British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 by G. P. Gooch; Harold Temperley;Lillian M. PensonReview by: Sidney B. FayThe American Historical Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Apr., 1928), pp. 648-651Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1839421 .

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648 Reviews of Books

author, however, has written judiciously. Possibly he is a little too severe in his estimate of Brougham's character. On the other hand, it is at least dubious to link the repeal of the Orders in Council (due to Brougham) with the Reform Bill and the Anti-Corn Law League as the three great illustrations of the rise to power of the new industrialists (p. 25).

WALTER P. HALL.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, I898-I914. Volume I., The Enid of British Isolation; volume II., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente. Edited by G. P. GOOCH and HAROLD TEMPERLEY, with the assistance of LILLIAN

M. PENSON. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. I927.

Pp. xxxii, 355; xxxii, 430. IO s. 6 d. each.) JUST as Germany began her documentary publications on the origins

of the war with four-volume Kautsky Documentts on the July crisis of I914, and then followed it with the monumental Grosse Politik on the preceding period from I87I, so England has begun her diplomatic reve- lations by a volume on July, I9I4 (vol. XI., reviewed in this journal, XXXII. 600), and has followed it with these two volumes on the period from I898 to 1904. The editors decided it was not necessary to go back to i87I, but begin with the year I898, when some of the British Cabinet, alarmed by the hostility of France and Russia, desired to substitute a policy of alliances for the traditional principle of "splendid isolation". The editors have wisely followed the German example of grouping the documents topically rather than in a strict chronological arrangement, but not the German practice of appending abundant foot-notes which, though very convenient and helpful to the historian, have been regarded as having a propagandist tendency.

Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley, it hardly needs to be said, have seen to it that the editorial work has been done admirably. They have been able to add to the ordinary diplomatic despatches some interesting " minutes " by Foreign Office secretaries and even by the Prince of Wales (Edward VII.). Those of the latter, however, are so few as to strengthen the impression gained from the documents as a whole, that Queen Victoria's genial son had a less direct influence on British foreign policy than popular imagination commonly attributes to him. In accord- ance with the Foreign Office practice observed in the case of volume XI. " documents containing information supplied or opinions expressed by certain Foreign Governments have been communicated to them for their agreement. The response has been generally satisfactory " (I. vii). We presume that this refers primarily to France, but not to Germany, which did not observe a like courtesy in publishing the Grosse Politik. This may account for some of the numerous asterisks indicating gaps or omis- sions in documents; as a rule, however, these gaps are due to the unim- portance of the matter omitted; only in a few instances, say the editors,

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British Docunients on the Origins of the War 649

are they due to a desire to consult the susceptibilities of individuals or governments.

By the opening of the year I898 many things indicated that England ought to abandon " splendid isolation ": the chronic hostility of France and Russia, the increasing friction with the Boers, the German seizure of Kiauchau, and the Russian economic grasp on Manchuria. So Lord Salisbury turned first to Russia, and on January I9 proposed an entente which should put an end to the long-standing friction between the Bear and the Lion. In view of the complications arising from the decay of the Chinese and Turkish empires, he proposed to harmonize British and Russian policies, not by a partition of territory, but by what he euphe- mistically called " a partition of the preponderance of political influence " But the Tsar and his shifty ministers did not receive the proposal in a way to inspire confidence, and so the British offer, here revealed in detail for the first time (I. 5-4I), was allowed to drop.

Then Mr. Joseph Chamberlain turned to Germany. On March 29, I898, while Lord Salisbury was absent in France for his health, Cham- berlain proposed to the German ambassador an Anglo-German defensive alliance. He was ready to get the treaty publicly approved by Parlia- ment, but this "would not prevent the inclusion in the treaty of one or more secret articles ". This we know from the Grosse Politik (XIV. 193 f.). But the editors of the British Documents say that they find no references to this Chamberlain offer of I898. The only documents which they find relating to an Anglo-German alliance in that year are sugges- tions from the German side. At a shooting party in January, I898, the Kaiser suggested to the British military attache the desirability of some friendly arrangements; at a luncheon at Friedrichshof in August he re- peated the suggestion to the British ambassador; but at a dinner in December he concurred with the ambassador that " there was certainly no necessity for a formal alliance ", because if it became advisable for Eng- land and Germany to act in common the arrangements could be made in twenty-four hours (I. 69, IOO10-5). This extraordinary fact that the British archives contain no mention of this Chamberlain proposal makes it seem likely that it was his own personal venture rather than an official move on the part of the British Cabinet.

The utmost that could be secured between the two countries at this time was the Anglo-German Convention of August 30, I898, for the contingent partition of the Portuguese colonies (I. 44-73). This, how- ever, became a source of irritation and suspicion on Germany's part, be- cause it did not produce the hoped-for results. Instead, Berlin soon ob- served closer relations between Lisbon and London after the visit of King Carlos to Windsor in the spring of I899. And in fact, upon the outbreak of the Boer WVar, by the Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration of October I4, I899 (often inaccurately called the "Windsor Treaty" and supposed to have been signed during the visit of King Carlos), Lord Salisbury renewed the old treaty of i66i. By this England promised to

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650 Reviews of Books

defend and protect all the Portuguese colonies. In return, Portugal undertook not to permit munitions of war for the Boers to enter the Transvaal, and, curiously enough, not to issue any formal declaration of neutrality, inasmuch as that would prevent the supplying of coal to Brit- ish warships at Delagoa Bay (I. 74-99).

