Brazilian "Tenentismo"

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Brazilian "Tenentismo" Author(s): Robert J. Alexander Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1956), pp. 229-242Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2508666Accessed: 12-05-2015 17:10 UTC

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NOTES AND COMMENT

Brazilian "Tenentismo"

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER*

ONE OF THE notable facts about Latin American politics during the last quarter of a century or more has been the rise of indigenous radical nationalist and reform parties

in a number of countries. The most famous of these is the Aprista movement of Peru, headed by the almost mythical Victor Rauil Haya de la Torre. From this Peruvian party these groups have acquired a generic name-the Aprista parties.

The movement which will be discussed in this article is one of this group. However, the Brazilian "Tenentes" are different fron most of the other Aprista groups. First, the movement had its origins in the army. Second, it never coalesced into a political party, despite the fact that the Tenentes have shared power, when they have not controlled the Brazilian government, since 1930.

In order to understand Tenentismo, one must comprehend the important role of the Brazilian army in the last half century. It was the military who ousted the last emperor and established the Republic; subsequently, the army took very seriously its role as the chief de- fender of the Republic and the supporter of constitutionalism. During the first thirty years after the founding of the Republic the army intervened in politics numerous timnes, and various of its leaders served as president.

The Republic and the army's participation in its affairs did not change the facts of the economy and politics of Brazil, which remained essentially a rural nation, dependent almost completely on one or two crops-principally coffee-for its foreign exchange and its prosperity. The political power remained in the hands of the owners of the vast coffee and sugar fazendas. The presidency tended to rotate between the favorite so5ns of the large states of Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes, none of whom desired or seriously attempted to change the status quo.

However, the first World War brought certain changes. Because the country was cut off from its principal sources of supply for inailu- factured goods-particularly foodstuffs and textiles-factory industry received a tremendous shot in the arm. Manufacturing increased

* The author is a iembelh of the department of economies in Rutgers Univer- sity.


230 HAHR I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDEr, rapidly and with it the middle class and the industrial working class gained in numbers and importance. Both the new middle class and the workers resented the continued domination of the country by the landholding aristocracy. As occurred widely throughout Latin Amer- ica in the post-World War I period, this discontent gave rise to new political developments.

Even before World War I a labor movement had been born in Brazil. In 1909 the first central labor organization, the Confederagao Operaria Brasileira, was established under anarcho-syndicalist influence. During the war the labor movement gained much ground, and there were several important strikes, perhaps the most notable being a walkout of 150,000 textile workers in Rio de Janeiro and other cities in 1919. The governments of the time were not sympathetic to the labor movement; even some years later a leading political figure de- clared that "labor is a problem for the police," a sentiment which was widely shared in ruling circles.'

However, labor and middle class unrest did meet with a certain sympathetic response among the younger officers of the army, most of whom were drawn from the middle class and shared the discontent of these elements.2 The first evidence of this unrest in the army came to light in 1922, when the soldiers of the Copacabaila fortress on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro rose in revolt, led by their junior officers, of whom the principal leaders were Antonio Siqueira Campos aind Eduardo Gomes. This revolt was fairly easily suppressed by loyal elements in the army.

In 1924 a much more serious revolt occurred in the city of Sao Paulo. It wNas led by Major Miguel Costa, Commander of Sao Paulo 's state rnilitia, supported by General Isidoro Dias Lopes, Joaquiin and Juarez Tavora, Eduardo Gomes, Cordeiro de Farias and Joao Alberto, all of whom were junior officers except General Dias Lopes. The rebels captured the city of Sao Paulo and held it for almost a month. As loyal troops gathered outside the city, the forces of Major Costa with- drew and started the long march towards the Iguassu River, in south- western Brazil.

Meanwhile, the regular armny 's battalion of railroad engineers, headed by twenty-six year old Captain Luiz Carlos Prestes, had re- volted in the southernmost state of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, in sympathy with the Sao Paulo rebels. After fighting their way through greatly superior government troops, the Costa and Prestes groups

' Interview with Edgard Leuenroth, one-time secretary general of the Con- federagao Operaria Brasileira, in Sao Paulo, 1946.

