12.6.2014 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 173/19012.6.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 173/190

DIRECTIVA 2014/59/UE A PARLAMENTULUI EUROPEAN I A CONSILIULUIDIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

din 15 mai 2014of 15 May 2014

de instituire a unui cadru pentru redresarea i rezoluia instituiilor de credit i a firmelor de investiii i de modificare a Directivei 82/891/CEE a Consiliului i a Directivelor 2001/24/CE, 2002/47/CE, 2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE, 2012/30/UE i 2013/36/UE ale Parlamentului European i ale Consiliului, precum i a Regulamentelor (UE) nr. 1093/2010 i (UE) nr. 648/2012 ale Parlamentului European i ale Consiliuluiestablishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text cu relevan pentru SEE)(Text with EEA relevance)

PARLAMENTUL EUROPEAN I CONSILIUL UNIUNII EUROPENE,THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

avnd n vedere Tratatul privind funcionarea Uniunii Europene, n special articolul 114,Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

avnd n vedere propunerea Comisiei Europene,Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

dup transmiterea proiectului de act legislativ ctre parlamentele naionale,After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

avnd n vedere avizul Bncii Centrale Europene (1),Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank (1),

avnd n vedere avizul Comitetului Economic i Social European (2),Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (2),

hotrnd n conformitate cu procedura legislativ ordinar (3),Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (3),

ntruct:Whereas:

(1) | Criza financiar a demonstrat c exist o lips semnificativ de instrumente adecvate la nivelul Uniunii pentru a gestiona n mod eficient situaia instituiilor de credit i a firmelor de investiii neviabile sau n curs de a intra n dificultate (denumite n continuare instituii). Aceste instrumente sunt necesare n special pentru a preveni insolvena sau, n cazul n care aceasta se produce, pentru a reduce la minimum consecinele negative prin meninerea funciilor de importan sistemic ale instituiei n cauz. Pe parcursul crizei, aceste provocri au reprezentat un factor major care a forat statele membre s salveze instituiile prin utilizarea banilor contribuabililor. Obiectivul unui cadru de redresare i rezoluie credibil este acela de a evita pe ct posibil necesitatea unei astfel de msuri.(1) | The financial crisis has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at Union level to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions and investment firms (institutions). Such tools are needed, in particular, to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimise negative repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. During the crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member States to save institutions using taxpayers money. The objective of a credible recovery and resolution framework is to obviate the need for such action to the greatest extent possible.

(2) | Criza financiar a cunoscut dimensiuni sistemice n sensul c a afectat accesul la finanare pentru multe instituii de credit. Pentru a evita intrarea n dificultate, cu consecine pentru ntreaga economie, o astfel de criz necesit msuri menite s asigure accesul la finanare, n condiii asemntoare pentru toate instituiile de credit altfel solvabile. Msurile respective implic un aport general de lichiditate din partea bncilor centrale i garanii din partea statelor membre pentru titlurile de valoare emise de instituiile de credit solvabile.(2) | The financial crisis was of systemic dimension in the sense that it affected the access to funding of a large proportion of credit institutions. To avoid failure, with consequences for the overall economy, such a crisis necessitates measures aiming to secure access to funding under equivalent conditions for all credit institutions that are otherwise solvent. Such measures involve liquidity support from central banks and guarantees from Member States for securities issued by solvent credit institutions.

(3) | Pieele financiare din Uniune prezint un nivel ridicat de integrare i de interconectare, multe instituii desfurndu-i deseori operaiunile dincolo de graniele naionale. Intrarea n dificultate a unei instituii transfrontaliere este susceptibil de a afecta stabilitatea pieelor financiare din statele membre n care i desfoar activitatea. Incapacitatea statelor membre de a prelua controlul instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate i de a proceda la rezoluia acestora astfel nct s se evite n mod eficient producerea de daune sistemice mai extinse poate submina ncrederea reciproc a statelor membre, precum i credibilitatea pieei interne a serviciilor financiare. Stabilitatea pieelor financiare este, prin urmare, o condiie esenial pentru instituirea i funcionarea pieei interne.(3) | Union financial markets are highly integrated and interconnected with many institutions operating extensively beyond national borders. The failure of a cross-border institution is likely to affect the stability of financial markets in the different Member States in which it operates. The inability of Member States to seize control of a failing institution and resolve it in a way that effectively prevents broader systemic damage can undermine Member States mutual trust and the credibility of the internal market in the field of financial services. The stability of financial markets is, therefore, an essential condition for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.

(4) | n prezent, procedurile de rezoluie a instituiilor nu sunt armonizate la nivelul Uniunii. Unele state membre aplic n cazul instituiilor aceleai proceduri pe care le aplic altor societi insolvabile; aceste proceduri sunt uneori adaptate pentru instituiile. Exist mari diferene de la un stat membru la altul n ceea ce privete fondul i procedurile prevzute n actele cu putere de lege i actele administrative care reglementeaz insolvena instituiilor din statele membre. n plus, criza financiar a demonstrat faptul c procedurile generale de insolven nu sunt ntotdeauna adecvate pentru instituiile, deoarece ele nu asigur ntotdeauna o intervenie suficient de rapid, meninerea funciilor critice ale instituiei ori pstrarea stabilitii financiare.(4) | There is currently no harmonisation of the procedures for resolving institutions at Union level. Some Member States apply to institutions the same procedures that they apply to other insolvent enterprises, which in certain cases have been adapted for institutions. There are considerable substantial and procedural differences between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which govern the insolvency of institutions in the Member States. In addition, the financial crisis has exposed the fact that general corporate insolvency procedures may not always be appropriate for institutions as they may not always ensure sufficient speed of intervention, the continuation of the critical functions of institutions and the preservation of financial stability.

(5) | Este prin urmare necesar instituirea unui regim care s ofere autoritilor un set credibil de instrumente pentru a interveni suficient de timpuriu i de rapid n cazul unei instituii neviabile sau n curs de a intra n dificultate, astfel nct s garanteze continuitatea funciilor financiare i economice critice ale acesteia, reducnd n acelai timp la minimum impactul situaiei de dificultate a instituiei asupra economiei i a sistemului financiar. Acest regim ar trebui s garanteze faptul c acionarii sunt cei care suport pierderile primii, iar creditorii suport pierderi ulterior acionarilor, cu condiia ca pierderile suferite de fiecare creditor s nu depeasc pierderile care ar fi fost suferite de acesta dac instituia ar fi fost lichidat n cadrul unei proceduri obinuite de insolven, n conformitate cu principiul potrivit cruia niciun creditor nu trebuie s fie dezavantajat, astfel cum este specificat n prezenta directiv. Noi competene ar trebui s permit autoritilor, de exemplu, s menin un acces nentrerupt la depozite i la operaiunile de plat, s vnd dup caz activitile viabile ale instituiei i s repartizeze pierderile n mod corect i previzibil. Aceste obiective ar trebui s contribuie la evitarea destabilizrii pieelor financiare i s reduc la minimum costurile pentru contribuabili.(5) | A regime is therefore needed to provide authorities with a credible set of tools to intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing institution so as to ensure the continuity of the institutions critical financial and economic functions, while minimising the impact of an institutions failure on the economy and financial system. The regime should ensure that shareholders bear losses first and that creditors bear losses after shareholders, provided that no creditor incurs greater losses than it would have incurred if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with the no creditor worse off principle as specified in this Directive. New powers should enable authorities, for example, to maintain uninterrupted access to deposits and payment transactions, sell viable portions of the institution where appropriate, and apportion losses in a manner that is fair and predictable. Those objectives should help avoid destabilising financial markets and minimise the costs for taxpayers.

(6) | Revizuirea n curs a cadrului de reglementare, n special consolidarea rezervelor de capital i de lichiditi, precum i mbuntirea instrumentelor pentru politicile macroprudeniale, ar trebui s reduc probabilitatea unor crize viitoare i s mbunteasc reziliena instituiilor la situaii de tensiuni economice, cauzate fie de perturbri sistemice, fie de evenimente specifice fiecrei instituii. Cu toate acestea, nu este posibil s se elaborareze un cadru de reglementare i de supraveghere care s evite ca instituiile respective s se confrunte vreodat cu situaii dificile. Prin urmare, statele membre ar trebui s fie pregtite i s dispun de instrumente adecvate de redresare i rezoluie pentru a face fa situaiilor care implic att crize sistemice, ct i intrri n dificultate ale instituiilor individuale. Astfel de instrumente ar trebui s includ mecanisme care s permit autoritilor s gestioneze n mod eficient situaia instituiilor care sunt n curs de a intra n dificultate sau sunt susceptibile de a intra n dificultate.(6) | The ongoing review of the regulatory framework, in particular the strengthening of capital and liquidity buffers and better tools for macro-prudential policies, should reduce the likelihood of future crises and enhance the resilience of institutions to economic stress, whether caused by systemic disturbances or by events specific to the individual institution. It is not possible, however, to devise a regulatory and supervisory framework that can prevent those institutions from ever getting into difficulties. Member States should therefore be prepared and have adequate recovery and resolution tools to handle situations involving both systemic crises and failures of individual institutions. Such tools should include mechanisms that allow authorities to deal effectively with institutions that are failing or likely to fail.

