Peacocke, pp. 205-210. 17 In his discussion of the nature of simple concepts, Armstrong also seems to grant the existence

of demonstrative beliefs. (pp. 60-69). He refers in passing to 'a certain elementary type of belief' (p. 61) such as 'the belief "that this thing here is red" '. (p. 62) Thus Armstrong and I do not appear to disagree as to the existence of demonstrative beliefs. We do seem to disagree on whether singular beliefs can be dispositionally analysed in terms of them.

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Eric Russert Kraemer 173

demonstrative beliefs are not also single-track dispositions? One response to this question is to ask what sort o f things could provide an appropr ia te (single-track) dispositional analysis o f demonstrat ive belief. To appeal again to other demonstrat ive beliefs seems unhelpful. For suppose we at tempt to analyse 'S believes that this is F ' as 'S has a tendency to pass f rom the belief that that is this to the belief that that is F ' . I f we ignore the problem of trying to figure out just what 'believing that that is this' comes to, we are still left with S's unanalysed demonstrative belief that that is F. So some other elements are needed to provide a dispositional account o f demonstrat ive beliefs. The question that I now see no way of answering is: what sorts o f elements might these be? For it seems clear that no purely behavioural (single-track) dispositional account will do. And there is no obvious non-circular dispositional account in terms of mental items which will work any better.

Now one might try to argue that since demonstrat ive deliefs are clearly occurrent (i.e. refer to present conscious mental states) this is sufficient reason to suppose them not to be dispositional. While I find this claim somewhat persuasive, I must admit that it is not conclusive. For, as Alston has argued, we should not assume that what is dispositional cannot also be occurrent. 18 There is, however, the following possibility to consider. It might be the case that the occurrent state associated with each demonstrat ive belief is not identical with the belief but only associated with it in some other way, perhaps, for example, as the trigger o f some as yet undiscovered disposition. 19 But should we take the possibility seriously? Given the difficulty o f prcducing such a dispositional account , I will assume that the burden of p r o o f lies with those who hold that an illuminating (single-track) dispositional account o f demonstrative beliefs can be given.

III. Problems and Projects

In order to tie up some loose ends, let us now consider several objections that might be raised to my view as well as several points that might be made in its favor. It seems appropr ia te to begin with an objection to Armstrong 's interpretation o f Ramsey on general beliefs recently presented by Christopher Hookway. 2° H o o k w a y notes that Ramsey claimed that general beliefs consist not only in a habit o f singular belief but also require 'a general enunciation'. 21 One might also apply Hookway ' s objection to my account of singular beliefs. Thus, it is impor tant to ask whether there is compelling reason in either case. Hookway points out that a general enunciat ion provision might 'facilitate the detection o f inconsistency' . This practical advantage, however, does not override what many philosophers take to be obvious: that both human beings as well as non-humans have non-enuncia ted beliefs. 2z H o o k w a y raises a second and more serious general worry:

1~ See William Alston, 'Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology', reprinted in Tuomela (1978), pp. 359-388, pp. 366-368.

~9 I owe this suggestion to Edward Becker. z0 See C. Hookway's discussion, 'Inference, Partial Belief and Psychological Laws' in Mellor,

(1980), pp. 91-108. 21 Ramsey, op. cir. p. 136. zz See, for example, Armstrong, chapter 3, and Mellor (1980), p. 141.

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174 Beliefs, Dispositions and Demonstratives

The enunc ia t ion m a y be requi red in o rder to make sense o f differences between bel ief states which a p p e a r to involve the same hab i t o f bel ief or inference, as for example the difference be tween bel ieving all swans to be white , and being agnost ic abou t tha t , while not expect ing to encounter any non-whi te ones. 23

It should, I think, be admi t ted that if there are two distinct beliefs that involve the same habit , then the analysis suggested here is inadequate . Having granted this, however , we need to ask jus t wha t evidence there is tha t there are such pairs of beliefs. H o o k w a y ' s example , though perhaps conclusive against some d i spos i t iona l theories , does not tell aga ins t an A r m s t r o n g i a n account . The t endency to pass f rom the bel ief tha t someth ing is a swan to the bel ief that tha t someth ing is a swan encoun te red by me to the bel ief the thing is white is not the same habi t as the t endency to pass f rom the be l ie f that the thing is white. Fo r the bel ief tha t a th ing is a swan is not the same bel ief as the bel ief tha t a th ing is a swan encoun te red by me. A t present it does not seem

' W 24 to me that there are any serious candidates to substant iate H o o k w a y s orry. A second p r o b l e m to cons ider is that raised by Pr ice to Ramsey ' s original

view. Price has the fo l lowing compla in t . 25

If we cons ider our menta l a t t i tude to induct ive genera l iza t ions , it seems obvious tha t we assent to them, or dissent f rom them, in jus t the same way as we assent or dissent to s ingular empir ica l p ropos i t ions . In fact, we believe them (or disbel ieve them) in jus t the same way as we believe o ther empir ica l p ropos i t i ons .

