Breaking from the Dialectical Method: The Trinitarian Structure of St. Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium

7/29/2019 Breaking from the Dialectical Method: The Trinitarian Structure of St. Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium

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Breaking from the Dialectical Method: The Trinitarian Structure of St.

Gregory of NyssasContra Eunomium

Daniel Photios Jones

University of DallasPatristic and Byzantine Theology

I. Introduction

St. Gregory of Nyssa, the youngest of the three great Cappadocian Fathers, wrote not

less than four treatises against Eunomius.1 Three of these dogmatic treatises were defenses of

his deceased brother St. Basil of Caesarea. The latter fourth book was written in response to

Eunomiuss Confession of Faith (Ekthesis Pisteos). Gregory neither possessed the

administrative monastic qualities of his brother Basil, nor was he an articulate orator and poetlike his friend Gregory of Nazianzus, but as Fr. David Bals notes, Gregory was gifted with an

outstanding ability of speculative thought and was better acquainted with the Greek

philosophy of the day, especially, Middle and Neoplatonism. 2 It is this locus of thought that we

wish to investigate in this paper concerning Gregorys refutation of Eunomius, including an

evaluation of the dialectical structure of Eunomius doctrine of God, in which to use as a spring-

board to discuss Gregory of Nyssas own Trinitarian structure with a special emphasis on the

procession of the Spirit through the Son. Though the phrase dia tou Yiou usually having a

connotation associated with the debates that surround the question of thefilioque,3 this paper

proposes a fresh approach in examining the structure ofContra Eunomium and the bearing that

dia tou Yiou has for Gregorys Triadology.

We will first trace the underlying metaphysic of Eunomius and its inherent

subordinationism and internal dialectic, Gregorys aphophatic and non-dialectical approach to

the simplicity of God and co-equality of the Persons of the Trinity, and finally conclude with the

meaning that the phrase dia tou Yiouhas for Gregorys Triadologyin theContra Eunomium

corpus.

II. The Neo-Platonic Structure of Eunomianism

1Johannes Quasten, Patrology III, p. 257

2David Bals, cited inEncyclodpedia of Early Christianity, Second Edition, p. 497

3Filioque: Latin meaning and the Son as later added in the Latin Creed by the Carolingian Theologians.


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Gregory, being the subtlest of the Cappadocian Fathers in his analysis of Eunomianism,

detects what are two simultaneous subordinationist structures.4 The first typelike Arianism

subordinates the Spirit to the Son to the Father,5 that is, the Son and the Spirit cannot be of the

same essence as the Pro-Nicenes maintained since the divine essence is defined by the Personal

Feature of the Father, that being a0ge/nnhtoj:[T]he one name [of the essence] is Unbegotten it cannot be [also called] Son, and if[properly called] Son it cannot be Unbegotten.6

And as summarized by Gregory in his own terms,

[T]he essence of the Only-begotten was not before its own generationfor he [Basil] didnot venture to say that He was before that supreme generation and formation, seeingthat he is opposedat once by the Nature of the FatherHe Who is without generationneeds not generation in order to His being what He is.7

Unbegotten, for Eunomius, becomes the characteristic of the highest Being in the hierarchy of

Being, and he identifies divinity with this feature. The Father is identified with the essence, andonly the essence is ingenerate. Every other name that is used of God in Scripture both implies

and is synonymous with ingeneracy.8 As with Plotinus conception of the One, where Being,

Activity, and Will are wholly indistinguishable9 and identical, so are the divine names identical

with the divine essence in the structure of Eunomius and all convertible with the term

ingenerate. The very simplicity of God takes on a very dialectical10 approach for Eunomius. The

One term a0ge/nnhtoj stands over against the Many terms for God. The reconciliation of this

One-Many dialectic, or rather their synthesis, is done by all terms being synonymous or

identical with a0ge/nnhtoj if applicable. Since any product of the divine essence must have thisone characteristic ofa0ge/nnhtoj to be divinity itself, the lack of this characteristic indicates that

the product is not from the essence.11 Since it is agreed on by all sides that the Son and the Spirit

do not share this feature, Eunomius argues that theycant be co-essential and co-equal with the

4Photios Farrell, God, History, and Dialectic: The Theological Foundations of the Two Europes and Their Cultural

Consequences, p. 1755CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 50: The whole account of our doctrines is summed up thus; there is the Supreme and

Absolute Being, and another Being existing by reason of the First, but after It though before all others; and a third

Being not ranking with either of these, but inferior to the one, as to its cause. 6

Apology 11:13-14;Extant Works p. 46-47.7CE III VI, NPNF II, 5, p. 203; c.f. CE III VI, NPNF II, 5, p. 200: If He was, He has not been begotten, and if He

has been begotten, He was not.8

Michel Ren Barnes, The Power of God: Du/namijin Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology, p. 1759

Jon Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 77, 79: The nature of the One and its acts as the One must be wholly

indistinguishableIn fact the will of the One and its essence (ou)si&a) are identical.10

Here I mean dialectic of opposition.11

Barnes, op. cit., p. 178: Since Gods essence is ingenerate, any product of His essence must also be ingenerate.

But what is generated cannot have as its essence to be ungenerated; such an essence would include a contradiction.

(emphasis mine)


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Father. Hence, Eunomius conception of divine simplicity as definitional and dialectical takes on

the following form:

(1) The Father is identified with the essence, which is identified as ingenerate.12(2)The essence of the dialectic with respect to the many divine names is the

reconciliation of their distinctiveness, or rather their reduction to absolute synonyms

and sameness with ingenerate. Simplicity operates as the great metaphysical (=)

sign.13

(3)Any real distinctions are other than the essence. This is tantamount to the samemetaphysical paradigm given by Plotinus who stated that distinction is

opposition.14 This means that any term that does not imply ingenerate is in

dialectical opposition to it. Ingenerate Generate

(4)Since the Son and the Spirit are distinct from the Father by their characteristic ofbeing generated, the first having one distinction and the latter having twodistinctions, they bydefinition cannot be co-eternal with the Father.15

The second structure that is inherent in Eunomius is actually a five tiered structure that

compliments the first:

We recognize that the divine essence is without beginning, simple and endless, but wealso recognize that its e0ne/rgeia is neither without beginning nor without ending. Itcannot be without beginning, for, if it were, its e1rgawould be without beginning as well,On the other hand it cannot be without ending, since, if the effects come to an end, theaction which produced them cannot be unending eitherThere is no need, therefore toacceptthe opinionsand unite the e0ne/rgeia to the essence.16

We notice here that there is an interposition of energy between each essence that is produced.