2 Virginio Santa Rosa, 0 sentido do tenentismo (Rio de Jaiieiro, 1933), p. 114.


BRAZILIAN 9 TENENTISMO " 231 joined forces somewhere near the niighty Iguassu Falls. The united forces reorganized, with Major Costa as the nominal commander-in- chief and Luiz Carlos Prestes as chief of genleral staff.

This fighting force, which at times dwindled to only a few hundred men, was the famous Prestes Column. It took this name from its second-in-command, who was the military genius of the Column, rather than from its commander-in-chief. In the succeeding three years, it walndered back and forth across Brazil, crossing a majority of Brazil''s states, piercing into several of them over and over again.

The fundamental object of the Prestes Column was to arouse the eivilian population of the backlands against the then dominant regimie3 In this it failed. Almost everywhere it was met by the fierce though ill-directed opposition of the local people, organized into a hastily recruited militia. It never got control of any of the country's major cities and thus made little contact with the labor movement or other discontented elements in the urban communities.4

However, it was not entirely a failure. It built up a "mistica" about the members of the group and particularly around Prestes, which was still a force in Brazilian political life a quarter of a century later. Prestes was greeted by even the hostile press as a military geniius, beinog compared with Napoleon, Caesar and Alexander.5 He was dubbed the "Kinight of Hope" and became virtually a legendary figure. The lesser members of the Column shared in this buildup. They developed an esprit-de-corps and a unity which was to be largely responsible for the Revolution of 1930, and won the respect and loyalty of large elements of the eivilian population, particularly in rural areas.

Those who participated in the activities of the Prestes Column were the mlen who were to dominate the country's political life after the Revolution of 1930. Major Juarez Tavora, leader of the Column's advanee guard, became after 1930 governor of the whole of northeastern Brazil and a power in the political and military life of his country

3 Abugar Bastos, in his biography of Prestes (p. 158) notes that the Column 'attempted, durilng three years, to arouse in the country the flame of revolution, so as to destroy, once and for all, the power of the oligarchs, which dominated all the states of Brazil. With the exception of Maranhao and Piaui, which con- tributed considerable niumbers of volunteers for the Column, the remiiaining regiolns remained quiet and paralyzed, answering not this call."I

4 Jorge Ainado cites (p. 194) an interview which Prestes gave to La Naci6n (Santiago de Chile), which appeared on December 28, 1941. Discussilng the Column, Prestes said, ''What we attempted, principally, wvas to arouse the masses of the interior, shaking them from the apathy in which they were living, indifferent to the fate of the nation, hopeless of any remedy for their difficulties and suf- ferings. I

Abgiiar Bastos, Prestes e a revolugdo social (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), p. 178.


232 HAHR I MAY I BOBERT J. ALEXANDER for several decades. In 1955 he was a canididate for the presidenicy. Joao Alberto chose civilian life after the Column period, but nonethe- less played a key role in post-1930 politics. He held the posts of interventor in the state of Sao Paulo, chief of the federal police, and

unumerous other positions after 1930. Estillac Leal was a leadilng figure in the Vargas regime, was Minister of War in 1951-1952, and became an important spokesmani for strongly nationalist groups in the army in the early 1950 's. Major Manuel Rabelo was a leader in the 1930 Revolution and a leader of the abortive revolution of 1935. Eduardo Gomes became head of the Brazilian airforce, led oppositioll to the Vargas dictatorship in 1944-1945, and was unsuccessful canldi- date for president in 1945 and 1950. Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias also remained in the armed forces, served as interventor of Rio Grande do Sul in the 1940's, and was named Minister of War in place of another ex-tenente, Estillac Leal, in 1952. Numerous other Tenentes played leading parts in their country's destiny after 1930, owing their original prominence to their participation in the fabulous exploits of the Prestes Column.

The Revolution of 1930 was largely the work of the Tenientes. In the election of 1930, the then chief executive, Washilngtol L-uiz, virtually imposed as his successor a former cabinet member, Julio Prestes-no relation to the leader of the famous Coluiin. Julio Prestes's opponent in that contest was Getulio Vargas, thenl governor of Rio Grande do Sul, the famous gaucho state. The idol of his own region, he was widely popular throughout Brazil, but was defeated by the government's vote-gathering and vote-counting machine. After his defeat, Vargas began planning a revolution against President Washington Luiz. In these plans he had the full cooperation of mnost of the Tenentes.