N o w it seems to me tha t Pr ice 's compla in t is correct . It suggests, I think, one reason why it is advan t ageous to extend the d i spos i t iona l analysis to s ingular bel iefs in add i t i on to general bel iefs .

There is, o f course , the remain ing wor ry to be faced, namely can not the same ob jec t ion be ra ised aga ins t demons t r a t i ve beliefs as opposed to non- demons t ra t ive beliefs? To assess this quest ion let us consider just what Price's ob j ec t ion is. He puts his p o i n t this way: 26

But this ha l f -way house [Ramsey's theory], which combines a disposi t ional t heo ry o f genera l beliefs with an occur rence theo ry o f s ingular beliefs, is not a sa t i s fac to ry pos i t i on to s top in, t hough it looks a t t rac t ive at first sight. On the con t r a ry , one has to go the whole hog, ei ther one way or the other ; and ei ther say tha t 'X believes P ' is a lways an occurrence-

z3 Hookway, p. 97. 24 Stephen Bo~r raises the following problem (in discussion). If my account is accepted, then

one cannot distinguish between the habits of the following two beliefs: (A) Jones believes that Smith's head is cut off, and (B) Jones believes that everything identical with Smith's head is cut off. Bo~r claims that (A) differs from (B) in that (B) includes knowledge of existential generalization and (A) does not. My response to Bo~r's problem is to claim that the associated habits of the two are not, contrary to Bo~r, identical. For the habit associated with (B) includes the concept of identity whereas that associated with (A) does not. And this is sufficient to distinguish the two habits.

_,5 Price, p. 182. aa Price, p. 183.

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statement about him, no matter what sort of a proposi t ion P is; or else say that it is always a disposi t ional s ta tement about him, no matter what sort of a proposi t ion P is.

For Price, an adequate account of belief should make belief homogeneous ; so we should either provide a disposi t ional analysis of all beliefs in terms of some non-bel ief entities, or we should a b a n d o n the disposit ional project altogether. Al though I am sympathet ic with Price's claim, it seems to me

that we should not a b a n d o n the mixed approach to belief if there is a good reason to dist inguish between different sorts of beliefs. A n d with respect to

this, I th ink there is a distinct advantage for the view presented here over Armstrong's fo rmula t ion . For demonst ra t ive beliefs do not seem to be believed, as Price puts it, in ' just the same way as we believe other empirical propositions' . For one thing, demonst ra t ive beliefs require a certain sort of 'direct' menta l occurrence that general beliefs and part icular beliefs do not. For instance, I cannot believe that this (some object in front of me) is red unless I am now directing my a t ten t ion on that object. But I can believe that all books are red or that Jones 's favorite book is red without now directing

my attention on any object. It is, I have suggested, a further question whether this special demonst ra t ive feature which distinguishes demonstra t ive beliefs from other beliefs can be given an enl ightening analysis. 2v

This leads us to a related topic. We may take it as a requirement of an adequate theory of belief that it explain why there has been tradit ional debate between those who th ink of belief as disposit ionaI and those who take belief to be occurrent. The view proposed here seems to contr ibute to just this goal.

The disposi t ional aspect of believing is accounted for in the disposit ional character of general and part icular beliefs. The demonst ra t ive element out of which these other types of belief are const i tuted offers some explanat ion of the occurrent aspect of belief since demonst ra t ive beliefs are, by nature it seems, occurrent . I shall not pursue here the quest ion as to whether there

are other impor tant elements needed to explain occurrent belief completely. 28

It is enough for my present purpose to suggest that the view that I propose

here sheds some light on why the two monist ic theories of belief emerged.

The final point that I wish to consider is how the view presented here affects

~,v But see R. M. Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis, 1981), pp. 45-47. Chisholm argues that demonstrative beliefs are to be explained as a form of belief de se. (Compare David Lewis, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se', Philosophical Review, Vol. 88 (1979), pp. 513-543.) Mark Pastin has claimed that such beliefs pose a problem for Armstrong. See Pastin's 'Knowledge and Reliability', Metaphilosophy, Vol. 9 (1978), pp. 150-162, p. 156.