Each essence has an energy that follows after it in the logical sequence of producing each lower

Being, but the energy is not without beginning or essential to each essence. The worry here by

Eunomius was that if the energies were essential to the essences they would necessarily be

productive and be co-eternal, thus not only necessarily producing the Beings of Son and Spirit

but also necessarily producing the created world.17 This is because each activity produces works

12This goes a step further than Arius who maintained that the essences of the Father and the Son are unlike each

other, yet never went to extent as defining the essence as ingenerate.13

Farrell, op. cit., p. 10814

Plotinus,Enneads III:2:16:54,Loeb Classical Library, p. 98-9915

This is similar to Plotinus system of One-Nous-World Soul where the Nous is distinguished from the One by one

distinction of cause: an Uncaused Cause, and the World Soul is distinguished by two classes of causes: an

Uncaused-Cause and a Caused-Cause.16

Apology 23:5-8,15-16;Extant Works p. 62-6517

Gregory quoting Eunomius CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 68-69: But perhaps some of the opponents of this will say, The

Creation also has an acknowledged beginning; and yet the things in it are not connected in thought with the

everlastingness of the Father, and it does not check, by having a beginning of its own, the infinitude of the divine

life, which is the monstrous conclusion this discussion has pointed out in the case of the Father and the Son. One


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insofar as it exists,18 which means that there is a corresponding existent with each activity. Each

one of these existents is absolutely identical with its own essence. Thus, the Eunomian system

takes on this 2nd dialectical structure shown:

(1) Father-Essence (Ingenerate)(a) Energy of Father in producing:

(2) Son-Essence (Generate)

(b) Energy of Son in producing:

(3) Spirit-Essence (Generate)

Notice in the five-tiered structure of Eunomius that the Energy of Father in producing the Son

has the same logical status vis--vis the Son-Essence and like wise so do (b) and (3). The

dialectic of opposition here, however, is between the essence and energy, the latter beingincommensurate with the Being that does the producing of the other Being and is, therefore,

non-essential. Gregory makes a sweeping indictment of this view and its interposition:

He [Eunomius] declares that a certain energy which follows upon the first Beingproduced, in the fashion of such a tool, a corresponding work, namely our LordBut

what is this energy which follows the Almighty and is to be conceived of prior to theOnly-Begotten, and which circumscribes His being?...And why do we go on talking of the

Almighty as the Father, if things which follow Him externally that produced the Son: andhow can the Son be a son any longerThe Holy Spirit also according to this sequence will

be found not in the third, but in the fifth place, that energy which follows the Only-Begotten, and by which the Holy spirit came into existence necessarily intervening

between them.19

The importance of this passage is to illustrate how the Eunomian system appears to multiply

constituents, from what is first thought of as three is actually now five. The dialectic at this point

appears to be breaking down and logically leading to absurd implications. In the Eunomian

system, we have what could be considered an arbitrary stopping pointperhaps even a

paradoxical pointof producing divine beings with the Holy Spirit. The question could be

asked why there couldnt be another supposed divine being produced bythe Spirit and so on

down the hierarchyad infinitum, since the starting points dont seem to be construed by

revealed truth but by philosophy in general. It is at this juncture that we could conclude that the

therefore of two things must follow. Either the Creation is everlasting; or, it must be boldly admitted, the Son is later

in time (than the Father). The conception of an interval in time will lead to monstrous conclusions, even when

measured from the Creation up to the Creator. 18

Barnes, op. cit., p. 193-19419

NPNF II, 5, p. 58


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Eunomian doctrine resembles Plotinus and not the Trinity as understood in the Christian

tradition.20 There is a structural problem in Eunomius that must be further scrutinized.

III. Apophasis and the Divine Names

One of Gregorys insights in evaluating the Eunomian system is his recognition of the

change of names for the divine hypostases (from Father-Son-Holy Spirit) to the Gnostic

technique of taking old terms and assigning new meanings to themdictatedby the

metaphysical assumptionsitself [rather than] Scripture:21

[I]n professing to expound the mystery of the Faith, he corrects as it were theexpressions in the Gospel, and will not make use of the words by which our Lord inperfecting our faith conveyed that mystery to us: he suppresses the names of Father,Son, and Holy Ghost, and speaks of a Supreme and Absolute Being instead of theFather, of another existing through it, but after it instead of the Son, and of a thirdranking with neither of these two instead of the Holy Ghost.22

These terms are to be rejected by Gregory since they destroy the relationships between the ThreePersons and reduce the Hypostases of the Son and Spirit to impersonal entities proceeding from

an ultimately Impersonal Supreme Being.23The rule of faith as it were takes precedent over

any philosophical first principle. In fact, it is not a stretch at all to say that Gregorys religious

first principles are not one or synthesized with Hellenistic first principles, but this does lead

to the question of how we can know God and what the divine names (o!noma) signify for Gregory

in which we will now touch upon. Unlike Eunomious where names either signify different

essences, or in the case ofEunomiusSupreme Being in which the names are all convertible to

ingenerate, Gregory has a very non-dialectical approach, and it is to this approach that we mustnow trace out.

Gregory is insistent in exposing the dialectical system of Eunomius. In CE II he makes

an interesting argument that goes right to the heart of the issue of the divine names and its

identity relation between simple and ingenerate:

They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by naturesimple, and that which is simple admits of no composition. If, then, God Who is declaredto be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungeneratemust belong to His very nature, and that name is identicalwith ungeneracy. To whom wereply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, for the former

20Paulos Mar Gregoros, Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence, p. 111

21Farrell, op. cit., p. 170-171

22 CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 5023

Farrell, op. cit., p. 171; c.f. NPNF II, 5, p. 50-51: If those had been the appropriate terms, they would not have

mentioned, as they did, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, granting indeed it were pious or safe to remodel at all, with a

view to this innovation, the terms of faith; or else they were all ignorant men and uninstructed in the mysteries, and

unacquainted with what he calls the appropriate namesthose men who had really neither the knowledge nor the

desire to give the preference to their own conceptions over what had been handed down to us by the voice of God.


