Building community resilience to disasters in WaSH (Water, sanitation … · 2016-08-26 · Post disaster water, sanitation and hygiene (WaSH) recovery support by government and NGOs

BuildingcommunityresiliencetodisastersinWaSH

(Water,sanitationandhygiene)duringrecovery

ThisthesisissubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyatthe

UniversityCollegeLondon

SnehaKrishnan

July2016

DepartmentofCivil,EnvironmentalandGeomaticEngineering

UniversityCollegeLondonGowerStreetLondon

WC1E6BT

2

‘I,SnehaKrishnanconfirmthattheworkpresentedinthisthesisismyown.Whereinformationhas

beenderivedfromothersources,Iconfirmthatthishasbeenindicatedinthethesis.'

Signed:_______________ Date:______________

3

Abstract

Recurring andmultiple disasters affect water and sanitation facilities and disrupt services. The

frequentdisplacementanddisasterlossesinfluencehygienebehaviourandrecoverypriorities.Post

disasterwater,sanitationandhygiene(WaSH)recoverysupportbygovernmentandNGOsandits

linkages with development are under-researched areas. This research explores approaches for

building community resilience in WaSH during recovery using two case studies from Eastern

India,AssamandOdisha.ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools,semi-structuredinterviews,

participant observations,photographs and documents are used to gather qualitative data. The

analysis provides an understanding of WaSH during recovery at different scales including

households,communities,governmentsandhumanitarianagencies.

InAssamandOdisha, therewere changes in hygienepractices, access and availability ofWaSH

facilities,achievedthroughexperientiallearningandagencysupport.Learningwithinhumanitarian

NGOs occurred during implementation, mainly from the communities and technical experts.

Government agencies in Assam focused on flood protectionmeasures, which forced the flood-

affected populations to relocate without any resettlement support. In Odisha, the government

undertook effective evacuation and reliefmeasures and planned for reconstruction, but largely

ignored sanitation. During recovery watersupply was prioritised over sanitation and hygiene,

overlooking gender aspects and menstrual hygiene. Thus, an opportunity during recovery to

influenceWaSHpracticesandtoaddressopendefecationchallengeismissed.Thehumanitarian

actionisfragmentedacrosssectorsthatemphasise,prioritiseproductiveassetssuchaslivelihoods,

andshelteroverWaSHsystems.

Thisresearcharguesforlonger-termandintersectoralrecoveryprogrammesthatreflectcommunity

prioritiesthroughincreasedparticipation.Thiswillhelpintransformingpre-existingWaSHpractices

andattitudestowardssanitation.Thisthesisconcludesthatintegratedapproachesshouldconsider

the pre-disasterpractices, recovery and development plans for effective programming. The

recovery programmes should factor learning and effective participation for building community

resilienceandbringingabouttransformationalchanges.

4

Acknowledgements

InMumbai,myhomewasfloodedduringthedelugein2005.Inmymaster’sthesisfromTISS(Tata

InstituteofSocialSciences),Ihadattemptedtounderstandflood-risks.Thishasbeenthefoundation

ofmyacademicandprofessionallife,whichtookmetotheriverplainsofBihar,Assam,andWest

Bengalinmyinitialyears.ThepresentstudyisdedicatedtothosefamiliesfromAssamandOdisha

whohaveenrichedme,and inspiredme toundertake this research.Most importantly, I extend

sincere gratitude to all the villagers, involved in this study, for their time, patience, openness,

hospitality and generosity. I hope that this research contributes in someway to their lives, by

improvingtheirconditionsandreducingtheirvulnerabilitytothemyriadhazardstheyface.

MyheartfeltandhumblegratitudetoDrsJohnTwiggandCassidyJohnson,whoguided,supported

and ensured I undertake credible research and meet their highest standards. Without John’s

support, this project would not have taken off, for his dedication and mentoring helped me

overcomemanyhurdlesduringthePhD:allowingmetotransferfromvisitingtofull-timestudent

andencouragingmetotakeanothercasestudywhenmyvillageinMorigaonwaswashedaway.

Cassidyhasbeenpatientwithme;herkindnessanddedicationhasinspiredmeendeavourinthe

process.The insightsandunderstandingtheyhavehelpedmedevelophavehelpedmenavigate

throughthisresearchprojectdespitemanyobstacles.ThankstoTakuFujiyama,MarcoFederighi,

andUCLGradSchoolforsupport.IthankBipulBorahandhisfamilyfortheirhospitalityandinsights

intoAssameselifeandculture.Ahugethankyoutodepartmentfriends:Martha,Oriana,Rukaya,

Carina,Viviana,Natalie,Rachna,LeeandAlejandro.KateCrawford,whohelpedmeputthepuzzle-

pieces togetheratcrucial stages,deserveshuge thanks. Ialso thankmy friendsDeepshikhaand

Rahulforstandingwithmethroughout.Myheartfeltgratitudetoallmyhostfamilies:Ranju,Baba

andMainNagaon,RajuuncleandRajiauntyinBlackburn,Amarjeet,Erin,andCassidyinLondon.

ThankstoJanviGandhi,whoprovidedendlesssupportandisafantasticsoundingboard.

Lastly,withoutmyparents-GirijaandH.KrishnanandSharan’slove,affectionandbeliefinme,and

understanding,supportandpatience.

Idedicatemythesistothesethreecheerleadersofmylife.

5

AbbreviationsACF–ActionContrelaFaim

ADB–AsianDevelopmentBank

ALNAP–ActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction

ANM–AuxiliaryNurseMidwives

APHED–AssamPublicHealthEngineeringDepartment

ARWSP–AcceleratedRuralWaterSupplyProgramme

ASDMA–AssamStateDisasterManagementAuthority

ASHA–AccreditedSocialHealthActivist

AWW–Anganwadiworkers

BBB–BuildBackBetter

BBSR–Bhubhaneshwar

BCC–BehaviourChangeCommunication

BDO–BlockDevelopmentOfficers

BWTU–BulkWaterTreatmentUnits

CATS–Communityapproachestototalsanitation

CBO–Communitybasedorganisations

CDPO–ChildDevelopmentProjectOfficers

CFW–Cashforwork

CGI–CorrugatedGalvanisedIron

CHAST-Children'sHygieneAndSanitationTraining

CLTS–CommunityLedTotalSanitation

CSO–CivilSocietyOrganisations

DDMA–DistrictDisasterPreparednessAuthority

DDMP–DistrictDisasterManagementPlans

DIPECHO–DisasterPreparednessECHO(EuropeanCommunityHumanitarianAidOffice)

DRDA–DistrictRuralDevelopmentAuthority

DROP–DisasterResilienceofPlace

DRR–DisasterRiskReduction

DWL–dailywageslabour

DWSM–DistrictWaterandSanitationMissions

6

ECHO – European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (formerly,

EuropeanCommunityHumanitarianAidOffice)

EWB–EngineerswithoutBorders

EFSL–EmergencyFoodSecurityandLivelihoods

FFW–FoodForWork

FGDs–FocusGroupDiscussions

FREMAA–FloodandRiverErosionManagementAgencyofAssam

GB–GreatBritain

GO–Governmentorganisations

GoA–GovernmentofAssam

GoI–GovernmentofIndia

GoO–GovernmentofOdisha

GP–GramPanchayat(GaonPanchayatinAssam)

GRO–Grassrootsorganisations

OSB–OrissaStateBranch

OSDMA–OdishaStateDisasterManagementAuthority

HP–HygienePromotion

IAG–InterAgencyGroup

IDS–InstituteofDevelopmentStudies

IEC–Information,EducationandCommunication

IFRC–InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties

IHHL–IndividualhouseholdLatrines

IIED–InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment

IMD–IndiaMeteorologicalDepartment

INEE–Inter-AgencyNetworkforEducationinEmergencies

INGO–InternationalNon-governmentalorganisations

INR–IndianNationalRupees

IRC–InternationalRescueCommittee

IRCS–IndianRedCrossSociety

KAP–Knowledge,attitudesandpractices

Kg–kilograms

Kmph–Kilometersperhour

7

LA–LocalAgencies

LRRD–Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment

MII/MIII–Mark2orMark3handpumps

MDG–MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

MDWS–MinistryofDrinkingWaterandsanitation

MEAL–Monitoring,evaluationandLearning

MGNREGS–MahatmaGandhiRuralEmploymentGuaranteeScheme

MNP–MinimumNeedProgramme

MoU–MemorandumofUnderstanding

MSF–MédecinssansFrontières

NBA–NirmalBharatAbhiyan

NDMA–NationalDisasterManagementAuthority

NFIs–Non-FoodItems

NIDM–NationalInstituteofDisasterManagement

NGO–Non-governmentalorganisations

NGP–NirmalGramPuraskar

NOC–No-ObjectionCertificates

Novib–AgencyA’saffiliatepartnerfromNorway

NRDWP–NationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgramme

OCHA–UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

ODF–OpenDefecationFree

ODI–OverseasDevelopmentInstitute

OFDA–OfficeofU.S.ForeignDisasterAssistance

ORC–OdishaReliefCode

ORS–OralRehydrationSalt

OSWSM–OdishaStateWaterandSanitationMission

PDM–PostDistributionmonitoring

PDPN–Pre-disasterPreparednessNetwork

PHAST–ParticipatoryHygieneandSanitationTransformation

PHE–PublicHealthEngineering

PHED–PublicHealthEngineeringDepartment

PHP–PublicHealthPromotion

8

PLA–ParticipatoryLearningandAction

PMandE–ParticipatoryMonitoringandevaluation

PoUWT–Point-of-usewatertreatment

PUR–waterpacketsbyProctorandGamble

PVC–Polyvinylchloride

PWSS–PipedWaterSupplyScheme

PWD–PublicWorksDepartment

RCC–ReinforcedConcreteCement

RedR–RegisteredEngineersforDisasterRelief

R&DM–RevenueandDisasterManagement

RDD–RuralDevelopmentDepartment

RO–ReverseOsmosis

RRF–RapidResponseFacility

RTE–Real-TimeEvaluations

RWH–RainWaterHarvesting

RWSN–RuralWaterSupplyNetwork

RWSSS–RuralWaterSupplyandSanitationSchemes

SanCoP–SanitationCommunityofPractice

SBA/SBM–SwachhBharatAbhiyan/Mission(AlsoreferredasCIM–CleanIndiaMission)

SC–ScheduledCaste

SEM–Self-EmployedMechanics

SFDRR–SendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction

SHGs–SelfHelpGroups

ST–ScheduledTribes

SuSanA–SustainableSanitationAlliance

TF–TaskForce

TOT–Trainingoftrainers

TSC–TotalSanitationCampaign

VDCs–VillageDevelopmentCommittees

WaSH–Water,SanitationandHygiene

WEDC–Water,EngineeringandDevelopmentCentre

WHO–WorldHealthOrganisation

9

WRD–WaterResourcesDepartment

WSSO–Watersupplyandsupportorganisation

UCT–UnconditionalCashTransfers

UKAID–UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(formerlyknownasDFID)

UNCRPD–UnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities

UNHCR–UNHighCommissionerforRefugees

UNICEF–UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

UNCESCR–UNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights

UNCRPD–UnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities

VDC–VillageDevelopmentCommittees

10

Glossary

Ahom:LocalindigenouspeoplefromAssam

Anganwadi:courtyardshelterusedasschoolsfor0-6yearsoldchildren

Baanpani:floods

Bodo:Assameseindigenoustribes

Borakhun:heavyrains

Chappals:footwear

Chaporis:Assamesetermforchars–unstableandtemporarylandformationsintheriver

Chars:fertilepatchoflandgeneratedintheriverinBangladesh,atermcommonlyusedinAssam

Chotai:matsmadeofjute

Chullas:traditionalruralcookingstove

Crèches:spaceforbabiesandyoungchildrenforcareduringtheworkinghours

Crores:tenmillion(10,000,000)

deuterolearning:theskillinhandlingandinfluencingcapacitiesforself-organisationby‘learningto

understand’

hectares:ametricunitofsquaremeasure,equalto100acres

jobcard:arecordcardundertheMGNREGSgivingdetailsofthetimetakentodoapieceofwork

Jhali:nettedfilter

jhadoo:broom

Kaccha:temporary

Kacharigaon:campsettlement

Kolshi:traditionalwaterpotsmadeofaluminium

Lakh:ahundredthousand

Log frame: tool for improving the planning, implementation, management, monitoring and

evaluationofprojects

Mishing:alocaltribelivinginupperreachesofBrahmaputra,alsocalledasfloodpeopleofAssam

Mistry:Technician,artist

NaDCC–SodiumDichloroisocyanurate(TrocloseneSodium),aformofchlorinefordisinfection.

Nagmagic:Brandoftoiletsquatslabs

Panchayat:avillagecouncil

Paakghar:traditionalAssamesekitchen

11

pH:ameasureofhowacidic/basicwateris

Purdah:gender-basedsegregationandseclusionnormswherewomencovertheirfaceswithveils

Pukka:concrete,permanent

Rabi:wintercrops

Saree:Indianwomen’sattirethatwomendrapearoundthebody

Sahis:hamlet,smallerunitofavillageinOdisha

Sarpanch:Villageheadman

Setu:bridge

Sitreps:situationreports

1GBP=100INR

12

TableofcontentsAbstract.........................................................................................................................................................3

Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................4

Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................................5

Glossary.....................................................................................................................................................10

Listoftables.............................................................................................................................................16

Listoffigures............................................................................................................................................17

Listofimages...........................................................................................................................................18

Listofannexures.....................................................................................................................................20

Chapter1:Introduction........................................................................................................................211.1ResearchTopicandcontext....................................................................................................................211.1.1Assamcasestudy.....................................................................................................................................................231.1.2Odishacasestudy.....................................................................................................................................................231.1.3Landscapeofhumanitarianaidintheregion..............................................................................................231.1.4Implementinginstitutionsintheregion........................................................................................................24

1.2ResearchQuestionsandObjectives......................................................................................................261.3ThesisOutline..............................................................................................................................................27

Chapter2:Literaturereview..............................................................................................................292.1Post-disasterrecovery..............................................................................................................................292.1.1Multidimensionalityofrecovery.......................................................................................................................292.1.2ContextofRecovery................................................................................................................................................312.1.3Disasterrecoveryobjectives...............................................................................................................................342.1.4Recoveryapproachesandstrategies...............................................................................................................39

2.2Water,SanitationandHygiene...............................................................................................................432.2.1AccesstoWater,Sanitation,andHygiene.....................................................................................................432.2.2EmergencyWaSH.....................................................................................................................................................482.2.3WaSHduringrecovery...........................................................................................................................................57

2.3ChapterSummary.......................................................................................................................................60

Chapter3:Conceptualframework....................................................................................................613.1Theconceptofresilience.........................................................................................................................613.1.1Vulnerability,RiskandCapacity........................................................................................................................61

13

3.1.2Communityresiliencetodisasters...................................................................................................................623.2Systemsthinkingandresilience............................................................................................................703.3ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery.........................................................................723.4Learningandknowledge..........................................................................................................................733.5Institutionalcapacities.............................................................................................................................773.6Participation.................................................................................................................................................783.7Integration....................................................................................................................................................803.8ChapterSummary.......................................................................................................................................81

Chapter4:Methodology.......................................................................................................................824.1Researchstrategy.......................................................................................................................................824.1.1ResearchProcess.....................................................................................................................................................834.1.2Casestudyapproach...............................................................................................................................................884.1.3Selectionofcasestudies.......................................................................................................................................89

4.2DataCollectionMethods...........................................................................................................................934.2.1ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools...........................................................................................944.2.2Interviews...................................................................................................................................................................994.2.3Documents...............................................................................................................................................................1014.2.4 Participantobservationandphotographs............................................................................................101

4.3Roleofpractitionerinresearch...........................................................................................................1024.3.1Biasesandethicsasresearcher......................................................................................................................104

4.4AnalyticalStrategy...................................................................................................................................106

Chapter5:AssamCaseStudy............................................................................................................1095.1 Assamfloods2012-13......................................................................................................................1095.2HouseholdWaSH.......................................................................................................................................1135.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH................................................................................................................................................1135.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH......................................................................................................1155.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps........................................................................................................................1185.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation.................................................................................................................................1225.2.5Recurringdisasters’impactonhouseholdWaSHsystemsduringrelocation............................124

5.3CommunityPost-DisasterRecovery...................................................................................................1305.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel.....................................................................................................................1305.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery...............................................................................................................137

5.4LocalinstitutionsinAssam....................................................................................................................1395.5 GovernmentAgencies’response..................................................................................................1425.5.1WaSHresponse......................................................................................................................................................142

14

5.5.2Longer-termrecoverymeasures....................................................................................................................1445.6HumanitarianAgencies’response......................................................................................................1475.6.1AgencyAWaSHResponseProgramme.......................................................................................................1475.6.2Institutionalapproachesandcapacities.....................................................................................................1535.6.3Consortium-basedandcollaborativeefforts............................................................................................157

5.7ChapterSummary.....................................................................................................................................159

Chapter6:OdishaCaseStudy...........................................................................................................1606.1CyclonePhailinandfloods,2013........................................................................................................1606.1.1Timelineofevents................................................................................................................................................162

6.2HouseholdWaSH.......................................................................................................................................1656.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH................................................................................................................................................1666.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH......................................................................................................1716.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps........................................................................................................................1746.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation.................................................................................................................................176

6.3CommunityPost-Disasterrecovery....................................................................................................1836.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel.....................................................................................................................1836.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery...............................................................................................................185

6.4LocalinstitutionsinOdisha...................................................................................................................1876.5GovernmentAgencies’response.........................................................................................................1906.5.1WaSHresponse......................................................................................................................................................1906.5.2Immediatereliefandrehabilitationmeasures.........................................................................................1916.5.3Recoveryandreconstructioninitiatives.....................................................................................................192

6.6HumanitarianAgencies’response......................................................................................................1936.6.1AgencyAResponseProgramme.....................................................................................................................1936.6.2Integratedapproachesinrecovery...............................................................................................................1996.6.3Consortium-basedapproachesinOdisha...................................................................................................201

6.7ChapterSummary.....................................................................................................................................205

Chapter7:Discussion..........................................................................................................................2067.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate

resilienceinWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedinto

practice?..............................................................................................................................................................2067.1.1IssuesinWaSHmeasuresduringRecovery..............................................................................................2067.1.2PoliciesandschemesrelatedtoWaSHandRecovery...........................................................................2087.1.3HumanitarianWaSHprogrammingandrecovery..................................................................................214

15

7.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthe

windowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?......................................................2167.2.1LearningapproachesinWaSHduringrecovery......................................................................................2167.2.2Knowledgeapproaches......................................................................................................................................2227.2.3Participatoryapproaches..................................................................................................................................224

7.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-

termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?..........................................................................................2277.3.1LRRDapproachandpreparedness................................................................................................................2277.3.2Inter-sectorintegration......................................................................................................................................229

7.4Reflectingontheresearchframeworkandquestions.................................................................2317.5Emergingthemesfromtheempiricalevidence..............................................................................2357.5.1WaSHTrajectoriesduringRecovery............................................................................................................2367.5.2GenderedrecoveryprocessesinWaSH......................................................................................................2427.5.3Coproductionofknowledge.............................................................................................................................245

Chapter8:Conclusions.......................................................................................................................2468.1AnsweringtheResearchQuestions....................................................................................................2468.1.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate

resilienceinWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?

..................................................................................................................................................................................................2468.1.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow

ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?....................................................................................2488.1.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term

developmentacrossdifferentsectors?...................................................................................................................2508.1.4Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,andhygiene

practices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?...................2518.2TheoreticalImplications........................................................................................................................2538.3Contributiontoknowledge...................................................................................................................2558.4Keyrecommendations............................................................................................................................2568.5Issuesforfurtherresearch....................................................................................................................258

Bibliography...........................................................................................................................................260

Annexures...............................................................................................................................................279

16

ListoftablesTable2.1:State-of-artofrecoveryliteratureonobjectivesandapproaches(Source:Author)......38

Table2.2:CriteriaoftheHumanRighttoWaterandSanitation(Source:Greene,2014)..............47

Table2.3:SphereIndicatorsforWaSH(Sphere2011)....................................................................48

Table4.1:ResearchDesign:Timelineofactivities..........................................................................84

Table4.2:SelectioncriteriawithinAssam......................................................................................91

Table4.3:SelectioncriteriainOdisha.............................................................................................92

Table4.4:ResearchmethodsusedinAssamandOdisha...............................................................94

Table4.5:Summaryofinterviewsacrosscasestudies.................................................................100

Table5.1:Theconsecutiveflood-wavesin2012and2013(ASDMA2012b)................................109

Table5.2:DisasterdamagesinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts(Source,ASDMA).....................111

Table5.3:Changesinwaterandsanitationatcommunitylevel...................................................134

Table5.4:CommunityprioritiesinSolmariandBoramari,2013..................................................137

Table5.5:Localactors’responseinAssamandroleforlong-termrecovery...............................141

Table 5. 6: Monetary compensation to damaged households in Sonitpur, Assam 2012 (Source:

BiswanathCircleoffice,2012)........................................................................................................144

Table6.1:TimelineofeventsinOdisha,October2013-March2014(Source:AgencyA)...........162

Table6.2:TypologyofstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore(Source:AgencyA,2014)...................166

Table6.3:ImmediatewatersupplymeasuresbyAgencyA(October–December2013)............177

Table6.4:ChangesinWaSHpracticesinPuriandBalasorevillages(author’sinterpretation).....184

Table6.5:CommunityprioritiesinstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore.........................................186

Table6.6:Localactors’responseinOdishaandroleforlong-termrecovery...............................189

Table6.7:AgencyACycloneandfloodresponse2013-14,Odisha...............................................193

Table6.8:WaSHmeasuresinOdishaason21stFebruary2014...................................................195

Table6.9:Integratedactivitiesincashforwork(CFW)andWaSH...............................................200

Table7.1:GapAnalysisofWaSHanddisastermanagementpoliciesinIndia(Source:Author)...209

17

Listoffigures

Figure2.1:Ladderofcommunityparticipation(Davidsonetal.2007)........................................422

Figure2.2WaSHinterventionscategories(AdaptedfromFewtrelletal.,2005)............................49

Figure2.3:Diseasetransmissionpathwaysoffaeco-oraldiseases(Prüss-üstünetal.n.d.)...........55

Figure2.4:HygieneimprovementframeworkSource:Sphere(2011)............................................56

Figure3.1:Aspectsofresilienceconceptualisation(Author’sinterpretation)................................66

Figure3.2:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery..................73

Figure4.1:Integrationofdifferentmethods..................................................................................93

Figure4.2:Listofactorsinvolvedinwater,sanitation,andhygieneservicesinSolmari...............96

Figure5.1:Flood-affecteddistrictsin2012(AdaptedfromIFRC,2012).......................................110

Figure5.2:Mapofaffectedarea inBiswanath,Sonitpur(Source:NaduarCircleOffice,Sonitpur)

........................................................................................................................................................111

Figure5.3:ImpactoffloodsonWaSHfacilities(Source:PHED,Sonitpur2012)...........................142

Figure6.1:MapindicatingaffecteddistrictsinOdishabycyclonePhailinandfloodsandAgencyA

interventionareasin2013-14(AdaptedfromMapAction,28October2013)..............................160

Figure6.2HouseholdkititemsandquantityofNFIkitsprovidedbyAgencyA............................164

Figure7.1:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery................232

Figure7.2:HouseholdTrajectoriesinWaSHduringrecovery........................................................237

18

ListofimagesImage5.1:Kolshiatraditionalpotusedforwatercollectionandstorage(Image:Solmari,14-01-13)

............................................................................................................................................................4

Image5.2:Awomenusing the floodwaters forhouseholdpurposes (Image: Sonitpur, 13-07-12)

........................................................................................................................................................115

Image5.3:Watersourcesinthevillagesafterthefloodsin2012(Image:Morigaon,08-01-13).117

Image5.4:Householdlatrineswithtemporarywalls(Image:Sonitpur,11-07-12)......................119

Image5.5:Waterstoragesystemarelockedinschoolreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12).119

Image5.6:Flood-affectedfamilieslivinginaschoolrunasreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)

........................................................................................................................................................119

Image5.7:Makeshiftsheltersinthecampsettlementsonembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-

12)..................................................................................................................................................121

Image5.8:Installationofhandpumpsontheembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)............121

Image5.9:Hygienemessagesdisplayedontheemergencylatrineneartheembankment(Image:

Solmari,05-01-13)..........................................................................................................................121

Image5.10:AyoungdisplacedgirlinSolmariusesmirrorgivenbyAgencyA(Image:Sonitpur,23-

09-13).............................................................................................................................................121

Image5.11:Newlyinstalledhandpumponaraisedplatform(Image:Boramari,09-01-13).......123

Image5.12:Womenusingarehabilitatedhandpump(Image:Morigaon,13-09-13)..................123

Image5.13:Usingnetsasawaterfilter(Image:Morigaon,14-01-13).........................................126

Image5.14:Kacchalatrinesself-builtbyhouseholds(Image:Morigaon,04-01-13)....................126

Image5.15:Womenandchildrenbathinginponds(Image:Solmari,28-09-13).........................127

Image5.16:Lockeduplatrinesontheraisedplatform(Image:Solmari,28-08-13).....................128

Image5.17:Communitybuiltaccessroadsduringrecovery(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)..........132

Image5.18:Theaboveaccessroaddestroyedin2013floods(Image:Boramari,04-09-13).......132

Image5.19:IntermediatemobilesheltersconstructedbyAgencyA(Image:Solmari,15-01-13)136

Image5.20:Sheltersconstructedonraisedplinth(Image:Boramari,29-01-13).........................136

Image5.21:Self-builtextensionsfortheshelters(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)..........................136

Image5.22:BoramariwomenmembersengaginginfootballaspartofPHPcampaigntopromote

keyhygienemessages(Imagecourtesy:AgencyA,15-01-13).......................................................150

Image5.23:RaisedhandpumpbyAgencyAA(Image:Sonitpur,17-01-13).................................158

Image6.1:Artesianwells,withnon-stopwaterflow(Image:Brahmapur,27-02-14)..................167

19

Image6.2:Pre-existingtubewellbuiltunderSpanishRedCrossprojectasapreparednessmeasure

afterthe1999supercyclone(Image:Pirosahi,08-11-13).............................................................168

Image6.3:Pre-existingopenwellbyPanchayat(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13).......................168

Image6.4:Deterioratingconditionsofthewaterpumpsintheislandvillage(Image:Khirisahi,27-

10-13).............................................................................................................................................169

Image6.5:Pre-disasterhouseholdlatrine(Image:Gombhoria03-03-15)....................................170

Image6.6:SubmergedIndiaMark-2handpump(Image:Brahmapur,28-10-13)........................171

Image6.7:Pre-existingprotectedopenwellssufferedstructuraldamageduringthecyclone(Image:

Gopinathpur,28-10-13).................................................................................................................173

Image6.8:Debrisnearhandpumps(Image:Gopinathpur,24-10-13)..........................................173

Image6.9:Openwellwithdebris(Image:Sanpatna,20-10-13)..................................................175

Image6.10:Womencollectingwater(Image:Khirisahi,28-10-13)..............................................175

Image6.11:Solecommunalhandpumpandbathingfacilityfor28householdsprovidedbyAgency

A(Image:Chadamankhana,03-03-14)...........................................................................................178

Image6.12:Householdcandlewaterfilters(Image:Sanpatna,28-01-14)...................................178

Image6.13:CommunalVestagaardfiltersinstalledimmediatelyafterthecyclone(Image:Sanpatna,

15-11-13)........................................................................................................................................179

Image6.14:Sharedfamilylatrine(Image:Gopinathpur,05-02-14).............................................179

Image6.15:Self-builtlatrinesinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)...................................................182

Image6.16:Self-builtlatrineinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)....................................................182

Image6.17:Rehabilitatedtubewellandbathingfacility(Image:Gopinathpur,28-02-14)...........183

Image6.18:Constructionofsemi-permanentfamilylatrinesinPuri(ImageSource:AgencyA).198

(Allimagesaretakenbytheauthor,unlessotherwisespecified)

20

ListofannexuresAnnexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence

Annexure2:Definitionsinresilience

Annexure3:MethodologyMatrixbasedonconceptualframework

Annexure4:Interviewguideforexpertfeedback

Annexure5:Summaryreportoftheexpertinterviews

Annexure6:InformedConsentFormforParticipantsinResearchStudies

Annexure7:Lineofinquiry

Annexure8:ToolsusedinAssamandOdisha

Annexure9:InterviewGuide

Annexure10:Sampleofamindmap

Annexure11:BiswanathCircleHouseholdAssessmentData

Annexure12:Listofdocumentsused

Annexure13:DistrictMaps

21

Chapter1:Introduction

1.1ResearchTopicandcontext

Throughinvestigationofwater,sanitationandhygiene(WaSH)systemsduringdisasterrecovery,

thisthesisexaminesapproachesforpromotingcommunityresilience.TwocasestudiesfromEastern

India, in Assam and Odisha, are explored to understand post-disaster recovery processes,

technologies,andapproachesusedinWaSHprogrammingtopromotecommunityresilience.The

impactofadisasterisdeterminedbythelevelofresilienceandpreparednesswithinasociety,its

infrastructure and its government (Bosher and Dainty 2011). Resilience is a ubiquitous term in

disasterriskmanagement,anincreasinglyprominentconceptindiscussionsaboutthepost-2015

policylandscapebutriddledwithcompetingmeaningsanddiversepolicyimplications(Matyasand

Pelling 2015). Disaster recovery is seen as a crucial aspect of disaster risk management, with

boundariesthatcannotbeclearlydefined(Raju2013).Recoveryismorethansimplyre-establishing

the physical or built environment; it is a social process that begins before a disaster and

encompassesdecisionsaboutemergencyresponse,restoration,andreconstructionactivities(Nigg

1995).The‘development’approachesinapost-disasterenvironmentcanbringeitherprogressor

destitution,bychoiceorinevitability,duetothecomplexityof‘disasters’(Collins2013).

Theconceptofresilienceinsciencehasbeencloselyrelatedtosystemstheory(Alexander2013).

Thesystemsapproachallowsacomprehensiveandcross-disciplinaryviewofthemanyapparently

separatefacetsofacomplexreconstructionprocess(Johnsonetal.2006).Systemsthinkingisuseful

tostudycomplex‘living’systemsundergoingnumerousdynamicexchangesatanygiventime(da

Silvaetal.2012).Resilienceisachievedatmultiplelevelsofanalysisandintervention(individual,

community,city,regionalandnational),multipletimescales(prevention,emergency,rehabilitation,

reconstruction and long-term development), and multiple sectors of intervention (emergency

action,physical reconstructionandhousing) (Lizarraldeetal.2014).Systemsthinkingguidesthe

developmentofframeworks,methodologiesandapplicationsthatfacilitatelearningaboutallthese

aspects (Checkland 1985). This research adopts systems thinking to study different system

componentsandparts,theirinteraction,networksandflows(Korhonen2007).Thisresearchadopts

aninterdisciplinaryapproachthat isabletomanagethecomplexityofadisastercontext(Mileti,

1999).Thethesisexploresmultipleperspectives,atvarioustimescales,levelsandsectors.

22

Inthisthesis,WaSHsystemscollectivelyrefertoemergencyprogramming,provisionofwaterand

sanitation facilities, service delivery, and hygiene practices. There are emergency and

developmentalWaSHapproaches.Diseasesoccurringafterdisastersare linkedtoan inadequate

watersupplyorpoorsanitationandhygienepractices(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).Environmental

sanitationprogrammesarevital for tacklingdiseases,andensuringhumandignity inemergency

situations(HarveyandReed2005).Themostcommoncausesofdeathinyoungrefugeechildren

are diarrhoea, pneumonia andmalnutrition (Davis and Lambert 2002). The challenge inWaSH

programmingisthetransitionfromemergencyresponsetorecovery,whichaffectsthenatureand

scopeofimplementation(King2015).TheconventionalemergencyWaSHapproachesaresupply-

driven to fulfil life-saving needs, whereas recovery, it is argued should focus on demand-led

approaches (Luff 2013). Thesedemand-ledapproaches, integratedwith livelihoods-basedWaSH

interventionshelptoreducethedependencyofcommunitiesonagenciesduringtransitionfrom

relieftodevelopment(Scott2013a).Thisresearchreviewsexistinggreyliterature–agencyreports,

briefing notes, conference proceedings, inter-agency consultation reports, and training

programmes–tounderstandthestateofartinWaSHduringrecovery.1Theliteratureonrecovery

mainlyfocusesonhousingandshelteringoptions,whileWaSHduringrecoveryremainsacritical

gapinknowledgeandpractice.

TheimpactofdisastersonprogressofWaSHinthedevelopmentcontextandpost-disasterchanges

areunder-researched.Accordingtothe2011census,67%ofruralhouseholdsinIndiadefecatein

theopen,despitedecadesofgovernmentspendingonlatrineconstruction(Coffeyetal.2014).This

thesis explores the policies in India pertaining to disaster recovery and WaSH: the Disaster

Management Act (2005), water and sanitation schemes [Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), later

renamedasNirmal BharatAbhiyan (NBA) and recently as SwacchBharatAbhiyan (SBA)]. Prime

Minister Narendra Modi’s Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign), was launched on 2

October2014,withtheaimtomakeIndiacleanby2019(Kumar2014).Thisresearchusestwocase

studiesfromAssamandOdisha,whichwereaffectedbydisastersintherecentyearsandhadhigh

opendefecationrates.

1ReferAnnexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence

23

1.1.1Assamcasestudy

Assam,inNorth-EasternIndiaisahighrainfallregionwithanaverageannualrainfallof2,546mm.

Itreceivesabout60to70percentofthemonsoonrainfromMaytoAugust(Hazarika,2006).This

resultsinmultiplefloodwaveswithinagivenyear.Assamfacedrecurringfloodsin2000,2004,2008,

and2012(AASCn.d.;Goswami2000;Hazarika2006).StudiesshowthatfloodsaffectWaSHsystems:

watersourcesaredamaged,qualityofdrinkingwaterdeteriorates,andpeopleusefloodwatersand

practise open defecation, which poses challenges for women and adolescent girls (Prasad and

Mukherjee2014).Thisresearchfocuseson2012and2013floodsinSolmarivillage–onthenorthern

banksofBrahmaputra–underSonitpurdistrictandBoramariKacharigaonvillage–onthesouthern

bank lower reachesofAssam–underMorigaondistrict.Sonitpurhasa totalpopulationof1.92

million(0.99millionmalesand0.93millionfemale);populationdensityis370peoplepersq.km.

andsexratiois946femalesper1000malesand(Census,2011).Morigaonhasatotalpopulationof

957,423(486,651malesand470,772females);populationdensityis617peoplepersq.kmandsex

ratiois967femalesper1000males(Census,2011).

1.1.2Odishacasestudy

Odisha faces multiple disasters such as floods, cyclones and droughts, and faces poverty,

unemployment,and lowper capita income (Ray-Bennett2009a).Odishahas the lowest levelof

household toilet access in India: at an 84.7 per cent open defecation rate (MHA, 2011 cited in

MommenandMore,2013).Between1993and2011,toiletcoverageinOdishaincreasedfrom1.4

percentto14percent–anannualincreaseofaround0.7percent(MommenandMore,2013).

ThisresearchfocusesonPuriandBalasoredistrictsafterthecyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloods

in2013.In2011,Purihadapopulationof1,698,730(865,380malesand833,350females),thesex

ratio is 963 females per 1000 males and population density is 488 per sq. km; Balasore has

populationof2,320,529(1,185,787malesand1,134,742females)withahigherpopulationdensity

(610persq.km)andsexratiois927femalespermale(Census,2011).

1.1.3Landscapeofhumanitarianaidintheregion

TheDisasterManagementActofIndia(GoI2005)providestheoverallpolicyframeworkandguides

humanitarianNGOstointerveneineventofdisastersisguidedbythewhichwasadoptedasapolicy

24

in2009. InAssamandOdisha, thehumanitarianaid landscapewasunique. InAssam, theNGOs

workedtogetherundertwoconsortiaunderECHOto implementanearlyrecoveryprogrammes.

AgencyA,aspartoftheconsortiumledbyAgencyAAalongwithAgencyCA,implementedtheearly

recoveryprogrammeinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts.AgencyAworkedwiththeirlocalpartners:

AgencyB inSonitpurandAgencyC inMorigaon. InSonitpurAgencyBhad limitedexperience in

disastersbutforgedanewpartnershipwithAgencyAwithahumanitarianmandate.InMorigaon,

AgencyCwasalong-termDRRpartnerandwaspartofthe2007floodsresponse.Theycontinued

toengagewithAgencyAafterthe2012floods.ECHOfundedanotherconsortiumledbyAgencySC

andotherregionalNGOsinAssam.Besideshumanitarianpartnershipsandconsortia,therewere

regionalNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisationsundertakingdevelopmentprogrammes,civilrightsand

conflictresponseinAssam.

InOdisha,thedonoragencies–UKAIDandECHO–replicatedtheconsortium-modelforresponse

andrecovery.UndertheUKAIDprogramme,AgencyCAandAgencySCweretherespectiveleads

fortwoseparateconsortiaforemergencykitsdistributionfortheaffectedpopulation.Theaimwas

to provide humanitarian assistance to cyclone- and flood-affected districts inOdisha. Agency A

workedwiththeAgencyCA-ledconsortiumalongwithfourotherNGOs.UndertheECHO-funded

consortia,AgencyAAandAgencySCledtwoconsortiatoprovideshelter,waterandsanitation,food

securityandlivelihoodssupport.AgencyAworkedwiththeAgencyAA,CAandotherNGOs.The

localpartnerNGOsincludedAgencyDinPuri,AgencyEinGanjamandAgencyFinBalasore.These

partners were long-term DRR partners with Agency A and had undertaken preparedness and

evacuation measures once cyclone warnings were disseminated. These partnerships facilitated

early and successful evacuation, efficient warehouse and logistics, relief and community

mobilisationeffortsinthedistricts.

1.1.4Implementinginstitutionsintheregion

InIndia,thereareanumberofstateinstitutionsrelatedtodisastermanagement–national,state

and district disaster management authorities, different line departments – Central Water

Commission, Indian Meteorological Department, Public Health Engineering, Water Resources,

Sanitation, Rural Development, Revenue and Disaster Management, Land Resettlement and

Rehabilitation,andPublicWorksDepartmentundertakingdifferent functionsbefore,duringand

25

afterdisasters.Inthisthesis,PublicHealthEngineeringDepartment(PHED)iscloselyfollowedas

the key government body implementing national and state-level water supply and sanitation

schemesandprogrammes(Section5.5and6.5).Revenue&DisasterManagementDepartmentin

Assamisin-chargeofrecoveryandrehabilitation.RuralDevelopmentDepartmentundertookwater

supplymeasuresinruralOdishaandOSDMAcoordinatedreconstructionprogrammesupportedby

WorldBank-AsianDevelopmentBank.

Thepublicpolicysphereindisastermanagementwitnessedalandmarkchangein2005,withthe

passingofDisasterManagementAct,2005(GoI,2005).Itlaiddowntheguidelinesforestablishment

ofNational,StateandDistrictDisasterManagementAuthorities.NDMAwasresponsibleforlaying

down policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management to ensure timely and effective

responsetodisasters.SDMAsdevelopandimplementthestatedisastermanagementplans,which

include vulnerability in the region, capacity building, prevention and mitigation measures, and

mainstreamdisasterriskreductionwithdevelopment.Inthedistricts,DistrictMagistrate/Collector

istheprimeauthorityfordisasterpreparedness,responsecoordinationandrecovery.DDMAacts

astheplanning,coordinatingandimplementingbodyfordisastermanagementandtakesmeasures

aspertheDistrictDisasterManagementPlans.

ASDMAdevelopedtheAssamStateDisasterManagementPlantoensurethatallcomponentsof

DisasterManagementareaddressedtofacilitateplanning,preparedness,operational,coordination

andcommunityparticipation(ASDMA,2012a).Itincludesfollowingaspects:1)Preventionofdanger

or threat of any disaster, 2) Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or

consequences;3)Capacity-building;4)Preparednesstodealwithanydisaster;5)Promptresponse

toanythreateningdisastersituationordisaster;6)Assessingtheseverityormagnitudeofeffectsof

anydisaster;7)Evacuation,rescueandrelief;8)Rehabilitationandreconstruction(ASDMA,2012a).

InOdisha,anumberofchangeswereinitiatedafterthe1999supercyclone:GovernmentofOrissa

draftedaDisasterManagementBillforthestateandinauguratedOSDMA(on28December1999),

which was taskedwith dealing exclusively with disastermitigationmeasures in the state (Ray-

Bennett 2009). OSDMA’s brief was to coordinate with local and international NGOs and

multinationalorganisationsduringdisasters,andimplementdisasterpreparednessandmitigation

measures.

26

1.2ResearchQuestionsandObjectives

ThisinterdisciplinaryresearchexplorestheexistingWaSHapproaches,technologies,interventions

andlinkagesduringrecovery.

Toaddressthistopic,themainresearchquestioninthisthesisis:

How effectively do different approaches to water and sanitation facilities, and hygiene

practices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?

Thequestionisrefinedfurtherintothreesub-questions:

1. How can the existing policies in WaSH and recovery be strengthened to incorporate

resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be effectively translated into

practice?

2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow

ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

3. Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term

developmentacrossdifferentsectors?

Aconceptualframeworkwasdeveloped,basedonthereviewofliteratureonrecovery,WaSH,and

resiliencethinking.Theframework–WaSHduringrecovery–consistedoflearningandknowledge,

participation,integrationandinstitutionsasconceptualthemesidentifiedfromexistingliterature

ondisasterresilience (Twigg2007;Manyena2006;Bahaduretal.2010;VossandWagner2010;

Schilderman and Lyons 2011). The framework was further expanded based on interviews with

experts inrecoveryandWaSHprogrammes(Annexure5).Afterfurthermodifications, Iusedthe

frameworkasaguidetodevelopdatacollectiontoolsforgatheringempiricaldataonWaSHduring

recoveryandanalysis.ThisresearchfocusesontwodisastereventsinIndia,andanalysesthepost-

disaster changes in WaSH systems during recovery, and response measures by households,

communities, agency programming strategies and actions by local actors and government

institutions.InAssam,Icollecteddataduringseveralvisitsfrom2012-13.In2012,Iparticipatedin

emergencyneedsassessmentcommissionedbyaUNagency.IfirstvisitedSolmarivillageinSonitpur

districtwhenthefloodsoccurredin2012.In2013,IundertookascopingstudywithAgencyAasa

27

volunteer.AgencyAimplementedtheirprogrammeinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts.Iundertook

themainfieldworkasanindependentresearcherinAugust-October2013inSolmariandBoramari

villagesinSonitpurandMorigaonrespectively.Odishawasincludedasasupplementarycasestudy

whentheCyclonePhailinandfloodsoccurredin2013.IwasdeployedwithAgencyAfromOctober

2013-March2014.

My associationwithAgencyA inAssamandOdisha enabledme to access thedisaster-affected

areas,andtostudytheresponseandrecoveryefforts.InOdisha,Iparticipatedasateamleadfor

AgencyAinPuridistrictforsixmonthsimmediatelyafterthecyclone.Ivisitedtheflood-affected

areasinBalasoreinMarch2014,6monthsafterthefloodsoccurred.Comingfromahumanitarian

practitionerperspective, this researchattempts tounderstand thepracticalitiesofWaSHduring

recovery,andconnectstheexistingtheoriesandconcepts.Accordingly,myroleasapractitioner

duringthisresearchhasinfluencedthedevelopmentofresearchquestions,withanaimtoaddress

gaps in theories and practice. This research begins by developing a conceptual and theoretical

understandingofWaSHduringrecovery, followedbyempiricalexplorationusingtheabovecase

studies. While undertaking fieldwork, the close association with the implementing agencies

provided a critical perspective on what external agencies can achieve in terms of behavioural

changeswithin the programme duration. As a practitioner, I have interactedwith the affected

communities, understood their recovery processes, and witnessed post-disaster changes. This

unique position of a reflective practitioner has influenced how the research has progressed to

identify gaps in concepts, theories and practices. Initially I wanted to investigate agency

interventions to promote community resilience, which gradually evolved to understand how

agenciesrecoveredafterdisasterswithorwithoutexternalinterventionstofinallyunderstanding

how households change their behaviour practices inWaSH and link this knowledge to existing

policies.Thisresearchinterpretstheempiricalevidenceinlightofexistingtheoriesandconcepts

relatedtoresilience,recoveryandwaterandsanitationtechnologies.

1.3ThesisOutline

Thisthesisisorganisedintoeightchapters.Chapter2reviewsliteratureondisasterrecovery,and

WaSHindevelopmentandemergencycontexts.Itprovidesanaccountofvariousperspectivesand

approachesinrecovery.Itidentifiesinterdisciplinarythemestounderstandpost-disasterchanges

28

and impactsonWaSHsystems.Chapter3describesapproaches to resilience thinking inapost-

disaster context. Itdevelopsa conceptual frameworkusing systems thinking including themes–

learning and knowledge, participation, institutional capacities and integration – identified from

literature. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology and case study approach, using

participatory research tools. It presents the ethical considerations, and the analytical strategy.

Section4.3explains therationale foranonymising theworkofAgencyAandotherparticipating

NGOsinthisthesis.

Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings from Assam at various scales: the households,

communities,localactors,andgovernmentandhumanitarianagencies’.Thischapterdescribesthe

changesovertimeinWaSHsystems,andagencies'actionstoinfluencethesechanges.Itdescribes

institutionalcapacities,andconsortium-basedapproachesinAssam.Chapter6presentsdatafrom

Odisha, ofworkingwith Agency A in the recovery programme. This chapter describes different

perspectives of households, communities, local actors, government and humanitarian NGOs. It

explains the integrated and consortium-based approaches in Odisha. Chapter 7 discusses the

empirical findings from the case studies to answer the research questions. It reflects on the

challenges in using the conceptual framework for data collection and analysis, and discusses

emerging themessuchasWaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocessesandco-productionof

knowledge. The final chapter provides conclusions and recommendations, the theoretical

implicationsofthefindings,andcontributiontoknowledgeinmethodological,practicalandpolicy

aspects.ThischapteralsoidentifiesissuesforfurtherresearchinWaSHduringrecovery.

29

Chapter2:Literaturereview

Thisinter-disciplinaryresearchexploresthelargelyunder-researchedareaofWaSHimplementation

during post-disaster recovery. This chapter reviews existing literature on recovery and WaSH

(Water,SanitationandHygiene),tounderstandthetheoreticaldevelopmentandpracticalevidence

ofrelevantissuesandapproachesinWaSHandrecovery.Section2.1reviewsrecoveryliterature

andunderstandsdisasterrecoveryasaprocess,andthecontext,objectivesandapproachesusedin

recovery.Section2.2focusesonWaSH:approaches,interventionsandchallengesinpost-disaster

WaSHprogrammes.

2.1Post-disasterrecovery

Disastersoccurasaproductofnaturaleventsandthesocial,politicalandeconomicenvironments

(Wisneretal.,2004).Disasterisdefinedas‘Aseriousdisruptionofthefunctioningofacommunity

orasocietycausingwidespreadhuman,material,economicorenvironmentallosseswhichexceed

theabilityoftheaffectedcommunityorsocietytocopeusingitsownresources’(UNISDR2009p.9).

When disasters occur the underlying fractures of discrimination, marginalisation and political

neglect are magnified (Oliver-Smith 1996). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

(SFDRR)2015-2030 identifiesrecoveryasapriorityaction,statingthatdisasterpreparednessfor

resilientrecoveryisessentialto‘BuildBackBetter’(UNISDR2015).Recoveryisacomplex,multi-

facetedconcept(OlshanskyandChang2009;Chang2010),butistheleastunderstoodphaseofthe

disastermanagementcycle(Mileti1999).

2.1.1Multidimensionalityofrecovery

Thereareinconsistenciesandconfusionregardingtheusageandmeaningoftheterm‘recovery’

(Dynesetal,1989;Quarantelli,1989).Quarantelli(1999)mentionsfrequentlyusedtermstoindicate

variousaspectsofrecoveryasfollows:

• Reconstruction(post-impactrebuilding)• Restoration(re-establishingpre-disasterphysicalandsocialpatterns)• Rehabilitation(restorationtoincludemorepeopleandthings,perhapstoanimproved

levelthanpre-disaster)• Restitution(restorationoftherightfulclaimantsofownersandimplieslegalactions)

30

• Recovery(attemptingtobringsomelevelofacceptabilitytothepost-disastersituation)(Nigg,1995;Quarantelli,1999;Mileti,1999;Sword-Daniels2014)

Disaster response is a more extensively researched phase than disaster recovery (Mileti, 1999

p.220). It includesemergencyshelters,searchandrescue,medicalassistance, firefighting,debris

removal,needsanddamageassessmentandreliefassistance(Mileti,1999;Sphere,2011).Post-

disaster responseentailsactionorassistancebasedoncorehumanitarian rights,2standardsand

principlesofhumanity,neutrality,impartialityandindependence(OCHA2012).Thehumanitarian

imperativebindsagenciestoprovidebasicservicessuchasfoodandnutrition,water,sanitation,

education,shelter,protectionandhealth(Sphere2011).Disasterrecovery‘oftenseemstoimply

attemptingtoand/orbringingthepostdisastersituationtosomelevelofacceptability.Thismayor

maynotbethesameasthepre-impactlevel’(Quarantelli,1999,p.3).Itisviewedasaprocessthat

encapsulates all activities, processes andplanning that followanydisaster, including short-term

activitiestorestorevitalsupportsystemsandlonger-termactivitiestoreturntonormallife(Dynes

andQuarantelli 1989;Nigg 1995;Mileti 1999;Quarantelli 1999; Rathfon 2010). It encompasses

decisionsaboutrestorationandreconstruction:howthosedecisionsaremadeandbywhom;what

aretheconsequencesofthosedecisionsonthecommunity;andwhobenefitsandwhodoesnot

benefit fromthosedecisions (Nigg1995).Recoveryalso includesaspectsofhealing,andmoving

towardsahealthystateandsocialchange(DynesandQuarantelli1989).

Thedifferentconceptualisationsofrecoveryexistduetothegapsinexpectationsbetweenwhat

Cannon(2008)termsasthe‘outsiders’–thosewhocometohelp–and‘insiders’–whoareaffected

by disasters. The outsiders often prioritise natural hazards higher than ‘insiders’, whomay not

distinguish between shocks or daily life struggles (Cannon 2008). Recovery literature draws

attentiontotheperspectivesoftheaffectedpeoplewhoexperiencerecoverydifferently(Mileti,

1999).Suchstudiesconceptualiserecoverytoencompassperceptions,expectationsandstruggles

oftheaffectedcommunities,anddeterminestheirthresholdsforrecovery(VossandWagner2010;

WisnerandGaillard2012;ShresthaandGaillard2015).

2TheHumanitarianCharterdefinebasicrightforthewelfareofthoseaffectedbydisastersorwar,torighttolifewithdignity,therighttoreceivehumanitarianassistanceandtherighttoprotectionandsecurity.

31

2.1.2ContextofRecovery

The conventional approach to disaster recovery has been critiqued as band-aid relief that

perpetuatesorcovers-uptheunderlyingcausesofdisaster,withoutbreakingthecycleofrecurring

disasters(IFRC,2001).Humanitarianreliefandaidprovisionshouldbereframedtoprioritiselocal

principlesandvalues(Roseetal.2013).Recoveryisperceivedasacomplexandextendedprocess

fromanoutsider’sperspective(Barenstein,2008;Cannon2008,Davis,2011).Itoperateswithinan

emotional, reactionary, time-sensitive, expensive and politically charged atmosphere (Natural

HazardsCentre,2001,p.2-2).Thereischaos,duetoinherentconfusions,conceptualvaguenessand

involvementofdifferentactorswithvariedinterests(Lizarraldeetal.2009).Thesechallengesplace

conflictingdemandsonlimitedavailableresourcesandexternalfunds(ibid).Enormouslocaland

external resources are required to support the recovery process (Lizarralde et al, 2010) and

capacities of those involved in the process (Kenny 2005). The chaotic atmosphere results in

duplicationofagencyeffortsaswitnessedafter the2005Kashmirearthquake (Nabi2014). The

problemofineffectivecoordinationisseeninallthephasesofdisasterresponse–rescue,relief,

andrehabilitation(Raju2013).

Nigg(1995)foundthatcommunityresponsetodisastershasconsequencesforfamilies,businesses,

andlocalgovernment.InBangladesh,socialrelationsandvulnerabilitiesofthoselivinginhazardous

environmentsinthefloodplainsandcoastalareaswerechallengedandreproducedbythegendered

and classed coping strategies and adaptation measures (Sultana 2010). In Sri Lanka, tsunami-

affected communities reorganised their lives, strategically and subjectively to fit the categories

introducedbygovernmentalandnon-governmentalagenciesforaiddistribution(Thurnheer2009).

Barenstein(2015)undertooklongitudinalstudyofrecoveryfromthe2001earthquakeinGujarat,

wheresheexaminedpeople’sstrategiesandpatternsofadaptationafterrelocation.Shearguesthat

affected populations are not passive recipients of external agencies' often culturally insensitive

projects, instead they transformtheexternally imposednotionsofappropriatehousing tomeet

theircultural-andlivelihood-specificneeds(Barenstein2015).

Recoverybecomesalengthyandextendedprocessbecauserestoringcriticalservicesandrebuilding

assetscouldtakemonthsorevenyears(NaturalHazardsCentre,2001).Existingstudiesperceive

recovery as a non-linear andmultidimensional process. There are three perspectives regarding

temporaldimensionsofrecoveryprocesses:techno-centricapproach,socialconstructionismand

32

systemsapproach.Thetechno-centricapproachtonaturalhazards,firstelaboratedbyHaasetal.

(1977), provided an initial comprehensive view of reconstruction. They claimed that ‘the

reconstruction process is ordered, knowable, and predictable’ (p. 261), and suggested phased

planningtofirstmeettheimmediateneeds,followedbyrestoration,thenreplacementandlastly

commemorative reconstruction (Haas et al. 1977). The technocratic approaches emphasised

preventive and mitigation aspects of disaster management (Mileti 1999; Olshansky and Chang

2009).Thisapproachwascritiquedbyvulnerabilitystudiesthatcontestedthelinearityofphases

and event-focused actions from a social and anthropological perspective ( Oliver-Smith 1996;

Cannon2008).Davis(1978)arguesthatrecoveryisnotalinearprocesswithdiscretestagesandend

products;insteadcommunityrecoveryactivitiesareincrementalinstagesandprogressisgradual,

dependingontheircapacitiesandpriorities. In thecountriesaffectedby the2004 IndianOcean

Tsunami,physicalrecoveryoccurred instagesoverthe10yearsbutchallengesforpsychological

recoveryremaintobeaddressed(Shaw2015).

Themorerecentsystemsapproachtorecoveryplanningfocusesonthelinkagesandinteractions

betweenelementsandimpactsofdisastershocksonthesesub-components(Sword-Daniels2014).

The systems approach can be used to understand temporal and spatial aspects of recovery. It

includes multiple perspectives, which accordingly define recovery as a household, economic,

planning, management or a housing problem (Olshansky and Chang 2009). These perspectives

emerge from the number of actors involved in recovery including communities, governmental

agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private industry (Meskinazarian 2011;

Rathfon2010;Sword-Daniels2014;King2015).Effectivecoordinationbecomeschallengingwhen

multipleactorsareinvolved;establishingcommoninterests,goalsandplansofactionbecomesa

challengefor‘harmonisation’ofnationalandinternationalhumanitarianaid(Kenny2005,p.212).

Post-tsunami research in Tamil Nadu emphasises the role of the government, knowledge

networking,andorganisationalmandatesandgoalsforengagingwithdonorsinlong-termrecovery

(RajuandBecker2013).

Theliteraturedrawsattentiontothefactthatrecoveryoccurswithintheexistingsocio-economic

conditions, cultural and geographical factors. Vulnerability studies question the ‘naturalness’ of

disastersbecausedisastersareaproductofsocial,politicalandeconomicenvironments(Wisneret

al.2004,p.6).Thepoorindevelopingcountrieswhoaredifferentiallyimpactedbythehazardsand

33

developmentprocessesoften liveorwork in dangerous andhazardous locations (Wisner et al.,

2004).Therearedifferentialimpactsbasedonrace,ethnicity,class,andgender(Oliver-Smith1996).

These differences depend on pre-existing socio-economic and environmental inequalities and

geographicalunevennessofdisasterimpacts(Walkeretal.2006).ThetraditionalAetacommunities

inthePhilippinesafterthe1991MtPinatuboeruptionhaddifferentialcapacitiesandtheresultant

culturalchangeswereinfluencedbydifferenthazardtypes,availabilityofspacetorelocate,pre-

disastersocio-culturalvulnerabilityandgovernment’spost-disasterrehabilitationpolicies(Gaillard

2006).Relocationwasanotherpolicyapproachduringrecovery:aftertheYungay,Peruearthquake

and avalanche in 1970, processes of relocation and resettlement decisions were insensitive to

communities’ attachments to environment and cultural values, and increased community’s

dependenceonaid(Oliver-Smith1979).

In her comparative study of post-tsunami Tamil Nadu and post-earthquake Gujarat, Barenstein

(2008) found that top-down contractor-driven approach to reconstruction was insensitive to

environmentalandsocio-culturalaspects,whiletheowner-drivenapproachallowedcommunities

tochoosebetweendifferentrelocationandresettlementstrategies,constructionapproachesand

supportingagencies.Inthe2010Haitiearthquake,socialcapitalenhancedaccesstoshelter-related

resourcesforthosewithconnections,butaccentuatedpre-existing inequalitiesandcreatednew

inequalities among displaced Haitians (Rahill et al. 2014). Schilderman (in Lyons et al., 2010)

rightfullyclaimsthatdisasterreconstructiondoesnottakeplacein‘vacuum’butwithinthecontext

of pre-disaster socio-economic development (p.33). Hence understanding the pre-disaster

developmentcontextandpoliciesisessentialforplanningrecoveryeffortsandunderstandingthe

potentialsocio-economicimpactsofdecisionstakenduringrecovery.

Recoveryprogrammesarelengthyandresource-extensive,andstruggletostrikeabalancebetween

time,speed,andqualityconcerns.Duringrecoveryanumberoftrade-offsindecision-makingare

madebasedonprogrammeproposalsandcontextualneeds.Theurgentneedforactioninashort

spanoftimeprovescounterproductivetosustainablerecovery(Barakat,2003).Recoveryagencies

struggle to strike a balance between the quality of their programmes and the quantity of their

interventions and achievements because of funding constraints, programming timeframes,

organisational capacities andurgencyof immediate action (Twigg2006). Speed is important for

rapidprogrammedelivery,repairingandrebuildingofinfrastructure(Chang2010;Rathfon2010).

34

Greater speed and quality of recovery depend on productive intergovernmental relationships,

effectiveuseofresourcesandbetterdecisionmakingatcommunitylevel(Rubin1985).Agencies

involvedinpost-tsunamireconstructioninAceh,Indonesiawereblamedfordelayedprogramming

becauseprogrammesweredesignedonunrealisticinitialexpectations,withoutfactoringthetime

required for community mobilisation, for resolving land issues, and establishing offices and

warehouses, and logistics (daSilva, 2010).Delaysoccurdue to structuralbarriers like shattered

economic and political structures, and organisational barriers like relief culture, competency,

knowledge,attitudes,politicalwillandsecurity issues (IFRC,2001).Hence, theexistingevidence

showsthatcurrentapproachesinrecoveryhaveshortcomings.

2.1.3Disasterrecoveryobjectives

What thenare theobjectivesof the recoveryprocess?Wouldbringingabout ‘normalcy’ include

reconstructingconditionsthatmadethepopulationvulnerabletotheimpactofdisasterinthefirst

place?A“good”disasterrecovery isholistic recovery,wherethecommunity’sbest interestsare

considered (Natural Hazards Centre, 2001, p.2-2) or include sustainability (Mileti 1999; Rathfon

2010).Studieshavefoundthatcommunitiestrytore-establishthemselvespost-disaster inways

thatarefamiliartothem,asinpre-disasterpatternsofsocialnetworks,livelihoodsandliving(Davis,

1978;Twigg,2006).Theresultingcontinuityandfamiliarityisessential,becauseitenhancestheir

psychological recovery (Mileti, 1999). This section describes three key conceptualisations and

objectivesofrecoveryfromrecoveryliterature:tobuildbackbetter(BBB),tolinkrelief,recovery

anddevelopment(LRRD)andtomaximisethewindowofopportunity.

BillClinton,whileoutliningtheresponsestrategyastheUNSecretary-General’sSpecialEnvoyfor

Tsunami Recovery, argued that ‘“building back better” (BBB) means making sure that, as you

rebuild,youleavecommunitiessaferthantheywerebeforethedisasterstruck’(Clinton2007,p.1).

For this required capacity building of institutions; expanding access to health and education

services; reducing poverty and strengthening livelihood security; advancing gender equality;

empoweringandopeningupspacesforcivilsocietyexperiences(Fan2013).Inrecovery,‘resources,

influenceandpoliticalstrengthtendtoweakenwhenthememoryofthedisasterbeginstovanish’

(Davis2007p.3).Recoveryplannersshouldaimtoaddressunderlyingrequirementsofemployment,

economic opportunity, sustainable livelihoods, resumption of food supplies, reconstruction of

publicinfrastructure,andcommunityvitality(Davis2007).People-centredrebuildingcontributesto

35

breaking the cycle of poverty and dependence and reduces people's vulnerability to disasters

throughrenewedthinkinginthefieldsofhousing,participationandlivelihoods(Lyonsetal.2010).

Fan(2013)arguesthatBBBapproachdoesnotprovidethetoolstohelpaddresscriticalquestions,

andthecriteriaagainstwhichagenciescanassesstheprosandconsofadoptingthisapproach.In

herdoctoralstudyofHaitianresponsefollowingthe2010earthquake,King(2015)foundthatthe

over-enthusiasticBBBapproachdisregardedrentalsupportoptionsasatemporary,non-sustainable

measure,andoverlookedthevalueofrentalsupportinmarketstimulationandencouragementfor

owner-driven repair and reconstruction for the new rentalmarket demand. The BBB approach

needs planning, capacities and investments in contextually relevantmeasures (King 2015). Fan

(2013)foundthatduringhumanitarianandreconstructionprogrammes,agenciesdidnothavethe

capacitiesor theorganisationalmandate toaddressstructural issues.Othersvouch for ‘building

backsafer’,whichprovidesaclearergoalforpost-disastersettlement(Kennedyetal.2008,p.33).

Akeyquestionraisedinthisdebateis:Whomdowebuildbackbetterfor?Irrespectiveoftheterm

used–saferorbetter–theconceptshouldmovebeyonditsemphasisonthephysicalaspectsof

reconstruction,shelterandhousingprovidedbyexternalactors.Thecontestationsofpowerand

politics of recovery and integration of common objectives across silos of humanitarian and

developmentprogrammingposechallengesforrecovery(MitchellandHarris2012).Thisresearch

arguesthatarenewedBBBapproachcouldconsiderneedsandaspirationsofthelocalcommunities

and their vision for recovery that link from pre-disaster to post-disaster and thereafter.

Humanitarian assistance should change its approaches to build local resilience and reduce

vulnerabilitytodevelopcommunitiesthatarecapableofbouncingforwardafteradisasterthrough

transparency,accountabilityandparticipationfromlocalcommunities(Roseetal.2013).

ThenormativeLRRDdiscourseindicatesrecoveryisoftengovernedbydiverseandinharmonious

normativeaims(Christoplosetal.2010).LRRDemergedasanimportantideaduringtheanalysisof

thefoodcrisesinAfricainthe1980s(IFRC,2001).Therewasagrowingrealisationthatthe‘grey

zone’between‘phases’ofassistancewasconsistentlyunder-funded(Ramet2012,p.4).Theearly

concept of a linear ‘continuum’ from relief to development evolved into a ‘contiguum’ so that

rehabilitation and development can occur alongside relief activities (Fan 2013, p.1). There are

challenges forachieving this,dueto lackofdefinitionalandconceptualclarityandconsensusof

36

LRRD,andchallengesforaddressingmacroeconomicandpoliticalfactors,andrealisinggovernance

andinstitutionalchanges(Buchanan-SmithandMaxwell1994).Thereisanoperationalgapbetween

reliefandrecoveryduetoshort-termorganisationalmandatesanddifferentinterestsandcapacities

tomanagethetransition(Lloyd-Jones2006).ToachieveLRRD,clarityamongdifferentstakeholders

about their roles and responsibilities in relief and development is crucial, but there are rigid

boundaries between old institutions, finances, and attitudes in development and relief (Twigg,

2006).InthecaseofHurricaneMitchinNicaragua,aidresponseandrecoveryeffortsweredriven

bythebroadertrends,includinghousehold,communityandgovernmentinitiativesandthewider

economicandmarket-relatedcontext(Christoplosetal.2010).

TounderstandLRRD,thisresearchexplores linkages intherecoveryprocessesatthehousehold,

community,governmentandNGOsfrompre-topost-disastersituations.Studieshaveinvestigated

these linkagesandhaveofferedvariousapproachesand solutions tobridge thesegaps through

different approaches: pre-disaster recovery planning (Becker and Sauders 2007), reframing risk

through disaster mitigation and preparedness (Christoplos et al. 2001), sustainable hazard

mitigation(Mileti1999)andresilienceapproachestoachieveLRRDpost-disasters(Manyena2009;

King2015).DRRmeasuresandsystemsforLRRDcanbeinstitutedthroughgovernmentandNGO

action(Lloyd-Jones,2006).Thereislittleevidenceofhowagenciesmakethetransitionfromrelief

torecoverygiventheexistingbarriersandcomplexnatureofrecovery(King2015).

Disasterstudiesclaimrecoveryprovidesopportunitiesforchangingpre-disasterconditions(Mileti,

1999;Rubin,2009;Changetal.,2011).Theopportunity to spearheadchangesand improve the

conditionsthatledtodisasterinthefirstplaceisprovidedduetotheinfluxofresources,mediaand

internationalattention,andrenewedinterest(Christoplos2006).Thisideathatdisastersrepresent

anopportunityforchangeandrenewalisnotnew:recoveryfrom1923,GreatKantoearthquake

aimedtomaximisethis‘windowofopportunity’totriggerwidersocialreformprocesses(Fan2013,

p.2).Howeverlittleguidanceisavailableonhowtomaximisethiswindowofopportunity.‘Theory

ofchange’isusedasanapproachfordesigningandevaluatingsocialprogrammes,andtoelaborate

anddocumentviewsonthelonger-termchangessought,thechangesrequiredandwhy,thecontext

forchangeandtheactors,andhowthedevelopmentprogramme’sstrategy,activitiesandoutputs

couldcontributetolong-termchange(Vogel2012).Forpost-disasterprogrammes,‘contributionto

change’ is used to document the household level changes over time, identify how effectively

37

agenciespromotedrecovery,andtheextenttowhichresources,assets,livelihoodsandwell-being

havebeenstrengthenedinrecovery(Fewetal.2013).

From the policy perspective, disasters act as focussing events, leading to a rethink in policy

initiatives,publicgroupmobilisationandagendasetting(Birkland1998).Focusingeventsserveas

importantopportunitiesforpoliticallydisadvantagedgroupstochampionmessagesthathadbeen

effectivelysuppressedbydominantgroupsandadvocacycoalitions.Sucheventscanthereforebe

animportanttoolforgroupsseekingpolicychange(ibid).Afocusingeventisaneventthatissudden;

relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of

potentiallygreaterfutureharms;itsharmsthatareconcentratedinaparticulargeographicalarea

orcommunityof interest (Birkland,1998p.54).Disasterscancatalysestructuraland irreversible

changesby creatingnewconditionsand relationshipswithinenvironmental, socioeconomicand

politicalstructures, institutionsandorganisations(Birkmannetal.2008).Theresultantchanges-

positiveornegative-provideopportunitiestopushpolicyagendas,initiatestructuralchangesand

increase participation (Lyons et al. 2010;Meskinazarian 2011). Recovery planning poses unique

challenges for practitioners and researchers, as time compresses, stakes increase, additional

resourcesflow,andpublicinterestisheightened(OlshanskyandChang2009).Theconceptofthe

rarebutbriefwindowofopportunityiscloselyassociatedwitheffectinglastingchange,buthowcan

local governments effectively meet the time-sensitive needs of housing, economic and social

recovery(OlshanskyandChang2009)?

Thisdiscussiononchangeemphasisesevent,actionandresponse:howchangeismanifested,who

effectschangeandwhatistheresponseofeachactorinresponsetotheevent.Manyena(2009)

discusses two approaches to social change: the radical or conservative and non-interventionist

approaches. In the former,communitiesactaschangeagentsandareempoweredto transform

institutionalandlegislativepolicies,whileinthenon-interventionistapproachesthepractitioners’

capacitiesarestrengthenedforworkingwithinthestatusquo(Manyena2009p.238).Birklandetal.

(2008)arguedthatchangeswereformalorinformalinnature,andwereproactiveandcouldalso

be sloworrapid,linearornon-linear, planned or unplanned andmaymanifest inmany aspects

across society. The evidence is not adequate to demonstrate how tomaximise the window of

opportunity and bring about transformational changes. Disaster recovery is the product of a

38

cumulativesetofdecisionstakenover longperiods,andthechoicesandprocessesarethefocal

pointforpotentialchange(Comfortetal.1999).

Thereislittleresearchonthecharacteristicsoflonger-termchangesafterdisasters(Birkmannetal.

2008). Post-disaster changes occur after small-scale and regular disasters; these are neglected

depending on frequency, magnitude, uncertainty, and the reactive response to each disaster

(Wisner and Gaillard 2012). There is no resolution or reductionmeasures after chronic hazard

conditions – recurring floods, landslides and erosion, lack of adequate access to water and

sanitation,andmalnutrition–leadingtofailureofsustainabledevelopmentpracticesanddisaster

riskreduction(GuppyandTwigg2013).VossandWagner(2010)foundthatlearningopportunities

wereavailableaftersmall-scaledisasters,throughparticipationandexperientiallearning(Vossand

Wagner2010).However,Birklandetal. (2008)believedthatsmall-scaledisastersdonot leadto

significantchanges.Researchershavearguedthattheamountandqualityofrecoveryresearchis

not adequate formeeting current and future recovery planning and implementation challenges

(Rubin2009).Thereisverylittleevidenceofhowchangesinrecoverycanbeachieved,measured

andreplicatedunderdifferentconditions,independentofscale,agent,magnitudeorresponseto

disasters(seeTable2.1).

Table2.1:State-of-artofrecoveryliteratureonobjectivesandapproaches(Source:Author)

No Themes:Objectivesandapproaches Articles/Studies1 Community response: diversity, knowledge and self-

organisation(Berkes2007)

2 Communityresilience:Capacitybuilding (Manyena,2006)3 Technological/Housing: Local building practices for safer

constructionpractices(Twigg,2006;daSilva,2010)

4 LRRD:DRRandMitigation (Christoplos,2006;Manyena,2006;Lloyd-Jones2006;Davis,2007)

5 ResourceInfluxandimprovedaccess (Lizarraldeetal.,2010;Changetal.,2011)

6 Sustainable Hazard Mitigation: Availability of externalfinancialandtechnicalassistance

(Mileti,1999)

7 Sector:Livelihoodandemployment (Twigg2006;Lyonsetal.2010)8 Technology: New appropriate technology-culturally

acceptableandrelevanttolocalvernaculartechnology(Jigyasu,2010)

9 Organisational learning: Structural and functional changesandselforganisation

(Quarantelli,1989,Alesch,2005)

10 Housing:re-establishlostassets,betteraccommodation (Barakat,2003)

39

2.1.4Recoveryapproachesandstrategies

Theexistingliteraturefocusesonconventionalapproachestorecoverythroughshelter,livelihoods

and critical sectors, and use of participatory approaches for recovery. Holistic and sustainable

recovery allows communities to choose from a range of goals and aspirations to envision their

recovery priorities (Natural Hazards Centre 2001). The planning approaches emphasise

sustainability, hazardmitigation and smart growth through comprehensive plans addressing all

relevant andnecessary sectors that impact community lives, and sustain changespost-disasters

(Natural Hazards Centre 2001). Community recovery can be organised into eight sectors:

demographics, housing, critical infrastructure, natural environment, economy, education, health

andwell-being,andcommunityidentity(Rathfon2010p.12).Nigg’s(1995)studyoffamilyrecovery

processes found that the needs and types of families varied depending upon their access to

resources and reliance on social capital. The focus on household or community provides a

microscopic view, while a holistic and systems view provides understanding of various needs,

interconnectionsandinterdependence,whichshouldbedevelopedinsyncwitheachotherduring

recovery (Alesch et al., 2009). Although the primary focus of this research is inWaSH systems

(section2.2),thereviewincludesstudiesonhousing,livelihoodsandcriticalservicestoexplorethe

interdependenciesandprimaryprioritiesatthehouseholdlevelforsafeshelteranditsrelationto

WaSHandhealthsystemsandlivelihoodopportunities.

Mostliteratureonrecoveryfocusesonhousingreconstructionincludingemergencyandtemporary

sheltering options (Davis 1978; Quarantelli 1991; Johnson 2007), implementation mechanisms

(Johnson 2002; Barenstein 2008; Jigyasu 2010; Rathfon 2010) and shelter reconstruction

programming(Barakat2003;Lloyd-Jones2006;daSilva2010;Jhaetal.2010).Quarantelli(1991)

proposes housing recovery after a disaster occurs in four stages: (1) emergency shelter, (2)

temporaryshelter,(3)temporaryhousing,and(4)permanenthousing(Quarantelli1991).Shelter

studies have reviewed approaches, technologies and strategies such as owner-built, contractor-

driven, subsidisedorparticipatoryapproaches (Barakat,2003;Barenstein,2010;daSilva,2010).

Studiesonshelterandreconstructioncomparethetraditionalknowledgeandconstructionpractices

withmodernconstructiontechniquesfordemonstratingresiliencetoearthquakes(Jigyasu2010;

Audefroy 2011). Although the above studies engage with critical debates on housing and

reconstruction,theylackaholisticunderstandingofdifferentsectoralneedsduringrecovery,and

do not provide longer-termempirical evidence to guide complexities and challenges posed by

40

fundingandtimescales,andapproachestoovercomeprogrammaticbarriersforLRRDandBBB.This

chapterdoesnotexhaustivelyreviewthesestudiesbecausetheydidnothelpaddresstheresearch

questiondirectly, and were notrelevant to the investigation ofapproaches in WaSH during

recovery.