After a report on the Von Diederichs-Dewey incident at Manila Bay by the English captain in command there (I. I05 f.), and accounts of the Samoan settlement (I. 107-13I), and the arrangements of the Nigerian boundary with France (I. I32-157), there follow many new and interesting documents on the Fashoda crisis, which were omitted from former official publications but which place the French in a less favorable light (I. I58-I93). A few documents on the Hague Peace Conference (I. 215-232) indicate the general bewilderment and embarrassment with which the Tsar's well-intentioned but ill-digested manifesto was received and then rendered largely abortive. The chapter on the South African WTar (I. 233-277) reflects the general Schadentfreude with which the Continental nations saw the proud Mistress of the Seas engaged in a long, costly, and at first unsuccessful war; it also discusses the various rumors of possible intervention or mediation by France, Russia, or Ger- many.

The complications of the Boxer Revolt and of the Russian penetra- tion of Manchuria led England and Germany to sign the Yang-tsze agreement of I900 for preserving the territorial integrity of China and for keeping her ports open to the trade of all nations on equal terms. Like the Anglo-German Convention concerning the Portuguese colonies, this agreement concerning the Far East was intended to promote the common interests of England and Germany, and improve the friendly relations between them. But it ultimately led to irritation between them, owing to a difference of interpretation as to whether or not it applied to Manchuria; Germany, not wishing to antagonize Russia, maintained that it did not, in which case, said Lord Salisbury, " I am not very much in love with this agreement" (II. 1-31). Further Russian encroachments, endangering Korea, gradually brought about the famous Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January, 1902. The various drafts of this, which editors have interestingly placed in parallel columns, enable the student to trace the views held by the two governments and the processes which led to their eventual agreement (II. 32-59, 89-I37).

In I9OI, there were further negotiations between Lord Lansdowne and the German representatives in London in regard to an Anglo-Ger- man alliance (II. 6o-88). According to the Germans the initiative came from the side of the English; according to these British documents it came from Germany. Perhaps the contradiction is to be explained by an excess of zeal on the part of the German negotiator, Baron Eckard- stein, who may have outrun the instructions of his government. The failure of the negotiations is commonly attributed to Germany's insistence on having the Triple Alliance, as well as Germany herself, included in

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Lee. Edward VII. 65I

the agreement, and to the blunders of Bulow and Holstein in thinking England needed Germany more than Germany needed England. This is in a large part true. But even if Germany had taken up the proposal more cordially, it is very doubtful whether the British Cabinet and Parlia- ment would have ever assented to any such alliance. Lord Salisbury has left on record a strong memorandum against it (II. 68) and his views were shared by the future Edward VII. and probably by a majority of the Cabinet.

More than a third of the second volume is devoted to the Anglo- F'rench Entente of I904. The visit of King Edward to Paris in the spring of I903, quickly followed by that of Loubet and Delcasse to Lon- don, had happily prepared the way. But much of the credit for the speed and success with which the numerous age-long sources of friction were smoothed away by compromise and concession belongs to M. fttienne, the French Colonial Minister, who suddenly broached the first compre- hensive entente proposal in London on July 2, I903, and to Lord Cromer, who was very anxious to get a free hand for the English in Egypt. To be sure, in some of the later negotiations, Delcasse took matters into his own hands behind the back of his Colonial Minister, justifying it perhaps to himself by the fact that he had formerly been Colonial Minister him- self, and understood very thoroughly how far he could go in making con- cessions to England without arousing too dangerous condemnation from the colonial party in the Chamber of Deputies. In view of their later protestations to Germany, it may be noted that the French were very insistent on keeping secret the negotiations concerning the future of Morocco, and declared to Lord Lansdowne that " Germany was the Power which the French Government would like to exclude "; Germany had no concern with Morocco; if at any moment she should attempt to assume a conspicuous r6le, it should be intimated to her that she had no locits standi (II. 275).

On most questions these British Docurments are much less complete and voluminous than the Grosse Politik. This is partly owing to the fact that the British have in the past published much of their diplomatic correspondence in Parliamenttary Papers; but it is partly owing to the more rigid selection exercised by the English than by the German editors. T he period from 1904 to 1914, however, it may be anticipated, will be treated in greater detail; the next eight volumes will be eagerly awaited by grateful students.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

King Edward VII., a Biography. By Sir SIDNEY LEE. Volume II., The Reign, January 22, 190i-May 6, 19IO. (London and New York: Macmillan. 1927. PP. xii, 768. 84 s. for the set.) THE first volume of this biography was reviewed in the American

Historical Revicw, July, 1926 (XXX. 8i8). Unfortunately the author did not live to complete his task, and the present volume, while based in

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