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represents the simplicity of the subject, the other its being without origin, and theseexpressions are not convertible in meaning though both are predicated of the onesubject.24

There is a distinction to be had here between incomposite and ungenerate yet both being

predicable of the one subject25 without confusing these two distinct realities. Moreover, Gregory

does not see this distinction as compromising the simplicity of God.26 If these two properties are

not considered distinct, but metaphysically identical of the same reality, then Gregory would not

be able to predicate the property of incomposite of the Hypostases of Son and Spirit. To phrase

it another way, since the Son and the Spirit do not have the property of ingenerate and

(according to Eunomius) is considered to be identical with the term incomposite, then it would

be impossible to say that the Son and Spirit have the same nature as the Father. It is for this

reason that Gregory of Nyssa can justify the distinction. But what is the presupposition

underlining the Eunomian system of thought? Gregory moves from attacking the identity of

these attributes, to now what he sees as the basis of Eunomius rational confidence of knowing

the nature of God:

In order, then, to render their attack upon the Savior efficacious, this is the blasphemousmethod that they have adopted. There is no need, they urge, of looking at the collectiveattributes by which the Sons equality in honour and dignity with the Father is signified,but from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue a distinctivedifference of nature; for the Divine nature is that which is denoted by the termungenerateand declaring this to be sovereign and supreme they make this wordcomprehend the whole greatness of Godhead, so as to necessitate the inference that ifungeneracy is the main point of the essence, and the other attributes are bound up withit, viz. Godhead, power, imperishableness and so onif (I say) ungeneracy mean these,

then, if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest.27

In other words, the dialectic of opposition among terms becomes the primary and sole means of

obtaining knowledge of the divine and this becomes not only the demonstration of knowing God

but also the very means of obtaining union with him. This is very similar to the Neo-Platonic

method described by Plotinus in theEnneads.28 Though Gregory is not adverse to any use of

24CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 252, emphasis mine; c.f. CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 195: [I]t is in his assault on the doctrine of

orthodoxy that he opposes theGodhead to the generateand this is the point he tries to establish by his words,

that that which is not ungenerate is not God.25

In the case of Ungenerate the predicable Subject would be the Father alone.26

Gregory continues, But from the appellation of Ungenerate we have been taught that He who is so named is

without origin, and from the appellation of simple that He is free from all admixture (or composition), and these

terms cannot be substituted for each other. There is therefore no necessity that, because the Godhead is by its nature

simple, that nature should be termed ungeneracy; but in that He is indivisible and without composition, He is spoken

of as simple, while in that He was not generated, He is spoken of as ungenerate. Ibid.27

CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 25628

Enneads I:3:4:2-9, op. cit., p. 158-159: [Dialectic] is the science which can speak about everything in a reasoned

and orderly way, and say what it is and how it differs from other things and what it has in common with them; in

what class each thing is and where it stands in that class, and if it really is what it is, and how many really existing


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dialectic in obtaining knowledge of things, his use of this method in distinguishing the different

order of Being between the sensible and intelligible and the uncreated and created would could

be considered dialectical,29 he is nonetheless adverse to itor perhaps to its sufficiencyin

obtaining knowledge and understanding the distinctions in God. We must now look at the

distinctions that Gregory has in mind in relation to the divine names and his apophatic, non-

dialectical approach.

Gregorys response to Eunomius on the knowability of God is quite negative. Though

hardly monolithic at times, he strongly affirms that no human facultyeven of the angels

themselvescan have a knowledge of the ou)si&a of God. God in essence is incomprehensible and

unknowable:

There is no faculty in human nature adequate to the full comprehension of the divineessence. It may be that it is easy to show this in the case of human capacity alone, and tosay that the incorporeal creation is incapable of taking in and comprehending that nature

which is infinite will not be far short of the truthYet if we weigh even their [angels]comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should

venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our ownweaknessfor wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences offuncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former notThe former is

bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees ofextension, limited by time and space; the former transcends all notion of degree, bafflingcuriosity from every point of view.30

This is not to say that incognoscibility of the divine nature should be taken in an absolute sense,

but it is a knowledge that is obtained byunknowing through faith. In other words, this is a

knowledge that is not obtained through rational discourse but rather through liturgical worshipof God and experiencing His works, which we will clarify here as Gregorys non-dialectical

approach.31 This is so for Gregory because man can never broach the adiastemic boundary of

the essence of God. No human faculty and reason whatsoever that man possesses can transcend

his diastemic conception. The divine nature has only one name: the single name of being

things there are, and again how many non-existing things, different from real beings. It discusses good and not good,and the things that are classed under good and its opposite, and what is eternal and not eternal, with certain

knowledge about everything and not mere opinion.29

Here I follow Fr. David Balss lead in his synopsis of Gregorys Hiearchy of Being in METOUSIA QEOU, p.34-52. But this student would argue that Gregory admits of a both/and dialectic of predication about a subject and

not an either/or dialectic of opposition. The Hypostasis of Christ is a case in point where you have two different

natures and opposite properties that exist in His One Person.30

CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 25731

Archbishop Basil Krivocheine, Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to St.

Gregory of Nyssa, p. 78-79


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Above every name.32 All that can transgress the adiastemic boundary are the divine e0ne/rgeiai

that flow from the divine essence:33

God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is ofHimself what also He is believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon Him,not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He

receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations [e0nergei=n] inregard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God,

we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeingthrough the things that are hidden. 34

And,

We are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certainpeculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, hethus speaks of the Divine nature: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate Hisoperations [e0ne/rgeiai], or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but Hisoperations [e0ne/rgeiai].35

Gregory is clear from these passages that the names of God are the actual names of the divine

energeiai.36The name Divine Life, which man partakes of, is also conceived as energeia by

Gregory:

[T]he True Life is an actuality, actualizing itself.37

Even the names qe/oj and qeo&thj are not names of the divine essence but ofGods energeia, 38

which gives Gregory a powerful argument in asserting the co-equality of the Hypostases. For if

the same operations are predicable of the Three Persons of the Trinity then this would point to

the undistinguishable character of their substance.39 However, if the divine essence has no

32CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 99

33Scot Douglass, Theology of the Gap: Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy, p. 87

34CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 265

35Ibid.

36David Bradshaw,Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, p. 163. Fr. David Bals

notes the same in METOUSIA QEOUp.114: Theappellations Being ( He who is ) or real Being ,therefore, are not to be taken, according to Gregory, as definitions of the Divine Substance. He later seems unclear

to what this distinction amounts to when he says, If they refer in a special way to the Divine Substance as opposedto the attributes which we can predicate of It, they do this exactly by showing that this Substance has no name. This

does not mean their content is purely negative. Though they cannot penetrate into the content of the Divine Reality,

they indicate the Fact of this Reality, and also Its self-sufficiency and infinity. It is the purpose of this paper to shed

some meaning on what that distinction is (or perhaps not). It is this writers opinion that opposing these n ames to the

attributes of God would blur the very distinction at which Gregory means to maintain against Eunomius. I shall

make a further comment on this later when I discuss the divine simplicity and dialectic.37

NPNF II, 5, p. 28738

On the Holy Trinity, NPNF II, 5, p. 329; On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p. 333; c.f. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 16339

On the Holy Trinity,Ibid.


