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British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 by G. P. Gooch; Harold Temperley; Lillian Penson Review by: Sidney B. Fay The American Historical Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Oct., 1930), pp. 151-155 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1837662 . Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:22 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 62.122.79.22 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 01:22:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914by G. P. Gooch; Harold Temperley; Lillian Penson

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British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 by G. P. Gooch; Harold Temperley;Lillian PensonReview by: Sidney B. FayThe American Historical Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Oct., 1930), pp. 151-155Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1837662 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:22

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.22 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 01:22:55 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Gooch and Temperley: British Documents 151

alliance. As a result of the controversy, England clinched her hold on Egypt, and the French, after the humiliating test of strength, became in time resigned to British occupation. Formal renunciation of Egypt, of course, was implicit in the accord of April 8, 1904. Thus, " the ground so torn and furrowed by- the Fashoda controversy became in a special sense the fruitful seed-bed of the Anglo-French entente " (p. 208).

On the responsibility for ordering Marchand's advance, Mr. Giffen seems to have overlooked the letters published in Le Matin (June 20-24, I905) by Marchand, Monteil, and Berthelot. Anglo-German relations in I897-I898 are- discussed without reference to the writings of Meinecke and Fischer, while standard works such as those by Fay, Brandenburg, Bourgeois, and Pages are omitted from the bibliography. There are few typographical errors, and the accepted spelling of Omdurman is not fol- lowed. Such slips, however, do not detract materially from the clarity of presentation, lively style, and sound scholarship which make Mr. Giffen's work a distinctive contribution to recent diplomatic history.

The Untiversity of Virginia. 0. J. HALE.

British Documenits on the Origins of the War, 1898-19I4. Edited by G. P. GOOCH, D.Lirr., F.B.A., and HAROLD TEMPERLEY, LiTT.D., F.B.A., with the assistance of LILLIAN PENSON, PH.D. Volume VI., Anglo-German Tension: Armaments and Negotia- tions, I907-I912. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. I930. Pp. lv, 867. $5-25.) THITS volume opens with a chapter on general Anglo-German relations

at the beginning of I907. They were far from cordial. The reasons for this, as sunmmarized by Saunders, the Berlin correspondent of the London Times, in an interview with Billow, were numerous: the impression that the Empress Frederick had not been fairly treated in Germany; the Kruiger telegram; Biilow's remarks about the British army during the Boer War; Germany's policy in Morocco; the idea that Germany, in pursuit of her own selfish ends, was thwarting England's efforts for Macedonliani reform; the hateful attitude of the English and German press toward one another; and, most important of all, " the real crux of the situation ", Germany's determination to build a powerful navy, which conflicted with England's vital necessity of preserving supremacy at sea (PP. I54-I56). Mr. G. S. Spicer, Assistant Clerk in the Foreign Office, however, traced the germs of Anglo-German tension further back: " Ger- man policy for more than 20 years, ever since the time when Bismarck preached the necessity of Germany becoming a colonial-and world- power, can be shown to have followed a line consistently unfriendly to the initerests of Great Britain. From I884 onwards there have been lnumerous quarrels between the two countries, in all of which Germany adopted a deliberately hostile and aggressive attitude towards Great Britain, whiclh was deeply resented by successive British Foreign Secre-

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152 Reviews of Books

taries " (pp. 56-58). He then recites at length incidents relatilig to Ger- man South West and East Africa, the Cameroons, Zanzibar, Egypt, the Yangtze Agreement, Tabah, and visits by crowned heads-in addition to the points mentioned by Saunders. The comments on Mr. Spicer's article by the two most influential men in Downing Street are significant: "A severe indictment of Germany but in my opinion correct" (Crowe); and "A very valuable analysis" (Grey).

Downing Street's endemic suspicion of Germany's policy of aggres- sion which alreadv existed in I907 and which Sir Edward Grey has revealed in his memoirs, was increased during the followinig years by the British and German press, and by the negotiations concerning the Bagdad Railway and naval armaments which fill the greater part of these eight hundred large pages.