(7) | Exercitarea unor astfel de competene i msurile luate ar trebui s ia n considerare circumstanele n care se produce intrarea n dificultate. Dac problema apare ntr-o anumit instituie, iar restul sistemului financiar nu este afectat, autoritile ar trebui s-i exercite competenele de rezoluie fr a se preocupa de efectele de contagiere. ntr-un mediu fragil, pe de alt parte, ar trebui s se acorde o mai mare atenie pentru a evita destabilizarea pieelor financiare.(7) | The exercise of such powers and the measures taken should take into account the circumstances in which the failure occurs. If the problem arises in an individual institution and the rest of the financial system is not affected, authorities should be able to exercise their resolution powers without much concern for contagion effects. In a fragile environment, on the other hand, greater care should be exercised to avoid destabilising financial markets.

(8) | Rezoluia unei instituii care i menine activitatea poate, n ultim instan, s implice instrumente publice de stabilizare financiar, inclusiv trecerea temporar n proprietatea public. De aceea, este esenial s se structureze competenele de rezoluie i facilitile de finanare pentru rezoluie astfel nct contribuabilii s fie beneficiarii oricrui surplus care poate rezulta din restructurarea unei instituii care este readus pe un curs sigur de ctre autoriti. Responsabilitatea i asumarea riscurilor ar trebui s fie recompensate.(8) | Resolution of an institution which maintains it as a going concern may, as a last resort, involve government financial stabilisation tools, including temporary public ownership. It is therefore essential to structure the resolution powers and the financing arrangements for resolution in such a way that taxpayers are the beneficiaries of any surplus that may result from the restructuring of an institution that is put back on a safe footing by the authorities. Responsibility and assumption of risk should be accompanied by reward.

(9) | Unele state membre au adoptat deja modificri legislative care introduc mecanisme de rezoluie a instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate; altele i-au exprimat intenia de a adopta astfel de mecanisme, n cazul n care ele nu sunt adoptate la nivel european. Absena condiiilor, competenelor i procedurilor comune de rezoluie a instituiilor poate constitui un obstacol n calea bunei funcionri a pieei interne i poate frna cooperarea dintre autoritile naioanle n cazul grupurilor de instituii transfrontaliere n curs de a intra n dificultate. Acest lucru este valabil atunci cnd, din cauza unor abordri diferite, autoritile naioanle nu au acelai nivel de control sau aceeai capacitate de a proceda la rezoluia instituiilor. Aceste diferene ntre regimurile de rezoluie pot afecta costurile de finanare ale instituiilor de credit, n mod diferit de la un stat la altul i pot crea denaturri ale concurenei ntre instituii. Existena unor regimuri de rezoluie eficiente n toate statele membre este necesar pentru a garanta c exercitarea de ctre instituii a drepturilor de stabilire pe care le confer piaa intern nu poate fi limitat de capacitatea financiar a statului membru de origine de a gestiona situaia de dificultate a acestora.(9) | Some Member States have already enacted legislative changes that introduce mechanisms to resolve failing institutions; others have indicated their intention to introduce such mechanisms if they are not adopted at Union level. The absence of common conditions, powers and processes for the resolution of institutions is likely to constitute a barrier to the smooth operation of the internal market and hinder cooperation between national authorities when dealing with failing cross-border groups of institutions. This is particularly true where different approaches mean that national authorities do not have the same level of control or the same ability to resolve institutions. Those differences in resolution regimes may affect the funding costs of institutions differently across Member States and potentially create competitive distortions between institutions. Effective resolution regimes in all Member States are necessary to ensure that institutions cannot be restricted in the exercise of the internal market rights of establishment by the financial capacity of their home Member State to manage their failure.

(10) | Aceste obstacole ar trebui eliminate i ar trebui adoptate norme care s garanteze c dispoziiile pieei interne nu sunt compromise. n acest scop, normele care reglementeaz rezoluia instituiilor de credit ar trebui s fac obiectul unor dispoziii comune minime de armonizare.(10) | Those obstacles should be eliminated and rules should be adopted in order to ensure that the internal market provisions are not undermined. To that end, rules governing the resolution of institutions should be made subject to common minimum harmonisation rules.

(11) | Pentru a asigura coerena cu legislaia existent a Uniunii n domeniul serviciilor financiare i pentru a garanta tuturor instituiilor un nivel maxim de stabilitate financiar, regimul de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice instituiilor care fac obiectul cerinelor prudeniale prevzute n Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 al Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (4) i n Directiva 2013/36/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (5). Totodat, regimul ar trebui s se aplice holdingurilor financiare, holdingurilor financiare mixte prevzute n Directiva 2002/87/CE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (6), holdingurilor cu activitate mixt i instituiilor financiare, n cazul n care acestea din urm sunt filiale ale unei instituii sau a unui holding financiar, a unui holding financiar mixt sau a unui holding cu activitate mixt i sunt supuse supravegherii ntreprinderii-mam pe o baz consolidat. Criza a demonstrat c insolvabilitatea unei entiti afiliate unui grup poate avea un impact rapid asupra solvabilitii ntregului grup, putnd astfel avea chiar implicaii sistemice. Prin urmare, autoritile ar trebui s dispun de mijloace eficiente de aciune n ceea ce privete aceste entiti, pentru a preveni contaminarea i pentru a elabora un plan de rezoluie coerent pentru ansamblul grupului, deoarece insolvabilitatea unei entiti afiliate unui grup poate avea un impact rapid asupra solvabilitii ntregului grup.(11) | In order to ensure consistency with existing Union legislation in the area of financial services as well as the greatest possible level of financial stability across the spectrum of institutions, the resolution regime should apply to institutions subject to the prudential requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). The regime should also apply to financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies provided for in Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), mixed-activity holding companies and financial institutions, when the latter are subsidiaries of an institution or of a financial holding company, a mixed financial holding company or a mixed-activity holding company and are covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking on a consolidated basis. The crisis has demonstrated that the insolvency of an entity affiliated to a group can rapidly impact the solvency of the whole group and, thus, even have its own systemic implications. Authorities should therefore possess effective means of action with respect to those entities in order to prevent contagion and produce a consistent resolution scheme for the group as a whole, as the insolvency of an entity affiliated to a group could rapidly impact the solvency of the whole group.

(12) | Pentru a asigura coerena cadrului de reglementare, contraprile centrale definite n Regulamentul (UE) nr. 648/2012 al Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (7) i depozitarii centrali de titluri de valoare, definii n regulamentul care urmeaz s fie adoptat de Parlamentul European i de Consiliu privind mbuntirea decontrii titlurilor de valoare n Uniunea European i privind depozitarii centrali de titluri de valoare (CSD), ar putea s fac obiectul unei iniiative legislative separate care s instituie un cadru de redresare i rezoluie pentru aceste entiti.(12) | To ensure consistency in the regulatory framework, central counterparties, as defined in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) and central securities depositories as defined in Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC could be covered by a separate legislative initiative establishing a recovery and resolution framework for those entities.

(13) | Utilizarea instrumentelor i a competenelor de rezoluie prevzute n prezenta directiv poate afecta drepturile acionarilor i pe cele ale creditorilor. Mai exact, competena autoritilor de a transfera aciunile sau o parte ori totalitatea activelor unei instituii ctre un cumprtor privat, fr acordul acionarilor, afecteaz drepturile de proprietate ale acionarilor. n plus, competena de a decide care datorii ale unei instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate s fie transferate, n conformitate cu obiectivul de a asigura continuitatea serviciilor i de a evita efectele negative asupra stabilitii financiare, ar putea afecta tratamentul egal al creditorilor. Prin urmare, msurile de rezoluie ar trebui s fie luate doar atunci cnd acest lucru este necesar n interes public, iar orice atingeri aduse drepturilor proprietarilor i creditorilor ca urmare a msurilor de rezoluie ar trebui s fie compatibile cu Carta drepturilor fundamentale a Uniunii Europene (Carta). n special, ar trebui ca, n acele situaii n care creditorii din aceeai categorie sunt tratai diferii n contextul unei msuri de rezoluie, aceste distincii s fie justificate din perspectiva interesului public i s fie proporionale cu riscurile abordate i, de asemenea, ele nu ar trebui s aib un caracter discriminatoriu, direct sau indirect, pe criterii de naionalitate.(13) | The use of resolution tools and powers provided for in this Directive may disrupt the rights of shareholders and creditors. In particular, the power of the authorities to transfer the shares or all or part of the assets of an institution to a private purchaser without the consent of shareholders affects the property rights of shareholders. In addition, the power to decide which liabilities to transfer out of a failing institution based upon the objectives of ensuring the continuity of services and avoiding adverse effects on financial stability may affect the equal treatment of creditors. Accordingly, resolution action should be taken only where necessary in the public interest and any interference with rights of shareholders and creditors which results from resolution action should be compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). In particular, where creditors within the same class are treated differently in the context of resolution action, such distinctions should be justified in the public interest and proportionate to the risks being addressed and should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.