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name to Gregory,40 yet being known through its energeiai, it is the point in this essay to now

investigate the kind of distinction Gregory has between ousia and energeia.

IV. Non-Dialectical Simplicity

Before we proceed on with an analysis of the text of St. Gregory of Nyssa on the divine

simplicity, it will be helpful to recall the system of Eunomius. We must remember and take into

account that Eunomius emphasized to such an extent the absolute unity of the Father that any

attribute that could be predicated of the Supreme Being, were identical with ingeneracy, both

individually and severally to the point that any predicate is synonymous and indistinguishable

with this name.41 The One divine attribute of ingenerate stood over against any other name: One

NameMany Names. All the other names are reconciled with ingeneracy by collapsing them

into this One by means of identity. This is the synthesis of their mutual opposition, and hence,

the essence of the dialectical method. With this in mind, we will now investigate Gregorys

view of simplicity.

As we have stated, so far, the strong apophasis that Gregory maintains in the knowledge

of God as well as situating the divine names at the category of the divine energeia, yet he is still

insistent that this does not contradict that God is simple. It would be wrong to think that he

maintains this out of polemical necessity against Eunomius. Simplicity is a doctrine held by

all:42

He [Eunomius] declares each of these Beings, whom he has shadowed forth in hisexposition, to be single and absolutely one. We believe that the most boorish and simple-

minded would not deny that the Divine Nature, blessed and transcendent as it is, wassingle. That which is viewless, formless, and sizeless, cannot be conceived of asmultiform and compositeSimplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of nodegreesWe comprehend a potency without parts.43

40CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 198: We are taught the fact of Its [the divine nature], while we assert that an appellation of

such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to

us.41

Michel Ren Barnes is the most insistent on this point that Ive seen on the non-identity of the divine attributes for

Gregory and their exact identity for Eunomius. Quoting Gregory stating, In our teaching, the indicators in God of

connatural rank are deity itself, wisdom and power, and being good, [being] judge, just, mighty, patient, true,

creator, sovereign, invisible and unending, Barnes goes on to state, The contrast between Eunomius

understanding of indicators and Gregorys may be summarized in this way: Eunomius understands the indicator to

be identical to the divine essence, while Gregory understandsprecisely not to be identical with the divine essence,

op. cit. p. 289-290, emphasis mine.42

Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 8043

CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 57


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Gregory goes on in the same passage to make a reductio ad absurdum argument out of

Eunomius own conception of simplicity.44 For if simplicity of the divine essence is the starting

point of theology and it is defined by the attribute ingenerate, how can he [Eunomius] than

admit of an absolute simplicity with respect to the Son and Spirit since they are really distinct

from the attribute of ingenerate? The implication would be that Eunomius could not admit of

Beings that are categorized by their difference[s] less and more without him unconsciously

establishing a composite and heterogeneous Deity.45But in Gregorys terms theyre starting

point is unfounded:

It starts from data that are not granted, and then it constructs by mere logic a blasphemyupon them.46

Gregory suspects the problem here to be in the ordo theologiae that Eunomius is starting with,

and that is the Neo-Platonic structure and its definitional character of the divine ousia as

ingenerate that we have stated. For Gregory, simplicity is precisely not the starting point, but the

reality of revelation in the Persons of the Trinity.47 He then considers the Hypostases in their

connatural acts or operations (e.g. the power to create), to deduce that they are united in nature

and power.48 Gregory hints at this proper ordo theologiae that first considers the reality of

Person and the Churches dogma of the Trinity in hisRef Conf of Eunomius:

For while there are many other names by which Deity is indicated in the HistoricalBooks, in the Prophets and in the Law, our Master Christ passes by all these andcommits to us these titles as better able to bring us to the faith about the Self-Existent,declaring that it suffices us to cling to the title, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in order toattain apprehension of Him Who is absolutely Existent, Who is one and yet not one.49

Moving along in the same passage Gregory describes this relationship of one and yet not one as

also being indicative of the attributes common to the Three Persons: He is divided without

separation, and united without confusion.50 We note that in these last two passages that

Gregory does not see the divine simplicity in opposition or in contradiction to the concept of

44Ibid.: If he [Eunomius] had been thinking of a Being really single and absolutely one, identical with goodness

rather than possessing it, he would not be able to count a greater and a less [Father and Son] in it at all. 45

Ibid.46

Ibid., p. 5647That is, there is a problem of the relationship between Faith and Reason for Eunomius. For Gregory if logic is

contradicting the teachings of the Church, then there is a problem in the logical orderthat the questions are being

asked. C.f. Gregoros, op.cit., p. 119: For Eunomius the conclusions of strict logic are finally authoritative[for the

Cappadocians] the teachings of the Church becomes a criterion for evaluating the validity of the logic used. 48

Barnes makes an interesting insight here, op. cit., p. 237: Gregory uses the title divine powerqei/a du&namijashis preferred title for God because du&namij is as far back in the descriptive sequence e!rgae)ne&rgeiadu&namijou)si&aas he can meaningfully speak.49

Ref Conf, NPNF II, 5, p. 10250

Ibid. We should stop and recognize the Chalcedonian language here being applied.


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real distinction.51 Though the names of each of these energies are designations through a process

of intellection [e0pi/noia],52 it would be wrong to think of these attributes as solely epistemic

distinctions in the human subject, but rather, each of them signifying a distinct reality in God as

well:

If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy orjudgment. Thus let all Gods attributes be convertible terms, there being no specialsignification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why dothe Scriptures vainly assign various names to the divine nature, calling God a Judge,righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful, and so on? For if none of these titlesis to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in theirmeaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words forthe same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from oneanother.53

Or perhaps to make these realities identical to the divine essence, Eunomius tries to

[Throw] everything into confusion [attributing to Basil of]identifying the essence of the

Only-begotten with his operation [e/ne&rgeia].54

We must recall here something we stated earlier in the essay. It is a part of the Neo-Platonic

dialectic to reconcile all the distinctiveness that could be attributed to the Highest Being. As

Gregory points out in the previous passage, thus quoted in CE II, where he shows a certain

amount of frustration and astonishment that a theologian would attempt to convert attributes

like justice, righteousness, incorruptible with terms like simplicity and ingeneracy, it is his point

and insistence that we must reject this method on the basis of the truths in Scripture. Scripture

is the criterion for assess the validity of the logic that is used.55

Gregorys doctrine of simplicity takes an even more interesting turn when we investigate

his meaning between the divine nature and what is around the divine nature (ta_ peri\ th_n qei/an

fu&sin). Though Gregorys use of this phrase is far and wide in his writings56 and too voluminous

51Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 82

52CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 281: If, then, these words are given us, but not as indicative of essence, and every word

given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these appellations be fitly applied to the Only-begotten Son

of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under

various names, according to the variety of His operations [e/ne/rgeiai], so that we may think of Him in the aspect sonamed.53

CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 297-29854

Ibid., p. 286-28755

Gregoros, op.cit., p. 11956

c.f. CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 259: And so, too, all the other things which in the course of his reasoning he [Abraham]

was led to apprehend as he advanced, whether the power of God, or His goodness, or His being without beginning,

or His infinity, or whatever else is conceivable in respect to [around] the divine nature; Ibid., p. 264: [W]e allow

ourselves in the use of many diverse appellations in regard to [around] HimFor whereas no suitable word has been

found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names fresh to our notions respecting [around] Him.