The editors have been very wise in including numerous summaries of the German press from Lascelles, De Salis, and Goschen in Berlin, and from Sir Fairfax Cartwright in Munich and Vienna. The sum- maries of the first three were generally fair, sympathetic, and even friendly to Germany, but were often received with cool or skeptical "minutes" by the suspicious officials in London. Cartwright's press summaries, on the other hand, were cleverly written, but betray a lack of sympathy, and even hostility, toward Germany. He emphasized the Anglophobe outbursts of less important South German newspapers. In fact, a comparison of his summaries with the original articles in the German papers shows that he was even guilty of serious misrepresenta- tions. What was his motive? Perhaps it is to be found in the psycho- logical fact that one is apt to attribute motives to others which are really one's own, and he says of Germany's diplomatic representatives abroad: "What occupies their thoughts when writing their despatches is the desire of favorably attracting on themselves the notice of the Kaiser, and they pay little heed to the correctness of -the iniformation they send home" (p. 5). If this was Cartwright's motive, he was eminently successful, for his press summaries received such comments from Crowe, Grey, and King Edward as: " An excellent and valuable report in all respects"; "Most interesting and well worth reading "; " An interesting and suggestive despatch"; "A most able despatch"; "A thoughtful review of the situation"; "I am glad that he is back and that his reports are coming in again" (pp. II, 32, 42, I08)-very different from the critical or

skeptical comments bestowed on the more reliable reports of Lascelles and Goschen. When Lascelles retired from Berlin in I908, Grey proposed to send Cartwright as ambassador in his place, but Cartwright's name had to be withdrawn (p. I85), and instead he was sent to Vienna to take the place of Goschen who became Lascelles's successor. At Vienna, as we know from the recently published Austrian documents, Cartwright soon incurred the ire of Count Aehrenthal, who desired his recall because of his anti-Austrian attitude and his dealings with the press.

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Gooch and Temnperley: British Documents 153

This volume deals with several visits of royalty and their political importance. For the masses, who occupy themselves but superficially with foreign affairs, and who in those days did not see royalty so fre- quently portrayed as in the later movie age, royal visits attracted much attention. For the people, and even for the press, meetings of sovereigns were often the outward and visible sign of supposedly good relations between their countries. Such visits were both an aid and an embarrass- ment to diplomacy. If they helped for the moment to improve the re- lations between the countries represented by two sovereigns, there was always the danger that other countries might fear that the august per- sonages and their ministers were plotting designs inimical to third parties. When Edward VII. visited the king of Italy in April, I907, Berlin was reported to be "stark, staring, raving mad", because of his supposed "intention to isolate and humiliate Germany" (p. 28). When Edward VII. or Lord Haldane visited Germany, or when the Kaiser went to Windsor, the French became very nervous, although Sir Edward Grey was meticulously careful to keep them very fully informed of the dis- cussions and to assure them that nothing would be agreed to without their knowledge. For it was one of the chief preoccupations of Downing Street that nothing should in the slightest way disturb the Entente with France.

When the Kaiser visited Windsor in I907 he told Grey how he had first become interested in the Bagdad Railway (p. 93):

Mr. Rhodes had told him [the Emperor] that he took a map to bed with him every night, and studied what parts of the world there were waiting for European development. He had perceived Mesopotamia to be one of these; and that was the place which Germany ought to take in hand. Mr. Rhodes had said this spontaneously to the Emperor at the very moment that the latter had conceived the idea of the Bagdad Railway, and when there were only four persons-himself, the Sultan, the German Chancellor, and the German Ambassador in Constantinople-who knew of the project. The Emperor had said to Mr. Rhodes: "You are per- fectly right, and that is what we intend to do." Rhodes had promised to do all he could in London to encourage the project. But in I903, the British government, in spite of the personal wishes of Lord Lansdowne and the British bankers, had refused to ap- prove British financial participation in the Bagdad Railway, and thence- forth for years the British government continually obstructed the project which the Kaiser had so fondly at heart. At the Windsor meeting of I907, the Kaiser was willing to concede to England the " gate " to India, that is, the control of the railway section from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. But Sir Edward Grey. out of regard for France and Russia, in- sisted that the negotiations should be a quatrc instead of a' de tt; Germany, unwilling to be in a minority of three to one, did not want to negotiate on this basis, and no understanding was reached (pp. 96 ff., 325 ff.). Moreover Russia, in order to block negotiations, persistently delayed stating her wishes until i910, when, without showing the slightest grati-

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XXXVI.-I I

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154 Reviezus of Books

-tude for Grey's consideration for her interests, she suddenly made a direct deal with Germany behind England's back. Grey also obstructed ani increase in the Turkish tariff, which would have afforded revenues needed by Germany for completing the railway. Less well known is Grey's demanid onl Turkey for a rival railway concession from the Persian Gulf toward the Mediterranean by way of the Euphrates Valley (p. 37I ff.).