The chief exception was the man who had given his name to the Prestes Column. Luiz Carlos Prestes had been living in Buenos Aires sinee a few months after the famous Column surrelndered to Bolivian authorities early in 1927. There he had fumbled for an ideology. Not satisfied with the vague ideas which had motivated the memnbers of the Column, Prestes sought a more satisfactory and questioln- answering dogma. In Buenos Aires, he came into contact with various left-wing elements in Argentine politics, particularly with Rodolfo Ghioldi, inumber-two man in the Argentine Comnmunist Party. The Comnmunist International, which then had its Latin American head- quarters in Montevideo, sent representatives to the Argentinie capital to try to induce Prestes to join forces with them. The efforts of these Comintern agents were reinforced by special representatives of the


BRAZILIAN " TENENTISMO " 233 Brazilian Communist Party. The Brazilian Trotskyites also attempted to win Prestes to their side.6

But it was the Stalinites who succeeded in winning his allegialnce. In March, 1930, Prestes issued a famous mnanifesto dissociatilng himself from the plans which he knew were then being made by his fellow- Tenentes to bring about a revolt in Brazil. He said that no revolt would be worthwhile unless it had the cooperation of, and was based onl, the urban working classes alnd the peasants. Early in 1931, after the 1930 Revolution had occurred, Prestes made -it clear that he had joined forces with the Communists.7 A few months later he left for Moscow, where he stayed until early 1935, participating in the deter- mination of policy for not only the Brazilian Communists but all of the Communist parties of Latin America.8

Meanwhile, Prestes ' fellow Tenentes had successfully organized the Revolution of 1930. Starting in Rio Grande do Sul, the rebel armies began to march northward, fully expecting a civil war which would last months, if not longer. Other rebel elements under Juarez de Tavora seized control of most of northeastern Brazil. Within a month the military authorities in Rio apparently decided that it was not worth their while to fight, and surrendered. Getulio Vargas then became provisional president, and the Tenentes became important elements in his government. Jorge Amado sums up the position of the Teneentes after the 1930 Revolution thus :9

These were the positions which the "tenentes" had: Juarez a kind of dictatorship of the North and Northeast; Jo0o Alberto, interventor of Sao Paulo, Juraci Magalhaes in Bahia; Jose Americo de Almeida, the miagnificent novel- ist, in the Ministry of Public Works, entering into conflict with the foreign companies, raising the program of "tenentismo" to the level of anti-imperial- ism; Ari Parreiras in the State of Rio; Antenor Navarro in Paraiba; in Maranhao, Reis Perdigao and Father Serra succeeding one another in the government; in Rio Grande do Norte Irineu Jofily, courageous and honest; in Ceara, carrying out a veiry popular government, Colonel Moreira Lima ... in addition others occupied innumerable posts of less importance. They had a large percentage of the power of the country in their hands. They were without doubt the most powerful force in the country at that moment.

However, the Tenentes were iiot successful in working out a con- 6 Interview with Aristides Lobo, the Trotskyite delegated to try to win over

Prestes, in Sao Paulo, June 17, 1953. 7 Bastos gives a detailed account of the evolution of Prestes from Tenente to

Communist in Chapters VI and VII. 8 Interview with Ignaeio Torres Giraldo, one-time secretary general of Com-

munist Party of Colonmbia, and one-time member of the Executive Committee of the Red International of Labor Unions. In Bogota, July 15, 1947.

9 Jorge Amado, Vida de Luis Carlos Prestes (Sao Paulo, undated), p. 235.


234 IIAHR I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDER sistent program or in organizing a Tenentista Party. This was their great tragedy: they could not organize, on a civilian plane, to establish a party which would rally the forces of unrest and discontent with the old regime existent in Brazil at that time. Nor were they able to develop a consistent body of doctrine, such as Haya de la Torre and his friends in Peru evolved during the 1920's.

Their ideas, however, evolved rapidly in the months following the October, 1930 Revolution. During the period of the Prestes Column, and even during the preparation of the 1930 revolt, they had had a simple political program, summed up in the old slogan, "a new broom sweeps clean, " but with little reference to social issues. Once in power, however, they quickly became aware that they must come to grips with social problems.

During the time of the Prestes Column the magazine, "5 de Julho," which spoke for the Column, expressed the ideas of the Revo- lutionaries thus :10

Reasons: financial and economic disorder; exorbitant taxes; administrative dishonesty; lack of justice; perversion of the vote; subornation of the press; political persecution; disrespect for the autonomy of the states; lack of social legislation; reform of the constitution under the state of siege. Ideals: to assure a regime loyal to the republican Constitution; to establish free primary instruction and professional and technical training throughout the country; to assure liberty of thought; to unify justice, putting it under the aegis of the Supreme Court; to unify the treasury; to assure municipal liberty; to castigate the defrauders of the patrimony of the people; to abolish the anomaly whereby professional politicians become prosperous at the expense of the public purse; rigorous economy of public moneys in keeping with effi- cient aid to the economic forces of the country.

This was not in any sense a "socialistic" program. By the out- break of the 1930 Revolution the leaders of the Tenentes had developed somewhat in their thinking on social problems. Thus Juarez Tavora, in arguing against Prestes' endorsement of communist methods early in 1930 says of his former chief's position:

One sees between the lines of his recent manifesto a frank revolt against the injustices of the present bourgeois organization of our society. He is not in agreement with the monstrosity whereby an insignificant minority of bourgeois potentates . . . oppresses the great majority who work and produce.

Tavora agrees with Prestes' indictment of contemporary Brazilian society, saying that he "recognizes the inequity of this order of things under which the proletarian majority labors," but he does not feel that it can be righted by "upsetting the existing order." His pre-

10 Ibid., p. 193.


BRAZILIAN "TENENTISMO 235 scription for the situation was " proportional representationi of all social classes" and some less fundamental changes."

One contemporary Brazilian commentator on Tenentismo, writinlg a few years after the 1930 Revolution, maintained that the Teilente programn in the Revolution was "social democratic" and nioted that it included demands for government recognition of trade unions and cooperatives; labor legislation, including minimum wage alnd maximum hour laws and anti-child labor legislation. The Tenentes also generally favored nationalization of the mines and of foreign trade, and a divisioni of the latifundia, that is, an agrarian reform. They sought, says this writer, a "moderate, petty-bourgeois capitalism. "12

Some of the measures were carried out by the provisional government of Getulio Vargas. Legal recognition-and extensive government control-was extended to the trade union and cooperative movement. Several years later minimum wage and maximum hour laws were passed. There was extensive government intervention in the economy, though little niationalization of the nation 's resources or industries. To this day, there has been no agrarian reform.

However, although some of the things in which the Tenentes believed were enacted after the Revolution of 1930, as a group they were never able to establish a political organization which could assure the orderly eiiactment of the program in which they believed. This failure to establish a Tenente political party was due in part to the fact that they had come to power in alliance with essentially conservative elements, such as Vargas himself, Arturo Bernardes, the old-line Paulista opposition, and other groups; and these conservative elements attempted to play downi as much as possible the role which the Teneiites had played in the 1930 Revolution. Jorge Amado describes this process :13

They began to ridicule the military side of the revolution. Even today the Revolution of '30 appears to many people as a revolution in which the government fled before armies and revolutionary leaders who existed only in their own imagination. . . . They carried on a campaign of ridicule against Juarez Tavora, transforming his victories in the Northeast into more or less pornographic anecdotes. They aroused the masses in Sao Paulo against Joao Alberto, exploiting regional and even separatist sentiments. When Juraci Magalhaes, on the recommendation of Juarez, went to take over as Interven- tor of Bahia, the students, the youth, the masses, who shortly before had applauded, defended and supported the revolutionaries, received him with hostilities, the oligarchy manipulating the crowd and the crowd allowing itself to be manipulated.

Bastos, pp. 231-232. 12 Santa Rosa, p. 114. 1 Amado, p. 238.


236 HAH:I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDER Without any solid political organization among the civilian popu-

lation, the Tenentes were unable to counter this kind of attack. Most of them continued in the armed forces, under military discipline, which implied loyalty to the Vargas regime, and were thus prevented from taking an open part in civilian political activities. After the writing of the Constitution of 1934-which showed the Tenente influenee in its provision for functional representation in Congress- and the election of Vargas as constitutional president, Getulio dismissed most of the remaining Tenentes from the key posts which they had held until that time.14

The failure of the Tenentes to organize and the consequent disper- sion of their forces was thus due, to a very considerable degree, to the skillful opposition of Getulio Vargas, one of the ablest politicians this hemisphere has seen in the twentieth century. Right down to the end of his life, Getulio sueceeded in playing one group of his multitudinous enemies off against another, aligning one group of opponelnts with him temporarily so as to circumvent a second group. Thus, even those Tenentes who, unlike their earlier companions now obedient in the army, turned against him and participated during the next twenty years in various movements of opposition to him were ineffective because they were almost always split among themselves and sooner or later fell victim to the political intriguing of " 0 pae dos pobres. "

In the first months after the 1930 Revolution, several attempts were made by elements among the Tenentes to form an enduring political organization. In Sao Paulo, Joao Alberto, who became interventor after the Revolution, worked more or less closely with a kind of "popular front" formed by dissident communists, anarchists, and other elements active among the workers and lower mniddle class; but no permanent political party emerged from this amalgam.15 In Rio de Janeiro, too, the Tenentes made an effort with the Club 3 de Outubre. This organizatioln, which funetiolled for several years after the 1930 Revolution, was compared by Virginio Santa Rosa to the Jacobin Club of the French Revolution.16 Its secretary was Major Juarez Tavora, and, according to Augusto Machado, "it sought to orient the ilation 's politics. But Getulio with his extraordinary political ability succeeded in transforming it into his own instrument. 'l7

In 1933 the Tenentes of the Club 3 de Outubre attempted to form 14 Ibid., p. 239. 15 Interview with Plinio Mello, leader of the Sao Paulo dissident eolmmunists

in 1930-1931, later Socialist leader. In Sao Paulo, June 16, 1953. 6 Santa Rosa, p. 114.

1 Augusto Machado, Caminho da revolugdo operaria e campesinta (Rio de Janeiro, 1934), p. 90.


BRAZILIAN " TENENTISMO " 9 237 a political party. In a revolutionary congress, sponsored by the Club, the short-lived Partido Socialista Brasileiro was formed.'8 The congress drew up a program which adopted "a general line tending to socialism, subordinate to Brazilian conditions. "19 It proclaimed "unionization and representation of classes in Parliament are the two fundamental theses which we write upon our banner. "20

The five principles of the P.S.B., as set forth in its manifesto, were the following :21

1. Socialism-adapted to the times and the national necessities and traditions. 2. The predominance of the union over the states. 3. The interests of the group above those of the individual. 4. The interests of Brazil above internationalism. 5. All power resting on the wishes of the citizens without any distinctions of

any kind.

This Partido Socialista was short-lived. It sought to gain a foothold in the labor movement through a group known as Accao Trabalhista, but this never struck deep roots.22 The party itself died within a few months.

The Tenente movement began to break up. How far disintegra- tion had gone became obvious in 1934 and 1935 with the organization of the National Liberation Alliance (A.L.N.). The heart of this movement was the Communist Party, of which ex-Tenente Luiz Carlos Prestes became chief after his return from Moscow early in 1935. He was also named honorary president of the A.L.N. which, being a frankly anti-Vargas coalition, now won the support of many ex- Tenentes. These included Major Rabelo, the commander-in-chief of the northeaste'rn military district; General Miguel Costa, Roberto Sisson, Agildo Barrata, and various others.23

It is no surprise that the National Liberation Alliance appealed to the Tenentes. Its program, issued in the middle of 1935, called for agrarian reform, unity of the labor movement, support for the strug- gles of the workers and peasants, the end of the influence of foreign- owned "imperialist" corporations in Brazil, and the repudiation of the country 's foreign-held national debt.24 This program was de-

18 This should not be confused with the present-day Partido Socialista Brasi- leiro, formed in 1947 as a result of the fusion of the post-dictatorship Esquerda Democratica and the group of doctrinaire socialists gathered around the small weekly Vanguardia Socialista.