On Not Three GodsNPNF II, 5, p. 332: Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine nature itself is

not signified, but some on of its surroundings is made known.


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to treat comprehensively here, I wish to draw on one passage to make a point. There is a

distinction and non-identity between the subject and what is around Him:

For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when Davidsays, God, a righteous judge, strong and patient, if is were not understood with eachof the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem

purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when is is understoodwith each of the names, what is said will clearly be of force, being contemplated inreference to that which is. As, then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning[peri\, i.e. around] Him some operation [e/ne&rgeia] of judgment, and by the is carryour minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the accountof His being is the same with the action [e/ne&rgeia].57

Each of these energies is predicated of the subject, i.e. the Persons of the Trinity. They have no

mode of existence, as it were, outside the reality and consideration of the Hypostases. They

exist only in a person, yet the energies are not identical with the subject and its being. Gregory

does not believe that this distinctionbetween the divine nature and what is around it

compromises the divine simplicity in any way. It is only if we take a dialectical or definitional

view of simplicity that this distinction would compromise the Trinitys absence of multiform and

composition. For if we do take a dialectical account it would amount to a difference in essences

which is precisely the point of contention between Gregory and Eunomius. Gregory could not be

anymore affirmative that Gods simplicity is non-dialectical:

For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the oneexisting there, the other could not co-exit in the same subjectbut the force of each ofthe terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a

peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it.58

One of the ways that Gregory uses to clarify this non-dialectical simplicity is the beautiful

analogy he applies with the simple human soul.59 Just as the human soul is simple, immaterial,

and incomposite, it still possesses many different distinctionswith respect to its faculties and

activitywhich could be predicated of it:

Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connectionwith one single, that that single soul is to be considered composite soul?...If, then, thehuman mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity,how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, andeternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to meanone thing, become of many parts, or take a share [participation] of all these to make up

the perfection of His nature60

57CE III, 5, NPNF II, 5, p. 198

58CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 298

59On p. 127 ofMETOUSIA QEOU, Fr. David Bals sees this as an unfortunate answer. Though far from being

perfect due to the diastema of mans human nature, I see this analogy as a useful one to express th is non-dialectical

simplicity.60

CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 300, emphasis mine.


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We should not press this analogy to far though as this would confuse the adiastema-diastema

breach that we mentioned earlier, but it does tell us something about the kind of distinction that

Gregory has in mind. The unity of the divine nature is not in opposition to the many divine

energeiai. To state more precisely, divine simplicity is not in dialectical opposition to a real

multiplicity of distinction in God. Is it possible that we could reject and resist this

interpretation and possibly see this multiplicity on the created side of the ontological divide

between Uncreate-Created?61 If so, we need to ask a question. How are we to escape the very

dialectic of opposition that Eunomius wishes to foist upon Gregory (i.e. that created being

differs and is in opposition to the Supreme Being because it is individuated by distinction)?

Would not this dialectic between simplicity and multiplicity of distinction not only compromise

the distinction between the divine ousia and the divine energeiaibut also between the divine

ousia and the divine hypostases? Fortunately, Gregory denies this answer because there is

nothing which can be contemplated in Godwhich has been created:62

For seeing that it is clear to all that God Who is over all has in Himself nothing as a thingcreated or imported, not power nor wisdom, nor light, nor word, nor life, nor truth, norany at all of those things which are contemplated in the fullness of the Divine bosom (all

which things the Only-begotten God is, Who is in the bosom of the Father), the name ofcreation could not properly be applied to any of those things which are contemplated inGod, it would follow, has His Wisdom as a thing imported, receiving afterwards, as theresult of making, something which He had not at first.63

We cannot brush aside this passage for it is striking. Gregorys argument here is simple.

Regarding the virtue of being uncreate, the many appellations that are contemplated in and

around God have the same logical status as the Person of the Logos. If the Logos is a creature,than the many divine names are created realities. If the Logos is uncreate, so are the divine

energeiaithat we perceive [e3nnoia].

It is possible to summarize point-by-point possible interpretations of Gregorys doctrine

of divine simplicity that should be precluded:64

(1) If any interpretation of the divine simplicity where unity precludes distinctions inGod is to be rejected.

(2)If any interpretation asserts that these distinctions imply a definition of distinctionis opposition to the divine nature is to be rejected.65

61 Bals, op. cit., p. 128. In rejection of the Palamite real distinction in God, Bals wishes to place all the

multiplicity of the divine names that are around the divine nature in created effects.62

Krivocheine, op. cit., p. 98, emphasis mine.63

CE III, I, NPNF II, 5, p. 14064

It is not my point here to try and circumscribe Gregory on divine simplicity, but to list points that I think should

be avoided, less we are to make Gregory the victim of Eunomius dialectical arguments.


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(3)Interpretations that assert unity in opposition to multiplicity are also to be rejectedas this would undermine Gregorys defense of the unity and uniqueness of the divine

Hypostases.

(4)If the interpretation of divine simplicity obscures the reality of the divine names asmaking them all identical both individually and severally with the divine ousia, it is

to be rejected.

(5)And finally, if the interpretation of simplicity emphasizes multiplicity to the extentthat the divine nature is seen as compositional or compounded in separation such

that the unity of the Persons of the Trinity would be destroyed is also to be equally

rejected.