(14) | Autoritile ar trebui s ia n considerare tipul de activitate a instituiei, structura acionariatului, forma juridic, profilul de risc, dimensiunea, statutul juridic i gradul de interconectare cu alte instituii sau cu sistemul financiar n general, domeniul de aplicare i complexitatea activitii economice, dac este sau nu membru al unui mecanism de protecie instituional sau al altor sisteme de solidaritate reciproc, msura n care exercit servicii sau activiti de investiii i dac intrarea sa n dificultate i lichidarea ulterioar prin procedurile de insolven obinuite ar putea avea un efect negativ semnificativ asupra pieelor financiare, asupra altor instituii, asupra condiiilor de finanare sau asupra economiei n ansamblu n contextul planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie i atunci cnd utilizeaz diversele competene i instrumente pe care le au la dispoziie, asigurndu-se c procedura este aplicat n mod corespunztor i proporional i c exist o sarcin administrativ minim legat de obligaiile aferente pregtirii planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie. ntruct coninutul i informaiile menionate n prezenta directiv i n anexa la aceasta stabilesc un standard minim pentru instituii cu relevan sistemic evident, autoritile pot aplica cerine diferite sau semnificativ mai reduse n materie de planificare a redresrii sau a rezoluiei i de informare, n funcie de instituie i cu o frecven a actualizrilor mai rar de un an. Pentru o instituie mic cu un grad redus de interconectare i de complexitate, un plan de redresare ar putea fi redus la unele informaii de baz privind structura sa, condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de redresare, precum i aciunile i opiunile de redresare. n cazul n care s-ar putea permite unei instituii s intre n insolven, atunci i planul de rezoluie ar putea fi redus. De asemenea, regimul ar trebui aplicat n aa fel nct s nu pericliteze stabilitatea pieelor financiare. n special, n situaiile caracterizate de probleme mai generale sau chiar de ndoieli cu privire la reziliena multora dintre instituii, este esenial ca autoritile s examineze riscul de contagiere provocat de msurile luate n legtur cu oricare dintre instituii.(14) | Authorities should take into account the nature of an institutions business, shareholding structure, legal form, risk profile, size, legal status and interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, the scope and complexity of its activities, whether it is a member of an institutional protection scheme or other cooperative mutual solidarity systems, whether it exercises any investment services or activities and whether its failure and subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, or on the wider economy in the context of recovery and resolution plans and when using the different powers and tools at their disposal, making sure that the regime is applied in an appropriate and proportionate way and that the administrative burden relating to the recovery and resolution plan preparation obligations is minimised. Whereas the contents and information specified in this Directive and in Annexes A, B and C establish a minimum standard for institutions with evident systemic relevance, authorities are permitted to apply different or significantly reduced recovery and resolution planning and information requirements on an institution-specific basis, and at a lower frequency for updates than one year. For a small institution of little interconnectedness and complexity, a recovery plan could be reduced to some basic information on its structure, triggers for recovery actions and recovery options. If an institution could be permitted to go insolvent, then the resolution plan could be reduced. Further, the regime should be applied so that the stability of financial markets is not jeopardised. In particular, in situations characterised by broader problems or even doubts about the resilience of many institutions, it is essential that authorities consider the risk of contagion from the actions taken in relation to any individual institution.

(15) | Pentru a garanta rapiditatea de aciune necesar, independena n raport cu actorii economici i pentru a evita conflictele de interese, statele membre ar trebui s desemneze autoriti administrative publice sau autoriti nvestite cu competene administrative publice care s ndeplineasc funciile i sarcinile de rezoluie, n temeiul prezentei directive. Statele membre ar trebui s se asigure c acestor autoriti de rezoluie le sunt alocate resursele corespunztoare. Desemnarea de autoriti publice nu ar trebui s exclud delegarea de funcii, sub responsabilitatea unei autoriti de rezoluie. Nu este necesar s se prevad ns tipul de autoritate sau autoriti pe care statele membre ar trebui s le desemneze drept autoritate de rezoluie. Dei armonizarea acestui aspect ar veni n sprijinul coordonrii, ea ar reprezenta un amestec important n sistemele constituionale i administrative ale statelor membre. Este ns posibil atingerea unui grad suficient de coordonare, cu ajutorul unei cerine mai puin intruzive, n virtutea creia toate autoritile implicate n rezoluia instituiilor ar trebui s fie reprezentate n colegii de rezoluie, care ar asigura coordonarea la nivel transnaional sau la nivelul Uniunii. Statele membre ar trebui, prin urmare, s aib libertatea de a alege autoritile responsabile pentru aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie i exercitarea competenelor prevzute n prezenta directiv. n cazul n care un stat membru desemneaz autoritatea responsabil cu supravegherea prudenial a instituiilor (autoritate competent) drept autoritate de rezoluie, ar trebui instituite mecanisme structurale adecvate pentru a separa funcia de supraveghere de cea de rezoluie. Aceast separare nu ar trebui s mpiedice funcia de rezoluie s aib acces la orice informaie aflat la dispoziia funciei de supraveghere.(15) | In order to ensure the required speed of action, to guarantee independence from economic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest, Member States should appoint public administrative authorities or authorities entrusted with public administrative powers to perform the functions and tasks in relation to resolution pursuant to this Directive. Member States should ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to those resolution authorities. The designation of public authorities should not exclude delegation under the responsibility of a resolution authority. However, it is not necessary to prescribe the type of authority or authorities that Member States should appoint as a resolution authority. While harmonisation of that aspect may facilitate coordination, it would considerably interfere with the constitutional and administrative systems of Member States. A sufficient degree of coordination can still be achieved with a less intrusive requirement: all the national authorities involved in the resolution of institutions should be represented in resolution colleges, where coordination at cross-border or Union level should take place. Member States should therefore be free to choose which authorities should be responsible for applying the resolution tools and exercising the powers laid down in this Directive. Where a Member State designates the authority responsible for the prudential supervision of institutions (competent authority) as a resolution authority, adequate structural arrangements should be put in place to separate the supervisory and resolution functions. That separation should not prevent the resolution function from having access to any information available to the supervisory function.

(16) | Avnd n vedere consecinele pe care le-ar putea avea intrarea n dificultate a unei instituii asupra sistemului financiar i asupra economiei unui stat membru, precum i eventuala necesitate de a utiliza fonduri publice pentru soluionarea unei crize, ministerele de finane sau alte ministere relevante din statele membre ar trebui s fie strns implicate, nc din faza de nceput, n procesul de gestionare a crizelor i de rezoluie.(16) | In light of the consequences that the failure of an institution may have on the financial system and the economy of a Member State as well as the possible need to use public funds to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of Finance or other relevant ministries in the Member States should be closely involved, at an early stage, in the process of crisis management and resolution.

(17) | Rezoluia eficient a instituiilor sau a entitilor dintr-un grup active la nivelul Uniunii necesit cooperarea dintre autoritile competente i autoritile de rezoluie n cadrul colegiilor de supraveghere i de rezoluie n toate etapele acoperite de prezenta directiv, de la pregtirea planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie, pn la rezoluia propriu-zis a unei instituii. n caz de dezacord ntre autoritile naionale cu privire la deciziile care urmeaz s fie adoptate referitor la instituii n conformitate cu prezenta directiv, autoritatea european de supraveghere (Autoritatea Bancar European) (ABE), instituit prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 al Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (8) ar trebui s joace, n cazurile specificate n prezenta directiv i n ultim instan, un rol de mediere. n anumite cazuri, prezenta directiv prevede medierea obligatorie realizat de ABE n conformitate cu articolul 19 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010. O astfel de mediere obligatorie nu constituie un obstacol pentru utilizarea, n alte situaii, a medierii facultative, n conformitate cu articolul 31 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.(17) | Effective resolution of institutions or group entities operating across the Union requires cooperation among competent authorities and resolution authorities within supervisory and resolution colleges at all the stages covered by this Directive, from the preparation of recovery and resolution plans to the actual resolution of an institution. In the event of disagreement between national authorities on decisions to be taken in accordance with this Directive with regard to institutions, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) should, where specified in this Directive, as a last resort, play a mediation role. In certain cases, this Directive provides for binding mediation by EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Such binding mediation does not prevent non-binding mediation in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 in other cases.