2,~ D. H. Mellor, for example, has argued that conscious belief that P is to be explained as the belief that one oneself believes that P. (See Mellor, (1980) pp. 146-49. Compare also his 'Conscious Belief', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 78 (1978), pp. 87-101.) 1 do not wish to argue that such de se belief can in turn be given a dispositional analysis in terms of demonstrative beliefs. As noted above (note 26) Chisholm has argued that demonstrative beliefs are to be analysed as beliefs de se, and not the other way around. It should be pointed out in connection with Mellor's analysis, however, that it does not account for the fact that one may have certain purely dispositional beliefs about what one believes oneself to believe. Thus, it seems, Mellor's theory does not adequately distinguish occurrent belief from non-occurent belief.

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176 Beliefs, Dispositions and Demonstratives

the t ru th o f Ramsey ' s c la im with which this d iscuss ion beg~in, that 'belief o f the p r i m a r y sort is a m a p by which we steer ' . 29 F o r Ramsey (as for A r m s t r o n g ) beliefs o f the ' p r i m a r y sort °' are pa r t i cu la r beliefs . Acco rd ing to the revis ion o f their view p r o p o s e d here, we have as much reason to take s ingular beliefs to be d i spos i t iona l as we do to cons ider genera l beliefs to be so. Thus if one were to unde r s t and ' p r i m a r y sor t ' as entai l ing non- d i spos i t iona l i ty , then, I suggest, it would be demons t r a t i ve beliefs which would more p r o p e r l y fit into this ca tegory . But demons t r a t i ve beliefs are not very p laus ib ly construed as the maps which Ramsey intends. Fo r typical maps do not con ta in demons t r a t ive ind ica t ions such as 'this br idge ' or 'here is a m oun ta in ' , nor is it clear what sense such ind ica t ions would have. F u r t h e r m o r e , such demons t ra t ive ind ica t ions do not seem to be things 'by which we steer ' . Ins tead, they seem to indicate where we cur ren t ly are in our steering. 3° These r emarks do not , however , seem to unde rcu t in any serious way what A r m s t r o n g takes to be the impor t ance o f Ramsey ' s m a p analogy for belief . In fact , they seem to s t rengthen it. F o r pa r t i cu la r beliefs , even when cons t rued as d i spos i t ions o f demons t r a t i ve bel iefs , would still seem to possess those map- l ike fea tures (st~ch as r ep resen ta t iona l i ty and complexi ty) which led A r m s t r o n g to his defense o f Ramsey ' s c la im. In add i t ion , by in t roduc ing demons t r a t i ve beliefs one can expla in why it is tha t someone is loca ted at one place on his bel ief m a p ra ther than at ano the r . In this way we can also expla in why one pa t t e rn o f s teering occurs ra ther than another .

These several cons idera t ions seems to me to p rov ide some plaus ib i l i ty for my p r o p o s e d revis ion o f A r m s t r o n g ' s mixed theory o f bel ief . This revision also has the add i t i ona l vir tue o f di rect ly in tegra t ing an i m p o r t a n t ca t egory o f bel iefs , namely demons t r a t i ve bel iefs , in to a mixed account . In addi t ion it presents a ser ious chal lenge for defenders o f the or ig inal mixed theory of b e l i e f - n a m e l y , to p rov ide an ob jec t ion to the (s ingle- t rack) d ispos i t ional account o f pa r t i cu la r beliefs which does not unde rmine as well the d i spos i t iona l i ty o f general beliefs . There are, o f course , o ther impor t an t quest ions tha t the mixed theor is t o f beliefs needs to address , such as how demons t r a t ive beliefs are re la ted to beliefs abou t onesel f -as-onesel f . I hope the present discussion has at least succeeded in making it clear that the project o f p rov id ing (s ingle- t rack) d i spos i t iona l analyses for beliefs m a y well be less l imi ted than has been prev ious ly though t . 31

The University o f Wisconsin Centers Received Apr i l 1984

29 Compare Price: 'Our beliefs are like posts which we plant in the shifting sands of doubt and ignorance', p. 293.

30 Whether Armstrong would disagree is not obvious, for he identifies demonstrative beliefs not with maps but with 'maps'. (62)

31 I am indebted to discussion with Ernest Sosa, Edward Becker, Hardy Jones and Robert Audi. An earlier version of this was presented at the Western Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, April 1982. I am grateful for the critical comments on that occasion of Stephen Bo~r.

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