V. , the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, and Dialectic

So far we have traced out Gregorys break up of Eunomius use of dialectic. In this part

we will look at the meaning ofdia\Ui9ouin the Contra Eunomium. It is precisely within this

context that is has a non-dialectical meaning. However, we shall first investigate a problem in

some other texts of Gregorythat would oppose this thesis. In GregorysDe Oratione Dominica,

which for purposes here we will assume the passage in the work to be authentic,66 he appears to

have a Trinitarian structure similar to Eunomius, specifically, in what perhaps could be

considered the Spirit originating from two classes of causes.Well quote the text here in full:

I say, that the nature of the Holy Trinity has been shown to be one, though not confused

as regards the properties which belong to each Person as His special characteristic, sincetheir special features are not changed into each other. Hence the characteristic of theFathers Person cannot be transferred to the Son or the Spirit, nor, on the other hand,can that of the Son be accommodated to the one of the others, or the property of theSpirit be attributed to the Father and the Son. But the incommunicable distinction of theproperties is considered in the common nature. It is the characteristic of the Father toexist without cause. This does not apply to the Son and the Spirit; for the Son went outfrom the Father, as says Scripture, and the Spirit proceedethfrom God and from theFather. But as the being without cause, which belongs only to the Father, cannot beadapted to the Son and the Spirit, so again the being caused, which is the property of theSon and of the Spirit, cannot by its very nature, be considered in the Father. On the otherhand, the being not ungenerated is common to the Son and to the Spirit; hence in orderto avoid confusion in the subject, one must again search for the pure difference in theproperties, so that what is common be safeguarded, yet what is proper be not mixed. ForHe is called the Only-Begotten of the Father by the Holy Scripture; and this termestablishes His property for Him. But the Holy Spirit is also said to be from the Father,and is testified to be the Sons. For it says: If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he isnone of His. Hence the Spirit that is from God is also Christs Spirit; but the Son, Who is

65Distinct realities can be predicated of a single subject according to Gregory and not be in opposition. What is

needed is a dialectic that can admit of a both/and, not either/or.66

Quasten, op. cit., p. 268-269; ACW v. 18, Intro., p. 8-10.


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from God, neither is nor is said to be from the Spirit; and this relative sequence ispermanent and inconvertible. Hence the sentence cannot properly be resolved andreversed in its meaning so that as we say the Spirit to be Christs, we might also callChrist the Spirits. Since therefore, this individual property distinguishes one from theother with absolute clarity, but as, on the other hand, the identity of action bears witnessto the community of nature, the right doctrine about the Divinity is confirmed in both;

namely that the Trinity is numbered by the Persons, but that it is not divided into partsof different nature.67

There are a number of things that needed to be pointed out in this passage. Since the

characteristic of the Fathers Person cannot be transferred and as being without

causebelongs only to the Father, Gregory applies the rule that whatever is said to be in

common is said of all three Hypostases [i.e. natural things], and whatever is said of only one

Hypostasis is proper only to that Hypostasis.68Gregory goes on to search for the pure

differences between Son and Spirit since they are[properly] classed as being not

ungenerated. It is here that Gregory seems to make an argument based on the analogy from the

economy to reason back to the theological Trinity, since the Spirit is from God is also Christs

Spirit, but he denies that the converse is true that the Son, Who is from God, neither is nor is

said to be from the Spirit. Can this be reflective of the eternal hypostatic origin of these two

hypostases? Unfortunately Gregory is not clear from this passage. Though we would not deny

that there is an order to the Persons coming in the economy, it seems that his strict rule here in

seeing a precise order in the economic cause would not make since of the Creed when we state

that the Son was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. In other words, the sending

of the Son in the economy by the Father is not an act that is alien to the Spirit [or one that is

alien to the Son for that matter]. It does not seem clear to me that Gregory sees the Holy Spirits

relation to the Hypostases Father and Son in dialectical fashion nor as in a Neo-Platonic

structure originating from an Uncaused-Cause and from a Caused-Cause as with Eunomius. If

construed in this sense, this would conflict with his statement in the same passage that the

Personal Feature of the Father [i.e. as cause] cannot be communicated to the other Hypostases.

However, in a passage in On Not Three Gods, Gregory appears that he presents without any

67On the Lords Prayer, ACW v.18, p. 54-55. There is no use ofdia& Ui9ou in this passage but it is irrelevant and

seems implied nonetheless.68

Farrell, op. cit., p. 169. We have made this point clear in the analysis of the appellations of God, but the hypostatic

properties of ingenerate, generate, and procession are what are unique to the each Hypostasis alone: Father, Son,

Holy Spirit respectively. C.f. St. Basil Letter XXXVIII to Gregory of Nyssa, NPNF II, 8, p. 137: My argument,

then, is this. That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis.

Suppose we say a man. The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature

is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we

say Paul. We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting. That is, in regard to hypostases of

the same nature, what is said about more than one hypostasis is said about all of them or the nature of them, but what

is not said of all of them is what is peculiar and specific.


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ambiguity the view that the Son fits this position as a mediatory cause. The Son is now an

interposition between the Father and Spirit:

[W]hile we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the differencein respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that onePerson is distinguished from another;by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and

another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize anotherdistinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by [dia&] that which isdirectly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides withoutdoubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of beingOnly-begotten, does not shut out the Spirits natural relation to the Father.69

It would appear that Gregory affirms that the Son is a mediate Cause to the Spirits existence. He

does not use any analogy of the economy and from the surrounding context it appears he is

writing of the theologicalTrinity. The idea that Gregory wishes to preserve the unique

Hypostatic feature of the Son: He being the Only-Begotten. For if the Son and the Spirit are both

Caused, how do we distinguish there unique properties? It appears that in this passage Gregory

has fallen prey to the use ofthe dialectic of oppositionwith a second step of interposition of

the Son in attempting to distinguish between generation and procession.70 This supposition can

and should be resisted since Gregory does state at the end of the passage that the Spirit has a

natural relation to the Father, though it is difficult to see howthe Spirits ownrelation of

origin from the Father could be considered natural if it is the Son that constitutes an

interposition between the Spirit and the Father.71

Turning to Gregorys Contra Eunomium corpus we find a different approach. As we have

remarked earlier, there is not just a problem of the Spirit and the Son being subordinated to thelevel of creatures, there is also a structural problem to Eunomius system. The former is a

product of the latter and this all by the dialectical method of distinguishing the hypostases by

opposition.72 When Gregory turns his aim toward the subordinated structure of the Eunomian

system, I find it fascinating that he avoids the implicit interposition that we saw in his works On

Not Three Gods and On the Lords Prayer. Gregory states in CE I his intention:

69On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p. 336

70St. Gregory the Theologian warns of this use of philosophy in synthesizing theology in the 5

thTheological

Oration, NPNF II, 7, p.319-320: For, tell me, what position will you assign to that which Proceeds, which hasstarted up between the two terms of your division, and is introduced by a better Theologian than you, our Savior

Himself? Or perhaps you have taken that word out of your Gospels for the sake of your Third Testament, The Holy

Ghost, which proceedeth from That Source, is no Creature; and inasmuch as He is not Begotten is no Son; and

inasmuch as he is between the Unbegotten and the Begotten is God. And thus escaping the toils of your syllogisms,

He has manifested himself as God, stronger than your divisions. What then is Procession? Do you tell me what is the

Unbegottenness of the Father, and I will explain to you the physiology of the Generation of the Son and the

procession of the Spirit, and we shall both of us be frenzy-stricken for prying into the mystery of God. 71

Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 21572

See point 3 on p. 3 of this paper.