Anglo-German naval rivalry is the most important single subject which runs all through this volume. Various proposals were made for relieving the tension caused by it, but lack of space precludes any dis- cussioni of them here. All the proposals came to nothing, chiefly for two fundamenltal reasons-Germany's persistent determination not to cut down by one iota the naval building program announced in I900, but rather to exploit the program to the utmost by building dreadnaughts of a size undreamt ot in I900; and, second, England's fears and suspicions of Germany's bad faith and sinister intentions, both as to an eventual nlaval struggle with England anid as to efforts to break up England's ententes with France and Russia.

Germanly's political folly in sticking to a naval policy which she ought to have realized would drive England into the enemy's camp is now evidenlt enough. Whatever one may think of Germany's arguments that she ought to have a fleet to protect her coast, commerce, and colonies, it was a supreme blunder to antagonize the greatest sea power at the same time that she was antagonizing Russia's land power by support of Austria in the Balkans.

Downing Street's deep-rooted suspicion of Germany is evidenced by the numerous "Minutes ", or official comments, which the editors have so wisely and generously printed with the diplomatic documents. "They [German officials] are none of them to be believed on their word" (p. 533). "The object lesson for us to remember is that there is little regard for truth in responsible quarters at Berlin " (p. 562). And in connection with the Haldane Mission (p. 738):

Germany wants to have an absolutely free hand in dealing with any problem of foreign policy without fear of mneeting with opposition of third parties. She wants to make herself so strong that she can dictate termiis to every Power. . . . She will leave no stone unturned to drive apart if possible the Powers of the Dual Alliance and England, America, and Japan. Nor hlas Germany any scruples of any sort whatever as to the methods to be employed for political ends. Bismarck alnd his successors have recogniized no standard of right and wrong in questions of foreign policy, or indeed in questions of internal policy either.

These Milnutes by Sir Eyre Crowe are typical. As senior clerk in the Foreign Office it fell to him to write the first long comments on dis- patches as they came in. Inevitably his hostile dissection of the reports from Germany greatly influenced Sir Edward Grey and the other officials who next read them, and who generally endorsed with brief comments

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Baernreither: Political Diary I55

Crowe's long criticisms. Crowe appears to have been accepted as an infallible authority on Germany. But unfortunately he was prone to accept baseless gossip as gospel truth. For instance, he cites in igo8 three alleged circumstances as evidence that Germany was making plans for the invasion of England. ( I ) "So great an authority as Moltke regarded the invasion of England as practicable. It is certain that the Great General Staff at Berlin is of the same opinion." (2) " It is only two or three years ago [actually 7 years earlier in 190I] that Baron von Edelsheim, then a captain of that Staff, published, with the authorization of his chief,, a pamphlet dealing in detail With the measures to be taken for the purpose." (3) " Some 2 or 3 years ago, I think, the Emperor with his own hand made a number of blue pencil corrections or alterations in the designs of 2 new liners [of the Hamburg-American Line], then about to be built, because His Majesty maintained that the designs as submitted to him would not permit of these ships taking their allotted part in the transport of 2 divisions to England " (p. II I7). The statements in regard to Moltke, the General Staff, and the Emperor are untrue, and Edelsheim was dismissed from the General Staff because he bad published his pamphlet uwithout the approval of his chief, General von Schlieffen, and because its views were in contradiction with those of the Genera! Staff. One has heard much of the malign influence of Holstein in the Wilhelmstrasse. What of that of Crowe in Downing Street?

Harvard University. SIDNEY B. FAY.

Fragments of a Political Diary. By JOSEPH M. BAERNREITHER. Edited and introduced by JOSEPH REDLICH. (New York and London: Macmillan Company. I930. PP. xxXii 322. $5.00.) THE great Austrian collection of papers dealing with the origins of

the war, recently published, contains some twelve thousand documents dealing with the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy in the years froin 19O8 to I914. This material is more extensive than that we possess on the policy of any other government. It gives a very complete view of the Austrian-Serbian problem as seen by official Vienna, and-the lacunrc are practically negligible. And yet, books like this diary of Joseph Baern- reither will continue to meet with a warm reception from students of pre- war diplomacy. As Professor Redlich points out in his interesting and appreciative biographical introduction, Baernreither was more than the average bureaucrat of the old regime. He had the official experience and the official contacts, but he avoided much of the red tape and most of the traditional ruts. He kept his mind open and insisted on seeing for himself.

The present volume is only part of the extensive diary which Baern- reither kept over a long period of years, but it is probably the most important part, for it deals almost exclusively with the Southern Slav problem, which the writer correctly estimated to be one of life and death for the monarchv, and to which he devoted his untiring attention. The

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