(18) | n cadrul procedurii de rezoluie a instituiilor sau a grupurilor active la nivelul Uniunii, deciziile luate ar trebui, de asemenea, s vizeze pstrarea stabilitii financiare i reducerea la minimum a efectelor economice i sociale n statele membre n care instituia sau grupul i desfoar activitatea.(18) | In the resolution of institutions or groups operating across the Union, the decisions taken should also aim to preserve financial stability and minimise economic and social effects in the Member States where the institution or group operates.

(19) | Pentru a putea aciona n mod eficient n cazul instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate, autoritile ar trebui s aib competena de a impune msuri de pregtire i prevenire.(19) | In order to deal in an efficient manner with failing institutions, authorities should have the power to impose preparatory and preventative measures.

(20) | Avnd n vedere extinderea responsabilitilor i a sarcinilor ABE prevzut de prezenta directiv, Parlamentul European, Consiliul i Comisia ar trebui s asigure punerea imediat la dispoziie a unor resurse umane i financiare adecvate. n acest scop, procedura de stabilire, execuie i control al bugetului su, astfel cum sunt menionate la articolele 63 i 64 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, ar trebui s in seama n mod corespunztor de sarcinile respective. Parlamentul European i Consiliul ar trebui s garanteze respectarea celor mai nalte standarde de eficien.(20) | Given the extension of EBAs responsibilities and tasks as laid down in this Directive, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission should ensure that adequate human and financial resources are made available without delay. For that purpose, the procedure for the establishment, implementation and control of its budget as referred to in Articles 63 and 64 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 should take due account of those tasks. The European Parliament and the Council should ensure that the best standards of efficiency are met.

(21) | Este esenial ca instituiile se elaboreze planuri de redresare i s le actualizeze n mod regulat, stabilind msurile care trebuie luate pentru restabilirea poziiei lor financiare n urma unei deteriorri semnificative. Aceste planuri ar trebui s fie detaliate i s se bazeze pe ipoteze realiste, aplicabile unei serii de scenarii solide i grave. Obligaia de a ntocmi planuri de redresare ar trebui aplicat ns proporional, astfel nct s se in cont de importana sistemic a instituiei sau a grupului i a gradului su de interconectare, inclusiv prin sisteme de garanii reciproce. n acest sens, coninutul solicitat ar trebui s in cont de natura surselor de finanare ale instituiei, inclusiv finanarea pe baz de garanii reciproce sau pasive, i de credibilitatea perspectivelor de a primi sprijin din partea grupului. Instituiile ar trebui s aib obligaia de a-i prezenta planurile autoritilor competente n vederea unei evaluri complete, care s stabileasc printre altele dac aceste planuri sunt suficient de cuprinztoare i dac ele ar putea restabili la timp viabilitatea instituiei, chiar i n perioade de dificulti financiare grave.(21) | It is essential that institutions prepare and regularly update recovery plans that set out measures to be taken by those institutions for the restoration of their financial position following a significant deterioration. Such plans should be detailed and based on realistic assumptions applicable in a range of robust and severe scenarios. The requirement to prepare a recovery plan should, however, be applied proportionately, reflecting the systemic importance of the institution or the group and its interconnectedness, including through mutual guarantee schemes. Accordingly, the required content should take into account the nature of the institutions sources of funding, including mutually guaranteed funding or liabilities, and the degree to which group support would be credibly available. Institutions should be required to submit their plans to competent authorities for a complete assessment, including whether the plans are comprehensive and could feasibly restore an institutions viability, in a timely manner, even in periods of severe financial stress.

(22) | Planurile de redresare ar trebui s includ posibile msuri care ar putea fi luate de ctre conducerea instituiei atunci cnd sunt ntrunite condiiile pentru intervenia timpurie.(22) | Recovery plans should include possible measures which could be taken by the management of the institution where the conditions for early intervention are met.

(23) | Pentru a determina dac o aciune a sectorului privat ar putea mpiedica ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil intrarea n dificultate a unei instituii, autoritatea relevant ar trebui s ia n considerare eficacitatea msurilor de intervenie timpurie ntreprinse n termenul prestabilit de ctre autoritatea competent. n cazul planurilor de redresare la nivel de grup, la elaborarea planurilor ar trebui s se in seama de posibilul impact al msurilor de redresare n toate statele membre n care grupul i desfoar activitatea.(23) | In determining whether a private sector action could prevent the failure of an institution within a reasonable timeframe, the relevant authority should take into account the effectiveness of early intervention measures undertaken within the timeframe predetermined by the competent authority. In the case of group recovery plans, the potential impact of the recovery measures on all the Member States where the group operates should be taken into account while drawing up the plans.

(24) | n cazul n care o instituie nu prezint un plan de redresare adecvat, autoritile competente ar trebui s aib competena de a solicita instituiilor luarea msurilor necesare pentru remedierea deficienelor majore ale planului. Aceast cerin ar putea afecta libertatea de a desfura o activitate comercial, garantat prin articolul 16 din Cart. Limitarea acestui drept fundamental este ns necesar pentru atingerea obiectivelor de stabilitate financiar. Mai precis, aceast limitare este necesar pentru consolidarea activitii instituiilor i pentru a evita o cretere excesiv a instituiilor sau a asumrii unor riscuri excesive de ctre acestea, fr capacitatea de a depi eecurile i pierderile i de a-i restabili baza de capital. Limitarea este proporional deoarece permite msuri preventive n msura n care acestea sunt necesare pentru abordarea deficienelor i, prin urmare, este conform cu articolul 52 din Cart.(24) | Where an institution does not present an adequate recovery plan, competent authorities should be empowered to require that institution to take measures necessary to redress the material deficiencies of the plan. That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter. The limitation of that fundamental right is however necessary to meet the objectives of financial stability. More specifically, such a limitation is necessary in order to strengthen the business of institutions and avoid institutions growing excessively or taking excessive risks without being able to tackle setbacks and losses and to restore their capital base. The limitation is proportionate because it permits preventative action to the extent that it is necessary to address the deficiencies and therefore complies with Article 52 of the Charter.

(25) | Planificarea rezoluiei este una dintre condiiile eseniale ale unei rezoluii eficiente. Autoritile ar trebui s dein toate informaiile necesare pentru a identifica funciile critice i pentru a asigura continuitatea acestora. Coninutul unui plan de rezoluie ar trebui, totui, s fie proporional cu importana sistemic a instituiei sau a grupului.(25) | Resolution planning is an essential component of effective resolution. Authorities should have all the information necessary in order to identify and ensure the continuance of critical functions. The content of a resolution plan should, however, be proportionate to the systemic importance of the institution or group.

(26) | Avnd n vedere cunotinele privilegiate deinute de instituie cu privire la propria funcionare i la orice problem care poate decurge din aceasta, planurile de rezoluie ar trebui elaborate de autoritile de rezoluie printre altele pe baza informaiilor furnizate de instituiile implicate.(26) | Because of the institutions privileged knowledge of its own functioning and any problems arising from it, resolution plans should be drawn up by resolution authorities on the basis of, inter alia, the information provided by the institutions concerned.

(27) | Pentru a respecta principiul proporionalitii i pentru a evita impunerea unei sarcini administrative excesive, ar trebui ca, pentru cazurile limitate prevzute n prezenta directiv, s se permit autoritilor competente i, dup caz, autoritilor de rezoluie, s acorde derogri legate de diversele situaii individuale de la cerinele legate de ntocmirea planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie. Astfel de cazuri includ instituiile afiliate unui organism central i scutite n totalitate sau parial de cerinele prudeniale din dreptul intern n conformitate cu articolul 21 din Directiva 2013/36/UE, precum i instituiile care aparin unui mecanism de protecie instituional n conformitate cu articolul 113 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013. n fiecare caz, acordarea unei derogri ar trebui s fac obiectul condiiilor specificate n prezenta directiv.(27) | In order to comply with the principle of proportionality and to avoid excessive administrative burden, the possibility for competent authorities and, where relevant, resolution authorities, to waive the requirements relating to the preparation of the recovery and resolution plans on a case-by-case basis should be allowed in the limited cases specified in this Directive. Such cases comprise institutions affiliated to a central body and wholly or partially exempt from prudential requirements in national law in accordance with Article 21 of Directive 2013/36/EU and institutions which belong to an institutional protection scheme in accordance with Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In each case the granting of a waiver should be subject to the conditions specified in this Directive.

(28) | Avnd n vedere structura capitalului instituiilor afiliate unui organism central, n sensul prezentei directive, aceste instituii nu ar trebui s fie obligate s elaboreze fiecare planuri de redresare sau de rezoluie separate doar din cauz c organismul central la care sunt afiliate se afl sub supravegherea direct a Bncii Centrale Europene.(28) | Having regard to the capital structure of institutions affiliated to a central body, for the purposes of this Directive, those institutions should not be obliged to each draw up separate recovery or resolution plans solely on the grounds that the central body to which they are affiliated is under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank.

(29) | Autoritile de rezoluie, n baza evalurii posibilitilor de soluionare de ctre autoritile de rezoluie relevante, ar trebui s aib competena de a solicita modificri ale structurii i organizrii instituiilor direct sau indirect prin intermediul autoritii competente, n vederea lurii de msuri necesare i proporionale n scopul de a reduce sau a elimina obstacolele importante din calea aplicrii instrumentelor de rezoluie i pentru a se asigura c entitilor n cauz li se pot aplica posibilitile de soluionare. Datorit naturii potenial sistemice a tuturor instituiilor, este esenial ca, pentru a putea menine stabilitatea financiar, autoritile s aib posibilitatea de a aplica oricrei instituii procedura de rezoluie. Pentru a nu nclca dreptul de a desfura o activitate comercial prevzut la articolul 16 din Cart, puterile discreionare ale autoritilor ar trebui s se limiteze la ceea ce este necesar pentru a simplifica structura i funcionarea instituiei, exclusiv cu scopul de a spori posibilitile de soluionare ale acesteia. n plus, orice msur instituit n acest scop ar trebui s fie conform cu dreptul Uniunii. Msurile nu ar trebui s conin niciun fel de discriminare direct sau indirect pe criterii de naionalitate i ar trebui s fie justificate de un motiv imperios, i anume de meninerea stabilitii financiare n interesul public. n plus, msurile nu ar trebui s depeasc nivelul minim necesar pentru atingerea obiectivelor urmrite. Atunci cnd definesc msurile care trebuie luate, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s ia n considerare avertismentele i recomandrile Comitetului european pentru risc sistemic, nfiinat n temeiul Regulamentului (UE) nr. 1092/2010 al Parlamentului European i Consiliului (9).(29) | Resolution authorities, on the basis of the assessment of resolvability by the relevant resolution authorities, should have the power to require changes to the structure and organisation of institutions directly or indirectly through the competent authority, to take measures which are necessary and proportionate to reduce or remove material impediments to the application of resolution tools and ensure the resolvability of the entities concerned. Due to the potentially systemic nature of all institutions, it is crucial, in order to maintain financial stability, that authorities have the possibility to resolve any institution. In order to respect the right to conduct business laid down in Article 16 of the Charter, the authorities discretion should be limited to what is necessary in order to simplify the structure and operations of the institution solely to improve its resolvability. In addition, any measure imposed for such purposes should be consistent with Union law. Measures should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality, and should be justified by the overriding reason of being conducted in the public interest in financial stability. Furthermore, action should not go beyond the minimum necessary to attain the objectives sought. When determining the measures to be taken, resolution authorities should take into account the warnings and recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9).

(30) | Msurile propuse n vederea abordrii sau eliminrii obstacolelor din calea posibilitilor de soluionare ale unei instituii sau a unui grup nu ar trebui s mpiedice instituiile s i exercite dreptul de stabilire conferit lor de Tratatul privind funionarea Uniunii Europene (TFUE).(30) | Measures proposed to address or remove impediments to the resolvability of an institution or a group should not prevent institutions from exercising the right of establishment conferred on them by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

(31) | Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie nu ar trebui s se bazeze pe accesul la sprijin financiar public extraordinar i nu ar trebui s expun contribuabilii la riscuri de pierdere.(31) | Recovery and resolution plans should not assume access to extraordinary public financial support or expose taxpayers to the risk of loss.

(32) | Tratamentul grupurilor n cazul planificrii redresrii i a rezoluiei prevzute n prezenta directiv ar trebui s se aplice tuturor instituiilor supravegheate pe baz consolidat, inclusiv grupurilor ale cror ntreprinderi sunt legate printr-o relaie n sensul articolului 22 alineatul (7) din Directiva 2013/34/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (10). Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s in seama de structura financiar, tehnic i economic a grupului relevant. Dac se ntocmesc planuri de redresare i de rezoluie individuale pentru instituii care fac parte dintr-un grup, autoritile relevante ar trebui s ncerce s asigure, n msura n care este posibil, coerena cu planuri de redresare i de rezoluie pentru restul grupului.(32) | The group treatment for recovery and resolution planning provided for in this Directive should apply to all groups of institutions supervised on a consolidated basis, including groups whose undertakings are linked by a relationship within the meaning of Article 22(7) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (10). The recovery and resolution plans should take into account the financial, technical and business structure of the relevant group. If individual recovery and resolution plans for institutions that are a part of a group are prepared, the relevant authorities should aim to achieve, to the extent possible, consistency with recovery and resolution plans for the rest of the group.

(33) | Regula general ar trebui s fie ca planurile de redresare de rezoluie ale grupului s fie elaborate pentru grup n ansamblul acestuia i identific msuri n raport cu o instituie-mam, precum i n raport cu toate filialele individuale care fac parte din grup. Autoritile relevante, acionnd n cadrul colegiului de rezoluie, ar trebui s fac toate eforturile necesare pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun cu privire la evaluarea i adoptarea planurilor respective. Totui, n cazuri specifice, n care a fost elaborat un plan individual de redresare sau de rezoluie, domeniul de aplicare al planului de redresare a grupului evaluat de supraveghetorul consolidant sau al planului de rezoluie a grupului decis de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului nu ar trebui s acopere acele entiti din grup pentru care planurile individuale au fost evaluate sau elaborate de autoritile relevante.(33) | It should be the general rule that the group recovery and resolution plans are prepared for the group as a whole and identify measures in relation to a parent institution as well as all individual subsidiaries that are part of a group. The relevant authorities, acting within the resolution college, should make every effort to reach a joint decision on the assessment and adoption of those plans. However, in specific cases where an individual recovery or resolution plan has been drawn up, the scope of the group recovery plan assessed by the consolidating supervisor or the group resolution plan decided by the group-level resolution authority should not cover those group entities for which the individual plans have been assessed or prepared by the relevant authorities.

(34) | n cazul planurilor de rezoluie la nivel de grup, la elaborarea planurilor de rezoluie la nivel de grup ar trebui s se in seama n mod specific de posibilul impact al msurilor de rezoluie n toate statele membre n care grupul i desfoar activitatea. La elaborarea planului ar trebui implicate autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n care grupul deine filiale.(34) | In the case of group resolution plans, the potential impact of the resolution measures in all the Member States where the group operates should be specifically taken into account in the drawing up of group resolution plans. The resolution authorities of the Member States where the group has subsidiaries should be involved in the drawing up of the plan.

(35) | Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s includ proceduri pentru informarea i consultarea reprezentanilor angajailor pe ntreg procesul de redresare i de rezoluie, dup caz. Dac este cazul, ar trebui respectate n acest sens acordurile colective sau alte nelegeri convenite de partenerii sociali, precum i dreptul intern i dreptul Uniunii privind implicarea sindicatelor i a reprezentanilor lucrtorilor n procesele de restructurare a ntreprinderilor.(35) | Recovery and resolution plans should include procedures for informing and consulting employee representatives throughout the recovery and resolution processes where appropriate. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, as well as national and Union law on the involvement of trade unions and workers representatives in company restructuring processes, should be complied with in that regard.

(36) | Dat fiind caracterul sensibil al informaiilor cuprinse n aceste planuri, informaiile confideniale din planurile de redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s fac obiectul dispoziiilor privind confidenialitatea prevzute n prezenta directiv.(36) | Given the sensitivity of the information contained in them, confidential information in the recovery and resolution plans should be subject to the confidentiality provisions as laid down in this Directive.

(37) | Autoritile competente ar trebui s transmit planurile de redresare i orice modificare adus la acestea autoritilor de rezoluie relevante, iar acestea din urm ar trebui s transmit planurile de rezoluie i orice modificare adus la acestea autoritilor competente, pentru ca fiecare autoritate de rezoluie relevant s fie informat pe deplin i n permanen.(37) | The competent authorities should transmit the recovery plans and any changes thereto to the relevant resolution authorities, and the latter should transmit the resolution plans and any changes thereto to the former, in order to permanently keep every relevant resolution authority fully informed.

(38) | Furnizarea de sprijin financiar din partea uneia dintre entitile unui grup transnaional ctre o alt entitate din acelai grup este n prezent limitat de o serie de dispoziii stabilite de dreptul intern din anumite state membre. Aceste dispoziii sunt destinate protejrii creditorilor i a acionarilor fiecrei entiti. Ele nu iau ns n considerare interdependena dintre entitile aceluiai grup. Este prin urmare oportun s se stabileasc condiiile n care sprijinul financiar poate fi acordat ntre entitile unui grup transnaional de instituii, cu scopul de a asigura stabilitatea financiar a grupului n ansamblu fr a pune n pericol starea de lichiditate sau de solvabilitate a entitii din grup care ofer acest sprijin. Sprijinul financiar ntre entitile unui grup ar trebui s fie voluntar i ar trebui s fac obiectul unor mecanisme de siguran corespunztoare. Este oportun ca statele membre s nu condiioneze, direct sau indirect, exercitarea dreptului de stabilire de existena unui acord privind furnizarea de sprijin financiar. Dispoziiile privind sprijinul financiar intragrup din prezenta directiv nu afecteaz obligaiile contractuale sau statutare asumate ntre instituii i care protejeaz instituiile participante prin intermediul garantrii ncruciate sau al unor mecanisme echivalente. Dac o autoritate competent restricioneaz sau interzice sprijinul financiar intragrup i dac planul de redresare a grupului face referire la sprijinul financiar intragrup, o astfel de interdicie sau restricie ar trebui s fie considerat ca fiind o modificare substanial n scopul revizuirii planului de redresare.(38) | The provision of financial support from one entity of a cross-border group to another entity of the same group is currently restricted by a number of provisions laid down in national law in some Member States. Those provisions are designed to protect the creditors and shareholders of each entity. Those provisions, however, do not take into account the interdependency of the entities of the same group. It is, therefore, appropriate to set out under which conditions financial support may be transferred among entities of a cross-border group of institutions with a view to ensuring the financial stability of the group as a whole without jeopardising the liquidity or solvency of the group entity providing the support. Financial support between group entities should be voluntary and should be subject to appropriate safeguards. It is appropriate that the exercise of the right of establishment is not directly or indirectly made conditional by Member States to the existence of an agreement to provide financial support. The provisions regarding intra-group financial support in this Directive do not affect contractual or statutory liability arrangements between institutions which protect the participating institutions through cross-guarantees and equivalent arrangements. Where a competent authority restricts or prohibits intragroup financial support and where the group recovery plan makes reference to intragroup financial support, such a prohibition or restriction should be considered to be a material change for the purpose of reviewing the recovery plan.

(39) | Pe parcursul fazelor de redresare i intervenie timpurie prevzute n prezenta directiv, acionarii ar trebui s pstreze responsabilitatea integral i controlul instituiei cu excepia cazului n care un administrator temporar a fost desemnat de autoritatea competent. Acetia nu ar mai trebui s pstreze o astfel de responsabilitate odat ce instituia a intrat n procesul de rezoluie.(39) | During the recovery and early intervention phases laid down in this Directive, shareholders should retain full responsibility and control of the institution except when a temporary administrator has been appointed by the competent authority. They should no longer retain such a responsibility once the institution has been put under resolution.

(40) | n vederea meninerii stabilitii financiare, este important ca autoritile competente s fie n msur s remedieze deteriorarea situaiei financiare i economice a unei instituii nainte ca aceasta s ajung ntr-un stadiu n care singura alternativ rmas la dispoziia autoritilor s fie rezoluia. n acest scop, autoritilor competente ar trebui s li se acorde competene de intervenie timpurie, inclusiv competena de a numi un administrator temporar, care fie s nlocuiasc organul de conducere i conducerea superioar ale unei instituii, fie s coopereze temporar cu acestea. Sarcina administratorului temporar ar trebui s constea n a exercita toate competenele de care dispune pentru a promova soluii n vederea redresrii situaiei financiare a instituiei. Numirea administratorului temporar nu ar trebui s aduc atingere n mod excesiv drepturilor acionarilor sau celor ale proprietarilor, ori obligaiilor procedurale instituite n temeiul dreptului comercial al Uniunii sau al celui naional i ar trebui s respecte obligaiile internaionale ale Uniunii i ale statelor membre referitoare la protecia investiiilor. Competenele de intervenie timpurie ar trebui s le includ pe cele deja prevzute n temeiul Directivei 2013/36/UE pentru mprejurri, altele dect cele considerate drept intervenie timpurie, precum i pentru alte situaii considerate necesare pentru a restabili soliditatea financiar a unei instituii.(40) | In order to preserve financial stability, it is important that competent authorities are able to remedy the deterioration of an institutions financial and economic situation before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. To that end, competent authorities should be granted early intervention powers, including the power to appoint a temporary administrator, either to replace or to temporarily work with the management body and senior management of an institution. The task of the temporary administrator should be to exercise any powers conferred on it with a view to promoting solutions to redress the financial situation of the institution. The appointment of the temporary administrator should not unduly interfere with rights of the shareholders or owners or procedural obligations established under Union or national company law and should respect international obligations of the Union or Member States, relating to investment protection. The early intervention powers should include those already provided for in Directive 2013/36/EU for circumstances other than those considered to be early intervention as well as other situations considered to be necessary to restore the financial soundness of an institution.

(41) | Cadrul de rezoluie ar trebui s prevad declanarea rapid a procedurii de rezoluie, nainte ca insolvabilitatea instituiei financiare s se reflecte n bilan i nainte ca toate titlurile de capital s fi fost terse. Procedura de rezoluie ar trebui demarat n momentul n care o autoritate competent, n urma consultrii unei autoriti de rezoluie, stabilete c o instituie este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate i c msurile alternative specificate n prezenta directiv ar putea preveni o astfel de situaie de dificultate ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil. n mod excepionale, statele membre pot s prevad faptul c, pe lng autoritatea competent, i autoritatea de rezoluie poate s stabileasc dac instituia este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, n urma consultrii autoritii competente. Faptul c o instituie nu ndeplinete condiiile de autorizare nu ar trebui s justifice n sine declanarea procedurii de rezoluie, mai ales dac instituia este sau ar putea fi nc viabil. O instituie ar trebui considerat n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate atunci cnd nu respect sau cnd este susceptibil s nu respecte, n viitorul apropiat, cerinele pentru continuarea autorizrii, atunci cnd activele instituiei sunt inferioare pasivelor sale sau sunt susceptibile s devin, n viitorul apropiat, inferioare pasivelor sale, atunci cnd instituia este n imposibilitatea de a-i plti obligaiile la scaden sau este susceptibil s se afle n aceast imposibilitate n viitorul apropiat sau atunci cnd instituia necesit sprijin financiar public extraordinar, cu excepia circumstanelor specifice prevzute n prezenta directiv. Necesitatea unei asistene privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen din partea unei bnci centrale nu ar trebui s fie, n sine, o condiie care demonstreaz n mod suficient faptul c o instituie se afl sau se va afla n viitorul apropiat n imposibilitatea de a-i achita datoriile la scaden. | n cazul garantrii de ctre stat a acestei faciliti, o instituie care acceseaz o astfel de facilitate ar face obiectul normelor privind ajutoarele de stat. n vederea meninerii stabilitii financiare, n special n cazul unui deficit de lichiditate sistemic, garaniile acordate de stat pentru facilitile de trezorerie oferite de bncile centrale sau garaniile acordate de stat pentru instrumentele de datorie nou emise, pentru remedierea unei perturbri grave a economiei unui stat membru, nu ar trebui s conduc la declanarea procedurii de rezoluie, dac sunt ndeplinite anumite condiii. n special, garaniile de stat ar trebui s fie aprobate n conformitate cu cadrul privind ajutoarele de stat i nu ar trebui s fac parte dintr-un pachet mai mare de msuri de ajutor, iar utilizarea msurilor de garantare ar trebui s fie strict limitat n timp. Ar trebui interzis garantarea de ctre statele membre a creanelor din titluri de capital. Atunci cnd furnizeaz o garanie, pentru noile emisiuni e instrumente de datorie, altele dect titluri de capital, un stat membru ar trebui s se asigure c garania este remunerat n mod suficient de instituie. Mai mult, acordarea de sprijin financiar public extraordinar nu ar trebui s conduc la declanarea rezoluiei n cazul n care, cu titlu de precauie, un stat membru devine participant la capitalul unei instituii, inclusiv al unei instituii publice, care i respect cerinele de capital. Un exemplu n acest sens ar putea fi situaia n care o instituie este obligat s atrag capital nou ca urmare a rezultatelor unui test de rezisten bazat pe scenarii de criz sau ale unui exerciiu echivalent desfurat de autoritile macroprudeniale care include o cerin ce vizeaz meninerea stabilitii financiare n contextul unei crize sistemice, instituia neputnd ns atrage capital prin mecanisme private, pe pieele de profil. Simplul fapt c unei instituii i s-a acordat sprijin financiar public extraordinar nainte de intrarea n vigoare a prezentei directive nu ar trebui s constituie un temei pentru ca instituia s fie considerat n curs de a intra n dificultate sau susceptibil de a intra n dificultate. n fine, accesul la facilitile de trezorerie, inclusiv la asistena privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen, oferite de bncile centrale poate constitui ajutor de stat n temeiul normelor privind ajutoarele de stat.(41) | The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution before a financial institution is balance-sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully wiped out. Resolution should be initiated when a competent authority, after consulting a resolution authority, determines that an institution is failing or likely to fail and alternative measures as specified in this Directive would prevent such a failure within a reasonable timeframe. Exceptionally, Member States may provide that, in addition to the competent authority, the determination that the institution is failing or likely to fail can be made also by the resolution authority, after consulting the competent authority. The fact that an institution does not meet the requirements for authorisation should not justify per-se the entry into resolution, especially if the institution is still or likely to still be viable. An institution should be considered to be failing or likely to fail when it infringes or is likely in the near future to infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation, when the assets of the institution are or are likely in the near future to be less than its liabilities, when the institution is or is likely in the near future to be unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or when the institution requires extraordinary public financial support except in the particular circumstances laid down in this Directive. The need for emergency liquidity assistance from a central bank should not, per se, be a condition that sufficiently demonstrates that an institution is or will be, in the near future, unable to pay its liabilities as they fall due. | If that facility were guaranteed by a State, an institution accessing such a facility would be subject to the State aid framework. In order to preserve financial stability, in particular in the case of a systemic liquidity shortage, State guarantees on liquidity facilities provided by central banks or State guarantees of newly issued liabilities to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State should not trigger the resolution framework provided that a number of conditions are met. In particular, the State guarantee measures should be approved under the State aid framework and should not be part of a larger aid package, and the use of the guarantee measures should be strictly limited in time. Member States guarantees for equity claims should be prohibited. When providing a guarantee for newly issued liabilities other than equity, a Member State should ensure that the guarantee is sufficiently remunerated by the institution. Furthermore, the provision of extraordinary public financial support should not trigger resolution where, as a precautionary measure, a Member State takes an equity stake in an institution, including an institution which is publicly owned, which complies with its capital requirements. This may be the case, for example, where an institution is required to raise new capital due to the outcome of a scenario-based stress test or of the equivalent exercise conducted by macroprudential authorities which includes a requirement that is set to maintain financial stability in the context of a systemic crisis, but the institution is unable to raise capital privately in markets. An institution should not be considered to be failing or likely to fail solely on the basis that extraordinary public financial support was provided before the entry into force of this Directive. Finally, access to liquidity facilities including emergency liquidity assistance by central banks may constitute State aid pursuant to the State aid framework.

(42) | n cazul rezoluiei unui grup cu activitate transfrontalier, orice msur de rezoluie ar trebui s ia n considerare impactul potenial al rezoluiei n toate statele membre n care instituia sau grupul i desfoar activitatea.(42) | In the event of resolution of a group with cross-border activity, any resolution action should take into account the potential impact of the resolution in all the Member States where the institution or the group operates.

(43) | Competenele autoritilor de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice i holdingurilor, n cazurile n care att holdingul, ct i o instituie-filial a acestuia sunt n curs de a intra n dificultate sau sunt susceptibile de a intra n dificultate n Uniune sau ntr-o ar ter. n plus, chiar n cazul n care un anumit holding nu este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau nu este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, competenele autoritilor de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice holdingului atunci cnd una sau mai multe instituii filiale ndeplinesc condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de rezoluie, sau o instituie dintr-o ar ter ndeplinete condiiile pentru rezoluie n acea ar ter, iar aplicarea instrumentelor i a competenelor de rezoluie n raport cu holdingul este necesar pentru rezoluia uneia sau mai multora dintre filialele acestuia, ori pentru rezoluia ntregului grup.(43) | The powers of resolution authorities should also apply to holding companies where both the holding company is failing or likely to fail and a subsidiary institution, whether in the Union or in a third country, is failing or likely to fail. In addition, notwithstanding the fact that a holding company might not be failing or likely to fail, the powers of resolution authorities should apply to the holding company where one or more subsidiary institutions meet the conditions for resolution, or a third-country institution meets the conditions for resolution in that third country and the application of the resolution tools and powers in relation to the holding company is necessary for the resolution of one or more of its subsidiaries or for the resolution of the group as a whole.

(44) | n cazul n care o instituie este n curs de a intra n dificultatesau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, autoritile naionale de rezoluie ar trebui s aib la dispoziie un set minim armonizat de instrumente i de competene n materie de rezoluie. Exercitarea acestora ar trebui s fie supus unor condiii i obiective comune, precum i unor principii generale. Odat ce autoritatea de rezoluie a luat decizia de a declana procedura de rezoluie mpotriva unei instituii, procedurile obinuite de insolven ar trebui s fie excluse, cu excepia situaiei n care este necesar s fie combinate cu utilizarea instrumenelor de rezoluie i la iniiativa autoritii de rezoluie. Statele membre ar trebui s fie n msur s confere autoritilor de rezoluie competene i instrumente suplimentare, pe lng cele care le-au fost conferite n temeiul prezentei directive. Utilizarea acestor instrumente i competene suplimentare ar trebui s respecte ns principiile i obiectivele rezoluiei, stabilite prin prezenta directiv. Mai exact, utilizarea unor astfel de instrumente sau competene nu ar trebui s afecteze rezoluia eficient a grupurilor transnaionale.(44) | Where an institution is failing or likely to fail, national resolution authorities should have at their disposal a minimum harmonised set of resolution tools and powers. Their exercise should be subject to common conditions, objectives, and general principles. Once the resolution authority has taken the decision to put the institution under resolution, normal insolvency proceedings should be excluded except if they need to be combined with the use of the resolution tools and at the initiative of the resolution authority. Member States should be able to confer on the resolution authorities powers and tools in addition to those conferred on them under this Directive. The use of those additional tools and powers, however, should be consistent with the resolution principles and objectives as laid down in this Directive. In particular, the use of such tools or powers should not impinge on the effective resolution of cross-border groups.

(45) | Pentru a evita hazardul moral, orice instituie n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui s fie n msur s ias de pe pia, indiferent de mrimea i de gradul su de interconectare, fr a provoca perturbri sistemice. n principiu, o instituie n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui s fie lichidat prin procedura obinuit de insolven. Cu toate acestea, lichidarea prin procedura obinuit de insolven ar putea s pun n pericol stabilitatea financiar, s ntrerup derularea funciilor critice i s afecteze protecia deponenilor. n astfel de cazuri, este foarte probabil existena unui interes public pentru a declana procedura de rezoluie mpotriva unei instituii i pentru a aplica intrumentele de rezoluie n locul recurgerii la procedura obinuit de insolven. Prin urmare, obiectivele rezoluiei ar trebui s fie asigurarea continuitii funciilor critice, evitarea efectelor negative asupra stabilitii financiare, protejarea fondurilor publice prin reducerea la minimum a dependenei instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate de sprijinul financiar public extraordinar i protejarea deponenilor care beneficiaz de acoperire, a investitorilor, precum i a fondurilor i activelor clienilor.(45) | In order to avoid moral hazard, any failing institution should be able to exit the market, irrespective of its size and interconnectedness, without causing systemic disruption. A failing institution should in principle be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. However, liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings might jeopardise financial stability, interrupt the provision of critical functions, and affect the protection of depositors. In such a case it is highly likely that there would be a public interest in placing the institution under resolution and applying resolution tools rather than resorting to normal insolvency proceedings. The objectives of resolution should therefore be to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability, to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support to failing institutions and to protect covered depositors, investors, client funds and client assets.

(46) | nainte de aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie, ar trebui ntotdeauna avut n vedere lichidarea instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate prin intermediul procedurii obinuite de insolven. Atunci cnd se recurge la instrumente de rezoluie, activitatea unei instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui s fie meninut, n msura posibilului, prin utilizarea de fonduri private. Acest lucru poate fi realizat fie prin vnzarea sau fuzionarea cu un cumprtor din sectorul privat, fie prin reducerea pasivelor instituiei, fie prin conversia datoriei sale n titluri de capital, n vederea efecturii unei recapitalizri.(46) | The winding up of a failing institution through normal insolvency proceedings should always be considered before resolution tools are applied. A failing institution should be maintained through the use of resolution tools as a going concern with the use, to the extent possible, of private funds. That may be achieved either through sale to or merger with a private sector purchaser, or after having written down the liabilities of the institution, or after having converted its debt to equity, in order to effect a recapitalisation.

(47) | Atunci cnd aplic instrumente de rezoluie i exercit competene n materie de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s ia toate msurile corespunztoare pentru a garanta c msura de rezoluie este luat n conformitate cu anumite principii, inclusiv cel al participrii n mod corespunztor la pierderi a acionarilor i a creditorilor, cel al nlocuirii conducerii, n principiu, cel al reducerii la minimum a costurilor legate de rezoluia instituiei i cel al tratamentului echitabil al creditorilor aparinnd aceleiai categorii. n special, trebuie ca, n acele situaii n care creditorii din aceeai categorie sunt tratai diferii n contextul unei msuri de rezoluie, aceste distincii ar trebui s fie justificate din perspectiva interesului public i, de asemenea, ele nu ar trebui s aib un caracter discriminatoriu, direct sau indirect, pe criterii de naionalitate. Atunci cnd utilizarea instrumentelor de rezoluie implic acordarea de ajutor de stat, interveniile ar trebui evaluate n conformitate cu dispoziiile relevante privind ajutoarele de stat. Ajutorul de stat poate intra n joc, printre altele, atunci cnd fondurile de rezoluie sau fondurile de garantare a depozitelor intervin n rezoluia unei instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate.(47) | When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should take all appropriate measures to ensure that resolution action is taken in accordance with principles including that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the management should in principle be replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised and that creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner. In particular, where creditors within the same class are treated differently in the context of resolution action, such distinctions should be justified in the public interest and should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality. When the use of the resolution tools involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be assessed in accordance with the relevant State aid provisions. State aid may be involved, inter alia, where resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds intervene to assist in the resolution of failing institutions.

(48) | Atunci cnd aplic instrumente de rezoluie i exercit competene n materie de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s informeze i s consulte reprezentanii angajailor, dac este cazul. Dup caz, contractele colective sau alte proceduri prevzute de ctre partenerii sociali ar trebui s fie respectate pe deplin n acest sens.(48) | When applying resolution tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should inform and consult employee representatives where appropriate. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, should be fully taken into account in that regard.

(49) | Limitrile drepturilor acionarilor i ale creditorilor ar trebui s fie conforme principiilor enunate la articolul 52 din Cart. Prin urmare, instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice doar acelor instituii de credit care sunt n curs de a intra n dificultatesau sunt susceptibile de a intra n dificultate, i numai atunci cnd acest lucru este necesar pentru atingerea obiectivului de stabilitate financiar, n interesul general. Mai exact, instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui aplicate atunci cnd instituia nu poate fi lichidat n conformitate cu procedura obinuit de insolven, deoarece acest lucru ar putea destabiliza sistemul financiar, iar aceste msuri sunt necesare pentru a asigura transferul rapid i meninerea funciilor de importan sistemic i atunci cnd nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil de gsire a unei soluii alternative provenind din sectorul privat care s fie suficient pentru redresarea deplin a instituiei, nici chiar majorarea capitalului de ctre acionarii existeni sau de ctre o ter parte. n plus, atunci cnd se aplic instrumente de rezoluie i se exercit competene n materie de rezoluie, ar trebui s se in seama de principiul proporionalitii i de particularitile formei juridice a unei instituii.(49) | The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should be in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilising the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to ensure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability of the institution. In addition, when applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, the principle of proportionality and the particularities of the legal form of an institution should be taken into account.

(50) | Atingerile aduse drepturilor de proprietate nu ar trebui s fie disproporionate. Acionarii i creditorii afectai nu ar trebui s suporte pierderi mai mari dect cele pe care le-ar fi suportat n cazul n care instituia ar fi fost lichidat la momentul lurii deciziei de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie. n cazul unui transfer parial al activelor unei instituii aflate n rezoluie ctre un cumprtor privat sau o banc-punte, partea rezidual a instituiei aflate n rezoluie ar trebui lichidat n baza procedurilor obinuite de insolven. n scopul protejrii, n cadrul procedurii de lichidare a instituiei, a acionarilor i a creditorilor rmai, acetia ar trebui s aib dreptul de a primi drept plat sau compensare a creanelor n cadrul acestei proceduri, cel puin suma pe care, conform estimrilor, ar fi recuperat-o n cazul n care ntreaga instituie ar fi fost lichidat prin procedura obinuit de insolven.(50) | Interference with property rights should not be disproportionate. Affected shareholders and creditors should not incur greater losses than those which they would have incurred if the institution had been wound up at the time that the resolution decision is taken. In the event of a partial transfer of assets of an institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge bank, the residual part of the institution under resolution should be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In order to protect shareholders and creditors who are left in the winding up proceedings of the institution, they should be entitled to receive in payment of, or compensation for, their claims in the winding up proceedings not less than what it is estimated they would have recovered if the whole institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.

(51) | Cu scopul de a proteja dreptul acionarilor i al creditorilor, ar trebui stabilite obligaii clare n ceea ce privete evaluarea activelor i a pasivelor instituiei aflate n rezoluie i, acolo unde se prevede n cadrul prezentei directive, evaluarea tratamentului pe care acionarii i creditorii l-ar fi primit n cazul n care instituia ar fi fost lichidat n baza procedurii obinuite de insolven. nceperea evalurii ar trebui s fie posibil deja din faza de intervenie timpurie. nainte de luarea oricrei msuri de rezoluie, ar trebui efectuat o evaluare corect i realist a activelor i pasivelor instituiei. Aceast evaluare ar trebui s fie supus unei ci de atac numai mpreun cu decizia de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie. n plus, n cazurile n care se prevede acest lucru n cadrul prezentei directive, ar trebui s se efectueze, dup aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie, o comparaie ex post ntre tratamentul acordat efectiv acionarilor i creditorilor i tratamentul de care acetia ar fi beneficiat n cadrul procedurii obinuite de insolven. n cazul n care se constat c acionarii i creditorii au primit ca plat sau compensare a creanelor echivalentul unei sume inferioar celei pe care ar fi primit-o n cadrul procedurii obinuite de insolven, ei ar trebui s aib dreptul la plata diferenei, n cazurile n care prezenta directiv prevede acest lucru. Spre deosebire de evaluarea efectuat naintea de luarea msurilor de rezoluie, ar trebui s existe posibilitatea de a contesta rezultatele comparaiei, separat de decizia de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie. Statele membre ar trebui s aib libertatea de a decide procedura de urmat pentru achitarea ctre acionari i creditori a diferenei de tratament constatate. Aceast eventual diferen ar trebui pltit din fondurile mecanismelor financiare instituite n conformitate cu prezenta directiv.(51) | For the purpose of protecting the right of shareholders and creditors, clear obligations should be laid down concerning the valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution under resolution and, where required under this Directive, valuation of the treatment that shareholders and creditors would have received if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. It should be possible to commence a valuation already in the early intervention phase. Before any resolution action is taken, a fair and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution should be carried out. Such a valuation should be subject to a right of appeal only together with the resolution decision. In addition, where required under this Directive, an ex-post comparison between the treatment that shareholders and creditors have actually been afforded and the treatment they would have received under normal insolvency proceedings should be carried out after resolution tools have been applied. If it is determined that shareholders and creditors have received, in payment of, or compensation for, their claims, the equivalent of less than the amount that they would have received under normal insolvency proceedings, they should be entitled to the payment of the difference where required under this Directive. As opposed to the valuation prior to the resolution action, it should be possible to challenge that comparison separately from the resolution decision. Member States should be free to decide on the procedure as to how to pay any difference of treatment that has been determined to shareholders and creditors. That difference, if any, should be paid by the financial arrangements established in accordance with this Directive.

(52) | Este important contabilizarea pierderilor n cazul intrrii n dificultate a instituiei. Evaluarea activelor i a pasivelor instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui s se bazeze pe estimri corecte, prudente i realiste, la momentul aplicrii instrumentelor de rezoluie. Valoarea pasivelor nu ar trebui ns s fie afectat n cadrul evalurii de situaia financiar a instituiei. Din raiuni de urgen, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s poat efectua o evaluare rapid a activelor sau a pasivelor unei instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate. Aceast evaluare ar trebui s fie provizorie i aplicabil pn la efectuarea unei evaluri independente. Standardele tehnice obligatorii ale ABE referitoare la metoda de evaluare ar trebui s stabileasc un cadru de principii aplicabile cu ocazia desfurrii acestor evaluri i ar trebui s permit aplicarea unor diferite metodologii specifice de ctre autoritile de rezoluie i evaluatorii independeni, dup caz.(52) | It is important that losses be recognised upon failure of the institution. The valuation of assets and liabilities of failing institutions should be based on fair, prudent and realistic assumptions at the moment when the resolution tools are applied. The value of liabilities should not, however, be affected in the valuation by the institutions financial state. It should be possible, for reasons of urgency, that the resolution authorities make a rapid valuation of the assets or the liabilities of a failing institution. That valuation should be provisional and should apply until an independent valuation is carried out. EBAs binding technical standards relating to valuation methodology should establish a framework of principles to be used in conducting such valuations and should allow different specific methodologies to be applied by resolution authorities and independent valuers, as appropriate.

(53) | Pentru a menine ncrederea pieei i a reduce la minimum contagiunea, este necesar o aciune rapid i coordonat. n momentul n care se stabilete c o instituie este n curs de a intra n dificultatesau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate i nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil ca vreo msur alternativ, a sectorului privat sau de supraveghere, s previn intrarea n dificultate a instituiei ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil, autoritile de rezoluie a