" Reis Peraigao, Manifesto do partido socialista brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1933), p. 25.

20 Ibid., p. 62. 21 Ibid., p. 63. 22 Machado, p. 91. 23 Amado, p. 250. 24 Bastos, p. 312.


238 HAHR I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDER signed to appeal to both the nationalist and the revolutionary sentiments of the Tenentes. It seemed to give cohesion and doctrinal basis to the amorphous movement to which the young officers had given birth more than a decade before.

However, not all of the Tenentes supported the A.L.N. and the revolution which it made in November, 1935. Tenente stalwarts such as Joao Alberto, Eduardo Gomes, and others remained loyal to Presi- dent Vargas. The November revolt was put down fairly easily after less than a day's fighting in Recife and Rio de Janeiro, and after it was crushed the Tenentes virtually ceased to exist as a cohesive force in Brazilian politics. Symbolic of the dissolution of the movement was the fact that the head of the military tribunal which tried Luiz Carlos Prestes for his participation in the November, 1935 revolt was General Maynard Gomes, an old member of the Prestes ColuMn1.25

A few Tenentes followed Prestes into the Communist Party, but their number was small. Others, such as Miguel Costa, retired from politics. Still others, such as Cordeiro de Farias, Juarez de Tavora, Eduardo Gomes and Estillac Leal, continued in the army. No matter what the members of this last group may have thought of what Vargas was doing, they went along with his attempt in 1937 to convert Brazil ilnto a fascist-patterned corporate state.

Upon the modification of the Vargas dictatorship in 1944, many of the Tenentes returned to activity in the political arena. Genleral Eduardo Gomes, chief of the Brazilian air force, took the lead in organizing the Uniao Democratica Nacional, rallying point for all anti-Vargas forces, which called for ain ending, once and for all, of Getulio's regime. Once Vargas had actually promised elections for December, 1945, the old Tenentes, who by that time domillated the army, used their influenee to make sure that he carried out his promise. When the old Tenente leader Joao Alberto was dismissed as chief of the federal police in October, 1945, in a move apparently designed to postpone the election, the army moved to oust the man they had put into office fifteen years earlier. In the election which followed, Eduardo Gomes, "O Brigadeiro," was a candidate for president, but was defeated by General Eurico Dutra, who appears to have played no role in the Tenente movement.

Gomes was again candidate for the presidency in the 1950 election. This time he was defeated by Vargas hiimself. Several old Tenentes participated in the new government of Getulio. Vargas named as his war minister old Tenente Estillac Leal, whom he removed later, however, on charges of being too lax about infiltration of Communists into

25 Arnado, p. 317.


BRAZILIAN " TENENTISMO" 239 the armed forces. In place of Tenente Estillac Leal, Vargas named Tenente Cordeiro de Farias.

Estillac Leal soon afterwards became the candidate of an extreme nationalist group for president of the Circulo Militar, the officers' club of Rio. Elections in this organization are generally believed to mirror the opinion of the Brazilian officer caste. Hence the importance of this contest. In spite of nation-wide campaign, in which the Communists took more than a small part, Estillac Leal was defeated.

In spite of Leal's defeat, this contest and his dismissal from office which gave rise to it served to highlight the influence of what might be called perverted Tenentismo, which still exists in the ranks of the Brazilian army. It consists of two groups that cooperate for the time being, but may not always do so. One of these elements in a group of extreme Nationalists, who appear to have much influence among the younger officer group. The other consists of those who covertly or openly are sympathetic to the Communist Party.

The older officers, who were the original Tenentes, are for the most part no longer "revolutionary. " Since the death of Vargas they have concerned themselves largely with the defense of "constitutionalism. " However, the fact that they have not completely abandoned the ideals of their youth is demonstrated by the candidacy of Juarez Tavora in the 1955 presidential election campaign and the wide support which he received from the higher ranks of the army.

Whatever influence Tenentismo continues to have in the army, it has still by the middle 1950's failed to organize a civilian political party expressive of its ideas and ideals. And this is the great tragedy, for there has developed a vacuum in Brazilian politics. A relatively small group is loyal to the Communist Party, not as a representative of the old Tenentismo, but rather as a program in its own right. Another much larger group is loyal to the memory of Getulio Vargas, again not as a representative of Tenentismo, but as the president responsible for most of the country's social legislation. The third major organized element in the Brazilian political picture of the middle 1950's consists of the traditionally anti-Vargas elemenlts, principally middle class, grouped largely in the Uniao Democratica Na- cionlal party.

However, a sizable segmenit of the Braziliani electorate is alienated from all three of these groups and is seeking a new political home. There are several proofs of this. The most striking was provided by the 1953 and 1954 elections in the state of SAo Paulo. In the former year a political unknown, Janio Quadros, backed by two small parties, the Partido Socialista Brasileiro and the Partido Democratico


240 HAHR I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

Cristao, swept the election for mayor of Sho Paulo city. In the following year, backed only by the Partido Socialista, he won election as governor of the state of Sao Paulo. One of the most notable facts about these two elections was the decline of the votes of the Commu- nists, the Vargasistas, and even of the Uniao Democratica Nacional. The Communist decline was spectacular, their vote falling from over 100,000 in 1947 to about 20,000 in 1953. The Vargasista Partido Trabalhista support fell almost as disastrously.26

Another indication of the fall, particularly of the Vargas and communist forces, is given by the trade union movement. Although the top officials of the labor organizations-who are subject to very close control by the government-remain largely Vargasistas, and the Comnmunists continue to have considerable influence in many of the lower-echelon trade union groups, the situation has changed radi- cally between the late 1940's and 1955.

The writer spent a considerable period in Brazil in 1946 studying the trade union movement there. At that time virtually all trade union officials with whom he talked were either supporters of Getulio or of the Communist Party. Trips to the country in 1953 and 1954 revealed the decline of both of these groups and the growth of a wide "independeint" element among the lower-echelon labor leadership, as a direct result of the disillusionment of the workers with both the communist and Vargas groups.

There is a multitude of small parties trying to fill this vacuumn in Brazilian politics and to capture the imagination of the Brazilian people. Chief among these are the Partido Socialista Brasileiro, a mnore or less orthodox democratic Socialist Party with a distinctly Brazilian flavor, and the Partido Demnocratico Cristao, modeled after the post-World War II Catholic parties of western Europe.

It is doubtful whether either of these can fill the vacuum caused by the deeline of Vargasismo and the set-backs of the communists. What is really needed in Brazilian polities is a nationalist democratic, socialist party of the type which Tenentismo promised in the 1920's aiid early 1930's, buit in the end failed to establish.

The 1955 presidential election campaign presented a picture of a peculiar revival of Tenentismo, with old Tenenite Juarez Tavora rull- ning oni a program reminiscent of that of the movement of the early 1930 Ys.27 Juarez's opening campaign speech, made in accepting the

26 Interview with Plinio Mello, June 16, 1953. 27 First nominated by the Partido Socialista Brasileiro and the Partido Demo-

cratico Cristao, Tavora also received the backing of the anti-Vargas Uniio Democratica Nacional and Partido Libertador. However, the management of his


BRAZILIAN v vTENENTISMOv 241

Socialist Party's nomination, recalled the Juarez Tavora of the days of Tenentismo's glory; it expressed the old Tenente revulsion against political corruption, the old nationalism, desire for social reform, and endorsement of trade unionism and agrarian reform. Finally, it re- flected the old Tenente concern for the sanctity of the Constitution.

Juarez Tavora started off his discourse by saying, ". .. I am more a nationalist than a socialist, but we are united by the same preoccu- pation with the greatest problem facing our country-the social problem in its many aspects." He promised his support to the building of a really free trade union movement, commenting:

I recognize the right to strike within the terms of the constitution which we must loyally obey, particularly if we are in power. I promise, democrati- cally, so long as it is not repealed, to fulfill the present labor legislation inso- far as it does not conflict with the constitution. But I promise sincerely and loyally to reform the law so as to adapt it to the letter and spirit of the constitution.

He went on to promise, "I will defend the liberty and autonomy of the unions . . I propose, first, to guarantee the complete freedom of elections in the unions; second, to help see to it that these elections are a true democratic expression of the majority, by fulfilling the legal obligation of holding elections in the work places. . "

Juarez promised to support the policy of economic nationalism represented by the government's oil monopoly Petrobras. He also said that he would push industrialization of the country, but in a way to assure the participation of the workers in the increased productivity of the economy.

Perhaps mnost fundamnental of all was his promise to carry out an agrarian reform, expropriating unused land, and turning it over to small proprietors, and imposing a progressive land tax. This plank in his platform represented an aspiration of the Tenentes of the 1930 's which remained unfulfilled in 1955.

Juarez Tavora ended his speech thus :28 . . .The essential, fundamental thing is that we know how to carry out our duty. To do this, we muist under all circumstances tell the people those truths which they are no longer accustomed to hearing, as men who do not wish to hide the truth, who are not afraid of confronting those interests which oppose the developmenit, the restoration, and the liberation of Brazil. It is under this banner, with thi.s inspiration, that I propose to realize our program in this country . . . no loinger as a, revolutionary Tenente of those

canipaign, aiid the program upon wlhieh he ran Awere largely the work of the left- wing of Juarez's supporters in the Frenite de Reiiovaqqo Nacionial.

28 Election throwaway, Juatrez, o candlidato do povo, issuedl by the Partido Socialista Drasileiro.


242 HAHR I MAY I ROBERT J. ALEXANDER bloody days, but still animated with the same spirit of the Tenente of 1922, a new revoluition, not of bayonets, not a revolution of violence, but a revolution of the free democratic vote, to save this country.

Thus harking back to the early Tenente movement, Juarez Tavora seemed in the 1955 election campaign to be attempting once more to establish Tenentismo as an indigenous popular political movement, socialist and nationalist in ideology. His failure to attain the presidency and the success of Juseelino Kubitschek, the heir of Vargas, in gaining it demonstrate both the vitality of the old master's machine and the continuing failure of Tenentismo's ideas to capture Brazilian popular imagination. Juarez Tavora's campaign, although hampered by the lack of a well-organized Tenente party, showed the persistence in Brazil of the ideas which have given rise to the Aprista parties in other Latin American countries.


Article Contentsp. [229]p. 230p. 231p. 232p. 233p. 234p. 235p. 236p. 237p. 238p. 239p. 240p. 241p. 242

Issue Table of ContentsHispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1956), pp. 171-308Front MatterThe Genesis of Economic Attitudes in the Rio De La Plata [pp. 171-189]Nueva Granada's Socialist Mirage [pp. 190-210]Gabriel Lafond and Ambrose W. Thompson: Neglected Isthmian Promoters [pp. 211-228]Notes and CommentBrazilian "Tenentismo" [pp. 229-242]

Bibliographical ArticleManuscripts Relating to Peru in the Yale University Library [pp. 243-262]

Obituary NotesWilliam Spence Robertson 1872-1955 [pp. 263-267]Manuel Toussaint 1890-1955 [pp. 268-270]

Book ReviewsGeneralReview: untitled [p. 271]Review: untitled [pp. 272-273]

ColonialReview: untitled [pp. 273-274]Review: untitled [p. 274]Review: untitled [pp. 275-276]Review: untitled [p. 276]

Revolutionary PeriodReview: untitled [p. 277]

After 1830Review: untitled [pp. 277-279]Review: untitled [pp. 279-280]Review: untitled [p. 280]

Bibliographies and Reference WorksReview: untitled [pp. 281-282]Review: untitled [pp. 282-283]Review: untitled [pp. 284-287]Review: untitled [pp. 287-288]

Book Notices [pp. 289-302]Professional Notes [pp. 303-308]Back Matter

Documents

Brazilian "Tenentismo"