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[O]n the subject of the Holy Spirit the blasphemy is plain and unconcealed: he says thatHe is not to be ranked with the Father or the Son, but is subject to both. I will thereforeexamine as closely as possible this statement.73

That Gregory is dealing with the issue of uncreate or created existence among the Hypostasis of

the Spirit and Son is evident, but it is precisely the dialectical structure that is producing the

problem, and he says that it is the starting-point [of Eunomiuis] from which this irresistible

perception of a hidden truth takes its rise in all these logical excursions.74 Instead of starting

from scriptural revelation, Gregory states Eunomius speaks first of beings instead of persons.75

The dialectic can never distinguish between more than two at a time and thus one Being

existing through the First76 and then one [that] is produced from another.77 It is no wonder at

this point that Gregory resists not only the inequality he sees among the Beings but the very

structure itself:

He opposes the arrangement of Scripture. He separates off that equality with the Father

and the Son of His proper and natural rank and connexion which our Lord Himselfpronounces, and numbers Him with subjects:he declares Him to be a work of bothPersons, of the Father, as supplying the cause of His constitution, of the Only-begotten,as of the artificer of His subsistence: and defines this as the ground of His subjection,

without as yet unfolding the meaning of subjection.78

Not only does Eunomius exchange out the meaning of Scripture of the names of the divine

Hypostases and their proper relations Gnostic style, but he can now exchange certain properties

that characterize each of the Beings since they are more or less simple! 79 Gregory has traced

out in this short passage the commonality Eunomius has with the Neo-Platonic framework.

Thus, the Spirit is distinguished by two classes of causes, an Uncaused-Cause and a Caused-

Cause: The Father supplying the cause of His constitution and the Son is the artificer of His

subsistence.Moreover, it is difficult to see, since Eunomius starts from data that are not

granted,80 where the system would ever have a principled reason to not cause another more

or less simple Being as stated earlier.81

73CE I, NPNF II, 5, p. 53

74Ibid. p. 56

75

Ibid. p. 56 There is a problem with the ordo theologiae in Eunomius as I stated earlier.76

Ibid. p. 5377

Ibid. p. 5578

Ibid. p. 5479Ibid. p. 5780

Ibid.81

C.f. p. 4 of this paper. Athanasius seemed to pick up on this point as well in the Neo-Platonic structure of the

Arians in Four Discourses Against the Arians, NPNF II, 4, p. 318-319: If then God be as man, let Him become also

a parent as man, so that His Son should be father of another, and so in succession one from another, till the series

they imagine grows into a multitude of gods.


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After discussing the division of intelligible being into uncreate and created,82 Gregory

points out the dialectic of the opposite qualityin that which fails of the good83 that

characterizes the Holy Spirit and the Son in Eunomius thinking because Eunomius admits the

Hypostases of Son and Spirit possess the good by acquisition and participation. Gregory goes on

to state that the divine nature

has distinctions within itself in keeping with the majesty of its own nature[and] weregard it as consummately perfect and incomprehensibily excellent, yet as containingclear distinctions within itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: aspossessing invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, butdifferentiated by the unique character of each Person.84

In this short excerpt we witness the same rule applied as earlier. Each Hypostasis is

characterized by his own unique hypostatic property. Gregory goes on to show in the strongest

of terms, however, that properties that are said about more than one Hypostasis are said about

the nature, but properties said about one and only one Hypostasis are unique to each one alone.

First he considers the Hypostasis of the Father:

This peculiarity contemplated in each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: theFather, for instance, is [both] uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generatedany more than He was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him and the Sonand the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father. This is peculiar anduncommunicable, being not seen in the other Persons.85

Then, the Hypostasis of the Son:

The Son inHis uncreatedness touches the Father and the Spirit, but as the Son and theOnly-Begotten He has a character which is not that of the Almighty or of the HolySpirit.86

And finally the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit:

The Holy Spirit by the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son andFather, but is distinguished from them by His own tokens.His most peculiarcharacteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the Fatherand the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate, nor as only-begotten: thisit is that constitutes His chief peculiarity.87

It seems that in this last passage, thus quoted, that Gregorys strong apophaticism does not wish

to touch further on the relation of the Spirit. He issimply, and confesses the absolute

distinctions amongst the Hypostases. It seem as if there is nothing more to say about the

Hypostasis of the Spirit since he has adequately been distinguished from the Ingenerate and theOnly-Begotten, but Gregory moves on to clarify the relationship of the Spirit to the other two

82 CE I, NPNF II, 5, p.60-61.83

Ibid. p. 6184

Ibid.85

Ibid.86

Ibid.87

Ibid.


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Hypostases, and it is the same rule as before: what is common is of the nature, what is unique is

of one Hypostasis:

Joined to the Father by His uncreatedness, He is disjoined from Him again by not beingFather. United to the Son by the bond of uncreatedness, and ofderiving His existence

from the Supreme88

It is clear in this passage that Gregory distinguishes what is shared in common among the

Hypostases and what is not. With the Father, what is common is uncreate, what is unique is not

being Father. With the Sonlike the Fatherwhat is shared is uncreate, but what is unique is

precisely His deriving His existence from the Father. The implications would be if the Holy

Spirit derived is His existencethat is proceedsfrom both the Father and the Son, something

would be common to two Hypostases which is not common to the Spirit. Either the derivation of

the Spirit would be common to Himself along with the Father and the Son, i.e. a property of the

common nature, or He is something of a dissimilar nature, since the derivation would only be

common to two Hypostases. Both conclusions are clearly unacceptable. The former would

destroy the Hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit and hence confuse all of them with the divine

nature, while the latter would be the very essence of the Eunomian dialectic! This is not to say

that Gregory sees no relation whatsoever between the Son and Spirit, as it seems this would

imply, but that this relation is properly not one of derivation or relation of origin. As we quoted

earlier from Gregorys workOn the LordsPrayer, He does see a certain order to the

Hypostases, a certain taxis [tacij] even.89 Gregory points to this order continuing with the

passage quoted:

He [the Holy Spirit] isparted again from Him [Father] by the characteristic of not beingthe Only-Begotten of the Father, and having been manifested by means of the SonHimself.90

This is a remarkable passage and will characterize the uniqueness of Byzantine Triadology since

the Cappadocian Fathers.91 Again Gregory distinguishes between what is common and

particular. The Holy Spirit is not the Only-Begotten [or the Ingenerate Father], but there is a

commonality in the Trinity of manifesting the Spirit , that starts first with the Father and goes

forth through the Son. That this manifestation is not a unique Hypostatic characteristic only to

one can be seen when Gregory identifies the manifestation of the Spirit with the divine energeia

in CE III:

88Ibid.

