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Buddhist Epistemology (pramāṇa- vāda), and Research in Buddhist Studies Notes for a lecture at the IBC, Summer Course 2008 | Mattia Salvini Having bowed to the One who became a praṁāṇa, who wishes good to the world, to the Teacher, the Sugata, the Protector, a compendium from my own thought, spread in many works, is here made, for the sake of establishing the pramāṇas. 1 Digṅāga Introduction It is common to employ theoretical tools taken from contemporary European philosophies and social sciences to approach one’s research in Buddhist studies. For example, some scholars may employ phenomenology; or, structural anthropology; or, materialist historicism; and so forth. I here propose that many of the difficulties a researcher may face could be tackled, or at least better understood, by employing theoretical tools from within the Buddhist tradition; in particular, from the tradition of Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇa-vāda). The latter was always concerned with finding a suitable way to discuss in a broader (i.e. not necessarily Buddhist) forum. 1 pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine | pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ || Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.1 1

Buddhist Epistemology and Research in Buddhist Studies

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Buddhist Epistemology (pramāṇa-vāda), and Research in Buddhist Studies

Notes for a lecture at the IBC, Summer Course 2008 | Mattia Salvini

Having bowed to the One who became a praṁāṇa, who wishes good to the world,to the Teacher, the Sugata, the Protector,a compendium from my own thought, spread in many works, is here made, for the sake of establishing the pramāṇas.1

Digṅāga

Introduction

It is common to employ theoretical tools taken from contemporary European philosophies and social sciences to approach one’s research in Buddhist studies. For example, some scholars may employ phenomenology; or, structural anthropology; or, materialist historicism; and so forth.

I here propose that many of the difficulties a researcher may face could be tackled, or at least better understood, by employing theoretical tools from within the Buddhist tradition; in particular, from the tradition of Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇa-vāda). The latter was always concerned with finding a suitable way to discuss in a broader (i.e. not necessarily Buddhist) forum.

1. Hetuvidyā and the Five Vidyā s

The general purpose of the five Vidyās | The specific purpose of Hetuvidyā

The practice of debate and discussion is present in all layers of Buddhist literature. In the Sūtras, Buddha Śākyamuni himself often employs vāda; either with non-Buddhist opponents, or as a teaching tool with his own students (who often question the cogency of the teachings). We find debates in Abhidharma texts (like the

1 pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine |pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ || Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.1

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Kathāvatthu, up to the Abhidharmakośa and beyond), and in practically all types of Buddhist śāstras.

Within the Bodhisattvayāna, the science of reasons (hetuvidyā) occupies an important place: it is one of the five sciences that a Bodhisattva has to master in order to obtain omniscience. In fact, it is even said that omniscience consists in the perfection of these five vidyās.

The specific purpose of ‘the science of reasons’ has to do with relating to externals, non-Buddhists. Knowing reasoning, which here must be linked to debate, is the way to convince them of the soundness of the Buddhist doctrines by starting from a common ground.

Texts

From the Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra:

Without having applied oneself to the fivefold knowledge,the supreme Ārya does not in any way reach omniscience.Thus, to subdue or assist others,or for the sake of omniscience, he surely applies oneself to those.

There are five types of knowledge: inner knowledge, knowledge of reasons, knowledge of words, knowledge of medicine and knowledge of topics in the arts and crafts. Here he shows the purpose for which a Bodhisattva should research them: all of them, without distinction, are for the purpose of obtaining omniscience. When we distinguish, moreover, he researches the knowledge of reasons and the knowledge of words in order to subdue others, who have no conviction towards that (omniscience). The knowledge of medicine and the knowledge of topics in the arts and crafts are for the sake of assisting others who need them. Inner knowledge is for the sake of directing oneself.2

2 vidyāsthāne pañcavidhe yogam akṛtvā sarvajñatvaṁ naiti kathaṁcitparamāryaḥ |ity anyeṣāṁ nigrahaṇānugrahaṇāya svājñārthaṁ vā tatra karoty eva sa yogam || 60 ||

pañcavidhaṁ vidyāsthānam | adhyātmavidyā hetuvidyā śabdavidyā cikitsāvidyā śilpakarmasthānavidyā ca | tadyadarthaṁ bodhisattvena paryeṣitavyaṁ taddarśayati | sarvajñatvaprāptyartham abhedena sarvam | bhedena punar hetuvidyām śabdavidyāṁ ca paryeṣate nigrahārtham anyeṣāṁ tadanadhimuktānām | cikitsāvidyāṁ śilpakarmasthānavidyāṁ cānyeṣām anugrahārthaṁ tadarthikānām | adhyātmavidyāṁ svayam ājñārtham || Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra, 11.60:

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From Sthiramati’s commentary to the Madhyāntavibhāga:

Something that should be known is ‘something to be known’: and that is in its entirety the five loci of knowledge. Moreover, those are called: inner, grammar, reasons, medicine, and topics in all the arts and crafts. Un-afflicted ignorance, being an impediment to knowledge in respect to those, is the ‘obscuration to what is to be known’.3

2. Epistemology and debate: Nyāya and Pramāṇa in relation to Vāda

Yogācāra texts on Vāda | Digṅāga and Dharmakīrti | Śāstrasiddhi vs. Vastusiddhi | The Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti ||

The second feature of hetuvidyā concerns more precisely the science of correct argumentation or debate. Debate was the predominant mode of philosophical enquiry in medieval (and possibly, ancient) India, if we go by the texts preserved to this day. Most philosophical texts are in fact in the form of a debate.

Yogācāra authors of the Āgamānuyāyī branch4 composed a few treatises on proper debate: Asaṅga has a section of the Ahidharmasammucaya, further commented upon by Sthiramati, devoted to this topic. Vasubandhu also wrote a short treatise on Vāda.

But it is specifically Digṅāga and Dharmakīrti, who shaped a comprehensive system of epistemology, or pramāṇa, closely linked with the issue of philosophical enquiry as a reasoned (and reasonable) debate.

In this context, Dharmakīrti introduces the distinction between śāstrasiddhi and vastusiddhi. Śāstrasiddhi means ‘establishment according to one’s own school’; vastusiddhi means ‘establishment

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? jñātavyaṁ jñeyam | tac ca sarvātmanā pañca vidyāsthānāni tāni punar adhyātmavyākaraṇahetucikitsāsarvaśilpakarmasthānākhyāni | tatra jñānavibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānaṁ jñeyāvaraṇam || Sthiramati’s sub-commentary on Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya 3.12.

4 Yogācāra philosophers can be divided into two branches. The first is called ‘Followers of Scripture’, (āgamānuyāyī) and comprises, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and so forth. They accept eight consciousnesses, and do not emphasize epistemology in a way comparable to the second branch. The latter is called ‘Followers of Reason’(yuktyānuyāyī), and comprises the school of Digṅāga and Dharmakīrti. They only accept six consciousnesses, and lay great emphasis on epistemology. There is nevertheless a very direct link between the two branches, since Digṅāga is considered to have been a direct disciple of Vasubandhu.

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according to the object’. According to Dharmakīrti, only the second type of establishment has any force in a debate.

For example: sound is considered permanent by some, impermanent by others; the Naiyāyika consider sound an attribute of the substance called ‘space’. None of these specific positions could be taken as a suitable starting point for these philosophers to debate with each other: but sound is itself accepted by all the parties involved, who can use it as a starting point to prove something more about it.

A remarkable text on the importance of reasonable debate as a means to understand reality (tattva) is the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti. In this text Dharmakīrti states (among many other things) that:

deception has no place in a debate;

a debate is for the sake of ascertaining what is true;

one should start from a common ground with the opponent;

digression into irrelevant topics is a cause of defeat.

As we will see, all four points can be helpful in finding a balanced style in academic research.

Texts

From Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya

If you say that those who wish to win, may also debate while employing some deception, we disagree: the śāstras composed by good people do not work where the erroneous perceptions of the wicked have jurisdiction. Those who are bent on helping others do not teach improper behavior, like false speech, aggrandizing oneself, demeaning others, and so forth. Moreover, to obtain profit, respect and praise by demeaning others is not the conduct of good people [...] Therefore, no debate for the sake of winning, is proper. [...] Following reasonable and proper ways is how good people debate.5

5chalavyavahāre’pi vijigiṣūṇāṁ vāda iti cet, na, durnanavipratipattyadhikāre satāṁ śāstrāpravtteḥ. na hi parānugrahapravttā mithyāpralāpārambhātmotkarṣaparapaṁsanādīn asadvyavahārān upadiśanti. na ca paravipaṁsanena lābhasatkāraślokoparjanaṁ satām ācāraḥ. [...] tasmān na yogavihitaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo nāma [...] tad eva nyāyānusaraṇaṁ satāṁ vādaḥ || Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti.

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From the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti: what to do with people who bring up irrelevant topics?

With these people one should simply stop talking: since there is nothing whatsoever that cannot be used by making a digression. (If we don’t accept this), it would then follow that an upholder of the doctrine of no-self might use dance and song to prove it.

In this way: someone may state the following proposition:

We Buddhists say that there is no ‘Self’.

Who are the Buddhists?

Those who accept the teachings of the Buddha, the Blessed One.

Who is the Buddha, the Blessed One?

The one, within whose teachings, the Revered Aśvaghoṣa became an ascetic.

And who is the Revered Aśvaghoṣa?

The author of the drama called Rāṣṭrapāla.

How is this drama, called Rāṣṭrapāla? Making such a digression, the Buddhist may recite ‘at the end of the invocation, enters the stage-manager’, then, he may dance and sing. The opponent may not be able to imitate its entire digression-performance, hence he would be defeated.

What a proper way to reflect upon reality on the part of the learned, honored by the good!6

6 ebhiḥ kathāviccheda eva karaṇīyaḥ, na hi kaścid arthaḥ kvacit kriyamāṇaprasaṅge na prayujyate, nairātmyavādinas tu tatsādhane ntyagītyāder api tatra prasaṅgāt. yathā pratijñābhidhānapūrvakaṁ kaścit kuryāt. nāsty ātmeti vayaṁ bauddhā brūmaḥ. ke bauddhāḥ. ye buddhasya bhagavataḥ śāsanam abhyupagatāḥ. ko buddho bhagavān. yasya śāsane bhadantāśvaghoṣaḥ pravrajitaḥ. kaḥ punar bhadantāśvaghoṣaḥ. yasya rāṣṭrapālaṁ nāma nāṭakam. kīdśaṁ rāṣṭrapālaṁ nāma nāṭakam iti prasaṅgaṁ ktvā nāndyante tataḥ praviśati sūtradhāra iti paṭhen ntyed gāyec ca. prativādī tāṁ ca sarvaprasaṅgaṁ nānukartuṁ samartha iti parājitaḥ syād iti. sabhyaḥ sādhusammatānām viduṣāṁ tattvacintāprakāraḥ. || Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti

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3. Pramāṇavāda as the system of Dig ṅ āga and Dharmakīrti

The importance of correct knowledge in worldly and non-worldly endeavors | Only two pramāṇas | Reasons for accepting only two | How does textual tradition (āgama) fit? | Other views on Pramāṇa

Dharmakīrti starts his short treatise, the Nyāyabindu, by stating that ‘the accomplishment of all human aims is preceded by correct knowledge.’ In other words, correct knowledge has a purpose; and for this reason, one may strive towards such knowledge. In fact, it may be even argued that being capable of a certain efficacy is the mark of existence: what exists can accomplish something. What constitutes accomplishment also depends from our purposes and usages; hence, our initial purpose might be closely linked to the results of our ‘correct knowledge’. This, which may appear as an inversion of Dharmakīrti’s initial assertion, is nevertheless what his system seems to imply; at least, in reference to what we may describe as ‘conventional’ valid knowledge: the knowledge of tables, planets, geopolitics or languages.

His chief commentator further elaborates that Dharmakīrti’s statement shows the purpose of the whole text: because, no cautious (or, sensible) person would start studying something without ascertaining its purpose and value. It would be a waste of time, like studying a treatise on the number of teeth of a crow.

What is to be noticed about Dharmakīrti’s assertion is that it is in no way specifically Buddhist. Firstly, because it is not necessarily concerned with matters of liberation, as he states that all human aims are preceded by correct knowledge. Hence, anyone should have some interest in what he is going to discuss. Secondly, he does not appeal to a specific view of correct knowledge, nor to a Buddhist doctrinal standpoint. He leaves correct knowledge without any further qualifications (although, of course, the reader is going to be shown that correct knowledge is embodied in the Buddhist tenets of impermanence and no-self).

Furthermore, Dharmakīrti accepts only two means of sound cognition: perception and inference. That does not necessarily exclude textual tradition or scripture, but the validity of the latter is not independent from the first two. In any case, the prominence given to direct perception and inference opens the possibility of an enquiry not bound by preconceived or inherited doctrinal standpoints. In other words, if one were to accept the tenet of no-self, it should be due to compelling reasoning, and not merely because the Buddha stated that it is so.

This view about two pramāṇas depends from a specific ontology: it depends on what Digṅāga and Dharmakīrti consider to be the

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possible objects of knowledge. And the latter are only two: the own-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and the generalized-characteristic or the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). The first is unique, lasts only one instant and has either minimal or no extension. The second is a conceptual imputation of similarity, of continuity through space and time: like ‘table’, ‘planet’, ‘I’, and so forth. Because there are only two possible objects of cognition, there are also only two types of valid cognition: direct perception cognizes the own-characteristic, and inference cognizes universals.

Needless to say that most of our ordinary experience is entirely bound within the conceptual and ultimately unreal world of the universals. The scope of Dharmakīrti’s system is to undo one’s habit of freezing instants into continuities, and to let direct perception ‘go with the flow’ of ineffable, selfless moments.

Textual tradition, though, does have a role in Dharmakīrti’s system: through inference, the words of the Buddha can be shown to be reliable, hence they can be resorted to in cases where direct perception and inference do not provide us with any compelling evidence.

I have spoken of Dharmakīrti’s as the system of Buddhist epistemology par excellence. This is partly justified by its great popularity and influence, as well as the sustained attention that this philosophy gives to the question of valid cognition.

Nevertheless, it is important to know that many other schools have discussed epistemological issues and have come up with very divergent solutions. Before Dharmakīrti, we find discussions about valid cognition in the Abhidharmakośa. Yogācāra philosophers like Sthiramati talk about valid cognition in terms only partly similar to those of Dharmakīrti’s school. In Madhyamaka, there have been open divergences (like Candrakīrti’s acceptance of four pramāṇas and criticism of the svalakṣaṇa), or conciliatory stances (like Atīśa, saying that emptiness is not understood through pramāṇas, but pramāṇas are used to help the non-Buddhists understand).

Texts

Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara on the purpose of their work:

The accomplishment of all human aims is preceded by correct knowledge: therefore, the latter is here explained.7

If what is spoken of would have no purpose, then a composition of words for the sake of understanding that, would not be fit to be taken up. Just like,

7 samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasidhhir iti tad vyutpadyate || Nyāyabindu, 1.1

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since the teeth of a crow have no useful purpose, a sensible person should not take up their examination.8

In this way: all sensible people engage in something after having enquired for a purpose in such engagement. Then, for what purpose did the Master compose this work, and for what purpose is it listened to by the listeners? In reference to such a doubt, explanation is declared as the purpose: in order to make correct knowledge explained and oneself as the one who explains, this work has been composed. And this work is listened to by students who want for themselves the explanation done by the teacher: therefore, the purpose of composing and listening to this work is an explanation.9

Digṅāga on the two pramāṇas:

In this context, direct perception and inference are the pramāṇas. Only those two: because, there are two types of characteristic as what is to be cognized by those pramāṇas. Apart from the own-characteristic and the general characteristic, there is nothing else to be cognized by the pramāṇas. Direct perception has the own characteristic as its object, while inference has the general characteristic as its object, as we are going to explain.10

Dharmakīrti’s definition of the two pramāṇas:

Among those two, direct perception is devoid of mental constructs and non-erroneous. A mental construct is an apprehension with an appearance fit to be joined with speech.11

8 abhidheyaṁ tu yadi niṣprayojanaṁ syād yadā tatpratipattaye śabdasandarbho’pi nārambhaṇīyaḥ syāt | yathā kākadantaprayojanābhāvāt na tatparīkṣā ārambhaṇīyā prekṣāvatā || Dharmottara’s commentary on the same.9 tathā hi sarve prekṣāvantaḥ pravttiprayojanam anviṣya pravartante | tataś cācāryeṇa prakaraṇaṁ kim arthaṁ ktaṁ śrtotbhiś ca kim arthaṁ śrūyata iti saṁśaye vyutpādanaṁ prayojanam abhidhīyate | samyagjñānaṁ vyutpādyam ātmānaṁ vyutpādakaṁ karttuṁ prakaraṇam idaṁ ktam | śiṣyaiś cācāryaprayuktām ātmano vyutpattim icchadbhiḥ prakaraṇam idaṁ śrūyata iti prakaraṇakaraṇaśravaṇayoḥ prayojanaṁ vyutpādanam || Dharmottara’s commentary on Nyāyabindu 1.1.

10tatra pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe te dve eva. yasmāt lakṣaṇadvayam |prameyaṃ na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ || Pramāṇasammuccaya 1.2 with Digṅāga’s own commentary. 11 tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanā’poḍham abhrāntam || 4 || abhilāpasaṁsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā || 5 || Nyāyabindu, 1.4 and 1.5.

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Among the two types (of inference), inference for oneself is the knowledge about what is to be inferred, derived from an inferential sign with three aspects.12

The three aspects, moreover, are: the invariable existence of the inferential sign in what is to be inferred; its existence only in similar instances; and its invariable, sure non-existence in dissimilar instances.13

The expression of an inferential sign having three aspects is inference for the sake of someone else.14

4. Academic research as a form of debate

Does the distinction between Śāstrasiddhi and Vastusiddhi help? | Does it affect one’s style? | Is purpose to be taken into account?

The discussion presented so far could help a researcher, if we consider that:

modern academic research is in the form of a debate;

the debate is between people with very different backgrounds and convictions.

In regards to the first point, reading a few pages of secondary literature should suffice to prove it! More specifically, a researcher is expected to situate one’s work within the available literature on the subject: and it is very much likely that one will have at least some difference of opinion with what has already been written. If one does not show one’s differences, it will be difficult to establish any originality in one’s own research. The expectation of originality may be disputed with good reasons: but as the present state of affairs is concerned, research scholars must prove that their research is an ‘original contribution’.

12 tatra svārthaṁ trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānaṁ tadanumānam || 3 || Nyāyabindu, 2.3.

13 trairūpyaṁ punarliṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam || 5 || Nyāyabindu 2.5.

14 trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṁ parārthānumānam || 1 || Nyāyabindu 3.1.

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As for the second point, this may be of particular interest for those who have convictions not very well fitting with mainstream views (in other words, for those who have some striking originality).

Unfortunately, or perhaps comprehensibly, genuine originality can meet with suspicion: only a limited degree of variation is easy to welcome. Openly counterintuitive positions are always difficult to maintain, however many good reasons one may have.

If one, for example, is a Buddhist practitioner, one may accept the doctrine of karman and rebirth as reasonable (in fact, one may be a Buddhist practitioner because he or she thinks that karman is plausible). Since this view is not a commonly accepted paradigm, it would be almost impossible to actively employ it as the basis for one’s arguments or reconstructions. It would also be unreasonable and ineffective, as it would have no weight for most readers.

Here the distinction between vastusiddhi and śāstrasiddhi turns useful. One may employ only certain shared presuppositions (vastusiddhi) and talk of what is more counterintuitive only with a specified context. It does not entail rejecting one’s own conclusions or what one finds more reasonable: but it must be presented skillfully. A further, but important, specification: not all counterintuitive positions are directly traceable to one’s being an ‘insider’ (which means, a direct participant in the object of one’s study: like, a Buddhist studying Buddhism). I will offer a precise example.

In a course on research methodology, all the students were asked whether they felt it was possible that Jesus may have walked on water. I was the only one to raise my hand.

I was immediately (and quite aggressively) attacked by a colleague who even requested that I walk on water then and there to support my position (incidentally, as there was no water in the room, I would have even had to surpass Jesus’ own deed: how to walk on water where there is no water?). The colleague also asserted that ‘academia cannot accept such things’.

To be precise, I have no idea as to whether Jesus did walk on water or not. The question was precise: is it possible? Since I have no way whatsoever to establish that it is impossible, I raised my hand. To say that it is scientifically impossible is in fact contradictory, since scientific laws depend on observation and the possibility of observing a divergent case is the basis to do experiments in the first place. Hence, there is no way to rule out a priori a certain type of empirical occurrence. One may state that, in other words, walking on water is improbable, perhaps even extremely improbable (depending on the extent to which one relies upon the physical

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sciences). But, as I said, I know of no way whatsoever to establish that it is impossible.

We can once again look at the same issue from the perspective of Dharmakīrti’s system of inference. One way in which an inference can be made is through non-perception. Yet, Dharmakīrti is not simply saying that what is not perceived does not exist. He says: what, having obtained the conditions for being perceived, is not perceived, that does not exist. For example, things which are: imperceptible by nature (like, a ghost) or too far in time or place, cannot conclusively be said not to exist. I would say that Jesus walking on water is too far in time and place for me to ascertain conclusively existence or non-existence. This type of caution in asserting non-existence (especially, non-existence in the past) can be sensibly employed while talking about distant histories. At least, I do not feel obliged to uphold positions, which I find inconclusive.

The argument I just made may be convincing to some and not convincing to others. Yet, I doubt that anyone would brush it away hastily as being completely unreasonable or out of bounds. Nevertheless, nobody else in the classroom accepted even the remotest possibility that someone may have walked on water: on the other hand, I was rebuked without being given any logical ground or argumentation. In fact, it was the seminar convener (a senior scholar) who seemed to be the only one sympathetic to my position. After all, if he thought it was entirely senseless, he may not have raised the question in the first place. I would think that a researcher should reflect upon counterintuitive positions, rather than brushing them aside. We (in theory) do research to broaden our horizons of understanding, and not to consolidate preconceived closures.

When I used the term ‘skillfully’ I meant, primarily, with a balanced language. One of the greatest difficulties a researcher has to face is to find one’s ‘voice’; to be able to express oneself in a clear, cogent and not rhetorically charged style. It is usually the style that first jumps to the eyes of a learned reader: many scholars will be rather uncharitable in judging whatever they consider indexes of lesser sophistication. Hence, it is important to aim at clarity, avoid digressions (see above!) and make sure one’s arguments have some cogency.

Regarding cogency and clarity, the system of inference for one-self and for others as explained by Digṅāga and Dharmakīrti is a most useful guideline. This was kindly brought to my attention by one of my supervisors. He noticed that, occasionally, my arguments lacked clarity, skipped some steps, or did not express important logical junctures between paragraphs. He remarked that, being acquainted with traditional Indian scholastics, like the system of anumāna

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(inference), I should be able to express myself in more cogent steps. Following his advice I was indeed able to present my reasoning in a more accessible and coherent style. Buddhist pramāṇa-vāda can be of help in this regard, as it offers an analysis of what an argument does and does not need to express. For example, a syllogism needs to express the inferential sign having three aspects.

A last concern, brought up by Dharmakīrti, and practically every Indian traditional text speaking of one-self, is: purpose. Is it worthwhile and ethical to take into account the purpose and possible benefit of one’s research? Or is more ethical not to bring up the issue, assuming that research is a purpose in itself?

The second position would be reasonable, perhaps, if we accepted the possibility of a pure research, encouraged only for the sake of knowledge in an environment where only knowledge is at stake. We need lots of optimism to see things that way.

The consideration of purpose is a reasonable ethical concern for those who engage in Buddhist studies while being Buddhist practitioners themselves. For example, mithyāvāda, or speaking the false, is a breach of basic discipline. Is not the researcher brought to express positions he or she does not believe in, just due to the pressure of conforming to academic standards? I would say this is at least possible. Moreover, is academic writing useful, or is it uninterrupted chattering (one of the ten akuśalakarmas)? It may be worth asking such questions, especially in respects to one’s own writing.

5. Possible ways to bypass controversies

Focusing on interpretation: the interpreter starts from the presuppositions of the authors interpreted | Employing sophisticated tools: phenomenology? | Remain within close readings of the texts, striving for clarity and balanced expression

To focus the topic on a more specific ‘case study’, I would like to refer to a fruitful discussion I recently had with a senior colleague. The issue at stake was history: in particular, both of us were somehow uncomfortable with the handling of Buddhism as a series of easily reconstructed facts, within which other by-products, like doctrine and so forth, could be placed.

Within such a framework, it would possible to ascertain such truths as the exact date of an author, what could and could not have happened in his life, and so forth. Such detail, which to me would

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seem both unascertainable and uninteresting, may become the bedrock of academic research. Any further analysis becomes a satellite of these, purportedly trustworthy, strings of facts.

For those who are less interested in factual details, dates, and so forth, and who wish to focus more on the meaning or content of one’s object of study, a few avenues are still available even within the present framework.

The first possibility is to focus on interpretation, and to make such a focus clear. This is the solution adopted by my colleague, who can then employ traditional presuppositions about the texts, within the cautionary justification that those are the starting point for the authors he studies. It is a clever move, which avoids one’s engagement with possibly very lengthy and unpleasant controversies.

Alternatively, one may look for relatively sophisticated tools within the social sciences themselves. In the study of religions, phenomenology has been employed with some success by authors such as Eliade, Otto, and so forth. It is in effect unfortunate that, while purporting to employ very modern tools that should ‘refine’ the understanding of Buddhism, ‘insider’ scholars often end up using very uncompromising and over-critical views about traditional positions. Such views are more often than not at odds with the sophisticated approaches that trained historians or social scientists may be familiar with. There are historians who would disown any definition of historical writing that reduces it to a reconstruction of ascertainable facts. What a fact could be is also a rather complex issue (is there such a thing in the first place?) As researchers, we must retain the intellectual freedom to reflect on such issues.

A simpler and reasonable solution is also to remain within a close reading and translation of the texts; to work mostly on the comprehensibility of one’s style, while avoiding excesses that would make it sound ‘odd’. Indeed, one may find out that with a balanced and cogent expression it is possible to say rather counterintuitive ideas without others even noticing.

The latter option should be of some interest to Buddhist practitioners, who wish to write about Buddhism being sincere to their own reasoned convictions. Such sincerity is an ethical responsibility, not only as a Buddhist, but as a human being and a researcher in general: after all, why should we ever be paid to write what we consider untrue? As Dharmakīrti said of his own field:

Treatises on proper reasoning are not composed by good people for the sake of earning profit and the like.15

15 na ca nyāyaśāstrāṇi sadbhir lābhādyuparjjanāya praṇīyante || Vādanyāya.

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शु�भमस्तु� च सर्वे‌षा म� दुः�खि�तु� म स्तु� कश्चन ।

यदि� पु�ण्य� र्वेय� प्रा प्तु � सर्वे य न्तु� पुरं� पु�म� ॥

Bibliography:

Nyyabindu of Dharmakrti with Dharmottara’s k

Malvania, D. (ed.), Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra’s Dharmottarapradīpa, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Institute, 1955 (revised ed.1971)

Pramāṇasamuccaya of Digṅāga with auto-commentary

Steinkellner, Ernst (ed.), Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1, www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf , April 2005

Madhyntavibhgastra with Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya and Sthiramati’s ṭīkā

Pandeya, Ramchandra (ed.), Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971

Mahynastrlakra of Maitreya/Asaga

Bagchi, S. (ed.), Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra of Asaṅga, Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1970

Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti

Gokhale, P.P. (ed. and tr.), Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1993

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