Georges FINGeorges suiteThe indepen-dent Gaul of the first century B.C. basedits prosperity on a subsistence economyand a thriving commerce. The land wasrich and well-exploited, despite widespreadforests. The practice of keeping livestock,which they had inherited from their noma-dic ancestors, was one of the chief sour-ces of wealth for the Gauls. The produc-tive regions sold their grain via a networkof well-established riverine ports. Merchantssold jewelry, wine, horses, slaves, and mer-

cenary contingents. Artisans excelled inthe metallic arts and knew how to extractminerals and how to make charcoal. Theyalso produced fine pottery, which theyexported to the Roman world. For Caesar,in dire financial straits at the time when hewas named proconsul, the conquest ofGaul seemed much more a way to pay offhis debts than to establish his militaryrenown. How then do we evaluate the risksof his enterprise?

The disparate forcesof the Gauls

What sorts of adversaries would Caesarfind in Gaul? The Romans were well acquain-ted with the Celts. They feared them, becausethey had confronted them for three centu-ries in northern Italy and later in southernGaul. Celtic society relied on a tripartiteorganization typical of Indo-European peo-ples, which Georges Dumzil has descri-bed brilliantly. A priestly class, that of thedruids, presided over the religious domainand influenced the laws. It shared the govern-ment with a knightly class (Caesar calledthem equites) which managed military ope-rations. Its members made up the Senate,consisting of powerful families and nobles.Finally, a productive class farmers, cat-tlemen, artisans and merchants provided

for the needs of the society as a whole.Thus it was the nobility who formed therelatively small nucleus of Gallic armies.These nobles fought on horseback along-side their closest dependents, the ambacti,who constituted a separate caste of semi-professional soldiers.

There were no standing armies in Gaul.Whenever it went to war each tribe wouldassemble its contingents, and when theyformed part of a coalition these would fightautonomously under their own leaders.When Caesar captured the Helvetian campby assault in 58 B.C., he discovered cen-sus documents listing the names of all mencapable of bearing arms. This evidencereveals the foundation of the Gallic mili-tary tradition: each leader must be able tostate how many men he could provide incase of mobilization. The levies were madeup of infantry contingents. These consis-ted of non-professional but well-trained sol-diers enrolled just for the duration of a cam-paign. They were armed only with shield,

I t took less than ten years andan army that never exceeded75,000 combatants for Cae-sar to transform a prosperous geo-graphic aggregate consisting ofseveral million inhabitants into aRoman province. To accomplishsuch a colossal task, the Romanproconsul developed a very broadrange of operative methods. Hewas enabled thereby to completehis victory over the Gauls, whoseown sturdy military tradition, moreo-ver, was at that time solidly esta-blished.

BELLUM GALLICUMThe manifold aspects of the Gallic War

FRDRIC BEY

Above. The surrender of Vercingetorix (19th cen-tury French color lithograph). Caesars victory atAlesia sealed the fate of the last independent partof Gaul. Despite the alliance of the majority ofGallic tribes against him, the Roman proconsulsucceeded in imposing the law of force.Bridgeman.

ART OF WAR

48

Gaul, the Romans could not have achie-ved so rapid and complete a conquest ofsuch a vast geographic area. The tribe ofthe Arverni, who had long held a dominantposition, had lost their hegemony at thetime of Caesars consulate. The conquestof southern Gaul by the Roman legionsduring the previous century had in factdeprived them of powerful client tribes thatwere now subject to the governor of Gal-lia Transalpina. Presently, it was rivalriesand a precarious equilibrium among themost important tribes that best defined thepolitical situation of Gaul. The Arverni andtheir clients (the Cadurci, Gabali, and Vel-lavii), their rivals the Aedui and their clients(the Segusiavi for example), and the Sequaniand the Bituriges were among the richestand most powerful tribes in independentGaul. In the northeast, the Belgic tribeskept themselves apart from these powerstruggles, remaining self-reliant in their still-untainted military vigor.

For intruding into this maze of influen-ces, Caesar and the Romans possessed aformidable trump card: for a dozen years,a veritable alliance had existed betweenRome and the Aedui. The latter were agenuine client of the Roman Republic. Theymonitored and controlled the Arverni, who

were traditional enemies of Rome, inexchange for the power to maintain a kindof primacy among the Gallic tribes. But thispower was only apparent, since the politi-cal structures of Gaul were, taken as awhole, in rapid decline. Each tribe, jealousof its independence, was controlled by anoligarchy made up of nobles who madedecisions purely on the basis of local, fre-quently quite selfish interests. Caesar wouldexploit these divisions so as to fight hisadversaries one at a time, most often usingthe logistical and military support of sometribes against others. Other than in 58 B.C.against the Helvetii, and the final phase ofthe great rebellion of 52 B.C. (after theAedui joined the alliance), Caesar alwayshad Gallic contingents, mostly cavalry, inthe ranks of his army. Starting in 57 B.C.,he recruited cavalry from the Treveri, repu-ted to be the best in all of Gaul. At certainpoints in the war, peoples as powerful asthe Bellovaci, the Suessiones or the Ambianiwere capable of temporary alliances withCaesar. Even during the siege of Alesia hecould still count on the indestructible sup-port of the Remi or the Lingones, who fur-nished him with provisions. Indeed, suchsymbolic figures of the campaign of 52 B.C.as Comnius and even Vercingetorix him-self had aided Caesar in the past, at the

spear and sword. The cavalry had betterequipment. They often wore a coat of mailor leather armor and a helmet. Their wea-pons were lances or swords. The Gallic civi-lization used metals, and so the Celts wereat no disadvantage against the Romanswith respect to weaponry. On the contrary,the Romans often copied their helmets ortheir swords. At the beginning of their waragainst Caesar, Gallic weapons were fabri-cated in large numbers by a method par-taking of almost proto-industrial swiftness.

When the assembly of leaders decided tocall them to arms, the levy was immediateand general. For the warriors this consistedof the obligation to join their troop along withtheir servants and slaves. When an armyconsisted of several tribes, especially whenmajor tribes were involved, inevitably a debatewould begin over which tribe would be incommand. These rivalries were reminiscentof those of the cities of classical Greece. Asan example, in 57 B.C. during the revolt ofthe Belgian tribes of Gaul, the Bellovaci, themost powerful militarily, were in competitionwith the Suessiones, the richest and mostinfluential of all the Belgae. In the end it wasthe latter tribe which obtained command ofthe army. When they went into combat, Gal-lic warriors placed themselves under the pro-tection and direction of their gods. The figureof Taranis, the Celtic Mars, dominated thepantheon of the Celts. In war the Gauls wereknown for their furor, to use the term employedby the Romans. For Strabo, the most reco-gnized trait of the entire Gallic race is that ofbeing irritable and mad for war . The Gallicfuror had nothing to do with barbarism; rather,it corresponded to an ideology of being beside oneself with a strong religious conno-tation. The Gallic warrior renounced his indi-viduality and placed his personal destiny inparentheses, linking it to that of his leader tillvictory or death. Here we see an ideologyclose to that of the devotio of the Romans.Death in combat was always glorious, a sacri-fice always preferable to the dishonor of cap-ture or, even worse, enslavement.

In the evolution of the art of war amongthe Gauls, the appearance of the civiliza-tion of the oppida (fortified towns or stron-gholds) at the end of the second centuryB.C. marks an important change. Underpressure from the Romans, who had conque-red southern Gaul, and the Cimbri and theTeutones, who had ravaged their territo-ries, the Gauls constructed numerous stron-gholds equipped with the famous murusgallicus, thereby establishing refuges thatwere often impregnable. Thenceforth, warswere envisaged as events within the contextof a longer period of time as the Gauls tur-ned toward more defensive strategies forwhich fortifications became essential.

Diplomacy andcollaboration

Central to Caesars military campaignswas the primary role held by diplomacy.Had they lacked allies within independent

49

ART OF WAR

Legions. Three of these legions were basedat Aquileia and the fourth was probablystationed in Roman Gaul, near Narbo. TheX Legion, consisting of more battle-harde-ned veterans, was considered the elite unitof Caesars army, and he would place spe-cial confidence in it from the very first ope-rations of the campaign. In 58 B.C. the pro-consul recruited two new units at his ownexpense in Cisalpine Gaul, the XI and XIILegions. With about 5,000 men per legion,his initial army thus contained about 30,000men, to whom must be added several unitsof auxiliaries: Cretan archers, Balearic slin-gers, Numidian light infantry, and Romanor Gallic cavalry (from allied tribes). In 57B.C., two more legions were recruited inCisalpine Gaul: the XIII and XIV Legions.Partly to make up for his losses and partlyto increase his forces, Caesar made furtherrecruitments in 53 B.C. Furthermore, heraised another new legion, the XV, and bor-rowed the I Legion from Pompey, bringinghis armys total effectives to ten legions.

head of auxiliary cavalry contingents fromtheir tribes. Caesar had utilized Aeduanauxiliaries in one way or another startingin the very first campaign year. Contingentsfrom other tribes later accompanied himin his operations against the Germans andduring the expeditions to Britain. Speakinggenerally, we may conclude that strugglesfor influence, the allegiance of some tribesto Rome, and diplomatic intrigues dulledthe warlike spirit of Gaul and contributedin a decisive way to its conquest by Cae-sar.

The Gallic War: asimple military walkin the park ?

Unlike Gallic armies, after Marius reformsthe Roman army had become a genuinestanding army, with professional soldierssigned up, as a rule, for twenty years ser-vice. In 59 B.C. Julius Caesar had at his dis-posal only four legions attached to his pro-consular province: the VII, VIII, IX and X

Finally, in 52 B.C. he raised twenty cohortsof conscripts in Cisalpine and TransalpineGaul to oppose the great rebellion inspi-red by Vercingetorix; these later becamethe V and VI Legions. After the Aedui defec-ted, he reinforced his cavalry with Germanmercenaries at the start of the summer of52 B.C. In that decisive year the proconsulthus had at his disposal about 70,000 menin an army made up of twelve legions, plussome contingents of light infantry and aboveall the fearsome German cavalry that hehad recently recruited. In addition, the num-ber of servants and slaves following thearmy was at least as large as that of thecombatants.

With this army, Caesar had at his dispo-sal a magificent instrument. At Rome, farfrom the combat zones, there was neveror almost neverany anxiety over the out-come of the war. In fact, it was only in 58B.C. that the Senate and Roman citizensshowed some slight apprehension over theoutcome of events. The Helvetian migra-tion and the incursion into Gaul by Ario-vistus and the Suevi, both occuring thatyear, reminded them of the bad old dayswhen the Cimbri and the Teutones reachedthe very gates of Italy exactly forty yearsearlier. After the two difficult but decisivevictories gained by Caesar over the courseof his first campaign in Gaul, Roman publicopinion tended to consider the war beingwaged by Caesar as a fascinating expedi-tion, but one with little military risk. In 54B.C., when the orator Cicero wrote to hisbrother serving in Caesars army, he expres-sed anxiety over natural conditions butnever over the fighting involved: Whatpleasure your letter from Britain has givenme! I was anxious about the Ocean; I wasanxious about the coast of the island. Itisnt that I consider the rest negligeable,but there I find more reasons for hope thanfor fear. In 52 B.C., the great revolt ofVercingetorix caused genuine stupefactionin Rome: by then nobody thought that anykind of setback for Caesars legions waspossible. So, then, was this war a mere mat-ter of a military walk in the park for Rome?As a matter of fact, when the number ofmajor battles and sieges conducted by theRoman army is tallied, it becomes evidentthat they were relatively few in number:hardly thirty at most.

In 58 B.C a battle took place on the leftbank of the Sane, followed by combatswith the rear guard on the right bank, thegreat battle against the Helvetii and thedecisive victory against Ariovistus and hisGermans: in all, only two major battles. Theyear 57 B.C. was busier, with five majormilitary episodes: the sieges of Noviodu-num and Atuatuca, the battles on the Aisneand the Sambre against the Belgae, andfinally the fighting outside Bibrax. The year56 B.C. had the same degree of intensity,but with fewer major battles: the fightingat Octodurus (Martigny), the naval battleagainst the Veneti, the campaign of Publius

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Gallic warrior restingon his sword (19th

century German colorlithograph). The Gallic

infantry was numerous and relatively well

equipped. It fought in tribal

contingents which,however, lacked

cohesion when theyhad to face theRoman military

machine and its pro-fessional organization

Bridgeman.

57-56 B.C., when a legion was detachedfor an independent mission and found itselfin great danger: Servius Sulpicius Galba,sent into Switzerland (Helvetia), was dri-ven out by the inhabitants of Octodurus(Martigny) and the tribes of that region (theVeragri and the Seduni). Galba had to retreatand go into winter quarters among the Allo-broges, inside the boundary of the RomanProvince. The XII Legion thus lost controlof an important line of communicationthrough the Alps. At the end of that sameyear, after his triumph over the Veneti Cae-sar moved against the Menapii in the northof Gaul. This time he was confronted withan unexpected problem: the Gauls refu-sed to fight, and fell back into their swampsand forests. The proconsul decided to cutdown their forests, but he had to abandonthat effort due to lack of time, upon theonset of winter.

The most serious Roman setback occur-red at the end of 54 B.C. After his secondexpedition to Britain, Caesar installed hislegions in seven winter camps, distributedacross the whole of Belgic Gaul, which hewanted to divide up into sections so as to

keep it under tighter control. The Eburo-nes launched a rebellion, probably at theend of October, and marched against themost isolated Roman camp, which wassituated in their territory. Their king, Ambio-rix, was able to induce the legates Sabinusand Cotta to leave their camp, where theyhad fifteen cohorts, by promising to letthem march to either of the nearest Romancamps, those of Labienus and QuintusCicero, which were located farther south.This, however, was a trap. The Eburonesattacked and surrounded the legionarieswhile they were on the march, and all fif-teen cohorts were massacred.

Q. Cicero, whose camp was in the terri-tory of the Nervii, would be luckier. Thistime the legate refused to quit his camp,and the assailants, lacking siege equipment,

Crassus in Aquitania, that of Labienus againstthe Treveri, and finally Sabinus campaignin the Cotentin peninsula. With the year55 B.C. we come to a very calm period,with just three minor episodes: the surpriseattack on the German camp, the crossingof the Rhine (without provoking any bat-tles on the right bank) and the clash withthe Britons on the occasion of the first lan-ding upon their island. In 54 B.C. there wasrenewed warfare, with five notable events:two combats in Britain, the attack of theEburones and their allies upon the campof Sabinus and Cotta, then the attack uponCiceros camp, and finally that of the Tre-veri upon Labienus camp. All these attackswere concentrated in the winter season sothat the Romans mobility would be limi-ted. In 53 B.C., the only notable event wasthe German attack on the camp of Atua-tuca, protected by Cicero. The remainingoperations consisted solely of punitive expe-ditions waged by the Romans. The first sixyears of the war thus saw only twenty signi-ficant engagements among Gauls, Britons,Germans and Romans. In comparison, theyear 52 B.C., that of the great revolt led byVercingetorix, was especially intense, withnine major battles or sieges in a single year:the capture of Vellaudunum, that of Cena-bum, that of Noviodunum of the Bituriges,the siege and destruction of Avaricum, Cae-sars battle at Gergovia, the battle won byLabienus at Lutetia, and the cavalry battlepreliminary to the siege of Alesia and thefighting around that town. The Romans fini-shed the conflict in 51 B.C., conductingonly four operations: an expedition againstthe Bellovaci, a campaign against the Tre-veri, the victory over Dumnacus, and finallythe siege of Uxellodunum.

This list of major military operations ofthe Gallic War allows us to conclude thatit was a war of only moderate intensity,without any major battles between 57 and52 B.C. (except for the naval battle againstthe Veneti). With the Helvetii and the Bel-gae vanquished, the legions met with nogenuinely dangerous opposition before 52B.C. The Belgic tribes were by far the mostwarlike, as Caesar himself indicates. Theyregulary practiced the art of war, and theyopposed trade and the fruits of civilization.To sum up, the Gallic War was characteri-zed more by pacification operations andby fighting on a small scale than by majorbattles, which were relatively rare. As forthe hazards encountered by the Romansoldiers, these were minor, as is proved bythe very low number of reverses they expe-rienced in eight years of conflict.

The rare Romanmissteps

Roman military superiority was so mar-ked that it led quite naturally to a certaindegree of overconfidence. On several occa-sions Caesar underestimated his adversa-ries ability to react, and it was at thesetimes that he suffered his rare reverses. Thefirst of these occurred during the winter of

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Above. Gallic cavalryman (19th century Italianengraving). Caesar used Gallic cavalry as auxilia-ries in his army even when opposing other Gauls,during the greater part of the Gallic War. In 52B.C., the general revolt of the Gallic tribes depri-ved him of these precious mounted troops, andhe had to call upon Germanic mercenaries.Bridgeman.

soon had to give up their plan, for they lear-ned that Caesar was approaching with twolegions to reinforce him. The following year,after he had begun a new punitive cam-paign against the Nervii and Ambio-rix, Caesar again had to dividehis army so as to trap hiselusive adversaries. Heleft his baggage atAtuatuca, with asingle legioncommandedby Q. Ciceroto guard it.The brotherof theauthor ofthe De ReP u b l i c ao n c em o r efound him-self assai-led bynumerousrebel l iousGauls andG e r m a n s ,especially theSugambri.Thistime, Cicero erredthrough imprudenceand barely escaped,losing five cohorts of recruits,or close to 2,000 legionaries.Meanwhile, Caesar for his part engaged insystematic destruction according to theprinciples of guerrilla warfare, but he didnot succeed in capturing Ambiorix. In all,between 58 and 53 B.C. Caesar lost theequivalent of two legions, always in thesame circumstances: numerically superiorrebels attacked isolated camps. In eachcase, the Gauls gained a temporary advan-tage by using their mobility to get the jumpon the proconsul. And in each case, theRomans returned in force to crush the regionthat was in revolt.

Another significant Roman check occur-red at Gergovia in 52 B.C. During the rathercomplex course of this battle of investmentagainst the oppidum of the Arverni, Cae-sar launched an assault to try to take controlof the high ground near the town. Part ofhis infantry, overconfident of its strengthand carried away by the lure of booty, incau-tiously assaulted the town. This unexpec-ted attack, hampered by lack of coordina-tion and planning, as well as by the defen-ding Gauls energetic resistence, resultedin the Roman legionaries suffering a bloodyreverse. Only the solid defensive positionestablished by the X Legion halted the routwhich ensued. Once again Caesars vete-rans had bailed him out. Nevertheless, theRomans lost 700 men and, worst of all, 46centurions, who always fought at the headof their troops. This loss was only equiva-lent to two cohorts, or less than two per-cent of Caesars effectives, but in this casethe psychological effect was more impor-

tant. The Gauls saw it as their first great vic-tory in an actual battle, rather than anambush.

A legion oncampaign: the

VIII Legion inGaul

To have an idea ofthe real intensity

of the Gallic War,it is interestingto follow inthe footstepsof one ofthe Romanl e g i o n sover thew h o l edurationof theconf lict.For this, itseems pre-ferable not

to choosethe armys

elite X Legion,which played a

specific role bothon the ground and

in Julius Caesars wri-tings. Let us consider,

then, the case of the VIIILegion, which was one of the four

legions employed in Gaul by the proconsulfrom the very start of operations.

Caesar took command of the VIII Legionat Aquileia in Cisalpine Gaul in mid-Marchof 58 B.C. Two other legions joined it aroundthat city before leaving for independentGaul. These were the VII and IX Legions.The X Legion was already at Geneva. In 58B.C., the VIII Legion participated activelyin Caesars first victories, over the Helvetiiand over Ariovistus Germans. It went intowinter quarters with the other legions ofthe army among the Sequani. Labienusassumed command of the troops duringthe winter of 58-57 B.C. while Caesar retur-ned to the province of Cisalpine Gaul.

The year 57 B.C. was without a doubtone of the most difficult for the VIII Legion,which fought in the two pitched battles ofthe campaign against the Belgae. The firsttook place beside the Aisne River and endedin a fairly easy victory. The second battlesaw the Romans opposed by the Nervii,Viromandui and Atrebates near a streamCaesar calls the Sabis (probably the Sam-bre River). The VIII Legion was deployedin the center of the army and was pairedwith a legion of new recruits (the XI Legion).Opposed by Viromandui warriors, the legio-naries of the VIII Legion pushed the Gaulsback to the bank of the stream after fiercefighting, and finished by massacring them.Somewhat later that same year, the VIIILegion was part of the force which suc-cessfully besieged Atuatuca, the oppidum

of the Atuatuci. The Bellum Gallicum givesno precise indications for determining whe-ther the VIII Legion spent the followingwinter with the group of units stationedamong the Belgae or with the group sentto the banks of the Loire River. For the years56-53 B.C., Caesars writings do not men-tion the VIII Legion by name, indicatingthereby the reduced intensity of the figh-ting. The VIII doubtless participated in theArmorican campaign and then the variouspacification operations which were thetype of activities Roman legionaries nor-mally engaged in.

With the year 52 B.C., the VIII Legionreturned to major campaigning. In mid-January, the dead of winter, it left Transal-pine Gaul and crossed the snow-coveredCvennes to ravage the territory of theArverni. The VIII Legion then returned toVienna (modern Vienne, France) to jointhe rest of the army in the territory of theSenones. Caesar then led forth his armyand captured Vellaunodunum, Cenabum,Noviodunum and Avaricum. From the oppi-dum of the Bituriges, which was the last ofthese strongholds to fall into Roman hands,the VIII Legion went on to Gergovia alongwith the other legions. During one episodeof the assault, the centurions of the VIIItook ill-judged risks with their legion, andbefore Caesar sounded the retreat the cen-turion Lucius Fabius, who ardently wantedto be the first to set foot on the rampartsof the oppidum, led forward his centuryand got three of his legionaries to hoist himup onto the wall. While he was doing this,another centurion, Marcus Petronius, andhis men were engaged in attacking thetowns gates. But the VIII Legion was sooncut off from the rest of the army, which hadcomplied with Caesars order to fall back.Partly isolated, the two centurions met aheroic death. It required the interventionof the X and XIII Legions to disengage theVIII, which had suffered most of the Romanlosses in the battle of Gergovia (see above).

Bolstered by new recruits, the VIII Legionlater participated in the siege of Alesiawithout distinguishing itself above the ordi-nary. In 51 B.C., the VIII Legion carried outpacification operations against the Atreba-tes. After eight years of campaigning inGaul, the VIII Legion acquired the nameof Legio VIII Gallica and the reputation ofgreat merit, along with Caesars other threeveteran legions. The reverse at Gergoviawas soon forgotten, and the confidenceaccorded to the VIII Legion during thecourse of the Civil War that followed theGallic War was clearly that of a unit linkedto its leader by indissoluble bonds.

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52

Bust of Julius Caesar. General, politician, diplo-mat, organizer and leader of men of the highestcaliber, Caesar appears as the most emblematicRoman of his epoch. His intelligence and his abili-ties as an organizer allowed him to deal with themany complexities involved in so vast a project asthe conquest of the long-haired Gauls .Bridgeman.

ART OF WAR

53

peoples which put up the greatest resis-tance. The Atuatuci, once they were van-quished, were sold at auction in a singlelot. He later subjected the Veneti to thesame fate. After his victory at Alesia, Cae-sar gave a slave to each legionary, meaningthat not less than 70,000 Gallic men weregiven to deserving soldiers in the Romanarmy as a bonus in addition to their pay.The latter hastened to resell their slaves tothe merchants who followed the army, soas to transform this gift of Caesar intoliquid cash. During the Gallic War as awhole the estimated number of Gauls ensla-ved by Caesar and carried off to Italy or toother provinces approached the total ofone million! From an economic point ofview, this massive influx into the servileworkforce would have decisive consequen-ces for the transformation of the expiringRepublic, detaching it permanently fromits traditional structures. o

Translation Stephen Neuville

The war and thecivilians

Numerous aspects made the Gallic Wara conflict during whose course the civilianpopulation was heavily impacted by events.Organized pillaging occupied the first rankamong actions by soldiers that had a directimpact on non-combatants. Even beforethe advent of the Roman legions, the Hel-vetii ravaged and pillaged the territory ofthe Aedui. They did so with a clearconscience, because the Aedui were rightlyaccounted allies of Rome. Whether doneby Gauls or Romans, this pillaging resultedin both destruction and thievery; the sol-diers hauled off everything valuable thatthey could carry.

As the Gallic War progressed, pillaginggrew ever more systematic, sometimesbecoming an overall strategy. When Cae-sar wanted to get rid of Ambiorix, the indo-mitable leader of the Eburones, he deci-ded to turn that tribes territory into a des-ert and destroy everything in itpeople,houses, and livestockand thereby pay hisadversary back for all the trouble he hadcaused him. Even when leaders did notdirectly order it, pillaging could sometimesbe the work of soldiers looking for provi-sions: legionaries were free to plunderenemy territory as much as they liked. Inthe end, destruction with the same effectas pillaging took a new turn when Vercin-getorix decided in 52 B.C. to fight theRomans by employing a scorched-earthpolicy.

In connection with pillaging, it should bepointed out that to conquering soldiersanything was allowed. Hence the GallicWar became the theater of rape and occa-sional assassinations, and these occuren-ces were not usually mentioned by authorsof the period since they were not conside-red worthy of mention. However, whenCaesar narrates the fighting at Gergoviahe mentions that at one point the Gallicwomen, thinking all was lost, partially dis-robed and in some cases were loweredfrom the wall and surrendered to the sol-diers ; they were hoping somehow to subs-titute being raped for being killed.

Another consequence of the war for civi-lians was that in many cases their statuschanged from being free to being hosta-ges or slaves. Caesar made systematic useof the practice of taking hostages in orderto guarantee peace and the continued sub-mission of conquered tribes. This was indeeda very widespread practice throughout anti-quity, and the Romans merely employedit on a grand scale in Gaul. As a rule Cae-sar treated his hostages very well, unlikeAriovistus, who apparently threatened tosubject his Gallic hostages to brutal tortureif even his smallest wishes were not gran-ted. The fate of Gauls who were reducedto slavery was obviously even worse. Cae-sar was usually magnanimous in victory,reserving reduction to slavery for those

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2008-2010Plutarque, Vies des hommes illustres, vies

dAlexandre et de Csar, Les Belles Lettres,2003

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Books 1990Christian Goudineau, Csar et la Gaule,

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dicte de lEmpereur), Prcis des guerres deCsar, Gosselin Libraire-diteur 1836

Jos Ignacio Lago, Las Campaas de JulioCsar, Almena 2004

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Above. A fight during one of the numerous siegesof the war . Litography of Joliet. DR