89Farrell, op. cit., p. 1057

90CE I, op. cit. p. 61

91For an analysis of the Byzantine doctrine of the eternal manifestation of the Spirit, see Aristeides Papadakis

Crisis In Byzantium: The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus.


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And yet who in the world does not know that life-giving power proceeds to actualoperation [e/ne&rgeia] both in the Father and in the Son92

And also common to the Holy Spirit:

For if there does reside in the Father and the Son a life-giving power, it is ascribed alsothe Holy Spirit, according to the words of the Gospel. 93

This is so for Gregory since the identity of the energeiaithat the Spirit possesses, is the same

energeiaias the Son and the Father, meaning it is something said aboutor more accurately

aroundtheir nature.94 This manifesting of the Spirit by the Father through the Son cannot be

thought of as a Hypostatic origination, precisely because Gregory identifies this act with the act

of willing, that is in God there is no difference between will and energy.95 As we have shown

previously, every operation and divine name is common to all the Hypostases. Gregory

expresses this manifestation in even more explicit terms as a circular movement among the

Persons in another work against Macedonius:

You see the revolving circle of the glory moving from Like to Like. The Son is glorified bythe Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son; again the Son has His glory from the Father;and the Only-begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what shall theFather be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son: and with what again shall the Son

be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit? In like manner, again, Faith completesthe circle, and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of theSon.96

It appears that in this passage that Gregory has in mind a manifestation of glory that is

irrespective of creation. A real relation that would characterize and constitute Gods internal

Being, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit will to manifest the divine love as energeiaiin

92CE III, NPNF II, 5, p. 245, Gregory also describes this manifestation of the divine energeia having a logical order

yet common to the Persons of the Trinity in On Not Three Gods, NPNF II, 5, p.334: Yet although we set forth

Three Persons and three names, we do not consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one from each

Person separately; but the same life is wrought in us by the Father and prepared by the Son, and depends on the will

of the Holy Spirit. Since then the Holy Trinity fulfils every operation in a manner similar to that of which I have

spoken, not by separate action according to the number of the Persons, but so that there is one motion and

disposition of the good will which is communicated from the Father through the Son to the Spirit (for as we do not

call those whose operation gives one life three Givers of life, neither do we call those who are contemplated in one

goodness three Good beings, nor speak of them in the plural by any of their other attributes); so neither can we callthose who exercise this Divine and superintending power and operation towards ourselves and all creation,

conjointly and inseparably, by their mutual action, three Gods.93

Ref. Conf.,Ibid., p. 13194Ibid., p. 13295

CE II,Ibid., p. 273: He [Moses] shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and

performance; but, on the contrary, that though the purposing initiates Gods activity, the accomplishment keeps pace

with the purpose, and that the two are to be considered together and at once, viz. the deliberate motion of the mind,

and the power that effects its purpose. C.f. On Not Three Gods,Ibid., p. 334 cited above in note 89.96

On the Holy Spirit against the followers of Macedonius,Ibid., p. 324


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many different ways to Them. It is at this level that we could say that the economic Trinity

reflects the theologicalTrinity.97

VI. Conclusion

This analysis, I presume, exposes some of the philosophical presuppositions of the

Eunomian system. The method of dialectic and the starting pointsin the ordo theologiaeof

Supreme Being and divine simplicity led to a subordinated structure of Triadology. First we

looked at the definition of what constitutes the Supreme Being as ingenerate and simple. All

the many names that are adequately predicable of this Being converge and are synthesized with

the attribute of ingenerate. Real opposition of terms denotes nature: Ingenerate Generate.

This dialectic of opposition is the way of knowing these distinctions. There is an interposition of

an attribute of energy or will that sustain each lower Being, that is, each energy has a real

existent associated with it.

In summarizing this essay in regard to St. Gregory of Nyssa, we see not only a break with

the dialectic of opposition but even a certain hostility towards it as a method in Theology and

more specifically in knowing and discussing the doctrine of the Trinity. Unlike Eunomius, who

thought that we could speak about the essence of God by the adequate terminology applied to it,

Gregory speaks of the divine names as being something distinct from the ousia of God and are

divine energeiaiaround Him. Gregory recognizes that man cannot comprehend the divine

nature, and that the only name for the divine nature is that it is above all names. Man can never

breach the adiastemic boundary to know the essence of God. Even God as True Being is adivine energeia signifying something around the divine nature. For God is always understood

as the cause of being, who is above all being.98 The bulk of this essay proceeds to evaluate the

divine simplicity for Gregory. Hopefully, it has been demonstrated that it is a non-dialectical

one. One that doesntpreclude multiplicity of distinctions in God, and one that does preclude a

divine simplicity to be construed as a dialectic of opposition between One and Many. We also

noted that divine simplicity was an outcome and conclusion rather than a starting point in doing

Theology. The Hypostases of the Trinity are co-equal since each of the divine appellations can be

predicated to all of them for example: justice, truth, goodness, uncreate, etc. Moreover,

commonality in their acts denotes commonality in nature. In the analysis touching the

procession of the Spirit, particular texts were analyzed to denote again the non-dialectical

97Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic

Tradition, p. 275, 29698

Ecclesiastes 7, 413 (1-4) Gregorii Nysseni Opera; cited in Deidre Carabine, The Unkown God Negative Theology

in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena, p. 238


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method. Weve also brought forth certain texts that seem difficult, and on the face of them,

would seem to take on a similar Neo-Platonic structure as seen in Eunomianism. Two particular

texts in Contra Eunomium I confirm the thesis of this paper. Gregory stringently maintains the

Basilian principle that what is said about more than one Hypostasis is common to their nature,

and what is said about only one Hypostasis is unique to that one alone. We also examined the

idea of the manifestation of the Spirit from the Father through the Son as this will become an

important theme of later Byzantine Theologians.


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Breaking from the Dialectical Method: The Trinitarian Structure of St. Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium