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BEYOND MERE SYMBOLISM: SYMBOLIC POWER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLITICS

Dr Matthew Eagleton-Pierce Lecturer in International Political Economy

SOAS, University of London m.eagleton-pierce@soas.ac.uk

PAPER FOR

Sociological Inquiries into International Law Workshop London School of Economics

16-17 May 2014

Questions of power are necessarily at the centre of the world economy and no account of capitalist practices can afford to avoid at least an acknowledgment of the concept. This is particularly true when studying the politics of international trade and the main multilateral institutional regulator, the World Trade Organization (WTO). A closer analysis of power can help us to understand why the structures and rules of the trading regime take their historical forms, how the actions of agents are either enabled or disabled, and what distributional outcomes are achieved. According to the conventional sense, among other manifestations, power may be at work when one country denies market access to another, or by indirect control over the procedures of the WTO, or by shaping the norms of the trading game. The WTO diplomatic environment, particularly in the period before Doha Round fatigue set in, was often coloured by prominent struggles over power. To invoke one metaphor, the fist on the negotiating table was often present, particularly in the context of divisions between Northern and Southern countries. Derived from my recent book (Eagleton-Pierce 2013), I argue in this paper that such representations of power provide, as starting points, necessary conceptual insights to aid our understanding of WTO history. However, my argument also seeks to go beyond these common International Political Economy (IPE) analytical foundations to uncover other important, but neglected, faces of power. In doing so, to borrow the conceptual vocabulary of Barnett and Duvall (2005), this paper begins by asking what are the limits of the compulsory and institutional senses of power for explaining WTO

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talks? Rooted in a materialist and positivist epistemology that has tended to emphasize the study of overt, decision-making actions, I suggest that the notion of compulsory power neglects how the efficacy of legitimate authority often rests upon other sources and practices. Indeed, the very choice to deploy a strategy of compulsory power is often bound up with deliberation over its anticipated effects on the ‘reputation’ or ‘image’ of the aggressor, implying that even the most coercive acts of economic domination are situated within an unstable social environment. At the same time, with an empirical focus on the WTO, my argument is attentive to how power relations are clearly mediated through institutional mechanisms and norms. Yet the analysis here also seeks to rethink the notion of institutional power through a sharper focus on political legitimation and, in particular, how the struggle over WTO agendas is a product of substantial incorporated labour that may be more subtle, disguised, or ‘underhand’ than conventionally depicted in the principal literature. In response to these lacunas, this paper offers a fresh approach for imagining, plotting and understanding the movements of power in this particular policy domain of capitalism. For any power in the international economy to survive and prosper, it needs to be supported by schemes of justification which, in recent decades, have tended to take on more elaborate forms. How these depictions of legitimacy are socially constructed and contested makes up a symbolic face of power, one that is attentive to how political and legal languages, as key symbolic systems, both reflect and constitute power. The idea of symbolic power is adapted from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, a key twentieth century sociologist who is widely cited in the social sciences, but has so far received very little attention within IPE. The larger motivation for adopting this approach is not to downplay or discard the analysis of economic forces but, on the contrary, to use an enlarged sociological lense to better understand why and how the political economy of the WTO takes its objectified forms. Elements of symbolic power, including those struggles over agenda setting classifications that shape the scope for bargaining and group-making, are not neutral resources, but unevenly distributed, historical instruments of cognitive construction. There are two sections. First, I outline the central strengths and drawbacks of compulsory power and institutional power as analytical tools. Brief examples are adopted from the WTO context to illuminate my larger claims. Second, the argument explains in more detail the conceptual content of Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power and what insights he can offer scholars of trade politics. 1. POWER ANALYSIS AND THE WTO SYSTEM: CONCEPTUAL

DEPARTURES Power matters in the political economy of global trade. A closer unpacking of power can help us to better explain why the rules of transnational commerce take their existing forms, how the movements of particular entities (states, firms and other producers) are configured, and what distributional outcomes are realised. In the shadow of earlier postwar debates in political science and sociology, the concept of power in the study of trade has tended to gravitate around compulsory and institutional senses, to adopt the labeling of Barnett and Duvall (2005). This section briefly uncovers how to theorise the WTO system in light of these two conventional notions. By way of a bridge to the next section, it also offers a series of conceptual

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cautions and criticisms on the limitations of compulsory and institutional dimensions of power. In my opinion, these notions are not invalid for scholarly analysis of the WTO system or trade politics more broadly but, rather, come attached with certain blindspots that, if allowed to govern our analytical vision, could marginalise the emergence of more critical views on the nexus between power and legitimation. The first meaning is the coercive or command view of power. As captured by Robert Dahl’s (1957, 1961) analysis in the context of the behavioural revolution, this agent-centric vision of power – the capability of actor A to force actor B to yield to its wishes – has historically been read as the most ‘fundamental’ or ‘intuitive’ sense of power. Unsurprisingly, it is a conceptualisation that has strongly informed academic analysis of the making of the WTO system, not only when scholars appeal directly to ‘power’ as a term, but also implicitly through numerous others references, such as the common dichotomy between ‘power’ versus ‘rules’.1 There is no question that we need this notion of power in order to unpick the forces of materialism, including those more aggressive instances of trade diplomacy. Coercion ‘works’ in trade relations, in the sense that policy actions that merit the term repeatedly appear and generate consequences that need explaining. Thus, historically, researchers in IPE and economics have read the US and the EU (or Britain in a previous era) as the ‘trade hegemons’ because they can adjust the preferences of the less powerful through a gamut of ways, such as by rewarding others with market access in return for policy changes, by offering side payments to break oppositional coalitions that stand in their way, by threatening to legalise a political dispute, or by intimating and charging that political sympathy will not be forthcoming in other issue areas (Krasner, 1976; Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg, 2006; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007; Jones, 2010). For those who are privileged, the political tools of compulsory power are many, even down to physically exhausting other trade representatives thorough marathon negotiating sessions at WTO ministerials (Jawara and Kwa, 2004). However, I argue that the notion of compulsory power, while always necessary, is nevertheless analytically limited in regards to what political action it spotlights. Two major problems expose the concept to further scrutiny. First, there is a concern surrounding how the notion is associated with the idea of domination and the agency that actors are presumed to hold. It is often used to define power relations as being relatively pervasive or resilient to change. Yet, if taken too far, such thinking can risk caricaturing the power of the powerful as omnipresent or impregnable. It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that the forces of compulsory power flow in a uni-directional manner from the North to the South, or that all Southern countries have experienced the effects of such compulsory techniques to the same degree. Part of the challenge of understanding power lies in inspecting its presumed durability, a point which is obvious given the economic transformation of countries like China. Second, paralleling the critique of Dahl that emerged from the 1960s (Bachrach and Baratz,

1 In the wider study of international trade, there is a tradition of this type of thinking. For relevant economic historians, see Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945); and Jacob Viner, ‘Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, World Politics, 1 (1948), 1, 1-29. In modern legal scholarship on trade, the distinction between ‘law’ and ‘power’ can be traced to John Jackson, ‘The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System’, Journal of World Trade Law, 12 (1978), 93–106. The same characterisation appears in John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

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1962, 1970; Lukes, 2005), one needs to problematise the representation of conflict within trading relations. Part of the instinctive appeal of the notion for trade analysts – one which is exaggerated by journalists when they speak of ‘trade wars’ – lies in how it creates the impression of recognisable disputes between adversaries. But is ‘war’ the most appropriate metaphor at all times? To what extent is power exercised through seemingly ‘calmer’ political processes, some of which may operate behind the scenes? Thinking counter-intuitively, could the very exercise of compulsory power, including an evaluation of its effectiveness, depend upon the utilisation of other forms of power? In short, my argument is that if one interprets power only in this sense of domination or conflict, there exists a risk of missing other signs of power that could be crucial for explaining the struggle over the political economy of commercial exchange. If the notion of compulsory power alerts us to direct methods of control, then the idea of institutional power points to the indirect means through which organisations ‘mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 51). Power can thus be seen in the formation, consolidation, and weakening of international institutions, of which the WTO represents a pertinent illustration. Institutional power can also be distinguished from compulsory power on two other grounds. First, when A and B operate at a distance, either spatially or temporally, it brings into focus not only immediate decision-making, but also ‘non-decision-making’; that is, those dominant rules or values that work to ‘effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 641). Such an idea is important for it indicates how, depending upon the circumstances, it may be possible for an actor to defend their interests without resorting to an exercise of compulsory power or, alternatively, that non-decision-making could serve as a prelude before the deployment of compulsory power. Second, the concept of institutional power also sheds light on some basic questions of legitimacy in the management of power relations. For instance, as Andrew Hurrell (2005: 34) notes, in the tradition of neoliberal institutionalism in IR and IPE, theorists have sought to address who gains how much from cooperative action, including assessing ‘the impact of numbers, of alliance patterns and cooperative clusters, and the extent to which unequal gains can alter power relationships and be plausibly turned into actual strategic advantage’. My caution regarding institutional power is not that the notion is inherently flawed but, rather, that is often does not go far enough. Any account of WTO negotiations will inevitably be preoccupied with institutional relations, including examining how different political agents vie to shape the rules, codes and decision-making practices of the organisation. In its basic form, institutional power can also point to the competition and collaboration between governments and other entities that could have a stake in trade politics, such as civil society groups. Nevertheless, the concept, as conventionally understood, also has limitations, particularly when compared to the notion of symbolic power. Perhaps most significantly from my perspective, although institutional power does thinly note the question of legitimacy, the concept is less useful for explicating the manifold ways in which language is intertwined with power within organisational settings. It is this richer, sociological sense of legitimation processes that Bourdieu’s conceptual tools aim to address, which I will now turn to.

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2. UNMASKING THE SYMBOLIC FACE OF POWER In the broader study of world politics, the potential utility of Bourdieu as a theoretical inspiration has sparked increased interest in recent years, mirroring the appropriation of his ideas elsewhere in the social sciences. Bourdieu has been framed in light of the so-called ‘practice turn’ in IR which has sought to conceive of political action in ways not captured by purposeful instrumental rationality (logic of consequences), norms (logic of appropriateness), or communicative action (logic of arguing) (Pouliot, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 2011). This interest has been particularly strong among scholars who address the politics of international security and diplomacy.2 Indeed, the extent to which Bourdieu has now ‘made it’ in IR can be illustrated by special volumes dedicated to analysing his work and how it can inform international political explanations (Adler-Nissen, 2012; International Political Sociology special issue, 2011). However, notwithstanding these developments, so far at least, Bourdieu’s concepts have rarely been used for enhancing our understanding of the politics of the world economy, a neglect that this paper aims to address (the limited exceptions being Hattori, 2001; Leander, 2002; and Pop, 2007). The application of the conceptual framework of symbolic power to the specific study of the WTO system is certainly not an automatic move, especially in a literature that has been strongly shaped by positivist epistemologies that have tended to ignore practices of political socialisation. But I argue that Bourdieu’s ideas do have merit and, coupled with a sense of the benefits and drawbacks of conventional notions of power, can enrich our understanding of political conduct within this particular institution. Bourdieu was a polyglot who studied philosophy, taught himself anthropology, before developing a significant corpus of sociological research. Rather than rigidly impose his concepts, he is treated here as an intellectual stimulus, not a prophet. A perspective on symbolic power brings forward a series of sub-concepts. With an eye on relational analysis, these ‘thinking tools’ work together to form a larger theoretical design. In essence, with brevity that potentially does violence to Bourdieu’s imagination, symbolic power offers a way to conceptualise how existing forms of power acquire legitimacy or, as he would put it, pass as (mis)recognised. It

2 In this vein, Didier Bigo’s work has been the most impressive for its theoretical sophistication and empirical labour. For a summary, see Didier Bigo, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power’, International Political Sociology, 5 (2011), 3, 225-258, as well as Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). Overlapping with IR, and informed by Bourdieu’s conceptual tools, Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth have written absorbing studies of how economists and lawyers construct transnational fields of expertise. See in particular their, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Elsewhere in IR, see the work of Iver B. Neumann, including ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31 (2002), 3, 627-651; and At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Also see Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu, the “Cultural Turn” and the Practice of International History’, Review of International Studies 34 (2008), 1, 155-181. However, single-authored book length investigations that are strongly imbued with Bourdieusian terminology are still rare. The exceptions being Michael Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007); Frédéric Mérand, European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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places particular attention on how language, as a preeminent (although not the only) symbolic system, both reflects and constitutes power, to the extent that the notion of power is considered intertwined with the idea of legitimation (Bourdieu, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1987a, 1987b, 1989, 1991, 1997).3 There are three major contributions of this perspective to the study of WTO political economy, with potential implications for IPE theory in general. First, such a framework offers new objects for investigation that are either discounted or underplayed in common debates on power in WTO politics. Against the compulsory power vision, which tends to treat language either as some ‘ephemeral’ feature of diplomatic tussles or as the dry preoccupation of lawyers, the idea of symbolic power can be deployed to explore the properties of the ‘linguistic market’, a Bourdieu expression for a bounded social space where only certain arguments acquire legitimacy. For the author of Distinction (1984), there is a panoply of linguistic methods that may be interlaced with power, but the role of classification systems is particularly important. Inspired by the classical anthropology of Durkheim and Mauss (1903) and the philosophical anthropology of Cassirer (1944), Bourdieu argues that classifications of the social world matter because they may have a determining effect on many practices operating at lower levels of abstraction; indeed, this is often a stated goal. For instance, when applied to the WTO, one can point to many classifications that have a political significance across national institutions and territories, not only in reference to particular trade agreements but also in the form of generic identity categories (such as the taken-for-granted developed/developing/least developed country schema). At the same time, in a further effort to tease out why only certain ideas are legitimate in the linguistic market, Bourdieu uses the twin notions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy to critically probe how the conventional wisdom is framed, rather that to rarify the commonsense as an ordinary state of affairs. Second, once power is understood to flow through language, I argue that the analysis of symbolic power can inform our understanding of core political processes. In terms of participation, a Bourdieusian approach works against the standard view of power as a scarce resource marshalled by an elite population. In contrast, he points to the diffuse, everyday practices of justificatory claim-making which shape definitions of political practices and yet, crucially, are often not read as expressions of power (as historically defined). In other words, symbolic power is a kind of ‘denied’ power in which the explicit declaration of self-interest is downplayed. This does not mean that privileged players are incapable of wielding such power in an intentional way (à la rational choice); rather, Bourdieu seeks to reveal how many practices would not be sustainable if they appeared to emanate from the pursuit of pure self-interest. Thus, agents need to cultivate symbolic power in order to insulate themselves from criticism. Such insights have consequences for how we plot change in WTO talks, including enriching the analysis of coalitions (Narlikar and Tussie 2004) and the links between language and political mobilisation (Wilkinson 2008). In respect to agenda setting, Bourdieu’s concepts shed new light on old problems. Particularly relevant for the WTO context are the ties he draws between law, politics and methods of institutionalisation. Law itself is symbolic power par excellence, a monumental body 3 The notion of symbolic power in international politics could also be imagined through non-linguistic forms, including religious symbolic depictions or artistic representations. For instance, on the UN’s use of blue helmets as a communication sign in combat zones, see Ian Hurd, After Hegemony: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

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of knowledge that works to publically codify particular interests into the universal (Bourdieu 1987a). Such a point is admittedly captured in some uses of the institutional power notion or in wider constructivist theorising that has traced the legal legitimacy of WTO rules and norms (Lang 2006, 2011). Again, however, the symbolic power framework can be distinguished by how deeply the politics of law are dissected, uncovering not only how interests are defended and distorted through law, but also via more subtle euphemisms and sleights of hand (Bourdieu, 1979, 1987a). Third, and related, it may appear that the competition over symbolic power, centred in my case on the attractive banks of Lake Geneva, acquires a certain autonomy from the material world it supposedly represents. The trade policy game seems to turn upon itself, with players engrossed in the chips and prizes that they have intersubjectively valued. But this depiction is only partially correct. The stakes for controlling symbolic power in the world economy are high because they shape the configuration and stabilisation of particular material interests. For instance, as other authors have argued, the GATT Uruguay Round settlement, which gave birth to the WTO, also consecrated legally justifiable rules which protect highly profitable corporate rents (for instance, in the areas of agribusiness and intellectual property, see Clapp, 2012; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Sell 2003; and Deere, 2009). Thus, it should not be surprising that the actors who benefit from such material gains will seek to safeguard and consolidate the outcomes of the Uruguay Round (either in the WTO or other trade forums). In this example, the notion of symbolic power could enter as a conceptual device for examining three core problems: (1) to unmask how the historical genesis of such legal classifications was shaped by particular corporate entities; (2) given the universalisation of these rules and norms, to reveal how major business interests will likely have an upper hand in subsequent trade agendas; and (3) to shed light on how the freedom of actors who are critical of dominant legal framings will be constrained by the classification struggles of the past. In sum, informed by a desire to expose social inequities and against liberal meliorist sensibilities, a Bourdieusian interpretation of materialism aims to uncover the often-elaborate forms of social labour used to conserve and transform capital. The call by Bourdieu for an expanded definition of political and economic interest – ranging from calculating strategies to masked or even unconscious practices – also matters for addressing the relationship between compulsory power and symbolic power. On this point, let me stress how I seek to advance such a research agenda. In one crucial sense, my argument is not only that a vision of power that is fixated on materialism represents a narrow interpretation but, in addition, how a symbolic power framework can help us to better grasp under what conditions forms of materialism, including coercive acts, acquire added analytical meaning. For instance, actions of compulsory power are sometimes used to deal quickly with a threat that cannot be accomplished by more time-consuming and strenuous processes of symbolic power accumulation. The coercive move may be used to cut short or disfigure a rival process of legitimation, but one would need to examine the content of such symbolic power to understand why compulsory power was being exercised at that point in time. Equally, if following the deployment of compulsory power, a certain actor has a damaged reputation, it may be very necessary for them to rebuild their stock of symbolic power around an issue. Such episodes reveal that coercion is usually rare and expensive because of the fundamental need to appeal to different logics of legitimacy in capitalist relations, an historical trend that has arguably become more pronounced.

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Indeed, because of the importance of protecting symbolic power, the agent who has potential compulsory power may resort to exercising their dictates behind closed doors; that is, away from other audiences who could expose the contradictions and cruelty of such measures. In essence, symbolic power is a different concept in how it allows for the durability and inertia of certain political relations and conditions of (mis)recognition, yet still facilitates scope for examining how agents actively remake the social world through historical tools of cognition. Importantly, the definition of symbolic power cannot be succinctly fixed and applied to all situations but, rather, should be treated here as an ‘open concept’ that acquires meaning through the labour of empirical research. Thus, in conversation with Wacquant, in a point Bourdieu (1992: 96-7) often underscored, concepts are no good unless they are put into action in a ‘systematic fashion’.

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