Vulnerabilitystudiesexploringdisasterimpactsandeconomicdecline,havearguedforalivelihoods

approach to reduce vulnerabilities (Anderson 1985). Lyons et al. (2010) argue that rebuilding

people’s livelihoods is equally important as building safer houses. There are studies on cash

transfers for shelter, cash forwork (CFW), or food forwork (FFW) projects that provide labour

opportunities through participatory projects that are externally funded (ACF 2009). Support to

livelihoodsindisasterresponseisstillarelativelynewapproach(Kennedyetal.2008;Uyetal.2011).

Itislargelyconfinedtosupportforagricultureandfoodsecurity-forexample,distributionofcash,

seeds and tools as part of agricultural support packages - or to providing short-termassistance

throughfoodforwork(FFW)andcashforwork(CFW)projects(Twigg2006).Theemergencyfood

programmingandlivelihoodsstrategiesadoptedbyagenciesinrecentyearshavehighlightedthat

incentive-basedactivitieslikeCFWandFFWprogrammesensurejobopportunitiesfortheaffected

communities, and help in kick-starting the economy devastated by the impact of emergencies

(Harvey et al., 2010; Sphere, 2011). These cash and material incentives influence community

participation,decision-makingandpowerrelationswithincommunities(Manyena,2006).

Thelivelihoodinitiativessuchascashtransfersprogrammehadapositiveimpactonfoodaccess

andreducingvulnerabilityinthefamine-affectedTillaberyregion,inNiger,butdidnotcontribute

towardslongerlastingimpactonhouseholds’foodsecuritystatus(Tumusiime2015).Uyetal.(2011)

foundthatpoorhouseholdsandcommunitiesinAlbayprovinceinthePhilippinesfacedchallenges

of limited access to alternative livelihoods and income opportunities. Post-tsunami research in

Nagapattinamfoundthatmerelydistributingboatstofishinggroupsforrestoringlivelihoodsfailed

toimproveequityorchangingsocietalnorms(Jordanetal.2015).TheimplementingNGOsleftthe

disaster-affected area after project completion, and did not understand the longer-term

implicationsoftheirlivelihoodinterventions(ibid).

Therearestudiesthatevaluateperformanceofcriticalservicesimpactedbydisasters.Thelifelines

orcriticalinfrastructuresystemsthatsupportactivities,suchaselectricpower,health,naturalgas,

water,telecommunications,andtransportationareessentialforholisticrecovery,becausewithout

41

energyandwater,householdsareforcedtorelocate(OlshanskyandChang2009).Recoveryinvolves

muchmorethansimplyrestoringthebuiltenvironment,ascommunitiesstruggletoachieveviability

inthenewly-emergingenvironmentwithinwhichtheyexist,and,totheextenttheyareable,to

shapethatenvironment(Alesch2005).Rebuildingandstrengtheninghealthsystemsisanimportant

humanitarian intervention, requiring effective engagement and planning for service delivery,

production,distributionandfinancing(Newbranderetal.2011).Asurveyofrecoveryindicatorsin

Nagapattinam, found that community infrastructure, includingwater systems, sanitation, roads,

andotheramenitieswereimportantfactorsinlong-termrecoveryoutcomes(Jordanetal.2015).

Although studies have demonstrated impacts on specific sectors, the understanding of

comprehensiverecoveryprocessesacrossallsectorsismissingintheliterature.

Participatory approaches in reconstruction are important for exploring the linkages between

disasters and development (Lyons et al., 2010). Davis (2007) recommends participation for

successful recovery and sustainability of programmes, as people aremore open to changes for

bettermentpost-disasters.Agencyguidelinesandframeworksemphasisetheroleofcommunities

inprovidingsustainablesolutions(UNDRO1982;PracticalAction2010;Sphere2011).Community

involvementinreconstructionprogrammesstrengthenstheirphysical,emotional,practicalability

toresistdisasters,andfacilitatesreconciliation,improvesinstitutionalresourcesanddevelopstheir

socialcapital(Barakat,2003).Participatoryprocessesinvolvingvulnerablepeoplehelptoidentify

and prioritise urgent needs and vulnerable groups (Twigg 2006). The process itself may be as

important as the outcome of participatory approaches (Mileti, 1999, Manyena, 2009). During

reconstructionthechallengesofscalingupandovercomingtimeandresourcespressurescanbe

overcomethroughparticipatoryandinclusiveapproachesinhousingandlivelihoods(Lyonsetal.

2010;SchildermanandLyons2011).

Therearechallengesinemployingparticipatoryprocessesintheimmediateaftermathofdisasters

becausetheurgentconcernsaretoaddressimmediatebasicneeds(NaturalHazardsCentre,2001).

Davidsonetal(2007)usedasystemsapproachtocomparefourcasestudiesofpost-disasterhousing

reconstructionprojects(oneeach inColombiaand inElSalvador,andtwoinTurkey).Thisstudy

showsthatthereisacontinuumofpossibilitiesforparticipationaslabourersononeend,orasactive

decision-makersandprojectmanagersontheotherend,whichisrarelyobtained(seeFigure2.1).

Often community capabilities are ignored in recovery programmes, therefore community

42

participationremainsamyththatishardlyputintopracticeintherightmannertoensureresilience

(Davidsonetal.2007).

Participatory approaches that empower people in important decision-making roles or offer

collaborationwithcommunitiespromotecommunitycontrolovertheproject,whereasbeneficiary

consultations on needs and wants (with no assurance that these concerns will be taken into

account), and merely informing them about the programmes cannot really be classified as

‘participation’(Davidsonetal.2007).Twigg(2006)advocatesagainstusingmeagreconsultations

withaffectedpopulations,as theydonotprovide long-termsolutionsor successandeventually

communities revert to unsafe conditions. Agencies should involve, engage, and empower

communitiestoundertakereconstructionactivities,sothattheiraspirationsandnotionsofresilient

communitiesarerealisedandtheyareabletocontributewiththeirknowledgeandskills(Jhaetal.,

2010).

Figure2.1:Ladderofcommunityparticipation(Davidsonetal.2007)

Tomeetrecoveryobjectives,itisessentialthatparticipationofallrelevantactorsinthedecision-

makingisensuredandtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesaredefined,includingthelocal,regionaland

nationalgovernment,civicbodiesandimplementingagencies(Barenstein2010;Alexander2012;

Sword-Daniels2014).Studieshaveanalysedgovernancemechanismsduringrecovery(Barenstein

2010;Meskinazarian 2011;Alexander 2012), the role of civil society in reconstruction following

43

earthquakesinTurkey(Johnson2011);andformationofnewauthoritiestooverseereconstruction

inItalyandIndia(Barenstein2010;Alexander2012).GujaratStateDisasterManagementAuthority

wasformedafter2001earthquake,andtheEarthquakeReconstructionandRehabilitationAuthority

was constituted after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. It is argued that community is not a

homogenous identity: instead there are diverse interests, needs and capacities, and underlying

aspectsofpowerandpoliticsindecision-making,whichoftenresultinconflictsdelayingdecisions

andaffectingthepaceandimpactofreconstruction(seeJhaetal.2010;Barenstein2010;Fan2013).

2.2Water,SanitationandHygiene

WaSHcollectivelyreferstoservicedeliveryandprogrammingforwaterandsanitationfacilities,and

hygienepractices.Inthisresearch,waterindicatesresearchandpracticearoundwatersourcesand

supply, treatment and use; sanitation refers to defecation practices and excreta disposal

mechanisms;andhygiene includespractices relatedtohandwashing,sanitation, foodandwater

handling,environmentalandpersonalcleanliness,andmenstrualhygiene.HygienePromotion(HP)

orPublicHealthPromotion(PHP)referstocommunitymobilisationandparticipation,information,

education and communication (IEC), behavioural change communication (BCC) and hygiene kit

distribution (Bastable and Russell 2013). WaSH literature includes development and

humanitarian/emergencyWaSH,environmentalandpublichealth.

2.2.1AccesstoWater,Sanitation,andHygiene

Morethan700millionpeoplelackaccesstoimprovedsourcesofdrinkingwaterandmorethanone

thirdoftheglobalpopulation–some2.5billionpeople—donotuseanimprovedsanitationfacility,

andofthese1billionpeoplestillpracticeopendefecation (WHO/UNICEF2014).Anestimated4

billioncasesofdiarrhoeaoccureachyear,causing1.8milliondeathsmainlyamongchildrenunder

fiveyearsofage,duetounsafedrinkingwater,poorsanitation,andpoorhygiene(Lantagneand

Clasen 2012). There are stark disparities across regions, between urban and rural areas, and

betweentherichandthepoorandmarginalised(WHO/UNICEF2014).GovernmentsandNGOsare

looking for solutions to tackle thedevelopmentproblemofonebillionpeopledefecating in the

open,addressbehaviourchangeandmonitorprogress(WijesekeraandThomas2015).

TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDG)relatedtodrinking-waterandsanitation(MDG7,Target

7c)aimsto:“Halve,by2015,theproportionofpeoplewithoutsustainableaccesstosafedrinking-

44

waterandbasicsanitation”(WHO/UNICEF2014).Withtherenewalofdevelopmentgoalsin2015,

international donors and agencies are revaluating investments inWaSH tomeasure access and

monitorprogress(Sparkman2012;Pritchettetal.2013).Accesstodrinkingwaterismeasuredby

theproportionofapopulationusinganimproveddrinking-watersource:asourcethat,bynature

ofitsconstruction,adequatelyprotectsthewaterfromoutsidecontamination,inparticular,from

faecal matter; while unimproved drinking water sources include unprotected dug wells,

unprotectedsprings,surfacewater,vendor-providedwater,bottledwaterorwaterdeliveredby

tanker(WHO/UNICEF2014).Accesstosanitationismeasuredbythepercentageofthepopulation

using an improved sanitation facility, which hygienically separates human excreta from human

contactincludingsewerconnections,septictanksystems,pourflushlatrines,ventilatedimproved

pitlatrinesorapitlatrinewithaslaborcoveredpit(ibid).Unimprovedsanitationfacilitiesinclude

pitlatrineswithoutslabsorplatforms,openpitlatrines,hanginglatrines,bucketlatrinesandopen

defecation(ibid).

Thespreadofwater-relateddiseasesdependsonenvironmentalconditionsandhumanbehaviour

that determine control andpreventionof diseases (Connolly et al. 2004). Studies onwater and

sanitation-relatedimprovementsevaluatedtheirimpactsondiarrhoealandotherinfections(Esrey

etal.,1991).Itwasfoundthatchildmortalityfellby55%,whichsuggeststhatwaterandsanitation

haveasubstantial impactonchildsurvival,andsanitationfacilitiesdecreasediarrhoeamorbidity

andmortality(Esreyetal.1991).Fromthepublichealthandepidemiologicalperspectives,provision

of WaSH impacts population health outcomes, economic benefits and livelihood opportunities

(Connollyetal.2004).Systematicreviewandmeta-analysisimpactstudyshowsthatdevelopment

interventions in drinking water, sanitation facilities, and hygiene practice improvements

significantlyreducedtherisksofdiarrhoealillnesses(Fewtrelletal.2005).

Accesstowaterandsanitationisasinequanonforthefulfilmentofbasichumanrights(UN2002).

InhisdiscussionoftheconceptofarighttosafetyformainstreamingDRRindevelopment,Twigg

(2003) states: ‘Everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of protection against

naturalandman-madehazards’(Twigg2003p.2).Therighttowaterandsanitationformsanintegral

part of a right to safety andhelps in improved accountability, increased focus onmarginal and

vulnerable groups, increased participation in decision-making and enabling individual and

community empowerment through sanitation (COHRE et al. 2007). Human right to water is

45

indispensible for leading a life in human dignity and for realisation of other human rights,

particularlytherightstolife,andtoadequatestandardofliving,housing,foodandhealth(UN2002).

In2002,theUNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsdeclaredwaterasahumanright

whereby all individuals are entitled to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and

affordable water for personal and domestic uses (UN 2002). It includes affordability, non-

discrimination,inclusionofvulnerableandmarginalgroups,accesstoinformation,participationand

accountability (UN2002). In2010, theUNGeneralAssemblyandUNHumanRightsCommission

declaredthatthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationisderivedfromtherighttoan

adequatestandardofliving,andinextricablyrelatedtotherighttothehighestattainablestandard

ofphysicalandmentalhealth,aswellastherighttolifeandhumandignity(UN2010)3.General

Comment No. 15 states that: ‘States parties should take steps to ensure that: Groups facing

difficulties with physical access to water, such as victims of natural disasters, persons living in

disaster-proneareasareprovidedwithsafeandsufficientwater.’(UN2002p.7)

Thehumanrighttowatersupplyandsanitationhasbeenrecognisedbygovernmenttreatiesand

legislation,thereforeobligatingcountriestochalkoutnationalstrategiesandplanstoensurethese

rightsarerealised(WHO/UN-Water2012).Thetreatiesrelatedtowaterare:

i. UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948),initsArticle25,clearlystatesthateveryone

hasarightto‘astandardoflivingadequatelyforhealthandwell-being’includingfoodand

housing,andaccesstowater(UN1948).

ii. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) specifies a number of rights

whichareessentialforfulfillingtheneedtoaccesstowater,implyingmainlythatnoperson

canbedeprivedoftheirownmeansofsubsistenceandthateveryhumanbeinghasinherent

righttolifeasmentionedinArticle6(UNHCR1966).

iii. InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,toorecognisesthisrightto

waterimplicitlyinitsarticles11and12,asarighttoadequatestandardoflivingandrightto

thehighestattainablestandardofphysicalandmentalhealth(COHREetal.,2007).

3Theresolutionwasadoptedduringthe64thsessionoftheUNGeneralAssemblyon3rdAugust2010

46

iv. TheConventionforRightsofChildren(1989),article24,statesthatchildrenhavearightto

thehighest attainable standardofhealth, guaranteed interalia through theprovisionof

adequateandcleandrinkingwater(Unicef2011).

v. TheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(2006)requires

‘equalaccessbypersonswithdisabilitiestocleanwaterservices,andtoensureaccessto

appropriate and affordable services, devices and other assistance for disability-related

needs’(COHREetal.2007p.70).

In humanitarian contexts,WaSHminimum standards and indicators for delivery are developed

undertheSphereProject(McDougalandBeard2011).SphereStandards(theHumanitarianCharter

andMinimumStandardsinDisasterResponse)outlinehumanitarianprinciples,standardsofservice

delivery and indicators (Sphere 2011). These are rooted in rights-based and people-centred

approaches (Brown et al. 2012);with useful parameters to ensure adequate access, safety and

accountabilitymeasures inemergencyprogramming (McDougalandBeard2011).Theminimum

standardsforwatersupply,sanitationandhygienepromotion(WaSH)areapracticalexpressionof

thesharedbeliefsandcommitmentsofhumanitarianagencies,andofthecommonprinciples,rights

anddutiesgoverninghumanitarianactionsetoutintheHumanitarianCharter(Sphere2011).

The key criteria to ensure the human right towater and sanitation are presented in Table 2.2

(Greene2014,p.6).

Table2.2:CriteriaoftheHumanRighttoWaterandSanitation(Source:Greene,2014)

Key

principles

Description

Sufficient Watersupplyandsanitationmustbecontinuousandsufficientforpersonalanddomestic

uses. This includes drinking water, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food

preparationandpersonalandhouseholdhygiene

47

Safe Thewaterrequiredforpersonalordomesticusemustbesafe,thereforefreefrommicro-

organisms,chemicalsubstancesandradiologicalhazardsthatconstituteathreattohealth.

Measuresofdrinkingwatersafetyareusuallydefinedbynationaland/orlocalstandards.

WHO’s Guidelines for drinking-water quality provide a basis for the development of

nationalstandardsthat,ifproperlyimplemented,willensurethesafetyofdrinkingwater.

Everyone is entitled to safe and adequate sanitation. Facilitiesmust be situatedwhere

physical security can be safeguarded. Ensuring safe sanitation also requires substantial

hygieneeducationandpromotion.Thismeanstoiletsmustbeavailableforuseatalltimes

of thedayor night andmust behygienic;wastewater andexcreta safely disposed and

toilets constructed to prevent collapse. Servicesmust ensure privacy andwater points

shouldbepositionedtoenableuseforpersonalhygiene,includingmenstrualhygiene.

Acceptable Watershouldbeofanacceptablecolour,odourandtasteforpersonalordomesticuse.All

waterandsanitationfacilitiesandservicesmustbeculturallyappropriateandsensitiveto

gender, lifecycle and privacy requirements. Sanitation should be culturally acceptable

ensuredinanon-discriminatorymannerandincludevulnerableandmarginalisedgroups.

Thisincludesaddressingpublictoiletconstructionissuessuchasseparatefemaleandmale

toiletstoensureprivacyanddignity

Physically

accessible

Everyone has the right to water and sanitation services that are physically accessible

within, or in the immediate vicinity of, their household, workplace and educational or

health institutions. Relatively small adjustments to water and sanitation services can

ensurethattheneedsofthedisabled,elderly,womenandchildrenarenotoverlooked,

thusimprovingthedignity,health,andoverallqualityforall.AccordingtoWHO,thewater

sourcehastobewithin1,000metresofthehomeandcollectiontimeshouldnotexceed

30minutes.

Affordable Waterandsanitationfacilitiesandservicesmustbeavailableandaffordableforeveryone,

eventhepoorest.Thecostsforwaterandsanitationservicesshouldnotexceed5%ofa

household’sincome,meaningservicesmustnotaffectpeoples’capacitytoacquireother

essentialgoodsandservices,includingfood,housing,healthservicesandeducation

Sphere (2011) provides indicators for provision of adequate WaSH facilities, appropriate

mechanisms for informationdissemination,knowledgeandunderstandingamongst theaffected

populationforpreventingwater-andsanitation-relateddiseases,andformobilisingcommunities

inthedesignandmaintenanceofWaSHfacilities(Table2.3).

Table2.3:SphereIndicatorsforWaSH(Sphere2011).

48

WaterSupplyIndicators ExcretaDisposal HygienePromotion

• Averagewaterusefordrinking,

cookingandpersonalhygienein

any household is at least 15

litresperpersonperday.

• The maximum distance from

any household to the nearest

waterpointis500metres.

• Queuingtimeatawatersource

isnomorethan30minutes.

• There are no faecal coliforms

per100mlofwateratthepoint

ofdeliveryanduse

• Any household-level water

treatment options used are

effective in improving

microbiological water quality

and are accompanied by

appropriatetraining,promotion

andmonitoring

• All excreta containment

measures,areat least30metres

away from any groundwater

source.Thebottomofanylatrine

or soak-away pit is at least 1.5

metresabovethewatertable.

• In flood or high water table

situations, appropriatemeasures

aretakentotackletheproblemof

faecal contamination of

groundwatersources

• Drainage or spillage from

defecation systems does not

contaminate surface water or

shallowgroundwatersources

• Amaximumof20peopleuseeach

toilet.

• Toilets arenomore than50mts

fromdwellings.

• Allhaveaccess tohygiene items

andtheseareusedeffectivelyto

maintainhealth,dignityandwell-

being

• All women and girls of

menstruating age are provided

with appropriate materials for

menstrual hygiene following

consultation with the affected

population

• All have access to information

and training on the safe use of

hygieneitemsthatareunfamiliar

tothem

• Information on the timing,

location, content and target

groupsforanNFIdistributionfor

theaffectedpopulation

2.2.2EmergencyWaSH

Diarrhoealdiseasesaccountformorethan40%ofdeathsintheacuteemergencyphase;over80%

ofdeathsoccur inchildrenunder2yearsofageamongstpeople living incamps(Connollyetal.

2004). This is due to the synergistic interaction between certain risk factors that promote

communicable disease transmission (Connolly et al. 2004). During emergencies, clean drinking

water, effective sanitation and good hygiene practices are vital for saving lives and reducing

suffering(ClasenandSmith2005)byeffectivelycontrollingconditionssuchasdiarrhoea.Usinga

systematicreview,Connollyetal(2004)identifiedriskfactorsthatpromotecommunicablediseases

incomplexemergencies.Theseincludemasspopulationmovementandresettlementintemporary

locations, overcrowding, economic and environmental degradation, impoverishment, scarcity of

safewater,poorsanitationandwastemanagement,absenceofshelter,poornutritionalstatusasa

49

resultoffoodshortages,andpooraccesstohealthcareorthecollapseoroverwhelmingofpublic

healthinfrastructureorabsenceofhealthservices(Connollyetal.2004).

ThisresearchadaptstheframeworkusedforselectionofinterventionsbyFewtrelletal(2005),for

analysingthevariouspost-disasterWaSHinterventionsincludingwatersupply,watertreatmentand

safety,sanitationandhygiene(Figure2.3).

Figure2.2WaSHinterventionscategories(AdaptedfromFewtrelletal.,2005)

The common sources of infection in outbreaks of communicable diseases are: polluted water

sources(faecalcontaminatedsurfacewaterenteringopenorsurfacewatersources);contamination

ofwaterduringtransportorstorageduetocontactwithfaecalmatter;sharedwatercontainersand

cookingpots;scarcityofsoapforhandwashingandconsumptionofcontaminatedfood(Connollyet

al.2004).Thechallengesofpost-disasterWaSHwererecentlyevidentintheexperiencefromthe

2010earthquake inHaiti,where1.5millionhomelesswere living inthousandsof IDP(Internally

displacedpopulation)andmakeshiftcampssetup inPortauPrincewithoutaccess toadequate

sanitationfacilities;anepidemicofcholeracomplicatedthereliefandrecoveryeffortsthesame

yearaffecting300,000peopleandkilling7000(Kingetal.2011).Thesituationwascomplexsince

reportedly theNepaliUNworkershad introduced the cholera. Thehumanitarianagencieswere

operatingtrucksoftreatedwatertocamps,anexpensiveundertakingonavastscale,formorethan

twoyears(BastableandLamb2012).Thesewatersupplymeasuresdidnotaccountforpre-existing

networksofwatervendorswhohadsubstantialcapacitytodeliverandmanywhocouldstartup

theirbusinesswithalittleextrasupport(King2015).Thesanitationmeasuresincludeddefecation

WaSHinterventionspostdisaster

WaterSupply

Communityinterventions

Householdprovision Waterstorage

Watersafety

Treatmentatsource

Treatmentathouseholdlevel

Sanitation Hygiene

Education Handwashing

50

insingle-use,biodegradableplasticbags(Colonietal.2012),orthe‘Peepoo’bagsmarketedasan

improvementupontraditionalbagsusedfordefecation(Pateletal.2011).

EmergencyWaSHfacesnumerouschallengesinwatersupply,latrinesandsolidwastemanagement,

hygienepromotionandprogrammingexitstrategies(BastableandRussell2013).Whileanecdotes

of individual andagencyapproachesexist, there is anurgentneed for field-based researchand

development into emerging technologies and pragmatic approaches to fill gaps and meet the

challenges of adequate and appropriate sanitation systems (Patel et al. 2011). The pre-existing

practices,accessandequityissuesinfluenceWaSHduringrecovery.Theliteraturereviewswater

supply,sanitationandhygienecomponentswithinWaSH.

Humanitarian water supply entails three essential sub-components: community water supply,

householdwatersupplyandprovisionofwaterstoragefacilities(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).Often

communities access rainwater, surface water from lakes, ponds, streams and rivers, which are

microbiologically unsafe (ibid). The groundwater from wells, springs tends to be of a higher

microbiologicalqualitydependinguponthedepthofthehandpump(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).

Externalagenciesoftenprovidesharedhandpumpsasitensuresincreasedvisibility,coverage,with

minimumassistanceorcommitmentforinstallation(ibid).Thereisariskofcontaminationinshared

facilities due to bad design, and rapid deterioration because of heavy use, disrepair, non-

involvementof communities in site selection, and lackof technical assistanceand capability for

operationandmaintenance(McGarry1980).Itisrecommendedthatmaterialselectionanddesign

oftechnologyforhouseholdmaintenanceandrepairbythelocalcommunities is includedinthe

long-termplantomeetpopulationneedsforsafedrinkingwater(ibid).

Emergencywatersourceinterventionsincludeprotectionofwells,diggingofnewboreholesatthe

communal level, anddistributionofwater throughpublic tap stands in campareas.There isno

documentedevidenceofhousehold-levelpipeddistributioninitiatedduringemergencyreliefphase

(ClasenandSmith2005).Repairofwaterdistributionnetworks and leakages in thedistribution

systemsareundertaken to resumenormalwater supplyquickly after anemergency (Parkinson,

2009;Smith,2009).Temporarywatersupplysolutionsareexpensiveandunnecessaryunlessitis

forvulnerablegroupswithlimitedornoaccesstocommonwatersources(Smith2009).

51

Duringemergenciesandmasspopulationdisplacement,waterquantityusuallytakespriorityover

water quality (Atuyambe et al., 2011). Studies indicate effectiveness of interventions may be

influenced by the environmental, behavioural and cultural practices of the affected population

(Atuyambeetal.,2011).Studieshavefoundthatwomen,primarilyresponsibleforwatercollection,

werehesitanttousetreatedwaterduetotasteissuesafter2010landslidesdisplaced5000people

inUganda(Atuyambeetal.,2011).Instead,thepreferenceforriverandtraditionalwatersources,

consideredtobeunsafeanduntreatedbytheagenciesprovidesvaluableinsightsonrecognising

traditionalbeliefsandpracticesonwatergovernance,andgenderedaspectsofwatercollection,

defecationandhygienepracticeswhencommunitiesaredisplacedbydisasters.

Participatory approaches for ensuring community ownership and long-term sustainability are

essential; and technological solutions need testing and feasibility studies before directly or

immediatelyreplicatingindifferentcontexts(Brownetal.2012;BastableandRussell2013). It is

necessarytodocumentinstitutional,financial,environmentalandsocialconstraintslimitingaccess

towaterinfrastructureservices,onceinternationalattentioniswithdrawnintherecoveryphase,to

informfutureprogrammedesign(Brownetal.,2012).Inpost-earthquakePakistan,AminandHan

(2009)studiedrainwater-harvesting(RWH)systemsasasupplementtoexistingwatersystemsand

distributionnetworksenabling low-cost infrastructure investmentsandefficientmanagementof

economicresourcesduringrecovery.InruralMuzaffarabad,socio-economiccontextanalysiswas

themost importantfactorforsustainabilityandsuccessfuluptakeofnewwatersupplyfacilities,

alongwithdueconsiderationofpre-existingsystems,designandmaterialoffacilities,ownershipof

sources,protectionandfinancialcosts(MicangeliandEsposto2010).Participatoryapproachesin

community-ledrehabilitationprojectshelpedtoreachouttovastlyspreadcommunitiesthatdid

nothaveaccesstowater(ibid).Howeversuchtechnologicalinterventionsdependuponpeople’s

attitudes,behaviourandinvolvementintheprogrammes(AminandHan2009).

Fromadevelopmentperspective,Boydell(1999)arguesthatruralwatersupplyandsanitationcan

be sustained through demand-driven approaches, wherebymanagerial decisions about service,

locationoffacilities,andcostsharingaremadelocally.Principally,thisapproachfavourscommunity

demandoverexternallydeterminedneed,andselecting levelsofservicetobeprovided(andby

implication,technologiestobeemployed),basedonthecommunities’desireorwillingnesstopay

insteadofanexternalperceptionofaffordability(Boydell1999).Theapplicationoftheseprinciples

52

inemergencieshasbeenexplored–forexamplecostsharingofWaSHfacilitiesinHaiti(Visser2012)

–butneedsfurthersubstantiation.

FewstudiesinemergencyWaSHdrawattentiontowardswatertreatmentmeasures.Brownetal

(2012)arguethatbothsufficientwater(quantity)andsafety(quality)arecriticalfor interrupting

disease transmission in humanitarian settings. There are two methods of water treatment –

treatmentat sourceand treatmentatpointofuse.Thedrinkingwater responseafter the2004

tsunami in Indonesia includedmobile treatmentplantsand installation, repairand rebuildingof

emergency storage and distribution systems, distribution of bleach (sodium hypochlorite),

bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite), chlorine tablets (NaDCC, halazone), PUR sachets

(combined flocculants and disinfectant products by Proctor andGamble), and alum (flocculent)

(ClasenandSmith2005).Itemergedthathousehold-basedapproachesinwatertreatmentdidnot

playasignificantroleintheinitialphasesoftheresponse,withthepossibleexceptionofboiling

(ClasenandSmith2005).Afterthe2010floodsinKashmir,bulkwatertreatmentunits(BWTU)were

deployedtosupplyadequateandaccessiblewatertolargenumberofusers(LuffandDorea2012).

Although different options for household treatment (referred as PoUWT: Point of Use Water

Treatment) exist for small-scale, non-acute, andhighdiarrhoeal disease-risk emergencies, these

requiresubstantialtrainingandmaterialstorecipients,adequatepre-placedstocksinemergency-

proneareas,andknowledgeofappropriatechlorinedosage(LantagneandClasen2012).Sphere

(2011) recommends selecting culturally acceptable PoUWT options and using locally available

productsforcontinueduseinthelonger-term.Afterthe2003floodsinHaiti,ceramicfiltersystems

weredistributed,wheretheuserslikedthefiltersfortheirhealthbenefits,butwerenotwillingto

payforthemorbearreplacementcosts.Distributionofaquatabswithoutadequatetraining,and

reportedlackofuseduetoconcernsovertasteandunwillingnesstopayinthelongrunhavebeen

documented(LantagneandClasen2012).

ComparisonofBTWUsandPoUWTsshowseffectivenessdependsoncostofmaterials,trainingand

followup:BWTUsneedhighlevelsoftechnicalsupport,highcapitalcostsandcertainconditionsfor

optimumuse;andPoUWToptionsrequirehygienepromotionandusermessagingwithfollowup

foreffectivebyhouseholdsforunfamiliarmethods(LuffandDorea2012).Evenifthewatersource

canbetestedandtreatedformicrobiologicalcontamination,waterremainsatriskofcontamination

duringtransportationfrompointofsourcetopointofuse (LuffandDorea2012).Forsuccessful

wateruseandsafety,availabilityoftrainedvolunteersisessentialtoundertakecleaningatpointof

53

use immediately after disasters and provide technical assistance in regular monitoring and

surveillance (Smith 2009). There is a need for stronger evidence for low-tech solutions for

beneficiaries,sustainabletreatmentsolutionsathouseholdlevel,andinvolvingwomeninusingand

maintainingwaterfilters;andissuesaroundthecost,sustainabilityandacceptabilityofdifferent

waterfilters(BastableandRussell2013).

AppropriatesanitationtechnologiesinemergencyWaSHarecritical.Focusingonsanitation,studies

indicatethatthebenefitsofawaterqualityinterventioncompletelydependuponthesanitation

andhygieneconditions:ifsanitationconditionsarepoor,waterqualityimprovementshaveminimal

impact(Eisenbergetal.2007).Adequateinfrastructuralprovisionandsufficienttechnicalcapacity

andfinancialresourcesarerequiredtomeetthedemandforsanitation,namelyforexcretaremoval,

treatmentanddisposal(WHO/UN-Water2012).Emergencysituationsarechallengingenvironments

forWaSH implementation, and recent experience fromHaiti andelsewherehashighlighted the

limitationsofcurrentemergencysanitation(Shultzetal.2009;Brownetal.2012;Kingetal.2013).

BastableandLamb(2012)presentsanitationoptionsforhumanitarianworkersincludingsquatting

slabs, plastic sheeting, and hygiene promotion materials and equipment. The geographical

challengesanddisastersrequireappropriatesanitationtechnologiesinchallengingenvironments.

ThiswasdemonstratedbyastudyinIndonesia,wherecommunitieslivingoncoastalland,swamps

andoverestuariesandriverswereaffectedbyregularfloods,andfacedphysicallimitationstosafe

sanitationduetolackofland,accessroadsandavailabilityofwaterthatisnotpolluted(Djonoputro

etal.2010).Thisstudyindicatesthatthepre-disasterphysicalenvironmentinfluencessanitation

practicesandfacilitiesduringdisasters,andinrecovery.

InBiharaftertheKosifloods,agenciesundertookDRRmeasuresinsanitation,tocountertheimpact

offloodsonfacilitiesandaccessduringdisasters,byconstructinglatrinecomplex(consistingoffour

single-pitpour-flushlatrines)alongwithonehandpumponraisedplatforms(Shekharetal.2010).

InBangladesh,andotherflood-pronecountries,toiletsareconstructedabovethehomesteadlevel,

topreventregularfloods(Khurshid2008).Forrapidinstallationduringdisasterstherearefinancial

costs for building raised platforms, which is twice the price of a normal pit latrine, and time-

consuminginunstablesoils;itisalsocostlytoprovidequickliningstopreventpitortrenchcollapse

(Bastable and Lamb2012). In diverse conditions, the use andmaintenance of latrines becomes

challenging,affectingthefunctioningofcommunitymanagementcommittees–theagenciescannot

54

paybillsfordesludgingforlong,andpoorhouseholdscannotbeartheoperationalcosts(Bastable

andLamb2012).

There are some concernsover usingdevelopmentprinciples in emergency contexts: ‘improved’

sanitation provision emphasises the value of shared latrines based on functionality rather than

techno-centricapproach(Sparkman2012;Mazeau2013).Duringcholeraoutbreaksincampsettings

inKenya,multiplehouseholdsusingthesamelatrinewerefoundtobebreedinggroundsforfecal–

oraltransmissionofcholerathroughoutthecommunity(Shultzetal.2009).Althoughtheresearch

indicatesspreadofdiseasesincamp-settingsduetolivingandsanitaryconditions,moreresearchis

required for understanding local perceptions and cultural barriers towards shared latrines

(Rheinländeretal.2015).Thisresearchbuildsontherelevanceofsanitationanditsimportance,as

perceived by communities that are frequently affected by floods, and are regularly displaced.

Despiteyearsofpracticeandliterature,concernsremainregardinghumanitariansanitationchoices

andsustainability:“Isitsufficientjusttodigahole,putaplasticslabonit,diginfourpoles,and

wrapsomeplasticsheetingaroundit(BastableandLamb2012,p.81)?”

InWaSH,inclusiveapproachesareusedtounderstandandrespectcommunityconcernsongender

and sharing toilets betweendiverse groups includingwomen, children,disabledand theelderly

(Pineraetal.2005).Duringthe2005earthquakeresponseinPakistan,women’sneedsforprivacy

andsecuritywereaddressedbyprovidingseparateandscreenedtoiletsandbathingblocksasa

resultofparticipatoryandconsultativeapproacheswiththewomen(Nawazetal.,2010).Afterthe

2003Bamearthquake,Oxfam’sWaSHresponsewasbasedoncontextualneedsandaholisticview,

including showers and latrines, cleaning materials and trained human resources in recovery

programming(Pineraetal.,2005).Theone-size-fits-allapproachtosanitationcannotwork inall

contexts(Jones2013),especiallypost-disasterwhenthereisneedforspeedy,timelyandculturally

inclusiveandappropriatetechnologicalsolutions(BastableandLamb2012).

55

Figure2.3:Diseasetransmissionpathwaysoffaeco-oraldiseases(Prüss-üstünetal.n.d.)

Hygienepromotionprojectsduringemergenciesareeffective,alongwiththeotherinterventions.

Meta-analysis and synthesis studies show that hygienepromotion is themost effectiveway for

reducingtheincidenceofdiarrhoea(Parkinson,2009).Researchontheimpactofrigorouspersonal

cleanlinessandcareineatinganddrinkinghabitsonreducingrisksofwater-bornediseaseshasbeen

carriedoutinvarioussettings(Feachemetal.1983;Noji1992;GomaEpidemiologyGroup1994;

MaraandFeachem1999).Theprovisionofappropriateandsufficientwatercontainers,cooking

pots,andfuelandsoapforhandwashingwasfoundtobeeffectiveinreducingtheriskofcholera

(Connollyetal.2004).Hygieneeducationorpromotionmeasuresarebasedonthef-chartofFigure

2.3 (Prüss-üstün et al. 2004). The pathogens are transmitted through a complex set of

interdependentpathways,includingbothcontaminatedfoodandwateralongwithhousehold-and

community-levelperson-to-personroutes(Eisenbergetal.2007).Thehygienemessagesaddress

thesepathways:watermaybecontaminatedduringdisasters,exposingindividualsthroughdrinking

Management actions concerning water supply and sanitation ofteninvolve water resource management, including the control of insectvectors of disease (such as malaria) and soil-borne helminths (such asascaris). Similarly, environmental management to control disease vectorsimpacts directly upon water supply and sanitation. Furthermore, accessto improved water sources has a significant impact on exposure to agentsof some water-based diseases (such as schistosomiasis) and diseases withwater-related insect vectors, and improved sanitation reduces certainvector-borne diseases such as trachoma. These intimate interconnectionsof exposure pathways and control mechanisms suggest that treatingwater, including supply and resource management, as an integral part ofthe risk factor unsafe WSH is rational.

1.2 Definition of risk factors

Unsafe WSH adversely affects health through multiple routes.

1. Transmission through contact with water that contains organismssuch as Schistosoma spp.

2. Transmission through vectors proliferating in water ecologies relatedto dams, irrigation schemes and other water resources projects (e.g. malaria, schistosomiasis, lymphatic filariasis). This should beincluded although it is currently unclear how or whether it can bequantified.

1324 Comparative Quantification of Health Risks

Human excreta

Water-borne sewage

Hands Soil

Animal excreta

Surface water Humans

Flies Dry sanitation involving reuse

Food

Ground- water

Drinking water

Non-recycling latrines

Pathogensource

Medium Environment Interface

Figure 16.1 Transmission pathways of faecal–oral disease

56

waterorrecreational,bathing,orwashingactivities,andfoodmaybecontaminatedeitherthrough

infected animals or from contact with contaminated water or soil. Soil may be contaminated

through impropermanagement of excreta (poor sanitation) (Curtis and Cairncross 2003; Prüss-

üstünetal.n.d.;Eisenbergetal.2007).

CurtisandCairncross(2003)foundthatriskofdiarrhoealdiseaseassociatedwithnotwashinghands

couldbereduced;implyingthathandwashingcouldreducediarrhoeariskby47%.Hygienepractices

are categorised as practices related to personal hygiene, water hygiene, domestic hygiene and

environmental hygiene (IFRC, n.d.). Handwashing helps in preventing faeco-oral disease

transmission and handwashing stations or personal hygiene kits may increase uptake and

consistency of handwashing, but their use in humanitarian responsewarrants further research

(Brownetal.,2012).Sphere(2011)advocatedfortheHygieneImprovementFramework(Figure2.4)

that places equal emphasis on the enabling environment, hygiene promotion and access to

hardwareforreducingdiseasesinemergencies.

Figure2.4:HygieneimprovementframeworkSource:Sphere(2011)

There is little evidence of what approaches work in effecting behaviour change post-disasters,

making it difficult for practitioners to take effective decisions regarding allocation of resources

(Brownetal.,2012).Thereareareas related toschoolWaSHandmenstrualhygiene,whichare

underexploredwithinemergencyWaSHliterature.BastableandRussell(2013)foundthathygiene

promotiontochildreninschoolscouldbepartoftheinterventionstrategy.Inpost-earthquakeHaiti,

themajorityoftheschoolswerefoundtobe lacking insafedrinkingwater,sanitationandhand

washing facilities, anddidnot invest in instruction forhygienepromotionandhealtheducation

57

(Giardinaetal.2011).Schoolsactasaninstitutionalvehicletoreachtheyoungergenerationand

stimulatehygieneandsanitationpracticeswhicharesustainedbeyondtheperiodofanintervention

(Giardinaetal.2011).Althoughguidelinesformeetingmenstrualhygieneneedsexist(e.g.Sphere

standards),morework isneededtocharacteriseappropriatestrategies tomeetneeds (Sommer

2012). Menstruation is a taboo subject, yet within same communities there are differences in

practices between younger and older women (Nawaz et al. 2010). In Pakistan women were

supportedwithsanitarynapkins,andspecialmenstruationunitsinadditiontobathingunitsthrough

careful involvement and sensitised approach to specific needs of women (Nawaz et al. 2010).

Howeverapproachestoeffectchangesduringrecoveryarelessdocumented.

2.2.3WaSHduringrecovery

There are challenges for WaSH during recovery in terms of knowledge gaps, and contextual

challenges in WaSH and relevant programming approaches during recovery. Emergency WaSH

research and practice show improved WaSH strategies adopted during disasters, and call for

innovative, on-the-job approaches during implementation. The understanding ofwhatworks in

emergenciesinWaSHinterventionsremainstacitknowledge,neithersystematicallydocumented

orpublishedinacademic,peer-reviewedjournals(Brownetal.2012).Insufficientevidenceexistsof

what innovations work in the emerging processes, technologies and approaches adopted in

humanitarianWaSHservicedelivery(Brownetal.2012;BastableandRussell2013).Theexisting

knowledge gap can be explored by documenting what technological choices, processes, and

approachesareimplementedoradoptedduringrecoveryandhowtheyallowfortransitiontowards

moresustainablesolutions.

The tacit knowledge is presented in a handful of technical journals (e.g. Waterlines, Water

Alternatives), by WaSH professionals working in international donor agencies (e.g. WHO and

UNICEF), or international humanitarian agencies (e.g Oxfam, ACF, MSF, IRC, Practical Action),

internationalresearchthink-tanks(e.g.ODI,IIED,WEDC,IDS),deploymentagencies(e.gRedRand

EWB) and communities of practice (such as SanCoP, Sphere, RWSN, SuSanA and GlobalWaSH

cluster). 4 Although worldwide technical forums exist, region-specific forums that deal with

4WHO –World Health organisation, ACF – Action Contra la faim, MSF –Medecins sans Frontiers, IRC – International RescueCommittee,ODI–OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,IIED–InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment,WEDC–Water,EngineeringandDevelopmentCentre,IDS–InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,RedR–RegisteredEngineersforDisasterRelief,EWB–EngineerswithoutBorders,SanCoP–SanitationCommunityofPractice,RWSN–RuralWaterSupplyNetwork,SuSanA–SustainableSanitationAlliance

58

prevalentcontextandprovide locallysustainablesolutionsneedtobedeveloped. Implementing

agencies have refrained from publishing what actually transpired during the programme: the

failures in implementation, and failure to learn and document experiences (Jones et al. 2013).

Institutionsstruggleduetoweakmechanismsforlessonlearning,implementingandsharing,which

constitute a brake on innovation and progress. As a result practitioners rely on standardised

guidelines,institutionalmemoryandtrialanderror(Brownetal.2012).

TherearechallengesposedbyrecoverycontextforsuccessfulimplementationofWaSHapproaches.

ThepracticalguidelinesforrecoveryWaSHadvocateforintegrationwiththedevelopmentprocess

(WisnerandAdams2002).Theenvironmentalengineers,policy-makersandprogrammemanagers

areencouragedtoavoidrelianceonfixedmaterialresourcesandinsteadfocusonPHPactivities,or

communityhealth-workertrainingtoenablecommunitiestomakeinformedchoicesaboutsource

andsiteselectionforwatersupplyandlatrines(WisnerandAdams2002).Humanitarianinitiatives

toimprovewatersupplyorsystemsshouldincorporatelongtermsustainability(Smith2009).The

emergencyresponsemeasuresinWaSHareprescribedfromthedevelopmentsectorinwhichthe

contextandchallengesdifferfromthoseofemergenciesandrecovery(Parkinson2009).Recovery

posesdifferentcontextualandprogrammingchallenges,becausetheshort-termactivitiesarenot

wellintegratedintolong-termdevelopmentprocesses:addressingdemographicchanges,returning

populations,integrationofdisplacedcommunitieswithhostcommunitiesandresettlementtosafer

locations(WisnerandAdams2002).Restorationofsanitationservices,distributionandaccessto

basic facilities such as toilets and showers allows communities to maintain their standards of

hygiene,preventcommunicablediseases,improvelivingconditionsandqualityoflifebyrepairing

andreconstructingexistingstructures(Pineraetal.2005).

There is littleevidenceofwhatprogrammingapproachesand strategiesareemployed inWaSH

duringrecovery.King’s(2015)researchinpost-earthquakeHaitifoundthatagencyWaSHservices

were short-term and expensive, hadweak participation and ownership, leaving services poorly

maintainedduetoweaktransitionmechanismsandexitstrategies.Agenciescontinuedtodeploy

expensivetruckingwater,wherepre-existingpracticeofthecommunitiesdependedonvendorsand

market for water pouches, moreover agencies who offered support in maintaining kiosks and

repairing the water supply network (standpipes and storage reservoirs) lacked the capacity,

expertise and guidance for undertaking long-term measures (King 2015). To support adaptive

resilience and combat programmatic barriers demand-led, participatory, neighbourhood

59

rehabilitationapproachesareessential(ibid).Interventionsshouldbebasedonneedsassessment

inreliefandrecovery,allowingdecision-makingtobeinthehandsoftheaffected,strengthening

ownership,andusinglocalcapacityandmanagingexpectations(ibid).

Transitionalapproachesareessentialtolinkrelieftodevelopmentwithadefinitivechangefroma

supply-driven to demand-driven approaches such as Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation

Transformation (PHAST) approach in camps, training WaSH committees, Community Led Total

Sanitation (CLTS) in resettlement or disaster-affected populations (Scott 2013b). Using social

indicatorssuchasneedsanddemand,localparticipation,capacitybuildingfromlocaltonational

actors,alliancesandpartnerships,governanceandaccountability, livelihood linkages,household

finances and agency economic resources a transitional log frame was proposed to achieve

sustainableWaSHservices(Scott2013a).

The systems approach to WaSH and recovery has gained impetus. Parkinson (2009) proposed

systemstheorytointegratepublichealth,environmentalandsocialprocessesthataffectdisease

transmissiontocollateandanalysedataobtainedfromthedisparatebutrelevantfieldsofstudy

involved.Forjustifiedandappropriateresourceallocationanddecision-making,systemsthinking

wasfoundtoberelevant(Parkinson2009).Tostudysuchinterconnectionsandinterdependencies,

Neely(2013)proposedtheuseofcomplexadaptivesystemstheoryandsocialnetworkanalysisto

understandWaSH in communities. Such tools help to bring the perspective of end-users: for

example,womencanaccordimportancetofactorssuchastimespentonwalkingtowaterpoints

(Neely2013).Chapter3investigatestheevidence-baseforsystemsapproaches.

ThedevelopmentalWaSHliteraturefocusesoncommunityparticipationapproaches,integrationof

appropriate technologies with local knowledge to address open defecation challenge, and

interventions towards sustainable access to safe water supply and sanitation facilities. The

humanitarian WaSH studies focus on practical challenges faced by agencies to balance the

humanitarianneedsof theaffected communitieswith longer-termdevelopmentobjectives.Not

only do humanitarian agencies have to provide WaSH service delivery that is speedy, timely,

appropriateandcost-effective,buttheyalsohavetodevelopstrategiesforsustainablewatersupply

andsanitation,operationandmaintenanceofWaSHfacilitiesandhygienebehaviouralchanges.This

researchinWaSHattemptstobridgeexistinggapsinknowledgeandpracticetounderstandwhat

strategiesworkandcanaidtransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.

60

2.3ChapterSummary

Inthischapter,Ihavereviewedliteratureontworesearchthemesrelatedtodisasterrecoveryand

WaSHindevelopmentandhumanitariancontexts.Thisreviewhasdemonstratedtherelevanceof

the research rationaleset inChapter1. In relation to recoveryapproaches, there is inadequate

empiricalevidenceonhowexistingtheoreticalandpracticalapproachesforbuildingbackbetter,

linking relief recovery and development and maximising the window of opportunity

afterdisasters.Theliteraturedrawsattentiontothefactthatrecoveryoccurswithintheexisting

socio-economic conditions, cultural and geographical factors,whichwill be explored using case

studiesfromEasternIndia(Chapter4).Thereviewoftheliteraturerelevanttothesecondresearch

theme for WaSHapproachesidentified participation, post-disaster access and technological

interventions as some of the practical issues in the humanitarian WaSH.

During recovery, the issuesof inadequateaccess toWaSH facilitiespost-disasters,inappropriate

WaSH technologies and ineffective post-disaster interventions exacerbate healthand

environmentalrisks.TheunderstandingofbehaviouralchangesinWaSHafterdisastersemergedas

acriticalknowledgegap,whilelackofsystematicempiricalevidencefortransitionalapproachesin

WaSHduringrecoveryemergeasagapinpolicyandpractice.

Giventhechallengesinpromotingchangesduringrecovery,itwillbeusefultoframethisresearch

withinrecoveryandWaSHdomainsusingresilienceobjectives.Chapter3willestablishthevalue

andrelevanceofusingresilienceconceptasaguidingtheoreticalframeworkforthisresearch.

61

Chapter3:Conceptualframework

Thischapterexploresliteratureonresiliencetodevelopaframeworktoguidetheresearchdesign

(Chapter4)andtoguidethedatagatheringandanalysis(chapters5-7).

3.1Theconceptofresilience

The recovery literature debates the feasibility of reconstructing the conditions that led to the

disasterinthefirstplace(Section2.1).Thisresearcharguesthatdisastersarenotjustdisruptionof

normal routine (Oliver-Smith, 1998), but are a socially-constructed phenomena (Wisner et al.,

2004). Recovery of systems, infrastructure and community should notwarrant returning to the

previousstateofequilibriumbutstrivefortransformation.Thissectionfurthersunderstandingof

recovery by reviewing theories and related concepts such as vulnerability, risks, capacities and

transformation.Theevolutionofresiliencethinkingandtheseconceptualisationsformthecoreof

theresilienceframeworkforthisresearch.

3.1.1Vulnerability,RiskandCapacity

Earlydefinitionsofvulnerabilityfocusedonthequantitativedegreeofpotentiallossintheeventof

a natural hazard (UNDHA, 1992). The physical hazards perspective of disasters considered

vulnerabilityasapre-existingconditionbasedongeographicallocations(Cutter1996).Disastersare

not unexpected events but a result of interactions between the physical environment, built

environment and the communities that livewithin these (Mileti 1999; Bosher 2008; Godschalk

2003).Studiesfocusingonpoliticaleconomyandsocialconstructionofdisastersfocusedonthepre-

existing conditions in the society that interact with hazards to cause disasters (Cannon, 1994).

Disastersareviewedasproductsofeverydayhardships,wherethoseaffectedaregeographically,

politically and socially marginalised (Wisner et al., 2004). The socio-political perspectives on

disasters view vulnerability as ‘the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that

influencetheircapacitytoanticipate,copewith,resistandrecoverfromthe impactofanatural

hazard(anextremenaturaleventorprocess)’(Wisneretal.,2004,p11).

Vulnerabilityconceptualisationhasbeencriticisedforimposingcategoriesofvulnerablegroupsthat

brand and typecast women, children, elderly, and disabled, and economically insecure groups

(Furedi, 2007). ‘Vulnerability couldbeviewedasa reflectionof the intrinsicphysical, economic,

62

socialandpoliticalpredispositionorsusceptibilityofacommunitytobeaffectedbyorsufferadverse

effectswhenimpactedbyadangerousphysicalphenomenonofnaturaloranthropogenicorigin’

(Manyena, 2009, p.30). This supply-driven model failed to recognise the capacities within

communities,organisationsandinstitutionstowithstandtheimpactofdisasters,prepareandplan

fordisasters,acceptcertainlevelsofriskandusetheopportunitiesprovidedbydisasterstoimprove

theirconditions(Manyena,2006).Withtheriseofthenumberandseverityofdisasters,andwith

theincreasingexposureofasignificantnumberofpeopleinhazardouslands,riskperceptionisan

importantfactorinthesocialconstructionofrisksanddisasters(Cannon,2008).Therehavebeen

attemptstodefine,differentiate,conceptualiseandestablishtherelationshipsbetweenadaptation,

resilience, adaptive action, coping, copingmechanismsand coping strategies (Kleinet al., 2003;

Cutteretal.,2008).Adaptationeffortsaimtoreducetheimpactofenvironmentalhazardsandto

addressequityconcernsinherentinsustainabilitydiscourses(Cutteretal.,2008).

Someauthorshavedistinguishedcopingcapacityastheabilityofaunittorespondtoanoccurrence

ofharmandtoavoiditspotentialimpacts,andadaptivecapacityastheabilityofaunittogradually

transformitsstructure,functioningororganisationtosurviveunderhazards(KellyandAdger2000).

Thecritiqueofvulnerabilityconceptsfocusesattentiontointrinsiccapacitiesofcommunities,based

onunderstandingofcopingandadaptation(Pelling2011).Thisresearchunderstandscapacityas

‘…theresourcesandassetsthatpeoplepossesstoresist,copewithandrecoverfromdisastershocks

they experience’ (Wisner et al., 2012, p28). In this research, coping capacity is interpreted as

surviving within the prevailing systems (Pelling 2011). Building on the social, physical and

organisationalelementsofasystemthisresearchexploressocialconstructionofdisastersandtheir

impact on essential services (Wisner et al., 2004). Resilience is intrinsically linked to, and

underminedbyvulnerability(Manyena2006).

3.1.2Communityresiliencetodisasters

‘Building Resilience’ has been invoked as a new organising principle by various international

organisations,UNbodiesandgovernmentagenciestoassess,monitorandreportontheprogress

andoutcomesofvariousinterventionsworldwide(Levineetal.2012,p.1).Theincreasingnumber

and impact of disasters have encouraged a growth in research on resilience, and on enabling

communities to recoverwithminimal external assistance (Mileti 1999).A resilienceapproach is

63

more positive than a vulnerability approach, because it focuses on improving and augmenting

capacities,ratherthanfocusingonproblems,howtoreduceorcopewiththem(Manyena,2006).

ThewordresilienceoriginatesfromtheLatinword‘resiliere’whichmeansto‘leapback’(Holling,

1973)or‘jumpback’(Kleinetal.,2003).TheOxfordEnglishDictionarydefinesresilienceas(i)the

actofreboundingorspringingbackand(ii)elasticity(Kleinetal.,2003).Conceptually,resilience

hasmultipleinterpretationsbasedondifferentdisciplinaryperspectives.Holling(1973)isattributed

tohavefirstusedtheterm‘resilience’fromanecologicalperspective(Manyena,2006;Cutteretal.,

2008)asthemeasureoftheabilityofanecosystemtoabsorbchangesandstillpersistandreturn

toitsstateofequilibriumafteratemporarydisturbance(Holling,1973).Indisasterstudies,Kleinet

al.(2003)notethatTimmermanin1981firstadoptedthetermasameasureofasystem’scapacity

toabsorbandrecoverfromhazards(Kleinetal.,2003;Mayunga,2007).

Resilience is variously studied inecology (GundersonandHolling, 2001;Carpenteret al., 2001);

psychology(Patonetal.,2005;Truffino,2010);ecosystemrenewal(Holling,1973);riskmanagement

(Mitchell and Harris, 2012); hazard mitigation (Mileti, 1999; Tobin, 1999; Burby et al., 2000);

pathwaystosustainabledevelopment(Vogeletal.2007);builtenvironmentandlandusestudies

(Burbyetal., 2000;Bosher,2008);public infrastructure (McDanielsetal., 2008); coastal studies

(Adger et al., 2005; George, n.d.; Oliver-Smith, 2009), and urban studies (Stevens et al., 2010).

Authorshavefoundresiliencetobeausefulconceptforholisticandsustainabledisasterrecovery

(Berke,2006),linkingdisasterriskreductionwithdevelopment(Manyena,2006;Twigg,2007)and

climatechangeadaptation(Adgeretal.,2003;SchipperandPelling,2006;Cutteretal.,2008;Pelling,

2011).

It ishighlyprobable that the term ‘resilience’emerged in reaction to the conceptof a ‘disaster

resistantcommunity’ (McEntireetal.2002,p.269).The latterwascoinedbyGeis (2000)as ‘the

safestpossible community thatwehave the knowledge todesignandbuild in anatural hazard

context’ (p.152). It is ameans to assist communities inminimising their vulnerability to natural

hazards by applying the principles and techniques of mitigation to their development and/or

redevelopment decision-making process through earthquake-resistant buildings (Geis 2000).

Resiliencefocusedontheinterconnectionsandrelationshipsbetweenphysicalandsocialsystems

at various scales (Tobin, 1999;Godschalk, 2003). Resilience is an active process of self-righting,

64

learnedresourcefulnessandgrowth;theabilitytofunctionpsychologicallyatalevelfargreaterthan

expected, given the individual’s capabilitiesandpreviousexperience (Patonetal., 2005,p.173).

Since an individual or groupor communitypossesses resilienceof varyingdegreeoverdiffering

periods, it isdifficult todescribeorgainconceptual consensusabout resilience (McEntireetal.,

2002).

There are different conceptualisations of resilience. Resilience approach has added value in

mobilisingfasteractionsforrapidandsuccessfuldelivery(Schwabetal.1998).Twigg(2007)argues

thatreducingpre-existingvulnerabilities,buildingcapacitiesandincreasingdisasterriskreduction

(DRR) measures are steps towards increasing resilience. Some conceptualise resilience as an

outcome (‘bounce back’, ‘withstand’, and ‘absorb negative impacts’) or as a process that

incorporatesadaptivecapacity,changeandlearning(Manyena,2006).Differentstudiesexplorethe

linkagebetween recovery, vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacities (Comfort et al. 1999;

Manyena2006;Cutteretal.2008;Kingetal.2013).Norrisetal(2008)findcommunityresilienceis

aprocesslinkinganetworkofadaptivecapacities(resourceswithdynamicattributes)toadaptation

afteradisturbanceoradversity,whenusedasametaphor,theoryorsetofcapacities(Norrisetal.

2008).Gaillard(2007)describesthreeperspectivesofresilience:asacomponentofvulnerability,as

theflipsideorpositivesideofvulnerability,andasthecapacityofasystemtoabsorbandrecover

fromahazardousevent.

There are numerous existing conceptual models for resilience. Twigg (2007) considers

characteristicsofresilientcommunitiesasgovernance,riskassessment,knowledgeandeducation,

riskmanagementandvulnerabilityreduction,anddisasterpreparednessandresponse.Manyena

(2009)analysesresiliencewithinthethemesofintegratingdisastersanddevelopment,community

participation, social learning and livelihood security. From an adaptive governance perspective,

Djalanteetal(2011)investigatefourcharacteristicstoincreaseresiliencetonaturalhazards,namely

polycentric andmulti-layered institutions, participation and collaboration, self-organisation and

networks,andlearningandinnovation.IntheDROP(DisasterResilienceofPlace)modelproposed

by Cutter (2008), resilience is both an inherent or antecedent condition and a process. The

antecedent conditions are viewedas a snapshot in timeor as a static state and thepost-event

processes in themodel are dynamic (Cutter 2008). The Panarchy framework looks at the links

between human and natural systems in temporal and spatial dimensions using a hierarchical

65

structure,linkingthesystemsinnon-stopadaptivecyclesofgrowth,accumulation,restructuring,

andrenewalinacoupledhuman-environmentalsystem(GundersonandHolling2001).

Paton and Johnston (2001) base their conceptual model on risk perception and risk reducing

behaviourthroughaction-outcomeexpectancies(i.e.considerationofwhetherriskmaybereduced)

andself-efficacy judgments (i.e.whether the requiredactionsarewithin thecapabilitiesof the

individual).Thismodelarguesthatpeoplemakeassumptionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesof

actionbeforeconsideringengaginginthatbehaviour;henceaction-outcomeexpectanciesprecede

efficacyjudgments(PatonandJohnston2001).Tobin(1999)proposedamodelsuitableforapost-

disasterrecoveryenvironment,basedonstructural-functionalviews,conflicttheory,competition

for resources, and other geo-sociological and anthropological principles for understanding

community resilience. This model highlights internal (i.e. structural, situational and cognitive

factors) and external influences (i.e. mitigation and recovery) on overall structural-functional

characteristicsofresilience(Tobin1999).Bahaduretal.(2010)listsresiliencecharacteristicsashigh

diversity, effective governance/institutions/control mechanisms, acceptance of uncertainty and

change, community involvement and inclusion of local knowledge, preparedness, planning and

readiness,highdegreeofequity,socialvaluesandstructures,non-equilibriumsystemdynamics,

learning,andadoptionofacross-scalarperspective.

For this research the applicability of resilience as a concept in the post-disaster recovery

environmentwas explored (Manyena, 2006; Cutter et al., 2008; Bahadur et al., 2010). The key

questionsforreviewingresilienceliteraturewere:

1. Howhastheauthorconceptualisedresilience?Whoseresilienceandagainstwhat?Forwhat

purposesandhowitcanbeachieved?

2. Whatelementsofthedefinitionofresiliencecanbeeasilytranslatedforoperationaland

practicalactionindisasterresponseandrecoveryprogrammes?

Theabovequestionsarenotnew,andhaveoftenbeendiscussedintheliterature(Carpenteretal.

2001;MitchellandHarris2012;Pelling2011).Addressingthesetwoquestionshelpsinuncovering

certainaspectsoftheresearchquestion,tounderstandcommunityresponseandapproachesfor

resilience.Thefigure3.1summarisesthekeyelementsof theresilienceconceptualisations from

existingliterature.

66

Figure3.1:Aspectsofresilienceconceptualisation(Author’sinterpretation)

Firstly,resilienceisdefinedforsystemsandcommunities(Aguirre2006;Twigg2007;Cutteretal.

2008;UNISDR2009);societiesandindividuals(Patonetal.2005);groups,organisationsandactors

(Pelling2011);andecosystems(Holling1973).Resilienceisseenasacapacityorcapability(Manyena

2006)toactinresponsetoanyformofdisturbanceorperturbations(Holling1973;Carpenteretal.

2001);stressorenvironmentalshocks(Manyena2006);destructiveforcesordisasters(Twigg2007;

Cutter et al. 2008; UNISDR 2009); potential exposure to hazards (UNISDR 2009); unanticipated

dangers, extreme natural events (Mileti 1999); and externally or internally induced demands

(Aguirre 2006). Various propositions on achieving resilience are put forth depending on

characteristicsof theunitoractor, including inherentcapacities, learning,organising, innovating

and changing. From an ecological perspective emphasis is on resistance andmaintaining basic

characteristicswhileanotherperspective calls for a transformational changeorevolution intoa

betterperformingunitwhichcandealwithfuturerisksanddisasters(Bahaduretal.2010).Within

thedynamicsystemssomeputitasbounceforwardabilitywithmoreoptimismsignallingforward

change(Manyena,etal.,2011;IPCC,2012;MitchellandHarris,2012).

Whoseresilience?

•Systems•Communities•Societies•Individual•Groups•Organizations•Ecosystems•Anyactor

Whatisresilience?

•Capacity/abilityto:•Absorbstress•Respond•Recoverorbounceback•Absorbimpacts•Copewithevent•Reducelossesanddamages•Adaptexistingresourcesandskillstonewsystemsandoperatingconditions.•Withstandandrebuild

•Action:•Anticipateandplanforfuture•Managebasicfunctionsandstructures

Resiliencefromwhat?

•Stressorshocks•Destructiveforces•Disasters•Potentialexposuretohazards•Unanticipateddangers•Extremenaturalevent•Externallyorinternallyinducedsetofextraordinarydemands•Environmentalshocks

Howsystemsbecomedisaster-

resilient?

•Capacitybuildingofcommunitiesandlocalorganisations•Self-organisation/reorganisationofsystems,localactors•Learning•Innovate,anddevelop•Nochangeinfundamentalcharacteristics•Maintainsustainabilityoflivelihoods•SocialCapital

67

The traditionalviewof resilienceas ‘bounceback’hasbeencritiquedas itdidnot lead towards

transformationalgains(Dodmanetal.2013).Theformulationofresilienceasthe‘bounce-forward’

abilityofcommunities fromdisasters iscloselyrelatedtothe ideaof transformationalnatureof

disasters(Manyena,etal.,2011,Pelling2011).Fromtheecologicalperspective,resilienceisseenas

thecapacitytowithstandchangeforsometimebutalso,pastacertainpoint,totransformwhile

continuingorregainingtheabilitytoprovideessentialfunctions,services,amenities,orqualities

(WalkerandSalt2006;Moser2008).Manyenaetal(2011)elaboratethat‘..the“bounceforward”

notionencapsulatessocialengineering,ifnotcommunityagency,inchangeprocesseswithinthe

contextofnewrealitiesbroughtaboutbyadisaster.’ (p.419).Thedistinctionbetweenresilience

andtransformationpost-disaster,andhowbothcanbeachievedisunclear;therehasbeenlittle

discussionanddebateabouttheselinkages.Pelling(2011)statesthatresilienceisseekingchange

‘… thatcanallowexisting functionsandpractices topersistand in thiswaynotquestioning the

underlyingassumptionsorpowerasymmetriesinsociety.’(p.50).Transformationis‘indicatedby

reforminoverarchingpolitical-economyregimesandassociatedculturaldiscourses’(ibid).

‘Transformation is conceptually nascent but drawing on insights from it provides potentially

valuableopportunitiesforthosedesigningresilienceinitiatives’(Bahadur2014,p.73).Resilienceand

transformation are differentiated by the scope and range of changes to values, institutions,

behaviourandassetsachieved(Pelling2011).Resiliencethinkingisusefulforthinkingaboutlong-

termtransformation;itisnotjustbouncingbackafterdisturbancebutalsoabouttransformation

and theusefulnessof transformation (Leach2008).‖Transformationprovidesaneffectivesetof

principleswithwhichtorectifythechargeof‘incrementality’levelledatresiliencethinking(Bahadur

2014, p.74). Pelling (2011) proposes transformation as one of the three pathways, along with

resilience(maintainingstatusquo),andtransition(incrementalchange).Transformationrefersto

irreversible regimechanges,basedon the recognition thatparadigmsand structural constraints

impedewidespreadanddeepsocialreform(Pelling2011).Sincetransformationisfundamentally

linked to issuesofpowerandpolitics, ithelps in reframing resilience thinking,andcontests the

failureofresiliencetoincludevaluesandpoliticalcontextofdecision-making(Leach2008).

Secondly, this researchframeworkadoptsaspectsofexistingresilienceframeworksandmodels,

wherebytherecurringthemesareincludedintheconceptualframework(Section3.3).Resilience

highlights the role of agency or actorwho is affected, impacted, or influenced by post-disaster

68

changes,itincludesthesetofactionstobetakentomitigate,absorbtheimpactsandtoanticipate

andprepareforfuturedisasters.Thereisaneedforeffectiveinstitutionsandinstitutionalstructures

for resilience (Mayunga2007;Djalanteet al. 2011). Trust, normsandnetworks in a systemare

important;perhapsmanifestedthroughalargenumberofcrediblecivilsocietyinstitutionssuchas

religiousorganisationsandrecreationalclubsthatareanintegralformofsocialcapital(Mayunga

2007p.7).Closelyassociatedwiththisnotionofeffectiveinstitutionsistheideaofself-organisation

orreorganisationthatemergesasakeyrecurringthemeinresiliencethinking(Carpenteretal.2001;

OstromandCox2010).Theabilitytoself-organiseisrelatedtotheextenttowhichreorganisation

is endogenous rather than forced by external drivers (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2001;

GundersonandHolling2001;).Self-organisationisenhancedbycoevolvedecosystemcomponents

andthepresenceofsocialnetworksthatfacilitateinnovativeproblemsolvingthroughalearning

approach(Carpenteretal.2001).

Thiscloserelationoflearningapproacheswithself-organisation,isofinterest,asreiteratedbythe

UNISDR’s(2005)definitionthatresilienceisdeterminedbythedegreetowhichthesocialsystemis

capableoforganising itself to increase thecapacity for learning fromdisasters forbetter future

protection and to improve risk reduction measures. This defines the scope for learning and

innovation(Pahl-Wostl2007;PellingandHigh2005;VossandWagner2010;Djalanteetal.2011).

Foster(2006)describestwotypesofresilience:preparationresilienceincludingregionalassessment

andreadiness,andperformanceresiliencecomprisingeventresponseandrecovery.Thesestages

are continual and overlap in terms of regions and scale and starting point (Foster 2006). The

resiliencestudiesarecommonintheirunderstandingofdiversity,redundancyandhigh levelsof

integration required between natural and social systems and therefore consider resilience

approachestostudysocial,ecologicalandsocio-ecologicalsystems(Bahaduretal.,2010).

Researchers, analysts, managers and theorists have reviewed, analysed, rephrased resilience

discussions and debated the usefulness and challenges of using the concept (Godschalk, 2003;

Cutter et al., 2008;McDaniels et al., 2008; Bahadur et al., 2010). The conceptual and practical

challenges define the nature of resilience and its implementation (Manyena, 2006). Resilience

definitionsareambiguousandincoherentacrossdisciplines,increasinglydifficulttogainconsensus

fordefining,measuring,assessingand/ormappingresilience(Mayunga2007).Resiliencethinkingis

multi-disciplinary,limitedtotheoreticalunderstanding,andlacksempiricalevidence(Bahaduretal.

69

2010).CannonandMuller-Mahn(2010)arguethatresiliencethinkingderivedfromanecosystems

approachfocusesonnatureandnaturalsystemsratherthansocio-economicsystems;therefore

thehumanactionis‘‘blamed’’fortheproblems.Anunclearresilienceapproachisindangerofa

realignment towards interventions that subsume and neutralise politics and economics, and

depoliticises the causal processes inherent in putting people at risk (Cannon andMüller-Mahn

2010).

Bahadur et al (2010) conclude that there is little guidance for developing indicators for specific

situations and for data collection. The challenge with the existing frameworks and models of

resilienceisoperationalizationduringrecovery.Agencyguidelinesandstandardsforhumanitarian

responsemaynotexplicitlyadoptoradheretoresiliencethinking.ArecentblogpostbyWhittallet

al(2014)generateddebatesfromhumanitarianprofessionalsengagedinWaSHonhowresilience

couldaddvalueinpost-disastercontext.Theconceptofbuildingresilienceisoftenatoddswitha

corehumanitarianapproachtocrisesduetothechallengesofdealingwiththestatethatrequires

timevs.addressingimmediateneedsofvulnerablegroups(Whittalletal.2014).

Levineetal(2012)statethat

‘though recovery is normally assumed, there is a dearth of evidence on just how this

happens. The preference for simplicity also means that frameworks cannot assist in

answeringcriticalquestions,suchaswhatisitthatmakespeoplemoreorlesssensitiveto

crisis,becausethesedimensionsareleftasunexplained“blackboxes”’(p.2).

Thedesiretoquantifyresilienceisobvious:toassesscomparativeneed,targetresources,measure

impactandjudge‘valueformoney’(Levineetal.2012,p.4).Thetrade-offbetweenshort-termand

long-termrecovery recurs in resilience literature,where immediatedecisionsaremade toavert

imminent threats. Resilience thinking stemming from diverse epistemic foundations makes

particularjudgementsbasedonvaluesattachedtoeithersocial,technologicalorecologicalsystems

(Bahadur2014).Similarlytrade-offsaremadeonthefunctionalisticperspective, inensuringthat

thesystemmaintainsitsbasicfunctioninginthefaceofdisaster(Twigg2007;UNISDR2009),without

addressingthestructuresinplacethatmakethemvulnerabletodisastersinthefirstplace.Thereis

limited evidence of how resilience addresses power issues at various scales – individual, or

70

household or community – and how these are reflected in policies and practice without

acknowledgingthepoliticalcomplexities(CannonandMüller-Mahn2010;Griffin2012).

Asasystemattribute,resiliencedoesnotclearlydistinguishsystemasanentity,itsboundariesand

relationwithitsenvironment(Mayunga,2007;Bahaduretal.,2010).Resiliencemayjustreinforce

thefocusonhazardorshock,attheexpenseofvulnerability(MitchellandHarris,2012).Itdiverts

attentionawayfromtheroleofagency,powerandpolitics;disbanding,destroyingormodifyinga

givensystemorsomepartssothatpresenceofcertainotherparts,orsystemsismoredesirableand

resilient(MitchellandHarris,2012).Hencetoanswer‘resilienceforwhat,againstwhom?’resilience

isboththecapacityofasystemtoreactappropriatelytomomentsofcrisesthathavenotbeen

entirelyanticipated,and itsability toanticipate thesecrisesandtoenact, throughplanningand

recovery, changes in the systems that will mitigate disaster impacts (Aguirre, 2006). Residual

uncertaintyisinevitableinadaptingtochangingcircumstances(PellingandHigh,2005),therefore

"cultures of safety" can be developed that provide patterns of anticipated effects, actions, and

strategies as well as templates for response, recovery, andmitigation (Aguirre 2006, p.2). It is

obvious that anyopportunity to increasepeople’s ability should be seized (Levine et al., 2012).

Despite concernsofblindlyadopting resilienceasa concept (McEntireetal. 2002; Furedi2007;

MitchellandHarris2012,Levineetal.,2012),thisresearchadoptsresilienceasanapproachthat

providesanopportunityto‘workacrosssilos’(Levineetal.2012,p.1)andtobreakdownthebarriers

betweendisciplinaryghettos.

3.2Systemsthinkingandresilience

‘Resiliencethinkingissystemsthinking,’(WalkerandSalt2006p.31).Therearemanyparallelsin

resilienceand systems thinking. Systems theoryhasa far-reaching influencewith itspromiseof

providingamechanism to integrate the social andnatural (Pelling2011). Itprovides theoretical

precisiononsociallearningandself-organisation.Pelling(2011)arguesthatusingsystemsapproach

inresiliencedrawsattentiontothepowerdebatesandasymmetries,whichdetermineforwhom,

where and when the disaster impacts are felt, and the scope for recovery. Systems thinking

incorporateschanges insocio-politicalsystemsdrivenfromactionsofpeopleatrisk,buildingon

existing social andpolitical reformmovements (Pelling 2011). Foster (2006) found that systems

thinkingapplies to thesystemasawhole,and itselements, suchas infrastructure, information,

71

physical environment, civic organisations, governance and economic systems. A system that is

resilientononeelementmaynotnecessarilyberesilientonanother(Foster2006).Anurbanstudy

bydaSilvaetal(2012)exploredcomplex‘living’systemsundergoingnumerousdynamicexchanges

atanygiventime,andfoundthatchangesaresystemic(i.e.changesinoneelementofthesystem

mayinducechangesinanotherelement),anddynamic(theresultoffeedbackloops)(daSilvaetal.

2012).

Chapter2demonstratedrecovery is riddledwithcomplexities.Ramalingametal (2008)propose

systems theory concepts to dealwith these complexitieswith the help of 10 guiding concepts:

interconnectedness and interdependent elements and dimensions; feedback processes that

promoteand inhibitchangewithinsystems;systemcharacteristicsandbehavioursemerge from

simplerulesofinteraction;nonlinearity;sensitivitytoinitialconditions;phasespace–‘thespaceof

the possible’; attractors, chaos and the ‘edge of chaos’; adaptive agents; self-organisation; co-

evolution(Ramalingametal.2008).Systemsthinking isusedvariouslyasananalyticaltoolorto

organiseexistingknowledgeaboutresiliencecapacities,outcomesandactions(Wrightetal.2012).

Itstudiesissuesandinteractionswithotherpartswithinthesystem,withanexpandedviewofthe

situation,andanalysestheunitswithin(Foster2006).Inrecoveryitisusedforinformeddecision-

making,betterunderstandingofthesystem,theinterrelatednatureofelementsinthesystemand

identifying patterns of behaviour (Simonović 2011). In emergency WaSH, a systems theory

framework is useful to integrate and analyse data obtained from public health, environmental

healthandsocialdeterminantsaffectingdiseasetransmission(Parkinson2009).ComplexAdaptive

Systemstheoryisusedtoinvestigatetheunpredictabilityofoutcomesforcommunitywatersupply

projectsinEastTimor(Neely2013).

Thisresearchidentifiessystemsthinkingasafoundationtoorganiseactorsatvariousscalesand

studytheirinterconnections,usefultostudyWaSHfacilities,governancemechanisms,community

practices and agency interventions during recovery. Building on Simonović’s (2011) approach,

systems thinking studiesdynamicsduring recovery,particularly inhygienebehaviour andWaSH

practices, understanding the structures and elements of the system, the interactions between

actorsacrossdifferentscalesthroughfeedbackandlearningmechanisms.Thisapproachwilladd

valuetoexistingknowledgeandprovideafoundationtodevelopaframeworkforexploringand

gatheringempiricalevidenceandpractitionerfeedback.Thisresearchincorporatessystemsthinking

72

intotheframeworkbyinvolvingdifferentstakeholders–individuals,householdsandcommunities,

localandexternalactorsandtheirinterdependenciesovertime,scaleandsectorsorcomponents.

Theframeworkaddressesthemultipleinterpretationsbydifferentactorsinasystembyincludinga

scalar perspective to seek understanding of how people, groups and organisations frame their

resilience (Leach 2008). Such a framework reflects multiple recovery priorities, aspirations and

capacities.

3.3ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery

Thisresearchunderstandscommunityresilienceasthecapacityoflocalcommunitiesandrelated

systemsandinstitutionstoabsorbstressduringdisastersandrecoverfromthem,withtheabilityto

perform their essential functions and develop their inherent capacities to prepare for future

disastersandrecoverfromsuchdisasterswithleastexternalassistance.Thisconceptualisationof

communityresilienceviewscommunityasanactiveagent,andstudiestheirinteractionswithWaSH

systems.Basedonthereviewofresilience,recoveryandWaSHliterature,learningandknowledge,

participation,integrationandinstitutionsareadoptedasconceptualthemestostudyresiliencein

WaSHduringrecovery(Manyena2006;Twigg2007;Bahaduretal.2010;VossandWagner2010;

Lyonsetal.2010;Whatley2013).Thethematiccomponentsincludesub-themesandspecificWaSH

indicators. The framework is validated through expert interviews and feedback from 12

humanitarian and development WaSH professionals including public health engineers and

promoters, DRR practitioners and academics using an interview guide (annexure 4). The final

frameworkincorporatedtheirfeedbackontherelevanceofthesub-themes,thepotentialindicators

andtheirdescription,thepotentialtoolsforgatheringempiricalevidencerelatedtothatindicator

and potential sources of evidence (annexure 5). Practitioners’ inputs on the framework and its

feasibility proved instrumental in choosing indicators forWaSHand appropriate tools to gather

empiricalevidence.Theoverallfeedbackwasthattheframeworkcomponentswererelevantand

useful,butdidnotfactororrepresenttime,scaleandprocesses.

Figure3.2showstheframeworkforWaSHduringrecoveryanditsfourkeythemes;thethemesare

discussedinsections3.4-3.7.

73

Figure3.2:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery

3.4Learningandknowledge

Manyenaetal.(2011)arguethatnewapproachesforlearningatthecommunityandorganisation

levels are required for resilience. This research explores themes of learning and knowledge to

understand resilience.The framework includes social learningunder the themeof learning,and

technologicalinterventionscomplementinglocalknowledgeunderknowledge.Theindicatorsrefer

toaspectsoforganisationallearningwithinlearningtheme.SociallearninginWaSHduringrecovery

isexploredthroughhygienebehaviourchangesandsocio-culturalpractices.

From a development perspective, Guijt (2007) proposed learning for social change based on

people,powerandprocesses for transformation and redistribution of power. Assessment and

learning are processes of on-going reflection about vision, strategies and actions that enable

continualreadjustment(Guijt2007).Manyena(2009)foundthathumanitariananddevelopment

programmes included institutional and community learning for promoting resilience to future

disasters.Cutteretal(2008)distinguishbetweenprogrammesemploying‘‘lessonslearned’’atthe

endofaprogrammeand learning for resilience.The former includesprogrammedebriefings,or

LearningandKnowledge

InstitutionalCapacities

Participation Integration

74

lessons identified on what went right or wrong and suggestions for course-corrections, while

learning for resilience emphasises critical reflections on these lessons based on organisational

valuesandpractice(Cutteretal.2008).

Learningtheoriesrefertothreeloopsoflearning:first,secondandthirdlooplearning(Boydetal.

2014).Firstloopisimprovingwhatisalreadybeingdone,secondloopmeanslearningtochangethe

mechanismsusedtomeettheobjectives,andthirdloopinvolveschangingunderlyingvaluesthat

determine goals and actions (Argyris and Schön 1996). Voss andWagner (2010) furthered the

theory:insingle-loop-learning,goaldivergenceandadaptationerrorsarerecognisedandcorrected.

Double-loop-learninggoesbeyondsimpleerrorcorrection, todevelop learning for improvement

thatquestionsunderlyingcausesandtriggersadditionallearning(VossandWagner2010).Vossand

Wagner(2010)callthethird-loop‘deuterolearning’–theskillinhandlingandinfluencingsingle-and

double-loop-learning–or‘learningtounderstand’,whichfocusesonfactorspromotingorinhibiting

learningandsecuringcapacitiesforself-organisation.

Itisarguedthat:

‘Knowledge of past failures in practice and learning is gathered, its communicationencouraged and consequently a process of (self-) reflection of the adequacy oforganisational knowledge, structures and rules of behaviour is institutionalised. By thismeanstheresponsecapacityoftheorganisationorthenetworkoforganisationsisenhancedwithregardstounpredictablesocietalandenvironmentalchange(VossandWagner2010p.663)’.

Analternativeapproach, includingdifferentexperts,risk-bearersand local communities, involves

knowledgeandpracticebeingcontested,co-producedandreflectedupon(Vogeletal.2007).Co-

productionofknowledgefordecision-makingandpolicycontextinvolvingvariousstakeholders–

experts,bureaucratsandprimary stakeholders–producesnew insights, informationandexpert

knowledgebycontestingandnegotiatingwiththelocalindigenousknowledge,inthecreationof

newknowledge(Edelenbosetal.2011).Vogeletal(2007)findthatthepracticalimplementationof

such learning approaches and tools for gaining consensus by various stakeholders remains a

knowledgegap.Acombinationofscientific/technicalandtraditionalknowledgebasesisnecessary

for building resilience (Berkes 2007). Within organisations, learning is a critical component for

effectiveness,whereastronglearningorganisationiscreatedthroughthedynamicsofstrongand

75

committedlearners,afavourablelearningcultureorethos,andeffectivelearningmechanismsor

structures (Whatley 2013). The memories of experiences, skills, values, and decision-making

processes stored within institutions are called institutional memory or a knowledge system

(Djalanteetal.2011).Intheeventofsmall-scaledisasters,itisarguedthatlearninglessonsfrom

smalldisasters(forexample,aflashfloodinasmalltown)isextremelyimportantforinstitutionsto

helpreducepossibledamageduring futuredisasters (VossandWagner2010).There isa lackof

evidenceaboutthetechnologies,approachesandprocessesusedinWaSHprogrammes(Brownet

al.2012).

Pelling (2011) finds social learning to be a property of social collectives, their capacities and

processes through which new values, ideas and practices are disseminated, popularised and

becomedominantinsocietyorlocalcommunities.Withinliterature,ideasofsociallearninghave

been advanced in the context of adaptive governance as a collective activity,which entails the

cooperativeproductionofknowledgeconcerningsystemicaspectsofsociety–theprevailingsocial

andpoliticalconditions(Boydetal.2014).Sociallearningisoftenfacilitatedthroughaccumulation

of social-ecological learningandunderstanding,oftenreferred toassocialmemory (Folke2006;

Djalanteetal.2011).Withindisasterstudies,learningisinvestigatedthroughchangesinbehaviour:

for instancecycloneevacuationstudies inBangladesh foundthatpeople’sperceptions,previous

experiencesofhazards,andattitudesactedastheprincipaldeterrentsofevacuation (Pauletal.

2010). Another study found that past hazard experience influenced evacuation behaviour

depending upon the severity of previous impact experience, false alarms, and past evacuation

experienceincludingthequalityofthestayinareliefshelter(SharmaandPatt2012).Thisthesis

attemptstodevelopanunderstandingofhowsociallearningoccursandmanifestsintheformof

behaviourchangesinWaSHpracticesthroughexternalsupport.

Studiesshowthatpastexperiencesandattitudesinfluencebehaviouralchangesindisasters,but

littleguidanceisavailableonhowthesechangesareeffectedduringrecovery.Djalanteetal(2011)

claim that social learning is essentially accumulated experiences, values, debates, and decision-

makingprocesses thathavebeenusedas strategies tocontinuallydealwithchange. Indisaster

studies,ithasbeensuggestedthattheexperienceofrecoveryshouldbesituatedwithintheroleof

placeasareorientingframework,includingaspectsofsocialcapital,socialandcollectiveidentities

andnetworkstoreframethediscourseonrecoveryinterventionsbasedonexperiences(Coxand

76

Perry2011). InWaSH,across-countriesstudyofhand-washingpracticesdividedthefactorsthat

determinehealth-relatedbehaviourintoplanned,motivatedandhabitualcategoriesforconceptual

understandingandresearch(Curtisetal.2009).Theyclaimedthatenvironment(social,physicaland

biological) and cognitive aspects (motivation, habits and planning) influenced handwashing

behaviour(ibid).Curtisetal(2009)foundthatmotivationwasoftentriggeredbydisgust,nurture,

status,affiliation,attraction,comfortandfear.Theinvestigationofpost-disasterchangeswillshow

howlearningoccurs.

In knowledge aspects, this research investigates technological interventions to find how these

complementlocalknowledge.Useofappropriatetechnologiescanbeenhancedbyunderstanding

how decisions onWaSH technologies are taken,who takes them and implements them. Social

learningtransformsthepotentialbehaviourofanactor–anindividual,aformalorganisation,an

informalgrouporevenanon-humanactantsuchaselementsoftechnologyornature–capableof

changing behaviour in response to experience (Pelling and High 2005 p.6). The application of

technologyenablestechnologicalevolution,newinformationexchange,informeddecision-making

anddocumentationofbestpractices,effectiveoutcomesofapproachesforupscalebygovernment

actionorreplication(Pelling,2011,p.56).Studiesonwatermanagementsystemsexplorecontinual

learning and improvement of interconnected technical systems and human systems, where

technologiesareembeddedinanetworkofsocialroutinesthatlinktechnologiestotheirfunction

(Pahl-Wostl2007).

Disaster studies consider local knowledge including community perceptions, beliefs,

understandings,andskillsusedorpotentiallyusedtocommunicateabout thephysicalandbuilt

environment(Wisner,2009).Anyexternalassistanceshouldbuildupontheknowledge,capacities

andexpertisewithinthecommunitytoreducedependencyandensuresustainablechanges(Pelling

and High, 2005). Emerging from the Gujarat reconstruction experience, it was argued that the

introduction of technology is a process, including appropriate design, and creation and

institutionalisation of delivery mechanisms, information, communication of technology and

capacity building of existing indigenous knowledge and practices (Jigyasu 2010). This research

explores the available technological options in WaSH, their technical feasibility in challenging

environmentsandcommunityorhouseholdadoptionofsuchtechnologies(Djonoputroetal.2010;

Brownetal.2012;BastableandLamb2012).

77

3.5Institutionalcapacities

This research proposes study of institutional capacities andmechanisms for undertakingWaSH

during recovery. The relevant institutions include national, sub-national and local government

organisations (GOs), informal communitygroups, grassrootsorganisations (GROs)or community

basedorganisations(CBOs),CivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs)andnon-governmentalorganisations

(NGOs).Inordertoclarifytheuseofterms,institutionsareunderstoodtobeorganisationsthatare

heldtogetherbyandproducerules,normsandarrangements(’rulesofthegame’),andagenciesor

organisationsarereferredasactors(’playersofthegame’)(Jones2013p.68).

Carpenter et al. (2001) underline the importance of institutions that can facilitate learning and

‘experimentinsafeways,monitorresults,updateassessments,andmodifypolicyasnewknowledge

is gained.’ (p.778) Experimentation is also seen as key tomaintaining the stability of a system

(BulkeleyandCastánBroto2013).Self-organisationisarecurringaspectofresilience,andPelling

(2001)conceptualisesitaspropensityforsocialcollectivestoformwithoutdirectionfromthestate

or high-level actors. This could include new canonical (formal) organisations such as registered

communitydevelopmentgroupsortradeassociations,orshadow(informal)organisationssuchas

networks of friends and neighbours (Pelling 2011 p.61). Training and technical expertise to

strengthen thecommunitycapacitiescanbesustained throughsuch institutionsand institution-

building(Manyena,2009).AdoctoralstudyofWaSHdevelopmentactorsandnetworksinMaliby

Jones(2013)bringsto lightthatapproachestounderstanding local institutions,emphasisingthe

importanceofimprovisationandadaptationacrossdifferentscales,shouldbeplacedwithinbroader

political economy analysis. Different approaches at community and at local government and

national levels are required: for the communities to drawupon traditionalWaSH practices and

agencyinfluencestoeffectbehaviouralandtechnicalchanges,andattheregionalleveltoadopt

‘bestpractice’ rather than ‘best fit’, andprovidingadditional resources tobuildabilitiesof local

governments to deliver sustainableWaSH services (Jones 2013). Although Jones’s (2013) thesis

focused on development WaSH, the importance of governance mechanisms in WaSH service

delivery are crucial in a post-disaster context for sustainable and changes and accessibleWaSH

facilities. This research investigates institutional pathways through representative institutional

mechanisms and policies; organisational mandate and capacities, facilities and infrastructure

studiedthroughresourceallocationanduseofinformationanddata.

78

3.6Participation

Thisresearchproposescommunityparticipation,multi-stakeholderpartnershipsandparticipatory

monitoringandevaluationas indicators toexploreWaSHrecoveryprogramming.WaSHservices

andfacilitiesarecharacterisedbyalargerangeofstakeholdersandapoorunderstandingofthe

responsibilitiesofeachactor(Mazeau2013).Thislackofunderstandingcanbechallengingduring

recovery.Sanitationdevelopmentapproaches(suchasCommunity-LedTotalSanitation(CLTS)and

itsvariants,andSanitationMarketing)emphasisechangingtheattitudesofthosepractisingopen

defecationorusingsub-standard facilities,persuading themto improvesanitationpracticesand

encouraginghouseholdstoinvestinsanitationimprovement(Carter2015).Mara(2012)seesthe

poorstateofsanitationastheresultofalackofpoliticalwillandalackofexpertiseamongengineers

in transferringexisting technologies (Mara2012).Thesuccessoforganisationsdependsontheir

abilitytodesignthemselvesassociallearningsystemsandalsotoparticipateinbroaderlearning

systemssuchasanindustry,aregion,oraconsortium,asparticipationincommunitiesofpractice

facilitates learning (Wenger 2000). Pelling (2011) notes, ‘There is the potential for bottom-up,

aggregate transformational change through, for example, the promotion of stakeholder

participation in decision-making, leading to the inclusion of new perspectives and values in

emerging policy’ (p. 69). For transformation, it is essential that local communities actively

participate in decision-making about the implementation of the processes, programmes and

projectswhichaffectthem(Meskinazarian2011,p.101).

Section2.1.4described the typologiesofparticipationproposedduring recovery.Thereare two

approaches in participation, namely guided participation (instrumental in nature) and people-

centred participation (transformative) (Twigg et al. 2001). Pelling (2007) termed the former as

‘exploitative’approachandthelatter‘emancipatory’. Intheformerapproach, localcommunities

playakeyroleinthesuccessfulimplementationofrecoveryactions,whiletheprogrammedesign

anddecision-makinglieswithdonorsandNGOs.Thecommunityparticipationinrecoveryactionis

instrumentalinsuccessfulexecution.Theexternalagenciesundertakeassessmentstounderstand

needsoftheaffectedcommunitiesanddesignprogrammesbasedonassessedneedsandagency

mandates.Bycontrast,thesecondmodeladdressesissuesofpowerandcontrolwithinprogramme

planningandimplementation(Twiggetal.,2001).Hereexternalagenciestaketheroleoffacilitators

and communities take the lead in decision making in design, implementation and monitoring

79

recoveryinterventions.People-centeredparticipationisfoundedonthebeliefthatordinarypeople

arecapableofcriticalreflectionandanalysis,andthattheirknowledgeisrelevantandnecessary

(Twigg,2004,p117).

Inthecontextofsanitation,thetop-downcentralisedplanningthatconsiderstoiletconstructionas

thefinalsolutiontosanitationhasbeencritiqued,insteadfocusisrecommendedtowardssustained

collectivebehaviourchange(Kar2012).Kararguesthat

‘The prevailing mind-set of planners, bureaucrats, donors and lenders is based on theassumptionthatpeoplearepoorandmustbegivenfreeorsubsidisedtoilets.Theyassumethat localpeopledonotunderstandthedangersofthefaecal–oralcontaminationandsohygieneeducation isessential.Localpeoplecannotconstruct toiletsontheirown;hencetoiletmodelsandtechnologicalknow-howmustbeprescribedtothem.Butthesetop-downattitudes combined with an excessive reliance on numbers and targets are part of theproblem.Solutionstocollectivehygienebehaviourchangewillnotcomethroughbuildingtoiletsorprovidingatechnologicalsolutionbyoutsidersbutbytriggeringademandthatmustcomefromwithinthecommunity.Whatisrequiredisadecentralisedbottom-upandcommunity-ledapproach’(Kar2012p.95)

ThemonitoringofprogressinsanitationisdiscussedindevelopmentalWaSHcontexts(Sparkman

2012; Mazeau 2013; WHO/UNICEF 2014). Monitoring changes due to the programme are

challenging inpost-disastercontext,hence thecurrent trends insanitationmonitoring requirea

holistic,people-centredapproachtofacilitate learning,andevaluationstrategiesforasanitation

system,incorporatingarangeofstakeholdersandperspectives(Sparkman2012).Manyena(2009)

commentsthattermssuchascapacity,learningandorganisingoftenindicatecommunityagency.

Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PMandE) approaches serve the functions of impact

assessment,projectmanagementandplanning,organisationalbuildingandlearning,understanding

andnegotiatingstakeholderperspectives,andpublicaccountability (EstrellaandGaventa1998).

Fourthgenerationevaluation,orparticipatoryevaluationmethods,arecharacterisedbynegotiation

betweenvariousstakeholders,participationineverystageoftheevaluationprocess,andafocuson

action(GubaandLincoln1989).Thereareevaluationmethodologiesappliedduringemergencies

(ALNAP2006;Vogel2012;Fewetal.2013).Theseareunclearontheextentofparticipationasit

meansdifferentthingstodifferentpeople(Manyena2009).Thisresearchexploresthescopeand

extentofcommunityparticipationandmulti-stakeholderpartnershipsinWaSHduringrecovery.

80

3.7Integration

ThisresearchexploresintegrationofWaSHovertimefromreliefandrecoverytodevelopment,and

withothersectors.Theintegrationasapathwayincludesapproachesforlinkingrelief,recoveryand

development, and achieving multi-sectoral integration. Socio-ecological resilience relies on the

interconnectednessbetweenthevariouscomponentsofasystem;linkingpreparednessmeasures

tolivewithdisastersbybuildingredundancywithinsystems(Bahaduretal.2010).AsRichardCarter

observes,theWaSHsectorisconfrontedwith

‘..thechallengesoflinkingdisasterpreparednessandriskreduction,emergencyresponse,post-emergency rehabilitation, and long-termdevelopment.Getting this continuum righthas longbeen theholy grail ofbothdevelopmentworkers andhumanitarianemergencypractitioners.’(Carter2012)

TheLRRDapproachhighlightedaspectsoftemporalintegrationofrecoveryinterventions(Section

2.1.3.2). Collins (2013) argues that an integrated approach is action-oriented science, based on

experiencesof successful disaster anddevelopmentprocesses,whichdemonstratepathways to

wellbeingand linkingdisaster todevelopment.This researchexploreswaysof integratingcross-

sectorcollaborativemechanismsandreplacingculturesofcompetitionwiththoseofcooperation

tofurtheragreedactions(Collins2013).InWaSH,LRRDapproachhasbeenstudiedtoaddressthe

transitionalgapinrecoveryprogramming(King2015).Financingemergencyservicesandstrategies

to manage the people’s expectations of how much assistance they can receive under which

circumstancesareareasofconcerntoensurethathumanitarianenthusiasmformakingpotentially

life-saving interventions available does not undermine long-term sustainability (Luff 2013). The

understandingofpoliciesontariffs,taxes,subsidiesandinsuranceneedstobestrengthenedwith

moreresearch(Brocklehurst2013).Itshouldbeundertakenasanationallevelpolicyissue,thatis,

notjustpartofdonororexternalagencypolicy(Jones2013).

Thisresearchproposesintegrationasathemetounderstandmulti-sectoralapproachesinrecovery,

where integration is soughtbetweensectors includingshelter, livelihoods,educationandhealth

insteadofstand-aloneWaSHinterventions.It isunderstoodthatrecoveryatthehouseholdlevel

includesprimaryhealth,water,sanitation,educationandlivelihoods,andnotjustrebuildingofthe

houses.Atthedistrictandmunicipallevels,aholisticsanitationprogrammingstrategycouldaddress

issuesofthelackofcoordinationbetweenrelevantsectors(suchashousing,energy,agriculture,

81

and health, aswell as public and private actors); challenges of leadership, and silo approaches

affecting collective impact, lack of district-wide or nation-wide service delivery; and lack of

opportunitiestolearnfromandcontributetoothersectorsoutsidesanitation(WilliamsandSauer

2014).Astudyofwatersystemsemphasisesintegratedapproachestoencompassallenvironmental

factorsofresources,technologiesandhumanbeings(Pahl-Wostl2007).Particularlyinthecontext

ofrecoveryprogramming,useofeffective inter-clustercoordinationapproachesandtransitional

programmingstrategiesinemergencyphasewasfoundtoenhanceresilienceinthepost-disaster

environment(King2015).

3.8ChapterSummary

This chapter reviews resilience literature and uses systems thinking to define the conceptual

framework to understand post-disaster recovery processes. The framework components are

conceptualisedaspathwaysforresilienceinWaSHduringrecovery.Thisthesisinvestigatesthefirst

pathway for resilience - learning and knowledge – through social learning and technological

interventions that complement local knowledge. These could manifest in the form of hygiene

behaviour changes and technical changes. It explores the second pathway for resilience –

institutional capacities – through representative mechanisms and policies, resource allocation

duringrecoveryanduseofinformationanddata.Theresearchstudiesthirdpathwayforresilience

–participation–intheformofcommunityparticipationandmulti-stakeholderpartnerships.The

thesis explores the last pathway for resilience – integration – by understanding approaches for

linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment,andmulti-sectoralintegration.

82

Chapter4:Methodology

This chapter describes the exploratory strategy used for addressing the research questions and

multi-sitedcasestudies(Section4.1).Thetoolsfordatacollectionincludeparticipatorylearningand

action (PLA) tools, interviews, documents and participant observation (Section 4.2). As a

practitioner,IreflectontheactionsundertakenwithAgencyA,anddiscussthebiasesandethical

issueswhileundertakingthisresearch(section4.3).Thedataanalysisstrategyincludedmindmaps,

thematicandcontextualanalysis(Section4.4).

4.1Researchstrategy

This research adopts a qualitative strategy from an inductive, interpretative epistemology and

constructivistontologytostudyhumanbehaviourpost-disasters.Iuseanexploratorystrategyto

understandandexplainsocialphenomena,andfocusattentiononparticularissuesregardingthe

socialandnaturalworlds(May1993).Itissituatedwithinepistemologicalandontologicalaspects

tounderstandcommunityresiliencetodisasters.Epistemologyconsidersthequestionsofwhatis

regardedasknowledgeofreality,andhowwestudyit;ontologyreferstothenatureofsocialreality,

whichiseitherobjectiveorsociallyconstructed(Bryman2008).Inthisqualitativeresearch,Iadopt

amethodology that focuses on themeaning, complexity and connectivity of social phenomena

(Silverman 2006). The research involves perspectives from various stakeholders’ and the

researcher’ssocialrealitiesbasedontheirexperiences.

To studymultiple perspectives involving different actors fromgovernment andNGOofficials to

communitiesandhouseholdmembers,thisresearchusesmultiplemethodsfordatacollection,such

as focusgroupdiscussions (FGDs), interviews,actormapping,participatorychangeanalysesand

priorityrankingexercises,whereappropriate.ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)toolsduring

fieldresearcharehelpfultoacquiretheclosestpossibleperspectiveofthecommunity.Chambers

(1995)warnsthatdespiteourbestefforts,anoutsidercannotgraspallthedimensionsofrurallife.

Initiallynamedrapidruralappraisal(RRA)andparticipatoryruralappraisal(PRA),thesetoolsare

defined as ‘a family of approaches andmethods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and

analysetheirknowledgeoflifeandconditions,toplanandtoact’(Chambers1994a,p.953).These

areusedtogatherinformationdirectlyfromthepeopleimpactedbydisasterstoformanintegrated

visionof their lives andneeds (Guijt andCornwall 1995). PLA tools have advantages of directly

83

learningfromlocalpeople,andseekingdiversitybyfacilitatinganalysisbylocalpeople;practicing

criticalself-awarenessandresponsibility;andsharing(Chambers1994b).

Thisstudyasks ‘Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,and

hygienepracticesduringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresilience’?Thisquestionis

brokendownintothreesubsidiaryresearchquestions.

1. HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporateresilience

inWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?

2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindowof

opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

3. Howeffectivelydoagencies facilitate the integrationofemergency responsewith long-term


4.1.1ResearchProcess

Theexploratoryprocessofthisresearchincludedinitialconceptualisationthroughliteraturereview

(Chapter 2), framework development and validation through expert interviews (Chapter 3) and

threestagesoffieldworkinAssamandoneinOdisha.Thereweretwomajoreventsthatinfluenced

theresearchstrategyandthechoiceofmethods:whenthefloodsrecurredinAssam,andwhenI

wasdeployedwithAgencyAinOdishaafterCyclonePhailinfor6months.InAssamIbeganfieldwork

inSolmari,whenthefloodsoccurredinJuly2012.Thiswasfollowedbytwovisitsin2013:ascoping

study,asavolunteerwithAgencyAduringJanuary-February2013,andanindependentstudyfrom

August-October2013.InSeptember2013,Morigaon,oneofmycasestudyvillages,wasflooded

again due to a breach in the embankment and communities were displaced. As a result, I

discontinuedmyresearchinMorigaon.InOdisha,CyclonePhailinhitOdishaon12thOctober2013,

andIwasdeployedbyAgencyAon19thOctoberuntil8thMarch2014inPuri(seeTable4.1).This

researchusedparticipatoryprocessesofdatacollection,duringinvolvementwithagencyAinAssam

andOdisha.Thisensuredscopeforcommunitiestoexpresstheirwillingnesstoaddresssomeofthe

problemsthataffectthem(EstrellaandGaventa1998).

84

Table4.1:ResearchDesign:Timelineofactivities

ConceptualisationStageLiteraturereviewandresearchquestions October2011-May2012Conceptualframeworkandexperts’interviews August2012-May2013Designdatacollectionprotocol July2013DataCollection–CaseStudyApproachAssamfloodspreliminaryassessmentvisit June-July2012Scopingstudy–2ndfieldvisittoAssamandfieldreport January-March2013Empiricaldatacollection–3rdfieldvisittoAssamsites August-October2013DeploymentinOdishaCyclonePhailinandfloods October2013-March2014FindingsandInterpretationDatamanagement,andmindmapinterviews

May–December2014IdentifyingthemesandrecurringpatternsTriangulationandcontextanalysisPresentationofFindingsReportandanalysefindings January–April2015Revisitingconceptualframework June2015Writingupthesis June–August2015Feedbackandincorporationofsuggestions September2015Submissionofresearch December2015

The first visit to Assam in July 2012 was immediately after the floods started, as part of an

emergencyneedsassessmentteamcommissionedbyaUNagencytounderstandtheextentand

aftermathofthefloodsinvariousdistricts.IvisitedSolmarivillageinSonitpurdistricttounderstand

the impact of floods onWaSH, and the emerging needs andurgent priorities. I explored issues

relatedtoflooddamages,waterandsanitationfacilities,consequencesoffloodsforcommunities,

facilities at camps, emerging needs for women and children, government response and

preparednessmeasures.Whileundertakingtheassessment,Iwasawareofmyroleasaresearcher.

IusedthisopportunitytodocumentthecommunityneedsanddevelopAssamasacasestudyfor

furtherresearch.ThisvisitstrengthenedtheargumentthatWaSHwasapriorityinemergency,and

provided an opportunity to document the recovery processes. I undertook five FGDs at the

relocatedareasandcamps,andfourinterviewswithgovernmentofficials;alongwithphotographic

evidenceofdamagesanddisplacedlivingconditionsincamps.

DuringmysecondvisittoAssamforascopingstudyinJanuary–February2013,IvisitedSonitpur

andMorigaondistrictsasavolunteerwithAgencyA.Thepurposeofthisvisitwastobuildrapport

85

withdifferentactorsinthefieldincludingcommunityleaders,panchayatleadersandNGOsworking

inthearea. Iwas introducedasaresearchertotheprojectstaffandcommunitymembers,who

were informed that I would revisit later in the year to understand community recovery and

resilience.Thecommunityfacilitatorsintheprogrammeactedaslocaltranslatorsduringmyvisits.

ThisprovidedmewithanopportunitytolearnAssameselanguage,andfamiliarisemyselfwiththe

localcultureandcontext.Duringthescopingstudy,Igatheredstaffperspectives,andinformation

onAgencyAinterventions.AgencyAprovidedlogisticssupportformyresearch,asIsupportedthem

with reportwriting and undertaking aWaSH KAP (knowledge, attitudes and practices) end line

survey.TheresultswerecomparedwiththebaselinesurveytoindicatechangesinhouseholdWaSH

practices.Iwasalsopartofthereal-timeevaluation(RTE)exerciseandworkshopwithAgencyA,

whichprovidedinsightsoncommunityfeedbackabouttheprogramme.Theinitialfindingsfromthis

visitinfluencedtheresearchasfollows:

• Iidentifiedandselectedthepanchayatsandvillagesformyfieldwork:SolmariinSonitpurand

BoramariKacharigaoninMorigaon.Thesewereselectedbasedontheextentofdamagesfaced

duringthe2012floods,closeproximitytoBrahmaputra,andagencyAinterventions.

• Thelocaltermsforfloodsandrains–banpaaniandborokhunrespectively–clearlydistinguished

betweenheavyrainsandfloods.Floodsoccurduetoheavyrains leadingtoriseinthewater

levelsofBrahmaputra,whichcausesovertoppingandbreachestheembankments.

• Iusedsemi-structured interviewswithkey informantsasuseful tools togatherdata,and in-

depth interviewswithhouseholds.Theseallowedthe intervieweestoofferwhatMay(1993)

calls their own ‘frames of reference’ (p.94). It was easier to hold relatively less structured

interviewswithhouseholdmemberstodiscussissuesthatwereclosetotheirlives,andspeak

abouthowdisasterschangedtheirpractices,theiraspirationsandplansforrecovery.

• Duringtranslation,itwasconvenientifIknewthelocaltermsforkeyconceptssuchasresilience,

recoveryandfloods.Accordingly,Ibriefedthecommunityfacilitators(whoactedastranslators)

about such concepts. This was crucial because it shaped the understanding of resilience –

bringingtogethercommunityapproaches,andhowthesefitwithinexistingliteratureandmy

researchframework.InAssamesetranslation,resilienceispurportedtobestructuralprotection

and mitigation measures, and recovery means rebuilding to previous conditions. The

programme staff explained these subtle differences to me, which helped me to refine my

86

concepts colloquially, and frame them within community and stakeholders’ perceptions of

resilienceandrecovery.

• Duringmyfirsttwovisits, Ifoundthatcommunityprioritieschangedastimeprogressed;the

reported importance or need for WaSH facilities varied. It was important to record these

prioritiesandchangesexpectedfromagencyinterventions.

• Imaintaineddailyrecordsofobservedchangesandunderstandingthroughinformaldiscussions

withAgencyAstaffandcommunitymembersinafielddiaryaspartofareflectiveprocess.These

fieldnotesyieldedinsightsintodailylifeandcontextualanalysis.

• Timewasdiscussedinrelativeterms,‘before’and‘after’and‘fromtimetotime’.Whenasked

morespecifically,individualswereuncomfortabletosuggestprecisedatesofevents.

• Government of Assamwas dealingwithmultiple floodwaves across 17 districts,whichwas

followedbyincidentsofviolenceandconflictinKokrajharandChirangin2013.

• WorkingwithAgencyAandthesupportIreceivedforfieldworkwasinvaluableinaccessingthe

remote villages. My role as a volunteer provided independence to conduct research and

approachlocalactors,whomightotherwisehavebeendifficulttocontactorengage.However,

thisassociationwithAgencyAraisedexpectationswiththecommunities,soIspecifiedmyrole

andclarifiedthepurposeofthestudyduringmyintroduction.

The final fieldwork inSolmariandBoramari,Assamwasundertaken inAugust -October2013. I

foundthatfloodprotectionmeasureshadexacerbatedcommunityvulnerabilities:theembankment

dividedthevillageandexposedthecommunitiestofloodsanderosion.Theriverinecommunities

in Solmari andBoramariwere forced to relocatewhen the newembankment put themon the

‘wrong’ side of the embankment without any protection from the river. Agency A programme

operationshadendedinthesevillagesinSonitpurandMorigaoninApril2013.Duringthisvisit,I

engagedwiththecommunitytounderstandtheirstory–attemptstorecoverfromthe2012floods

–preparednessmeasures for the impending floods in2013, and changes inWaSH facilities and

practices. Ispentthreemonthsfocusingonthedisplacedcommunities inSolmariandBoramari,

whowerelivingonembankmentsandfloodplatforms.InBoramaritheentirevillagewaswashed

away, and the populations were displaced. This visit provided crucial insights into community

capabilities toovercomechallengesof relocationandrecurringdisasters.Thefieldwork involved

gatheringmultipleperspectivesusingvarioustoolsfromhouseholds,communitiesandgovernment

87

officials,localNGOsandhumanitarianagencies.InBoramari,thefieldworkhadtobestoppedwhen

thenewembankmentwasbreachedinBoramarivillageon14thOctober2013.

InOdisha,Iundertookanextendedfieldworkof6monthstodevelopasupplementarycasestudy.

CyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloodsin2013hadaffected12millionpeopledirectlyorindirectly

(Dash 2013). The study districts included Puri and Balasore. I was deployed as Agency A’s

programmeofficer/teamleaderandmyroleinvolveddecision-making,emergencykitdistribution

and implementation of WaSH programmes in Puri. I undertook a separate monitoring visit to

Balasore inMarch2014–6monthsafter floodshadaffectedthedistrict–whereAgencyAhad

supportedthelocalpartnerAgencyFforfoodandhygienekitdistribution,emergencyshelter,water

supplyandbathingspaceinstallation.AsapractitionerinOdishaIassessedcommunityneeds,and

undertookprogrammeplanningafterthecyclonethroughdiscussionswiththecommunities,local

NGOsandgovernmentofficials.Duringthefirstphaseoftheresponse(October-December2013),

the field visits took place 6 days a week. A total of 15 villages were targeted for undertaking

distributionto2000households.Ialsofacilitatedcommunitydiscussionsduringdonorandsenior

management monitoring visits. These visits were useful to understand the existing community

capacitiestorespondandrecoverfromthecyclone.

OdishawasusefultogainacriticalperspectiveonthedifferencesinWaSHpracticesandrecovery

processesacrossdifferentvillages,andtheimpactofagencysupportonrecovery.Thetoolsused

for data gathering included household interviews, observations, transect walks, focus group

discussions, village mapping, participatory change analyses, and priority ranking exercises. The

methods fordatacollection inOdishavaried fromAssam:asapractitioner itwaschallengingto

maintainaneutralstanceandacademicrigorinOdisha.Thefollowingshowshowtheexperiencein

Odishashapedthisresearch:

• ThevillagesinvolvedinPuriwerecategorisedbasedongeographicallocationdependingonease

ofaccessandprogrammeoperations.Theseincludedcoastal,islandandmainlandvillages(see

Chapter6)

• Asanagencyrepresentative,thecommunityexpectationscouldhavepotentiallyinfluencedthe

informationtheyprovidedduringassessmentsandmonitoringvisits,whichisusedinthethesis.

88

• Emergency responsewarranted immediatemeasures to save lives. For quick distribution of

emergencykitsagenciesusedeitherthetargetingapproach(reachingouttomostvulnerable

and affected community groups) or adopted blanket approach (reaching out to all the

householdsinavillageirrespectiveofdamages).

• Ilearntthatcallforproposalsforrecoverybydonorswererequiredtobesubmittedwithinthe

firstfewweeksofthedisaster;AgencyAincorporatedtherecommendationsfromAssamreal-

timeevaluations(RTEs)inOdisha.AgencyAintervenedinearlyrecoveryundertheconsortium-

modelapproachinAssamandOdisha.

• Themediareportsshowedgovernmentwassuccessfulinsavinglivesduringthecyclonethrough

preparedness measures, early warning and evacuation systems. However the field reality

indicated there were gaps and delays in government relief items reaching the affected

communities.

• TheStatemachineryandhumanactorsdealtwithsecondary/multipledisastersuchascyclones

andfloodsaffectingdifferentdistrictsatthesametimeinOdisha,similartowhatIobservedin

Assamaswell–conflicts,recurringfloodsanderosion.

SomeinputsfromsecondarysourcesindicatedthefollowinginformationonOdisha:

• Theregionispronetomultiplehazardsandhasalonghistoryofmultipledisastersduetoits

geographiclocation,politicaldisturbance,andineffectivedisasterpolicies(Ray-Bennett2009a).

• StudiesfromOdishahaveexaminedtheroleofdiversityandcomplexinterplayofcaste,class

andgenderinsurvivingmultipledisasters(Ray-Bennett2009b).

• The 2011 census shows only 14.1% of rural households in Odisha have access to sanitation

facilities,and85.9%practiceopendefecation(Census2011).Odishaisoneofthestateswiththe

lowesthouseholdtoiletaccess(MommenandMore2013).

4.1.2Casestudyapproach

Thisresearchusedmulti-sitecasestudiestoexploreWaSHandcommunityresilience.Acasestudy

approach is useful depending on research objectives, clearly defined universe, and for focused

explorationof a phenomenon (George&Bennett 2005)A case is an explorationof a 'bounded

system'(boundedbyplaceandtime)tostudyaprogramme,event,activityorindividuals(Creswell

1998).Usingacasestudyapproachdifferedfromthetraditionalpositivistapproachesthatdivorced

phenomenafromcontextbyminimisingorcontrollingthecontexttoisolatetheeffectofarelatively

89

smallnumberofvariables(Yin,2009).Butinthisresearchthephenomenonandthecontextwere

considered.Thisresearchadoptedcasestudiessothatit‘benefitsfromthepriordevelopmentof

theoreticalpropositionstoguidedatacollectionandanalysis’(Yin2009p.14).Thisresearchfound

casestudieshelpfulinguiding‘anempiricalinquirythatinvestigatesacontemporaryphenomenon

withinitsreallifecontext’(Yin2009,p.13).Thephenomenonincludeddisastereventsandrecovery

actionsbyhouseholds,communities,INGOs,governmentactors,andlocalinstitutions.

Thecasestudyapproachhelpedinaddressingthecomplexissuesandvariablesencounteredduring

thefieldwork;italloweduseofwiderangeofmethodsandsourcesofevidencewithoutconstraining

oneself to a pre-determined selection of tools and techniques (Yin 2009). With regard to the

misunderstandings of case study research stated by Flyvbjerg (2006), this research relied upon

theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge, and was consciously aware of the dangers of

generalisingfromthecases.5Theapproachseemedappropriatetoexploretherecoveryprocesses,

andunderstandWaSHinordertoaddresstheresearchquestions.Theresearchbenefittedfrom

casestudiesforlearningthatprovidesdepth,notbreadth,andasnarrativesintheirentiretynot

withanaimtosummariseorgeneralise(Flyvbjerg2006).

Casestudiesarecategoriseddependingonthenumberofcasesandsitesofstudy.Thisresearch

explored recovery using two case studies from India, andwithin each casemultiple siteswere

studiedtounderstandWaSHpractices.AccordingtoclassificationprovidedbyStake (1995), this

researchusescollectiveandintrinsictypesofcasestudy.Anintrinsiccasestudyhelpsingaininga

betterunderstandingofaparticularuniquecaseandacollectivecasestudyincludesanumberof

casesinordertoinquireintoaparticularphenomenon(Stake1995).TheAssamcasestudywasalso

longitudinalasitattemptedtoexplorerecoveryayearfollowingthefloodsin2012.

4.1.3Selectionofcasestudies

Toexploretheresearchquestionacrossthetwocases,datawererequiredonanumberoflevels:

household,community,NGOandgovernment(Greene2014).

5Othermisunderstandingsstatethatgeneralisationscannotbemadefromasinglecase,oracasestudyismostusefulinpilotstagestogeneratehypotheses,orcasestudiesarebiasedtowardsverificationoftheresearchers’hypothesis,andaredifficulttosummarise(Flyvbjerg2006).

90

• Householdlevel:Datawerecollectedthroughinterviewsandobservationstoexplorechanges

inWaSHpracticesduringrecovery.Itincludedhouseholdperspectivesanddecisionsregarding

investmentsinWaSHpost-disasters.

• Communitylevel:WaSHcommunalfacilitieswereobservedinordertounderstandtheiruseand

maintenance, and accessibility issues. Data included community priorities and changes, and

perspectivesfromthelocalactorsandCBOs.

• NGO level: Data were collected from humanitarian NGOs regarding response and recovery

measuresinWaSHandinformationonprogrammesthroughdocuments,interviewsandnotes.

• Government level:Qualitativedataondistrict, stateandcountry leveldisastermanagement

policiesandwaterand sanitation schemeswere collected togainamacro-leveloverviewof

WaSHanddisasters.

ThesitesforfieldworkinAssamandOdishawereselectedbasedonthefollowingcriteria:

• Sincecommunitycapacitiesandchangespost-disastersweretobestudied,villagesaffectedby

floods,cycloneorerosionwereselected.

• Asthesub-researchquestioninvestigatedtheroleofinstitutions,theselectedsiteswerepart

ofAgencyAandtheirlocalpartnerNGO’sinterventionareas.

• In order to maintain uniformity across diverse community groups, similar locations were

considered,wheretheselectedgroupslivedontheruralfringes,exposedtorecurringdisasters

duetotheirgeographiclocationsandproximitytoriversandlakes.

TheinitialstudywasfundedbyanErasmusMundusExchangescholarship:theprimarycondition

wastoconducttheresearch inmynativecountry– India.Thefirstcasestudyfocusesonflood-

affectedcommunitiesinAssam.Assamhasanaverageannualrainfallof2,546millimetres,oneof

thehighestinIndia.

Table4.2:SelectioncriteriawithinAssam

Area Criteria Sitesconsidered Siteselected ReasonsState 1. Disaster-proneregion 1. CycloneAila,West

Bengal2009Assam 1. Recurrentfloods

in2012

91

2. Experienceofrecentevent

3. On-goingresponsework

4. Appropriateforindependentresearcher

5. WaSHcontext

2. Maharashtra3. Assam

2. Historyoffloods3. Accesswith

AgencyA4. Initialassessment

teammember5. Rampantopen

defecationrates

Districts 1. Affectedbyfloodsin2012

2. Pastdisasterhistory3. AgencyAon-going

work

1. Lakhimpur2. Dhemaji3. Sonitpur4. Morigaon5. Bongaigaon6. Chirang

SonitpurandMorigaon

1. On-goingfloodresponse

2. RecommendedbyNGOsandGOs

3. Previousvisitsandfamiliaritywithlocalactors

4. Othersweredifficulttoaccessorconflict-affected

Villages 1. Riverinecommunities2. Floodaffected3. SimilarAgency

Interventions4. Hazardhistory5. Diversecommunity

demography

1. Solmari2. Boramari3. Maihangblock

SolmariandBoramari

1. AgencyAintervenedinshelter,WaSHandlivelihoods

2. Priorcontactsandestablishedrapport

TheBrahmaputrariverbasininAssamisextremelypronetofloods,characterisedbyregularerosion

anddevastationduringmonsoons.Assamhasahighrateofopen-defecation,asper2011census;

only59.6%oftotalhouseholdshavetoilets(GlobalSanitationFund2013).SolmariandBoramari

villagesbothAgencyA interventionareaswere selected for the research. Thehouseholdswere

randomlyselectedtoreflectthediversityincommunities.

Thesecondcasestudyfocusesoncyclone-andflood-affectedcommunities inOdisha(seeTable

4.3). Cyclone Phailin affected Ganjam and Puri districts in Odisha, while the subsequent floods

affectedBalasore.

Table4.3:SelectioncriteriainOdisha

Area Criteria Sitesconsidered Siteselected Reasons

92

State 1. Disaster-proneregion2. Experienceofrecent

event3. On-goingresponse

work4. WaSHcontext

1. Odisha2. AndhraPradesh

Odisha 1. CyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloodsin2013

2. AccesswithAgencyA

3. Initialassessmentteammember

4. Rampantopendefecationrates

Districts 1. Affectedbycycloneandfloodsin2013

2. Pastdisasterhistory3. AgencyAon-going

work

1. Puri2. Ganjam3. Balasore

PuriandBalasore 1. On-goingAgencyAresponse

2. DeploymentinPuri

3. MonitoringvisitinBalasore

Villages 1. Riverine/Coastalcommunities

2. Floodaffected3. SimilarAgency

Interventions4. Hazardhistory5. Diversecommunity

demography

1. Arakhakudda2. Sanpatna3. Khirisahi4. Brahmapur5. Mahinsha6. Padanpur7. Pirosahi8. Gopinathpur9. Kanasblock10. Sahadevpur11. Chadanamkhana12. Gombhoria

Puri:Arakhakuda,Sanpatna,KhirisahiBrahmapurPadanpurPirosahiGopinathpurSahadevpurBalasore:ChadanamkhanaGombhoria

1. Puri:villageswereaccessedfortheresponseprogrammeandcategorisedascoastal,inlandandisland

2. Balasore:Affectedbyfloodsin2013,anderosion

The selection of two case studies where disasters had recently occurred provided a unique

opportunity towitness, document and study recovery as it unfolded. The higher rates of open

defecation inAssamandOdisha prior to the disaster provided the context to understandpost-

disasterchangesincommunitypracticesandapproachesusedbyagenciestopromotecommunity

resilienceduringrecovery.Floods,cycloneanderosionhadaffectedtheselectedstudysites,hence

followingthecommunitieslivingintheseareasovertimewashelpfultostudythechangesoccurring

during recovery.My previous associationwith local agencies working in Assam and interest to

understandthecontexthadledmetofollowthecasestudywhenthefloodsfirstoccurredin2012.

InOdisha,thecyclone2013wasanotherinterestingavenuetounderstandhowOdishaevacuated

andrespondedtotheneedspriortotheonsetofthecyclone.Thestatemachineryhadlearntlessons

and implemented preparedness and mitigation programmes after the previously 1999

Supercyclone,which had been instrumental in saving lives. Thismulti-disaster event suited the

researchaimstounderstandcommunityrecoveryfromamega-scaleevent.

93

4.2DataCollectionMethods

Several inter-dependent methods were chosen that complemented one another to draw a

meaningfulanalysisofchanges(seeFigure4.1andTable4.4)Thisaidedexternalvalidityandbuilta

morecompletepictureofhouseholdandcommunityrecoveryandWaSHpractices.Fieldnotesand

adailyjournalweremaintainedtomanageinternalvalidityanddevelopreflexivity.

Figure4.1:Integrationofdifferentmethods

Table4.4:ResearchmethodsusedinAssamandOdisha

•Emails•Newspaperarticles•AgencyReports•Briefingnotes

•Audio-visualsandphotographs•Observation•Fieldnotes•Fielddiary

•Semi-structuredInterviews•Unstructuredhouseholdinterviews•Informalconversations

•Transectwalks•Focusgroupdiscussions•PriorityRanking•Changeanalysis

PLATools Interviews

DocumentsParticipantObservation

94

Nameofthetool

Assam Odisha

Sub-ResearchQuestions

1 2 3ParticipatoryLearningandActionToolsTransectwalks 12 23 √ Participatorymappingexercises 4 20 √ Focusgroupdiscussions 23 43 √ √ √Participatorychangeanalyses 4 4 √ √Priorityranking 4 16 √ √Interviews(seeTable4.5)Keyinformantinterviews √ √Householdinterviews √ Documents(seeAnnex13) √ √Observationandphotographs √ √ √

4.2.1ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools

Inthisresearch,participationisimportantintheconceptual,methodologicalandanalyticalaspects.

Fordatacollection,PLAtoolswereusedtogatherdataontheimpactofdisastersinWaSHsystems.

There aremyriad interpretations of participation, and challenges and criticisms levelled against

these approaches (Guijt and Cornwall 1995). Schilderman and Lyons (2011) question, ‘whose

participationinwhosedecisionsandwhoseactions?’(p.227).ThisresearchusesPLAtoolstogather

multipleperspectives,andtodocumentthelivedrealitiesofpeoplerecoveringfromdisasters.This

involved purposive sampling of respondents for community and household members. For key

informants–NGOandGOstaff,andlocalactors–detailedknowledgeandexperienceofworkingin

the region was essential. The use of PLA tools for data gathering and interactions with local

communities,asshownbyLeDeetal(2014),facesconstraintsoftimeanddistance.PLAtoolsare

lesslikelytodeliveranswerstolocalcommunities’problemsorempowerthem;theyareintended

toservetheresearch(ortheresearcherandprogramming)interests.

ThisresearchcontendsthatusingPLAtoolsinitselfcannotbringaboutpositivechange.Agencies

relyonparticipationasameanstoextractinformationfromacommunity(GuijtandCornwall1995).

Agrowingnumberofstudiesuseparticipatorymethodsinevaluation,urbanstudiesandclimate

resilience(Chambers1994a;Burke1998;EstrellaandGaventa1998;Twiggetal.2001;Moserand

Stein2011).Chambers (1994a)discussessequencingoftoolsstartingwithmapping, followedby

95

priorityranking,stakeholdermappingandwealthranking.Mikkelsen(2005)groupsPLAtoolsbased

onspace,timeandrelationalparameters.Space-relatedPLAtoolssuchasmappingandmodelling

aidinexplorationofspatialdimensionsofpeople’sreality;time-relatedsuchasseasonaldiagrams,

work-activitydailyschedules,time-linesandtrendanalysistoolsenablecommunitiestousetheir

ownconceptoftimetoexploretemporaldimensions;andrelationaltoolsincludingVenndiagrams,

matrixscoring/rankingmethodsareusedtostudyrelationshipsbetweenvariousitemsoraspects

ofsameitem(Mikkelsen2005).

ThePLAtoolsusedinthisresearchincludedparticipatorymapping,transectwalks,priorityranking,

actormapping,andparticipatorychangeanalysesandfocusgroupdiscussions(FGDs)(Mikkelsen

2005p.63).DuringfieldworkIfollowedalineofinquiry(annexure7).ThePLAtoolswereusedto

assesscommunityprioritiesandallowedengagementwithcommunityparticipants,basedonthe

dataneeds,opportunitiesandlimitationsofthefieldsetting,andconstraintsoftime,logisticsand

otherresources(annexure8).SeparateFGDswereheldwithwomen,menandchildren,andwith

elderlyordisabledmembers,whereappropriateandfeasible.ThePLAtoolsusedduringfieldwork

wereintuitive,andrespectedculturalpractices(LeDeetal.2014).Duringmyengagement,Iwas

consciousofmylimitationsinusingparticipationasameanstogiveavoicetoeveryone.Thetools

forpriorityrankingandparticipatorychangeanalyseswereintendedtodrawactiveparticipationof

local communities in the production of knowledge, in how they framed their problems and

challengesthataffecttheirlives(Freire1970).LeDeetal(2014)arguethatparticipationisaprocess

andsometimesresearchprojectsarelimitedintheircapacitytoempowerlocalcommunities.Used

insuchamanner,thesetoolsarelimitedinbringingaboutsocialchange,self-reliance,orcapacity

ofnegotiationwithpowerstructures.

Transect walks: Transect walks were initiated during every field visit with a few community

members tounderstandvisiblechanges ingeographical layout,WaSH facilitiesandpractices, to

gaugedistancesbetweenhouseholdsandWaSHfacilities.Duringdisasters,transectwalkshelped

toassesstheextentofdamageinremotelocationswiththecommunitiesandunderstandissuesof

accessibilityandavailabilityofWaSHfacilities.Thesewereundertakenthroughoutthesite,while

taking notes on sanitation facilities and practices, and taking photographs. A huge amount of

information can be gathered in this way but care should be taken not to make sweeping

assumptionsbasedonlimitedobservation(Harveyetal.2002p.17).Thishigh-profilewalkdispels

96

suspicionofoutsidersandinformsresearchersaboutareasthathavegreatervulnerabilitytosevere

weather(MoserandStein2011).Iwascautiousnottoadvisecommunitiesduringthewalksand

askedopen-endedquestions(Chambers1994b).

InAssam,frequentvisitswithinthesamecommunitiesledto12transectwalksintwosites,while

inOdisha,23transectwalkswereundertakenalongwithprojectparticipants.Ifacedchallengesin

accessingthevillagesdependingonthetimetotravelandavailablemeansoftransport,weather

conditions and inundation during floods. The walks allowed a snapshot of the existing WaSH

facilities,agencyinterventionsandthemannerinwhichthecommunitiesaccessedwater,sanitation

and housing facilities post-disasters. I used othermethods such as observation, interviews and

groupdiscussionsasawayoftriangulatingdata.

Participatorymapping:Thisresearchincludedparticipatorymappingexercises–villageandactor

mapping– toobtainanoverall viewof thephysical situationand relevantactors inWaSH.This

researchdevelopedalistofactorsinvolvedatthevillage/settlementlevelinWaSHserviceprovision

(Figure4.2).

Figure4.2:Listofactorsinvolvedinwater,sanitation,andhygieneservicesinSolmari

School&Anganwaditeacher

Healthworkers-ASHA,ANM(Auxiliary

Nurses/midwives)Wardmember

PanchayatPresident/Member

ofLegistaliveAssembly

AgencyAandLocalNGOB Youthfacilitators

Masonrygroups

97

Actormapshavebeenusedtorecordthetypesandstrengthsofsocialnetworksexperiencedbythe

respondentsinotherstudies(Bosher2005;King2015).6Thisinvolveddevelopingroughsketchesof

site plans or schematic maps of existing WaSH facilities; key public services and institutions;

indiscriminatedisposalofexcreta,flood-proneareas,watersources,storageanddistributionpoints;

andslopes,drainageandgeologicalfeatures(Harveyetal.2002p.17).Communitymembersand/or

localstaffundertookvillagemappingtostimulatediscussionsandobtain information.Themaps

indicateequalweighttoallactors,wheninfacttheyhaddifferentroles,andfunctions.

FocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs):ThisresearchusedFGDstodeterminecommonneeds,timeframes

andprioritieswithcommunities.Thishelpedtoframethecontextandgaininsightsregardingthe

situation, followed by two other exercises, priority ranking and participatory change analyses.

FollowingtheprinciplessetbyHarveyetal(2002),thisresearchconductedfocusgroupsseparately

with women members to discuss issues of menstrual hygiene, hygiene behaviour and privacy

concernsoveruseofwaterandlatrinefacilitiesduringemergencies.Thediscussionswereheldin

anyavailableshelteredspace–schoolsorlocalcommunalareas–involving6-8informants.FGDs

canbechallenging,astheycanbedistortedbypeerpressureorbycertainparticipantswho,because

oftheirpersonality,interestorcompetenceindiscussions,maydominateagroupandothersmight

feelintimidated,hidingthedifferingviewsanddisagreementsbetweenparticipants(Goughetal.

2013).Thesedifficultieswerecounteredbyfacilitatingsubsequentsmallergroupdiscussionswith

relatively homogeneous participants (i.e. of the same sex and similar experiences), or with

household interviews. This research conducted separate FGDs following similar work to factor

differentperspectivesandvulnerabilitieswhichinfluenceaccess(Nieuwenhuys1997;Twigg2014).

For research purposes I facilitated the discussions, sometimes with the help of Agency A

managementorfieldstaff.Forprogrammingpurposes,atdifferentstagesoftheprogrammecycle,

thepurposeoftheFGDsvaried:duringassessment,informationgatheredwasspecifictoemergency

food,water,sanitationandshelterneeds;duringmonitoringvisits,FGDswereheldtodiscussthe

effectiveness and gaps in the programme; and regular FGDs were held to gather community

6TheSociogramisasurveytoolthataimstoquantifythelevelofresilienceexperiencedinacommunitybeforeandafteradisaster;toassessthetypesandstrengthofsocialnetworksexperiencedindividualswithinan‘everyday’contextandwithina‘crisisperiod’(Bosher2005;King2015).Bosher(2005)categorisedthetypes(formal/informal)andweightedthestrengthofrelationshipbetweentherespondentandthevariousinstitutionsandorganisationsaccessedinsideandoutsidetherespondent’svillage.

98

feedbackandcomplaintsontheprogrammingservicesandassistance.Overall23groupdiscussions

were held in Assam over three visits in 2 sites, and 43 in Odisha across 10 sites. Due to the

longitudinalnatureofthestudy,multipleFGDswereheldinthesamesites;thegroupcomposition

variedsometimesbecauseparticipantswereabsentduetorelocation,migrationorbusywiththeir

livelihoodactivities.Wherewomenmemberswereinvolvedinthediscussions,effortsweremade

toorganisethegroupsintheirpreviouscohortsbasedonproximity.Itooknotesduringthemeeting,

orimmediatelyafterwards.TheFGDswerenotrecorded.

Priorityranking:Ineachstudyvillage,aftertheFGDspriorityrankingexerciseswereundertakenas

asequentialtask,inwhichtheparticipantslistedtheirimmediateandurgentneeds,prioritiesand

issues faced during recovery. The participantswere requested to list their urgent concerns and

accordimportancetoeachneedorprioritythroughconsensusandprioritysettingapproach.This

generatedconversationabouttheroleandimportanceofvarioussectorssuchashousingandland,

water, sanitation, livelihoods and health, encompassing future development and risk reduction

measures.Participantsprioritised,modifiedandrevisedtheiranswersastheimportanceofeach

sectoronthelistwasdiscussedanddebated.InAssamthisexercisewasundertakenduringmyfinal

visitinSeptember2013,andinOdisha,thiswasregularlyusedtodeterminedynamicchangesinthe

humanitarianneedsforprogramming.Asthegroupscontainedmixedgendergroups,avarietyof

needswerelistedanddifferentprioritieswerementioned.Thesedifferenceswerenotedinthefield

diary.Duetotimeconstraintsparticipantswereaskedtolistfiveimportantpriorities.Tocounter

challengesfacedbytheparticipantswhowerenotliterate,Iusedpictorialrepresentations,drawn

onthegroundshowingwatersource,toiletorhouseorland,livelihoodsorembankments.

Participatorychangeanalyses:Thechangeanalysisformatwasdevelopedbasedontheguidelines

forcontributingtochangemethodologypresentedinSection2.1(Fewetal.2013).Itlookedatthe

majorrecentdisastereventintheregionandtabulatedvariousaspectsrelatedtoWaSHfacilities

andpractices,shelter,population,livelihoodandmigrationpatterns,accesstohealthandpresence

ofvariousorganisationsandserviceproviders.Inthisresearchatimelineofthevillageprofilewas

producedbefore,duringorimmediatelyafterthedisaster,andduringrecovery.Sword-Danielsetal

(2015) facedchallengesofelicitingaccurate recall frompastmemories,whileusing timelines to

collectqualitativedata.Participatorychangeanalysestoolisusefultogatherrichdatatoexplore

retrospectivechangesinhouseholdlocation,WaSHpracticesandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Instead

99

ofdeterminingspecifictimescalessuchas10-12daysafterthedisasteror3or6monthsafterthe

disaster,thisexercisereferredtophases:

• t-1Priortothefloods–pre-disastercontext�

• t-2Emergencyphaseduringthedisaster�(approximately10days–2months)

• t-3Earlyrecoveryphaseduringthefirstassessmentvisit�(approx.2months–6months)

• t-4Longer–termrecoveryphasewhenthefloodsrecurred(approx.7months–1year)

InOdisha,thelastphasewasnotexploredbecausethefieldworklastedforsixmonthsafterthe

cyclone.

4.2.2Interviews

Thisresearchrelieduponinterviewmethodforgatheringdataandanalysis,asaneffectivetoolfor

descriptiveandanalyticalpurposes,andtosituatethedataintheirfullersocialandculturalcontext

(McCracken, 1988, p.9). Following McCracken (1988), this research adopts investigator (or

researcher) as an instrument (self as instrument) to understand the social phenomena. During

fieldwork,semi-structuredinterviewswereusedatthehouseholdlevelandwithkeyinformants.

Thisallowedforflexibilityandthediscoveryofmeaningoftheparticipants,andprovidedgreater

understandingofthehouseholds’pointofview(May1993,p.94).

Atthehouseholdlevel,relativelylessstructuredandguidedconversationswereheldtocollectrich

information,rangingfrom20minutestoanhourwiththehouseholdmembers,foracquiringrich

accountsabouttheirlivesafterthedisaster,WaSHpractices,post-disasterchangesandexperiences

duringrecovery.Anunstructuredformatwaspreferredoverastructuredsurvey/interviewformat,

withoutrecording.Thehouseswererandomlyselectedacrossseparateclusterswithinavillageto

getgeographicallydiverseperspectivesandpractices.InAssam,18householdsacrosstwovillages

werepurposivelysampledforinterviewbasedongender,ethnicity,age,andthoselivingalongthe

riverbanks, and on the embankments. In Odisha, 10 household interviews were held with

households.Sometimesatranslatorwaspresent;bothAssameseandOdialanguages–bothbeing

similartoHindi–wereeasiertograspandlearnforme.Thisallowedmetocommunicatewithout

aninterpreterortranslator.Inthebeginning,Iintroducedmyself,andthepurposeoftheinterview,

andtookverbalconsent fromtherespondent.The informalityandcasualnessof thediscussions

aidedtherespondentstofreelyexpress,confideanddiscussissuespertainingtotheirdailylives.

Someoftheissuesdiscussedincluded:howdodifferentvulnerablegroupssuchaselderly,children,

100

womenanddisabledmembersaccesswatersources,theirdefecationandhandwashingpractices

andhowthesechangedpostdisasters(Annexure7).

Ontheotherhand,semi-structuredinterviewswereheldwithkeyinformants,involvingAgencyA

and local NGOs. In Assam 38 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with NGO staff and

experts, humanitarian and government officials using an interview guide (Annexure 9). Other

stakeholders–localleaders,governmentofficers,headsoflocalorganizations,andschoolteachers

–werealsointerviewed.InOdisha36interviewswereconductedwithkeyinformants.Iconducted

alltheinterviews,andvoice-recordedafterseekingtherespondent’spermissionandsignedconsent

allowingmetousetheinformationforresearchpurposes(Annexure6).Theintervieweehadthe

righttoremainanonymoussothattheycouldfreelyprovidetheirinputsandopinions,asperthe

UCLethicsguidelines.Theinterviewslastedbetween40minutesandonehourandinterviewees

wereaskedtoprovideanyfeedbackorcontributionsoraskquestionstowardstheend.Someofthe

scheduled interviews were cancelled or discontinued and held at a later date due to limited

availability of the interviewees and their time constraints. Sometimes due to time constraints,

intervieweesofferedtohaveinformalconversations,meetingsorSkype(Tableno4.5).Inall144

interviewswereconductedwithhouseholds,NGOofficials,governmentandotheractors.

Table4.5:Summaryofinterviewsacrosscasestudies

Interviews Assam OdishaHouseholdinterviews(A) 18 10InterviewswithStateAuthorities 2 2InterviewswithDistrictAuthorities 10 2InterviewswithBlockOfficials 2 1InterviewswithGramPanchayatmembers 3 5InterviewswithNGOs 14 3InterviewswithINGOsanddonors 1 7InterviewswithschoolteachersandCBOs 3 10Meetingswithconsortiamembers 2 5Real-timeevaluationfieldvisitsandworkshop 1 1Interviews–Total(B) 38 36Informalconversations(C) 10 12InterviewwithAgencyAstaff(D) 10GrandTotal(A+B+C+D) 144

The interviews were recorded and transferred on my computer. I had taken notes during the

interviewtomarkimportantthemes,andpointersifIwishedtoprobeanyparticularstrandthat

101

mayhavebeenmissed.Alltheinformationabouteachinterviewwasincorporatedintothedatabase

inExcelandcodifiedtomaintain theanonymityof the interviewee.These interviewswerethen

playedbackformindmapping(Fearnley2011)(section4.4).

4.2.3Documents

Documentswere key sources of evidence in both the case studies. During the associationwith

Agency A, I had access to internal reports, and other documents generated after meetings,

discussionsandsitreps. IaccessedAgencyA’sandpartnerNGOs’records,accounts, institutional

missionstatements,annualreports,budgets,evaluationofprojectreports,minutesofmeetings,

internalmemoranda,policymanuals, case studies, institutional reports,official correspondence,

demographicmaterialandvarioussurveydataandreports,massmediareportsandpresentations,

anddescriptionsofprogrammedevelopmentandevaluation.Aseparatehard-drivewasmaintained

for systematicorganisationofdocuments collected, and formaintainingadatabase.A thematic

analyticalstrategywasusedtoreviewdocuments,assesstheusefulnessandrelevanceofdifferent

documents.Quiteoften,documentsserveassubstitutesforrecordsofactivitiesthattheresearcher

couldnotobservedirectly(Fearnley2011).Sincedocumentsareoftenwrittenatthetimeofthe

event or shortly after they tend to preserve knowledge and views at the time ofwritingwhile

informationisfreshinpeople’sminds(Fearnley2011).Thedocumentsgatheredfromorganisations

inAssam,andOdishawereclassifiedasgovernmentdocuments,NGOdocuments(separatefolders

forAgencyAandothers),andemailcommunications,journalandnewspaperarticles,publishedand

unpublished studies.Overall195 documentsweregatheredand reviewed fromAssam,and175

fromOdisha(seeAnnexure12).Newsarticlesweresearchedinlocalnewspaper’sonlinedatabases

–AssamTribune,andOrissaPostreferringtothespecificdisasterevents.

4.2.4 Participantobservationandphotographs

Thisresearchalsodependedonparticipantobservationsrecordedinmyfieldnotesandjournaland

in photographs to construct the complex realities and changes in a post-disaster context and

documentmyreflectionsoftheexperience.Participantobservationshelpedunderstandshort-term

accountofpost-disastercontextsandagencyinterventionsaimingtoproducearichunderstanding

of people’s experiences in a variety of contexts (Brockmann 2011). The observations included

changes in geographical layout,practices, facilities,displacementpatternsand campconditions.

Specificobservationsweremadeofpracticesonwatercollection,treatment,storageandusageand

102

defecation. During the fieldwork, whilst actively participating in the programme I recordedmy

observations and interviews in field notes and separately recorded personal reflections in my

researcher’sjournalonadailybasis.Thispracticeallowedmetoconsolidatedailyexperiencesand

perspectivesgatheredduringdiscussions.Theobjectivewasnotjusttosimplyrecordanddescribe

eventsandactivitiesbutalsotoinitiatethefirstlevelofanalysisthroughmyreflections.Ireferred

toverbalandemailcommunications,non-verbalcuesobservedduringmeetingsandworkshops.I

maintained a daily log of activity description, location, date and time/duration, content of the

activityandinteractionsbetweenparticipants.Reflections,outcomesandfollowupactionswere

alsoincludedwhereverappropriate.InOdisha,Irecordedmyparticipantobservations,interactions

and discussions with staff, emails, daily updates, meeting minutes and reports. These proved

valuableandenrichingsourcesofdataonhowdecisionsweremade,whichwouldnotbeevident

from interviewsordiscussions. Fieldnoteswereuseful alternatives to voice recording, and rich

descriptionforphotographs.

Images and recorded videos provided an in-depth understanding of a particular programme

intervention,practicesandtopographicalchangespost-disasters.Photographicresearchmethods

havebeenappliedinmultiplewaysdependingontheroleofthephotographsintheresearchdesign,

thephilosophicalorientationoftheresearcherandroleofparticipantstocapturechanges(Rayand

Smith2012).Suchresearcher-driventoolsarearichsourceofinformationfordocumentingchanges

inthesitesovertimeinAssamandOdisha.Especiallyinerosion-affectedareasofAssam,thisproved

crucialtounderstandtheextentofdamages,populationdisplacementandrelocationchallenges.

Thesephotographswere included inadatabaseofpictures–300 inAssamand350 inOdisha–

organisedbasedonsitesanddatestaken.Inall23imagesfromAssamand18fromOdishawere

used,relevanttothenarrative(Chapters5and6).

4.3Roleofpractitionerinresearch

Dependingupontheaimoftheresearch,theparticularrolesadoptedbyresearchersvary,which

influencethedatagatheringprocess(May1993).Asapractitionerundertakingqualitativeresearch,

Iactivelyengagedingatheringdata,understandinglinkagesandidentifyingpatterns.Ialsoreferto

myexperienceofworkingasahumanitarianprofessionalasengagedinreflectivepractice.

103

Beingareflectivepractitionerinvolvesreflection-in-action(thinkingwhatoneisdoingwhileoneis

doing it) and reflection-on-action (where a practitioner reviews their actions subsequently to

explainagaintheunderstandingsinlightoftheoutcomes)(Greenwood1998).Myresearchadopts

thereflecting-on-actionapproachforprofessionalexperiencesinAssamandOdisha. Iundertook

surveysinAssam,andwastheteamlead–responsiblefordecision-making–inPuri,Odisha.There

weretwomethodologyaspectsemergingasareflectivepractitioner,relatedtothefieldworkand

its impactoncommunities.Thefieldwork,asdescribedabove, includedassessmentsandregular

monitoringvisitsatmultiplesites,whichweretime-intensiveand involvedmanyresources.Asa

practitioner,toolsthathelpedgatherquickinformationtoserveprogrammedecisionswereused.

Theextentofcommunityparticipationduringtheimmediateaftermathofthedisasterwaslimited

toconsultationswithkey leaders for identifyingbeneficiariesandselectingappropriate sites for

quick distribution and installation ofWaSH facilities. Often, the demands for quick response in

variousaffectedvillageswashigh,buttherewereresourceconstraintsandpre-determinedtarget

for beneficiaries. In many cases the actual needs of households were ‘unheard’ in the initial

assessments.Theprogrammereportingrequiredcollectionofgender-disaggregateddata,thumb

impressionsofeachrecipient,undertakinghouseholddamageassessmentsurveysandabaseline

survey. Thedatagathering forprogrammeswas repetitive given thenumberofmonitoringand

donorfieldvisitstosamelocations,andaskingthesamequestionstocommunitiesrepeatedlyby

differentvisitorsledtoduplicationofinformation.

Personal factors influence professional experiences, driven by needs, preferences, perceptions,

emotionsandpowerandwithinorganisationalbeliefs(Reeves1994).Therewereexternalfactors

thatinfluencedprogrammingdecisionswithbudgetimplicationsandneededjustificationstothe

senior management and donor approvals based on project requirements, staff welfare and

communityaspirations.

“It ischallengingtoworkbeyondstaff'scomfort level, logistics'comfort levelduetohigh

temperaturesandhumidconditionsnearChilkhalake.Teammembersarespending8–12

hoursinthefieldand3-4hourstravellinginvehiclesandboats.Takingupislandvillagesis

104

making the work expensive and time consuming. The shelter and PHE activities require

considerablebackupbythetransportationbudget.”7

Thisjournalentrydocumentsthechallengesfacedwhileworkinginmorethan40degreesCelsius

in Odisha. As a practitioner, I was concerned that the high temperatures affected programme

outputs, but from the perspective of the communities, this potentially affected their recovery,

accesstohealthandotherfacilitiesandgeneralwellbeing,aspectsthatwerenotdirectlyexplored

inthisresearch,orwithintheresponseprogramme.

4.3.1Biasesandethicsasresearcher

Imaintained conscientiousness in data collection through good documentation, being aware of

issues, and maintaining traceability of data gathered (de Weerd-Nederhof 2001 p.527). The

potential research biases include spatial, project, person, professional and diplomatic biases

(Chambers 1983 p.13). As a reflective practitioner, interacting with communities as an agency

employee,obviouslyinfluencesthedatagatheringandanalyticalprocess.Positioningmyselfasa

practitionerresearcher,thedatagatheredinsuchaway-immersedwithinthecontext-maintaining

objectivitywaschallenging.Thisresearchacknowledgestherewerebiasesinthedatacollectionand

analyticalstrategies,comingfromaconstructiviststance.Forinstance,myroleasapractitionerhas

influencedthedevelopmentofresearchquestions,andsettheresearchobjectivetoaddressgaps

inresilienceandrecoverytheoriesandWaSHpractice.Therearepersonalandprofessionalbiases

in framing this research beginningwith conceptual development and selection of case studies.

Representinganagencywhileundertakingfieldworkinfluencedthedatagatheredwithindividuals,

households, andcommunitymembers.Perhaps, the respondents’ andparticipants’ involvement

wereguidedbymypositionofpowerwithintheagencyinprogrammeimplementation.Thisclose

associationwiththeimplementingagencyalsoprovidedinsightsonorganisationalmechanismsin

learning,participationandintegration.Thiseventuallytookshapeofunderstandingandreflecting

onwhat external agencies can achieve in terms of behavioural changeswithin the programme

duration. As a practitioner-researcher, my analysis and understanding stems from them the

professionalandpersonalconcernsIdevelopedduringmypractice,andthroughthepartnership

withAgencyA.Inthisuniqueposition,therearebiasesofhavingincludedtheagencyprojectareas,

7Diaryentry:Puri,27thMarch2014

105

and region-specific findings. However, this stems from the research’s social constructivist

underpinnings.Thishasallowedmetoreflectonpracticeandunderstandimplicationsforconcepts,

theoriesandagencypractice.

This research acknowledges such biases and adheres to ethical principles of doing no harm to

researchparticipants,informedconsent,andprivacy(Bryman2008p.118).Itfollowedofficial(and

necessary)proceduresaspertheEthicalguidelinesattheUniversityCollegeLondonandcomplying

withtheDataProtectionAct1998ll.Providinginformation,gaininginformedconsentfromresearch

participants,andAgencyAandotherparticipatingorganisationswerestepsundertakenpriortothe

commencementofthefieldwork.Thisresearchwassensitivetotheethicalissuesofworkingina

disastersituation.Theresearchparticipantsweredisaster-affected,soeffortsweretakenthattheir

participation did not exacerbate their vulnerability or pose further difficulties (Patel 2011).

Consideringthattheparticipantshadsufferedfromlossesduetodisasters,andwereindespair,the

questionsrecalling theeventand its impactswere limitedto thenarrativesaspresentedbythe

participants.Theywerenotprobedforfurtherinformationordetailsiftheydidnotwishtodiscuss.

This informationwas gathered through secondary data and key informant interviews, to avoid

causingadditionalemotionaldistressofrelivingtheexperienceofcyclone,floods,lossesanddeaths.

Whenchildrenwereinvolvedduringfieldwork,priorpermissionwassoughtfromtheirparentsor

schoolteachers.

Since I belong to the southern part of India, and hail fromMumbai, I was an outsider female

researchingremoteareasinAssamandinOdisha.Igainedaccessthroughlocalleadersofself-help

groups,youthfacilitatorsandhealthworkers.Beingawoman,itwaseasiertobuildrapportwith

womenintheruralareas,whodiscussedfreelyaboutprivateconcernsrelatedtomenstrualhealth

andsecurityconcernsfacedwhilelivingincamps.Thecommunitymemberswerecuriousandasked

aboutmymarriedstatusandmycasteduringtheinitialrapportbuilding.Inordertoreflectupon

how this influenceddata gathering,my impressions, participants’ feedback and responseswere

oftenrecordedinmyjournal.Ifoundspeakinglocallanguagesverycomforting,whichturnedthe

interactionsveryfriendlyandengagingfortheparticipantsinalessformalmanner.Theparticipants

mighthaveconsideredmetobeactingonbehalfoftheNGO,andthat Icould influenceagency

decisions for providing community support. This has potentially influenced the participants’

responsestomyquestionsduringfieldwork.

106

Thehouseholdinterviewdatawastriangulatedwithfocusgroups,andstakeholderinterviews.In

Odisha, privacy and confidentiality aspects were upheld by anonymising the agencies and

participants. In this thesis,namesare codified, and the researcher is solely responsible fordata

analysesatallstageswithoutanyinvolvementofexternalpeople.Thisisdonekeepinginmindthe

confidentialityaspectsoftheorganisation,theirworkandtheaffectedcommunitiesinvolvedinthe

project.WhenlocaltranslatorsfromtheNGOwereusedfortheprogrammepurposes,somebasic

measureswere taken to establish rapport building, taking informed consent to use the data to

informtheresponseprogrammeandresearchproject,andaddresslanguagebarriers.

In order to adhere to principles of privacy and confidentiality, this thesis anonymises the data

gatheredfromthetwocases.Giventhepracticalchallenges,thisstudyendeavouredtomaintain

ethicalconsiderations includingtheprinciplesof informedconsentandsensitivity inquestioning

peopleaffectedbydisasters, togetherwithrespect forpeople’s rights toanonymityandprivacy

(Fewetal.2013p.49).ThehumanitarianagenciesarereferredtoasAgencyA,B,C,D,E,FandCA,

AAinthenarrative.ThehouseholdintervieweeswereanonymisedasA1,A2,andsoforthinAssam

andO1,O2,O3andsoforthinOdisha.ThekeyinformantswerecategorisedandanonymisedasLA

(LocalAgencies),GO(GovernmentOfficials),PH(Publichealth),andExperts.

4.4AnalyticalStrategy

The conceptual framework and the research questions guide the analytical strategy. It was

challenging toanalysemultipleperspectivesgained throughmulti-methodsandmulti-sited case

studiesbutwasmanagedwiththehelpofacoherentandinductiveanalyticalstrategy.Thestrategy

involved prior processing and structuring of gathered data. The data analysiswas prompted by

LeCompte’s(2000)notionofassemblingajigsawpuzzle,throughinterpretationandunderstanding

ofthefragmentsandofthewholepicture.Thetaskofanalysis,whichmakesinterpretationpossible,

requiresresearchersfirsttodeterminehowtoorganisetheirdataanduseittoconstructanintact

portrait of the original phenomenon under study and to tell readers what that portraitmeans

(LeCompte2000p.147).

The data gathering produced a large data set, making analysis a long and iterative process

(McCracken1988).Therewasrichvalueoftheinformaldatagatheredfromthefield.Thefollowing

107

stepsweretakeninanalysis:maptheinterviewcontentusingmindmaps;codingandinterpreting

thedata;identifyingthemesandorganisingthedataintodifferentcategories;analysingtheinter-

relationships;andcross-siteanalysis(Miles1979).Ianalyseddocuments,reports,meetingminutes,

articles,emailrecords,observationsandreflectionswerecompiledinfieldnotestosupplementthe

dataobtainedfrominterviewsandPLAtools.Thiswasdonebycoding,usingquotationsandmemos

to record interpretation, factual information,processesandstages in recoveryprogrammesand

representingthedatainacoherentformtoanswertheresearchquestions.Intheend,therewasa

complexsetofdata,asdifferentquestionsposedtodifferentintervieweesbasedontheirroleand

areaofexpertiseeliciteddifferentresponsesalongvarioustangents.Theanalysisisiterative,and

did not directly compare the responses across different sites. The salience of the theme was

consideredrelevantandimportant,nothowmanyparticipantscontributedtoeachtheme(Sword-

Daniels2014).

4.4.1Mindmapping

Fortranscribinglonginterviewrecordings,mindmapsweredrawnforeachinterviewofphrases

andsentencesfromtherecordingundervariousthemesandthetimeswerenoted(Samplemind

map-annexure10).Mindmapsarediagrammaticrepresentationsofwords,ideasortasks,arranged

around a central theme. Mind mapping is used effectively in management and operations for

planning and problem-solving; but there is little literature on its practical and analytical use in

academic research (Fearnley 2011). Traditional procedures for data transcription are extremely

time-consuming;hencemindmapsareusedinthisresearchtomanagethedataandtorepresent

them visually formaking connections, interpreting concepts and perceptions.Whilewriting up,

importantcommentsorrelevantquoteswereelaboratedthroughcross-referencingwiththetaped

interviews.Fearnley(2011)foundthatusingmindmapsblurredtheboundarybetweentranscribing

and analysis. It is an untested technique, but she advocates its use for interpretative analysis,

requiring a workable combination of researcher creativity and accountability to the data. This

researchacknowledgesthatthemindmaprecords lessdetailthanactualtranscription;however

since Iwas involved throughout theprocessofdatacollectionandanalysis I couldestablish the

connectionsbetweenthebranches.

4.4.2Thematicanalysis

In this research, the conceptswere validated by their presence (or absence) in the interviews,

documents and observations, and through constant comparison for similarities, or differences

108

duringcoding(CorbinandStrauss1990).Codesaretags,namesorlabels;andtheprocessofcoding

involvestagging,namingandlabellingpiecesofdatatoattachmeaning,andindexingthemforeasy

retrieval(Punch2009).Usingopencodingthedatawerecategorisedwithdescriptivecodes(Corbin

and Strauss 1990). This generated categories that supported the analysis at different scales

followingthesub-researchquestions.Categoriesweregeneratedmanuallywiththehelpofmemos

andinventoriesofcodesandtheirrelationships.Memosweredevelopedtodescribeandkeeptrack

ofallcategories,andquestionsduringtheanalyticalprocess.Effortsweremadetolinkthedatato

WaSH during recovery practices, so the memos directed the analysis towards answering the

researchquestion.Similaritiesaswellascontradictionsweresoughtthatformedvariationswithin

an identified theme.Themeswere thenrelatedtooneanotherand linkedtobroaderstructural

conditionsthatformedtheirowncorecategory,orweregroupedintooverarchingcategoriesthat

formthecoreconceptsinthestudy,suchaslearning,knowledge,changesandparticipation.Finally,

extensivewriting and rewriting of ideas, themes and issues led to establishing the overarching

themes that emerged from the data, which go on to form the empirical chapters. There was

constant back and forth in narrating events and relationships, or describing the process and

interpretingthechangesemergingfromthedata.Thisshowsthatdatawereanalysedonanon-

goingbasis,todeveloptheoriesinductively(Kawulich2004).

4.4.3ContextAnalysis

Theanalyticalstrategyinvolvedunderstandingofthecontextualfactorsforbothcasestudies.This

exploredspatialandtemporalaspectsthroughcontextualanalysis,whichwashelpful toanalyse

linkagesbetweensequencesofeventsandactionsininterpretingchanges.Thecontextualanalysis

exploresthescenarioofthehouseholds’demographics,needs,accesstofacilities,andservices.This

analysisinterpretsmacro(regional,nationalandinternational)andmeso(stateanddistrict)policies

impactmicro(household,settlementandvillage)level.Datafromsecondarysourcesandprimary

datawereincorporatedintheanalysis.Thuscontextualanalysisprovidesuseful insights intothe

economicandsocio-political realitiesof thecommunitieswhilediscussing recoveryprocesses. It

allowedunderstandingofthemesandissuesemergingfromtheempiricalresearch,whichwerenot

originallypartoftheconceptualframeworkorthefocusofthisresearchinquiry.

109

Chapter5:AssamCaseStudy

ThischapterpresentsempiricalevidencefromAssamtodescribetherecoveryafterthe2012floods

(Section5.1);householdWaSHpractices(usingdatafromhouseholdinterviewsandobservations)

(section5.2);communityrecoverypriorities(usingdatafromchangeanalysesandpriorityranking

exercises) (section 5.3). It reviews the data from semi-structured interviews and documents to

describelocalrecoveryinitiatives(section5.4),governmentresponse(section5.5),andresponseby

AgencyAandotherhumanitarianNGOs(section5.6).

5.1 Assamfloods2012-13

In 2012, Assam faced consecutive waves of floods from June-October due to breaches in

embankments:43breacheswerereportedontheriverBrahmaputraand14onitstributaries.The

firstwaveoffloodsaffected2.4millionpeoplein4,540villagesacross128revenuecirclesasshown

inFigure5.1.8BySeptember,newerareasweresubmergedacross2,174villagesunder77revenue

circlesin18districts,affecting20lakhpeople.9Thefloodsdisplaced543,088peopleandcaused126

deathswith19reportedmissing(ASDMA2012b).In2013thefloodsanderosionrecurred,which

affectedtherecoveryprocessesinpreviouslyflood-affectedareas(Table5.1).

Table5.1:Theconsecutiveflood-wavesin2012and2013(ASDMA2012b)

2012Floodwaves AffectedDistrictsFloods across the state(June-July2012)

Sonitpur, Nagaon,Morigaon, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Dhubri, Barpeta,NalbariJorhat,Golaghat,Sibsagar,Dibrugarh,Tinsukia,Kamrup

2ndand3rdwaves Morigaon,SonitpurBarpeta,Dhemaji,KamrupandSibsagar

Floods and erosion(2013)

Morigaon,Lakhimpur,Dhemaji,Sonitpur

8Administrativeunitunderthedistrict,comprisedofoneormoredevelopmentblocks9AssamTribune:NewsArticle,September272012

110

Figure5.1:Flood-affecteddistrictsin2012(AdaptedfromIFRC,2012)

111

SonitpurandMorigaonfacedseverelossesasindicatedinTable5.2(ASDMA2012a).

Table5.2:DisasterdamagesinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts(Source,ASDMA)

Impacts Sonitpur Morigaon

Affected developmentblocks

3–TezpurSadar,BiswanathandGohapur

3 – Mayang, Laharighat andBhurhanda

Totalvillagesaffected 251 322Totalareaaffected 2977.893hectares 58150hectaresLossofcropareas 15935hectares 39906hectaresTotallivestocklost 4160 400Totalpopulationaffected 2,24,579 80,000Totalcasualties 6 5Totaldisplacedpopulation 1,97,986 30,000Totalreliefcamps 120 258

Figure5.2:MapofaffectedareainBiswanath,Sonitpur(Source:NaduarCircleOffice,Sonitpur)

Highway

NaduarCircle

Embankment

Breach

KomoliaGP

BishwanathCircle

BrahmaputraSolmari

Bachadangi

112

The2012floodsinSonitpur–thefirstfloodsfor12yearsinSolmari–occurredduetoabreachin

theembankment(Figure5.2).Duringthe2012floodsinSolmari,thefloodwaveshaddevastated

theembankmentandravagedthepublicschoolbuilding. In2012,officialrecordsshowthatonly

300familieswerelivinginSolmari,whichwasreducedto80familiesin2013.10However,duringthe

assessmentinJuly2012,unofficialstatisticsindicatethat3000familiesintheneighbouringvillages

weredisplaced–1400inSolmari–duetotheembankmentbreachinSolmari.6500persons–2000

women,3250men,1250children300infantsand100elderly–werelivinginmakeshiftcamps.11In

Boramari,floodsanderosionwerearegularphenomenon:floodshadoccurredin1942,1950,1974,

and 1981, and annually from 2006-2013 after construction of the KaliaBhomora Bridge on the

Brahmaputra.BoramariwascalledasKacharigaon(campsettlement)asithosteddisplacedfamilies

fromotherflood-anderosion-affectedvillagesinAssam.Therewere1215peoplein142households

belongingtotheethniclocalcommunitiesandBengali-speakingMuslimmigrantfamilies.12InJuly

2012,AgencyAlaunchedemergencyresponseinSonitpurandMorigaonwithlocalNGOpartners

AgencyBandCintherespectivedistricts.Theinitialsupportincludeddistributionoffood,non-food

items (NFIs), and shelter and hygiene items. The WaSH support consisted of construction of

emergencylatrinesandbathingcubiclesincampareas,chlorinationofwater-sourcesandhygiene

promotionactivities.

The European Commission’s Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Department (ECHO)

announced€2millioningrantsforearlyrecovery.Accordingly,thehumanitarianagencies–Agency

A,AgencyCAandAgencyAA–underaconsortiumforrecoveryprogrammetitled‘Humanitarian

assistance to vulnerable population affected by flood in Assam’were awarded € 900,000 for 6

months.Thisgrantwasforundertakingactivitiessuchas:installationofhandpumps;construction

offlushlatrinesandbathingcubicles;distributionofchlorinetabletsforwaterpurification;provision

ofhygieneandwomen's sanitary kits;wastemanagementvia cleaningofdrainage systemsand

healtheducationsessions.AgencyAcontinuedearlyrecoveryefforts inSolmariandBoramari in

WaSH,emergencyfoodsecurityandlivelihoods(EFSL)andshelterinterventions(Section5.6).

10Interview:GO-7,Solmari,16-09-1311Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201212Interview:GO-8,Morigaon,19-09-13

113

5.2HouseholdWaSH

Thissectionpresentstheemergingthemesfromobservationaldataand18householdinterviews

over several visits in Solmari and Boramari (highlighted in Figure 5.1). The household practices

varieddependingonlocation,prioraccessandnatureoffloods,asperthedatafromtheinterviews,

accountsofeventsandobservationaldata.Thesearedescribedunderpre-disasterWaSH(recallin

interviewsanddocuments),immediateimpactonWaSHfacilities(transectwalks,observationsand

secondary sources); WaSH situation in relief camps (FGDs with families in these camps);

improvementsinWaSHsituation;andrecurringdisastersandWaSH(observationandinterviews).

The information in each scenario is organised under water sources, collection, treatment,

defecationpractices,bathing,andhygienepractices,menstrualhygiene,schoolWaSH,rolesand

responsibilities,technologyandaccessibility.

5.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH

ThemajorityoftheruralpopulationdependedongroundwaterfordrinkinginAssam.13Solmariand

Boramari did not have public piped water supply scheme in the vil (PWSS). 14 The WaSH KAP

(Knowledge,AttitudesandPractice)baselinesurvey indicatedtubewellswereprimarilyused.15It

wasobservedthatIndiaMark2and‘Popular6’handpumpswereprominentlyused.TheIndiaMark

IIisahuman-poweredpumpdesignedtoliftwaterfromadepthoffiftymetresorless;PopularNo.

6 Pump is a lever operated suction pump for shallowwells, installed in collapsible tube wells,

designedforfamilyuse,andservingupto100persons.InSonitpur,thegovernmentinstalledTara

(directaction)handpumpsthroughsubsidiestofamiliesselectedonpre-determinedcriteriaevery

year.16TarahandpumpsaredesignedbyUNICEF,forliftingwaterfromborewellswithstaticwater

levelnotexceeding15m;theyaremorecost-effectivethanotherpumpsformediumlifts(upto15

m)andaresafefrombacteriologicalcontaminationsinceallundergroundpartsaremadeofnon-

corrosivematerialslikePVC(polyvinylchloride)orStainlessSteel.Thealternativewatersourcesfor

theruralhouseholdsincludedponds,riversandlakesforwashing,bathingandcleaning.

13Interview:INGO4,201414InterviewPH-2,January201315Document:AgencyAWaSHKAPsurvey,201316Document:Needsassessmentreport,2012

114

Image5.1:Kolshiatraditionalpotusedforwatercollectionandstorage(Image:Solmari,14-01-13)

Therewere 15 handpumps in Solmari, used for drinking and cooking purposes,whilemembers

depended on river for cleaning and bathing purposes. Primarily, women and young girls were

responsibleforwatercollection.Onanaverage,eachhouseholdrequired30 litresperdayfor6

members,forvariouspurposes.Womentravelledfor30minutesone-waytocollectwaterin3-4

roundtripsdaily.Thetraditionalpracticewastouselocalpotscalledkolshi(Image5.1),orbuckets

andjerrycanstocollectwater,andcarry2-3utensilsineachtrip.17

Thehouseholdsdidnotfollowanyparticularmethodsforwatertreatment;alum,acrystallinesalt

containing aluminium and potassium iswidely used in industry as a hardener and purifier. The

householdsusedalumtoremovesolidparticles,orboilingandstoringinearthenpotsforcooling.

Thehouseholdsabandonedhandpumpsiftherewasanychangeincolourofwaterortaste.18The

accesstoandavailabilityofwaterandsanitationfacilitieswaslimitedandtherewasnoprovision

forpipedwater supply scheme (PWSS) in their village. In Solmari,only500personsusedeither

public toilets (pit latrines,pour-flush latrines, flushingtoilets)or family toiletsandsharedfamily

toilets(pitlatrines,pour-flushlatrines,flushingtoiletsetc.).Althoughhouseholdshadconstructed

17FGD(women):Solmari,January2013&Boramari,September201318HouseholdInterview:A2,January2013

115

privatelatrineswithsubsidiesfromthegovernment,theycontinuedtodefecateintheopen.19Open

defecationwasstillcommonlypracticed,ashouseholdswerenotawareofhowtodealwiththe

faecalwaste,oncethesoakpitsfilledup.20

5.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH

The flash floodswere caused by breach or overtopping of embankments; these destroyed and

damagedtheWaSHfacilitiesduetotheimpactofstrongwatercurrents.Householdsweredisplaced

andlivedneartheembankments.Therewerelimitedsafeandfunctionalhandpumpsinthevillages

in2012duetocontaminationanddestruction.HouseholdsfounditdifficulttoaccessWaSHfacilities

duringthemultiplefloodwavesin2012.AllthehandpumpswerecompletelydestroyedinSolmari

duetothefloods.21

Image5.2:Awomenusingthefloodwatersforhouseholdpurposes(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)

Thefloodscontaminatedopen,unprotectedwatersurfaceslikepondsandlakes.Existinglatrines

were covered with debris. The households used contaminated water sources without any

19Informalconversation:GO-1,Solmari18-01-1320Document:AgencyAWaSHKAPsurvey,201321Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012

116

treatment. 22 25-30 families depended on a single functional water source, causing extensive

groundwaterdepletion.23Therewereonly5functionalhandpumpsinthevillage.Theaveragetravel

distancesforcollectingwateronewayandbackincreasedupto1km,andtimerequiredwasalmost

60minuteson footduring floodsdue to inundationofnearestwater sources.24Womenhad to

queueforlongertimes(uptoanhour)tocollectwater.Theyaccessedthehandpumpsbywading

throughfloodwaters,orbyboatsdrivenbymen;sometimeswomenusedfloodwatersforcleaning

andwashinginstead(Image5.2).Thehouseholdshadalsolosttheirwatercollectionutensilsalong

withotherhouseholdassets.

The floods, resultantdisplacementandchallenges inaccessingWaSHfacilitiesduring floodshad

seriousconsequencesforwomen’shealthasillustratedinthefollowingexample:

MrsA1(35F)fromtheBodotribeinBoramariwaspregnantduringthe2012floods,andstayedina

changghar(houseonstilts)withherhusbandandsixchildrenduringthemonsoon.Lackoffood,

cleanwaterandadequatesleepresultedinMrsA1andhernewborn,bothsufferingfromanaemia

anddiarrhoeaafterthefloods.By2013,A1hadrecoveredherhealththroughfinancialsupportfrom

AgencyA.

“Ifellilllastyearwhenfloodshappenedandwouldhavelostmybabyduringthefloodsdue

toillhealth.Icouldnotreachthehospitalwhenbabywasill–itwasallsubmergedinwater.

Therewasnowatersupplyandpeopledefecatedinthefloodwaters.Welearnt laterthat

theseposeahugehealthriskofdiarrhoea,andourchildrenwereaffectedbecauseofthis.”

25

Oneof theriskyWaSHpractices involvedconsumptionofwater fromthecontaminatedsources

withoutpropertestingormicrobiological treatmentafterthefloods.Therewasnoprovisionfor

properdrainage,apronsorsoakpitsleadingtofurthercontaminationandstagnationasshownin

image5.3.Duringthefloods,peopletravelledbyboatsfordefecatinginfloodwaters.26MrsA3(40F),

belongingtotheBodotribe,movedtoBoramarieightyearsago,whentheirpreviousvillagewas

22Documents:AgencyAWaSHassessmentreportonAssamfloods2012-1323Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201224Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201225HouseholdInterview:A1,Boramari(06-01-13,13-09-13)26Interview:PH–2,AgencyA29-01-13

117

engulfedbytheBrahmaputra.Whenthefloodsoccurredin2012theirhomesweresubmerged,and

thehouseholdhandpumpandlatrinewereinundated.Duringthefloodsthefamilylivedinchang

ghar for a month till the waters receded. They continued without access to food, safe water,

sanitationorbathing.MrsA3andherchildrendependedonthemeninthefamilytogoonaboat

duringthefloods–forwatercollectionanddefecation–inthefloodwaters.27

Image5.3:Watersourcesinthevillagesafterthefloodsin2012(Image:Morigaon,08-01-13)

The households had latrine facilities but did not use them, instead they continued with open

defecation.InSolmari,theassessmentsurveyindicatedthat1500adultsand500childrenpracticed

uncontrolledopendefecationduringthefloods,and3500adultspracticedcontrolleddefecation.

Afterthefloods,uncontrolledopendefecationwascommonduetonon-availabilityofpublictoilets,

andfunctionalhouseholdlatrines.28Asaresult,morethan50householdshadreportedlysuffered

from water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, vomiting, stomachaches and infections during the

floods.29MrA2(56M)afarmer inSolmarihadbuiltahousehold latrineandbathingunit,which

werecoveredwithdebris(Image5.4).Post-floods,thefamilycontinuedtodefecateintheopen,

27HouseholdInterview:A3,Boramari28Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201229Document:(UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012)July2012

118

andbatheintheriverduetotheirculturalpreferences.Theyreportedfeelinguncomfortablewhile

defecatingwithinclosedspaces.Womenusedthelatrinesduringthenightorbeforesunrise.30

5.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps

Theflood-affectedfamilieswereevacuatedtoschoolsandcollegesinthetowns.InSolmari3000

displaced families were living in Biswanath public school, or makeshift camps on the

embankments.31These schoolswere runbydistrictadministrationasgovernmentcamps till the

floodwatersreceded.Intheschool,approximately12,000people(4500women,5000men,1200

children,and80elderly)werelivingintheclassroomsandpassageswithoutadequatearrangements

forlivingandbasicfacilities.32Thecampswerediscontinuedtoallowschoolstoresume,thefamilies

movedtomakeshiftcampsontheembankments,PWDroadsorhighgroundswithnoaccessto

drinkingwaterandsanitation.33

Inthemakeshiftcampsindividualfamilieslivedintentsbuiltwithsalvagedmaterialssuchasplastic

sheetsortarpaulins,aluminium/tinsheetsandwoodenpoles.34InSonitpur,500familieswereliving

inmakeshiftcampsonthebreachedBiswanath-Paanpurembankment(Figure5.2).Therewereonly

fivehandpumpsapproximately15-30minuteswalkingdistanceoneway.35Thesemakeshiftcamps

continueduntilOctober2012, as consecutive floodwavesaffectedSonitpur andMorigaon. The

frequent displacement, living under crowded conditions, open defecation near water sources,

consumptionofunsafewaterwithoutpropercontainers,ortreatmentposedahugerisktohealth

andledtodeteriorationoflivingconditions.36Around1000adultmembersand400childrenwere

reportedtopracticeopendefecation,while300adultsand100childrenhadaccesstoonly8-10

functionaltoilets.37

30Householdinterview:A2,18-01-1331Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201232Fieldnotes:July17th,Sonitpur,201233Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201234Fieldnotes:SonitpurJuly201235Fieldnotes:July201236Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201237Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012

119

Image5.4:Householdlatrineswithtemporarywalls(Image:Sonitpur,11-07-12)

Image5.5:Waterstoragesystemarelockedinschoolreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)

Image5.6:Flood-affectedfamilieslivinginaschoolrunasreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)

120

The existing facilities in schools could not be accessed; they were locked up to prevent camp

residentsfromusingthesefacilitiesmeantforschoolstudentsandteachers(Images5.5and5.6).

“Theschoolmanagementcommitteesarelockinghandpumpsandlatrinestopreventusfromusing.

They say it is for the students there, not for the flood-affected populations.”38 Therefore, the

affectedpopulationinthecampswentforopendefecationduetolackoflatrinesinbothschools

andmakeshiftcamps.Inthemakeshiftcampsontheembankment,thelocalPanchayatandWard

members supported in relief distribution and installed handpumps for temporarywater supply

(Images5.7and5.8).

Only 10% of the flood-affected and displaced populations received some support by the local

leaders: foodgrains,plasticsheetsandmosquitonets.AgencyAconstructedemergency latrines

separateformenandwomen.InSolmari,theyinstalledfouremergencylatrines(Image5.9).Inthe

reliefphase,AgencyAwasresponsibleforoperationandmaintenanceandencouragedhousehold

memberstouselatrines.Thewomencontinuedtobatheintheopenriversandlakesandstruggled

withissuesofprivacyandsecurity.Thoselivinginthecampsbathednearthehandpumps.

TheschoolbuildinginSolmariwaswashedawayduringthefloodsin2012,andthisposedparticular

challengesinhygieneeducationandaccessforchildrentoWaSHfacilities.InBoramari,theschools

resumed once the floodwaters receded. However, the life of adolescent girls in schools was

challengingpost-floods.MsA4(12F)fromSolmari(Image5.10)founditdifficulttoliveanormallife

post-floods.Shehadmissedschoolduringthefloodsbecauseitwaswashedawayduringthe2012

floods,andinsteadwenttomakeshiftschoolwithoutanyfacilities.Forbathing,shewenttothe

riverornearbypondwithherfriends,orsister.Shewasshytobatheanddefecateintheopenas

passers-bylooked.Shefeltinsecureanduncomfortablesoshebathedwithherclotheson.39

38Fieldnotes:Campresident13-07-12,School/reliefcampvisit,Biswanathblock39Informalconversation:A4Solmari,23-09013

121

Image5.7:Makeshiftsheltersinthecampsettlementsonembankment(Image:Sonitpur,

13-07-12)

Image5.8:Installationofhandpumpsontheembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)

Image5.9:Hygienemessagesdisplayedontheemergencylatrineneartheembankment(Image:

Solmari,05-01-13)

Image5.10:AyoungdisplacedgirlinSolmariusesmirrorgivenbyAgencyA(Image:Sonitpur,

23-09-13)

122

Womenandadolescentgirlsreportedthattheywentforopendefecation,andwerereluctantto

discussmenstrualhygiene.40Itemerged that theyusedanoldpieceofsareeoranyothercloth

during their menstruation, washing and reusing the same cloth each time. The women were

restricted during ‘those’ days andwere prohibited from enteringmain sections of the house –

kitchen,prayerroomssincetheywereconsideredimpureandpollutedduringmenstruation.The

adolescentgirlspreferredusingsanitarynapkins,butcouldnotaffordthem,andwereunawareof

disposalmechanisms.41Initially,thewomenwereunawareoftherisksassociatedwithchildren’s

faecesanddisposalmethodsduringfloods.42

5.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation

From1-6monthsfollowingthefloods,AgencyAinterventionsrestoredaccesstosafewaterand

sanitation in Solmari and Boramari. Village volunteers were trained to repair and chlorinate

handpumps.43Communalhandpumpswereinstalledoverraisedmoundsforaccessduringfloods

(Image5.11)andpre-existinghandpumpsalongwithprovisionofconcreteaprons,constructionof

drainagechannelsandsoakpitstopreventseepage(Image5.12).44

AgencyAprovidedbucketsforcollectingandstoringwaterthroughhygienekitdistributiontoeach

household.Thebucketshadhandlesforcarrying,lidsforpreventingcontaminationduringtransport

andstorage,anddetachabletapstoreleasewater.However,thewomencomplainedofbackaches

andarmsprainswhilecarryingheavybuckets,whichtheywerenotusedto,sotheypreferredkolshi

forwatercollection,usedsareestocoveritandasafilter.45Womenalsopreferredusingearthen

pots,kettlesorpitchersforstorage.46

40FGD(women):Solmari,13-07-1241FGD:Younggirls16-01-1342FGD(Women):17-01-13,Solmari43Informalconversation:INGO-10,Morigaon,04-01-1344HouseholdInterview:A5,Solmari28-07-1345FGD:Women-RTE14-01-1346Fieldnotes:27-08-13,Solmari

123

Image5.11:Newlyinstalledhandpumponaraisedplatform(Image:Boramari,09-01-13)

Image5.12:Womenusingarehabilitatedhandpump(Image:Morigaon,13-09-13)

124

Forwatertreatment,householdsreceivedchlorinetabletstopurifywaterduringtheemergency

fromAgencyA.However,householdsinSolmarireportedreluctanceinusingthesetabletsbecause

theydislikedthechlorinetaste.Theydidnotpracticeanyotherwatertreatmentmethodexcept

boiling – expensive and difficult due to use of cooking fuel or wood, and unfavourable during

summerduetotheheat–anduseofclothfilters.Thepoorhouseholdsdidnotpurchasewater

treatmenttabletsbecausetheycouldnotaffordthewaterpurifiertabletsavailableinthemarkets.47

ItemergedthatforhouseholdsavailabilityofwaterwasimportantthanqualityofwaterinSolmari.48

Agency A installed four emergency bathing cubicles near the camps in the embankment, with

privacyscreensforsafetyandsecurityofwomen.Thewomenpreferredthesefacilitiesandfound

themsafeandsecureandusedthemregularly.49

When the populations returned to their original villages, the emergency latrines were

decommissioned,andmaterialswerehandedtothecommunitiesforreuse.50Forpromotinguseof

latrines and access during future floods, Agency A constructed a communal latrine complex on

raised platforms in Solmari and Boramari villages. In December 2012, three new latrines were

constructed inSolmariand four inBoramariusingcorrugatedgalvanised iron (CGI) sheets.User

groups(groupofmembersfromneighbouringhouseholdsthatshareagency-builtwatersourceor

latrine)wereprovidedwithcleaningmaterials–jhadoo(brooms),harpic(washingliquid),mugsand

buckets–forcommunaluseandmaintenanceoflatrines.51

5.2.5Recurringdisasters’impactonhouseholdWaSHsystemsduringrelocation

InApril2013,theconstructionofthenewembankmentisolatedSolmariontheriverside.During

the followingmonsoons, the landandassetswerewashedawaydue toerosion.Thehousehold

investmentsinhandpumps,shelter,latrinesandlivelihoodassetswerelostduetorecurringfloods

anderosionforcingall thehouseholds inSolmaritoabandontheir land,shelter,andrelocateto

safer areas. The households retained the shelter and emergency latrine materials, but WaSH

facilitieswereinadequateintherelocatedareas.ThefixedWaSHfacilitiesprovidedduringrecovery

couldnotbemovedwhile relocating,hencethenatureof floodinganderosion in2013andthe

47Informalconversation:GO4,Solmari29-09-1348HouseholdInterview:A5:Solmari28-07-1349Fieldnotes:27-08-13,Solmari50Informalconversation:INGO-10,Morigaon,04-01-1351Interview:LA6–Sonitpur,September2013

125

technologyposedachallengeforthehouseholdrecoveryandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.InSolmari

the ‘Popular 6’ (P6) handpumps were removed and reinstalled, and ‘Mark- II’ pumps were

abandoned.18familieslivingonplatforminSolmaridependedononehandpump.52Anengineer

claimed,

“ThePopular6modelismucheasiertotakeapartandmoveandreinstall,whereastheMark

2isaheaviermodelthatrequiresspecialisedtoolsandskillstoopenupandevenifyoudo,

one of the vital parts, the suction filter, is at the bottom of the casing which could be

anywherebetween100feetto300feetunderground-whichisapaintotakeout.”53

ThepoorhouseholdsinSolmariandBoramarilivingincloseproximitytotheriverwerewaryofthe

river’smovements during themonsoons. Theydependedon communal facilities or openwater

bodies,because installingprivatehandpumpswasexpensiveandentailedadditional costsevery

year for flood-protection – aprons and raised concrete platforms – without receiving damage

compensationof2012floods.54In2013,10householdsdependedon4self-builthouseholdlatrines,

abandoningthecommunal latrinemodels.Themajoritywentforopendefecationdueto lackof

adequate latrine facilities, and inability to afford private latrines.55In Boramari, the households

wereawareof risks involvedwithopendefecation. Somehouseholds in Solmari likeA6andA8

rebuilt private latrines when they relocated. They preferred household latrines to shared or

communallatrines.

52FGD:Solmari,28-08-1353Informalconversation:Expert–5(PublicHealthEngineer)54Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-1355FGD:Boramari,04-09-13

126

Image5.13:Usingnetsasawaterfilter(Image:Morigaon,14-01-13)

Image5.14:Kacchalatrinesself-builtbyhouseholds(Image:Morigaon,04-01-13)

These self-built latrines were constructed with reused plastic sheets (Image 5.14). Household

decisionsofinstallinglatrinesweremutuallyagreedbythehusbandandwife.Theprimitiveself-

built latrineswere dangerous because of the risk of falling and causing injury, and pit spillage.

Frequent displacement and losses led to impoverishment and inability to invest in household

latrines.Themembersreportedthattheydefecatedinthesugarcanefields,andavoideddefecating

nearwaterbodies.56

MrsA6(28F),fromSolmarihadjustaboutmanagedtorecoverfromlossesdueto2012floods.Her

problems were magnified when her newly built house fell on the wrong side of the new

embankment.ThefamilyhadtoabandontheirlandinSolmari,dismantletheshelterandrelocate

56FGD:Boramari,01-09-13

127

to a raisedmoundnear theembankment. She rebuilt a private latrineusing salvagedmaterials

becausesheprioritisedhouseholdlatrineanddependedoncommunalhandpumps.57

InBoramari10-15familiesreliedoncommunalhandpumps;andusedclothfilterstoremovesolid

particles(Image5.13).58MrsA7(42F),anAnganwaditeacherinBoramari,hadtorelocateherfamily

by herself as her husbandhadmigrated forwork. She invested in a household handpumpbut

continuedopendefecation.Sheconstructed raisedstorageunits topreventherdocumentsand

essentialfoodgrainsfromgettingsoakedduringfloods.Sheboiledthewaterbeforeconsumption,

forgoodhealthofherchildren.

“Itismucheasiernowtomanagemyhouseholdactivities,takecareofmychildrenandalso

fulfilworkintheAnganwadibecauseofthehandpumpIinstalledinthehousehold.Istillgo

to theopen fields fordefecationnear the sugarcaneplantations,but [am]always scared

whensomeonepassesby.”59

Forbathingthehouseholdsusedwaterfromthecommunalhandpumpsandopenwatersources

suchasponds(Image5.15).

Image5.15:Womenandchildrenbathinginponds(Image:Solmari,28-09-13)

57Householdinterview:A617-09-1358FGD:Boramari,04-09-1359HouseholdInterview:A7,Boramari04-09-13

128

Mrs A8 (39F) from Solmari had acquired land when she relocated on the safe side of the

embankmentin2013.Astherewasnoexternalsupport,theyinvestedinalatrineandhandpump.

Thecostofbamboowas500INR(roughly5GBP),plasticsheetforwallscost200INRand400INR

forthelabourers(roughly2and4GBPrespectively).Theybuiltalatrineusingthehusband’sincome

earnedasamistry(mason);theywereawareoftherisksassociatedwithopendefecationfortheir

children.ThisMrsA8believesinculcatessafehygienebehaviouramongsttheirchildrensuchashand

washingatcriticaltimes.60

Onlyahandfuloffamilieslivingnearthefloodplatformspreferredusingthecommunallatrines.In

Boramari,Muslim familiesweredeniedaccess to communal latrines andas aprotest, theyhad

damaged the door to open toilets. Therewere tensions between the indigenous tribes (Bodos,

Ahoms)andMuslim immigrants. InSolmari andBoramari, the facilitieswere lockedupbecause

publicusers left the facilitiesveryunclean leavingtheneighbouringusers tocleanandmaintain

thesefacilities.61InSeptember2013inSolmari,theneighbouringhouseshadlockedupthelatrines

topreventpublicuse(Image5.16).62

Image5.16:Lockeduplatrinesontheraisedplatform(Image:Solmari,28-08-13)

60Householdinterview:A8,Solmari,28-09-1361FGDSolmari,05-09-1362Householdinterviews:28-09-13,Solmari

129

Duetorecurringdisasters,householdsdidnotinvestinpermanentandfixedWaSHfacilities.They

investedleastamountofresourcesinrebuildingtheirhomesandforrecoveringlosses.Thisenabled

themtorelocateswiftlywhenthevillagegetsfloodedanderoded.TheresponsibilitiesforWaSH

recoveryandrelocationfelluponwomen,astheywereinvolvedinwatercollectionforhousehold

consumption, cooking and bathing children. The women-headed households in Solmari and

Boramariwereresponsibleforhouseholdrecovery.AstudycommissionedbyAgencyAfoundthat

outwardmigrationoftheyouthforincreasinghouseholdincomeresultedinlossofmanpowerin

agricultureandgenderimbalancespostfloods.63Themenandyouthmigratedforlabourworkin

Karnataka, leaving behind the women for running the households, fulfilling childcare

responsibilities,andearningadditionalincomethroughlivestockrearing,labourworkorproducing

local liquor. However, women did not take decisions on recovery investments because men

controlled the financesand remittancemoney. In Solmari,womenwere illiterateand therefore

lacked understanding of technical aspects of WaSH facilities – minor fixing and repairing of

handpumps,andaccesstolocalmobilesolutionsforlatrineconstruction.64

Theelderlygroupsprovidedenrichingperspectivesonfloodhistory,WaSHpracticesandattitudes.

In Boramari, they explained that floods in Morigaon became regular after the construction of

KaliaBhomoraBridge,Tezpur,whichalteredtherivercourseandcausedmorefloodsinMorigaon.

Thisresultedinfluctuatingfloodsallovertheplains.AnelderlymemberfromBoramaricommented,

‘Since2007,humanitarianandlocalNGOshavesupportedus–constructingraisedplatforms,

raised houses, raised handpumpsand latrines – unfortunately thesewere lost again and

againtofloods.However,theknowledgeandskillsremainswithusandweusethemonce

thefloodsareover’.65

Although PHP activities,monitoring changes and use of facilities can lead to change, sustaining

changesoverlong-termwhentherearenofloodsischallenging,unlessattitudesofthisgeneration

waschangedthroughwillingness,knowledgetransferandtechnicalsolutions.66

63Document:AgencyAPost-DisasterrecoveryNeedsAssessment,February201364Interview:LA-6,Sonitpur65Householdinterview:A9,Boramari24-09-1366FGD:elderlymembersBoramari18-10-13

130

Thefloodshadconsiderableimpactsonschools,andchildren’shealthandhygienepractices.During

FGDs with children in Solmari, they demonstrated their awareness of hygiene practices and

understandingoftheimportanceoftoilets.Sincetherewerenotoiletsavailableintheschool,they

practicedopendefecation.Inavillagemappingexercise,childrenhighlighteddefecationareasin

yellowandfloodedareasinblue,indicatingthatthesameareaswherepeopledefecatewerebeing

flooded.TheyaspiredforthenewschoolinSolmariwithmodernfacilitiesfordrinkingwater,toilets

and for playing. 67 The generational gap amongst children and elderly was evident in their

implementationof safepractices:elderly realise importancebutdonotchange theirbehaviour,

whilechildrenlearnandareeagertoadoptsafepracticesbutlackaccesstofacilities.

5.3CommunityPost-DisasterRecovery

This sectiondiscusses the changes at the community level, gatheredusingparticipatory change

analysesformats;andcommunityprioritiesusingdatafrompriorityrankingexercises(seesection

4.2.1).

5.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel

Theflood-affectedcommunitiesinSolmaridemandedfornewembankmentforresilienceagainst

floods in January 2013.68In Solmari and Boramari new embankmentswere constructed inMay

2013, which forced all households to vacate their land as it fell on the wrong side of the

embankment.InMorigaon,theembankmenthadbreachedinthe2008floods,andagainin2012,

followed by a breach of the new embankment in 2013: the same year it was built. Thus

embankmentsfailedasflood-preventionmeasuresforthestudyvillages:thefrequentbreachesand

ad hoc manner of construction compounded community recovery by marginalising community

sections and forcing them to relocate. It also influenced agency programming strategies and

interventions,asAgencyAwithdrewitsoperationsfromSolmariwhenthenewembankmentwas

constructed.Thereweremixedreactionsfromthecommunitiesregardingtheembankments.One

oftheyouthinSolmariclaimed,

67FGD:Children,Solmari16-10-1368FGD(men):Solmari,28-01-13

131

“InmylifetimeitselfIhaveseenthreeembankmentsbeingwashedaway,don’tknowhow

manymyfatherandgrandfathershaveseen.Thelastonelastedfortwoyearsandonebefore

thatfor5years.”69

TheeldersinSolmarivillagerecollectthatmorethannineembankmentsmusthavebeenwashed

awayinthehistoryoftheregion,duetonon-maintenanceandfloods.ThelocalmasonsinSolmari

villagefelttheneedtousemoderntechnologiesusedinMajuliisland,Jorhat.Despiterequesting

thelocalPanchayatandwardmemberstolookintopermanentprotectionmeasuresintheregion,

theseissueshavenotbeenaddressed.Thereisastrongdemandforscientificprotectionmeasures

topreventdamagesanddestruction,andimportantlylossoflandduetofloodsanderosioninthe

future.70

TheMuslimsettlerswhostrugglewithlandentitlementsandrightfulsettlementsoftenoccupyand

cultivateincharareasorchaporis(unstableandtemporarylandformationsintheriver).71Thelocal

indigenoustribesandAssamesepeoplerefrainfromlivingincharareasandarenotabletocope

withthefast-pacederosionobserved inmanyareas inAssam.TheBangladeshisettlersthrive in

suchconditionsastheyhaveadaptedtothevagariesofrecurrentfloodsintheircountryandhave

developedstrategiesandmechanismstooccupytheshiftingislands.72

69Householdinterview:A10Solmari12-08-1370FGD(men):Solmari–14-10-1371Thesecharsareformedwhenafertilepatchoflandisgeneratedwithintheriverwhenlandislostinthemainvillage.InthelowerreachesoftheBrahmaputravalley,thesanddepositiontakesplaceatalargerextent.Thusthewideningoftherivermorphologyleadstothe‘chars’or‘saporis’thatarefertilegroundforfarming,grazingandsettinguptemporaryshelterswithdismallynobasicamenities.72Focusgroupdiscussions:Morigaon03-08-13

132

Image5.17:Communitybuiltaccessroadsduringrecovery(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)

Image5.18:Theaboveaccessroaddestroyedin2013floods(Image:Boramari,04-09-13)

133

Therecurringfloodsin2013ledtolandlossandpopulationdisplacementinBoramariastheriver

wasnowflowingwheretheoriginalvillageoncestood(Images5.17and5.18).73Thecommunity

groupsinBoramarirelocatedforsurvival.AnAgencyAofficialexplainedthat:

“PeopleofMorigaonareactuallyresilient,buttheirresiliencewillneverallowthemtogo

pastsubsistencelevels.Theirresilienceisaboutmobilityactually.Youhavetolookatmobility

aspectsbecausethesefamiliesarelandless,theyaremovingfromplacetoplace.[..]They

arestillabletouselandduringthewinterseasonformultiplecropping–rice,mustard,jute

andsugarcane.Peopleareresilientbecausetheyhaveadoptedmultiplestrategiestosurvive,

suchasfishery,rabicrops[..]Theirabilitytocopewithstressforverylongperiodsoftime

doeshaveaneffectontheirhealth,theirnutritionalstatus,butstilltheyareabletowithstand

thatstresswhichinmostcasescommunitiescan’tdo.74

Mobility and relocation as a strategy works for some aspects of resilience but creates specific

problemswithrespect toexpensiveandfixedWaSHfacilities.Theparticipatorychangeanalyses

aidedinunderstandinghowregulardisastersandfrequentdisplacementledtoresourcedeprivation

andpovertyovertime.Thechangesinwater,sanitation,hygienepractices,housingandlivelihoods

inSonitpurandMorigaonfrompre-disastertountilayearafterwhenthefloodsrecurredoverfour

timeperiodsarelistedbelowandsummarisedinTable5.3:

1. t-1Priortothefloods–pre-2012situation2. t-2Emergencyphaseduringtherecurringfloodsin20123. t-3Earlyrecoveryphasewhenthevisitwasundertakeninearly20134. t-4Longer-termrecoveryphasewhenthefloodsrecurredin2013

73Fieldnotes:Solmari,18-09-13andBoramari04-09-1374Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13

134

Table5.3:Changesinwaterandsanitationatcommunitylevel75

Aspects Before(t-1) Emergency(t-2) Earlyrecovery(t-3)

Recurrence(t-4)

Drinkingwatersources

Private handpumps

Openwatersources–riversorlakes

Emergency handpumps byagencies

1-3 Communal handpumps

Waterhandling(collectionandstorage)

Separate utensilskolshi forcollection andstorage

Lostallutensils Buckets providedby NGO, keepcontainerscovered

Kolshi, keepcontainerscovered

Watertreatment

Notreatment Govt mechanics andNGO volunteerschlorinated

NGO providedhalogentablets

No treatment,sometimes filter orboil

Sanitation Open defecation–SolmariPrivate latrines –Morigaon

Emergencylatrines Communallatrines

Open defecation,some use privatelatrines

Handwashingafterdefecation,before eating,feedingchildren, andcooking

Irregularly (withash afterdefecation, withwater beforeeating,notbeforefeeding orcooking)

Not done in camps,used soap after kitdistributionregularly

Somecouldaffordto buy soaps,others did notcontinue with thepractice of usingsoap, but usedash/soil

Onlywater,ashafterdefecation

Bathing Privatefacilities Riveror floodwaters,laterbathingcubicles

River River/communalhandpumps

These changes replicate the recovery patterns observed inWaSH and housing practices at the

householdlevel(Section5.2).ThedifferentialaccesstoWaSHfacilitiesdependedonlearning,social

capitalandknowledge,whichvariedacrossthegeographiclocations(inSolmariandBoramari,in

the reliefcampsormakeshift settlements,or theproximity to theriverandtheembankments).

Therewerechangesinaccesstodrinkingwatersources,andusageinthecommunitygroups.The

transitionfromprivateindividualhandpumpsbeforedisasterstousingopenwatersourcesduring

the floods tousingcommunalhandpumpsafterexternal interventionswasdocumented.During

relocation in 2013, the pre-installed facilities were either abandoned or washed away due to

erosion.Anotableshiftinpracticesemergedfromthefactthatcommunitygroupsdidnotrelyon

floodwatersoropensourcesfordrinkingduringfloods;insteadtheyreliedonfriendsorneighbours

or communal sources due to awareness of risks associatedwith consumption of contaminated

75Changeanalysesexercise:Solmari14-10-13andBoramari18-10-13

135

water.76Priortothefloods,thecommunitiesdidnotfollowanytechniquesforwatertreatment.77

FGDparticipants reported thatAgencyApromoted treatmentmeasures suchas chlorinationof

handpumps,orusingchlorinetabletsatpointofuse,butcommunitiesdidnotpracticethesedueto

concerns of taste, cost of tablets, and lack of knowledge on how to use them.78The preferred

methodswereboilingorfiltrationoruseofclothfiltersorjhalis(nets)toremovesedimentsfrom

thewater.79

In Solmari and Boramari, the communities had different attitudes towards sanitation despite

increasedknowledgeabouttherisksassociatedwithopendefecation.InSolmari,thegroupslacked

eagernesstoinstalltheirownlatrinesduetoeconomicconditions,whereasinBoramaritherewas

astrongdemandforlatrinesduringthe2013floods.80Thedifferenceinattitudesbetweenthetwo

communitiescouldbeattributedtothehazardhistory,priorNGOactivities,culturaldifferences,

collectivememoryandeconomicconstraintsduetoresource-deprivedconditions.81Withmaterial

and technical support from external agencies to improve their sanitary conditions, Agency A

reportedanincreaseinemergencyandcommunallatrineusage.82TheFGDparticipantsindicated

changesinhygienepracticesdependingonculturalattitudes,andtheaffordabilityandfeasibilityof

practices.Muslim communities observed the religious practice ofmaintaining cleanliness while

observingtheirdailyablutionsandprayers,butwerelesseagertowashhandspost-defecation.83

Since soap was unaffordable, communities washed hands with soil, or ash after defecation.

Availabilityofwaterduringdefecationwas important foranal-cleansingandwashinghandsand

feet.84

76FGD(Women):Solmari28-07-13andBoramari04-09-1377FGD:Solmari17-07-1378FGD(women):Solmari,28-09-13.79Fieldnotes:Solmari,29-07-1380Changeanalysesexercise:Solmari14-10-13andBoramari18-10-1381Interview:LA1:Boramari,AgencyB82Document:AgencyAKAPAnalysisreport,February201383HouseholdInterview:MsKhatum,Solmari,28-09-1384FGD(men):Solmari,28-01-13

136

Image5.19:IntermediatemobilesheltersconstructedbyAgencyA(Image:Solmari,15-01-13)

Image5.20:Sheltersconstructedonraisedplinth(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)

Image5.21:Self-builtextensionsfortheshelters(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)

137

The frequent displacement and relocation resulted in communities building mobile houses in

SolmariandBoramari. InSolmari100%housesweredestroyedduringthe2012floods.Although

temporaryshelterswereimmediatelysetup,intermediateshelterswereprovidedbyAgencyA–

madeof timber, jutemats, bamboo, CGI sheets (eitherprovidedbyAgencyAor salvaged from

ruins).Thisenabledfasterdismantlingwhilerelocationduringrepeatedfloods.Communitiesalso

builtchangghars(housesonstilts)forlivingduringfloods.

AgencyAbuilttheintermediatesheltersonaraisedmudplinthusinglocalmaterials(seeimages

5.19and5.20).Thehouseownersextendedthehousetoincludespaceforkitchenandcattle-shed

(see image 5.21). During the relocation after the 2013 floods, communities depended on their

neighboursandfamiliesforsupporttodismantlethesheltersandreusethematerialstorebuildin

saferareas.Thiswascheaperthanconcretehousesthatwerewashedawayduringerosion.85

5.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery

DuringpriorityrankingexercisesinSolmariandBoramari,thecommunitygroupscameupwiththe

followingissues(table5.4).86

Table5.4:CommunityprioritiesinSolmariandBoramari,2013

Priorityissues Solmari Boramari

1 Safeshelter Watersources,buckets2 Safelandforhousingandagriculture Foodsupply/ration3 Latrines Tarpaulinsheetsforshelter4 Adequatewatersources Latrines5 Electricity,protectionfromriver Protectionfromriveranderosion

Thepriorities reportedby theparticipants in FGDsevolved in thepost-disasterphase.Priorities

variedacrossSolmariandBoramaridependingontherecurrenceoffloods,impactoferosionand

household’seconomicmeansforrecovery. InSolmari,wherefloodsoccurredafter12years,the

communityparticipants prioritised safe shelter and protection from floods. Contrastingly in

Morigaon,where floodsoccurredannually, communityparticipantsprioritisedessential facilities

suchasdrinkingwater,foodandsanitation,duringtheexercisein2013.Thereweremixedreactions

85HouseholdInterview:A10,Solmari,28-01-1386Rankingexercise:Solmari14-10-13,Boramari18-10-13

138

regarding the protection provided by embankments in Solmari: inJanuary 2013, prior to its

construction FGD participants considered that an embankmentwould protect their homes and

villagesfromfuturefloods.However,inJuly2013theparticipantswereclearthattheembankments

hadfailedtoprotectfromfloodsandlimittheextentoferosioninthevillages.Theywereforcefully

displacedbecausetheirhousesfellonthewrongsideoftheembankmentandrecurringfloodsand

erosionhadwashedawaytheirhomesteadsandcroplands.

Thereweredifferencesintheprioritiesreportedbymen,womenandchildren.InbothSolmariand

Boramari,menprioritisedtangibleandproductiveassets–shelterandlivelihoodsandsecureland

tenure–thatcontributedtowardsasecurefuture.Womenwereconcernedaboutissuesofday-to-

day access to drinkingwater, secure sanitation facilities and personal needs such asmenstrual

hygiene and household assets. However, they prioritised household needs instead of personal

needsforrecovery.WhereaschildparticipantsinSolmariprioritisedsecureschoolbuildingbecause

after their schoolwaswashed away in the 2012 floods regular classeswere held inmake-shift

camps.Thechildrenlistedotherprioritiessuchasbookstostudy,spacestoplaysportsandgames

andurinalsandlatrinefacilitiesintheschool.InBoramari,landwassusceptibletoerosion,andland

priceswereincreasing,soparticipantslistedessentialfacilitiessupportfordrinkingwater,foodand

sanitation. Communities who suffered from floods for the first time prioritised embankment

protection and productive assets, while those suffering frequent flood and erosion prioritised

restoration of basic facilities.87Water supplywas prioritised over owning toilets, and adequate

quantityofwaterwasmoreimportantthansafewaterquality.88

Asisobvious,theagencies’understandingandprioritiesforrecoveryweredifferentfromthoseof

communities. This was based on what theyconsidered or perceived essential for achieving

community resilience to disasters. 89 For the government agencies focus was immediate relief

provision, restorationofdamaged infrastructureandfacilitiesandembankmentconstructionfor

floodprotection.For thehumanitarianagencies recoveryprogrammesconsistedofstandardised

food and non-food items distribution, livelihood support, WaSH and shelter interventions to

87FGD:Mixed,Solmari,14-10-1388FGD:Mixed,Boramari,18-10-13.89Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13

139

facilitate early recovery at household and community level. Agency A officials considered that

buildingofembankmentswillreducethefloodrisksfacedbythevillagers.

“In Sonitpur we (Agency A) had gone in for the first time because of the breach in

embankment.Thisiswhatthedistrictadministrationtoldus.Sonitpurwasnotaregularly

floodedarea.Weintervenedtherewhentherewasabreachintheembankmentandflood

after12years,sowedidahumanitarianresponse.Simultaneouslywegotassurancebythe

governmentthattheembankmentwillberepaired.Oncethebreachisfixed,thepeopleor

areathatwasaffectedbythefloodswouldmoreorlessgobacktonormalcy;becausethat

particularembankmentwasaffectedonlyduetothefloods.”90

Thedifferentperspectivesonwhatwasessentialtorecoveryimpactedtherecoveryprocessesand

community resilience. InMorigaon, the new embankment constructed in April 2013, breached

whenthefloodsrecurredinOctober2013,leadingtofurtherdisplacementofthecommunitiesdue

toerosion.Sincetheirbasicneedsforfood,watersupplyandsanitationwereunaddressedbythe

governmentandhumanitarianagencies,theFGDparticipantsprioritisedfood,WaSH, livelihoods

andsecurehousingsupport.

5.4LocalinstitutionsinAssam

In this section, the local recovery efforts are presented using data from secondary sources,

interviewsandmeetingswithlocalactors.Itemergedthatlocalschoolsandanganwadisadvocated

safe WaSH practices. 91 The provision of WaSH facilities in schools along with inculcating safe

practicesandawarenessoflatrineusage,handwashingandpersonalcleanlinessamongststudents

wasaprimaryresponsibilityofteachers.Thelocalgovernmentactorssuchaswardmembersand

GaonPanchayatPresidentwere involved inreliefprovision,damageassessment,compensation,

and provision of subsidies in housing, water and sanitation schemes. 92 The local Panchayat

supportedWaterResourcesDepartment(WRD)andDistrictRuralDevelopmentAuthority(DRDA)

forconstructionofembankmentinSonitpurandMorigaonundertheLandAcquisitionAct(1894)

90Interview:INGO-3,18-11-1391ActorMappingExercise:Solmari,16-10-13,Boramari:18-10-1392Circleoffice,underrevenueofficeismandatedwithreliefunderthedevelopmentblock.

140

andprovidedemploymentundertheMGNREGAscheme.93TheLandActhascomeundercriticism

forforciblyacquiringlandfordevelopmentpurposesandcausingdisplacementbypayingnominal

landacquisitionfeestothehouseholds(Chidambaram2015).94

Agency A recruited local community youthmembers through local NGO partners (Agency B in

Morigaon and C in Sonitpur) for the response programme. They were involved in supporting

emergency relief distribution, conducting household surveys and monitoring visits, hygiene

promotion,monitoringandsupervisingconstructionactivitiesatthevillagelevelandcommunity

mobilisation.95However,facilitatorsandNGOpartnershipsfunctionedonlyduringtheprogramme

–oncetheprogrammeendedthelocalfacilitatorsdidnotfunctionintheprojectlocations.Thelocal

capacitiesandactivitieslackedappropriateskillsforcommunitymobilisationandforadvocacywith

government for long-term solutions and disaster preparedness. 96 Similarly, the CBOs such as

Masons’Associations,WaSH committees anduser groups, disaster relief task forces and village

development committees were involved and trained only during the programme. They had no

formalised role in WaSH during recovery beyond the programme’s duration. 97 Agency A had

providedtraininginresilientconstructionpracticesforthecommunitymembers.98Thegrassroots

organisationslackedfinancialresources,technicalexpertiseandscientificsolutionstodealwiththe

localisedissuesinfund-raisingandcommunitymobilisation.99Thevillagedisasterpreparednesstask

forces(TFs)facedchallengesoffrequentdisplacement,lossoffacilitiesandinvestments,andlack

ofinputssuchasboats,seedsandlivelihoodsupport.100Thesechallengesaffectedtheirstructure

andfunctionsoncetheprogrammeended.TheCSOsinAssamengagedinlargermacro-issuesand

werenotdirectlyengagedinWaSHandchallengesofrecoveryfromrecurringfloods.

Thetypesoflocalactors,theirrolesandactivitiesandchallengesfacedbythemaresummarisedin

Table5.5.

93Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13andInterview:GO-3,Sonitpur94Interview:INGO-10,AgencyA95Interview:PH–2,January201396Interview:LA-630-08-1397FGD(Men):Solmari,14-10-1398Informalconversation–INGO-1099Informalconversation–LA-7,Morigaon18-10-13100Interview–Expert-1,04-10-13

141

Table5.5:Localactors’responseinAssamandroleforlong-termrecovery

No Categories Type Actorsinvolved Activities Challenges1 Local

serviceproviders

Health ASHA, ANM,midwives

- Providehygieneinformationthroughleaflets- House-to-housevisitsduringimmunisation

- Limitedhumanresources- Difficultiesinoutreachactivitiesduringfloods

Educationserviceproviders

School andAnganwaditeachers

- Personal hygiene, and environmentalcleanliness

- Observe and disseminate awareness ofhandwashing,nailcutting,uselatrines

- Limitedresources- Expertise and skills for hygiene promotion duringemergencies

- Affectedbyfloods

2 Localactors Governmentbodies

Circle office, linedepartments andother relevantagencies, thePanchayat

- Reliefprovision,- Damageassessmentandcompensationwiththedistrictadministration

- Subsidies for housing, handpumps andlatrinesandLandforembankments

- Limitedroleandmandateforrecoverysolutions- Lack of coordination and guidelines for recoverybetweenlinedepartments

- Fundingdelaysforrestorationandlimitedresourcesforrecovery

Youthfacilitators

Agency–recruitedstaff

Trainedforprogrammeimplementation- ReliefdistributionandHygienepromotion,- Householdsurveysandmonitoring- ConstructionandFacilitationskills

- Limitedrolewithinprogramme- Organisedforprogrammepurposes- Timeboundpresence

3 Communitygroups

Community-BasedOrganisations

Masons’Associations,WaSHcommittees, taskforces

- TraininginDRRconstructiontechniques- Replicateinhousingpractices- Floodprotectionmeasures- Village disaster preparedness task forces(TFs)

- Lackofself-organisingcapabilitiesandresources- Difficultiesduringrelocation- Lackofpoliticalsupport inresettlement,andaccesstoservices,landownership

- Presencelimitedtoprogrammeduration

4 CivilSocietyOrganisations

All AssamStudents’ Union,Kisan MuktiSangram Samiti(Farmers’Groups)

Advocacyonissues:- Displacementbydams,- ScientificmeasuresforBrahmaputra,- Politicalandethnicmovements

- LimitedbytheirroleinrecoveryinWaSHsystems- Politicalsupportandexpertiseinrecovery- Centre-State relations determine funding anddevelopmentprogrammesinAssam

5 LocalNGOs Developmentandhumanitarian

AgencyBandCOtherNGOs

- Humanitarian objectives and reliefdistribution

- Partnershipsandnetworksforresponse

- Fundingforlonger-termrecoveryprogrammes- Expertise and mandate for WaSH and resilienceprogramming

142

5.5 GovernmentAgencies’response

5.5.1WaSHresponse

GuidedbytheAssamReliefManual(1976),thePublicHealthEngineeringDepartment(PHED)

tookthefollowingactionstopreventdiseaseoutbreaksafterfloods.101

“ThefloodsituationinAssamstartswithJuneandcontinuestillOctoberin3-4phases.

The low-lying places get submerged, and water-borne diseases spread after

floodwaters recede. We take extra precautions for drinking water restoration by

rigorousdisinfectionasperproceduresforring-wells,handpumpsinalltheaffected

villagesbyourtrainedstaff.”102

In June2012, thePHED in thedistrictsundertookdamageassessments: inSonitpur, 3345

latrines and 34 water facilities were damaged (Figure 5.3). 103 The PHED repaired 239

handpumpsanddisinfected1632SpotSourcesalongwithwatersampletestsanddistributed

26542chemicalpacketsand1,55,000halogentabletsforwaterpurification.104InMorigaon,

PHEDstationed5 tankerswithReverseOsmosis (RO) treatmentsystems formobilewater

treatment.105

101

AssamReliefManualpreparedin1976,isanintegratedplanforreliefadministrationforspeedcoordinationandeffectivecontrol102

Interview:GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13103

Meetingnotes:GO-12,Sonitpur12-07-12104

Meetingnotes:GO-12,Sonitpur12-07-12105

Interview:GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13

0

1000

2000

3000

Pipedwatersupplyservicesaffected

Drinkingwatersourcesaffected

Lowcostlatrinesaffected

Spotsourcestobe

restored

SONITPUR(TOTAL)

BISWANATH

143

Figure5.3:ImpactoffloodsonWaSHfacilities(Source:PHED,Sonitpur2012)

Howeverthesesporadicpost-disastermeasureswereinadequatetocounterrecurringfloods

and overlooked the remote villages. The development schemes were not functional: in

Solmarinosubsidieswereprovidedafterthe2012floodsforhouseholdlatrinesunderthe

TotalSanitationCampaign(TSC).106Theprogressratesinruralwatersupplyandlatrinewas

low,anddidnotfeatureintherecoveryplans.

The immediate government action focused on damage assessment, water supply and

treatment, but ignored remote areas, sanitation subsidies and damage compensation.

Governmentofficialsclaimedthatsituationwasundertheircontrolandtheywereprepared

for floods because floods are a regular phenomenon in the state. 107 The district

administrationsignoredthehumanitariansituationinthefloodedvillagesafterpeopleleft

thereliefcamps.108AssamChiefMinisterhadannouncedanexgratiaamountofINR1lakh

(roughlyGBP1000)eachtothenextofkinofthosekilledduetofloods.Thelinedepartments

submitted district-wise damage estimates and proposals to the Revenue and Disaster

Management (RDM) department. The RDM made budgetary relief and rehabilitation

allotmentsunderthestateannualplans.109

“Wegavepicturesandnamesofhousesdestroyed;governmentannouncedtheywill

giveINR15000[150GBP]foreachhousecompletelydamaged,butnoideawhenthis

willhappen.”110

Theaffectedhouseholdshadnotreceivedhouseholddamagecompensationmoneyeventwo

yearsafterthefloodsin2012.111Thehouseholddamageassessmentdataclassifiedaffected

houses as partially, severely or completely damaged (Table 5.6 and Annexure 11).112The

damages were assessed for kaccha (temporary and non-concrete) houses and pukka

(permanentandconcrete)houseseligibleformonetarycompensation.

106

Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13107

Meeting:GO-6Governmentofficial108

Meeting:INGO-10:AgencyA18-07-12109

Interview:GO-2110

Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13111

Meeting:GO-3–Governmentofficial–October2013112

Document:BiswanathRevenueCircleHouseholdAssessmentData(Annexure11)

144

Table5.6:MonetarycompensationtodamagedhouseholdsinSonitpur,Assam2012(Source:BiswanathCircleoffice,2012)

5.5.2Longer-termrecoverymeasures

GoA focused its long-term flood protection measures on embankment construction,

restorationandrehabilitationofinfrastructure,preparednessandmitigationinitiatives.Asa

preparednessmeasure, the PHED focused its pre-disaster efforts on training and hygiene

awarenesscampaigns.Themistrys(masons)andfieldLevelKhalashis(mechanics)weregiven

training for repairing WaSH systems, and disinfection. 113 PHED undertook rainwater-

harvesting systems in schools, PRI buildings and block offices. The hygiene awareness

programmesfocusedonchangingpeople’shabitsofwaterhandlingtopreventcontamination

ofwaterduringfloods.114Forresilienceagainstfloods,PHEDpromotesconstructionofaprons

aroundthewatersourcestopreventcontaminationthroughseepage,andproperdrainage

systemstotakeusedwaterfarfromthewatersource.115

Thereweredifferentdepartmentsandauthoritiesundertakingvariousrelatedprojectsfor

longer-termdevelopment.TheAssamStateDisasterManagementAuthority (ASDMA)was

mandatedwithpreparednessandcoordination,whiletheRevenueandDMDepartmentwas

responsibleforrecoveryandrehabilitation.Atthedistrict-level,coordinationmechanismsare

initiatedbyDistrictDisasterManagementAuthorities(DDMAs)withinlinedepartmentsand

local NGOs under district disaster management plans (DDMPs). 116 DM authorities have

113

Document–MorigaondisasterpreparednessnoteAgencyA,May2012114

Interview–GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13115

Interview–GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13116

Meeting:GO-11–Morigaon17-09-13

Damagedstructures Fullydamaged(INR) Severelydamaged(INR)

Partiallydamaged(INR)

Kacchahouses 35,000 6300 1900

Pukkahouses 15000 3200 1900

Huts 2500

Cattlesheds 1250

145

limitedauthorityandmandateforrecovery.Emphasisingpreparedness,anASDMAofficial

stated,

“Wehavetounderstandthatrelief,recoveryandrehabilitationareimportantparts,

and visible part of DM, therefore NGOs or agencies are more interested in these

becausethatisvisible.Howevertobreakthedisaster-povertycyclewehavetofocus

onpreparedness,buildingcapacities,andearlywarningsystems.”117

Floodmanagementinvolvedotherdepartmentsinthestate.Centralgovernmentassistance

of INR 744.90 crores was provided to the State Government for a Flood Management

Programmetobuild100floodandanti-erosionprojects;additionallyINR2.51croreswere

releasedin2013forfloodcontrol(GoI2013).TheWRDinAssamundertookembankmentand

floodwallsrepairandconstruction,rivertrainingandbankprotectionmeasures,anti-erosion

andtownprotectionworks,riverchannelization,drainageimprovementandsluices,raised

platforms, flood forecasting, warning and flood zoning. 118 DRDA implemented the

constructionworksundertheMG-NREGSforprovidingruralemploymentforhouseholdswith

jobcards.119

There have been state-level consultations for solutions on rivermanagement; and newer

technologiesinembankmentconstructionhavebeenproposed.Anongoingprojectfunded

by the Asian Development Bank and implemented by the Flood and River Erosion

ManagementAgencyofAssam(FREMAA)withintheWRDhasproposedriverbankprotection

through the construction of ‘geo-tube’ embankments, using textile bags to protect the

structure of the embankment from erosion. The projects face opposition from local

communities as theyhave to giveup their fertile lands, forcefully relocate toother areas

without resettlement support. Although the project claims that participatory discussions

wereheldandNGOswereengaged,thedelineationoftheembankmentwasfoundtobea

top-downmeasure,withlimited,ifany,consultationsatcommunitylevel.120Thisisthecase

eveninotherareasinAssamfacingregularerosionandfloods(LahiriandBorgohain2011;

117

Interview:GO-2118

Weblink:http://online.assam.gov.in/web/water/home119

FGD(men):Solmari18-08-13120

FGD(Men):Solmari,14-10-13

146

Dasetal.2009;Baruah2012;Hazarika2006).Theeffectivenessofembankmentswaslimited

by poor design overlooking local drainage, insufficient maintenance, failure due to river

erosion,andlimitedlocalparticipation.

Theresettlementofriverinehouseholdsisachallengeintermsofpolicydecisions,livelihoods

andlandissues.Theplainareasareflood-prone,whilehighlandsfallwithinprotectedareas

underforestcoverorareprivatelyownedascommercialteaestates.121Further,thegeneral

preferenceoftheriverinepeople,whodependontheriversforagricultureandfishingfor

subsistence,istocontinuelivingwithrisks.Anotherissueplaguingtheriverinepopulations

ofAssamisthemega-scalehydro-electricdamsproposedbycentralgovernmentintheupper

reachesoftheBrahmaputraanditstributariesintheneighbouringstateofArunachalPradesh

(Baruah 2012). There are issues related to the downstream impacts of the projects and

seismicriskduetotheconstructionof168hydro-electricprojectsontheBrahmaputraand

itstributaries(Baruah2012).Theresultantchangingnatureandintensityoffloodsisalarming

the scientists andpolicy-makersbut limitedaction isbeing taken forwantof appropriate

solutions.Further,thehumanitariansituationisaggravatedeachyearduetotherecurrence

offloods.

121Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13

147

5.6HumanitarianAgencies’responseThissectiondescribesAssamFloodResponseProgramme(AFRP)implementedbyAgencyA

withfundingfromECHO:theprogrammingprocessesandapproaches,institutionalcapacities

and consortium-based support. Agency A’s programme included WaSH, shelter and

livelihoodsimplementedovertwophases:theimmediateemergencyresponse(July2012–

September2012,3months)andtheearlyrecoveryprogramme(October2012–May2013,6

months).

5.6.1AgencyAWaSHResponseProgramme

TheWaSHinterventionsconsistedofhardware(PublicHealthEngineering:PHE)andsoftware

(PublicHealthPromotion:HP).

“[AgencyA] invests inhardwaresupporttobuildresilience–suchasstructuraland

publichealthengineeringandalsosupportssoftware.Therewedefinitelyseebenefits

from these interventions in locations where we have implemented because [post-

floods]WaSHandtheriskreductionmodelsaredirectlyrelated.122”

In the emergency phase, the PHE interventions consisted of emergency water supply,

chlorinationofwatersourcesandothertreatmentmeasures,provisionofemergencylatrines

and construction of bathing cubicles.123 Under the early recovery programme in Assam,

communalfacilitieswereinstalledonraisedmoundsforaccessduringfloods.Theseincluded

raised handpumps and separate latrine complexes for men and women. The existing

handpumps in the villageswere rehabilitatedwith concrete aprons, raised platforms and

drainage. Open water sources like wells, ponds and drains were chlorinated under the

programme,asthecommunitygroupsusedthesesourcesforvariouspurposes.AgencyAalso

undertook pond dewatering (cleaning and draining of pond water, recharged with fresh

groundwater),debriscleaning,drainageclearingandconstructioninthevillagesunderthe

WaSHprogramme.Theraisingofstructuresabovethefloodlevelswasacrucialelementfor

122

Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13123

Document:AgencyAAssamfloodresponse2012-13report,01-03-13

148

buildingresilienceofwatersystemsinthevillages.124Thewaterusergroupsreceivedtraining

andtoolkitsformaintenanceandrepairofhandpumps.125

“Rehabilitationandraisingthestructures,andconstructionofapronsaroundexisting

dugwells,handpumpsareundertaken [..]But thechallengesare the local context,

local practices and how PHP can effectively introduce safe hygiene behaviour

change.”126

AgencyAdidnotinvestinprovisionofraisedwatersourcesforthehighestflood-levelsdue

tolackoffinancialresourcestoundertakesuchaprojectintheerosion-proneregion,with

theriskoflosingtheinvestments.Financingofwatersupplyinruralareaswasachallenge

due to inefficiencies in the government development programmes, leaving the poor

household to bear the additional costs of raising and maintaining the water sources,

constructingraisedplatformwithaccessibility(steps)anddrainage.127Micro-creditsupport

for WaSH facilities was recommended through income-generating avenues, disaster

insuranceanddamagecompensationtoinfluencegreateruptakeofWaSHfacilities.128

The sanitation response in Assam involved a phased approach: during the emergency,

defecationareasweredemarcatedtocontrolspreadofdiseases,andseparateemergency

latrinesformenandwomenwereconstructedintheembankmentcamps.129AgencyAwas

responsibleforwastemanagementanddisposal,withminimalroleofcommunities.130Asthe

populationsreturnedtotheirhomesafterthefloods,orthepitswerefilledup,thesefacilities

weredecommissionedandmaterialswerehandedovertothecommunitiestoreuse.131The

longer-termsanitationmeasuresincludedconstructionofcommunallatrinesinthevillages

andlatrinecomplexesontheraisedfloodshelters.Additionally,usergroupswereprovided

withcleaningmaterials,solarlampsforbettersecurity,andlatrineswithpadlocksandkeys

124

Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13125Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant126

Interview:PH3AgencyAPHE127



Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13130

Interview:PH-3,AgencyAPHE131


149

forregularuseandmaintenance.132Thefollowingyear,whencommunitiesweredisplaced

again, the group members used primitive forms of self-built latrines using the materials

providedfortheemergencylatrinesin2012(Section5.2.5).

Forhygienepromotion,AgencyAundertookawarenesscampaignsforvillagemembers,and

trainingandcapacitybuildingforcommunitymembers,usergroupsandlocalfacilitators.PHP

efforts led to community mobilisation and increased ownership of the hardware.133 The

awareness programme provided hygiene messages on handwashing, household water

treatment,promotinguseoflatrines,safewaterandfoodhandlingpractices.Theseactivities

included understanding and assessment of existing practices, promoting and sustaining

behaviouralchanges.Thelocalhistory,powerrelations,andsocialvulnerabilitywerefactors

influencingprogrammetargetingandbeneficiaryselection.134

“Mostly the communities develop their understanding of the importance of

handwashing these days due to the exposure in urban areas through media and

advertisements;howevertheymaynotoftenpracticeastheydon’ttakeitseriously.

ThejobofthePHPteamismaketheselinkagesprominentandprovideinformationon

preventivemeasurestoaddressthespreadofdiseases.”135

For designing the hygiene messages, a WaSH KAP (knowledge, attitude and practices)

householdsurveywasundertakentoreviewthelocalcontextandexistinghygienepractices

atthehouseholdlevel.Thesurveyresultswereusedtoidentifykeyhealthrisksintheareas,

supplemented by the PHP team’s observations and participatory discussions with the

communities. 136 The risky hygiene practices were identified, and relevant messages on

maintaining safewater chain, handwashing, use of latrines, cleanliness and personal and

environmentalhygienewerecommunicatedtothecommunitiesduringhouseholdvisitsand

132Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant133Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13134Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant135Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant136Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13

150

campaigns.137Theendlinesurveywascomparedwiththebaselineforestablishingchanges

inhouseholdpracticesandtheeffectivenessofprogramme.138

Thehygieneprogrammingapproachesincludedtestinglocalwater-sourcesandsharingthe

resultswithcommunitymembersforunderstandingwater-sourcecontaminationlevels.The

PHPteamestablishedlinkagesbetweendiseasesatthehouseholdlevelandcontamination

results.139ThePHPactivitiesinvolvedfemalecommunitymembersthroughmother’sgroup

meetings, training foruser groupsandadolescentgirlmembers, streetplays, competitive

matches,sport-games,villagecampaignsandpromotionalevents.Thecommunicationmedia

includedposters,banners,visualcards,andpamphlets,allprintedinlocallanguages.Aninter-

villagevolleyballtournamentwasorganisedinMorigaon,whendifferenthygienemessages

onhandwashing,environmentalcleanlinesswererepeatedlyannouncedand IECmaterials

weredisplayedemphasisingkeyhygienemessages(Image5.22).140

Image5.22:BoramariwomenmembersengaginginfootballaspartofPHPcampaigntopromotekeyhygienemessages(Imagecourtesy:AgencyA,15-01-13)

137Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13138Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13139

Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant140

Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13

151

Theeconomicconditionofindividualhouseholdsinfluencedtheadoptionofnewpractices.It

was also essential to influence cultural attitudes towards WaSH during community

consultations and household visits for encouraging behaviour change.141Local alternative

solutions were recommended for poor households, who could not afford soap for

handwashing,touseash,soil,stone,vegetableskinorbananaleafash.Ayearafterthefloods,

communitiesexhibitedawarenessof risksofunhygienicpracticesduring floods in causing

diseasesthroughadoptionofhouseholdlatrines,usingclothfilters,andhandwashingusing

ashafterdefecation.142

PHP included interventions in the local schools andactivities involving school children for

hygienepromotion.InthemakeshiftschoolinSolmari,ahandpumpwasinstalledwithapron

anddrainagetopreventseepage.InBoramaritheschoolteacherswereengagedforhygiene

promotionandgames for improvinghygiene levelsamongstchildren.143Between2012-13

Agency A conducted 33 school-based events, in which 82 teachers and 3497 students

(primary and middle school) participated in Sonitpur and Morigaon.144 Personal hygiene

messagesincludedregularlycuttingthefingernails,washinghairandbathingeveryday.145

“Childreninruralareaswalkedbarefoot;makingfootweartoschoolscompulsorydid

notsolvetheproblembecausechildrenlosttheirchappals(slippers)inschool.Thepoor

householdswerenotabletoaffordtobuyforalltheirkids,thereforethePHPteam

advocatedwashingthefeetofthechildrenbeforetheywenttobed.Thishelpedto

preventthespreadofgermsthroughfeetduetowalkingbarefootinthefieldswhere

opendefecationwasprevalent.”146

AgencyAalsoprovided intermediateshelterto150households inAssamundertheECHO

recoveryprogramme. Its shelterprogrammehadtwocomponents:distributing tarpaulins,

141

Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant142

Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE143Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13144Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13145

Informalconversation:GO-7,29-08-13146

Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant

152

nylonropesandgroundsheetstoeachhouseholdforemergencyshelterduringthefloods;

and transitional shelterprovision to targetedhouseholds consistingof localmaterials like

bamboo,chotai(jute-mats),andj-hooks,corrugatedgalvanised iron(CGI)sheetsprocured

from local vendors.147In Solmari, 61 households and in Boramari 25 households received

intermediateshelters.148Thedesignprototypewasfinalisedaftercommunityconsultations

and technical expert guidance, to suit their cultural practices and acceptance. Resilience

features,buildinghousesonraisedplinths,wereincorporatedtopreventwaterinundation

during floods. The use of local materials and design enabled the houses to be easily

dismantled during displacement. 149 The houses were supported with plinth bands and

additionalprotectionfortheroofforstability,asAssamislocatedinZone4forearthquake

risks.150

AgencyAprovidedlimitednumbersoftransitionalshelterbytargetingmostvulnerableand

needy households based on selection criteria: poor, affected, women-headed, elderly,

disabled,andlandlesshouseholds.Howeverthisexcludedotherhouseholdswithinthesame

communitieswhohadsufferedlossesduringthefloodsbutdidnotreceivesheltersupport.

AgencyAencouragedownersofthehousestoengageintheconstructionprocess,facilitating

a owner-driven approach. This approach – including provision of locally available shelter

materials – was useful in resource-constrained environments where houses, land and

livelihoodassetswereregularlylosttodisasters.Therewerechallengesofestablishingland

ownershipandensuringlandisavailableforlandlesshouseholds.151InBoramari,displaced

housesthatdidnotpossesslandpapersweresupportedbasedonneedsandvulnerability

withapprovalsfromthegaonPanchayat.152

Underlivelihoodinterventions,AgencyAfocussedoncashtransferstofacilitateemergency

householdincome:anamountof₹6800eitherascashforwork(CFW)orasunconditional

cash transfers (UCT). The households were targeted at, using inclusive selection criteria

147

j-hooksareforsupport,attachabletoceilings,walls,concreteorflanges148

Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13149


Document:ShelterConstructionandMonitoringSteps151

Document:ShelterConstructionandMonitoringSteps152

Document:ShelterJustificationNote–23November2012–MorigaonFieldOffice

153

definedduringcommunityconsultations.Thesecriteriaincludedpoorestandmostvulnerable

households,thoseaffectedbyfloodsanderosion,andthosesufferingfromlossoflivelihoods

and household assets, especially women-headed households and those with elderly or

disabled members. The CFW activities involved community development or flood-

rehabilitationprojects.153After communitydiscussions, activitieswereproposedbasedon

disaster risks, hazards and needs: these included repair/construction of access roads,

constructionofraisedplatformsforfloodsheltersandschoolplatforms.Thewagerateswere

kept at a lower rate than the market price and government wages on MGNREGA, to

encouragethosememberswhohadaccesstothemarketstooptoutoftheCFWproject.154

The project amenities at the village level included a work-shed for participants to rest,

drinkingwater,firstaidkit,crèches,biscuitsandtoysforthechildrenofwomenparticipants,

andurinalsfortheworkers.155Sincemorethan50%womenparticipated,theirdailyworkload

increased. Hence work-times were flexible to include women’s availability and school

timings.156

5.6.2Institutionalapproachesandcapacities

Thissub-sectionexplorestheextentofparticipationinWaSHhumanitarianprogrammesand

agencycapacitiestorespondthroughlearningapproachesandpartnerships.

AgencyA involvedtheVillageDevelopmentCommittees (VDC),comprisingvillage leaders,

elders, traditional leaders and community members, for emergency kit distribution and

immediate relief.157For the recovery phase, pre-existing villageWaSH committee (if non-

existent new committeewas constituted)were involved in latrine construction and hand

pumprehabilitation.Detailedguidelinesweremadeavailabletotheprogrammestaffthat

detailed thesocialprocessesandstep-by-stepproceduresbefore,duringandafter latrine

construction.158Duringtheinitialvillagemeeting,understandingofspecificneedsrelatedto

defecationandpotentiallatrinesites,materialsandvolunteers’availabilitywasdeveloped.159

153


Document:RTEreport,January2013andWorkshopnotes:Guwahati155

FGD(mixed):Solmari,13-01-13156

Document:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13157

Projectstaffmeeting:Morigaon06-01-13,Solmari09-01-13,158

Document:Socialprocessoflatrineconstruction,AgencyA159Interview:LA-6

154

Subsequently,thepit-latrinedesignandfunctionsweresharedwiththecommitteemembers

for finalisation based on previous flood levels and community preferences. These were

followedbyatechnicalsite-feasibilitystudyforwateravailabilityandpotentialgroundwater

contaminationdependingonthedistancefromwatersources,soilconditions,drainageand

seepageconditions,andthenumberofuserspertoilet.160AgencyA’stechnicalprojectstaff

supervised and trained the field staff, masons and local households on latrine design,

construction,useandmaintenanceofthelatrines.

For rehabilitating handpumps, thewater Committees and user groupswere consulted to

understand technological considerations for water supply facilities.161 During community

consultations, available sources, collection points and distances from settlements were

discussed.Communityparticipationenabledidentification,selectionandprioritisationofthe

handpumpsbasedonaccess, previous flood levels and thenumberofusers.162Technical

sanitarysurveysindicatedthedistanceofwatersourcesfromlatrines,theageoftubewells,

presenceofplatforms,andifwastewateriscollectingonthegroundaroundthesources.163

Thissurveydidnotincludethelocationandextentofthewastewatercollection.InSonitpur,

where theprogrammewasdiscontinuedsubsequentlydue to lackof funding, the toolkits

werehandedovertovillagecommitteesandusergroups.164

“Initiallyduringtheemergencyitwasverydifficulttoengagethecommunitiesbecause

of the frequent displacement and theneed to take swift action; onlywomenwere

availableforconsultations,themenwereawaylookingforlabourworkinthetowns.

We consulted women regarding decisions about beneficiary identification or site

selection.IntheMuslimcommunities,menwerethedecisionmakers,sotheyrevisited

andchangedthewomen’sdecisionssayingthatwomenareignorantofsuchissuesas

160



Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13(Tubewellsnotmorethan3-4yearsago(incaseofHandpumplessthan3-4years).163Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant164

Fieldnote–Morigaon,January2013

155

they were uneducated. This was a major reason for [a] lot of language problems

betweenthefieldstaffandthecommunities.”165

Theabovequote indicatesthatwomen’sparticipationandcommunity feedbackvaried: in

Muslimcommunities,theparticipationofwomen-folkislimitedduetothesystemofPurdah

– where women are restricted in their public movements by covering their faces. 166 In

Morigaon, because men had migrated to cities, women were responsible for household

decisions. 167 The programme relied on community consultations and was sensitive to

vulnerablehouseholds’needs,buttheirinclusionindecision-makingwasminimal.InSolmari

theshelterandlivelihoodsupportwasextendedtomentallydisabledcoupleinthevillageas

theirnameswerelistedduringcommunityconsultations.168

Theinstitutionalcapacitiesandabilitiestomonitorassessandinitiateimmediateresponse

afterdisasterswereinfluencedbyenhancedfinanceandlogisticalsystems,localpartnerships,

human resources and preparedness to respond to disasters. 169 The funds for initial

humanitariansupportwereself-generatedbyAgencyAanditsinternationalaffiliatepartners;

ECHO funded the early recovery programme for 6months. The disaster fund-raisingwas

specific for the emergency phase, and not for a longer duration. The agency had limited

capacitiesforfund-generationandlimitedresourcestoaddressunderlyingsocio-economic

vulnerabilities and household poverty, or issues related to frequent displacement and

recurringerosion.

Thelimitedfundingresultedinastreamlinedprogramme,whichincludedtheneediestand

marginalisedgroups.170Thepre-positionedcontingencystockswere immediatelydeployed

totheaffectedareas,andwerereplenishedwithdonormoney.171

165Interview:LA-6,AgencyB166

FGD(mixed):Solmari,13-01-13167

Interview–Expert-214-11-13168

FGDSolmariandBachadangi05-09-13169

Interview:INGO-9170

Interview:PH2171Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13

156

“Sonitpurwasatemporaryintervention–anassessmentpost-reliefphasewascarried

out based on which a joint proposal was submitted to DIPECHO [ECHO’s Disaster

Preparedness funding] proposal along with [Agency AA] and [Agency CA]. As the

proposalwasrejected, thework inSonitpurwasdiscontinueddueto lackofsecure

funds.”172

Thelocalpartnershipsdependeduponthelocalagency’sinterestsandcapacities,aswellas

its familiarity with local context and humanitarian background. 173 In Morigaon, partner

AgencyBhaddevelopeda localpresenceandadvocacywithgovernment foradoptionof

raised latrine models and advocated for safer land for the displaced communities.

ContrastinglyinSonitpur,partnerAgencyChadlimitedexperienceandmandateforworking

inemergencies.174As theprogrammedependedondonor funding timelines, it adopteda

non-interventionistapproachduringtherecurringfloodsin2013duetolackoffunding.The

programmewasdiscontinuedfromSonitpurandinMorigaontheon-goingDRRprogramme

wasimplementedthroughpartneragencyB.175

The programme implementation involved consultants, partner staff or fresh recruits. The

knowledgeretentiondependedontheinvolvementofthecorestaffduringtheprogramme

implementation, but there was high staff turnover in the organisation, which affected

institutionalmemory.Theteammembersrequiredtrainingongendersensitisation,logistics

andfinancialsystems,andsector-specificexpertise.176

“With response each year, the same set of consultants are part of the team, this

increasesfamiliarityandwaysofworkingawareness.Basicorientationisneededon

howtomanagefloat[cashusedfordaily/weeklyofficeandprogrammeexpenses],

maintainrecords,systemsandapprovalsetc.”177

The organisational learningmechanisms, lessons learnt and documentation captured the

172

Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13173Interview:LA-2,AgencyC174Interview:LA-5,AgencyB175Informalconversation:INGO11,04-02-14176Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant177Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE

157

emergency and recovery operations and influenced organisational learning, preparedness

andinstitutionalcapacitiestorespondtodisasterseffectively.178Duringreal-timeevaluations

(RTEs)intheprogramme,externalevaluatorsprovidedobjectivefeedbackontheprogramme

basedoncertainglobalbenchmarks.179AgencyAwasevaluatedagainstthesebenchmarksto

provide quick fix solutions, short-term gains and longer-term challenges. 180 Agency A

implementedRTErecommendationssuchasprovisionofsolarlampstoeveryhouseholdto

provide women’s safety and security in the dark. However the RTEs failed to capture

underlyingchallenges:whatsolutionswereimplementedinWaSH,howeffectiveanduseful

theywere,andhowthesesolutionssustainedovertheyears.

There were other challenges in documenting the programme experiences and lessons,

especiallyinWaSH:

“Oneofthechallengeisweakdocumentationmechanisms,anddocumentationrarely

goesbeyondthedonorrequirementsandreportingguidelines.InWaSHparticularly

therearealotofprocessesandstandardsadoptedininterventions.Whileworkingin

emergenciesquickimpactssolutionsarereadilyimplemented,whichmayhavelimited

longtermviabilitybutthesedecisionsarenotcapturedatall.”181

5.6.3Consortium-basedandcollaborativeefforts

The EuropeanUnion provided EUR 2,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to over 80,000

flood victims in Assam for a maximum duration of 6 months (ECHO 2012). Agency A

participated under a consortium headed by Agency AA with Agency CA under the

‘HumanitarianassistancetovulnerablepopulationsaffectedbyfloodsinAssam’programme.

Inthisstudy,theparticipatingmembers:AgencyAA,andCAwereinterviewedtounderstand

the experiences of working in a consortium, each with different expertise and strengths

178

Interview:INGO-1AgencyA179

Document:AgencyA:RTEBenchmarks.180

Fieldnotes:RTEworkshop,22ndFebruary2014,Puri,Odisha:TheRTEbenchmarksincluded:Speedandtimelinessoftheresponsebetterinrelationtootheractors,withconsiderationofemergencypreparednessmeasuresinplace;qualityandscaleappropriatetothecontextandcapacity,andisvaluedbytheaffectedpopulation;Effectivemanagementstructuretoprovideclarityandwell-communicateddecision-makinganddirection(includingpartners)andisappropriatelyaccountabletotheaffectedpopulation;keysupportfunctionsaresufficientlyresourcedandbeingeffectivelyrun.Risksthatarebeingtakenarebeingcalculatedanddocumented;internal(agencyaffiliates’)relationshipsareproductiveandwell-coordinated;considerations of the longer term implications and connectedness; campaigning, advocacy, media and popularcommunications,oracombinationofthesetools,appropriateforthecontextareexecutedeffectively.181

Interview:LA-2,AgencyC

158

leading specific sectors andworkingunder commonobjectives. The consortiumapproach

enabledawidercoverage,andfundingsupport.182

Thevariedcontextswithinthestatemeantagencieshadtotakedifferentapproacheswithin

theprogramme.For instanceinMishingcommunities inUpperAssamwherehouseswere

built on stilts, Agency CA and partners constructed chang ghars;while in Morigaon the

structureshadtobemobileforeasydismantlingduringfloodsanderosion.SimilarlyinWaSH,

Agency AA built raised handpumps on concrete platforms above previous flood levels to

preventinundationduringfloods,andensurecontinuousaccesstosafewater(Image5.23).

AgencyAdidnotconstructraisedhandpumpsbecauseitlocalcommunitiescouldaccessthe

raisedstructuresduringfloodsonlywiththehelpofboats,andtherewasriskoflosingthe

investments in raising WaSH facilities due to erosion. Within consortia the agencies

exchanged ideas, and mutual learning formed the basis for different strategies in

implementation.Howevertheconsortiumwaslimitedtotheprogrammeduration,anddid

notfunctionbeyondthedonorprovisions.Thereweredelaysindecision-making,ingaining

consensusasagencieshaddifferentwaysofworking.

Image5.23:RaisedhandpumpbyAgencyAA(Image:Sonitpur,17-01-13)

182

Interview:INGO-4

159

There were other forms of collaborative efforts in Assam including Inter Agency Groups

(IAGs),informaldistrictnetworksandcoordinationmechanismsthatwereactiveduringthe

monsoonseason,butdidnotextendintorecoveryefforts.183

5.7ChapterSummaryThis chapter describes post-disaster changes inWaSHpractices, availability and access to

WaSH facilities, and use of technologies in WaSH during recovery. Under learning and

knowledge pathways for resilience, the data showresultant hygiene behavioural changes

triggeredbysocialadexperientiallearning.TheWaSHpracticesevolvedbasedonmotivation,

learningfromeachotherandfromthehumanitarianagenciesandfromtheexperiencesof

recurringfloodsanderosion.Duetolackofknowledgeathouseholdandcommunitylevel,

themobilityandrelocationasacopingstrategyworkedforsomeaspectsofresiliencebut

posed challenges formoving fixedWaSH technologies during displacement. The study of

institutionalpathwaysshoweddifferentrecoveryprioritiesandperspectivesforgovernment

and humanitarian agencies. The government undertook relief measures as pernational

guidelines. It followedstatepoliciesfordisastermanagementandcontinueddevelopment

assistance through existing schemes – water supply, sanitation, housing, and rural

employment.The long-termpowergenerationprojectscontinuedthroughconstructionof

damsinupstreamBrahmaputra.Inparticipationasapathwayforresilience,therewaslimited

participation in the government decision-making. The local government undertook

embankment construction with nominal community participation. On the other hand,

humanitarianagenciesencouragedsmallnumbers fromthecommunities toparticipate in

standardrecoveryinterventions-buildinghouses,cashforwork-withoutaddressingroot

causes of vulnerability. Agencies provided communal WaSH services, which were not

equitablyaccessedbythemarginalisedsectionsofthecommunitiesinSolmari.Intermsof

integration as a pathway, humanitarian agencies ceased their programme in the affected

communities, handing over the longer-term recovery needs as the responsibility of the

government.Toachievesectoralintegration,AgencyAcoordinatedeffortsinWaSH,cashfor

workandshelterprojectsthroughvillage-levelcommunities.

183

Interview:INGO–5,02-10-2013

160

Chapter6:OdishaCaseStudy

ThischapterdescribesCyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloods(Section6.1);WaSHpractices

atthehouseholdlevel(usingdatafromPLAtools,householdinterviewsandobservations)

(section6.2);andcommunitychangesandprioritiesduringrecovery(usingdatafromchange

analysesandpriorityrankingexercises)(section6.3). Itreviewssemi-structuredinterviews

anddocumentstodescribethelocalrecoveryinitiatives(section6.4),governmentresponse

(section6.5),andtheresponsesbyAgencyAandotherhumanitarianNGOs(section6.6).

6.1CyclonePhailinandfloods,2013CyclonePhailin,categorisedasVerySevereCyclonicStorm,madeitslandfallinOdishaon12th

October2013,andaffectedGanjam,andPuri;subsequentfloodshitBalasore(IMD2013).

ThisresearchfocusesonPuriandBalasore(Figure6.1)

161

Figure6.1:MapindicatingaffecteddistrictsinOdishabycyclonePhailinandfloodsand

AgencyAinterventionareasin2013-14(AdaptedfromMapAction,28October2013)

162

The cyclone killed 44 people, damaged 256,633 homes and affected 13.2million people

(WorldBank2013). InPuri,KrushnaPrasad,BrahmagiriandKanasblockswereaffected.184

The cyclone resulted inheavy rains causing the riversBaitarani, Budhabalanga,Rusikulya,

Subarnarekhaand Jalaka tooverflowand cause floods inMayurbhanj, Balasore,Bhadrak,

Keonjhar,JajpurandGanjam.Thefloodsaffected1.2crorepeoplein16000villagesand2015

grampanchayats.InBalasore,Basta,Baliapal,BhograiandJaleshwarblockswereaffected.185

6.1.1Timelineofevents

Accurate weather forecasting, effective planning, and the dedication showed by the

administrativemachineryensuredalmost‘zerocasualty’duringthecyclone(Dash2013).The

government,humanitarianandcommunityagenciesmobilisedevacuation,earlysearchand

rescueteamsandcoordinationeffortsimmediately(Table6.1).Internationaldonors–UKAID,

ECHO,WorldBank (WB)andAsianDevelopmentBank (ADB)providedfinancialsupport in

responsetothedisaster.UKAIDprovided£2mthroughitsRapidResponseFacility(RRF)for

respondingto the immediatehumanitarianneeds for implementation from1stNovember

2013for12weeks(UKAID2013).TheEuropeanCommissionprovided€3milliontoprovide

assistancetocyclone-affectedpopulations(ECHO2013).

Table6.1:TimelineofeventsinOdisha,October2013-March2014(Source:AgencyA)

Date TimelineofeventsinOdisha09/10/2013 Cyclone Phailin warning circulated and processes of evacuation, communication

initiated11/10/2013 CyclonepreparednessmeasuresinitiatedbyGoO

12/10/2013 CyclonePhailinmadelandfallatGopalpur,Ganjamonthenightof12thOctober2013;GoogleCrisisResponseteambeganrespondingbyprovidingadisasteroneboxtousersinIndiawiththedetailsfromthenationalweatheragency,theIMD;astheofficialIMDwebsitecrashes

14/10/2013 ReportsoffloodsinBalasore,Mayurbhanjdistricts

15/10/2013 AgencyAvisitsBalasoreforNeedsAssessmentafterfloods;ECHOAssessmentmissionto Ganjam, Puri and Balasore (15 – 18 Oct); Agency E seeks support from districtauthoritiesforreliefandfoodtobedistributedtoflood-affectedfamiliesinBalasore.

19/10/2013 FooddistributioninSanpatana,PuriandGanjam,andcommunitykitchensbyAgencyEinBalasore;UKAID-assessmentmissioninGanjam-Puri–Balasore

21/10/2013 ForecastofheavyrainfallincycloneandfloodaffectedvillagesinOdisha

184

Meeting:Emergencyofficer,Puri24-10-13185

OrissapostNewsarticle15-10-2013Twindisasters

163

26/10/2013 UKAIDRRFactivationandcallforproposalsmeetinganddecisiontoformconsortia

27/10/2013 FieldvisittoBrahmapurandKhirisahiislands,duringheavyrainsandinundatedareasinlow-lyingpartsoftheislandsbytheauthor

27/10/2013 Arakhakudafooddistribution

28/10/2013 TrainingofDRRhandpumptechniciansforchlorinationandhandpumprepairinPuri- facilitated by Agency D; UK AID RRF proposal submitted by the consortia led byAgencyCA,whereAgencyAwastheLogisticslead

29/10/2013 First meeting of successful consortium members in Bhubhaneshwar win theapplication for GBP 1 million for 14100 households which was revised to 16170households

31/10/2013–7/11/2013

Islamic Relief food distribution in Puri villages – Pirosahi, Padanpur, Arakhakuda,BrahmapurandKhirisahi(andothers)

10/11/2013 48hourLivelihoodassessmentToolkittraining

12/11/2013 NFIkitdistributionstartedinSanpatana,Puri

15/11/2013 ConsortiummemberssubmitproposalforECHOprogramme14/11/2013-24/11/13

HumanitarianServicesSupportProfessionalfromGB(WaSH)visittoOdisha

24/11/2013 Director Programme and Advocacy and Regional Manager visit Arakhakuda,Sanapatna,Puri

3-4/12/2013 ECHOProjectreviewandplanningmeetinginBBSR-PuriandGanjam

6/12/2013 Ambassador to India from EuropeanUnionwith EU officials, Ambassador to India,CzechRepublic,AmbassadorofHungarytoIndia,ECHO-CommunicationandVisibilityvisitSanpatnainPuridistrict

8/12/2013 GopinathpurinlandvillagesreceivefirstUKAIDkits

25/12/2013 Firstcashdistribution-CFWandUCTbyAgencyAinPuri

15/01/2014 LivelihoodssupporttofarmersinPuri-distributionofseedsandseedlingsbyAgencyA

23/01/2014 CompletionofUKAIDsupportedNFIdistributionbyAgencyA

28/01/2014

UKAIDHighCommissionermeeting forUKAIDconsortiummembers;Orientation -Village Representatives, WaSH Team and Volunteers on Community Based WaterPurification(Puri)

4-10/02/2014 Inter-agencyneedsassessmentwithconsortiamembersinworstaffectednon-priorityGramPanchayatsinOdisha-PuriandGanjam(Sphere/ECHO/Consortium)

6/02/2014 GenderassessmentinPuribyAgencyA

5&6/02/2014 ConsortiumShelterTOTinGanjam8&9/02/2014 ConsortiumGenderinEmergencytraining

11-22/02/2014 Real-timeevaluationbyAgencyA

3-8/03/2014 BalasoreUKAID,ECHOMonitoringvisitandresearchfieldpreparationvisit.

8/03/2014 NovibDonorvisit,Sanpatna

164

Thesupportprovidedbygovernmentagenciesandhumanitarianactorsvariedaccordingto

prioritisation of villages and households affected by cyclones, floods and erosion. The

government provided 50 kg of rice, tarpaulin and INR 500 cash (50 GBP) to each of the

householdsincyclone-hitPuri,whiletheflood-affectedhouseholdsinBalasorereceived25

kgriceandINR250(25GBP).ThereweredisparitiesinAgencyA’shumanitarianresponsein

Odisha,dependingondonor funding. Theaffected villagesweredifferentiatedasper the

donors–UKAID,non-UKAIDandECHO(forrecovery)–forthedistributionofkititems,the

itemsreceivedundereachdonor,thetimeofdistribution,andrecoverysupport.Themost

affectedvillageswereprioritisedforimmediatekitdistribution,whichincludedsomeofthe

itemsshowninFigure6.2,andrecoverysupport.186Otheraffectedvillages–Gopinathpur,

BrahmapurandKhirisahi–receivedcompletepackageundertheUKAIDprojectinDecember

2013 (Figure 6.2).187The water filters and kitchen sets were targeted at women-headed

households,andwerenotprovidedtoallhouseholds.

Figure6.2HouseholdkititemsandquantityofNFIkitsprovidedbyAgencyA

186

Document:Muster rolls distribution dates Sanpatna (12/11/2013& 14/11/13), Arakhakuda (15/11/2013), Padanpur(13/11/2013),Pirosahi(14/11/2013)187

Document–AgencyAListofprojectvillages–December2013

Sl no Item Qty (number)

1 Plastic Bucket with lid - 14 Litre capacity 2

2 Plastic Mug, 1 Litre capacity 1

3 Household water filter 1

4 Fleece Blanket 200 x 200 cm 2

5

Utensils Kit- Steel Plate 4 Pcs, Steel Glass-Size-250 Ml-2 Pcs, Steel Serving Spoon - 2 Pcs, Cooking Spoon-(1) Ladle-85 Gms and (2), Almunium Kadai-2 Liter Capacity- 1 Pcs, Almunium Dekchi with Lid-7 Liter capacity, 1 Pcs, Steel Bowls-Weight each 50 Gms- 4Pcs

1 Set

6HDPE Tarpaulins, SIZE 12 X 18 Feet and 180 GSM 1

7HDPE Ground sheet 140 GSM, size 12 X 9 Feet 1

8 Nylon Rope - 6 mm thickness with length 15 meters 1

9Solar Lantern with Solar Charger, Multiple mobile charger, AC Adaptor with Battery 1

10 Bathing Soap:120 gms: Brand Medimix 8 numbers

11 Detergent cake- 100 Gms -Brand or Wheel 8 numbers

12NADCC Tablets (Brand Aquatabs .67 mg for 14 lt water storage container) 6 Strips of 10 Tabs

each

13Sanitary Cloth (4 meters of cloth-Width-40 inch with Suede Bag and with 2 meters cotton rope) 1 Pcs

14 ORS Brand-S&P- 1 litre sachet-contains 21.50 Gms 5 Pcs

15 Steel Nail cutter-Medium Size-Only for Nail cutting-Length-7 Cm 1 Pcs

16 Plastic Comb-12 Inches-Unisex 1 Pcs

17 Savlon (anti septic and Disinfectant) 100 ML 1 bottle

18 Cotton swab- 100 gms -Sterilized 1 Pcs

19 Soap case / Container for 120 Gm Soap 1 Pcs

Emergency Non- Food Assistance to Cyclone Phailin and Flood Affected Communities in Odisha (2013-14)

List of Non Food Items (NFI) Per Household

165

6.2HouseholdWaSHCyclonePhailinandthesubsequentfloodsaffectedhouseholdassetsandWaSHfacilities.This

section presents data on household impacts,WaSH damages and hygiene practices from

householdinterviews,PLAtoolsandFGDs.Thedataareorganisedintopre-disaster,during

disasterandimprovedWaSHcontextwithinthe10studyvillagesinPuriandBalasore.This

sectiondescribes–pre-disasterWaSH(interviewsandFGDs), immediate impactonWaSH

facilities (transectwalks,andobservations); theWaSHsituation in reliefcamps (FGDsand

interviews),andimprovementsintheWaSHsituation.Therecurringthemesincludeaccess

towater sources and sanitation facilities, use andmaintenanceof facilities,waterquality

measures athousehold level, roles and responsibilities, and changes inhygienepractices.

AgencyAclassifiedvillages forprogrammingascoastal, inlandand islanddependingupon

theirgeographicalcharacteristics.188

MenandyouthinOdishamigrateforworktoKerala,KarnatakaandTamilNadu–Purihasa

27%householdmigration rate (Sharmaetal2014).Odishavillagesarecharacterisedbya

complex interplay of caste, class and gendermediated by the circumstances emerging in

multipledisasters(Ray-Bennett2009p.18).Themajorityofcoastalandislandpopulationare

engagedinfishingoralliedactivitiesandbelongtotheNoliyacommunitywhohadmigrated

fromAndhraPradesh(Mohantyetal.,n.d). InSanpatna,95%ofthepopulationcomprises

Beheras.189TheBisois (2%),thepoorest fishinggroups, liveon islandsandsandbars inthe

ChilkhaLake,withoutproperaccesstoWaSH,healthandeducationfacilities.190Intheinland

villages, the households depend on dry fruit cultivation and daily wages labour (DWL).

Padanpur consists of landless labourers who depend on big farmers, landowners and

fishermenforincome.

Thesesocio-economicfactors(table6.2)influenceaccesstoWaSHfacilitiesinthevillages.

188

Meeting:RTEteamDebrief–11-02-14189

ThestatisticalinformationoffamilytitleswereinferredfromAgencyAdistributionrecords(musterrolls)190

Fooddistribution–7-11-13,Arakhakuda

166

Table6.2:TypologyofstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore(Source:AgencyA,2014)

Typology GramPanch Village NoofHHs Watersources Profile

PuriDistrictCoastal Arakhakuda Sanpatana 300 13handpumps,3wells,1

pondFishing

Arakhakuda 1250 558handpumps,3wells FishingIsland Brahmapur Brahmapur 500 5handpumps,1pond Traders

Khirisahi 300 26handpumps,1pond FishingInland Manika Padanpur 25 3handpumps Landless

labourersArakhakuda Pirosahi 70(Muslim) 16 handpumps, 1 open

wellLabourers

Arakhakuda Sahadevpur 25 25handpumps,1well FarmersArakhakuda Gopinathpur 310 37 handpumps, 1 well

and1pondLabourers

BalasoreDistrictRiverine Basta Chadanamkhana 28 25handpumps,1well Erosion

andfloods

Raghunathpur Gombhoria 45 Public piped watersupply,1handpumpand1pond

Floods

6.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH

The ruralpopulation inPuriandBalasoredependongroundwater sources for theirdaily

householdpurposes.191InBalasore,itemergedthatriverandpondswereprimarysourcesof

waterand10%ofthepopulationhadaccesstotubewells.192AKAPbaselinesurveyindicated

that77%ofrespondentsusedtubewells,18%dependedondugwells,4%onpublicwater

supplyand1%onrivers,pondsandotheropenwatersources.193Governmentprovided58%

ofthesources;therestwereprivateandcommunalsources.

In Puri, artesian wells were common and traditionally used. 194 These are considered

unsustainable by the humanitarian agencies – the unregulated water-flow exhausts the

191

Interview:LA-8andInterview–PH-3192

Informalconversation–LA-13193

Document:KAPreportFebruary2014194

Anartesianwell issimplyawellthatdoesn’trequireapumptobringwatertothesurface;thisoccurswhenthere isenoughpressureintheaquifer.Thepressureforcesthewatertothesurfacewithoutanysortofassistance.

167

groundwater sourceandwasteswater (Image6.1).195Therewere raisedwater sources in

Puri,constructedunderthefloodrehabilitationproject in2001bytheOrissaStateBranch

(OSB)oftheIndianRedCrossSociety(IRCS)(IFRC2002).Therewereothersconstructedafter

the1999supercyclonebySpanishRedCross(seeImage6.2).However,thesefacilitieswere

notmaintained:image6.3showsawellwithoutcovertopreventdustanddebrisfromfalling

intothewatersource.TheKAPreportsuggeststherewereaccessissuesinPuri–79%ofthe

respondents reported30minutesqueuing time, and5%of the respondents claimed they

waitedforanhourtocollectwater.196

Image6.1:Artesianwells,withnon-stopwaterflow(Image:Brahmapur,27-02-14)

195

Informalconversation:LA-14196

KAPsurveyindicatesdatafromPuriandGanjamandexcludesBalasore.

168

Image6.2:Pre-existingtubewellbuiltunderSpanishRedCrossprojectasapreparednessmeasureafterthe1999supercyclone(Image:Pirosahi,08-11-13)

Image6.3:Pre-existingopenwellbyPanchayat(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13)

169

Image6.4:Deterioratingconditionsofthewaterpumpsintheislandvillage(Image:Khirisahi,27-10-13)

Theexistingstructuresweresusceptible todisastersdue to lackof repairormaintenance

(Image6.4).Thefacilitieshaddeterioratedovertheyearsduetolackofregularmaintenance,

resultingincracksthatledtogroundwatercontamination.Anexpertengineer,whoobserved

communitypracticesandtheimpactofthecycloneonWaSHfacilitiesinPuriduringhisvisit

toSanpatnaandBrahmapur,noted,

“Manypeoplerelyondrinkingwatertakenfromopenwellsorpartiallyopenwells.Thevery nature of these types of water supply means they are susceptible tocontaminationeitherfromthewellbecominginundatedduringafloodorfromdebrisbeingblownintothewellduringastorm.Oftentheapronaroundopenwellsisnottotallyeffective,increasingtheriskofwaterinthewellbecomingpollutedwhenthereisstandingwateraroundthewellhead.Theresultisthatthewaterqualityinpoorlymaintainedopenwellsdeterioratesduetoacyclone.”197

InOdisha,opendefecationwasrampant:only15percentofhouseholdsinOdishahadaccess

toimprovedsanitation.198TheKAPreportstatedthat58%oftherespondentsdefecatedin

197

Document:AgencyA-CommentsontheJointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse(22-11-13)198

Document:AgencyA,CommentsontheJointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse(22-11-13)

170

open fields, 25% near openwater sources and only 7% used latrines.199It emerged that

womenwentbehindthebushesfordefecationinthedarkoraftersunset,orbeforesunrise,

to avoid being seen by others.200Household latrines and latrines in the existing cyclone

shelterswereuncommon.201AlocalNGOofficialnoted,“Thereisnohouseholdtoiletinany

ofthevillagesinPuri,noteveninthehotelsontheroadsides;eventhestaffhavetourinate

intheopenduringfieldvisits.”202ThiswasaproblemthatIfacedduringmyfieldworktoo.203

Image6.5:Pre-disasterhouseholdlatrine(Image:Gombhoria03-03-15)

199

Document:AgencyAKAPbaselineReport–February2014,page.14200FGDs(women):Sanpatna02/11/2013,Khirisahi28/10/2013;Gopinathpur08/02/2014201

FGD(women):Sanpatna2/11-2013&Khirisahi28/10/13202


Fieldnotes,Sanpatna(20-10-13),BrahmapurandKhirisahi(27/10/13)

171

Image6.6:SubmergedIndiaMark-2handpump(Image:Brahmapur,28-10-13)

In Gombhoria, 12 households had constructed latrines with the help of first instalments

received under the government – the District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) –

schemesforsanitationprovisionandhadaccesstoonehoureachdaypipedwatersupply.Mr

O1(36,M)ownedalatrinein2001withfundingfor3concreteringsfromtheDWSM(Image

6.5).204InChadanamkhanatherewere25tubewellsusedforvariouspurposes.205

6.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH

ThedisasterimpactsonWaSHfacilitiesdependedonthehouseholdlocationandthenature

ofthehazard(cycloneinPuriandfloodsanderosioninBalasore).Allthesedisasterimpacts

affectedhouseholdaccess toWaSH facilities. InBalasore,due toerosion, thehandpumps

werewashedaway,whilethefloodsresultedinwaterinundation.Thestormsurgeduringthe

cyclonecausedstructuraldamagestotheWaSHfacilitiesnearthecoastandtheChilkhaLake,

204

HouseholdInterview:O1,Gombhoria3-03-14205

FieldNotes:FGDs(womenandchildren)Chadanamkhana04-02-14

172

affectingthewaterquality.Thehandpumpsweresubmergedandopenwellswereinundated

bysalinewaterintheislandandcoastalvillages(Image6.6).206

“Many handpumps observed, particularly those installed by the government, lack

apronsandit isverymuchdoubtedthatsanitarysealshavebeenaddedduringthe

constructionoftheboreholes.Assuchtheriskofcontaminationfromstandingwater

duringafloodeventishigherthaniftheboreholeshavesanitarysealsandconcrete

aprons.Handpumpswhichhavebeeninundatedasaresultofthecycloneshouldbe

assumed to be contaminated and should be disinfected. At some handpumps the

salinitywasfoundtobehighbutitisnotknownifthisisconnectedwiththerecent

cycloneorthelevelsaretypicallyhigh.”207

Image6.7:Pre-existingprotectedopenwellssufferedstructuraldamageduringthecyclone

(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13)

206

Fieldnotes,Householdvisits–28thOctober2013,Sanpatnavillage207

Document–Commentsonthe“Jointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse”(22-11-13)

Damage towatersourcecaused bystormsurge

173

Image6.8:Debrisnearhandpumps(Image:Gopinathpur,24-10-13)

InKhirisahi,duetoheavyrainsandfloods,communitymembersreportedchildrensuffered

fromdiarrhoeaandvomiting;andtherewerechallengesinaccessingthehealthfacilitiesin

the mainland from the island villages. 208 Incidences of diarrhoea were also reported in

Arakhakudaduetocontaminationofwatersourcesandlackofwatertreatmentmeasures.209

AspartofAgencyA,Iundertookhouseholdvisitstounderstandthecausesoftheoutbreak

in Arakhakuda,where it emerged that handwashing after defecationwas not a common

practice; the water containers were not cleaned or covered during transportation and

storage;children’sfaecesweredisposedinthebackyardneartheChilkhalake;andgarbage

waslitteredwithoutproperdisposalmechanisms.210

Formenstrualhygiene,thehouseholdsreceivedonepieceofcloth(4meters),cottonrope

fortyinganddetergentsoap(8pcs.).Thissupportwasinadequateiftherewasmorethan

onemenstruatingmember inthefamily.211DuringFGDswithadolescentgirlsandwomen,

thedifferentmenstrualhygienepracticeswerediscussed:sanitarymaterials,changingand

208

Fieldnotes:Khirisahifieldvisit28-10-13209

Email:Diarrhoearesponsedecisions,4-11-13210

Documents:Fieldsurvey–Post–DiarrhoeaoutbreakinArakhakudacase-tracingofhouseholds–08-11-13211FGD(Women):06-02-14,Gopinathpur

174

disposalmechanismsandsocio-culturalattitudesrelatedtomenstruation.212In the fishing

households,womenusedold ragsandcotton sareesduringmenstruation,washedwitha

separate soap and reused the next month.213 In the inland villages, the adolescent girls

preferredsanitarypadsbutcouldnotaffordthem.Thegeneralpracticewastochangeonce

eachdayofthecycleandburnwithothergarbage.214

6.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps

Thecyclone shelters inPurihad the standing capacity for1000-1200people,with limited

access toWaSH facilities.215The uncoveredwells in the shelters were covered by debris

(Image6.9).216

Image6.9:Openwellwithdebris(Image:Sanpatna,20-10-13)

212

FGDs(women):Sanpatna,Padanpur,Pirosahi,Gopinathpur,Arakhakuda,KhirisahiandHaripurhamlets(Feb,2014)213

FGD(Women):06-02-14,Gopinathpur,Arakhakuda214

Householdinterviews:24-10-13,Gopinathpur,SanpatnaandPirosahi215

Informalconversation:LA-14&Fieldnotes,Sanpatna(20-10-13),BrahmapurandKhirisahi(27-10-13)216

Fieldvisit:Sanpatna,Arakhakuda(20-10-13)andGopinathpur(28-10-13)

175

Image6.10:Womencollectingwater(Image:Khirisahi,28-10-13)

Theopensourceswerecoveredwithdebris(Images6.7and6.8).Inmostareas,waterhad

turnedbrackish;butdespitethis,householdsusedthesourcesduetolackofalternatives.217

InPuri(Sanpatna,Padanpur,BrahmapurandKhirisahi),theexistingfunctionalwatersources

wereinadequatetoaddresstheneedsofallthehouseholds.Thelow-lyingareasintheisland

villageswereinaccessibleduetoheavyrainsandwaterlogging,even10daysafterthecyclone

(28/10/2013).InSanpatna,initiallythreethousandpeoplewereevacuatedandshelteredin

thecycloneshelterthreedayspriortothelandfall.Twentyfamiliescontinuedlivinginthe

cyclonesheltersforamonth.218ThePanchayatandlocalleadersarrangedfordrinkingwater

andcookedfoodforafewdaysduringtheemergencyperiod,buttherewerenoprovisions

forcookingandstoring food,drinkingwaterandsanitation in thecycloneshelter.219Since

217

Focusgroupdiscussion-Haripurisland–8thNovember2013218

Fieldvisit(TransectwalkandFGD):20-10-13,Sanpatnavillage219

Fieldnotes(FGD):22-10-13Gabakundadistribution

176

their homeswere destroyed, they lived in cyclone shelterswithout separate facilities for

womenandchildren.

Womenfacedchallengesofsecurityandprivacyintheshelters,andalsoduringbathingand

open defecation.220It was difficult for women tomaintain personal hygiene and change

menstrual clothes due to lack of privacy and space.Women continued to fulfil essential

household duties such as water collection, storage, cooking, and supporting livelihood

functions.Theywereresponsible forcollectingwater, in jerrycans,paintbucketsand jars

(Image6.10). InBalasore,womenandadolescentgirlscollected4bucketsofwaterduring

eachroundofwatercollection(forahouseholdconsistingof6-8members).221InBrahmapur,

therewereseparatewater facilities for lowercastehouseholds,whowerenotallowedto

batheandwash in thecommunalponds.222InPadanpur, thepoor, lowcasteand landless

familiessurvivedondailywagelabour,togetherwithpoultryandcattlerearing,whichlimited

theirfinancialcapacitiestopurchasesoap,waterpurificationtabletsorsanitarypads.

6.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation

Agency support in Odisha led to improvements inWaSH facilities after the disaster. The

governmentdeployedmobilewatertankersforthecyclone-affectedpopulationsintheinland

villages.However,theinterior,remotevillagesandislandswereignored.AgencyAprovided

emergency WaSH support, and addressed longer-term WaSH needs by rehabilitating

handpumpsandconstructingsharedlatrines.

Inthevillagesthereweredifferencesinagencyinputs(SeeTable6.3).223

Table6.3:ImmediatewatersupplymeasuresbyAgencyA(October–December2013)

220

FGD(women)-Arakhakudafieldvisit11-02-14221

FGD(women)-Gombhoriafieldvisit03-03-14222FGDs–BrahmapurDistribution–05-11-13223

Document:ProjectMatrixupdate,28December2013(TheseareproposednumbersinthebudgetapprovedbyECHO)

177

VillageNames Chlorinationof handpumps

Dewateringofopenwells

Rehabilitationofhandpumps

Provision ofVestagaardcommunalwaterfilters

Householdwaterfilters

Sanpatna 55 1 2 3 277Arakhakuda 269 4 6 -Brahmapur 85 1 0 2 115Khirisahi 17 1 0 1 272Padanpur 3 1 2 - Pirosahi 0 0 1 Gopinathpur 12 1 3 1 5Sahadevpur 0 0 0 - Chadanamkhana 0 0 1 - 28

InBalasore,WaSHsupportwaslimitedbasedonperceivedneedsandprogrammingdecisions.

InChadanamkhana,all thepre-existingwater facilitieswere lostduetoerosion.AgencyA

installed an emergency hand pump in October 2013, which was still being used by 28

householdssixmonthsafterthefloods(Image6.11).

178

Image6.11:Solecommunalhandpumpandbathingfacilityfor28householdsprovidedbyAgencyA

(Image:Chadamankhana,03-03-14)

Image6.12:Householdcandlewaterfilters(Image:Sanpatna,28-01-14)

179

Image6.13:CommunalVestagaardfiltersinstalledimmediatelyafterthecyclone(Image:Sanpatna,15-11-13)

Image6.14:Sharedfamilylatrine(Image:Gopinathpur,05-02-14)

180

InPuri,AgencyAundertookrehabilitationofwatersourcesinGopinathpur,Arakhakudaand

Sanpatnavillages.Theartesianwellswerefittedwithregulatorstocontrolthewaterflow.

Thewatertreatmentmeasuresincludedprovisionofwaterfiltersandchlorinetablets.The

affected villages in Puri were provided with Vestagaard communal water filters, while

household candle water filters 224 were provided to targeted families in Puri and

Chadanamkhana in Balasore (Images 6.12 and 6.13). Vestagaard filterswere immediately

deployedafterthecyclonefor3months.Howevertherewerecomplaintsofslowdischarge

ofwaterduetoimpropermaintenance,damagetothefiltersandturbidwaterconditions.

Thecandlewaterfilterswerereportedasoneofthemostusefulitemsinthepost-distribution

monitoring(PDM)surveys.225

For addressing open defecation practices, agency A installed six shared family latrines in

Gopinathpur,alongwithhygienepromotionapproaches(Image6.14).Nevertheless,people

werefoundtopreferopendefecationduetoculturalattitudes,despiteawarenessgeneration

ofthebenefitsofusinglatrines.226

MrsO2(27,F)stated,

“..usingthecommunallatrineiseasy,becauseitisbehindourhome,andsharedby

our neighbours. But it is inconvenient to clean and maintain it because after use

nobody cleans, I am responsible for bringing water and flushing and cleaning the

toilet.”227

MeanwhileMrs.O3(38,F),motherof4childreninGopinathpurvillage,confessed,

“Honestly, I continue todefecatebehind thebushes, once it getsdark. The central

locationofthetoiletmakesmeuncomfortablebecausepeoplecanfindoutanditsvery

224

Waterispouredintotheupperoftwocontainerandflowsthroughacandlesituatedinthebottom.Oncethewaterhaspassedthroughthecandle,itiscollectedinthelowercontainer.Thissystembothtreatsthewaterandprovidessafestorageuntilitisused.225

FieldNotes:FGD(womenandchildren)Chadanamkhana04-02-14226

Fieldnotes:PHPtraining,Puri:28-02-14227

HouseholdInterview:O2,Gopinathpur28-01-14

181

uncomfortable,Isuggestmychildrentouseinthedarkwiththesolarlight,butIprefer

goingintheopenbecauseIamusedtoit.”228

In contrast to the improved sanitation in Puri through agency support, households in

Gombhoria continuedusing self-built latrines (Images6.15and6.16).229The latrineswere

builtwithlocallysalvagedmaterials,andtemporarypits,andwereusedduringthenightby

womenandchildren.Themenpreferredopendefecationandsuggestedthiswastoprevent

fasterfillingupofthesmallpit.230Thedamagedfacilitieswereusedwithoutproperrepairs

orrestorationduetolackofadequatefunds,orfinancialsupportbyagencies.Itwasobserved

thatthestructureswererisky,andaccident-proneforchildrenandtheelderlyordisabled.

Womenandchildrenwereopenandmotivatedtowardsusinglatrines.

MsO4(14F),fromChadanamkhanawaslivinginatemporarysheltermadeofplasticsheets

afterthefloods.Duetoerosion,herfamilyhadlosttheirland,farmsandhandpumps.She

says:

“WeusetoiletsfordoingourbusinessinschoolandIpreferthat.Latrineisbetterthan

goingintheopen.IfIgooutintheopenpeopleseemeandIdon’tfeelsafesometimes.

NobodywillfindoutifIgotolatrineinmyownhome.”231

228

HouseholdInterview:O3,Gopinathpur28-01-14229

FGD:Gombhoria,03-03-14orInterview:LA-815-02-14230

HouseholdInterview:O5Gombhoria03-03-14231

Householdinterview,-O4Chadanamkhana,03-03-14

182

Image6.15:Self-builtlatrinesinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)

Image6.16:Self-builtlatrineinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)

183

6.3CommunityPost-Disasterrecovery

6.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel

Thepost-disasterrecoverychanges,particularlyinWaSHinPuriandBalasorearesummarised

inTable6.4.Thetimeperiodsarelistedbelow:

5. t-1Priortothefloods–pre-2013situation

6. t-2Emergencyphaseduringthecyclonein20137. t-3Earlyrecoveryphaseduringthe6monthsfollowingthedisaster.

AgencyAundertookrepairandrehabilitationofcommunalwatersources(Image6.17),and

trainedtheusergroupmembers(membersfrom4-5neighbouringhouseholds)forrepairand

maintenance of the facilities in Gopinathpur, Sanpatna and Arakhakuda. For structural

resilience against future floods andwater inundation, the handpumpswere raised above

previousfloodlevels,usingconcreteapronsanddrainage.

Image6.17:Rehabilitatedtubewellandbathingfacility(Image:Gopinathpur,28-02-14)

184

Table6.4:ChangesinWaSHpracticesinPuriandBalasorevillages(author’sinterpretation)

Aspects Sanpatna Brahmapur Gopinathpur Chadanamkhana Gombhoria

T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3Watersupply

Tubewell

Inundatedtubewells

RaisedTW Artesianwells

Openwells

DisinfectedTW

TW,Well

DamagedTW

RaisedTW

Privatehandpump

River OnecommunalHandpump

Pondsandtubewell

CommunalTW

Raisedhandpump

Treatment None No Communaland HHwaterfilters

Cloth No Waterfilter

No No Waterfilters,chlorinetablets

No No Waterfilters

Nomeasures

No Waterfilters,chlorinetablets

Defecation Open Open Communallatrines

Open Open Communallatrine

Open Open Communallatrine

Opendefecation

Open Opendefecation

Opendefecation

Open Privatekacchalatrines

Handwashing

No No Yes No Yes,ash No No Yes,soap

No Yes Yes,withash

No No Yes,withsoap

Bathing Well No Pond Pond Ponds TW Ponds Bathingcubicles

Nearthehandpump

River Bathingspace inGopinathpur

Nearthehandpump

Pond Intermittentpipedwatersupply,ponds

185

Communitymemberscontinuedtopracticeopendefecationdespiteawarenessoftherisks.Inthe

coastalandislandvillages,thedifferentgroupswerereluctanttousesharedlatrinesduetoissues

ofmaintenanceandsanitationpractices.232Inthemainlandvillages,owingtodenselypopulated

settlements, households were keen to use agency-built latrines for privacy. 233 Agency A had

installedahandpumpnearthelatrineinGopinathpur,sothatuserswereabletocollectwaterfor

anal-cleansing.Contrastingly,inGombhoria,motivatedcommunitiesusedself-builtlatrines,inthe

absenceofexternalsupport.

Intheinlandvillages,handwashingstationsweresetup,wheresoapswerelefthanginginfishing

nets, as a visual reminder for handwashing and also lasted longer as it drained away surplus

water.234Inthecoastalvillages,thefishingcommunitiescouldnotaffordsoap,butpractisedhand

washing with ash and banana leaves.235 Ponds and lakes were frequently used for bathing. In

Gopinathpur,womenusedbathingunitsprovidedbyAgencyA.236

6.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery

Thissub-sectionreportsfindings from the priority rankingexercises undertakenduring FGDs

presented in Table6.5.Within the two districts the priorities for communities during recovery

variedacrossthevillagesinPuriandBalasore.Theprioritiesdependedonthedamagesincurred,

thetypeofdisaster,geographicallocationandsocio-economicconditions.Basedonthetypologyof

thevillages,Table6.5presents thepriorities listed in thecoastalvillagesalongChilkha lakeand

islandvillageswithinChilkhaandthetworiverinevillages–ChadanamkhanaandGombhoria.The

fishingvillagesalongthecoastandislandswithinChilkhalakePurihadlosttheirkulchahousesand

livelihoodassetssuchasfishingnetsandboatsduetothecyclone.Theyprioritisedrebuildingtheir

houses,butalsorestorelivelihoodassetssothatthehouseholdincomecanbeinvestedinother

recoverypriorities.

232

FGDs:Gopinathpur13-02-14andGombhoria04-03-14233

FGD:Gopinathpur,13-02-14234

Fieldnotes:Gopinathpur06-03-14,Sanpatna13-02-14andPadanpur13-02-14235

FGD:Sanpatna(13/02/2014)236

TransectWalk:Gopinathpur(28/01/2014)

186

Table6.5:CommunityprioritiesinstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore

Coastal Island Inland Chadanamkhana GombhoriaPriority#1 Foodsecurity Repair

boats andfishingnets

Livelihoodssupport

Shelter Housing

Priority#2 Income generation– repair boats andfishingnets

Drinkingwatersupply

Drinking waterfacilities

Livelihoodsupport

Latrinefacilities

Priority#3 Housing Housing Latrinefacilities

Land Drinkingwater

Priority#4 Drinking watersupply

Healthsupport –disabilityaccess

Menstrualhealth

Stone pitching topreventerosion

Livelihoodsupport

Priority#5 Latrinefacilities Latrinefacilities

Latrinefacilities Healthsupport

Thecycloneimpactsvariedacrossthevillages:incoastalvillagesSanpatnaandArakhakuda,kaccha

(non-concrete)houseswerecompletelydestroyed,andpakka(concrete)housessufferedstructural

damages.Thefishinghouseholdsincoastalandislandvillageshadalsosuffereddamagestotheir

fishingboatsandnets.Inthesevillages,themarketsweredifficulttoaccess,sotheavailabilityof

food for the household members was limited. These households prioritised food and income

supporttorestarttheirfishing.Forthefishinghouseholdslivinginkacchahousestheprioritywas

shelterandotherbasicfacilities.IntheinlandvillagesinPuri,cyclonehadaffectedthecropsand

farmlands were rendered salinised. The farming groups prioritised seed support, and irrigation

facilities to ensure that their loss in farming income can be regained.On the other hand, in

Chadanamkhana,whichwasaffectedbyriverineerosionhouseholdsweredisplacedduetolossof

landforhomesteadsandfarming.Inthisvillagethecommunityparticipantsprioritisedlandtenure

securityand floodanderosionprotectionworks (stonepitchingor spurring topreventerosion).

Thesepriorities reflected the longer-term recoveryneeds,buthumanitarianagencieswereonly

involved in initial provision of food and non-food items, emergency shelter provision, and

installationofwatersupply.

WaSH, as a priority was also variously reported across the villages and by the community

participants.Intheinlandvillagesthehouseswererelativelylessdamaged.TheFGDparticipants

listedlivelihoodsupportandwater,sanitationandhygieneneeds.Inthecoastalvillages,thefishing

187

communitiesgaveleastprioritytolatrinesbecauseurgentprioritiesforshelterandlivelihoodassets

were unaddressed. 237 Drinking water and sanitation emerged as a priority depending upon

participants’awarenessaboutrisksassociatedwithunsafeWaSHpractices.Latrinesemergedasa

priority concern inGopinathpur andGombhoria,where the communities had learnt about safe

hygieneandsanitationpracticesduringhygienepromotioneffortsbyAgencyAandFrespectively.

TheWaSH priorities were different according to the participants' gender: women participants’

prioritised installationofWaSH facilities. They considered this could ease their access anddaily

responsibilities for water collection and defecation. While the male participants’ prioritised

productive assets such as shelter and livelihoods for recovery. In Chadanamkhana, the male

participantslistedresettlementtosafelandsforshelterandlivelihoodsasarecoverypriority.

There were differences in the community priorities and those set by the government and

humanitarian agencies. The government agencies and NGOs did not address humanitarian and

recoveryneeds in thevillagesaffectedby floodsanderosion inBalasore,aswellaslonger-term

needs such as protection and resettlement across Puri and Balasore.Agency A prioritised the

cyclone-affectedPuriandGanjamdistrictsforrecoverysupport.Ithadbudgetforconstructingonly

25 houses in cyclone-affectedOdisha under the ECHO funded programme (See Section 6.5). In

WaSH,thegovernmentagenciesdidnotcatertothemarginalisedgroupsinthecoastalandisland

villages.TheWaSHsupportwaslimitedtodisinfectionofhandpumpsandtechnicalrepairs(See

Section6.4).

6.4LocalinstitutionsinOdishaThis section describes the efforts undertaken by local actors including PRIs (Panchayati Raj

Institutions), health and education service providers, and local NGO staff (Table 6.6). Agency A

involvedschoolandanganwaditeachersthroughgamesandcompetitionsforstudentstopromote

safehygienebehaviour.Thelocalgovernmentactors–Panchayatmembers,revenuecircleofficers

and village leaders – mobilised communities during the cyclone, disseminated early warning

messages,evacuatedthemtothenearestcyclone-andflood-shelters,andorganisedemergency

237

FGDs-Sanpatna(07/03/2014)FGDsinGopinathpur(13/02/2014),Sanpatna(07/03/2014),andGombhoria(04/03/2014).

188

food andwater supplies.238In Balasore, the local NGO (Agency E)mobilisedwomen’s self-help

groups (SHGs) to run community kitchens in the relief camps.239Thepre-disaster preparedness

networksinthedistricts,whichconsistedoflocalNGOsandGROs(Grassrootsorganisations),were

activatedinpreparationforthecyclone.AgencyAandlocalpartnerNGOsdeployedrescueboats

andmobilisedcontingencystocksfromtheirwarehouses,suchastarpaulinsheetsandhygienekits.

Distributionofemergencykitsandrunningofcommunitykitchensinthecyclone-andflood-affected

villages were carried out with the help of local community facilitators, youth leaders and SHG

members.Thelocalgovernmentagencies–RDDandPRImembers-werequickinmobilisingfood,

cashandwatersuppliestotheaffectedpopulationsinPuri.

238


Semi-structuredinterview:LA-8

189

Table6.6:Localactors’responseinOdishaandroleforlong-termrecovery

No Categories Type Actorsinvolved Activities Challenges1 Local

serviceproviders

Health ASHA, ANM,traditionalmidwives

- Involved in recovery programming- WaSHtrainingandcapacitybuilding

- Provision of chlorine tablets and preventivehealth

- Limitedhumanresources- Difficultiesinoutreachactivitiesduringdisasters

Educationserviceproviders

School andAnganwaditeachers

- ManagingSchoolWaSHcommittees- Awards for best students in cleanlinessawarenessofhandwashing,nailcutting

- Firstspaceforhygieneeducation

- Limited resources in schools affectedby disastersthemselves

- Primaryfocusisoneducation- Lackofmaintenanceofschoolfacilities

2 Localactors Governmentbodies

Circle office, linedepartments andother relevantagencies, thePanchayat

- Reliefprovision,- Damageassessmentandcompensationwiththedistrictadministration

- Subsidies for housing, handpumps andlatrines

- Landallocationforembankments

- Limitedroleandmandateforrecoverysolutions- Lack of coordination and guidelines for recoverybetweenlinedepartments

- Unclearroleinlonger-termrecovery

Youthfacilitators

Agency –recruitedlocal paid-volunteers

Trained for supporting programmeimplementation- ReliefdistributionandHygienepromotion,- Householdsurveysandmonitoring- ConstructionandFacilitationskills

- Limitedrolewithinprogramme- Lackofappropriateskillsandknowledgeofpublichealthpromotionornopriorexperienceofworkingindisasteraffectedareas

- Timeboundpresence

3 Communitygroups

Community-BasedOrganisations

Disasterpreparednessnetworks

- TraininginDRR- Search and rescue, shelter managementcommittees

- Villagetaskforces(TFs)

- Limited funding and informal organised efforts inrespondingtodisasters,noclearroleinlonger-termrecovery

4 LocalNGOs DevelopmentandDRR

AgenciesDandFinPuri,E(Balasore),G(Ganjam)

- Priorexperienceof1999supercyclone- Humanitarian objectives and reliefdistribution

- Partnershipsandnetworksforresponse

- Fundingforlonger-termrecoveryprogrammes- Expertise and mandate for WaSH and resilienceprogramming

190

6.5GovernmentAgencies’response

ThissectiondescribestheGovernmentofOdisha(GoO)WaSHresponse,reliefandrehabilitation

measuresandrecoveryprogrammes,usingdatafromagencyreports,newspaperarticles,emails

andmeetings.

6.5.1WaSHresponse

ThegovernmentdataindicatedthatCyclonePhailinhaddamaged3089pipedwatersupplyschemes

(PWSS) but no comprehensive information was available on the impact on the sanitation

infrastructure (Mommen et al. 2014). 240 Rural Development Department (RDD) organised 234

tankers,345mobilevans,29lakhwaterpouchesanddeployedgeneratorstorestartpipedwater

supply in 18 affected districts through the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS). 241 RDD

response included disinfection of 58,100 tubewells and distribution of 1,661 (25-kg) bags of

bleachingpowder.ThefinancialcostsincludedINR122.34lakhforemergencydrinkingwaterand

additional INR27.61crores for repairing3040ruralpipedwatersystemsand1,62,170damaged

tubewells.242

Despiteabovemeasures,sanitationfacilitieswerelackinginthecycloneshelters,andintheaffected

villages.ThereweregapsinoutreachmeasuresbytheRDDastheyhadlimitedcapacitiesintheface

ofmultipledisasters.Self-employedmechanics(SEMs)weredeployedforhandpumpdisinfection,

buttheycouldnotaccesstheremote,waterloggedandisolatedvillages.243Similarly,mobilewater

tankers catered to the roadside villages and ignored the farthest hamlets and island villages.244

DuringaRDDmeetingforINGOcoordinationinWaSHsupport,itemergedthatsubsequentrains

andfloodshadstretchedtheDepartment’slimitedresources,andgreaterflexibilitywasneededin

thehumanitarianWaSHresponseforthechangingconditionsandthelocalcontext.245RDDofficials

240InOdisha,drinkingwaterandsanitationfallsunderthemandateofRuralDevelopmentDepartment(RDD).TheRuralWaterSupplyandSanitation(RWSS) isthe implementingagencyunderRDDforruralwaterandsanitationsector.TheOdishaStateWaterandSanitationMission(OSWSM)wasconstitutedin2002forprovidingoverallpolicyguidanceforcommunityledandparticipatorywatersupplyandsanitationprojects.241OrissapostOct23Drinkingwatersupplyfor18districtsinstate242OrissapostOctober23rd,2013Drinkingwatersupplyfor18districtsinstate243Fieldnotes:PHPmeeting–2November2013–BrahmapurandKhirisahichallenges244FieldvisitBrahmagiriblock,February2014245Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef

191

encouragedNGOstoundertakedisinfectionofwatersources,watertreatment,storageandtesting,

(re)constructionofwatersourcesandraisedplatforms,hygienepromotionamongcommunitiesand

schools, assessments and trainings. 246 Issues pertaining to WaSH response raised during the

meetingwere:247

- Disinfectionofwater sources: Itwasdecided that INGOs should focusondisinfectionof

privatewatersourcesandwells,whileRDDdisinfectedthegovernment-installedtubewells.

Allsources,includingponds,shouldbedisinfected,butmessagesshouldbegiventoavoid

drinkingpondwater.

- Householdversuscommunity-level focus:RDDencouragedNGOsto focusonhouseholds

whilegovernmentcouldfocusonthecommunitylevelforhygienepromotion.

- Sanitation options: The prevalent open defecation practice, near water sources, was

recognised as a major health threat; there was a need for stronger evidence for the

suitabilityandappropriatenessoftrenchtoiletsinthecontextofOdisha.Duringthemeeting,

RDD encouraged sharing of experiences by agencies on trench toilets and sanitation

promotionapproachestocontinuebeyondtheemergencies.

- Tankers, pumps and treatment units: RDD welcomed the deployment of tankers,

generators/solarpumpsbyINGOstosupportsupply,treatmentanddistributionofwater.

Thus, itemergedthattheGoOwaschallengedbythemultipledisasters,andpre-existing lackof

sanitationdevelopmentinOdisha.

6.5.2Immediatereliefandrehabilitationmeasures

GoO exhibited dedicated efforts in saving lives through preparedness during the 2013 cyclone

comparedtothe1999supercyclonethatclaimednearly10,000lives(Dash2013).TheWorldBank

applaudedthesuccessinpreparednessandevacuationmeasuresthroughCycloneandFloodShelter

ManagementandMaintenanceCommittees,betterweatherforecasting,near-accuratepredictions,

betterdisasterpreparednessandcommunications(WorldBank2013).TheOdishaStateDisaster

ManagementAuthority(OSDMA)coordinatedrelief,restoration,andreconstructionactivitiesafter

246Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef247Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef

192

CyclonePhailin.TheRevenueandDisasterManagementDepartment(R&DM),Odishaisin-charge

ofimplementationoftheOdishaReliefCode(ORC)duringdisasters(GovernmentofOdisha1996).

Odisha Relief Code, the only existing disaster policy document for Odisha, explicitly mentions

‘sanitaryarrangements’justonceinthecontextofrestorationactivitiespost-disasters.

TheCentralgovernmentofferedreliefassistanceofINR1000crorestothestatetodealwiththe

aftermathofthecyclone.FromthePrimeMinister’sNationalReliefFundanexgratiaamountofINR

2lakheach,tothenextofkinofdeceased,andINR50000eachfortheinjuredwasannounced.248

The line departments sent the damage reports and list of beneficiaries entitled to government

support for rehabilitation. 249 In Balasore, it emerged that the district administration faced

challengesduringhouseholddamageassessment.Duringbeneficiarylistingthereweredifferences

due to the political mandates of the sarpanch (village headman) and the ward members for

nominating households for compensation, and confusions resulting from multiple assessments

undertaken by local Panchayat and Central assessment teams. 250 There were reports of

politicisation of relief aid because the local Panchayats, who implemented the government

schemes,usedthisopportunitytogainsupportfromtheirvotebanks.251

6.5.3Recoveryandreconstructioninitiatives

TheOSDMAplayedanactiveroleduringtherehabilitationbytakingproactivemeasuresinresource

mobilisation, databasemanagement, and coordinationwith different departments and affected

districts, donors and NGOs. In Odisha, the World Bank funded and supported a $1.45 billion

programme in the cyclone-affected districts of Ganjam, Puri and Khorda for building disaster-

resilient houses, improving slums and city infrastructure, and strengthening disaster risk

managementcapacities.252Additionally,$313millionfundswerepledgedbytheWorldBankand

theAsianDevelopmentBank:$55millionforconstructionof162cycloneshelters,$152millionfor

reconstruction of damaged households within a 5 km radius of the coastline, and slum

redevelopment.253TheseproposalsdidnotfactorWaSHinterventionsintotheresettlementplans.

248NewsarticleOrissaPost:Nov9PMannouncesinterimreliefof₹1000crores249NewsarticleOrissapost:Oct28thFocusshiftstolong-termrehab250Districtofficialmeetingnotes19-02-14251Semi-structuredInterview:LA-9,19-02-14252 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/14/india-and-world-bank-sign-usd-153-million-agreement-for-odisha-disaster-recovery-project253OrissapostNov13,WB-ADBjointmissiondeclares$313millionaid

193

During the stakeholder consultation meetings, there were discussions about approaches for

sanitationimprovement,buttheissuewassidelined,duetothelimitedtimeavailablefordiscussion,

andthelackoftechnologicalsolutionsandpoliticalwillforimplementationduringreconstruction.254

6.6HumanitarianAgencies’response

ThissectionpresentshumanitarianandrecoveryWaSHinterventionsbyAgencyAandpartnerNGOs

afterthecyclonePhailinandfloodsinPuriandBalasore.Italsodescribestheintegratedapproaches

andconsortium-basedapproachesinOdisha.

6.6.1AgencyAResponseProgramme

Agency A had different local partners, donor support and varying programme duration in the

affecteddistricts(Table6.7).

Table6.7:AgencyACycloneandfloodresponse2013-14,Odisha

District LocalPartner Donor Programmeduration

Puri AgencyDandF UKAID,ECHO 12months

Balasore AgencyE UKAID 3months

Ganjam AgencyG UKAID,ECHO 12months

The immediateevacuation, relief supportand responsemeasureswere rapidlymobilisedas the

organisations had set up preparedness initiatives after the 1999 super cyclone. The localNGOs

participated indistrict coordinationmeetingswith thegovernment,andactivatedapre-disaster

preparednessnetwork(PDPN)ofNGOstoevacuatecommunitieslivingalongthecoastline.Agency

A deployed contingency stocks, mobilised water filters and chlorine tablets, and deployed

assessmentteamsandhumanresourcesimmediately.AgencyAalsograntedapprovalstoitslocal

partner NGOs for spending contingency funds for evacuation and purchase of food, soap, and

tarpaulinsinPuri,GanjamandBalasore.255

AgencyAanditslocalpartnersprovidedWaSHsupportintwophasesafterthecycloneandfloods

–immediateemergencywaterprovisionandtreatment,followedbyrehabilitationofwatersources

254Fieldnotes:12-11-13WorldBank,OSDMAoffice&INGOsstakeholderconsultationmeeting,Bhubhaneshwar255Briefingmeetingnotes:19-10-13,Bhubhaneshwar

194

and provision of shared sanitation facilities during the early recovery programme. Regular

assessments and technical training programmes guided the WaSH interventions. The core

programmestaffanddeployedexpertsfrominternationalaffiliatesundertooktheemergencyWaSH

needsassessmentsinPuri(7th–13thNovember).256Theassessmentfindingshighlightedstructural

damages of water sources, degradation of water quality due to the cyclone, inadequatewater

supplycausingover-relianceonexistinginundatedsources,andriskypracticesofwatercollection,

transportandstorage.

Thewatercomponentoftheprogrammewasdesignedwiththeobjectiveofprovidingsafewater

supplyandhygienemessagesonsafewaterhandling,alongwithdisinfectionofcontaminatedwater

sources andprovisionofnewcommunalwater facilities (basedonneedandprovisionofwater

filtersatthecommunalandhouseholdlevel).257AgencyAdeployedwatertankersforaweek,and

installedVestagaardfiltersforcommunalwateruseandtreatmentinPuri,alongwithformationof

user committees, demonstrations and training. 258 The filters were inappropriate to the local

conditions:turbidwateraffectedthefiltertechnology,resultingincloggingofthefiltersandslow

outputrate.259AgencyAalsodeployedteamsofhandpumpmechanicsandpublichealthpromoters

forchlorinatingandrepairingtubewells,andgeneratingawarenessontherisksofconsumptionof

contaminatedwater.260Refreshertrainingprogrammeswereundertakenonwatertreatmentand

hygienepromotioninPuri(28thOctober2013).261Subsequently,800tubewellsinPuri(25thOctober

2013–31stNovember2013)werechlorinated.262

Duringearlyrecovery,WaSHmeasuresincludedinstallationofcommunalhandpumps,tubewells,

communallatrinesandbathingcubicles,rehabilitationofpre-existingwatersourcesandcommunity

pond generation through CFWprojects in the study villages (Table 6.8). Programme support in

Balasorewasdiscontinuedaftertheemergencyphase.

256Email:Meeting-Summaryoffindings-WaSHJointAssessment-PhailinOdisha257Informalconversation–WaSHmeeting,Puri28-10-13258Document–AgencyAWatertankeringstrategypaper,19-10-13:DistributionplanwasfinalisedafterpermissionsfromtheGanjamdistrictadministrationfor30 litreswaterperdayperhouseholdforeachtargetedvillagewillbeprovidedfor7daysafterwaterqualitytests.Accordingly,18,500litresweredistributedcateringto276householdsin7villages259Fieldnotes:StaffMeeting,18-11-13,Puri260Email:MinutesWaSHINGOclustermeeting+immediateactioninthefield,22-10-13261Email:Fieldupdate26-10-13262Email:Fieldupdate26-10-13

195

Table6.8:WaSHmeasuresinOdishaason21stFebruary2014263

Village Raisedpump

Pond Rehabilitation ofpumps

Communallatrines Bathing

Sanpatna 0 1 12 Arakhakuda 2 4 Brahmapur 2 23 6Khirisahi Padanpur 1 3Pirosahi 0 Gopinathpur 1 1 1 6 4Sahadevpur Chadanamkhana 1

Based on the consortium proposal, a detailed budget activity sheet for Ganjam and Puri for

implementation (January – March 2014) included structural interventions in WaSH, health

promotion,livelihoodsandshelter.AgencyA’sproposednumbersinWaSHinterventionswereas

follows.264

1. Rehabilitationofexistingwatersourceswithapronsandsoakpits(100nos);

2. Raisingopenwellsandwellcoverandretrofitting(30nos);

3. Installationofhandpumps(Popular-VI),apronsandprivacyscreen(50nos);

4. Installationoflatrinesandbathingcomplex(100nos);

5. Distributionoftoolkitsforrepairandmaintenance(20nos),andtraining(4nos);and

6. Watertestingandchlorinationofhandpumpsandopenwells(200nos).

To contextualise Agency A’sWaSH programmewithin proposed budget and assessed needs, a

consultant engineer was deployed to undertake a detailed WaSH assessment. This included

supporting,trainingandsupervisingthePHEandPHPteamsfordevelopinganddesigningwaterand

sanitationinterventionsbasedonproposedactions.265Itwasproposedthatcertainactivitiescould

bemodifiedtoreflectthecommunitypractices:

263Document:AgencyA–ProjectMatrix–Puri,21-02-14264Document:AgencyAECHO-fundedrecoveryprogrammeBudget,January2014265Email:ExpertsupportinPHEconstruction–OdishaResponse–14-01-14

196

“Asperthebudget,thelatrineandbathingcomplexaresupposedtobeconstructedtogether.

But since people are living at their permanent dwellings, itwould be better to construct

individualtoiletssharedbytwotothreefamiliesinsteadofcommunitytoilets.Inthiscase,it

won'tbegoodtohavebathingcomplexattachedtolatrines.Thecommunityhabithereisto

takebathonthewatersource(handpumporopenwell).SoIwouldrecommendtohave

latrineandbathingspaceseparately…Theprivacyscreenaroundtheneworrehabilitated

existinghandpumpand/oropenwell,willservethepurposeofbathingspace.....recommend

somevariationslikeheightoftheplatform….thisisfloodproneareaandtheheightofthe

platformneedstobeat least2ft.Also ifweareproposingtheseplatformstobeusedas

bathingspacebyprovidingtheprivacyscreen,thenitsdimensionsshouldbe3x2m.For

otherplatformsdimensioncouldbe2x2m”266

Thefeasibilityandrequirementsofrehabilitationofwatersourcesandsharedlatrineswerestudied

in Sanpatna,Arakhakuda,Haripur, Padanpur andGopinathpur.Basedon space,water level and

durationofstayofcommunitiesintheparticularsites,retrofittingof‘Popular6’handpumps,open

wells anddugwellswas suggested forproviding raisedplatformsandaprons, soakpit andwell

cover.267 The artesian wells were fitted with regulatory valves. Sanitary and technical surveys,

databaseofthehouseholdsusingthesourceandcommunityresolutionsandapprovallettersfrom

governmentofficialswereobtained.268Sanitarysurveysandwatertestingweremandatorybefore

repairing the structures because of the high iron content in the region; water quality tests for

bacteria(+/-),fluoride(+/-)andarsenic(+/-),totaldissolvedsolids(TDS),pH(howacidic/basicwater

is),turbidity,andodourwererecommended.269Areadyreckonerforfield-staffandtechnicianswas

developed that described the procedures. 270 The international personnel and the RTE team

observedthattheWaSHfieldteamlackednecessaryexpertiseandknowledgeofsuchprocedures.

271

266Email:Fieldobservations–14-01-14267Email:WaSHupdatesfromPuri+pointsregardingPHE–25-01-14268Email:Trackingsheets:WaSHconstructions-materials,labour,GPS,HHandgendersegregateddata–25-01-14269Email-Format:Waterqualitysurveillancereportingformat-commontoall,01-03-14270Document–Photopresentation-Dugwellrehabilitation:photopresentationontheprocess.11-02-14271FieldNotes:RTEDebriefworkshop,Puri24-02-14

197

Agency A had provisions for 50 shared latrines in Puri, each of which will be shared by 3-4

households. During the study in Puri, as of 7th March 2014, 4 latrines in Gopinathpur, 18 in

Brahmapur(includingadisabled-friendlylatrinedesignedwitharamp),and8latrinesinSanpatna

wereconstructedusingbamboo,tarpaulinsheetsandplasticNagmagicsquattingslabs.TheRTE

teamsuggestedreplacingtarpaulinsheetswithbamboomatsforthelatrinesuperstructureasthe

sheetsweresusceptibletoheavywindsinthecoastalareas(Image6.18).272

The latrines were constructed after determining the feasibility of shared latrines through

community consultations, understanding the inundation levels and socio-economic factors for

sharing.Therecordsandproceduresweremaintainedfornumberofhouseholdsusinglatrines,male

andfemale,andchildrenNo-ObjectionCertificates(NOC)weretakenandcommunityresolutions

were passed on agreement on the user groups and hand over of cleaning materials – harpic

(disinfectant),jhadoo(brooms)andbucketsforstoringwaterforanal-cleansing.273Theprogramme

staffundertookconsultationwithusergroupsandregularmonitoringvisitstoinspectthefacilities,

tounderstandhouseholduseof latrinesandchallenges facedbymembers.274The latrineswere

providedwithfences,andnewhandpumpsnearthelatrines(foranal-cleansingandflushing),and

handwashingstationstoencourageuseoflatrines.275

272FieldNotes:RTEDebriefworkshop,Puri24-02-14273Email:Toiletconstruction25-01-14274Gopinathpur-Householdmonitoringvisit–04-02-14,FGDs:13-02-14,and07-03-14275Email:Distributionofcleaningmaterials+Document–Villagewisecleaningmaterial–26-01-14

198

Image6.18:Constructionofsemi-permanentfamilylatrinesinPuri(ImageSource:AgencyA)

ForPHP,AgencyAfocusedongeneratingawarenessandchanginghygienebehaviour.Themessages

revolvedaroundsolidwastemanagement,waterquality,sanitation,andhygienepractices.Under

the ECHO-funded programme, Agency A had a budget for undertakingmass campaigns, village

cleanliness drives, solidwastemanagement, printing and displaying IECmaterials, and capacity

building. The key hygiene messages related to hand washing, water handling, food handling,

menstrualhygiene,solidwastemanagementanduseofsanitationpractices.276Intheaftermathof

diarrhoealdiseasesinArakhakuda,agencyAimmediatelysetupOralRehydrationSalt(ORS)booths,

demonstratinghowtoprepareORSandpreventchildrenfromfallingsickthroughconsumptionof

safewater.Chlorinationofwatersources,settingupcommunalVestagaardfiltersandconcentrated

hygienepromotionefforts in local languagewerealsoundertaken.277Theteamorganisedvillage

276Email–printingofIEC–27-01-14277Email:DiarrhoeaoutbreaksinPuriandGanjam,4-11-13

199

meetingsandpublichealthcampaignsfordisseminatinghygienemessagesonhandwashingbefore

eating,coveringfoodandwatercontainersandmaintainingenvironmentalcleanliness.278Through

hygienepromotioneffortsinPuriandBalasore,changeswerereported,

“There was good awareness about hand-washing at critical times. 100% of respondents

sharedthattheywashhandsbeforeeating.[..]About96%washhand[s]beforecookingand

4%donotwashhandsbeforecooking.93%respondentswashtheirhandsbeforefeeding

whereas99%washtheirhandsaftertoilet.Italsocameoutthat98%respondentswashtheir

handsaftercleaningtheirinfantafterdefecation.”279

The female members in Gopinathpur found the newly installed bathing units, near the water

sources, provided them with privacy, with additional space for washing clothes and taking

wastewaterdrainageawayfromthewatersource.280Insolidwastemanagement,villagecleaning

driveswereundertakenforclearingthedebrisandgatheringallthewastegeneratedinthevillage.

Thenthehouseholdswereencouragedtoassessthegarbageandsolidwastegeneratedbyeach

household and disposal practices. This was helpful to trigger demand generation for garbage

disposal bins.281InPuri, schoolWaSHactivitieswereundertaken, throughwater, sanitationand

hygiene committees.282The students participated in activities and demonstrations, where they

wereencouragedto learnandsingsongsnarratingthe importanceofhygieneandhealth.Hand

washingafterthemiddaymealwasencouragedinschool,andonMondaysinspectionofnailswas

undertaken.283InArakhakuda,studentsparticipatedinavillagerallyoncleanlinessandchallenging

opendefecationpracticesinthevillage.

6.6.2Integratedapproachesinrecovery

AgencyAincludedshelterandlivelihoodsinterventions–cashtransfersandsupportingvulnerable

livelihoodsof farmers and fishermen in the recoveryprogramme.Cash transferswereprovided

eitherasunconditional,orinlieuofcashforwork(CFW),toselectedhouseholds.TheCFWprojects

278Stafftrainingdiscussion:12-11-13,Puri279Document:KAPbaselineReport–February2014280FGDs:07-03-14Gopinathpur281StaffMeetingnotes–PHPfeedback–Solidwastemanagement–07-02-14282RTEdiscussions,Purioffice–12-02-14283RTEdiscussions,Purioffice–12-02-14

200

at the village level were determined through participatory exercises such as hazard and social

mapping,whichprovidedscopetointegratecommunityneedsandprioritiesincludingwatersupply

(Table6.9).Ineachvillageprimaryandsecondaryactivitieswereidentifiedthatwereundertaken

within 60 days by the participants. CFW projects included pond generation, clearing and

regenerationinBrahmapur,KhirisahiandPadanpur.

Table6.9:Integratedactivitiesincashforwork(CFW)andWaSH

Villages PrimaryCFWactivity/site SecondaryCFWactivity/siteSanpatna Boatstand+Netstand RoadlayingArakhakuda Layingofroads LevellingcyclonesheltergroundsBrahmapur Newpondgeneration RaisedplatformforfloodsKhirisahi Debriscleaningnearpond LayingofroadsintheislandGopinathpur Layingroads ClearingpondPadanpur Pondregeneration AccessroadlayingPirosahi Levellingmadarasaground Layingroadabovefloodlevels

Arrangementsweremade for providingbasic facilities at thework-site includingdrinkingwater

supply(orVestagaardwaterfilter),food/biscuitsforchildren,hoesandbamboobasketsforearth

work(1hoe:3basket),work-shadeandurinals.284Attheendof60days,theparticipantsrequested

Agency A for continuing the CFW project and provide additional days for work and income

support.285Thissupportcouldnotbeconcededbyhumanitarianagencies,ascontinuingtheproject

beyondthestipulatedperiodrequiredadditionalfinancesanddonorapprovals.Theprojectswere

unabletolinkwithgovernmentschemesbecausetheschemesweredysfunctionalinthevillages.In

asurveyconductedbyAgencyAtounderstandtheruralemploymentprovidedundertheMGNREGA

scheme,itwasfoundthatnoworkhadbeenundertakeninthepast6-7yearsinPuri.286InWaSH,

efforts were taken to link WaSH with the government schemes through training and capacity

building.ThelocalpartnerAgencyDfacilitatedtrainingonNirmalBharatAbhiyan(NBA)forvillage

representatives,WaSHteamsandvolunteers,alongwithcommunitybasedwaterpurification.287

‘NirmalBharatAbhiyan’ (NBA), formerlyknownasTotalSanitationCampaign (TSC), isa flagship

284Email-Mandatoryrequirements-CFWandUCTdocumentationandWorksitefacilities,16-01-14285FGDsGopinathpur(07-02-14),Sanpatna(13-02-14),Arakhakuda(07-03-14)andPadanpur(13-02-14)286Surveydatabase:MGNREGSsurvey,February2014287Email:OnedayorientationonNirmalBharatAbhijan(NBA)

201

government scheme for sanitation and cleanliness. The programme was re-launched with the

objectiveofacceleratingthesanitationcoverageinruralareassoastocomprehensivelycoverthe

ruralcommunity.288

Howevertherewerechallengesinthefunctioningofthegovernmentschemes.Anagencyofficial

commented:

“Sometimes establishing programmes and government schemes linkages are so difficult,

becauseweassumethatpeace-timedevelopmentprogrammesandgovernmentschemes

are functional, soonce theprogrammeends,we justprovide informationongovernment

schemesandexpectthatourmodelswillbescaledupandreplicated.Weneedtoaccountfor

systeminefficienciesandfactorthemintoprogrammedesign.Ourchallengehasbeenscaling

upofourmodels,andsystematisation.”289

Therefore, the humanitarian programmes face challenges in establishing linkages with the

governmentschemesanddevelopmentactorsduringrecovery.

6.6.3Consortium-basedapproachesinOdisha

InOdisha,theinternationaldonors,UKAIDandECHO,invitedinternationalNGOsandhumanitarian

agenciestobidforfundingthroughconsortiummodels.Thereweretwoconsortiaeachforboth

donors,withatleast5participatingagenciesineach.TheUKAIDdonorassessmentstartedon19th

October2013,theRapidResponseFacility(RRF)callforproposalswasopenon26thOctober2013

(Table6.1).Theparticipatingagencieshad36hourstosubmitaunifiedproposalforbiddingforthe

funding,whilemanyagencieswerestillundertakingassessmentsandidentifyingtheneedsinthe

affectedareas.

Therewereadvantagesandchallengesofworkinginaconsortium.AgencyAofficialcommented:

288Thiswillbeachievedthroughrenewedstrategiesandsaturationapproach,withaviewtocreateNirmalGramPanchayatswiththefollowingpriorities:1)ProvisionofIHHLtobothBPLandIdentifiedAPLHHswithinaGP,2)GPwithaccesstowatertobetakenup.PriorityshouldbegiventoGPshavingfunctionalpipedwatersupply,3)ProvisionofsanitationfacilitiesinGovernmentSchoolsandAnganwadis,4)SolidandLiquidWasteManagement (SLWM)forproposedandexistingNirmalGrams,5)ExtensivecapacitybuildingofthestakeholderslikePanchayatiRajInstitutions(PRIs),6)VillageWaterandSanitationCommittees(VWSCs)andfieldfunctionariesforsustainablesanitationand7)AppropriateconvergencewithMNREGSwithunskilledman-daysandskilledman-days289Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3

202

“Thereareprosandconsofworkinginaconsortia:Itgivesyouweightageofbringingupa

programmeatalargescale,2-3bigorganisationscometogethertoaddressneedsandcover

alargearea;sharingofskills,competencies,andleadstocross-fertilizationofskillsandideas;

donors are attracted towardsworking in consortia – in termsof outreach and enhanced

coverageandvisibility.”290

AgencyCAofficialcommented:

“Thereislotofvalueofworkinginconsortia,Iwouldrateitonapositiveside.Obviouslythere

are flip sides. Not each member may have the same enthusiasm and same spirit while

workingtogether. InAssamtherewerethreemembers,now inOdishathereare five, the

speed and interest varies. This needs to be further strengthened as a consortium. The

problemisspeedvs.accuracy,andconsensusversustheUSP[uniquesellingpoint]ofeach

organisation.”291

In the UK AID-funded consortium Agency A was the logistics lead – purchasing, warehouse

managementanddistributionforpartneragencies.AgencyCAwastheprogrammelead–ensured

adherence to timelines and qualities, and reporting. More than 21,000 households received

emergency kits. The procurement and uniform purchasing caused delays in undertaking

distribution, but there were benefits of increasing outreach, scale and financial gains in the

consortium-model.ThereweretwoconsortiaoperationalintheUKAIDandECHOprogrammesled

byAgencyCA(UKAIDleadagency),AgencyAA(ECHOleadagency)andAgencySTC(leadagencyfor

bothUKAIDandECHO).Therewerechallengesinensuringthesmoothrunningoftheprogramme

throughconsortiummembers:

“Thecomplicationsofworkinginaconsortiumarethatitisprocessheavy;transactioncosts

arehigh;decisionmakinginaconsortiaalsotakestime.Itleadstoclashesofideas,although

initiallyagenciescometogether,thewaysofworkingofeachorganisationisdifferent.The

290Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3–November2013291Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014

203

fastestconsortiummember’seffortsgetdraggeddownbytheslowestmemberagency in

termsofdelivery.”292

Aparticipatingagencyofficialechoedthereweredifferencesinagencieswaysofworking:

“All agencies did not have similar capacities. Some are experts and have strong core

humanitarian principles [..], while others are rights-based, and some others are child-

centric.”293

InOdisha,theconsortiumapproachprovidedspaceforcollaboration,whereagenciescouldlearn

from each other through common standards, programming approaches and advocacy. UK AID-

funded kit distributionhelped in standardising kit items acrossNGOmembers. This allowed for

agencies to include sanitary clothsandnapkins, solar lamps, cooking sets andwater filters. The

consortiummemberscametogetherforadvocacythroughregularjointreportingofachievements

andprogrammeoutputs,usingsocialnetworkingsitesandblogpoststodocumentandsharethe

memberagencies’initiatives.294Theseinitiativeswerelimitedtotheprogrammeduration,asthe

collaborationwasdonor-specific.Thefamiliarityoftheagenciesworkingtogetherwasinstrumental

infacilitatingeasiercoordinationduring2014CycloneHudhudandfloodsthatrecurredinOdisha.295

Thecontinuityandsustainabilityofsuchlearningforumsneedsfurtherinvestigation.

Decision-makinginconsortiawasatime-consumingprocess:duringworkshops,meetingsandjoint

trainingevents,timewasspentforstreamliningandinitiatingnewprocessesandformats,instead

of focusingongatheringevidence,orcommunityneeds,or longer-termapproaches.296The joint

trainingeffortsallowedagenciestobuildexpertise indifferentsectors,butagency interestsand

mandateslimitedtheextenttowhichthis learningwassystematisedandinstitutionalisedwithin

each agency. For instance, Agency CA undertook shelter programming and facilitated Shelter

‘TrainingofTrainers’(TOT)fortheparticipatingagenciesinGanjam;howeverAgencyAhadlimited

292Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3–November2013293Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014294https://phailincycloneresponse.wordpress.com/295https://sphereindiablog.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/situation-report-1-flood-and-heavy-rainfall-in-odisha-05th-august2014/296Fieldnotes:Bhubaneshwar,06-12-13

204

funding,mandateandcapacitytoundertakeshelterprogramming.Only25shelterswereproposed

undertheearlyrecoveryprogrammebyAgencyA.

Financial compliance and reporting were complicated procedures. Donor regulations and

mandatoryconditionsandguidelinesrequiredthatanychangesinoutputs,expensesandactivities

weretobereported,andapprovedbythedonor.Sixmonthsafterthecyclone,reportsindicated

thattherewereaffectedareasthatwerenotcoveredbyanyoftheconsortiamemberagencies.

ECHO froze the livelihood budget-line for all the partners until a justification was given. The

participatingagenciesundertookneedsassessments,andjustifiedstrategiesformeetingtheunmet

needsoftheignoredareas,whichwaslatersupportedthroughOFDA(OfficeofU.S.ForeignDisaster

Assistance)funds.Therewasgeneralconsensusduringthemeetingsthatagencieshadlimitedand

time-bound resources within the ECHO programme tomeet recovery needs in the operational

villages,sotoexpandtonewerareas6monthsafterthedisasterswasahugechallenge.ForAgency

A,thisposedfinancialconstraintsbecausethelivelihoodcomponenthadcommenced,andfarmers

hadreceivedseedsupport.

Thefinancialauditsbydonorsrequiredpapersandsignaturesforgoodsreceivedbyrecipientsand

community participants for the local projects. The spending on visibility boards and banners

displayingdonor logos in the villagesdidnotdirectly contribute toprogramme sustainabilityor

effectiveness.297Theemphasisonoutcomes, gathering sexandgenderdisaggregateddata– for

weekly/monthly/quarterlyreportingfortargetedandreachedbeneficiaries–weretime-consuming.

Theprogrammesandmonitoringdidnotadequatelyassesstheimplicationsofquickdecisionson

targeting in shorter time-periods. Under ECHO guidelines, the cash had to be delivered to the

householdswithin90daysaftertheprogrammecommenced.Thisputenormouspressureinrapidly

identifying,verifyinganddisbursementofcashforunconditionalgrants,andforCFWprojectsto

plan,design,approveandimplementcommunityprojects.298

Thepartneragencystaffsummarisedthechallengesofconsortium-basedprogrammingasfollows:

297Seehttp://www.hapinternational.org/what-we-do/hap-standard.aspxformoredetails298Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014

205

“Welearnfromeachother;eachorganisationhastheirownexpertise,mandate,objective.

Thewayagenciesdothingsarealsodifferent.Inprincipleitcontributes,butwhenitcomes

topolicy-levelwork,itisstillnotcomingtogether,forissuesofdam,land,whicharelarger

issues.Inaddressinghumanitariancrises,wearefine,butrootcauseswehavenotdeveloped

inconsortiayet.”299

Theconsortium-basedapproachesareanewphenomenon,withcontributionsfromparticipating

agencies,buttheyneedstrengtheningtomaximisethespaceforcollaborationtoaddresslonger-

termrecoveryissues.

6.7ChapterSummary

Thischapterdescribedagencyinterventions–repairandrehabilitationofwatersources,provision

of sanitation facilities – and household and community WaSH practices. Under learning and

knowledge pathway, the chapter studies WaSH technologies deployed by agencies during

humanitarian response in conjunction with local knowledge and practices. The exchange of

knowledgeresultsinhygienebehaviorchangesandincreasedawarenessofsafepracticesinhand

washing,menstrualhygiene,safewatercollectionandstorageanduseoflatrinesfordefecation.

This was achieved through consistent promotion strategies adopted by humanitarian agencies.

AgencyAanditspartnerorganisationsadoptedparticipatoryapproachesforimplementingrecovery

programme interventions inwatersupply rehabilitation,cash forworkprojectsandprovisionof

family latrines. Studying institutional pathways showed thatgovernment and humanitarian

agenciesrecovery interventionsdidnotmatchthecommunitypriorities.Governmentundertook

immediatereliefprovision,restorationofwatersupply,buttookanon-interventionistapproachin

emergencysanitationprovision.Thisapproachwasmainlybecauseopendefecationwasrampant

inOdishapriortothecycloneandthereforeconstructionoflatrineswithoutappropriatepromotion

campaignwouldnotbeeffective.Intermsofintegration,AgencyAadoptedexitstrategiestolink

their interventionswithexistingdevelopmentprogrammes.,whichwerenothelpfulbecausethe

governmentprogrammesweredysfunctionalpriortocyclone.

299Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-1–May2014

206

Chapter7:Discussion

Thischapteranalysestheempiricalfindings(Chapters5and6)toaddresstheresearchquestions.I

discuss how WaSH and recovery policies translate into practice (Section 7.1); how learning,

knowledgeandparticipatoryapproachesinWaSHduringrecoveryledtoaction(Section7.2);and

howemergencyresponsewasintegratedintolonger-termdevelopment(Section7.3).Ialsodiscuss

thechallengesofusingtheconceptualframework(Section7.4)andthethemesemergingfromthe

data,whichwerenotincludedintheframework–WaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocesses

andcoproductionofknowledge(Section7.5).

7.1Howcantheexistingpolicies inWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedto

incorporate resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be

effectivelytranslatedintopractice?

Thegovernment institutions, localactorsandhumanitarianagencies inAssamandOdisha faced

numerouschallengesinimplementationofWaSHresponse.ThecentralargumenthereisthatWaSH

duringrecoveryremainsacriticalgapintheexistingpolicies,schemesandprogrammingstrategies,

and often ignores post-disaster sanitation and hygiene. I argue that an opportunity, which is

availableduringrecovery,toinstilandsustainchangesinWaSH,isoftenmissedbytheagencies.

7.1.1IssuesinWaSHmeasuresduringRecovery

TheexistingpoliciescanbestrengthenedthroughanunderstandingofWaSHrecoveryprogrammes

andtheissuesfacedbythegovernment,localandhumanitarianactorsduringimplementation.The

governmentsinAssamandOdishafocusedonshort-term,relief-centricwatersupply,ignoringthe

longer-termrecoveryneedsof thedisaster-affectedanddisplacedpopulations.Thegovernment

support in water supply and food provisioning was limited to the relief camps in Assam and

accessiblevillagesinOdisha.Itwasobservedthattheaffectedpopulationslivinginthereliefcamps,

multi-purpose shelters, and villages in Assam and Odisha had inadequate water sources and

sanitationfacilitiestoaccessduringrecovery.Thegovernmentmeasuresdidnotreachouttothe

remotevillages,whichwereworsthitbyfloodsandcyclones,wherethemostvulnerablegroups

had limitedaccess toWaSH facilities (Sections5.2.2and6.2.2). ThePHED restoredpipedwater

207

supplyschemes(PWSS)anddisinfectedspotsources(handpumpsandtubewells)alongtheroads,

andtownships(Sections5.5.1and6.5.1).TheruralareasdidnothavePWSS,andremainedunder-

served during disasters. In Assam, the line departments (PHED, Health Department and RWSS)

mobilisedhumanresources,anddistributedchlorinetablets;itemergedthathouseholdsdidnot

preferchlorinationduetotasteandodourissues.Agenciesworkinginrecoverycouldincorporate

localtechniquesoftreatingwateratthehouseholdlevel.Thesechallengedtheeffectivenessand

impactofWaSHreliefmeasures,andhygienebehaviouralchangesweredifficulttosustainwithout

committedlonger-termeffortsinaddressingtheattitudinalchanges.

Theempirical evidence indicates thatunsafeWaSHpractices–drinkingof contaminatedwater,

open defecation practice, lack of handwashing and food and water handling practices – cause

spreadofwater-bornediseasesandposesignificantpublichealthrisksduringdisasters,asfoundin

theexistingliterature(Prüss-üstünetal.2004;Brownetal.2012).Thechallengeofcontinuedopen

defecation, as a development concern,was largely unaddressed in thepost-disaster context. In

Assam,thePHEDrestoreddamagedwatersources,butsanitationwasleastprioritisedforrecovery

fromcyclicalandrecurringfloods(Section5.5).Similarly, inOdisha,sanitationprovisionwasnot

included in theOSDMA-World Bank reconstruction proposals (Section 6.5.3). The preparedness

measures focused on water, as the line departments advocated raised handpumps, undertook

stockpilingofwaterpurificationtablets,andpurchasedwatertreatmentunits.InbothAssamand

Odisha,watersourceswereraisedforaccessduringdisasters.Thereweremanygapsintheabove

measuresincluding,lackoffinancialsupporttohouseholdswhoborethecostofraisedplatforms

andlackoftechnicalknowledgeforoperationandmaintenance.TheWaSHpreparednessmeasures

also lacked a multi-hazard perspective, as different disasters had different impacts on WaSH

facilities–cyclonescausedstructuraldamages to theWaSHfacilitiesduetostormsurge; floods

resultedinsubmergenceandinundationcausinggroundwatercontamination;whileerosioncaused

WaSHfacilitiestobewashedaway.

Another critical issueemergingoutof theempirical evidence suggests lackof attention to local

actorsandwomeninWaSHduringrecovery.Thelocalactors,serviceproviders,andPanchayatiRaj

institutions(PRIs)implementingtheschemeshadlimitedcapacities,resourcesandpower(seeTable

5.5and6.6).Inordertosustainbehaviouralchangespost-disasters,theinvolvementofcommunity

208

leadersneedstobesystematisedinhygienepromotionefforts.ThePRIshavelimitedresourcesto

allocateannualsubsidiesforpost-disastertoiletconstructionandhandpumpinstallation.Thereis

potential to involve the health and education service providers in hygiene education through

outreachprogrammes.Howevertheirexistingresponsibilities insector-specificroles lackedclear

directionforhygienepromotionduringrecovery.Womenfacedprivacyandsecurityissuesdueto

lackoflatrines,difficultiesduringopendefecationandwatercollection,andproblemsinattending

to menstrual hygiene needs during disasters. Gender aspects in WaSH during recovery were

overlookedbythegovernmentactions,anaspectnotedinotherresearch(O’Reilly2010;Sommer

2011).TheempiricalevidenceshowshowwomeninAssamfaceddifficultiesinaccessingsafeWaSH

facilitiesduringdisastersandtherecoveryphases.

7.1.2PoliciesandschemesrelatedtoWaSHandRecovery

ThefollowingpoliciesandschemesinWaSHandrecoveryareexaminedforunderstandingcritical

gapsinimplementation(Table7.1):

- Watersupplyschemes:NationalRuralDrinkingwaterprogramme

- Sanitationschemes:TotalSanitationCampaign

- DisasterManagementPolicy(2009)andAct(GoI2005)andstateplansandreliefmanuals

(RevenueDepartment1976;GovernmentofOdisha1996;ASDMA2012a;OSDMA2013)

The Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Government of India is in charge of national

programmessuchas theTotalSanitationCampaign (which includesNirmalGramPuraskar, later

renamedasNirmalBharatAbhiyan,andaddressedasSwachBharatAbhiyansinceOctober2014)

andNationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgrammeforensuringsafedrinkingwaterandsanitation.

209

Table7.1:GapAnalysisofWaSHanddisastermanagementpoliciesinIndia(Source:Author)

Policy/Scheme

Features Implementedby Institutionalandfunding ChallengesAssam Odisha

NationalRuralDrinkingwaterprogramme

Decentralisedand

Public-private

partnership

betweenGPand

PHED;Shiftthe

focusfrom

handpumpsto

PWSS,focuseson

avoidingrelianceon

singlewater

sources,whichcan

becontaminated

duringnatural

calamities,

integrateduseof

traditionalsystems

Convergencewith

TSCandMGNREGA

forponds

construction,

drainage,latrines

MinistryofDrinkingWaterandsanitation(MDWS)Watersupplyand

support

organisation

(WSSO)for

monitoring,

community

participation,

capacitybuilding

ASHAWorkersshall

bepaidanincentive

ofINR75perwater

supplyconnection.

Northeaststates

have10%funds

reservedthrough

centralsupport

APHEDmaintainsPWSS

andspotsources

(conventionalhand

tubewells,DirectAction

(Tara)pumps,IndiaM

II/MIIIpump,andRCC

ringwell.

InAssam,activitiesinclude

1.MinimumNeed

Programme(MNP)

2.AcceleratedRural

WaterSupplyProgramme

(ARWSP)

3.RuralWaterSupply

4.Swajaldharaplan

5.Jalmanischemefor

schoolwatersupply

6.Waterqualitythrough

testing

7.FormationofVillage

leveluser’scommittees

forPWSS

DepartmentofRuralDevelopment,Odisha.Fundsareunder-

utilisedandonly52.28

%habitationsarefully

covered,47.71%are

partiallycoveredand

only2.27%PWSSare

reportedtobe

managedbytherural

population.

Only2%fornatural

calamitieswith100%

allocationsbythecentral

governmentasperpolicy,

whichlimitsthefunds

availablefromthestate

toaddressruraldrinking

waterafterdisasters.

Policyemphasiseswater

securitybutlagsbehind

inimplementation;

knowledgegenerationis

top-down.

Gender-blindpolicy

approach:Nominal

representationofwomen

atvillage-level

committees;trainedand

employedasmechanics

210

Policy/Scheme


SwachBharatMission

(SBA/SBM)

CleanIndia

Mission,2014

(Also

TSC/NBA)

Total

Sanitation

Campaign-TSC

NirmalBharat

Abhiyan)

Nationalflagship

programmeto

provideaccessto

individual

householdlatrines

(IHHL)toallrural

households,

schools,

anganwadisand

publicinstitutions

Convergencewith

MGNREGSwithINR

4,500/-forlabour,

INR4600/-NBA,

beneficiary

contributionofINR

900/-forSC/ST,

smallmarginal

farmers,landless

labourersphysically

handicapped

women-headed

families

MDWSwithtwoSub-Missions,the

SwachhBharat

Mission(Gramin)

andtheSwachh

BharatMission

(Urban)

InvolvesBDOsand

CDPOs,GP

ExecutiveOfficers

andAWWs,DWSM

throughtheir

DistrictProject

Coordinators,

DistrictlevelWSSO

Consultants,Asst.

Engineers,Block

levelJunior

Engineers,Grass

rootlevelSEMsand

fieldfunctionaries

involvedinIHHL

construction.

APHED:UnderTSConly50.20%IHHLs,64.88%

BalwadiToiletand18.48%

SanitaryComplex

constructed

Needtoaccelerate

sanitationcoverage

Componentsofnational

programmeinclude:

1.Start-upactivities

(baselinesurveys)

2.IECactivities

3.Ruralsanitarymartsand

productioncentres,

districtrevolvingfunds,

communitysanitary

complex

DepartmentofRuralDevelopment,Odisha

NBAcallsforyearlylist

generation,finalisation

throughverification,

andapprovedbyGram

SabhaandPanchayat

Samitiforeventual

approvalbyZilla

ParishadforIHHLs

Forsubsequentyearsit

shallbeplacedto

GramSabhainusual

mannerduring

preparationoflabour

budgetoftotal

MGNREGSworks.

Annualbeneficiary

identification,subsidies

provision,convergence

withMGNREGA,which

hasabysmalrecordsof

implementationinthe

statearedeterrentsin

sanitationdevelopment.

Inthecontextofdisaster

recovery,theopportunity

foradvocatingchanges

andgeneratingdemand

forsanitationismissed.

Lackofsupportfor

Households/habitations

interestedinconstructing

latrinespost-disasters

andlackofprovisionof

latrineswithinthe

disastersheltersfor

children,elderlyand

disabled

211

Policy/Scheme


Disaster

Management

Act(2005)and

Policy(2009)

Policy refers to

reconstruction to

build disaster

resilient structures

and advocates for

speedy, owner

driven, linking with

safe development

and livelihood

restoration

Under the Disaster

Management Act,

2005 NDMA and

state and district

authorities to

overseeDM;

NationalInstituteof

Disaster

Management

(NIDM) for capacity

building

Assam Relief Manual(1976)Assamfollowsthemanual

for relief provision, does

notincluderecovery.

Line departments engage

in water supply post-

disasters besides relevant

preparednessmeasures

Odisha Relief Code(1996)Emphasises provision

of drinking water

supply, and recovery

measures by line

departments post-

disasters, however

completely missed

sanitation

1. Erosion is not

acknowledged as a

natural disaster, hence

affected families do not

receive relief or

rehabilitationsupport.

2. Lack of emphasis on

restoration of WaSH

facilities, sanitation is

missedinreliefmanuals

212

Table7.1describesthepoliciesandhighlightscriticalgapsinhumanitarianWaSHinterventionsas

follows:

a. TheexistingpoliciesemphasiseimmediateWaSHreliefmeasuresbythelinedepartments

(PHED,AssamandRDD,Odisha)–drinkingwatersupply,disinfection,repairandrestoration

ofPWSSandspotsourcespost-disasters.

b. The policies do not reflect a multi-hazard perspective in preparedness, restoration and

compensationfordamagesatthehouseholdlevelthroughtheschemes.

c. ThenationalWaSHpolicies,namelytheNationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgramme(NRWDP)

andTotalSanitationCampaign,donotfactorWaSHserviceprovisionintorecoveryandallow

fortransitionintodevelopmentschemes.Theannualprovisionofsubsidiesforhousehold

latrinesandwatersupplydidnottakeaccountofthelossesincurred,andtherearesystemic

deficienciesintheimplementationofsanitationschemesinthedevelopmentcontext.

d. Themanuals,policiesandprogrammesdonotincorporatewomen’sneedsandchallenges

facedduringdisasters,andareblindtogendersensitivitiesduringreliefdistribution.There

are no separateWaSH facilities for women, or privacy in the relief camps and cyclone

shelters.

e. Theprogrammesdonotclearlydefinetheroleoflocalactorsinrecovery,astheapproachis

fragmentedintovariousdevelopmentprojectsandschemes(Sections5.4and6.4).Thestate

government and line departments have limited funds and resources at their disposal to

addressWaSHrecoveryneeds.Thepoliciesincorporateincentivesforgrassrootsworkersfor

installationofWaSHfacilities,butthesecouldbeintensifiedpost-disaster.

f. Althoughpoliciesreflecttheneedforwaterqualityimprovement,andhygienepromotion,

theserelyonIECmaterialsastheonlyapproach,whichisoftenoutdated.Hencethereisa

needforwide-rangingapproachesthatincorporatenewerandfeasibletechnologiestoface

disasters,togenerateawarenessandtoengageinbehaviourchangecommunication.

ThisresearcharguesthatprovisionofWaSHfacilitiesduringrecoveryisacriticalgap,whichrequires

policy attention. A holistic approach to WaSH programmes will enable progress in sanitation,

improveaccesstowatersupplypost-disastersandinstilhygienebehaviourchanges.Itisarguedthat

thereisapotentialforstrengtheninglocalactors’roleinWaSHduringrecoverythroughdevolution

213

of power and authority, and strengthening attention to incorporatewomen’s roles inWaSH to

reflectthedynamismofwomen’scapacitiesandneedsduringrecovery.

Thecentralfindingfromtheanalysisofgovernmentresponseisthatrecoveryisthemissinglinkin

the policy shift from a reactive response to proactive prevention approach in the Disaster

ManagementActof2005andthePolicy,2009.Thesedonotconsidererosionasanaturaldisaster,

therebypreventingthegovernmentandNGOsfromprovidingreliefandrehabilitationsupportto

erosion-affectedhouseholdsinAssamandOdisha.TheStatereliefcodesandmanualswerefound

tobeinadequateasaguidingdocumentforGovernmentrelief:theprovisionsinthecodeslaydown

theprocesstobeestablishedbefore,duringandafteradisaster,andassigndutiesbutleaveitopen

fortheDistrictadministrationonthespecificsofhowtoperformthoseduties,toprotectthebasic

rightsandentitlementsof theaffectedpopulation.The linedepartments followout-datedrelief

manualsforpost-disasteraction–theOdishaReliefCode,1980(updatedin1996)andtheAssam

ReliefManual (1976)– thatdonot reflect thecomplexitiesof recurring, ‘localised’andmultiple

disastersorprovideclear,adequateemphasisonrecoveryofWaSHandrelatedsystemsforlonger-

term,asreflectedinotherstudiesundertakeninOdisha(Ray-Bennett2009a).

Lastly,thedivisionofdisastermanagementfunctionsinthegovernment,forreliefcoordinationand

undertaking recovery, results in a fragmented approach. For instance, the SDMAs focus on

preparedness and coordination during disasters, while the Revenue and Disaster Management

Department focuson recoveryand rehabilitation.Thereweredifferencesbetween the recovery

activitiesundertakenbytheSDMAsinAssamandOdisha,whichcouldbeattributedtotheevolution

ofthestatebodiesandpoliticalacceptanceofdisastermanagementovertheyears,andavailability

ofresourcesforrecovery.InAssam,thereisagrowingmovementforconsideringtheAssamfloods

asanationalproblem,whichwillallowforcentralfundsasgrantsinsteadofthecurrentprovision

offundingasloans(Das2007).InOdisha,OSDMAdemonstratedevolutioninrecoveryplanningand

increasingcapabilitiesbyspearheadingthereconstructionprogrammeafterthecycloneinOdisha,

whereasASDMAwaslimitedinitsrecoverymandate(Section5.5.3).Recoveryprojectsandfunds

were channelled through development programmes, mainly focussing on flood control and

managementmeasures such as embankments and anti-erosionworks,which are inadequate to

214

address the recurring floodinganderosion inAssam.Theprogressachievedby institutionalising

disastermanagementthroughtheAct,statepoliciesandplansaredefinitelystepstowardstheright

direction,which reflectaspectsofcommunity resiliencedespite theabovegaps in recoveryand

WaSH.

7.1.3HumanitarianWaSHprogrammingandrecovery

ThehumanitarianNGOsinAssamandOdishaundertookdifferentapproaches,whichweredifferent

fromthegovernmentresponsetoaddressemergencyWaSHneeds.InAssamandOdisha,AgencyA

demonstrated its strength in addressing WaSH needs holistically, reaching out to the farthest

affected areas andmarginalised communities, who are likely to bemissed by the government.

However, theprogrammesweredesignedon thebasisofemergencyneedsassessmentsby the

agenciesanddonors.TheUKAIDprogramme inOdishawasamassiveundertakingtodistribute

emergency relief kits to more than 21,000 affected households in Odisha. The ECHO-funded

programmes in Assam and Odisha included rehabilitation of water sources, provision of

intermediateshelters,communallatrinefacilities,andlivelihoodsupportthroughcashtransfers.

This research argues that time-bound, short-term recovery programmes are unable to address

WaSHneeds for all the affectedhouseholds andhence resort to targeting themore vulnerable

householdgroups,orproviding sharedor communal facilities. The responseprogrammes fail to

address the longer-term issues – hygiene behavioural changes and open defecation practices –

within short timeframes (6-8 months). In Assam, Agency A installed WaSH facilities that were

washedawayduringtherecurringfloodsorabandonedduringdisplacement.Communitypriorities

andneedsforprivatelatrines,sustainablelivelihoodsandsecurehousingforlonger-termrecovery

felloutsidetheexistingprogrammingstructures.TheECHOfundinginAssamwasonlyfor6months,

afterwhichtheagencywithdrewitsoperationsduetolackoffunds.In2013,anewembankment

wasconstructedthatput thevillagesonthe ‘wrong’-sideof thenewembankmentandexposed

households to recurring floods and erosion due to breach in the new embankment forcing

communitiestorelocate.ThisregressivelyimpactedtheinstalledWaSHfacilitiesandrecoveryof

householdsinAssam.

215

Agencymandatesandguidingprinciples influencehumanitarian interventions.Thehumanitarian

dossier signedbyAgencyAdistinguishesdisasters into four categories,anddefines thewaysof

working with partners and international affiliate agencies for each category.300 Accordingly, in

AssamandOdishaprioritisationofdisastersoccurred:AgencyAdidnotintervenewhenfloodsand

erosion recurred in Assam. In Odisha, Agency A provided only relief support for 3 months to

communities affected by floods, overlooked erosion-affected areas in Balasore, and providedrecoverysupportfor6monthstocyclone-affecteddistricts.

The working principles for Agency A, as part of a comprehensive framework for emergencies,

include a rights-based approach, sectoral expertise, an integrated approach, a risk reduction

approach,workingwithlocalsandpartners,genderequalityandprotection,learningandimproving

its own performance, accountability to the affected communities and donors, and advocacy.301

FollowingtheseprinciplesagencyAdevelopeditsstrengthsandexpertiseinemergencyWaSHand

livelihoods, logistics and financial systems, participation and learning mechanisms. The gender

programming approaches included strengthening women’s roles through planning and

implementation, and ensuring women had direct access to humanitarian assistance and equal

300Itsetsthecriteriaandprocedures,notwithstandingtheprioritylevelofacountry,whenaspecifichumanitariancrisisbreaksoutsuchevent–togetherwithourexistingcapacityandstrategiesinthespecificcontext–isassessedandcategorisedinordertodecidehow(and if)AgencyAhas to respond.Humanitariancrisisaresortedas:Category1–high2 level,Category2–moderate level,Category3–lowlevel;Non-Category–noresponseisrequiredorpossible.301Rights-basedapproach(therighttoadecentlivelihood,toessentialservices,avoiceindecision-makingandanidentityfreefromdiscrimination),expertise(considerableinstitutionalknowledgeandcapacitytodeliverinspecificareasofemergencyresponse:foodsecurity, emergency livelihoods, emergency shelter, public health promotion and in particular the provision of safe water andsanitation),anintegratedapproach(humanitarian,developmentandcampaignworktomaximiseimpact,humanitarianworkoftenincorporates programs to rebuild livelihoods or to empower people to speak out, organise and have a voice in changing theirsituation), a risk reduction approach (reduce the future vulnerability of communities to disasters by integrating risk reductionstrategiesintoitslong-termdevelopmentworkthroughinitiativesthatbuildcommunities’resilience,includinggivingthemasayindecisionsthataffectthemandtrainingthemtobeemergencyresponders;anddisasterpreparednesswork,suchasplantingtreestoreducetheriskoffloodingandlandslides,orbuildingcycloneshelters),workingwithothers(withlocalpeopleusuallythefirsttorespondtoacrisis,localpartnerorganizationsandaffectedcommunities),genderequality(emergenciesexacerbateexistingpowerrelationshipsinfamiliesandincommunities.Duringhumanitariancrises,therearemorefemale-headedhouseholds,andwomenandgirlsaremorelikelytobethetargetofviolence),protection(allciviliansaffectedbyconflictanddisastersshouldbeprotectedfromthethreatofviolence,coercionanddeliberatedeprivation,andthattheyhavetherighttoreceivethehumanitarianassistancethey need. Civilians are increasingly targeted in armed conflicts, andwomen and children are particularly vulnerable), learning(improvingitsownperformancetodeliverbetterqualityhumanitarianassistanceandprotection,havethecredibilityandevidencebasetoinfluencetheperformanceoftheinternationalhumanitariansystemtodelivermoreandbetterprotectionandassistance),accountability (to the affected communities, as well as donors, makes its work more effective, as well as giving beneficiariesownership of the projects that affect them. This entails involving disaster-affected people in the design, implementation andevaluationofprograms,consultingthemondecisionsthataffectthemandprovidingcomplaintsmechanisms),influencingothers(influencetheperformanceofothers,includingnationalgovernmentsandtheUNsystem,toprovidegreaterassistanceandbetterprotectionforpeopleaffectedbynaturaldisastersandconflict),

216

control over essential resources. Theseworkingprinciples influencedprogramming strategies in

WaSHduringrecovery,andwillbereferredtoagain(Section7.2-7.3)

7.2 How can learning, knowledge, and participatory approaches help in

translatingthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

The empirical evidence provides understanding of the three approaches used in WaSH during

recovery–learning,knowledgeandparticipation–tofacilitatechangesinWaSHsystems.

7.2.1LearningapproachesinWaSHduringrecovery

The empirical evidence suggests learning during recovery occurred through twomechanisms –

socialandorganisationallearning–basedonexperientiallearningandlearningfromeachother.It

isarguedthatalthoughlearningapproachescouldpotentiallyfacilitatechangesinWaSHsystems

andpractices,thereareconstraintsintheexistingmechanisms.

FollowingPellingandHigh(2005),Pelling(2011)andManyena(2009),thisresearchunderstands

social learning as a process that enables communities to survive disasters through changes in

behaviour, and developed on the basis of trust and relationships (Section 3.4.1). The empirical

research indicates social learning in WaSH occurring throughWaSH coping strategies, WaSH

preparednessmeasures, and hygiene behavioural changes.Wisner et al (2004) describe coping

strategies as urgent actions undertakenwith the objective of survival in the face of a potential

disaster. This research refers toWaSH coping strategies as practices that progressively enable

households and communities to meet their survival WaSH needs after disasters. WaSH

preparednessmeasures refertohouseholdandcommunityactionsundertakenpriortodisasters

based on the experiences of previous disasters. The objective is tominimise damages incurred

duringdisasterstoWaSHfacilitiesandensureaccessduringdisasters.Hygienebehaviouralchanges

refertosustainedimprovements inexistingknowledge,attitudesandpracticesovertime.These

three forms of learning help to understand how social learningmechanisms inWaSH can help

217

translatethewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery,alsopartoftheemergingthemeson

WaSHtrajectories(discussedindetailinsection7.5.1).

AsWaSH coping strategies, household and community membersadopted new and safeWaSH

practices based on information provided by agencies on safe hygiene practices and prior

experiences.TheWaSHpracticespriortodisastersposedhealthrisksaswomen,childrenandthe

elderly fell sickduringdisastersdue towater-bornediseases (Section5.2). These includedpost-

disastercorrectivemeasurestomeetimmediatewatersupply,insteadofrelyingoncontaminated

floodwaters,submergedhandpumpsandopenwatersources.Tocorrectopendefecationpractices,

areas for opendefecationweredemarcated away from thewater sources, and emergency and

communal latrineswerebuiltandusedby themembers.Another strategywas to relyonsocial

networks,mainlyneighbours,friendsandfamilymembersforWaSHsupport.InAssam,households

had adopted strategies such as sharecropping, shared homesteads, and use of communal

handpumpstodistributethefinancialburdenandriskoflossesamongstagroupofhouseholds.

HouseholdsandcommunitiesundertookWaSHpreparednessmeasuresinareasaffectedbyregular

disasters,sometimeswiththesupportofPHEDandhumanitarianagencies.Raisedhandpumpswere

installedabovepreviousfloodlevels,basedonhazardhistoryandcommunityknowledgeofliving

withdisasters.InAssam,agenciesprovidedhandpumpsandlatrinefacilitiesonraisedfloodmounds

foraccessduringfloods.InOdisha,agenciesinstalledraisedwatersources,whichwereusedduring

the2013CyclonePhailin.Duringrecovery,AgencyAconstructedraisedplatformsforhandpumps,

and provided them with privacy screens as preparedness measures. Communities regenerated

pondsandlakes,andinstalledregulatorsinartesianwellstoregulatetheflowasalternativewater

sources.

Hygiene behavioural changesdepended on enhanced awareness of safe hygiene practices, and

understandingofrisksassociatedwithunhygienicpractices.Thesechangesreflectedtheintangible

aspectsoflearninginWaSHsuchasattitudinalchangesandactivitiesarisinginresponsetoanon-

going experience. Pelling and High (2005) consider that behaviour includes internal and tacit

activities such as conscious or unconscious cognition, emotional affect or the formation and

218

operationofpersonalrelationships.Thehouseholdsadoptedlow-costwaterpurificationmeasures

suchasuseofclothfilters,alumandchlorinetablets,andboiling.InAssam,householdmembers

washedtheirhandsusinglocalmaterialssuchasash,bananaskinorsoil.Thechangeswerebrought

aboutbyhygienepromotionactivities,andexistingguidelinesadvocateforlearningandbehavioural

changes with the help of not just IEC materials but through participatory or learner-centred

approaches(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).

However, social learning mechanisms face certain constraints that limit how the window of

opportunityavailableduringrecoveryistranslatedintoaction.Firstly,thesemechanismsaddress

immediatepost-disasterWaSH,but longer-termsustainablechangesare ignored.Social learning

failstotranscendintorecoverywherecommunitiesfacecyclicalandrecurringdisasters.Secondly,

the social networks are not effective to fulfil long-term WaSH needs because households get

displacedduringdisasters,andlocalpowerdynamicsinfluencesocialcohesivenessandsharingof

resources.InAssamthereweretensionsbetweentheindigenousgroupsandimmigrantsi.e.Bodos

and Ahoms and BangladeshiMuslims. This led to differential access to existingWaSH facilities

(Section5.2.5).Lastly,thefinancialcostsofconstructionandmaintenanceofraisedwatersources

werebornebyhouseholds.Thetechnicalknowledgeofoperationandmaintenanceoffacilitieswas

important–theraisedstructureswereatriskofcontaminationduringdisastersiftherewerecracks

intheconcreteaprons,orduetobrokensanitaryseals.Thesefindingsaresimilartotheexisting

understandingofemergencyWaSHinterventions,whichshowthatthesustainability,feasibilityand

safemaintenanceof theWaSH infrastructure remainsanareaof challenge inemergencyWaSH

(Smith2009).

Thesecondmechanismoflearningoccurredatorganisationalsites–governments,humanitarian

NGOs,andacrossNGOsinaconsortium.Asisobvious,therearedifferencesinhowagencieslearn

andinstitutionalisechangesintheirapproachesthroughindividuallearning,priorexperiencesand

learningfromeachotherandfromcommunities.Duringrecoverythegovernmentactionsfocused

onlyonfloodprotectioninAssam,andcyclonemitigationandrehabilitationinOdisha(Section7.1).

Thedifferentapproachesby thegovernmentsofAssamandOdishadependedon thenatureof

disasters, prior experiences,mandates and capacities of disastermanagement institutions, and

219

willingnesstolearnandimplementchanges.Afterthe1999supercycloneinOdisha,theGoOand

OSDMAhaddevelopeda‘cultureofpreparedness’,whichhelpedpreventcasualtiesduringthe2013

cyclone.Thiswasachievedthroughsearchandrescueteams,evacuationandearlywarningsystems,

andspeedyreliefmobilisationforaffectedhouseholds(Dash2013).OSDMAplannedandproposed

areconstructionprogrammewithWorldBank-AsianDevelopmentBankfundingforconstruction

ofcyclone-shelters,housing,andslumredevelopment(Section6.5).

Contrastingly, inAssam, thegovernmentdealtwith recurring floods.Government learning from

previous floodexperienceswas limited, as theunderlying issues – recurring floodsanderosion,

rehabilitation and resettlement – remained unaddressed. Moreover, learning from previous

responseswasnotdocumentedtostrengthenfutureactions.Evidentlythestatefloodmanagement

andanti-erosionworksdemonstratedthis lackof learningeffortbythegovernment.Since1954,

structural measures such as construction of embankments, dykes and river training had been

adopted toprevent floods (Das2007).Theadhocconstructionofembankmentsafter the2012

floodsfailedtocheckerosionandrivermovement,andtheembankmentswerebreachedduring

subsequentmonsoonsin2013.Itisarguedthatthecommunitieslivingintheregion,withtraditional

knowledgetodealwiththefloods,werenotinvolvedindecision-makinginthegovernmentflood

management programmes. The riverine populations were alienated and forcefully relocated

withoutresettlementsupport.Theexchangeoflocaltraditionalknowledgeandscientifictechnical

expertisewasmissinginthegovernmentaction.

Learninginhumanitarianagenciesoccurredthroughinstitutionalmechanismsandcollaborations

with other actors – local NGOs, other agencies in a consortium and communities. Agency A

institutionalised monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEAL) mechanisms in the response

programmes in Assam and Odisha (Section 5.6.2 and 6.6.1). This research argues that the

mechanismssupporttransferoflearningfromoneprogrammetoanother,butoverlookunderlying

structural issueswithineachcontext. For theagency, learningwas specific toprogrammes,and

hencesimilartoolswereusedacrossallprogrammes–tounderstandWaSHneeds,AgencyAused

sectoral assessments, real-time evaluations (RTEs), andWaSH knowledge, attitude and practice

(KAP) surveys (sections 5.6.2). These tools were applied within the pre-designed humanitarian

220

response programmes. Expert consultants were hired for WaSH sectoral assessments to

recommendtoiletdesign,bathingfacilities,andwatersourcerehabilitationplans(Section5.6.2).

Sincetheprogrammeoutcomesandbudgetweredeterminedbeforetheassessmentwascarried

out,theexpertswerenotmandatedtosuggestcorrectivemeasurestoaddressopendefecationin

shorttimeframes.

AgencyAreliedonRTEsforprogrammaticlearningincludingshort-term,mid-courseprogrammatic

changesaswellaslonger-termprogrammaticandstrategicrecommendations.InOdisha,theRTE

teamsuggesteduseofcontext-appropriate latrinematerials thatwouldallowventilation;hence

tarpaulinsheetswerereplacedwithbamboomatsforthelatrinewalls(Section6.6.1).InAssamand

Odisha, transferrable lessonswereadopted,whichshows that learning fromoneprogrammeto

another responseoccurs,mainly because similar interventionswereundertakenwithin the two

programmes.Theselessonsincludeddistributionofsanitarycloth,alongwithdemonstrationsby

the public health volunteers on how to use sanitary pads and cloths. In Assam, the RTE team

recommended distribution of solar lights for security and privacy of female members during

defecationandbathing,whichwasreplicatedinOdisha.However,criticalanalysisandreflectionof

organisational mandates and systems was beyond the remit of these evaluations and learning

mechanisms.Iftheagencydidnotintervene,RTEsdidnotevaluatenon-interventionistapproaches

or thenon-inclusionof longer-term issuesof resettlement, sustainable livelihoodsandwomen’s

empowermentwithinrecoveryprogrammes.

TheagenciesundertookWaSHKAPsurveystounderstandhouseholdchangeswithabaselineatthe

beginningoftheprogrammefordesigningthehygienepromotionstrategy.Theresultsoftheend

linesurvey,attheendoftheprogramme,arecomparedwiththebaselinetounderstandtheimpact

andchangesinitiatedbytheprogrammesinhouseholdWaSHpractices.Howeverempiricalfindings

showthatKAPsurveyfindingsweremerelyusedforreportingpurposes,andnot fordeveloping

sustainable changes inWaSH practices. The hygiene promotion strategies were based on field

assessmentsandstaffperceptionsinsteadofKAPfindings,becausetheKAPbaselineisundertaken

after the programme proposals are designed, submitted to donors and finalised. Despite the

221

potential for assessing changes and learning from KAP surveys, agencies failed to capture the

processesinvolvedinWaSHimplementation.

AgencyAalso learnt aspartof the consortiummodel inAssamandOdisha (Section5.6.3). The

consortiummodelwas adopted in recent disasters in India; pushed by donors for its value for

money,programmeoutreach, scaleandvisibility. This researchargues that consortia canact as

spacesforcollaborationwithjointeffortsatdocumentationofbestpracticesandadvocacy.These

spaces,Wenger (2000) argues, allow for contestation of ideas. However, since they are donor-

driven, consortia last only for the programme’s duration. Different NGOs participating in the

consortiumadoptflexibleanddiverseapproaches,usefulforadvocacyandinfluencingpolicies.The

consortium, inwhichAgencyAparticipated inAssamandOdisha,adopteddiverseprogramming

approaches through consultations with local NGOs and communities based on contextual

understanding(Section5.6.3).InOdishatheconsortiummodelworkedasacollaborativeplatform

forknowledgemanagement,whichdocumentedtheprogrammeobjectivesandoutcomesthrough

regularnewsletters,meetings,workshopsanddigitalplatforms.302Thesewere supportedby the

internationaldonors,andlimitedtothefundedprogrammes.Besides,therewereagencynetworks

andInterAgencyGroups(IAG)inbothstatesareinvolvedincoordinationduringdisasters,andjoint

needsassessments,buthavelimitedrolesinrecovery(Section5.6.3and6.6.3).Thisresearchargues

thatexistingconsortiaapproacheshavepotentialbutfailtosustaineffectivelearningapproaches

thattransformorganisationalpoliciesandpractices.

Learningapproachescanhelpintranslatingthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery

intoaction,ifthelearningfrominterventionsistranslatedintothedailylivesofaffectedpopulations

andnotlimitedtoprogramming.Thisechoesthefindingsfromstudiesonlearningforresilienceand

recovery(Manyena2009;King2015).Reflectingontheoriesoflearning(Section3.4),theempirical

research shows that learning occurred through step-by-step correctivemeasures in Assam and

Odisha.Usingtheoriesonlearningfrom(small)disasters(VossandWagner2010),thelearningat

302http://www.sphereindia.org.in/Download/03.11.2014%20Sphere%20Newsletter_November%202014%20Issue%20No%205.pdfandhttps://phailincycloneresponse.wordpress.com/

222

variouslevels–households,communitiesandgovernmentorganisations–occurswithinasingle-

loop.Suchlearningfocusesonfirst-orderchanges,whicharedirectconsequencesofexperiencesof

disasters.AgencyAdemonstratedcapacitiestoengageinsecond-looplearning,whichacknowledge

prevailingbehaviourpatternsandallownewproblem-solvingtechniques.Thelearningisspecificto

theprogrammeinterventionswithinspecificcontextsandcorrectionofmistakeswithintheexisting

guidelinesandbenchmarks.Thushumanitarianactorsengagedin‘learningforimprovement’,the

double-loop-learning, where the focus is to examine current interventions, enhance existing

capacities,andincorporatesuggestionsforimprovementofinterventions,processesandoperating

procedures.However, theopportunityprovidedduring recovery ismissedbecause thirdkindof

learning – deutero-learning – does not occur. This learning engages the actors in critically

questioning and addressing underlying issues of open defecation, menstrual hygiene, erosion

impacts,landentitlementsandrelocationsupport.Learningtomeetsuchobjectivesrarelyoccurs

becausethestakeholders’focusremainsononlyonelevel.Thisresearchcontendsthat‘learningto

understand’basedonpastfailures;participationofallstakeholdersandaddressingstructuralissues

isabsentintheexistinglearningmechanisms.Theorganisationsshouldengageindeutero-learning

asdiscussedbyVossandWagner (2010), inwhichagenciesgobeyondsimpleerrorcorrections,

questionunderlyingcausesandtriggeradditionallearning.

7.2.2Knowledgeapproaches

Theknowledgeaspectofagencyapproachesisexaminedthroughtechnologicalinterventionsand

documentation (Section 3.4.2). The humanitarian WaSH interventions provided technological

solutions in water supply, treatment and sanitation facilities. The humanitarian agencies

rehabilitatedtheexistingwatersources,alongwithconcreteaprons,drainageandsoak-pitstoavoid

contaminationofgroundwaterthroughseepagefromthecracks.Theempiricalevidencesuggests

that the suitability and appropriateness of the technologieswas essential to address theWaSH

needs during recovery. The in-house expertise within agencies was limited; programme

implementationwasundertakenbyexpertconsultants,whohadlimitedtimetounderstandlocal

knowledge,andinformationonavailableandappropriatetechnologicalsolutionsinWaSHthatare

relevant to the context and nature of disasters. The proposed solutions were constrained by

budgets.InAssam,thelatrineswerebuiltusingtinsheets,whichweretoohottouseduringthe

223

summerseason. InOdisha theshared latrinesweresemi-permanentas thewallsweremadeof

tarpaulinsheets,whichcouldbeeasilydamagedbycyclonewindsinthecoastalareas.Oneofthe

biggestchallenges faced inrecoveryWaSHandavailabletechnologieswasthepre-existingopen

defecationpractices.Althoughagenciesprovidedemergencycommunallatrines,andsharedfamily

latrinesduringrecovery,thehouseholdspreferredprivatelatrinesorcontinuedopendefecation.

Fortheagencies,themobilityofhouseholdsandfrequentrelocationasacopingstrategy,worked

forsomeaspectsofresiliencebutcreatedspecificproblemswithrespecttoexpensive,fixedWaSH.

Mobilesanitationtechnologiesusinglocalmaterialswererequiredinflood-anderosion-affected

areas inAssam insteadof communal fixed latrines. The agency-built, fixedWaSH facilitieswere

abandoned when communities relocated in 2013. Similarly, in Odisha the mobile, communal

Vestagaardwater-filterswereunsuitabledue to turbidwaterconditions.These required regular

repairs,knowledgeandfamiliarityoftheusersforproperuseandmaintenance.Suchtechnologies

needpriortestingandpiloting;market-basedsolutionsandcheaperalternativesshouldbeexplored

withlocalmanufacturers.Therewasaknowledgegapofwhatappropriatesanitationtechnologies

wouldworkinthegivenhazardandgeographicalcontextofcoastalOdisha(Section6.5).

Thisresearchfoundchallengesindocumentingknowledge:theexistingsurveys,formatsandtools

wereusedtocapture,manageandreportdatafordonorsandfundraising,buttheprogramming

decisionsandimplementingprocesseswerenotcapturedorretainedininstitutionalmemory.This

aspectofknowledgegenerationinNGOshasbeencriticisedinexistingliterature(TwiggandSteiner

2002).SinceconsultantsandlocalpartnerNGOstaffimplementedWaSHtechnologies,theylearnt

throughtrialanderror.Theknowledgeretentiondependedontheinvolvementofthecorestaff(on

institutionalpayrolls)withtheprogrammeduringimplementation.On-the-jobexperienceofwhat

technologies worked within each specific context remained with the individuals and was not

retainedasinstitutionalmemory.Tacitknowledgeofcontext-specificapproachesandprocessesin

programmeimplementationwasnotcapturedintheinstitutionalmemoryeither.Existingstudies

arguetheneedfordocumentingwhattechnologiesandapproachesworkindifferentemergency

contexts(Brownetal.2012),whichremainsagapasobservedinOdisha.Strengtheningknowledge

approaches–arangeoftechnologicalsolutions,market-supportforWaSH,capturingprogramming

224

processesandoutcomesofexistingapproaches–willhelpintranslatingtheopportunityavailable

duringrecoveryintoaction.

7.2.3Participatoryapproaches

Communityparticipation isconsideredasderigueur fordevelopment interventions inthewater

supplyandsanitationsector (O’Reilly2010).This researchexamined theextentandoutcomeof

participatoryapproachesinrecoveryprogrammesinAssamandOdishaandfoundthatpost-disaster

agenciesusedparticipationasaphasedapproach.Thisthesisarguesthatagenciesshouldfactor

whenthecommunitiesareincludedindecision-makingprocess,andwhataretheremitsoftheir

influence over agency decision-making. Initially during the relief phase, there were limited

opportunitiesforparticipationwithinshorttimeframes(0-3months),soagenciesundertookblanket

distributionwhereallthehouseholdswereprovidedwithemergencykits.Thevillagedevelopment

committeemembers– local leaders,traditional leaders, localelectedrepresentativesandhealth

workers – were consulted for developing household lists of beneficiaries in the most-affected

villages.Emergencywatersupply,sourcerepairandchlorination,andconstructionofemergency

latrinesandbathingcubicleswereundertakenafterconsultationwithlocalleaders.Theagencies

used participatory tools during assessments to gather data and decide programme objectives,

insteadofinvolvingcommunitiesattheprogrammedesigningandplanningstages.

The lackof participation in the initial phase is problematicbecauseprogrammaticdecisions are

takenatthisstage;proposalsaresubmittedbyagenciestodonors.InOdishatheUKAIDandECHO

proposalsweresubmittedwithin lessthanamonthofthedisaster(Table6.1).Thecommunities

werelimitedtoprovidinginformationatthisstage,andhadnopoweroverkeydecisions.Therefore

programmesdidnotappropriatelyreflectthecommunityrecoveryprioritiesandlonger-termneeds.

Thedynamichouseholdandcommunitychanges–displacement,migration,andWaSHtrajectories

–duringrecoverywerenotfactoredintohumanitarianprogrammes.InAssam,themultipleflood

wavesledtofrequentdisplacementofaffectedpopulations,whichposedchallengestotheWaSH

programmeteamsastheWaSHfacilitiesatthereliefcampsinschoolsoronembankmentswere

abandonedandnewfacilitieshadtobereinstalledintherelocatedareas.

225

TheempiricalevidenceindicatesthatlocalcommunitiesweregraduallyinvolvedinWaSHprojects.

Later, agencies constituted and consulted village committees and task forces for beneficiary

targeting, designing community projects and site selection (Section 5.6.2). Sector-specific

committeeswereconstitutedforCFW,livelihoods,andwaterandsanitationprojectsatthevillage

level.TheWaSHcommitteerepresentativeswereconsultedfordecisionsonbeneficiarytargeting

and sitingofWaSH facilities. Theywereprovidedwith informationabout government schemes,

trainingondisinfectionandrepairofwatersources,andprovidedwithtoolkitsforoperationand

maintenanceofWaSHfacilities.However,therolesandresponsibilitiesofthecommitteemembers

and their functions beyond the programme duration were unclear. These committees were

functional as long the programmes operated – when the project staff visited the areas for

implementingormonitoringtheyengagedwiththecommitteerepresentatives.InAssamafterthe

programmes ended, the committees became dysfunctional and did notmeet regularly because

members had relocated ormigrated. This finding is similar to previous research on community

participation in post-disaster housing and reconstruction (Davidson et al. 2007). That study

illustratedthatthepointatwhichthecommunitiesareinvolvedindecision-makingdeterminesthe

result of the recovery programmes (ibid). This research suggests that community participation

shouldbeintegratedintheprogrammedesignasearlyaspossibleby includingbeneficiariesup-

front at the design stage, and by providing definite roles for communities, who are the key

stakeholdersbuthavetheleastpower.

Theempiricalevidencedemonstratesthatparticipationwaslimitedinscopeintheprogrammesas

agenciesfollowedroutineandconventionalapproaches,ledbytheguided-participation(Twigget

al.2001),orexploitativeparticipation(Pelling2007)model.Thereweretensionsbetweenefficiency

(controlling labour and time costs) and inclusiveness (expanding participation) in the recovery

programmes.Theprogrammesfailedtoaddresstherootcausesofinequalities,andrespondedto

the‘community’asahomogenousentity–withsimilarneedsandvoices.Thisresearcharguesthat

merelyadoptingcommunityparticipatoryprocessesdoesnotenablethecommunitiestotransform

themselves.Itisimportanttounderstandwhoareincludedwithintherecoveryprogrammesfrom

thecommunities.Theempiricalresearchdemonstratedthatafterthedisastersthehumanitarian

agenciesreachedouttothevulnerableandmarginalisedgroups,wholivedintheruralfringesand

226

inaccessibleareasinAssamandOdisha.However,theycouldnotaddressdiverseidentities,multiple

needs,capacitiesandpracticesduetoshorttimeframesandbudgetaryconstraints.Theinclusionof

vulnerable groups was crucial to ensure that community consultation processes were truly

representative. The humanitarian agencies particularly targeted vulnerable households for the

WaSH interventions based on specific inclusion criteria: women-headed households, elderly,

disabledandpooraffectedhouseholds.

Acrucialaspectofinclusioninhumanitarianprogrammeswasrelatedtowomen’sparticipationin

thevillagecommitteesandbeneficiarytargeting.Forwomentoparticipateindecision-makingat

thehouseholdandcommunityitisnecessarytoaddresstheunderlyinghouseholdandcommunity

power dynamics. Agency A demonstrated a gendered approach in their recovery programming

throughgender-sensitiveplanning,which included femalemembers inasproject staff, inWaSH

committeesandWaSH facilities’usergroups.AgencyA includedwomen-headedhouseholds for

WaSH, livelihoods and shelter support. The agency understood that women’s participation in

communityprojectsenhancedtheircapacities,developedtheirunderstandingandincreasedsocial

cohesion.InAssam,theRTEteamcommendedtheirsensitivitytowardswomen’sneeds,household

prioritiesandresponsibilitiesbyadoptingflexibletimingstoencouragegenderparticipationinCFW

projects, hygiene campaigns and village meetings. Despite these approaches, the recovery

programme in Assam faced challenges due to the power dynamics and underlying social

relationships in the households and communities.The male members objectedto women’s

involvementincommunityprojectsinbothAssamandOdisha.Theygavereasonssuchaswomen’s

securityconcerns,perceivedcriticismbyvillagers,andthepurdahsysteminMuslimcommunities

(Section 5.6.2.4). In Assam, male members revisited decisions on site selection and targeting,

arguingthatthesedecisionsweremisguided,aswomenwerelessawareduetoilliteracyandlacking

requisiteinformation.303

Theevidenceshowsthatwomen’sabilityandfreedomforaccessingWaSHfacilitiesisagendered

problem,notonethatcanbesolvedby‘women’sparticipation’alone(O’Reilly2010).Thisresearch

303Semi-structuredinterview:LA-6September2013,Solmari,Assam

227

suggests that thorough analysis and regular discussions with household groups, community

consultations,andparticipationofbothmenandwomeninchoosingsitesforWaSHfacilitieswill

helpresolvetheseaspects.Suchmeasuresbringtotheforefronttheunderlyingcomplexrelations

ofpowerthatenableordisablewomen’sparticipationinWaSHprogrammes,decisionsaboutsiting,

and their usage of water sources, bathing spaces and latrines. As Sultana (2010) argues,

understanding the gendered dynamics of both disasters and the interventions is necessary for

comprehensiveandrobustpoliciesandprojects.

7.3 How effectively do agencies facilitate the integration of emergency

responsewithlong-termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?

This research explores integration across NGOs and government actions over time, and within

differentsectorsduringrecovery.Theempiricalevidencesuggestsagenciescanaddresstemporal

integrationthroughLRRDandpreparednessmeasures,andaddresssectoralintegrationbyplanning

andimplementingcomprehensiveinterventionsduringrecovery.

7.3.1LRRDapproachandpreparedness

RecoveryisoftenthemissinglinkinLRRDapproach,thoughitiskeyforeffectivetransitionfrom

relief to development. Thehumanitarian agencies’ programming strategies to achieve temporal

integration did not explicitly mention LRRD approaches. The empirical research found two

programmingstrategies–exit strategiesandpreparednessmeasures–areusedbyagencies for

temporalintegration.Theexitstrategiesincludedcommunitycapacitybuilding,generatingdemand

forsafeWaSHfacilitiesandlinkingthemtogovernmentprogrammesthroughadvocacy.TheWaSH

facilitiesandcommunityassetswerehandedovertotheusergroupsandlocalcommunities.The

latrineuser groupswere trainedon cleanliness, operationandmaintenance, andprovidedwith

cleaning materials for latrines. The WaSH committee representatives and water user group

membersreceivedtrainingonoperationandmaintenanceandwereprovidedwithtoolkitstoopen,

repairandmaintainthehandpumps.Thelistoftrainedlocalfacilitatorswassharedwiththelocal

leaders, PRIs, anddistrict governmentbodies. The typical exit strategywas to link the recovery

228

projects with government rural employment, housing, sanitation, and water provision

programmes. 304 Accordingly communities received training and information about existing

governmentschemesforWaSH.

The systematic linking with development programmes was challenging because government

programmes were dysfunctional in Assam and Odisha. 305 In Odisha, Agency A, as part of a

consortium,undertooksurveystounderstandtheimplementationofthegovernmentschemes.In

Puri,theworkundertheMGNREGSwasundertakenonlyfor60daysinthepastsixyears.Inthe

ECHO-funded consortium programme in Odisha, agencies were responsible for engaging in

advocacywiththegovernment.Aconsortiummemberreflects:

“Ourexperienceofworkinginrecoveryhasbeenverymixed,because[of]thewaythingshave been designed and perceived by donors, with recovery limited to early recovery –meeting the immediate needs maybe for 3-6 months. Not necessarily all recovery[interventions] leadstorehabilitationorbuildbackbetter.Practicallyyouneedprocesses,betterknowledgetopreparefordisasters.”306

Thisresearcharguesthatdespitetheexitstrategies–communitycapacitybuilding,handingoverof

WaSH assets to communities, and linking and advocacy with the government – there were

institutionalbarriersthatposedchallengesduringthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.The

humanitarian agencies faced challenges not only from the inefficiencies in government

programmes,but alsoorganisationalbarriers suchas lackof fundsand commitment to address

longer-termrecoveryobjectives.InAgencyAparticularly,afterthehumanitarianteamexited,joint

proposalsweresubmittedalongwithregionalofficesforlonger-termprogrammes.Thisindicates

thattherewerestrongdivisionsbetweenrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentobjectivesasperceived

by the actors, donors and governments, which were further constrained by time and resource

allocation.

304NREGA,IndiraAwazYojana,TSCandNRDWP305SurveyResults:AgencyA,February2014,Puri,Odisha306INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-4

229

Temporalintegrationwasachievedthroughpreparednessmeasures,initiatedbythegovernment

andhumanitarianagencies.Tothisend,agenciesprovidedemergencycash,andconstructedshared

latrinesandcommunalhandpumps,whichpreparedcommunitiesagainstfuturedisasters.During

disasters, preparednessmeasures saved lives and ensured access toWaSH facilities. An official

stated:

Thekeysynergyinreliefandrecoveryisactuallypreparedness.Justoneword–beprepared.Soourworkispreparingpeople,systemsandinfrastructuretofaceashockintheformofrescueboats,orraisedhandpumps,raisedstorage,orwhetheritispreparingourselvestodoimmediate cash transfers to provide people with cash in hand for food support afterdisaster.307”

Agency A and partner NGOs enabled communities to prepare through construction of raised

mounds,andrehabilitationofdamagedwatersources,withWaSHfacilitiesandothercommunity

assets. Preparedness allowed for recovery immediately after the disaster struck. This research

argues that existing programming strategies inWaSH are unable to facilitate the integration of

emergency responsewith long-termdevelopment because the exit strategies lack guidelines to

operationaliseLRRD,andstruggletolinkwithgovernmentprogrammesduetosysteminefficiencies.

7.3.2Inter-sectorintegration

Integrationacrosssectors,althoughcrucialforrecovery,isnoteffectivelyaddressedintheexisting

recoveryapproaches. Theempirical research shows sectoral integrationoccurringat two levels:

between WaSH and other sectors (shelter, livelihoods and others), and within WaSH (water,

sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene). The empirical evidence suggests that within time-

boundprogrammessectoralintegrationisoftenoverlooked;thefragmentedapproachestovarious

sectors limit thepotential for holistic changesduring recovery. Theexisting sectoral integration

approaches do not fit the households’ and communities’ recovery priorities (Sections 5.2.2 and

6.2.2).ThereweredifferentprioritiesacrossvariouscommunitiesinAssamandOdishathatincluded

longer-termchallenges–landandfoodsecurity,livelihoodsupportandprotectionmeasuressuch

asembankments(Tables5.4and6.8).Theseprioritieschangedovertime,anddifferedaccordingto

307INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-3

230

gender, age,mobility, and socio-economic conditions of the householdmembers. The erosion-

affected community groups prioritised longer-term issues like security of land tenure, assured

incomegenerationthroughlivelihoodrecovery,andprotectionfromtheriver,whilethecyclone-

affected groups prioritised essential services such as water supply and livelihood and shelter

rebuilding.Thehumanitarianprogrammesandtop-downgovernmentapproachesdidnotreflect

these variations within recovery priorities, or community visions for longer-term recovery. The

communitiesperceived resilienceasnot justphysical recoveryof lost assetsbutalsoaspired to

escapethevicioustrapofpovertyandrecurringdisasters.

InOdisha, the humanitarian agencies integratedCFWwithWaSHneeds by building community

assetssuchasponds,watertankconstruction,andpondanddebriscleaning.Thisintegrationwas

achievedatthecommunitylevelbecausecommunitieswereinvolvedinidentificationofprojects

andimplementation.Theprioritiesweresetbycommunitiestoincludewatersupplyandstorage,

whichwasintegraltotheirholisticrecoveryalongwithshelter,saferaisedland,andprotectionof

assets from floods and cyclone (Section 6.3.2). The resultant integration in the recovery

programmeswasadhoc,andoftenaby-productofcommunityparticipation;itwasnottheprimary

focusof theprogrammes. Theprogramming strategies for sectoral integrationwereunclear, as

sectorswereprioritisedbasedonfundsandexpertise.Overallthefocuswasonshelterandcash

transfers,whileWaSHreceivednominalattention.Shelterconstructionwasprioritisedbasedon

visibilityandcoverage,whilehygienepromotionalactivitieswereintangible.Cashtransfersreceived

more attention, enabling households to purchase their essential items depending on functional

markets,andwere faster to implement if thesystemsare inplace.308Ontheotherhand,WaSH

investmentsandhygienepromotionrequire longer-termcommitmentandextendedpresenceof

thehumanitarianagencieswiththecommunities.

Thisresearcharguesforintegrationnotjustwithinsectors,butalsowithinWaSHprogrammes.The

evidence suggests there are disparities in funding and interventions for sanitation and hygiene

promotion,particularlymenstrualhygiene.Thewatercomponentisprioritisedintermsofcoverage

308INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-3

231

andoperationcosts.Fromasystemsperspective,agenciesincorporatedredundancywithinWaSH

systems by setting up alternatewater supply sources, and alternate sanitationmechanisms for

controllingopendefecation.WithinWaSH,communitygroupsprioritisedaccesstoadequateand

safewatersupplyhigherthansanitation(tables5.4and6.8).Thisdependedontheirperceptions

andattitudestowardssanitation,pre-existingpractices,awarenessofrisksassociatedwithopen

defecationandcontaminationofwatersources.Thisawarenessandknowledgeabouttheriskscan

be enhanced through public health promotion activities and financial and technical support in

constructionoflatrinesbyhumanitarianagencies.AgencyAfocusedmoreonconstructinglatrines,

bathingcubiclesandrehabilitatingwatersources,whichwerevisibleaspectsofWaSH,whilethe

intangiblechangesinhygienepracticesandmenstrualhygieneweredifficulttocapture.Thefocus

was on outputs such as the number of hygiene campaigns, training programmes and village

meetings, and changes identified from KAP surveys, but these did not reflect the outcomes of

hygiene behavioural changes that occur over the longer term. Similarlymenstrual hygienewas

ignored,sincediscussingmenstruationwasconsideredataboo;womenwereculturallyprohibited

toopenlydiscusstheirprivateneedsandconcerns.Therefore,thisresearcharguesthatintegration

isanessentialcomponentwithinWaSH,andacrossWaSHandothersectorsthatareessentialfor

recovery, inorder that the changesover timeare transformational innaturewhere community

recoveryprioritiesareholisticallyaddressedtofacilitatecommunityresilience.

7.4Reflectingontheresearchframeworkandquestions

Inthissection, I reflectontheconceptual frameworkonresilience inWaSH(Chapter3)andthe

researchquestions inthe lightoftheanalysisofempiricalevidence(SeeFigure7.1). Initiallythe

conceptualframeworkwasdevelopedtoexploreWaSHsystemsduringrecoverywiththehelpof

identifiedthemes–learning,participation,institutionalcapacitiesandintegration.However,there

were certain contextual, scalar, temporal and methodological challenges while using the

framework,whichemergedduringthefieldworkandanalyticalstages.

232

Figure7.1:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery

Contextualaspects:Theforemostchallengeofusingatwo-dimensionalframeworkwasthatitdid

not incorporateanycontext.Using thesame framework in twodifferentcontexts inAssamand

Odisha showed differences in the stakeholder capacities and interests, the nature, impact and

frequency of disasters in each context. TheWaSH development scenario and the communities’

responseandchangesafterthedisastersweredifferentinbothcasestudies.Hence,includingthe

context of the recovery and resilience processes – recurring nature of disasters, one-off mega

disasters like cyclones, and pre-disaster socio-economic development context – helps in

understandinghowrecoveryisdifferentineachcontextandwhatfactorsdeterminethechangesin

WaSHpracticesandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Thecontext-specificWaSHpracticesanddevelopment

progress in sanitation and improved access to water supply can help analysewhat transitional


Institutionalcapacities

Participation Integration

How can learning, knowledge, andparticipatory approaches help intranslating the window of opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

How can the existing policies inWaSHand recovery be strengthened toincorporate resilience in WaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?

How effectively do agencies facilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewith long-term development acrossdifferentsectors?

How can learning, knowledge, andparticipatory approaches help intranslating the window of opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

233

approachescanbeusedtolinkrelief,recoveryanddevelopment.Acentralargumentofthisthesis

–thatinstitutionsareunabletoaddresstheunderlyingstructuralissues,whichcausedisastersin

thefirstplace–canbereflectedintheframeworkbyincludingcontextualaspects.

Scalaraspects:Theconceptualframeworkdidnotdepictthescalarperspective–theactorsand

stakeholdersinvolvedinWaSHandrecovery–foranalysingrecoveryandresilience.Referringto

themulti-scalarperspectiveintheframeworkwillhelptointerpretactionsandresponsebyvarious

actorsandunderstandthedifferenceswithineachresponse.Itemergedduringthemainfieldwork

in2013,thatvaluesandpoweraspectswereabsentintheframeworkbecausemultipleactorsand

theirresponseswerenotpartoftheframework.Theempiricalresearchshowedthateachactor

interpretsresiliencedifferently.Hence,cleardepictionofscaleintheframeworkenablesthereader

topositionthemselvesforbetterunderstandingandinterpretation.Includingthescalaraspectsof

recoveryhelpsinestablishinglinkagesbetweentheactors,andthepowerdynamicsbetweenthe

actors.

Temporalaspects:Theempiricalevidenceshowedthatcyclicalandrecurringdisastersinfluenced

recovery processes; hence learning, participation and institutional capacities can be studied at

variouspointsintimetounderstandhowrecoveryisimpacted.Thisresearcharguesthattemporal

aspectsareimportantastherecoveryprocessunfoldsovertime,whileorganisationalinterventions

are over shorter timeframes and consider recovery nearer to the time of the disaster. Existing

studieshavehighlightedtheneedforlongitudinalandretrospectivestudiestoidentify,understand

andsustainchangesstimulatedbydisasters.ThisresearchdemonstratedthatWaSHpracticesand

access to facilities changed over time; hence acknowledging the temporal aspects within the

frameworkwillidentifyapproachestoestablishandsustainWaSHbehaviouralchanges.

Methodologicalaspects:Theframeworkwasdevelopedtounderstandcommunityresilienceand

howagencies can facilitate recoveryusingdifferent approaches.However, during the courseof

subsequentfieldworkandanalysistheagencyperspectivechangedgradually.Themicroscopicfocus

on households and communities (see section 7.5.1) helped to develop an understanding of the

inherentdynamiclinkagesandinteractionspost-disasters.Includingmethodologicalaspectsinthe

234

framework can specifically guide agencies to implement WaSH during recovery focussing on

emerging WaSH trajectories, and dynamic recovery processes. This will inform the sampling

strategy,theselectionofvillagesdependingontheNGOinterventions.Therefore,Ibelievethatthe

methodological approach, had it been focused entirely on developing a framework to guide

humanitarianactors,orgovernmentinstitutions,wouldhaveemphasiseddifferentaspectsduring

recovery.Thisisadirectionforfutureresearch,whichcouldproducerichinsights.

Developingatoolforpractitionersforunderstandingrecoverycouldincludehowthedataforeach

indicatorisgatheredandranked(Annexure3).Thiscanguideagencyinterventionsduringrecovery.

Thisisareflectionstemmingfrommydualroleinthefieldasapractitionerandresearcher,onhow

agenciesdesignandimplementtheirrecoveryprogrammes.Asareflectivepractitioner,Ifoundthat

theagenciesusedparticipatorytoolstogatherinformation,nottofulfiltheemancipatoryobjectives

ofparticipation(LeDeetal.2014).Ratheragenciesusedparticipatorytoolsmerelytoguideand

inform the programmes. Hence developing a tool for practitioners could describe themethods

involvedfordatagatheringandanalysis.

Similarly, in lightof theempirical dataanalysis andwith thehindsightofhaving conducted this

research,Irevisittheoriginalresearchquestions.Thisoffersanopportunitytoreflectonwhether

thesequestionswereappropriatetobeginwith,andhowcantheybeposeddifferently.Themain

researchquestion"Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,and

hygienepractices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?”was

theguidingframeworkofthisresearch.Anymodificationinthisquestionwouldhavealteredthe

theoretical foundation of the research. The focus on community resilience provided a different

perspectiveandvaluetothisresearch.Perhapsadifferentstartingpointwouldhaveenabledmeto

understand degrees of changes in WaSH practices by households, and interventions by both

governmentandNGOs.Inhindsight,itemergesthatthesubresearchquestionscouldhavebeen

framed in such a way to provide a clearer perspective to understand changes at household,

communityandpolicylevels.Astrongerfocusintheresearchquestiontounderstandwhattriggers

and sustain changes in WaSH behaviour could have helped identify learning approaches and

235

strategies thatagencies couldadopt touse thewindowofopportunityprovidedbydisasters to

makelastingchanges.

Lastly, Ibelievethatposinganadditionalquestioncouldhavehelpedmetogather,analyseand

present empirical data in a richermanner“How do households affected by disasters learn and

changetheirpracticesrelatedtoWaSHduringrecovery;andwhatdoesthistellusabouthowdo

communitiescopewithrecurringdisasters?”Sucharesearchprojectcouldhaveprovidedtangible

insightsonhowexistingpoliciesareorarenotworking,insteadofacommentaryonhowWaSH

policiesarecurrentlybeingimplemented.Thisresearchprojectofcourse,wouldhaverequireda

completelydifferentsetofmethodologicalapproaches,andwouldbeafarmoreambitiousproject.

7.5Emergingthemesfromtheempiricalevidence

The aspects of context and scale helped to analyse agency approaches to promote community

resilience.Thissectiondescribesnewemergingthemes,whichwerenotoriginallyreflectedwithin

the frameworkandresearchquestions.Thesemicroscopicandcontext-specificaspectsofWaSH

and recovery processes help to study how households’ and communities’ WaSH systems are

impacted by disasters and how they recover over time. The analysis of gender and household

perspectives, and intra-household power dynamics, helps to understand how these influence

household recoveryprocessesandaccess toWaSH facilities. Theseaspectswere ignoredwithin

standardisedhumanitarianprogrammingandtop-downgovernmentaction.Thissectionmarksthe

transitionofthinkinginthisresearch,wheretheinitialunderstandingofWaSHfromasystemsand

technological outlookmoved to a viewpoint of agency response and recovery programmes, to

graduallyacknowledgingthatthesocio-economicandculturalaspectsofWaSHduringrecoveryare

alsocritical todevelopanadvancedunderstandingof resilience.Theemergingthemes fromthe

empirical evidence, on WaSH trajectories in recovery, gendered processes of recovery and

coproductionoflearningaredescribedindetail.

236

7.5.1WaSHTrajectoriesduringRecovery

This sectiondiscusses emerging findings at thehousehold and community level, using the term

‘trajectories’tounderstanddifferentscenarios,asdescribedintheempiricalchapters(Section5.2

and6.2).Theevolutionofrecoveryalongacontinuumisfundamentaltothenotionoftrajectories

inthisresearch.Trajectorieshavebeenpreviouslyused instudiesoncomplexadaptivesystems,

and socio-ecological systems tounderstand changesover time (Holling1973;Ramalingamet al.

2008;Guijt2007;Broto2015),andinresiliencestudies(Mayunga2007).Therecoverytrajectories

after disaster have been the focus of discussion for many years (Moser 2008, p.6), indicating

differences inhazardexposure anddisaster impactsbetweendifferent sites (Chhotray and Few

2012).TrajectorieshelpinunderstandingtheWaSHrecoveryprocessesinAssamandOdisha,which

emergefromthesameevent,andevolveovertime,andindifferentlocations.Thearrowsindicate

thesetrajectories,representingdynamichouseholdtrajectoriesinacontinuumandpossibilitiesof

multiplerealitiesbasedonexperiences,andvariationsandcontext-specificmanifestations(Figure

7.2).

237

Figure7.2:HouseholdTrajectoriesinWaSHduringrecovery

238

Figure7.2representsamicro-level,disaggregateddepiction,shapedby(andshapes)thefollowing

threeelements,asrecoveryunfolds.Theseare:

A) Household characteristics (such as socio-economic conditions, cultural attitudes and

motivation,location,technology,prioraccessandavailabilityofWaSHfacilities)

B) Contributingfactors(natureofdisastersandexternalsupport)

C) Trajectoriesfeatures(learning,copingstrategies,preparedness,hygienebehaviourchanges

andpost-disasteraccesstoWaSH)

Thehouseholdcharacteristicsarelinkedwiththecontributingfactors–natureofthedisasterfaced

bythehouseholds,andtheavailabilityofexternalsupportthroughgovernmentorhumanitarian

actors. The resulting trajectory featuresdependon these characteristicsand factors,working in

conjunctionwith each other. Thus, the trajectories are path-dependent, influenced by a set of

factors and their presence or absence. The factors, in a loosely bounded box, indicate porous

boundaries,whichareinfluencedbylargersocio-politicalprocesses.Theseprocessesincludemacro-

level policies related to resettlement support, forced relocation, migration or flood protection

measureslikeembankments,orissuesrelatedtolandownership,livelihoodsandhousing.

Socio-economicfactors:ThehouseholdsdisplayedvariationsintheirWaSHpracticesandrecovery

investmentsdependingona complex interplayof socio-economic factors suchasgender, caste,

tribes, religion, immigrants, class and economic conditions. The empirical evidence shows

differencesinthecommunities’accesstoWaSHfacilitiesandknowledgeofsafehygienepractices

dependingonsocio-economicfactors(Section5.2and6.2).InAssam,thepoorhouseholdslivedin

temporarysettlementsforthefivemonthsofthemonsoon,withlimitedabilitiestoinvestinprivate

handpumpsorlatrines.Thosehouseholds,whohadasecuremeansofincomethroughremittances,

orbusinessesinthetownships,wereabletoinvestinlatrinespost-disastersinAssam,orrepairthe

water-sources.InOdishatoo,thefishinghouseholdslivedonahand-to-mouthexistenceanddid

notinvestinorprioritiseindividualwatersourcesorlatrines.

Culturalattitudesandmotivation:Cultureinfluencedthelocalknowledgeandmotivationinfluenced

changes inWaSHpracticespost-disasters. InAssam,women traditionally usedkolshis forwater

239

collection, and used clothes or alum for filtering water. In Assam and Odisha, these practices

reiteratedover time,andplayedout in relationtoagency interventions,suchasuseofchlorine

tablets or candle water filters for water filtration. The cultural attitudes and generational

perceptionsdeterredmanyhouseholdmembersfromusinglatrines–mencontinueddefecatingin

theopenalthoughhouseholdlatrinesexistedandinsistedwomenuselatrinesfortheirsecurityand

safetyafterdark(Section6.2.4). InAssam,childrendemandedforschool latrines(Section5.2.5),

while the elderly members preferred to defecate in the open. This difference was due to

generationalattitudes(Section5.2.5),becausetheelderlyareconditionedtouselatrinesfromthe

previousgenerations–theirattitudesaredifficulttochange,afindingsimilartoastudyconducted

by Coffey et al (2014) in a non-emergency context in India. The individual motivation of men,

women, children, andelderly, aswell as inter-householdpowerdynamics influencedhousehold

decisionsonWaSHinvestmentsduringrecovery.

Prior WaSH accessibility and availability: The prior access 309 to WaSH influenced household

trajectoriesdependingonhouseholdandagencyinvestmentsinWaSH.InAssam,womentravelled

1-2kilometresandwaitedformorethananhourforcollectingwater(SeeSection5.2.2).During

disasterswomenhadtotravelfartherusingboatstocollectwaterfromdistantwatersources,orby

wadingthroughdeepfloodwaters.Theavailabilityofsafedrinkingwaterwasconstraineddueto

damages to theexisting sources,andextensiveuseby thedisplacedhouseholds.AsperCensus

2011, Assam has coverage of 59.6% of household toilets. During disasters, in both Assam and

Odisha,memberscontinuedtodefecateintheopen–nearbushes,floodwatersorontheroadside.

Thepre-disasterlackoftoiletscouldbeattributedtoeconomicreasons,culturalattitudes,socio-

economicreasons,lackofawarenessabouttheintrinsicandextrinsicbenefitsofaccessingtoilets

withinthehousehold,andtheappropriatetechnologiesasexplainedfurther.StudiesinAssamhave

identified lack of cost-effective solutions for latrines and low priorities accorded to latrines as

deterrentsinhouseholdinvestmentsinlatrines(GlobalSanitationFund2013).

309Accesstodrinkingwatermeansthatthesourceislessthan1kilometerawayfromitsplaceofuseandthatitispossibletoreliablyobtainatleast20litrespermemberofahouseholdperday(WHO/UN-Water2012)

240

Technology: Technology influenced the availability of WaSH facilities in the rural areas. The

households lacked technical knowledge of operation, repair, and maintenance of handpumps

(Section 5.2.5). InOdisha, the raised handpumps fell into disrepair due to lack ofmaintenance

(Section6.2.1).Theartesianwells inOdisha indiscriminatelyexhaustedthegroundwater,dueto

unregulated flow.Dependingon thenatureof thedisasterandsubsequentactions,appropriate

technologiessuitabletothecontextwereessential.Thefrequentdisplacementofhouseholdswas

challenging for suitableWaSH technologies used in the region.Mobility as a strategy of flood-

affectedhouseholdsinAssamaffectedfixedWaSHfacilities,asitdisruptedhouseholdaccess,and

riskedWaSH investmentsbeingwashedawaydue to erosion (Section5.2.5). InAssam,Mark-2,

Popular -6 and Tara direct action pumpswere in use,whichwere raised for protection against

floods,butwhencommunitiesweredisplacedduetoerosiontheyhadtoabandonthesefacilities.

For addressing these concerns in WaSH it was necessary to develop suitable and appropriate

cheaper alternatives for post-disasterWaSH interventions. For sanitation, an evidence base for

technological solutions in the coastal areas inOdishawasmissing (Section6.5.1). This deterred

investmentsinlatrinesinOdishabythehousehold,community,governmentorNGOs.Asargued

earlier, this research found that local solutions for latrines were essential depending upon the

geographicallocationsandnatureofdisasters.

Geographical Location: As one would expect, there are underlying tacit connections between

householdlocationandsocio-economicstatusesindeterminingaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Table6.2

indicatesthedifferentialavailabilityofwatersupplyfacilitiesinOdishaacrossthedifferentvillages.

InOdisha,thehouseholdsincoastalandislandlocationsdependedoncommunalwatersources,

while in the inland villages, the households owned individual handpumps. The topographical

aspects,livinginhazardouslocationsandfrequentdisplacementduetodisastershaveaninfluence

onexistingWaSH infrastructure. Thehousehold locationemergesas thebackgroundwhere the

relationshipsbetweenhouseholds,theirsocialnetworksandaccesstotheWaSHfacilitiesplayout

atanygivenpointintime.Thetopographyinfluencedhouseholdwaterandsanitationtechnologies.

Inregionssufferingfromregularflooding,raisedWaSHfacilitieswerebuilt;inareas,sufferingfrom

erosion therewas a need formobilewater supply, treatment and sanitation technologies. The

householdslivinginhazardousareas–incloseproximitytorivers,coastalareas,islandsandchars

241

weresusceptibletodisasters,andtheWaSHsystemshadapropensitytosufferdamagesduring

disasters. In coastalOdisha, cyclone and flood shelters for refugeduringdisasters lackedWaSH

facilities.InAssam,ingovernmentschoolsrunasreliefcamps,affectedpopulationsweredenied

access to school WaSH facilities (Section 5.2.2). When households on the ‘wrong’ side of the

embankment, unprotectedby the river relocated, theyabandonedWaSH facilities in 2013. This

indicatesthatgeographicallocationinfluencestheWaSHtrajectoriesinconjunctionwiththenature

ofdisasters.

Natureofdisasters:ThisresearchfoundthattheimpactonWaSHsystemsdependedonthedisaster

types – cyclones, floods or erosion. The recovery processes depended on the impacts, and the

agencysupport.Incyclone-affectedareasinOdisha,thestormsurgecausedstructuraldamagesto

theWaSHfacilitiesinthecoastalandislandvillagesleadingtogroundwatercontamination(Section

6.2.3).Whileintheerosion-affectedareasinAssamandOdisha,theWaSHfacilitieswerecompletely

washedaway,sohouseholdsresortedtoopenwatersources.Inflood-affectedareas,thenatureof

floodinghaddifferentconsequencesfortheWaSHsystems:overtoppingorbreachofembankments

destroyedexistingWaSH infrastructure,water inundation ledtosubmergenceofWaSHfacilities

and groundwater contamination affecting water quality. The empirical evidence indicated how

theseinfluencedthehouseholdtrajectoriesinWaSH:householdsadoptedstructuralmeasuresthat

suitedthehazardcontext.InareasofsubmergencetheWaSHfacilitieswereconstructedonraised

platforms, or on stilts, while in areas where erosion was a regular phenomenon, households

investedtheleastamountofresourcesinWaSHfacilitiesormobilestructuresthatcouldbeeasily

dismantled. For instance,householdsused self-built primitive latrines, and installedhandpumps

thatwereeasytoremoveandreinstallduringrelocation.

External support: The presence, absence and quality of external agency support influenced the

WaSH trajectories. In thepresenceofhumanitarianandgovernmentagency support, therewas

improvement in WaSH facilities and practices. Agencies provided raised water sources and

sanitationfacilities,andinstalledcommunaltoiletsforeasyaccessibilityduringdisastersonaraised

mound(Section5.2.2and6.2.3).InAssam,agenciesusedlocallyavailablematerialsforemergency

latrines and raisedwater sources. In addition, the humanitarian actors held hygiene promotion

242

campaignsandcommunityawarenessprogrammesforenhancingWaSHknowledge,attitudesand

practices. In instanceswhen external agencies did not give support during recovery, theWaSH

trajectoriesdependedontheprioraccesstofacilities,experientiallearning,motivationandsocio-

economicfactors.Forinstance,householdsbuiltprimitivelatrinesafterthe2013floodsinAssam,

and Odisha, which were financially cheap, but not technically improved sanitation facilities.

Therefore,itwasimportantthathouseholdshadfinancialandtechnicalinputstomaketheWaSH

facilitiessafer,mobile,cheaperandresilienttodisasters.

Theinfluencesofhouseholdcharacteristicsandcontributingfactorsintherecoveryandresilience

process result in various household trajectory features. The WaSH trajectories vary between

households, and each household may exhibit one or many of the trajectory features: coping

strategies,learning,hygienebehaviouralchanges,preparednessandimprovementsinpost-disaster

accesstoWaSHfacilities,someofwhichwerepresentedearlierinthischapter.Theoutcomesof

learning,coping,hygienebehaviourchangesandpreparednesswerediscussedinSection7.2.1.The

improvementinpost-disasteraccesstoWaSHemergedasasignificantandtangiblefeatureofthe

WaSHtrajectories.Therewasanimprovementinknowledgeandpracticesduringrecovery,because

households relied upon the communal handpumps and latrines. The households had access

toVestagaardfiltersandcandlewaterfiltersthathelpedimprovewaterquality.Duringrecovery,

householdshadaccesstoimprovedWaSHfacilitiesinthevillages,andWaSHfacilitieswereprovided

atthereliefcamps,embankmentsandschools.TheseimprovedaccesstoWaSHduringrecurring

disasters. The improved access is indicated through increase in the number of available water

sources,thesmallerdistancesfromhouseholdsandsettlementstoaccessWaSHfacilities,andlower

numberofpeoplesharingthefacilities,andtheresultantdecreaseinthequeuingtimeatthewater

sources.Throughexternalinterventions,rehabilitationofdamagedfacilitiesallowedforimproved

accesstoWaSHsources(Section5.2.2).

7.5.2GenderedrecoveryprocessesinWaSH

The empirical evidence draws attention to the intra-household power dynamics and underlying

socialfactorsdefininggenderedrolesandresponsibilitiesinWaSH(Section5.2and6.2).Aswomen

areresponsibleforwatercollectionandstorage,cookingandchildcare,theirroleisimplicitwithin

243

theWaSHtrajectories.Itbecomeschallengingduringfloodsandcyclonesbecausethenearestwater

sourcesaredamaged,sowomenaccessdistantsourcesbywading throughneck-deepwater,or

dependonmen forboats to travel in floodwaters to fetchwater. Ithasbeenargued inexisting

studiesthatalthoughmenparticipateinagenderedactivity,thisisnotatruereversalofgender

roles, but a temporary role (Sultana 2010). This research indicates that the entrenched gender

normsandsensitivitiesmakeitdifficultforwomentorecover,astheyareconstrainedinaddressing

theirpersonalneedsregardingmenstrualhygieneanddefecationduringdisasters.Womengofor

opendefecationearlyinthemorningorafterdusktoavoidbeingseen,forissuesrelatedtoprivacy

anddignity.Theissuesrelatedtomenstrualpracticesandmaintainingpersonalhygieneareoften

overlookedinpost-disasterpriorities.Women’sneedforprivacywasmoreasociallydictatednorm,

for inappropriatenessofmengazingatthem,whilebathing,defecatingorurinating.Thisechoes

findings from a non-emergency context in rural Rajasthan (O’Reilly 2010). Menstrual hygiene

emergedasthe‘silent’need,whichwasleastexpressedordiscussedbutwasessentialforwomen’s

dignity, privacy, health and wellbeing. During emergencies, due to lack of latrine facilities and

sanitarymaterials,womenfaceddifficulties inwashing,changinganddryingtheusedmenstrual

clothes (Section 5.2.3). The use of sanitary pads had cost implications, whenwomen had little

controlover thehousehold finances, andwereunawareof theproperdisposalmechanisms for

sanitarypads(Section6.2.3).Theculturalnormsisolatedandsecludedmenstruatingwomenand

adolescentgirls,whofacedmobilityordietaryrestrictions.Thislackofawarenessandknowledge

of hygienic practices and related cultural norms were generational, impacting women’s

participation in daily activities and chores, and school attendance during menstruation for

adolescentgirls.

Thesegenderedrecoveryprocessesformthesecondemergingthemeofthisthesisthatwomenare

burdened by their ‘triple roles’ - productive, reproductive and community in the post-disaster

situation (Ray-Bennett 2009b). This empirical research highlights that within the household

trajectoriesduringrecovery,themen,andwomen(childrenandelderlyordisabled)havedifferent

needsanddifferentaccesstoWaSHfacilitiespost-disasters.Insteadofcallingthesewomen’sneeds

orpriorities,thisresearchrecommendsagenciesusegenderedapproachestoshowthatalthough

thedifferentialimpactsonwomencanbesingularlyaddressed,itisequallyimportanttobesensitive

244

tomen’sperceptionsandattitudestowardswomen’sneeds,rolesandresponsibilitiesrelatedto

WaSH during disasters. Ignoring or overlooking gender priorities or unmet needs affected daily

householdactivities,healthandwellbeingduringdisasters(Section5.2.2).InAssam,menoverruled

decisionstakenbywomenregardingsitingoffacilities(Section5.6.2).

AlthoughitisacknowledgedthatwomeninitiatechangesatthehouseholdlevelinWaSHthrough

handwashing, use of latrines, and safe water handling practices, the decision on household

investmentsinlatrinesisoftentakenbymentoprotectwomenandchildrenfromassaultduring

opendefecationinthedark.Theseintra-householdpowerdynamicsandpowerimbalanceswithin

the community influenced control of resources and investments inWaSH, livelihoods or house

repairs during recovery. Social processes in regular lives were exacerbated on interaction with

naturaldisasterprocessestoproducethedifferentiatedvulnerabilitiesandsufferingsthatensue,

whichhavegenderedimplications.

Thegenderedrecoveryprocessesalsooccurredduetoout-migrationofmenandyouthsinAssam

andOdishatoearnincomeinthetownsandcities,leavingbehindthewomen,childrenandelderly.

Thewomenwereresponsibleforrelocatingandrebuildingpost-disasters,whilethecontrolover

money – in the formof remittances, resources and land ownership – remainedwithmen. This

limited women’s choices in household investments in leasing land, paying masons, purchasing

essential items, or installing handpumps or latrines. Therewere gender differences in recovery

priorities:womenprioritisedWaSHbasedontheirunderstandingofthepreventivebenefitsofsafe

hygienepractices,andthedifficultiestheyfacedinaccessingWaSHfacilitiesduringdisasters.The

menprioritisedproductiveassetssuchaslivelihoods,shelterandlandsecurityduringrecoverywhile

womenprioritisedwatersupply,sanitationandeducationasrecoveryobjectives (Section5.3.2).

Theseprioritieswerenegotiated, contestedandactedupondifferentlyby themenandwomen

withinthehouseholdsdependingupontheintra-householdpowerdynamics(casesA6-A8insection

5.2.5).

245

7.5.3Coproductionofknowledge

Theanalysisofempiricaldatahighlightedanewemergingtheme–coproductionofknowledgeby

affectedhouseholds,communities, localactors,governmentandNGOs.This involvedgenerating

knowledgeofsafeWaSHpractices,anduseoflocaltraditionalknowledgeforpromotingcommunity

resiliencethroughWaSHwithexternalsupport.InAssamandOdisha,householdsparticipatedin

therecoveryprogrammingwheretheywerejointlyinvolvedincommunityprojectswiththeagency

A in WaSH knowledge generation and asset building. This was undertaken through enhanced

awarenessof safeWaSHpractices,constructionofWaSHfacilities,andsharedunderstandingof

localconstructionpracticesandhazardcontext.Thisjointproductionofknowledgeistermedhere

ascoproductionofknowledge(Armitageetal.2009;Heggeretal.2012).Thehouseholdsalongwith

otherstakeholdersplayakeyroleinthecoproductionofknowledge(Edelenbosetal.2011).

This research found instances of coproduction of knowledge in WaSH, where community

participation and agency support led to changes in newly installed WaSH infrastructure post-

disasters.Theparticipatoryprocessesweredirectedtowardsdevelopingcommunityparticipants'

technical expertise in repair and maintenance of handpumps, and mobile latrine construction

throughtrainingworkshopsanddemonstration.InAssam,agenciesbuiltontraditionalpracticesof

chang ghars (houses on raised stilts) along with handpumps and latrines in Assam, and raised

handpumps inflood-proneareas. InOdisha,agency-built latrinesweremodifiedtosuitthe local

context throughcommunity feedbackandparticipation in the constructionprocess (See section

6.5).InCFW,communitymembersparticipatedintheconstructionofraisedmoundswithWaSH

facilities for access during disasters, pond generation, and debris cleaning post-disasters. This

coproductionmechanismenabledhouseholdsandcommunitiestohaveaccesstoWaSH,whereby

theinstitutionsprovidedtechnicalknowledgeandexpertisefordealingwithregulardisasters.

Thischapterearlierdescribedthechallengesinlearning,knowledgeandparticipatoryapproaches,

whichlimitedtheextentofcoproductionofknowledgeasunderstoodinthisresearch(Section7.2).

Theagencieshadlimitedunderstandingofindigenouspractices,andshortprogrammedurations

hinderedtheextentofparticipationandlearningacrossagencies,householdsandcommunities.

246

Chapter8:Conclusions

Thischapterpresentstheconclusionsoftheresearchonbuildingcommunityresilience inWaSH

during ongoing recovery processes. It answers the research questions and provides

recommendations(Section8.1),discussestheoreticalimplicationsofthisresearch(Section8.2)and

presentsitsconceptualandmethodologicalcontributions(Section8.3).Italsosuggestsdirections

forfutureresearch(Section8.4).

8.1AnsweringtheResearchQuestions

Inthissection,Ianswertheresearchquestionsandproviderecommendations.Thesub-research

questionsare:

1. How can the existing policies in WaSH and recovery be strengthened to incorporate

resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be effectively translated into

practice?

2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow

ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

3. Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term


Lastly, I answer the main research question and draw upon recommendations for policy and

practice.Thequestiondrivingthisresearchis:Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterand

sanitation facilities, and hygiene practices, during post-disaster recovery promote community

resiliencetodisasters?

8.1.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate

resilience inWaSH?Furthermore,howcan thesepoliciesbeeffectively translated into

practice?

Chapter 7 presented the existing policies, discussed the lack of agency WaSH support during

recovery,andreflectedonthegapsinthepoliciesemergingfromtheempiricalevidence.Although

post-disasterrecoverypresentedopportunitiestoimprovepracticesandupgradeexistingaccessto

247

WaSH facilities, there were contextual and programmatic challenges that were difficult to

overcome. The agencies’ – government, local actors and humanitarian NGO – policies and

programmesfocusedonreliefandresponsemeasures,overlookingWaSHneedsduringrecovery.

Governmentsupport–householdsubsidiesunderwatersupplyandsanitationschemes,disaster

damage compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement support – was missing in the recovery

phase. The response focused on immediate reliefmeasures,whichwas inadequate in terms of

coverageinwatersupply.Thegovernmentplanningandeffortsoverlookedsanitationprovisionand

hygienepromotion.This limitedthescopeforchangesinWaSHpracticesandaccesstosafeand

improvedWaSHfacilities.

Theanalysisofnationalandstategovernmentpoliciesandhumanitarianagencyprogrammesshows

thatWaSHduringrecoveryremainsacriticalgap.Thenationaldisastermanagementpolicylacks

clear guidelines for addressing recovery objectives; government schemes in water supply,

sanitation, and state disaster relief manuals overlook provision of holistic WaSH – sanitation,

hygieneandmenstrualhygiene–supportpost-disasters. Inordertostrengthenthegovernment

policies in recovery andWaSH it is essential to shift the focus from a short-term relief centric

approach,whichislimitedtowatersupplyonly,andmovetowardslonger-termtransitionfocusing

on holistic WaSH, including sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene needs. The state relief

manualsshouldbeupdatedinordertoaddresstheincreasingneeds,complexitiesandchallenges

ofrecurringdisasters(whichmaybeofamulti-hazardnature),andvulnerabilitiesofthepopulations

living intheat-riskareas.Thenationaldisastermanagementpolicyshouldconsidererosionasa

naturaldisasterandundertakemeasuresformitigatingthelossesduetoerosion,andplanrecovery

andrehabilitationsupportforaffectedcommunities.

The recoverymeasures should includestrategies toaddressandovercomeexistingchallenges–

prevalent open defecation practices, inadequate access to water sources, recurring disasters,

insecurelandandtenureaspects–forbuildingcommunityresilience.Thisresearchcontendsthat

WaSHshouldbeaddressedholisticallyinthepost-disasterefforts,alongwithprovisionofadequate

WaSHinfrastructureinreliefcampsandmulti-purposereliefshelters,andstrongercommitmentfor

improvingprogressinsanitationdevelopmentduringrecovery.Thepost-disastermeasuresshould

248

addressdisaster impactsonexistingWaSHfacilities throughfinancial supportandrisk reduction

withindevelopmentschemesinruralwatersupplyandsanitation.Itissuggestedthatpoliciesdefine

stronger roles and build capacities of state authorities for disaster management and local

government actors to address longer-term recovery – through identifying needs, proposing

participatory recoveryplans, and strengthening the local serviceproviders includinghealth, and

educationforoutreacheffortsinhealthandhygienetotacklethechallengeofopendefecationby

generatingdemand.

The humanitarian actors addressed theWaSH needs of the poor, marginalised and vulnerable

groups, including water supply, sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene. The recovery

programmes specifically addressed gender needs in the affected communities and supported

household recoveryby includingwomen in their interventions.However, theprogrammeswere

time-boundandshorter-term;hence,theyfounditdifficulttosustainhygienebehaviouralchanges,

andaddressopendefecation,andstructuralissuesrelatedtoriverineerosion,resettlement,failure

ofembankmentsandlandtenuresecurity.Agenciesprioritiseddisastersbasedonavailablefunding,

disaster impacts and attention, which meant that erosion, recurring floods were ignored, and

recoverymeasureswereundertakenonly aftermajordisasters suchas cyclonesand large-scale

floods.Itisrecommendedthathumanitarianagenciesclearlydefinetheirrecoverymandates,and

influencedonorpoliciesforlonger-termintervention.Agenciesshouldincludecapacitybuildingof

local agencies and communities to address recoveryobjectivesusingparticipatory and inclusive

approaches.Thisapproachwillenablecommunitiestotackleattitudesandpracticesrelatedtoopen

defecation,anddevelopstrategiestoaddresslarger-levelissuesrelatedtofloodprotection,damage

compensationandresettlementofcommunitieslivinginflood-anderosion-affectedareas.

8.1.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthe

windowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?

Section7.2exploredandanalysedlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproaches.Thesocial

learningmechanismsinWaSHfocusedonimmediateWaSHneeds,overlookinglonger-termissues

ofaccessandchangesinWaSHsystems.Householdsandcommunitiescontinuedopendefecation

249

andunsafewaterhandlingpracticeswithouteffortstoincreaseawareness,financialsupportand

changes in attitudes. Government agencies differed in their approaches to initiate recovery

processes,andinthisway,theylearntfromexperiences.Thepost-disasterinterventionsfocused

ontop-downprotectionmeasureswithoutengaging,consultingandempoweringthecommunities.

The empirical evidence suggests that ad hoc embankment construction further exacerbated

community vulnerabilities, forcing them to relocate in the event of recurring disasters. Analysis

showed that social learning mechanisms focused on corrective measures, and humanitarian

organisations engaged in learning for improvement, without bringing about radical changes in

agencyprogrammingstrategiesandimplementation.

Thisresearchconcludesthatparticipationofaffectedcommunitiesshouldbeinitiatedinthedesign

phaseoftheprogrammes,insteadofa‘phasedapproach’whereparticipationgraduallyincreases

in the responseprogramme. The sustainability ofWaSH committees and their capacity building

were important to factor during implementation of recovery programmes. Agencies adopted

inclusiveapproachesforrepresentationinthevillages,buildinguponexistingvillagedevelopment

committees.Forstrengtheningandsustainingtheseorganisationsitisimportanttoclearlydefine

the roles of themembers during and after theprogrammeshave ended. Encouragingwomen’s

participation in recoveryprogrammesand targeting femalemembersduringhygienepromotion

efforts were effective in enhancing awareness and improving household WaSH practices. The

emerging findings on gendered recovery processes show thatWaSH during recovery should be

addressedbyinvolvingbothmenandwomenduringcommunityparticipationtodiscussissuesfaced

by women in WaSH and in general during recovery. Participatory approaches should include

decision-makingonhouseholdinvestments,andchallengesfacedbywomenforaccessingdistant

WaSH facilities, lack of privacy and secure spaces for bathing, and attending to theirmenstrual

needs: these are culturally ingrained and depend on power dynamics at the household and

communitylevel.

Chapter7showsthatthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery isnottranslatedinto

action.Hence,thereisaneedforstrengtheninginstitutionalcapacitiestoadoptlearning,knowledge

250

andparticipatoryapproachestomeettheaffectedcommunities’recoveryneeds.Theseapproaches

canbemaximisedtotranslatetheopportunityintoaction,byaddressingunderlyingvulnerabilities

of communities living in hazardous locations, resource-constrained environments, and facing

recurringdisastersandnot justprovisionofWaSHfacilitiespost-disasters.Theemergingthemes

discussedinSection7.5.3indicatesthepotentialforcoproductionofknowledgeofsafeWaSHassets

andpractices to informandsustainhygienebehaviouralchangesand increasedaccess toWaSH

facilitiesduringrecovery.

Withthisperspective,institutionalcapacitiescanbestrengthenedduringrecoverytopreventand

mitigate impacts of disasters, and encourage people-centred development programmes.

Developing an evidence-base for technologies in different disaster contexts, local practices and

indigenousknowledgealongwithrapidlydeployablemarket-basedsolutionsandtechnologiesasa

preparedness activity will help improve humanitarian capacities for WaSH during recovery.

Humanitarian agencies’ monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms need to incorporate

lessons learnt and critically reflect on programmemandates and contextual needs rather than

proposing quick fixes and transferrable solutions. It is suggested that enhancing roles and

responsibilities of different actors and stakeholders in coproductionof knowledge inWaSHand

disasters by institutionalising consortia as space for collaboration and cross-learning can help

translate thiswindowofopportunityduring recovery through focusedactionsand commitment

fromallstakeholders.

8.1.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewith

long-termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?

Section 7.3 explored the integration across time and sectors during recovery programmes.

Humanitarianagencies’programmingstrategiesdidnotexplicitlyincludealinkingreliefrecovery

anddevelopmentapproach(LRRD):instead,exitstrategiesreliedonlinkingprogrammeactivities

with the government’s development schemes. Integration across sectors – WaSH, shelter and

livelihoods–throughhumanitarianprogrammingwasachievedtocertainextent,whileintegration

withinWaSH–watersupply,treatment,sanitation,menstrualhygiene,andhygienepractices–was

251

limited. The standard programme components, designed immediately after the disaster, were

basedonagencycapacitiesandexpertise.

To sustain post-disaster changes in WaSH behaviour it was necessary to provide institutional,

financialandtechnicalassistancetohouseholdsduringrecovery.Thehouseholdsandcommunities

hadtorecoverthemselvesfromcyclicalfloodsanderosion,whilestrugglingwithpoverty,insecurity

in food, livelihoods and land tenure, and deal with the failure of embankments as protection

measures.Thisresearcharguesthatintegrationacrosstimeandvarioussectorscanhelpcommunity

recovery processes, preparedness towards future disasters and building inherent capacities for

resilience.Presently,agencyapproachestowardsintegrationarelimitedtofulfillingtheirsurvival

WaSHneeds,andrestoringlivelihoodsandintermediateshelter.Theresearchconcludesthatlack

of integration adversely affects recovery processes, and results in forced displacement and

outmigrationduetohostileandresource-constrainedenvironmentsandrecurringdisasters.

8.1.4 How effectively do different approaches to water and sanitation facilities, and

hygiene practices, during post-disaster recovery promote community resilience to

disasters?

Theexistingpoliciesandpracticefailtoaddressholisticandlonger-termrecoveryofhouseholdsand

communitiesaffectedbyfloods,cycloneanderosion.Therecurringdisastersposesignificantthreats

totheWaSHsystemsandtheirunsafepracticesposehealthhazardsintheemergency.Thiscanbe

addressed through learningandknowledgeapproaches,ashouseholdandcommunitymembers

becomeincreasinglyawareofsafeWaSHpractices.Learningandknowledgeisimportanttoimprove

and transform their existingpractices of opendefecation, unsafewater supply,women’s needs

relatedtomenstrualhygiene,handwashingandwatertreatment.Thecoproductionofknowledge,

resultingfromconsultativeprocesses,motivatescommunitiestoadopthouseholdlatrinesduring

recovery in the absence of agency support. Agencies can support sustained changes in WaSH

systemsbyprovidingappropriatetechnologyandlocalcheaperalternativesinWaSH–suitableto

thecontextandresilienttomultipledisastersintheregion–alongwithtechnicalknowledgeand

expertise.Forimprovingorganisationallearningmechanisms,thisresearchsuggestsparticipatory

approachesanddevelopinganevidencebaseforcontext-appropriatetechnologicalsolutions.

252

Humanitarian agencies adopted participatory approaches during the implementation stages of

recovery programmes, whereas the government programmes lacked a consultative and

participatory approach in their longer-term projects. Humanitarian agencies used inclusive

approaches by targeting women-headed households, and involved women in their hygiene

promotionactivities.However,thisresearchconcludesthatagenciesshouldgobeyondtemporary

quickfixapproachesandsupporttransformationalchangesatthecommunity level,byanalysing

andaddressinghouseholdpowerdynamicsandgenderedrecoveryprocesses.

The institutional capacities to plan, design and implement recovery programmes depended on

agencymandatesandability togenerateresources for longer-termprogrammes.ForLRRD,pre-

existingpracticesandattitudes–towardsopendefecation,consumptionofcontaminatedwater

during disasters – should be changed. Agencies should prepare households and communities

towardsfuturedisasters,andsupportlonger-termrecoveryobjectivesduringthetransitionalphase.

Thedemandforimprovingefficiencyofgovernmentprogrammeimplementationinthevillagesis

crucialforeffectiveintegrationofhumanitarian,recoveryanddevelopmentaspects.Thisresearch

concludes thatpost-disasterhouseholdsandcommunitiesneed tobe supported, consultedand

informedfordesigninganddevelopinglonger-termplans.Thishelpsinreducinganxiety,frustration,

lossesanduncertaintyduetorecurringdisastersinresource-constrainedenvironments.

Throughtheanalysisofemergingthemes,andtheseapproachesatdifferentscales–household,

communities, local actors, government institutions and humanitarian agencies – this research

provides a new perspective on the initial conceptual framework components as pathways for

resilience.Thesepathwaysallowforsituating thecentral findingsof this researchaswellas the

emergingthemesofWaSHtrajectoriesandgenderedrecoveryprocesses.ChangesinWaSHduring

recoverygraduallyunfoldovertimeandvaryaccordingtospace,influencedbyrecurringdisasters,

pre-disasterWaSHcontextand institutional support. The learningandknowledge,participation,

institutional capacities and integration pathways for resilience facilitate recovery and resilience

frommultipleandrecurringdisasters.Withinthesepathways,therolesandcapacitiesofvarious

253

actors, the post-disaster and dynamic interactions between stakeholders can be analysed and

strengthened.

8.2TheoreticalImplications

This research set out tounderstand thedynamicsbetweenWaSH systemsandpracticesduring

recoveryfromdisasters.TheunderexploredthemesofrecoveryandWaSH(Chapter2),wasstudied

using systems thinking to understand actions across scales, roles of multiple actors and their

approachestobuildcommunityresiliencetodisasters(Chapter3).Theempiricalfindingsanddata

analysis discuss factors influencing WaSH systems by improving access to WaSH facilities and

facilitatinghygienebehaviouralchangesduringrecovery(Chapters5,6and7).Thesefindingsand

analysesaddtoexistingknowledgeofhowWaSHsystemsandpracticesareimpactedbydisasters,

andhowagencysupportcanpromotecommunityresilience.Therearetheoreticalimplicationsfor

theexistingliteratureonrecovery,WaSH,andresilience.TherecoveryprocessesinWaSHatvarious

levels–households,communities,governmentandhumanitarianNGOs–fromtheresponseand

longer-termactivitiesareanalysed.

Theempiricalevidenceisreviewedtounderstandexistingrecoveryapproaches–BBB(BuildBack

Better),LRRDandwindowofopportunity(Chapter2).Whenaffectedbymultipledisasters,agencies

prioritiseddisasterbasedon thescaleofdisastersandexisting institutionalcapacities.Thenon-

inclinationof agencies to respond to regulardisasters likeerosionand recurring floods calls for

larger-levelpolicyactionstorecogniseerosionasadisaster.Thenon-interventionistapproachfails

tosupporthouseholdandcommunityrecoveryprocesses.Hence,theempiricalevidencesuggests

that recovery did not enable the building back better of disaster-affected households and

communities.TheLRRDapproachhasnotgainedcurrencywiththehumanitarianactorsexplicitly

studiedinAssamandOdisha.Agenciesattainedtransitionfromresponsetodevelopmentthrough

preparednessmeasuresandbybuildingstructurally resilientWaSHsystemstopreventdamages

duringsubsequentdisasters.

254

This research provides empirical evidence for participation inWaSH recovery programmes, and

factors influencing implementation of technological solutions in different contexts. It is also

important that communities are involved and participate in programmes that influence their

recovery,developmentandoverallwellbeing.Thishasimplicationsforthetop-downprogrammes

undertaken by the government and guided participatory approaches adopted by NGOs which

consider communities as a homogeneous entity, capable of envisioning inclusive recovery and

resilience processes. There are intrinsic and extrinsic factors for sustaining hygiene behavioural

changes andpost-disaster access toWaSH facilities. The intrinsic factors – financial capabilities,

technicalknowledgeforconstructionandmaintenance,andmotivationforusingsafeandimproved

water sources and latrines – liewithin control of thehousehold and communitymembers. The

extrinsic factors – disaster impacts, institutional support in coproduction of WaSH assets – lie

beyondthecontrolofcommunities.Thesefactorshaveimplicationsforbuildbacksaferrecovery

theories:duetoinadequacyofsafeandimprovedcommunalwatersourcesandlatrinesinstalled

post-disasters, householdmembers used self-built primitive latrines, and consumedwater from

unsafehandpumpsduringrecovery,whichcouldnotbecategorisedas‘improved’WaSHsources.

The findingsalsoaddress thequestions raised in the literature review:whomdowebuildback

better for? (Section 2.1.3) In practice, the poor and vulnerable groups are identified through

participatoryapproachesinitiatedbythehumanitarianagencies.However,chapter7demonstrated

that it is unadvisable to restore pre-existing conditions that lacked access toWaSH facilities or

knowledgeofsafeWaSHpractices.Thisresearchquestionsthefeasibilityofbuildbackbetterasan

approach;insteaditadoptsresiliencethinkinginrecoverytoconsiderhouseholdandcommunity

needs,priorities,aspirationsandtheirvisionforfuture.Thisperspectiveshouldsupportagenciesto

linkprogrammesfrompre-topost-disasterandbeyond.

Thisresearchprovidesanalternativeperspectiveofresilience,asacontinualprocessof learning

andknowledge,andparticipationofcommunitiesand institutions.Forachievingresilience, time

and space are important aspects influencing the resilience processes to transform

household/communitycapacities.This shows thatactors,unitsand institutions,atagiven level,

recoverdifferentlybasedonpriorconditions.Throughsystemsthinkingthisresearchhighlightsthe

255

inter-connections and dynamics between actors at different scales. In this research, resilience

thinkingisusedtoexplaindifferentialaccesstoWaSHfacilities,institutionalcapacitiestosupport

recovery,householdrelianceonsocialcapital.ResilienceinWaSHsystemsduringrecoverycanbe

promoted when hygiene behavioural changes are achieved through experiential learning,

coproduction of assets based on local practices, hazard contexts and appropriate technologies

provided by the institutions. Transformational changes are possible when underlying socio-

economicissuesandpre-existingpracticesareaddressedthroughparticipationofthehouseholds,

communityandlocalactorsinlearning,planningandimplementation.Therefore,resilienceisnot

anend-objectiveorstaticconcept,butunderstoodasaprocessthatconsistsofvariousbuilding

blocks – response, recovery or preparedness actions – influenced by dynamic interconnections

between actors, communities and the environment. The foundation for building community

resilience, in WaSH during recovery, lies in integration of institutional efforts with recovery

trajectoriesandcommunitypriorities,overtimeandacrossallsectors.

8.3Contributiontoknowledge

Thisthesiscontributestomethodological,practicalandpolicyspheres.AsindicatedinChapter2,

therearefewstudiesthatlookatNGOpracticesofWaSHduringrecovery,andfewerstillthatrelate

to resilience, hence this research develops an understanding of how changes occur in WaSH

practices.Theempiricalcasestudiesexploredrecoveryacrossdifferentdisasters–cyclonesand

recurringfloodsanderosion–describingthecontext,actorsandtheiractionswithinagivenpolicy

environment(Chapters5and6).

This research is original in its use of reflective practitioner methodology for gaining empirical

evidence of changes in WaSH systems and practices through recovery programmes. This

methodologyprovides insights intodecision-making,processesandapproachesdeployedduring

recovery, and systems and mechanisms within organisations. The empirical evidence gathered

throughaninsider’sperspectiveisausefulguideforagenciesinvolvedinplanningandimplementing

recoveryWaSHprogrammes.Thepositionofareflectivepractitioneralsoalloweduniqueaccessto

256

community perspectives, expectations and resultant changes as part of a humanitarian

organisation.

Thepracticalimplicationsofthisresearchhelptranslatethewindowofopportunityduringrecovery,

by improving access to WaSH facilities, and facilitating changes in sanitation preferences and

hygienepractices.Thecontributionofthisresearchtothepolicycontextlaysstrongemphasison

studyandanalysisofrecurringdisasters–floodsanderosion–andtheir impactsoncommunity

resilience. Transformational changes in thepolicy sphere can incorporate longer-term roles and

actionby institutions,governments,humanitarianandlocalNGOs,andcommunityorganisations

duringrecovery.

8.4Keyrecommendations

TherearekeyrecommendationsforhumanitarianagenciesworkinginWaSHduringrecoverybased

onthisresearch,whichincludefivecriticalaspectsthatwillfacilitateholisticrecoveryprogramming:

1) SupportingsociallearningmechanismstoaddressrecoveryandincludingalternativeWaSH

facilitiesforaccessduringdisasters;

2) Prioritising and triggering additional learning beyond corrective actions, improving

programme implementation and facilitating coproduction of knowledge along with

households,communities,andgovernmentagencies;

3) Testing,assessingandevaluatingtechnologicalsolutions forwatersupply, treatmentand

sanitationalongwiththehouseholdandcommunitypreferences;

4) Ensuring that inclusiveandparticipatoryapproachesareadopted in thebeginningof the

response programmes, where communities have a larger role to plan and design

programmesthataffecttheirrecovery,initiateandorganisetransformationalchangesover

thelonger-termrecovery;and

5) Adopting an LRRD approach and integrate sectors in response and recovery in order to

holistically address community needs. By adopting an LRRD approach, the pre-disaster

developmentalchallengesofunimprovedwaterfacilitiesandprevalenceofopendefecation

aretackledthrougheffectivegovernmentschemesandNGOactionduringrecovery.

257

Basedonempiricalevidence,thisresearchcommentsontheexistingpoliciesinAssam,Odishaand

nationallyondisastermanagementandWaSHschemes.InAssam,policyfocusonthechallenges

faced by communities displaced due to regular floods and erosion was missing. The futility of

embankmentsasfloodprotectionmechanismsandresultantdisplacementofcommunitiesexposed

tofloodrisksshouldclearlyreflectinthefloodmanagementpolicies.Thiswillleadtoalternative

measures for floodprotectionusingscientificaswellas traditionalmechanisms fordealingwith

floods.TheexistingAssamReliefManual,whichguidesthegovernmentbodiesintheeventofany

emergency,shouldbeupdatedto includeholisticapproachtoreliefandrecovery.Anintegrated

response should identify community needs during recovery, including water, sanitation and

hygiene,alongwithshelterandhousingoptions.Theexistingschemescanaddressrecoveryneeds

bycompensatingdamages incurred inhousehold toiletsand/orproviding incentives topromote

latrines after disasters. This approachwill help to engage communities proactively to endopen

defecationandreducehealthrisks.

InOdisha, theexistinggovernancemechanism focusedondisasterpreparednessandmitigation

measures.Intheaftermathofthecycloneandsubsequentfloods,itemergedthatamulti-hazard

approach to disaster management will be crucial in building resilience to future disasters. The

longer-termrecoveryplansandimplementationofreconstructionprogrammesfailtomaximisethe

opportunity to address pre-existing challenges and rebuild communities in a holistic manner.

Sanitation emerged as the least prioritised aspect of the government response; existing policy

mechanismsandschemes shouldaddress sanitationneeds.Existingwater supplyandsanitation

schemesshouldstronglyfocusonhygienepromotion.

The existing policies on disaster management andWaSH are blind to gendered approaches to

recovery.Thiswillreflectgenderedaspectsinthepoliciesinaholisticmanner,focussingonhow

water collection, transport of water and storage, defecation are undertaken by women and

adolescent girls. This is also crucial to understand they bear the impacts and responsibilities of

householdrecoveryintheabsenceofmenwhomigrateforwork.

258

8.5Issuesforfurtherresearch

ThisresearchprimarilyfocusedonWaSHduringrecovery;itdidnotexploreshelter,livelihoods,and

smallbusinessesduringrecovery.Althoughasystemsperspectivewouldhaveenabledscrutinyof

these sectors, it fell beyond the scope of this research. The emerging themes can be further

unpacked in future research: recovery processes are characterised by different community

priorities,WaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocessesandpathwaysforresilience.Suchastudy

couldexplaincausalityandinterrelationshipsbetweenfactorsidentifiedintheWaSHtrajectories

acrossdifferentscales,contextsandtime.Forinstance,thedynamicsbetweencommunities,and

localorganisations–governmentbodies,communitybasedorganisations,androleofcivilsocieties

–canbeanalysedwithparticularemphasisondevelopmentofWaSHsystemsinvariouscontexts.

Future research could either use a quantitative approach using development statistics to

understandnationalgovernmentprogrammeoutcomesduringrecovery,orunderstandbehavioural

changesusingethnographic,anthropologicalperspectiveonsocialrecovery.Futureresearchcould

bealongitudinalstudyofrecurringdisasterstoinfluenceexistingpoliciesthatwillreflectrealities

oferosionandflood-affectedpopulations.A longitudinalstudyofreconstructionprogrammes in

OdishaaftertheCyclone,orcomparativeanalysiswiththe1999supercyclone,couldstudyhow

transformativechangesoccurover10,15oreven20yearsfollowingthedisaster.

This study explored approaches used by institutions to effect changes in WaSH systems and

behaviour during recovery, characterised by ideas of ‘learning’, ‘community participation’, and

involving institutions. Future studies could use systems’ thinking for designing the research,

identifyingboundariesandanalysingconsequencesandchangestoprovideausefulfoundationfor

resiliencethinking.Thisapproachisfeasibletoexploreandexplaincomplexsystemsdealingwith

changesovertime.

Future studies can specifically explore the socio-political context ofWaSH programmes using a

political-economyapproachforresilience.InAssam,certainaspectsofWaSHsystemswereguided

byideasofcitizenship,legalownershipoflandandotherassets,rightsandentitlements.Further

researchcanexplorehowpoliticalidentitiesinfluencedresilienceinWaSH.Theunderstandingof

risks,perceivedbycommunitiesandhouseholdsintheseareas,andthemanifestationofhazards

259

across complex systems over time, and each context can provide enriching avenues for further

research. This will help go beyond contextual uniqueness and generalise using in-depth,

interdisciplinaryresearchforimprovingknowledgeofrecoveryandcommunityresilience.

260

Bibliography

AASC,Documentationonpastdisasters,theirimpact,measurestaken,vulnerableareasinAssam,Guwahati,India.

ACF,2009.ImplementingCash-basedInterventions:AGuidelineforAidWorkers,Paris.

Adger, W.N. et al., 2003. Adaptation to climate change in the developing world. Progress inDevelopmentStudies,3(3),pp.179–195.

Adger, W.N. et al., 2005. Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters. Science, 309(5737),pp.1036–39.

Aguirre,B.E.,2006.OntheconceptofResilience,NewarkDE:DelawareResearchCenter,UniversityofDelaware.

Alesch, D.J., 2005. Complex urban systems and extreme events: toward a theory of disasterrecovery.In1stInternationalConferenceonUrbanDisasterReduction.18–20January.Kobe,Japan,p.8.

Alexander, D., 2012. An evaluation of medium-term recovery processes after the 6 April 2009earthquakeinL’Aquila,CentralItaly.EnvironmentalHazards,12(1),pp.60–73.

Alexander, D., 2010. Rebuilding after disasters: From emergency to sustainability. ConstructionManagementandEconomics,28(10),pp.1117–1119.

Alexander, D., 2013. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: An etymological journey. NaturalHazardsandEarthSystemSciences,13(11),pp.2707–2716.

ALNAP, 2006.Evaluating humanitarian action using theOECD-DAC criteria: AnALNAP guide forhumanitarianagencies,London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

Amin,M.&Han,M.,2009.WaterenvironmentalandsanitationstatusindisasterreliefofPakistan’s2005earthquake.Desalination,248(1-3),pp.436–445.

Anderson,M.B.,1985.Areconceptualizationofthelinkagesbetweendisastersanddevelopment.Disasters/HarvardSupplement,9(s1),pp.46–51.

Argyris,C.&Schön,D.,1996.OrganisationalLearningII:Theory,LearningandPractice,Reading,Mass:Addison-WesleyPublishingCompany.

Armitage,D.R.etal.,2009.Adaptiveco-managementforsocial–ecologicalcomplexity.FrontiersinEcologyandtheEnvironment,7(2),pp.95–102.

ASDMA, 2012a.Assam StateDisasterManagement Plan, Guwahati, India: Assam StateDisasterManagementAuthority,GovernmentofAssam.

ASDMA,2012b.Assamstatedisasterreport-10August2012.,p.3.

Atuyambe, L.M. et al., 2011. Land slide disaster in easternUganda: rapid assessment ofwater,sanitationandhygiene situation inBuluchekecamp,Bududadistrict.Environmentalhealth,10(38),pp.1–13.

261

Audefroy, J.F., 2011. Haiti: post-earthquake lessons learned from traditional construction.EnvironmentandUrbanization,23(2),pp.447–462.

Bahadur,A.V,Ibrahim,M.&Tanner,T.,2010.Theresiliencerenaissance?Unpackingofresiliencefortacklingclimatechangeanddisasters:,Brighton,UK.

Bahadur,A.V.,2014.Policyclimatesandclimatepolicies:Analysingthepoliticsofbuildingresiliencetoclimatechange.Doctoralthesis,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofSussex.

Barakat,S.,2003.Housingreconstructionafterconflictanddisaster,London:HumanitarianPracticeNetwork(HPN),OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

Barenstein,J.,2015.Continuityandchangeinhousingandsettlementpatternsinpost-earthquakeGujarat, India. International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, 6(2),pp.140–155.

Barenstein, J., 2008. From Gujarat to Tamil Nadu: Owner-driven vs. Contractor-driven HousingReconstructioninIndia.InAchievingeffectivepost-disasterreconstruction.p.17.

Barenstein,J.D.,2010.Whogovernsreconstruction?Changesandcontinuityinpolicies,practicesandoutcomes.InG.Lizarralde,C.Johnson,&C.Davidson,eds.RebuildingafterDisastersFromemergencytosustainability.London:TaylorandFrancis,pp.149–176.

Baruah, S., 2012. Whose River is it anyway? Political Economy of Hydropower in the EasternHimalayas.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,XLVII(29),pp.41–52.

Bastable,A.&Lamb,J.,2012.Innovativedesignsandapproachesinsanitationwhenrespondingtochallengingandcomplexhumanitariancontextsinurbanareas.Waterlines,31(1-2),pp.67–82.

Bastable, A. & Russell, L., 2013. Gap Analysis in Emergency Water, Sanitation and HygienePromotion,Oxford:HumanitarianInnovationFund.

Becker, J.&Saunders,W.,2007.EnhancingSustainabilityThroughPre-EventRecoveryPlanning.PlanningQuarterly,(164),pp.14–18.

Berke,P.R.,2006.PlanningforPostdisasterResiliency.TheANNALSof theAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,604,p.192.

Berkes, F., 2007. Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: Lessons from resiliencethinking.NaturalHazards,41,pp.283–295.

Birkmann, J. et al., 2008. Extreme events and disasters: a window of opportunity for change?Analysisoforganizational, institutionalandpoliticalchanges,formalandinformalresponsesaftermega-disasters.NaturalHazards,55(3),pp.637–655.

Bosher, L. ed., 2008.Hazards and the built environment attaining built-in resilience, Abingdon:Routledge.

Bosher,L.,2005.‘TheDivineHierarchy’:ThesocialandinstitutionalelementsofvulnerabilityinSouthIndia. Flood Hazard Research Centre, School of Health and Social Sciences, MiddlesexUniversity.

Bosher,L.&Dainty,A.,2011.Disasterriskreductionand‘built-in’resilience:towardsoverarching

262

principlesforconstructionpractice.Disasters,35(1),pp.1–18.

Boyd, E. et al., 2014. Environmentalities of urban climate governance inMaputo,Mozambique.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,26(1),pp.140–151.

Boydell,R.,1999.Makingruralwatersupplyandsanitationprojectssustainable.Waterlines,18(1),pp.2–4.

Brocklehurst, C., 2013. Editorial: Financing the WASH sector - getting the economics right.Waterlines,32(4),pp.263–264.

Brockmann, M., 2011. Problematising short-term participant observation and multi-methodethnographicstudies.,6(2),pp.229–243.

Broto,V.C.,2015.Contradiction,intervention,andurbanlowcarbontransitions.EnvironmentandPlanningD:SocietyandSpace,33(3),pp.460–476.

Brown, J. et al., 2012. Water, sanitation, and hygiene in emergencies: summary review andrecommendationsforfurtherresearch.Waterlines,31(1),pp.11–29.

Bryman,A.,2008.Socialresearchmethods3rded.,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Buchanan-Smith,M. &Maxwell, S., 1994. Linking relief and development: An introduction andoverview.IDSbulletin,25(4),pp.1–19.

Bulkeley,H.&CastánBroto,V.,2013.Governmentbyexperiment?Globalcitiesandthegoverningofclimatechange.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers,38(3),pp.361–375.

Burby,R.J.etal.,2000.Creatinghazardresilientcommunitiesland-useplanning.NaturalHazardsReview,1(2),pp.99–106.

Burke,B.,1998.EvaluatingforaChange:ReflectionsonParticipatoryMethodology.NewDirectionsforEvaluation,(80),pp.43–56.

Cannon,T.,1994.VulnerabilityAnalysisandtheexplanationof‘Natural’disasters.InA.Varley,ed.Disasters,DevelopmentandEnvironment.Chichester:JohnWileyandSonsLtd,pp.13–30.

Cannon,T.,2008.Vulnerability,‘innocent’disastersandtheimperativeofculturalunderstanding.DisasterPreventionandManagement,17(3),pp.350–357.

Cannon,T.&Müller-Mahn,D.,2010.Vulnerability,resilienceanddevelopmentdiscoursesincontextofclimatechange.NaturalHazards,55(3),pp.621–635.

Carpenter, S.R. et al., 2001. From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?Ecosystems,4(8),pp.765–781.

Carter,R.C.,2012.Editorial.Waterlines,31(1),pp.3–5.

Carter, R.C., 2015. Editorial : Reaching the last 2.5 billionwith adequate sanitation.Waterlines,34(3),pp.2–3.

Census,2011.CensusofIndia2011AvailabilityandTypeofLatrineFacility:2001-2011,NewDelhi.

Chambers, R., 1994a. Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Analysis of experience. WorldDevelopment,22(9),pp.1253–1268.

263

Chambers, R., 1994b. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm.Developmentstudies,22(10),pp.1437–1454.

Chambers,R.,1995.Povertyandlivelihoods:whoserealitycounts?EnvironmentandUrbanization,7(1),pp.173–204.

Chambers,R.,1983.RuralDevelopment:PuttingtheLastFirst,Harlow:Longman.

Chang,S.E.,2010.Urbandisasterrecovery:ameasurementframeworkanditsapplicationtothe1995Kobeearthquake.Disasters,34(2),pp.303–327.

Chang,Y.etal.,2011.Anintegratedapproach:managingresourcesforpost-disasterreconstruction.Disasters,35(December2004),pp.739–765.

Checkland,P.,1985.Fromoptimizingtolearning:Adevelopmentofsystemsthinkingforthe1990s.JournaloftheOperationalResearchSociety,36(9),pp.757–767.

Chhotray,V.&Few,R.,2012.Post-disasterrecoveryandongoingvulnerability:Tenyearsafterthesuper-cycloneof1999inOrissa,India.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,22(3),pp.695–702.

Chidambaram,P.C.,2015.AcrosstheAisle:Standupandbecounted.IndianExpress.Availableat:http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/across-the-aisle-stand-up-and-be-counted/(accessedon18thJanuary2015).

Christoplos,I.etal.,2010.LearningfromrecoveryafterHurricaneMitch.Disasters,2001,pp.202–219.

Christoplos, I., 2006. The elusive ‘window of opportunity’ for risk reduction in post-disasterrecovery. In Briefing paper for session 3 at the ProVention Consortium Forum 2006.‘StrengtheningGlobalCollaborationinDisasterRiskReduction.’Bangkok,pp.2–5.

Christoplos, I.,Mitchell, J.&Liljelund,A.,2001.Re-framingrisk:thechangingcontextofdisastermitigationandpreparedness.Disasters,25(3),pp.185–98.

Clasen,T.etal.,2007.Interventionstoimprovewaterqualityforpreventingdiarrhoea:systematicreviewandmeta-analysis.BMJ,334(7597),p.782.

Clasen,T.&Smith,2005.TheDrinkingWaterResponsetotheIndianOceanTsunamiIncludingtheRoleofHouseholdWaterTreatmentIncludingtheRoleofHouseholdWaterTreatment,Geneva:WHO.

Clinton,W.J., 2007. Lessons for a Safer Future: Drawing on the experience of the IndianOceantsunami disaster: Eleven key actions for building nations’ and communities' resilience todisasters,Geneva:UNISDR.

Coffey,D.etal.,2014.RevealedPreferenceforOpenDefecation:EvidencefromanewsurveyinruralNorthIndia.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,XLIX(38).

COHREetal.,2007.ManualOnTheRightToWaterAndSanitation,Geneva.

Collins, A.E., 2013. Linking disaster and development: further challenges and opportunities.EnvironmentalHazards,12(1),pp.1–4.

Coloni, F. et al., 2012. Biodegradable bags as emergency sanitation in urban settings: The field

264

experience.Waterlines,31(1-2),pp.122–132.

Comfort,L.etal.,1999.Reframingdisasterpolicy:Theglobalevolutionofvulnerablecommunities.EnvironmentalHazards,1(1),pp.39–44.

Connolly,M.aetal.,2004.Communicablediseasesincomplexemergencies:impactandchallenges.Lancet,364(9449),pp.1974–83.

Corbin, J.M.&Strauss,A.,1990.Grounded theory research:Procedures, canons,andevaluativecriteria.QualitativeSociology,13(1),pp.3–21.

Cox,R.S.&Perry,K.M.E.,2011.LikeaFishOutofWater:ReconsideringDisasterRecoveryandtheRole of Place and Social Capital in Community Disaster Resilience. American Journal ofCommunityPsychology,48,pp.395–411.

Creswell, J.W., 1998.Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions.,ThousandsOaks,CA:SagePublications.

Curtis, V. & Cairncross, S., 2003. Effect of washing hands with soap on diarrhoea risk in thecommunity:asystematicreview.THELancetInfectiousDiseases,3,pp.275–281.

Curtis,V.,Danquah,L.O.&Aunger,R.V.,2009.Planned,motivatedandhabitualhygienebehaviour:Anelevencountryreview.HealthEducationResearch,24(4),pp.655–673.

Cutter,S.L.etal.,2008.Aplace-basedmodel forunderstandingcommunityresiliencetonaturaldisasters.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,18(4),pp.598–606.

Cutter, S.L., 1996.Vulnerability toenvironmentalhazards.Progress inHumanGeography, 20(4),pp.529–539.

da Silva, 2010. Lessons from Aceh: Key Considerations in Post-Disaster Reconstruction, Rugby:PracticalActionPublishing.

daSilva,Kernaghan,S.&Luque,A.,2012.Asystemsapproachtomeetingthechallengesofurbanclimatechange.InternationalJournalofUrbanSustainableDevelopment,pp.1–21.

Das, H.N., 2007. Disaster Management in Assam. Dialogue: Astha Bharathi. Available at:http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Jan07/H.N.htm(accessed9thDecember2015).

Das,P.,Chutiya,D.&Hazarika,N.,2009.AdjustingtoFloodsontheBrahmaputraPlains,Assam,India,Guwahati,India:AaranyakandICIMOD.

Dash, S.P., 2013. How Odisha Managed the Phailin Disaster. Economic and Political Weekly,XLVIII(44),pp.15–18.

Davidson, C.H. et al., 2007. Truths and myths about community participation in post-disasterhousingprojects.HabitatInternational,31(1),pp.100–115.

Davis,I.,2007.LearningfromDisasterRecovery:GuidanceforDecisionMakers,GenevaandKobe:InternationalRecoveryPlatform(IRP).

Davis,I.,1978.Shelterafterdisaster,Oxford:OxfordPolytechnicPress.

Davis&Lambert,R.,2002.EngineeringinemergenciesapracticalguideforreliefworkersRedR,ed.,

265

London:ITPublicationsonbehalfofRedR.

deWeerd-Nederhof,P.C.,2001.Qualitativecasestudyresearch.ThecaseofaPhDresearchprojecton organising and managing new product development systems.Management Decisions,39(7),pp.513–538.

Djalante,R.,Holley,C.&Thomalla,F.,2011.Adaptivegovernanceandmanagingresiliencetonaturalhazards.InternationalJournalofDisasterRiskScience,2(4),pp.1–14.

Djonoputro, E.R. et al., 2010. Understanding sanitation options in challenging environments.Waterlines,29(3),pp.186–203.

Dodman,D.etal.,2013.Understandingthenatureandscaleofurbanriskinlow-andmiddle-incomecountriesanditsimplicationsforhumanitarianpreparedness,planningandresponse,London:HumanSettlementsGroup,InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment(IIED).

Dynes,R.R.&Quarantelli,E.L.,1989.Reconstruction in thecontextof recovery:ThoughtsontheAlaskanEarthquake,DelawareResearchCenter,UniversityofDelaware.

ECHO, 2012. Commission implementing decision on the financing of emergency humanitarianactions in India from the general budget of the European Union, Brussels: EuropeanCommission.

ECHO,2013.VictimsofCyclonePhailintoreceiveadditional€3millioninassistancefromtheEU.23October2013.Availableat:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-994_en.htm(accessed8thDecember2015).

Edelenbos, J., van Buuren, A. & van Schie, N., 2011. Co-producing knowledge: Joint knowledgeproduction between experts, bureaucrats and stakeholders in Dutch water managementprojects.EnvironmentalScienceandPolicy,14(6),pp.675–684.

Eisenberg,J.N.S.,Scott,J.C.&Porco,T.,2007.Integratingdiseasecontrolstrategies:balancingwatersanitationandhygieneinterventionstoreducediarrhealdiseaseburden.Americanjournalofpublichealth,97(5),pp.846–52.

Esrey,S.A.etal.,1991.Effectsof improvedwatersupplyandsanitationonascariasis,diarrhoea,dracunculiasis, hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, and trachoma. Bulletin of the WorldHealthOrganization,69(5),pp.609–621.

Estrella,M.&Gaventa,J.,1998.WhoCountsReality?ParticipatoryMonitoringandEvaluation:ALiteratureReview,Brighton,UK:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies.

Fan,L.,2013.Disasterasopportunity ?BuildingbackbetterinAceh,MyanmarandHaiti,London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

Feachem, R.G. et al., 1983. Sanitation and Disease: Health Aspects of Excreta and wastewatermanagement.InWorldBankStudiesinWaterSupplyandSanitation3.WashingtonDC,USA:JohnWileyandSons,p.37.

Fearnley,C.J.,2011.StandardisingtheUSGSvolcanoalertlevelsystem:actinginthecontextofrisk,uncertaintyandcomplexity.Doctoralthesis,DepartmentofEarthSciences,UniversityCollegeofLondon.

266

Few,R.etal.,2013.ContributiontoChange:Anapproachtoevaluatingtheroleofinterventionindisasterrecovery,

Fewtrell,L.etal.,2005.Water,sanitation,andhygiene interventionstoreducediarrhoea in lessdevelopedcountries:asystematicreviewandmeta-analysis.TheLancetinfectiousdiseases,5,pp.42–52.Availableat:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15620560.

Flyvbjerg,B.,2006.FiveMisunderstandingsAboutCase-StudyResearch.QualitativeInquiry,12(2),pp.219–245.

Folke,C.,2006.Resilience:Theemergenceofaperspectiveforsocial-ecologicalsystemsanalyses.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,16(3),pp.253–267.

Foster,K.,2006.ACaseStudyApproachtoUnderstandingRegionalResilience,Buffalo,NY,USA:InstituteofUrbanandRegionalDevelopment,UniversityofCalifornia.

Freire,P.,1970.PedagogyoftheOppressed,NewYork:Continuum.

Furedi,F.,2007.Thechangingmeaningofdisaster.Area,39(4),pp.482–489.

Gaillard, J.-C., 2006. Traditional societies in the face of natural hazards: the 1991Mt. Pinatuboeruption and the Aetas of the Philippines. International Journal ofMass Emergencies andDisasters,24(1),pp.5–43.

Geis,D.E.,2000.Bydesign:Thedisasterresistantandquality-of-lifecommunity.NaturalHazardsReview,1(3),pp.151–160.

George,A.,BuildingLocalCapacitiesforDisasterResponseandRiskReduction:AnOxfam-BEDROCStudy,Trivandrum.

George,A.&Bennett,A.,2005.CaseStudiesandTheoryDevelopmentintheSocialSciences,London:MITpress.

Giardina,D.,Prandini,F.&Sorlini,S.,2011.Addressingschoolwater,sanitationandhygienefortherecoveryphaseinHaiti2010.In35thWEDCInternationalConference,Loughborough,UK,2011The Future ofwater, sanitation and hygiene: Innovation, adaptation and engagement in achangingworld.Loughborough,UK:Refereedpaper,WEDC,pp.1–4.

GlobalSanitationFund,2013.TheSanitationDriveinAssamVoicesfromtheGround,NewDelhi.

Godschalk,D.R.,2003.UrbanHazardMitigation:CreatingResilientCities.NaturalHazardsReview,4(3), pp.136–143. Available at: http://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2003)4:3(136).

GoI,2013.LokSabhaUnstarredQuestion,NewDelhi:GovernmentofIndia.

GoI,2005.TheDisasterManagementBill.GovernmentofIndia.

GomaEpidemiologyGroup,1995.PublichealthimpactofRwandanrefugeecrisis:whathappenedinGoma,Zaire,inJuly,1994.TheLancet,345,pp.339–344.

Goswami,D.C.,2000.FloodForecastingintheBrahmaputraRiver,India:ACaseStudy,Guwahati,India:GuwahatiUniversity.

267

Gough,K.V., Langevang,T.&Namatovu,R.,2013.Researchingentrepreneurship in low-incomesettlements: the strengths and challenges of participatory methods. Environment andUrbanization,26(1),pp.297–311.

GovernmentofOdisha,1996.OdishaReliefCode,

Greene,N., 2014. Intra-annual variability in standards ofwater and sanitation inUpperHumla,Nepal:aninvestigationintothecauses,importanceandimpact.DoctoralThesis,LoughboroughUniversity.

Greenwood,J.,1998.Theroleofreflectioninsingleanddoublelooplearning.Journalofadvancednursing,27(5),pp.1048–1053.

Griffin, L., 2012. Toughen Up. Centre for the study of democracy: The Bulletin, University ofWestminster,pp.1&2.

Guba,E.G.&Lincoln,Y.S.,1989.FourthGenerationEvaluation,LondonandBeverlyHills,California:SagePublications.

Guijt, I., 2007. Assessing and Learning for Social Change: A Discussion Paper, Institute ofDevelopmentStudies.

Guijt,I.&Cornwall,A.,1995.CriticalreflectionsonthepracticeofPRA.PLANotes,(24),pp.2–7.

Gunderson, L.H. & Holling, C.S., 2001. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human andNaturalSystems.InL.H.Gunderson&C.S.Holling,eds.Washingto,Coverlo,London:IslandPress,pp.125–126.

Guppy,L.&Twigg,J.,2013.Managingchroniccrisesandchronichazardconditions.,12(1),pp.5–18.

Haas,J.E.,Kates,R.W.&Bowden,M.J.,1977.ReconstructionfollowingDisaster1sted.J.E.Haas,R.W.Kates,&M.J.Bowden,eds.,Cambridge,Massachusets:TheMITPress.

Harvey,P.etal.,2010.FoodaidandfoodassistanceinemergencyandtransitionalcontextsAreviewofcurrentthinking,London:HumanitarianPolicyGroup.

Harvey,P.,Baghri,S.&Reed,B.,2002.Emergencysanitation:assessmentandprogrammedesign,Loughborough,UK:Water,EngineeringandDevelopmentCentre,LoughboroughUniversity.

Harvey, P. & Reed, R., 2005. Planning environmental sanitation programmes in emergencies.Disasters,29(2),pp.129–151.

Hazarika,S.,2006.Living intelligentlywith floods,Guwahati, India:Centre forNortheaststudies,India.

Hegger, D. et al., 2012. Conceptualising joint knowledge production in regional climate changeadaptationprojects:Successconditionsandleversforaction.EnvironmentalScienceandPolicy,18,pp.52–65.

Holling, C.S., 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems.Annual review of ecology andsystematics,pp.1–23.

IFRC, 2002. India: Orissa Cyclone, Final Report, International Federation of Red Cross and Red

268

CrescentSocieties(IFRC).

IFRC,2001.WorldDisastersReport2001:Focusonrecovery,Geneva: InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties(IFRC).

IMD, 2013.Very Severe Cyclonic Storm, Phailin over the Bay of Bengal (08-14October 2013): AReportbyIndiaMeteorologicalDepartment,Bhubaneshwar:IndiaMeteorologicalDepartment.

IPCC, 2012. Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate changeadaptation.ASpecialReportofWorkingGroups Iand II of the IntergovernmentalPanelonClimate Change P. . Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi,M.D.Mastrandrea,K.J.Mach,G.-K.Plattner,S.K.Allen,M.Tignor,Midgley,ed.,Cambridge,UK,andNewYork,NY,USA:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Jha,A.K. et al., 2010.SaferHomes, StrongerCommunities:AHandbook forReconstructingafterNatural Disasters S. Jha, K.A,with Duyne Barenstein, J., Phelps, P.M., Pittet, D., Sena, ed.,WashingtonDC:WorldBank.

Jigyasu, R., 2010. Appropriate technology for post-disaster reconstruction. In Rebuilding afterdisasters:fromemergencytosustainability.pp.pp49–69.

JohnHopkinsandIFRC,Water,sanitationandhygieneinemergencies.InPublicHealthGuideforemergencies. The Johns Hopkins and the International Federation of Red Cross and RedCrescentSocieties(IFRC),pp.372–441.

Johnson,C.,2007.Impactsofprefabricatedtemporaryhousingafterdisasters:1999earthquakesinTurkey.HabitatInternational,31(1),pp.36–52.

Johnson,C.,2011.Kernelsofchange:civilsocietychallengestostate-ledstrategiesforrecoveryandrisk reduction in Turkey. Environment and Urbanization, 23(2), pp.415–430. Available at:http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0956247811416071[AccessedJune5,2012].

Johnson, C., 2002. What’s the big deal about temporary housing? Planning considerations fortemporary accommodation after disasters: example of the 1999 Turkish earthquakes.ProceedingsoftheFirst InternationalConferenceonPost-disasterReconstruction: ImprovingPost-DisasterReconstructioninDevelopingCountries,pp.23–25.

Johnson,C.,Lizarralde,G.&Davidson,C.H.,2006.Asystemsviewoftemporaryhousingprojectsinpost-disasterreconstruction.Constructionmanagementandeconomics,24(4),pp.367–378.

Jones,S.etal.,2013.Learningfromfailure:lessonsforthesanitationsectorDiscussionPaper–UKSanitation Community of Practice (SanCoP), London: UK Sanitation Community of Practice(SanCoP).

Jones,S.D.,2013.SharingtherecurrentcostsofruralwatersupplyinMali:theroleofWaterAidinpromoting sustainable service delivery. Doctoral Thesis, Department of Geography, RoyalHolloway,UniversityofLondon.

Jordan, E., Javernick-Will, A. & Amadei, B., 2015. Post-disaster reconstruction: lessons fromNagapattinamdistrict,India.DevelopmentinPractice,25(4),pp.518–534.

Kar,K.,2012.WhynotBasicsforAll?ScopesandChallengesofCommunity-ledTotalSanitation.IDS

269

Bulletin,43(2),pp.93–96.

Kawulich, B., 2004. Data Analysis Techniques in qualitative research. Journal of Research inEducation,14(1),pp.96–113.

Kelly,P.M.&Adger,W.N.,2000.Theoryandpracticeinassessingvulnerabilitytoclimatechangeandfacilitatingadaptation.ClimaticChange,47(4),pp.325–352.

Kennedy,J.etal.,2008.TheMeaningof‘BuildBackBetter’:EvidenceFromPost-TsunamiAcehandSriLanka.JournalofContingenciesandCrisisManagement,16(1),pp.24–36.

Kenny,S.,2005.ReconstructioninAceh:Buildingwhosecapacity?CommunityDevelopmentJournal,42(2),pp.206–221.

Khurshid,A.,2008.Flooddisasters:Learningfrompreviousreliefandrecoveryoperations,London:ALNAP.

King, 2015. Resilience in the Humanitarian Sphere: Stimulating Resilience for Recovery in Haiti.Doctoralthesis,LoughboroughUniversity.

King,K.,Bosher,L.S.&Kayaga,S.,2013.Resilienceinthehumanitariansphere:stimulatingresilienceforrecovery.In36thWEDCInternationalConferenceDeliveringWater,SanitationAndHygieneServicesInAnUncertainEnvironment.Nakuru,Kenya,pp.1–6.

King,K.,Bosher,L.S.&Kayaga,S.,2011.Sustainablerecovery:creatingHaitianresilience.In35thWEDCInternationalConference,Loughborough,UK,2011TheFutureofwater,sanitationandhygiene:Innovation,adaptationandengagementinachangingworld.Loughborough,UK,pp.1–4.

Klein,R.J.T.,Nicholls,R.J.&Thomalla, F., 2003.Resilience tonaturalhazards:Howuseful is thisconcept?EnvironmentalHazards,5(1),pp.35–45.

Korhonen,J.,2007.Environmentalplanningvs.systemsanalysis:Fourprescriptiveprinciplesvs.fourdescriptiveindicators.JournalofEnvironmentalManagement,82(1),pp.51–59.

Kumar,V.,2014.WhoseCleanliness?EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,XLIX(43and44),pp.13–15.

Lahiri,S.&Borgohain,J.,2011.Rohmoria’sChallenge:NaturalDisasters,PopularProtestsandStateApathy.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,XLVI(2),pp.31–35.

Lantagne,D.&Clasen,T.,2012.Point-of-usewatertreatmentinemergencyresponse.Waterlines,31(1),pp.30–52.

LeDe,L.,Gaillard,J.C.&Friesen,W.,2014.Academicsdoingparticipatorydisasterresearch:howparticipatoryisit?EnvironmentalHazards,14(1),pp.1–15.

Leach,M.,2008.Re-framingResilience:aSymposiumReport,Brighton,UK:STEPSWorkingPaper13,STEPSCentre.

LeCompte,M.D.,2000.AnalyzingQualitativeData.Theoryintopractice,39(3),pp.124–130.

Levine,S.etal.,2012.Therelevanceof‘resilience’?,pp.1–4.

Lizarralde,G.etal.,2014.Asystemsapproachtoresilienceinthebuiltenvironment:thecaseof

270

Cuba.Disasters,39(S1),pp.S76–S95.

Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C. & Davidson, C., 2009. From complexity to strategic planning forsustainablereconstruction.Rebuildingafterdisasters:fromemergencytosustainability,p.248.

Lloyd-Jones, T., 2006. Mind the Gap! Post-disaster reconstruction and the transition fromhumanitarianrelief,London:RICS.

Luff,R.,2013.SubsidiesforWASHindevelopment,mitigation,relief,andrecovery:Acriticalbutneglectedaspectofpractice.Waterlines,32(4),pp.286–294.

Luff, R. & Dorea, C., 2012. Bulk water treatment unit performance: For the cameras or thecommunity?Waterlines,31(1),pp.53–66.

Lyons, M., Schilderman, T. & Boano, C., 2010. Building Back Better. Delivering people-centredhousingreconstructionatscale,PracticalActionPublishing.

Manyena,S.B.,2009.Disasterresilienceindevelopmentandhumanitarianinterventions.DoctoralThesis,SchoolofAppliedSciences,UniversityofNorthumbria.

Manyena, S.B. et al., 2011. Disaster resilience: a bounce back or bounce forward ability? LocalEnvironment,16(5),pp.417–424.

Manyena,S.B.,2006.Theconceptofresiliencerevisited.Disasters,30(4),pp.433–50.

Maps of India, 2013a. Balasore District, Odisha Map (online). Available at:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/orissa/districts/baleshwar.htm (accessed 9 December2015).

Maps of India, 2012. Morigaon District, Assam Map (online). Available at:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/assam/districts/marigaon.htm (accessed 9 December2015).

Maps of India, 2013b. Puri District, Odisha Map (online). Available at:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/orissa/districts/puri.htm(accessed9December2015).

Maps of India, 2007. Sonitpur District, Assam Map (online). Available at:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/assam/districts/sonitpur.htm (accessed 9 December2015).

Mara,D.,2012.Sanitation:What’stheRealProblem?IDSBulletin,43(2),pp.86–92.

Mara, D. & Feachem, R.G., 1999. Water-and excreta-related diseases: unitary environmentalclassification. Journal of Environmental Engineering, 125(4), pp.334–339. Available at:http://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9372(1999)125:4(334) [AccessedSeptember27,2012].

Matyas,D.&Pelling,M.,2015.Positioningresiliencefor2015:theroleofresistance,incrementaladjustmentandtransformationindisasterriskmanagementpolicy.Disasters,391,pp.S1–S18.

May,T.,1993.SocialResearch:Issues,methodsandprocess1sted.,Buckingham:OpenUniversityPress.

Mayunga,J.S.,2007.UnderstandingandApplyingtheConceptofCommunityDisasterResilience:A

271

capital-basedapproach.Indraftworkingpaperpreparedforthesummeracademy,MegacitiesasHotspotsofRisk:SocialVulnerabilityandResilienceBuilding.Munich,Germany,p.16.

Mazeau,A.,2013.Notoiletathome :Implementation,UsageandAcceptabilityofSharedToiletsinurbanGhana.DoctoralThesis,LoughboroughUniversity.

McCracken,G.D.,1988.Thelonginterview,NewburyPark,California:SagePublications.

McDaniels, T. et al., 2008. Fostering resilience to extremeeventswithin infrastructure systems:Characterizingdecisioncontextsformitigationandadaptation.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,18(2),pp.310–318.

McDougal,L.&Beard,J.,2011.RevisitingSphere:newstandardsofservicedeliveryfornewtrendsinprotracteddisplacement.Disasters,35(1),pp.87–101.

McEntire,D.A.etal.,2002.ComparisonofDisasterParadigms:TheSearchforaHolisticPolicyGuide.PublicAdministrationReview,62(3),pp.267–281.

McGarry,M., 1980. Appropriate Technologies for environmental hygiene. InProceedings of theRoyalSocietyofLondon.SeriesB,BiologicalSciences,Vol209,No.1174,MoretechnologiesforRuralhealth(Jul28.1980),pp.37-46.

Meskinazarian,A.,2011.SocialResilienceofpost-earthquakeBam.DoctoralThesis,DepartmentofGeography,King’sCollegeLondon.

MHA,2011.CensusofIndia,2011,NewDelhi:MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,2011.

Micangeli, A. & Esposto, S., 2010. Post-earthquake rehabilitation of the rural water systems inKashmir’sJehlumValley.Disasters,34(3),pp.684–694.

Mikkelsen,B.,2005.MethodsforDevelopmentWorkandResearch:ANewGuideforPractitioners2nded.,ThousandsOaks,CAandLondon:SagePublications.

Miles, M.B., 1979. Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis.AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,24(4),pp.590–601.

Mileti,D.S.,1999.DisastersbyDesign:AReassessmentofNaturalHazardsintheUnitedStates1sted.,Washington,D.C:JosephHenryPress.

Mitchell, T. & Harris, K., 2012. Resilience: A risk management approach, London: OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

Mommen,B.A.&More,P.S.,2013.OpendefecationfreeOdisha:achievableorapipedream?AnanalysisofsanitationpromotionsinOdisha,India.InDeliveringWater,SanitationAndHygieneServicesInAnUncertainEnvironmentin36thWEDCInternationalConference.Nakuru,Kenya,p.6.

Moser,C.&Stein,A.,2011.Implementingurbanparticipatoryclimatechangeadaptationappraisals:amethodologicalguideline.EnvironmentandUrbanization,23(2),pp.463–485.

Moser,S.C.,2008.Resilience intheFaceofGlobalEnvironmentalChange,SantaCruz,California:CommunityandRegionalResilienceInitiative.

Nabi,P.G.,2014.Coordinatingpost-disasterhumanitarianresponse:lessonsfromthe2005Kashmir

272

earthquake,India.DevelopmentinPractice,24(8),pp.975–988.

NaturalHazardsCentre,2001.Holisticdisasterrecovery:Ideasforbuildinglocalsustainabilityafteranaturaldisaster,Boulder,CO:NaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationsInformationCenterUniversityofColorado.Availableat:www.colorado.edu/hazards/[AccessedMay29,2012].

Nawaz, J.etal.,2010.Oxfamexperienceofprovidingscreenedtoilet,bathingandmenstruationunitsinitsearthquakeresponseinPakistan.Gender&Development,18(81-89).

Neely, K., 2013.UnderstandingWASH through complexadaptive systems theory. In36thWEDCInternationalConferenceonDeliveringWater,SanitationAndHygieneServicesInAnUncertainEnvironment.Nakuru,Kenya:Refereedpaper,WEDC,pp.1–5.

Newbrander,W.,Waldman,R.&Shepherd-Banigan,M.,2011.Rebuildingandstrengtheninghealthsystemsandprovidingbasichealthservicesinfragilestates.Disasters,35(4),pp.639–660.

Nieuwenhuys,O.,1997.Spacesforthechildrenoftheurbanpoor:experienceswithparticipatoryactionresearch(PAR).EnvironmentandUrbanization,9(1),pp.233–250.

Nigg, J.M., 1995. Disaster Recovery as a social process, Preliminary Paper 219, University ofDelaware,DisasterResearchCenter.

Noji,E.K.,1992.DisasterEpidemiology:ChallengesforPublicHealthAction.JournalofPublicHealthPolicy,13(3),pp.332–340.

Norris,F.H.etal.,2008.Communityresilienceasametaphor,theory,setofcapacities,andstrategyfordisasterreadiness.Americanjournalofcommunitypsychology,41(1-2),pp.127–50.

O’Reilly, K., 2010.Combining sanitationandwomen’sparticipation inwater supply: anexamplefromRajasthan.DevelopmentinPractice,20(1),pp.45–56.

OCHA, 2012.What are Humanitarian Principles?, UnitedNationsOffice for the Coordination ofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).

Oliver-Smith, A., 1996. Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disasters. Annual Review ofAnthropology,25,pp.303–328.

Oliver-Smith,A.,1998.Globalchangesandthedefinitionofdisaster.InE.L.Quarantelli,ed.Whatisadisaster? :perspectivesonthequestion.London:Routledge,pp.177–194.

Oliver-Smith, A., 1979. Post-Disaster consensus and conflict in a traditional society: The 1970avalancheofYungay,Peru.MassEmergencies,(4),pp.39–52.

Oliver-Smith,A.,2009.SeaLevelRiseandtheVulnerabilityofCoastalPeoplesRespondingtotheLocalChallengesofGlobalClimateChangeinthe21stCentury,Bonn,Germany:UNUInstituteforEnvironmentandHumanSecurity(UNU-EHS).

Olshansky, R. & Chang, S., 2009. Planning for disaster recovery: emerging research needs andchallenges.InProgressinPlanning.pp.200–209.

OSDMA, 2013. State Disaster Management Plan, Available at:http://www.osdma.org/Download/State_Disaster_ManagementPlan_Aug2013.pdf (Accessed1February2015).

273

Ostrom,E.&Cox,M.,2010.Movingbeyondpanaceas:amulti-tiereddiagnosticapproachforsocial-ecologicalanalysis.FoundationinEnvironmentalConservation,37,pp.1–13.

Pahl-Wostl,C.,2007.Transitiontowardsadaptivemanagementofwaterfacingclimateandglobalchange.WaterResourcesManagement,21,pp.49–62.

Parkinson,J.,2009.AReviewoftheEvidenceBaseforWASHinterventionsinEmergencyResponses.,(January),pp.1–51.

Patel,D.,Brooks,N.&Bastable,A.,2011.Excretadisposalinemergencies:BagandPeepootrialswithinternallydisplacedpeopleinPort-au-Prince.Waterlines,30(1),pp.61–77.

Patel,K.,2011.TenureAndVulnerability:TheEffectsOfChangesToTenureSecurityOnTheIdentityAnd Social Relationships of the Urban Poor. Doctoral thesis, International DevelopmentDepartment,UniversityofBirmingham.

Paton, D. & Johnston, D., 2001. Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience andpreparedness.DisasterPreventionandManagement,10(4),pp.270–277.

Paton,D.,Smith,L.&Violanti,J.,2005.Disasterresponse:risk,vulnerabilityandresilience.DisasterPreventionandManagement,9(3),pp.173–180.

Paul,B.K.etal., 2010.Cycloneevacuation inBangladesh:Tropical cyclonesGorky (1991)vsSidr(2007).EnvironmentalHazards,9(1),pp.89–101.

Pelling, M., 2011. Adaptation to climate change: from resilience to transformation, London:Routledge.

Pelling,M.&High,C.,2005.Sociallearningandadaptationtoclimatechange.,2005(April),pp.1–19.

Pinera, J.-F.,Reed,R.A.&Njiru,C.,2005.Restoringsanitationservicesafteranearthquake: fieldexperiencesinBam,Iran.Disasters,29(3),pp.222–236.

PracticalAction,2010.PCRTOOL3:LearningfromDisasters,Rugby.

Prasad,E.&Mukherjee,N.,2014.SituationAnalysisonFloodsandFloodManagementSituationAnalysisonFloodsandFloodManagement,EcosystemsforLife:ABangladeah-lndiaInitiative,IUCN,InternatonalUnionforConservationofNature.

Pritchett,L.,Samji,S.&Hammer,J.,2013.It’sAllAboutMeEUsingStructuredExperientialLearning(‘e’)toCrawltheDesignSpace,WashingtonDC:CGDWorkingPaperNo.322,CenterforGlobalDevelopment.

Prüss-üstün,A.etal.,2004.Unsafewater,sanitationandhygiene.InComparativeQuantificationofHealthRisks:GlobalandRegionalBurdenofDiseaseduetoSelectedMajorRiskFactors,2.

Punch,K.F.,2009.TheAnalysisofQualitativeData.IntroductiontoResearchMethodsinEducation,pp.169–205.

Quarantelli,E.L.,1989.DisasterRecovery:CommentsOnTheLiteratureAndAMostlyAnnotatedBibliography*. Available at: http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/handle/19716/1331[AccessedMay13,2012].

274

Quarantelli,E.L.,1991.PatternsofshelteringandhousinginAmericanDisasters,PreliminaryPaper170,UniversityofDelaware,DisasterResearchCenter.

Quarantelli, E.L., 1999. The disaster recovery process: What we know and do not know fromresearch, Newark DE. Available at: http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/handle/19716/309[AccessedMay13,2012].

Rahill,G.J.etal.,2014.ShelterrecoveryinurbanHaitiaftertheearthquake:Thedualroleofsocialcapital.Disasters,38(S1),pp.73–93.

Raju, E., 2013. Exploring Disaster Recovery Coordination: Stakeholder Interfaces, Goals andInterdependencies.Doctoralthesis,FacultyofEngineering,LundUniversity.

Raju,E.&Becker,P.,2013.Multi-organisational coordination fordisaster recovery:Thestoryofpost-tsunamiTamilNadu,India.InternationalJournalofDisasterRiskReduction,4,pp.82–91.

Ramalingam, B. et al., 2008. Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications fordevelopmentandhumanitarianefforts,London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

Ramet,V.,2012.Linkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment:Towardsmoreeffectiveaid.,p.11.Available at:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491435/EXPO-DEVE_SP(2012)491435_EN.pdf(Accessedon6thAugust2015).

Rathfon,D.L.,2010.MeasuringLongTermPostDisasterCommunityRecovery.Doctoralthesis,CivilandEnvironmentalEngineering,UniversityofDelaware.

Ray,J.L.&Smith,D.,2012.UsingPhotographstoResearchOrganizations:Evidence,Considerations,andApplicationinaFieldStudy.OrganizationalResearchMethods,15(2),pp.288–315.

Ray-Bennett,N.S.,2009a.Multipledisastersandpolicyresponsesinpre-andpost-independenceOrissa,India.Disasters,33(2),pp.274–290.

Ray-Bennett,N.S.,2009b.Theinfluenceofcaste,classandgenderinsurvivingmultipledisasters:AcasestudyfromOrissa,India.EnvironmentalHazards,8,pp.5–22.

Reeves, T., 1994. Managing Effectively: Developing Yourself Through Experience, Oxford:Butterworth-Heinemann/InstituteofManagement.

RevenueDepartment,1976.TheAssamReliefManual,Guwahati,India:GovernmentofIndia.

Rheinländer,T.etal.,2015.Redefiningsharedsanitation.BulletinoftheWorldHealthOrganization,pp.1–6.

Rose,J.etal.,2013.Thechallengeofhumanitarianaid:anoverview.EnvironmentalHazards,12(1),pp.74–92.

Rubin,C.B.,2009.LongTermRecoveryfromDisasters–TheNeglectedComponentofEmergencyManagement.JournalofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyManagement,6(1).

Rubin, C.B., 1985. The community recovery process in the United States after a major naturaldisaster.InternationalJournalofMassEmergenciesandDisasters,3(2),pp.9–28.

Schilderman,T.&Lyons,M.,2011.Resilientdwellingsorresilientpeople?Towardspeople-centred

275

reconstruction.EnvironmentalHazards,10,pp.218–231.

Schipper,L.&Pelling,M.,2006.Disasterrisk,climatechangeandinternationaldevelopment:scopefor,andchallengesto,integration.Disasters,30(1),pp.19–38.

Schwab, J. et al., 1998. Planning for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. Apa PlanningAdvisoryServiceReports,(483-484),p.1.

Scott, R., 2013a. Sustainable WASH interventions as populations transition from relief todevelopment.,(February).

Scott, R., 2013b. Sustainable WASH interventions as populations transition from relief todevelopment.In36thWEDCInternationalConference,Nakuru,Kenya,2013Deliveringwater,sanitationandhygieneservices inanuncertainenvironment.Nakuru,Kenya:Briefingpaper,WEDC,pp.1–5.

Sharma, A.& et al, 2014. Studies, Stories and a Canvas: Seasonal Labormigration andmigrantworkersfromOdisha,Udaipur:CentreforMigrationandLabourstudies,AajeevikaBureu.

Sharma,U.&Patt,A.,2012.Disasterwarningresponse:Theeffectsofdifferenttypesofpersonalexperience.NaturalHazards,60(2),pp.409–423.

Shaw,R.,2015.RecoveryfromtheIndianOceanTsunami:ATen-YearJourney1sted.,SpringerJapan.

Shekhar,A.,Dwivedi,S.&Bhagwat, I.,2010.Ensuringsafewaterandsanitationduringfloods inruralcommunitiesofBiharState,India.Waterlines,29(3),pp.204–208.

Shrestha,S.&Gaillard,J.-C.,2015.Small-ScaleDisastersandtheRecoveryProcess.InA.Lizarralde,G.,DuyneBarenstein,J.Cardossi,G.Oliver,ed.SustainablePost-DisasterReconstruction:FromRecovery to Risk Reduction; 2013 international i-Rec conference. Ascona, Switzerland:Montreal:GroupederechercheIF,GRIF,UniversitédeMontréal,pp.43–54.

Shultz, A. et al., 2009. Cholera outbreak in Kenyan refugee camp: risk factors for illness andimportance of sanitation. The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene, 80(4),pp.640–5.

Silverman,D.,2006.InterpretingQualitativeData.MethodsforAnalysingTalk,TextandInteraction3rded.,London:SagePublications.

Simonović,S.P.,2011.IntroductiontoMethodsandToolsforaSystemsApproachtoManagementofDisaster.InSystemsApproachtoManagementofDisasters:MethodsandApplications.JohnWiley&Sons,Inc,pp.85–112.

Smith,M.,2009.Lessons learnedinWASHResponseduringUrbanFloodEmergenciesTheGlobalWASHLearningProject,Loughborough,UK:ALNAP.

Sommer, M., 2012. Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies: Gaps andrecommendations.Waterlines,31(1-2),pp.83–104.

Sparkman, D., 2012. More than just counting toilets: The complexities of monitoring forsustainabilityinsanitation.Waterlines,31(4),pp.260–271.

Sphere,2011.TheSphereProject:HumanitarianCharterandMinimumStandardsinHumanitarian

276

Response.Availableat:http://www.sphereproject.org/[AccessedJune5,2012].

Stake,R.,2005.Multiplecasestudyanalysis.,NewYork:GuilfordPress.

Stake,R.,1995.TheartofcasestudyresearchThousandOaks,ed.,CA:SagePublications.

Stevens,M.R.,Berke,P.&Song,Y.,2010.Creatingdisaster-resilientcommunities:Evaluatingthepromiseandperformanceofnewurbanism.LandscapeandUrbanPlanning,94(2),pp.105–115.

Sultana, F., 2010. Living in hazardouswaterscapes: Gendered vulnerabilities and experiences offloodsanddisasters.EnvironmentalHazards,9(1),pp.43–53.

Sword-Daniels,V.L.,2014.Exploringthedynamicsandconsequencesoflong-termvolcanicactivityfor the healthcare system inMontserrat,West Indies. Doctoral thesis, Department of Civil,EnvironmentalandGeomaticEngineering,UniversityCollegeLondon.

Thurnheer,K.,2009.Ahouseforadaughter?Constraintsandopportunitiesinpost-tsunamiEasternSriLanka.ContemporarySouthAsia,17(1),pp.79–91.

Tobin,G.,1999.Sustainabilityandcommunityresilience:theholygrailofhazardsplanning?GlobalEnvironmentalChangePartB:EnvironmentalHazards,1(1),pp.13–25.

Truffino,J.C.,2010.Resilience:AnApproachtotheconcept.RevistadePsiquiatríaySaludMental,3(4).

Tumusiime,E.,2015.Doearlycashtransfersinafoodcrisisenhanceresilience?EvidencefromNiger.DevelopmentinPractice,25(2),pp.174–187.

Twigg, J., 2014. Attitude before method: Disability in vulnerability and capacity assessment.Disasters,38(3),pp.465–482.

Twigg,J.,2007.CharacteristicsofaDisaster-resilientCommunityAGuidanceNote,Teddington,UK.:DFIDDisasterRiskReductionNGOInteragencyGroup.

Twigg,J.etal.,2001.GuidanceNotesonParticipationAndAccountabilityinDisasterRiskReduction,London.

Twigg,J.,2006.Technology,post-disasterhousingreconstructionandlivelihoodsecurity,London:DisasterStudiesWorkingPaper15,BenfieldHazardResearchCentre.

Twigg,J.,2003.Therighttosafety:someconceptualandpracticalissues.WorkingPapersinDisasterStudies&Management,(9),pp.2001–2003.

Twigg, J. & Steiner, D., 2002. Mainstreaming disaster mitigation: Challenges to organisationallearninginNGOs.DevelopmentinPractice,12(3-4),pp.473–479.

UKAID,2013.HumanitarianResponsetoCyclonePhailininIndia:BusinessCaseandInterventionSummary,UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.

UN,2010.GeneralAssemblyResolution,Geneva.

UN,2002.UnitedNationsCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,GeneralCommentNo.15:Therighttowater(arts.11and12oftheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Socialand

277

CulturalRights),

UN,1948.UnitedNationsUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights1948.

UNDHA, 1992. DisasterManagement Internationally AgreedGlossary of Basic Terms Related toDisasterManagement.,(December1992).

UNDRO,1982.ShelterafterDisaster:GuidelinesforAssistance.,p.20.

UNHCR, 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Available at:http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm(Accessedon15thSeptmber2012).

Unicef,2011.AsummaryoftherightsundertheConventionontheRightsoftheChild.,1,pp.1–4.

UnicefIndia&RedRIndia,2012.AssamFloodsAssessment.,(July).

UNISDR,2015.SendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction2015-2030,Geneva.

UNISDR, 2009.UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, k management Critical facilitieDisasterPublishedbytheUnitedNationsInternationalDisasterriskDisasterriskmanagementDisasterriskreductionStrategyforDisasterReduction(UNISDR).

Uy,N.,Takeuchi,Y.&Shaw,R.,2011.LocaladaptationforlivelihoodresilienceinAlbay,Philippines.EnvironmentalHazards,10(2),pp.139–153.

Visser,M.,2012.TakingStock:Sanitationforall!...freeofcost inemergencies.Waterlines,31(1),pp.8–10.

Vogel,C.etal.,2007.Linkingvulnerability,adaptation,andresiliencesciencetopractice:Pathways,players,andpartnerships.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,17(3-4),pp.349–364.

Vogel, I., 2012. Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development, UKDepartmentofInternationalDevelopmentReview.

Voss,M.&Wagner,K.,2010.Learningfrom(small)disasters.NaturalHazards,55,pp.657–669.

Walker,B.&Salt,D.,2006.ResilienceThinking:SustainingEcosystemsandPeople inaChangingWorld,WashingtonDC:IslandPress.

Walker,G.etal.,2006.AddressingEnvironmentalInequalities :FloodRisk,Bristol,UK.

Wenger,E.,2000.CommunitiesofPracticeandSocialLearningSystems.Organization,7,pp.225–246.

Whatley,B.,2013.ImprovedlearningforgreatereffectivenessindevelopmentNGOs.DevelopmentinPractice,23(8),pp.963–976.

Whittall, J., Philips, M. & Hofman, M., 2014. Opinion and Debate: Building resilience bydeconstructing humanitarian aid. Available at: http://www.msf.org.uk/article/opinion-and-debate-building-resilience-deconstructing-humanitarian-aid[AccessedAugust14,2015].

WHO/UN-Water,2012.UN-WaterGlobalAnalysisandAssessmentofSanitationandDrinking-Water(GLAAS):2012ReportThechallengeofextendingandsustainingservices.

WHO/UNICEF,2014.ProgressonDrinkingWaterandSanitation:2014Update,Luxembourg:World

278

HealthOrganizationandUNICEF2014.

Wijesekera, S. & Thomas, A., 2015. Taking stock : Reaching the bottom billion – beyond opendefecation.Waterlines,34(3),pp.206–209.

Williams, S.R. & Sauer, J., 2014. Unclogging the blockages in sanitation : inter-sector linkages.Waterlines,33(3),pp.18–20.

Wisner,B.etal.,2004.AtRisk:NaturalHazards,People’sVulnerability,andDisasters2nded.,NewYork:Routledge.

Wisner, B., 2009. Local Knowledge and Disaster Risk Reduction. In SideMeeting on IndigenousKnowledge,GlobalPlatformforDisasterReduction.Geneva,pp.1–7.

Wisner,B.&Adams,J.,2002.WaterSupply.InB.Wisner&J.Adams,eds.Environmentalhealthinemergenciesanddisasters:apracticalguide.Geneva:WorldHealthOrganization,pp.92–126.

Wisner,B.&Gaillard,J.,2012.Anintroductiontoneglecteddisasters.Jàmbá:JournalofDisasterRiskStudies,2(3),pp.2002–2009.

World Bank, 2013. INDIA Cyclone Phailin in Odisha; October 2013 Rapid Damage and NeedsAssessmentReport,Bhubaneshwar.

Wright,C.etal.,2012.AFrameworkforResilienceThinking.ProcediaComputerScience,8,pp.45–52.

Yin,R.,2009.Casestudyresearch:DesignandmethodsFourth.,London:SagePublications.

279

Annexures

Annexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence:Activitiesundertakenundervarious

WaSHinterventionspostdisasters

No WaSHIntervention

Typesofactivitiesundertaken

1. Watersupply • Water supply at the community level, household provision and provision ofstoragefacilities(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).

• Repairing ofwater distribution networks, repair of leakages in the distributionsystems(Smith,2009;Parkinson,2009).

• Phasedapproach:Protectionofwells,diggingofnewboreholesatthecommunallevel,anddistributionofwaterthroughpublictapstandsincampareas;recoveryefforts began the housing and emergency water treatment and distribution;followedbyprolongedphasedestroyedandcontaminatedwatersystems,wellsandboreholeswererestored,rebuiltorreplaced(ClasenandSmith2005)

• Hardwareinstallationssuchashandpumps(McGarry1980).

2. Watersafety • Treatmentatthesourceoratthepointofconsumption• Testingformicrobiologicalorchemicalcontamination• Provisionofbucketswithlidtoavoidcontaminationduringtransportofwater• Householdlevelwatertreatmentpractices,safewaterhandlingpracticeswillhelpreducetheriskoftransmissionorcontamination(ClasenandSmith,2005).

• Mobilewater treatment purification plants like desalination plants or portablecoagulation/disinfectionsystems

• Promotion of household level water treatment including boiling, chlorination,solardisinfection, filtrationandcombinedflocculationordisinfection (Clasenetal.,2007).

3 Sanitation • Setting up safe excreta disposalmechanism is the first line of defense againstfaeco-oralpathologicaltransmission(Brownetal.2012)

• Promotionofuseoftoilets• Excretaremoval,treatmentanddisposal(WHO/UN-Water2012).• Improvinghouseholdtoiletusage• Promotionofsafedisposalmeasuresforchildren’sfaeces.• Provisionoftoiletcleaningmaterialsandmaintenancetoolkits

4. HygienePromotion

• Promotemessagestargetingpracticesrelatedtopersonalhygiene,waterhygiene,domestichygieneandenvironmentalhygiene(IFRC,n.d.)

• Promotionofhandwashingatcriticaltimestopreventfaeco-oraltransmissionofdiseases

• Provisionofsoapsandwaterstoragefacilitiesthroughhouseholddistribution• Undertakepromotionactivitieswithchildreninschools• Menstrualhygienemanagementwithadolescentandwomengroups• Promotion of water treatment practices at household level like chlorination,boiling,andsanitationpracticessuchasuseoftoilets,cleanlinessandmaintenanceoffacilities

280

Annexure2:DefinitionsofResilience

No Definition AuthorandYear1 Resilienceasphysical,biological,personality,social,andculturalsystems'

capabilitytoeffectivelyabsorb,respond,andrecoverfromaninternallyorexternallyinducedsetofextraordinarydemands.

Aguirre(2006)

2 “Systemorcommunityresiliencecanbeunderstoodasacapacitytoabsorbstressordestructive forces through resistanceoradaptation; capacity tomanage, or maintain certain basic functions and structures, duringdisastrousevents (andthe)capacity to recoveror ‘bounceback’afteranevent”

(Twigg,2007.p.6)

3 “...theabilityofasocialsystemtorespondandrecoverfromdisastersandincludesthoseinherentconditionsthatallowthesystemtoabsorbimpactsand cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes thatfacilitatetheabilityofthesocialsystemtore-organise,changeandlearninresponsetoathreat”

(Cutter et al., 2008,p.599)

4 b.“Thecapacityofasystem,communityorsocietypotentiallyexposedtohazardstoadapt,byresistingorchanginginordertoreachandmaintainanacceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by thedegreetowhichthesocialsystemiscapableoforganizingitselftoincreasethis capacity for learning frompastdisasters forbetter futureprotectionandtoimproveriskreductionmeasures.”

(UNISDR,2005)

5 •theamountofdisturbanceasystemcanabsorbandstillremainwithinthesame state or domain of attraction;• the degree to which the system is capable of self- organisation;•thedegreetowhichthesystemcanbuildandincreasethecapacityforlearningandadaptation.

Carpenter

6 Resilience describes an active process of self-righting, learnedresourcefulness and growth ± the ability to function psychologically at alevel far greater than expected given the individual's capabilities andpreviousexperiences.

Paton, Smith andViolanti,2000)

7 Resilience is the capacity to copewith unanticipated dangers after theyhavebecomemanifest,learningtobounceback.

Wildavsky,1991

8 Itisthebuffercapacityortheabilityofasystemtoabsorbperturbation,orthe magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a systemchangesitsstructurebychangingthevariables.

Hollingetal.,1995

9 Resilienceisafundamentalqualityofindividuals,groupsandorganisations,andsystemsasawholetorespondproductivelytosignificantchangethatdisruptstheexpectedpatternofeventswithoutengaginginanextendedperiodofregressivebehaviour.

HorneandOrr,1998

281

10 Resilience is the ability of an individual or organisation to expeditiouslydesign and implement positive adaptive behaviours matched to theimmediatesituation,whileenduringminimalstress.

Mallak,1998

11 Local resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able towithstandanextremenaturaleventwithoutsufferingdevastating losses,damage,diminishedproductivity,orqualityoflifewithoutalargeamountofassistancefromoutsidethecommunity.

Miletti,1999

12 The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems andoperatingconditions.

Comfort,1999

13 Theabilitytorespondtosingularoruniqueevents. Kendra andWachtendorf,2003

14 Thecapacityofthedamagedecosystemorcommunitytoabsorbnegativeimpactsandrecoverfromthese.

Cardona,2003

15 Theabilityofanactortocopewithoradapttohazardstress. Pelling,2003

16 Ecosystemresilienceisthecapacityofanecosystemtotoleratedisturbancewithoutcollapsingintoaqualitativelydifferentstatethatiscontrolledbyadifferentsetofprocesses.Aresilientecosystemcanwithstandshocksandrebuild itselfwhennecessary.Resilience in social systemshas theaddedcapacityofhumanstoanticipateandplanforthefuture.

ResilienceAlliance,2005

18 Itequates resiliencewith theability tousedisturbancesasoccasions fordoing‘newthings,forinnovationandfordevelopment’

(Folke2006:253).

19 resilience is conceptualised as the ability of a system to adapt toenvironmental shocks and continue functioning without there being achangeinitsfundamentalcharacteristics

(Manyena2006).

20 Thisunderstandingofcommunity resilience todisasterssprings fromthesustainableliveli-hoodsapproachwheresocial,economic,human,physicaland natural capital are seen asthedeterminantsofresilience

(Mayunga2007).

21 Social resilience is composed of components such as economic growth,stability and distributionofincome,degreeofdependencyonnaturalresources,anddiversityinthekindofactivities/functionsbeingperformedwithinsystems

(Adger2000).

22 This conceptualisation defines resilience in terms of sustainability, itselfdeterminedbytheabilityofusers(e.g.fishermen)withinasystemtoself-organiseandreorganisetosustainablymanageresources

(Ostrom2009).

23 Resilienceresultsfrom:Anindividual,organisationorsystemhavingahighdegreeofflexibilityinrespondingtoclimatechange,whenthereislargevarietyintheskillsetscontainedwithinthesystem;Asubstantialdegreeofredundancy‘...ofprocesses,capacities,andresponsepathwayswithin

(Rockefeller Foundation2009)

282

aninstitution,community,orsystem,toallowforpartialfailurewithinasystemorinstitutionwithoutcompletecollapse’(ibid.:2);Substantialplanninginthepreparationofidentifiedimpacts(itisacknowledgedthataccuratelyplanningforfutureimpactsofclimatechangeisnotusefulbutitnonethelessleadstolearningandbuildsskills);Ahighdegreeofdiversityofresponseandrecoveryoptionsandahighlevelofdecentralisation;Existenceofplansforfailuresothat‘break-downshappengracefully,notcatastrophically’(ibid.:2);andAnumberofdifferentsectorscometogethertoplan,executeandrecoverfromclimate-relatedimpacts.

24 Itprovidestwocomplementaryformsofresilience.Preparationresilienceis formed of assessment and readiness and performance resilience isformedofresponseandrecovery.

(Foster2006).

25 Resilience is the ability of communities to absorb external changes andstresseswhilemaintainingthesustainabilityoftheirlivelihoods

Adger2002

283

Annexure3:MethodologyMatrixbasedonconceptualframework

ResearchQuestion

Sub-researchQuestions

Components CharacteristicsPotentialIndicators

Description

How

effectivelydodifferen

tap

proa

chestowaterand

san

itation

facilities,and

hygiene

practicesduringpo

st-disasterrecovery

prom

otecommun

ityresilience?

Howcanlearning,

knowledge,and

participatoryapproacheshelpin

translatingthewindow

ofopportunityavailableduring

recoveryintoaction?


SocialLearning

SafeHygieneBehaviour

Promotionandofsafehygienebehaviourthroughprogramme

interventions,hygienemessages,activities,campaignsin

schoolsandwithincommunitiesconductedbygovernment

departments,externalorganizationsandthesubsequent

changesinhygienebehaviouradoptedbycommunities.

Socio-Culturalpracticesandattitudes

Socialandculturalaspectsrelevanttohealthandhygiene;

specificattitudes,beliefsandpracticesthatenablecommunities

topreventhealthoutbreakspostfloods:e.g.Handwashing

practices,safewaterusage,treatmentandstoragepractices,

defecationpractices,safefoodhandling

TechnologicalInnovationandLocalKnowledge

Adoptionoftechnologicalinterventionscomplementing

localknowledge

Theoutcomesofcommunitycapacitybuildingefforts,whereby

communitymembersandinformalusergroupssuchas

households,localyouth,masonsandbuildersaretrainedon

constructionofhazard-resilientmeasuresforprotectingwater

supplies,theiroperationandmaintenanceandsafehygiene

practicesbuildingupontheindigenousknowledgewithinthe

communities.

Documentation

Documentationmechanismstounderstand,identifyand

promotebestpracticesstemmingfromindigenousknowledge,

appropriateuseoftechnology,localadaptationandcopingand

copingstrategiesonwatersupply,treatmentandsafeexcreta

disposalmechanismswithinthecommunities

284

HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthened

toincorporateresilienceinWaSH?

Furthermore,howcanthese

policiesbeeffectivelytranslated

intopractice?

InstitutionalCapacities

MechanismsandPolicies

Representativemechanisms

Representativemechanismsincommunitygroups,CBOs,local

governingbodies;andpoliciestoguideproperallocationof

rolesandresponsibilitiesforinformeddecision-makingandwell-

definedprogrammeobjectivesandtheiroutcomes.

Organizationalmandateandcapacities

Well-definedinstitutionalmandatesfordisasterrecovery,clear

visionforresilienceandpresenceoftechnicalknowledgeand

expertisewithenhancedinstitutionalcapacitiestointervene

andstrengthencommunities'resiliencetofuturedisasters

FacilitiesandInfrastructure

Resourceallocationand

use

Human,technical,materialandfinancialresourcesforrecovery

adequatetomeettheinstitutionalrolesandresponsibilities,

suchasbudgetaryallocationforrecoveryatnationalandlocal

level

Informationanddata

Availabilityofbaselineinformationwithorganizations,dataon

existingandnewlyestablishedfacilitiesandstructures,

informationofhazards,vulnerabilitiesandrisksfacedbythe

communities.

Howcanlearning,

knowledge,and

participatoryapproacheshelpin

translatingthewindow

Participation

CommunityParticipation

Inclusionandrepresentation

Communityledprocessesinstitutedfordisasterrecoveryand

WaSHinterventions;Inclusionandrepresentationofvulnerable

groupsindecision-makingwithinformalandinformal

institutions,specificallyaddressingissuesofgender,elderly,less

abledandchildren

Multi-StakeholderPartnerships

Localandexternal

collaborations

Localstakeholdersparticipateandcollaboratewithexternal

organizationsandagreeforstablepartnershipssuchasIAGs,

technicalsupportagencies,externalagenciesforrecovery

efforts

285

ofopportunityavailableduring

recoveryintoaction?

Monitoringandevaluation

ParticipatoryM&Esystemstoassessandrevieweffectivenessof

variousreliefandrecoveryoperations

HoweffectivelydoagencyapproachesinWaSH

facilitatetheintegration

ofemergencyresponsewithlong-

termdevelopment

acrossdifferentsectors?

Integration

Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment

Programmetimelinesandoutcomesofinterventions

Programmatictimelinesandinvolvementbyagenciesin

responseandrecoveryeffortsofrecentfloodsindevelopment

activitiesandhowtheseledtochanges

IntersectoralLinkages

286

Annexure4:Interviewguideforexpertfeedback

InterviewSchedule

(Hello, thankyou foragreeing to takepart in this interview. Iwill begin the interviewwithyour

introduction,followedbyabriefdescriptionaboutmyresearchandtheframework.ThenIwillask

youradviseoneachcomponentandtheindicatorsthatIhavechosenforthisstudy.)

Nameoftheinterviewee

TimeandDate

Designation

Organization(ifapplicable)

Expertise-Sector(WaSH/Other)/Recovery

Durationoftheinterview

Skypeorfacetoface

1. A. Please tell me briefly about your experience in this sector, how long you have been

involved?

B.Whatarethedifferentagencies/institutionsthatyouhaveworkedwith,inwhatcapacity

andinwhichcountries?

2. A.Doyouuse‘resilience’aspartofyourworkorinyourorganization’swork?

B.Ifso,howdoyouuseresilienceandwhatisimpliedbytheuseofthisterm?

3. Whatdoyouthinkaretheessentialinterventionsandactivitiesfollowingadisasterinthe

recoveryphase,specificallyinWaSH?

4. Doagenciesadoptdifferentapproachestowater,sanitation,andhygieneprogrammingin

post-disasterrecovery?Ifso,whataretheyandhowdotheydifferfromeachother?

5. HowcanWaSHeffortsbeimprovedtoenhancetheresilienceofthecommunitiesandthe

systemstofuturedisasters?

(Now,incaseyouhavehadthechanceofgoingthroughtheframeworkIsentyou,Iwouldliketo

gothrougheachcomponentandthecorrespondingindicatorchosenforthepurposeofthisstudy.If

notletmebrieflygiveyouanoverviewoftheframework)

287

A. LearningandKnowledge

Would you consider learning and knowledgeofWaSH practices to be significant in promoting

resiliencewithinthecommunities?Ifso,whyaretheysignificant?

1. Howdoyouthinkcansociallearningpromoteresiliencewithinthecommunities?

A. Howsignificant arehygieneeducation campaigns andcultural attitudes toWaSHas

relevantindicatorsforsociallearning?

B. Howcantheimpactofhygienecampaignsandculturalattitudesbemeasured?

C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceoftheindicatorsor

waysofmeasuringthem?

D. Are there any other indicators for social learning that should be considered in this

framework?

2. HowcantechnicalinnovationsinWaSHcomplementlocalknowledgetopromoteresilience

withincommunities?

A. Howsignificantarecommunity trainingsorworkshops inWaSHanddocumentationmechanismsasrelevantindicatorsfortechnicalandlocalknowledgeinWaSH?

B. Howcantheimpactofcommunitytrainingsanddocumentationbemeasured?

C. Doyouknowofanyexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceof these

indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?

D. Are there any other indicators for technical and local knowledge that should be

consideredinthisframework?

B. Institutionalcapacities

WouldyouconsidercapacitiesofinstitutionsengagedinWaSHtobeasignificantfactortopromote


1. Howdoyouthinkcaninstitutionalpoliciesandmechanismspromoteresiliencewithinthe

communities?

A. How significant are representative mechanisms, organizational mandates andcapacities relatedtoWaSHasrelevant indicatorsof institutionalcapacity topromote

resiliencewithincommunities?

B. Howcantheimpactofsuchmechanismsandpoliciesbemeasured?

C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceorrelevanceoftheindicatorsor


D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsformechanismsandpoliciesthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?

288

2. How can facilities and infrastructure within institutions engaged in WaSH promote

resiliencewithincommunities?

A. Howsignificantareresourceallocationanduse,and(availabilityof-)informationanddataasrelevantindicatorsoftechnicalandlocalknowledgeinWaSH?

B. Howcantheimpactofresourceallocation,useandinformationanddatabemeasured?



D. Arethereanyother indicators for facilitiesand infrastructurewithin institutionsthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?

C. Participation

WouldyouconsiderparticipatoryapproachesinWaSHprogrammestobesignificantinpromoting


1. Howdoyouthinkcancommunityparticipationpromoteresilience?

A. How significant are inclusion and representation (of vulnerable groups) in WaSH

programmingasrelevantindicatorsforpromotingresilience?

B. Howcantheimpactofinclusionandrepresentationbemeasured?

C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceoftheindicatorsor


D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsforcommunityparticipationthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?

2. How can multi-stakeholder partnerships during recovery promote resilience within

communities?

A. Howsignificantarelocalandexternalcollaborationsandparticipatorymonitoringandevaluationmechanismsasrelevantindicatorsformulti-stakeholderpartnerships?

B. Howcantheimpactoftheaboveindicatorsbemeasured?



D. Are there any other indicators for multi-stakeholder partnerships that should beconsideredinthisframework?

D. Integration

Wouldyouconsider integration (acrossdifferentphasesandvarious sectors) tobea significantfactorforpromotingresiliencewithincommunities?Ifso,why?

289

A. Howsignificantarelinkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentandintersectorallinkagesasrelevantindicatorsforintegrationtoachieveresilience?

B. Howcantheimpactoflinkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentandintersectorallinkages

bemeasured?

C. Do you know of any examples showing either the significance and relevance of these

indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsforintegrationthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?

Finally, what other factors do you think are essential for building resilience through WaSHprogrammingduringrecovery?

290

Annexure5:Summaryreportoftheexpertinterviews–16/05/2013

ThepurposeofinterviewingexpertsintheareasofWaSHanddisasterrecoverywastounderstand

howeffectivelydifferentapproachestoWaSHfacilitiesandpracticesinrecoverypromotedisaster

resilience. Itwas regarding the conceptual framework forpromoting resilience,whichhasbeen

developedaspartofmyresearch.Thisexpertadvicewassoughttohelpvalidatetheframeworkand

theindicatorschosenforitsmaincomponents(learning,participation,institutionalcapacitiesand

integration).Practitioner’s inputsontheframeworkanditsfeasibilitywerehelpful indeveloping

theresearchmethodologyforgatheringempiricalevidence.

Aspartofthisactivityaround30expertswerecontactedthroughemailseekingtheirparticipation

over Skypeor in person. These includedpractitioners from the various fields of public health –

engineersandhygienepromoters,resilienceandDRRpractitionersandacademiaandalsorecovery

experts.Ofthese15replied,2refusedandsomealsoprovidedcontactdetailsofotherrelevant

experts.

Atablesummarizingtheprofileofthoseinterviewedhasbeenincluded.

No Name Duration Expertise Skype/Facetoface

1 DA 45mins DM Facetoface

2 VM 75mins WaSH,Accountability Facetoface

3 CK 50mins DM Skype

4 AB 1.14hrs WaSH Facetoface

5 VW 15mins MonitoringExpert Facetoface–Brief

6 AB 20mins- Resilience Facetoface–Brief

7 DL 47mins Water-Academic Skype

8 RL 41mins WaSHPractitioner Skype

9 PA 27+1+2 WaSHPractitioner Skype

10 JA 55mins WaSHPractitioner Facetoface

11 PS 1.09hrs+32 WaSHPractitioner Skype

12 PB 12+55mins WaSHPractitioner Skype

291

Outofthe12experts,6wereinterviewedoverSkypeand6inperson(2providedbrieffeedback).

Thesewererecordedandtranscribedlaterwiththehelpofmindmaps.Mindmapswerefoundto

beveryquickandeasywaytodepictthestructureoftheframeworkandrepresentkeyconcepts

thatwerediscussedandrecordthetime. Itallows foreasyretrievalandto identify themesand

correlatethem.

Thegeneralcommentswere:

1. Theframeworkseemstobehighlyrelevant,butthereisaneedtodefinetheargumentthatbuildingcommunityresiliencethroughWaSHisdifferentthanbuildingresilientWaSHinfrastructure.

2. Regardingtheframework–Someoftheexampleschosentodescribetheindicatorsareveryspecifictoaparticulartypeofhazardsuchasfloods.Theframeworkignoresmulti-hazardapproachmajorly.Andshouldincludeexamplesonurban/ruralresilienceaswell.

3. Theframeworkincludesmostlydevelopmentindicatorsnothinginittomentionthatitisaresilienceapproach.Theysuggestthatthefocusisontheinfrastructureandwhatisthethresholdforthesesystemstoabsorbshocks.

4. Needtoeitherincluderightsbasedapproachwithintheframework.

292

Annexure6:InformedConsentFormforParticipantsinResearchStudies

WaSHinPost-DisasterRecoveryandResilience

If you have any questions about the Information Sheet or the explanation already given to

you, please ask me before you consent to participate in this research. You will be given a

copy of this Consent Form to keep for your reference.

Participant’s Statement: Please tick the following that apply:

□ I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my

satisfaction, I have read the information sheet, and I agree to take part in this study.

□ I understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this

research, I can notify Sneha Krishnan and withdraw immediately.

□ I understand that my participation in this research will be kept anonymous.

□ I understand that the information I provide can be quoted in my name in the

research under my name, position and affiliation

□ I choose that only the name of my organization be refered to for the purposes of this

research

□ I am happy for this interview to be recorded and am aware of and consent to, any

use Sneha Krishnan intends to make of the recordings during and after the

research.

□ I understand that information I have submitted will be included in a report and I will

be sent a copy. I wish to remain anonymous and reference will only be made to my

organisation.

□ I agree that the information I provide may be used by others for future research.

□ I want Sneha Krishnan to seek my approval before publishing any information I

provide, in order to prevent misquotations and misunderstandings.

Name (please print): ___________________________

Signature: ____________________________________ Date: ________________

Researcher’s signature: _______________________ Date: ________________

293

Annexure7:Lineofinquiry

Visit1

Rapportbuilding

MeetAgencyA/localvolunteers.NGOstaffwherepossible.

Purpose–Togetageneraloverviewoftheareasandvillagelayouts

Establishdistanceandaccessroutes/travelandcostimplications

Observepeople’srelocation,damagesduetofloods,cropping.

Visit2-5

TransectWalk

Identifyvolunteersfromthecommunitieswhowillagreetoshowustheirvillage.

Theyshouldknowtheroads.CanitbetheAgencyAvolunteers?

Couldinclude2or3women,childrenwhenpossibleandmen(couldbedifficultbecausemenare

onthefields/laborwork)

Thequestionstobeaskedwiththeparticipantsduringthewalkcouldincludethefollowing:

1. Numberoffamiliesinthesettlement2. TheirLivelihoods3. Thecropsandtypes4. Topographyoftheregion5. Landholdingpatterns6. Sheltertypes7. Waterfacilities8. Defecationareas9. Vulnerablezones10. Safeplaces11. Houseswithlatrines12. Bathingfacilities

Visit6

SocialMapping

Stepstobefollowed:

1. Identifyandenlistparticipantsforthemappingexercise.2. Explainwhymapsareimportant?3. Whowilldraw?4. Whoisawareofthevillagelayoutandwillhelpdraw?

294

5. Pleasedrawamapofthecommunitysettlement?6. Whatarethekeylandmarks?7. Whichareasareaffected?8. Canyoulistthefollowinginthesettlements,iftheyexist?

a. Roadsb. Riversc. Pondsd. Canalse. Schoolsf. Healthcentresg. Handpumpsh. Mosques/Temples/Churchi. Postofficej. Panchayatofficek. OtherGovtofficesl. Fields/Farmsm. Forestareasn. Vulnerableareas

Visit7

a. Timeline

Year Disasterevent Damagesdescription

b. Participatorychangeanalysisa. Useflipchartsandexplaintheformatusing images(hand-drawn)anddescribedin

locallanguageb. Discussandlistdownwhateachofthemputforwardintoseparatecolumns

No Description Beforethefloods During the

floods

Postfloods

1 Nameofthevillage

2 Typeofshelter

3 Sourceofdrinkingwater

4 Placefordefecation

295

5 Bleachingofhandpump

6 Waterstorage

7 Handwashing at critical

times

8 Garbagedisposal

9 Bathing

10 Possessionoftheland

11 Diseases

12 Accesstohealthcare

13 Organizationalpresence

14 Otherchanges

Visit8

Householdinterviews(10)

Themes

1. Watera. Sourceofdrinkingwaterb. Watercollectionpracticesc. Waterstoragepracticesd. Watercontainere. Watertreatmentpracticesf. Watertransportg. Costofbuyingwater(ifapplicable)h. Waterhandlingpracticesi. Watersourceforotherpurposesj. Accesstowaterpointsk. Timeconsumed/travelledl. Whocollects?Genderm. Ownershipn. Serviceproviders/Agenciesinvolvedo. Alternatesources(redundancy)

2. Sanitationa. Defecationpractices–open/controlledorcommunal/private/govttoiletsb. Toiletfacilitiesc. Structureoftoiletsd. Raisedlevele. Costoffacilitiesf. Expertiseforconstruction

296

g. Laborinvolvedh. Accesstotoiletsi. Ownershipoftoiletsj. Govtschemesk. Locationl. Culturalattitudestodefecationm. Genderaspectsn. Agenciesinvolvedinsanitation

3. Hygienepracticesa. Wateratpointofusetreatmentb. Handwashingatcriticaltimesc. Handwashingfacilitiesd. Changeinpracticese. Socialconstraintsf. Culturalattitudestohygienebehaviourg. Healthpromotionactivitiesh. Keymessagesandlearningi. IECmaterials

4. SchoolWaSHpractices–facilitiesavailableandhygienepromotion5. SocialLearning

a. Raisedhandpumps/structuralresilience–trainingandawarenessb. Trainingonlatrineconstruction/raisedlatrinesc. Localmechanismstocontrolspreadofdiseasesorreducefloodimpactsd. Floodprotectionstrategiese. Newtechnologicalinputsf. Changeinpracticesattributabletofloodsg. Learningfrompeers,neighbours,relatives,organizationsh. Documentation–identifybestpractices-??i. Otheraspects

6. Institutionsa. Listoforganizationsb. Areasofwork/assistancereceived

i. Livelihoodsii. Shelteriii. Healthiv. WaSH

c. Schoolsd. Healthcentres

7. Participationa. RedressalofissuesatthePanchayatlevel/Blocklevelb. Participateinanotherorganizationc. Voiceofvulnerablegroupsd. Decision-makinginthevillagee. Women’s/Youthgroupsf. Dependenton–friends/relatives/others

297

g. Socialnetworksh. Whatassistance?Land/Shelter/Utensils/Money/Foodi. Compensationoftheassistance

8. Integrationa. Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment

i. Fluctuatingpopulationsii. Changingneedsiii. Howaretheymet?iv. Howcantheybesustainable?v. Availability/accessanduseofresourcesvi. Managementofwatersourcevii. Latrineoperationandmaintenance

b. Sectoralintegrationi. Othermajorneedscurrentlyii. Howcantheybeintegrated?

9. Migration10. Relocation/resettlement11. Shelter

Visit9

Actormapping

Visit10

Groupdiscussions–Problemidentificationandpriorities

Stepstobefollowed

1. Explainthepurposeofthisexerciseandwhatcanbeachieved2. Discusstheproblemsanddescribetheirimpactsduringpostdisasterrecovery3. Listoutallthepriorities4. Askthemtoprioritizewhichonesareimportantbasedontheirorderofsignificance5. Discussthefollowingwiththecommunitymembers:

a. Howhasthesituationchangedfromthetimesbeforethe2012floods,andhastherebeenanimprovementorbecomeworse?

b. Howwouldyouensurethatwecouldbecomemoreresilienttofuturefloods?c. Howcouldwe strengthenourwater sourcesand sheltersand latrines tobecome

moreresilient?

298

Otherofficialstobemet:

No Description Sonitpur Morigaon

1 Districtcollector 1 1

2 LocalNGOchieffunctionaries 4 4

3 Otherorganizationalstaff 5 5

4 Blockdevelopmentofficer 1 1

5 PublicHealthEngineer 1 1

6 Publichealthdept 1 1

7 Ruraldrinkingwater 1 1

8 Healthcentres 3 3

9 EducationDept 2 2

10 BlockEducationOfficer 1 1

11 Schoolteachers/Headmasters 5 5

12 Anganwadiworkers/Auxillarynurse

midwives/ Multiple Purpose

workers

5 5

Total 30 30

Questionsforaboveactors:

1. DistrictCollector/BlockDevelopmentofficera. Introductionb. Whatisthenatureofhazardsprevalentinthedistrict?c. Can you please describe the process of recovery in the district andwhat are the

challenges?d. Whatmeasuresareundertakentodevelopresilienceofthepeopleandsystemsto

therecurrentnatureoffloodsanderosion?e. Whatarethevariousneedsthatemergeduringdisasterrecoveryinsuchasituation?f. What are the challenges faced inWaSH during post disaster recovery given the

situation?g. Whatarethepoliciestodirectfinancialandotherallocationofresources?h. Arethereanymechanismsinplacetoincreaselearningwithintheadministration?If

sowhatarethey?i. Whatisthescopeforincreasedparticipationtoincreaseresilience?j. How can we encourage various organizational involvements and increase their

capacitiestobeinvolvedinrecoveryandrehabilitation?k. Howcanweintegratetherecoveryprocessacrosstimeanddifferentneedsthento

achieveresilience?

299

l. Whatinyourperspectiveneedstobedonetoimproveandincreaseresilienceofthepeopleinthedistrict?

PointersforPhoto-documentation

Photographsshowing

1. Watersource–openorhandpumps(raisedorsunkenordamaged)2. Sheltertypes(AgencyAorself-built/pukkaorkaccha)3. Latrine(ifpresent–private/communalorAgencyprovidedmaterials)4. Bathingfacilities(ifpresent)5. Opendefecatedareas6. Sewage7. Waterstorage8. Handwashingobservationalbehaviorathouseholdorschools9. IECmaterials

300

Annexure8:ToolsusedinAssamandOdisha(Source:Manyena,2009)

Name of the

tool

Purpose Risks Opportunities

Sitevisits Getafirsthandimpressionofimpactsandscale

ofdestruction,providesachancetointeractwith

the communities, observe and document the

experiences. This is the primary and most

importantsteptoaccessandfamiliarisewiththe

villages. Visit local offices, schools, health

centrestogetoverallpictureofhazards,health

andhygienestatus

Transaction and time costs involved are

huge,logisticsofreachingthevillagehad

to be arranged. Depending on public

transportandthenwalkingaffectedtime

allottedtofieldwork.Visitingthevillages

during floods also a challenge as most

areas remain waterlogged/washed away

duetoerosion

Provides theaccuratepictureof the

village and establishes a connection

with frequentvisits.Visually see the

impact and magnitude of the

disastersandlivingconditionsofthe

people

Rapport

building

Make local connections and identify key

informants from the communities. To get a

general overview of the areas and village

layouts; Establish distance and access routes/

travelandcostimplications

Observe people’s relocation, damages due to

floods,cropping.

Access to communities through agencies

influences the role of the researcher

affecting the objectivity and impartial of

datagathered

Communities get to know the

researcher better, understand the

backgroundandtrustingrelationship

isformedeventually

Transectwalk Walkwith the local volunteers and community

members-women,childrenandmen.Observe

Due to size of the villages, covering all

settlementsandexploringthelengthand

Whenaccompaniedbylocalsthistool

proves useful to discuss various

301

their village, and discuss with them about the

geographical layout, hazard impact and scale,

demographics, water points, defecation areas

and safe spaces.Also lookout for houseswith

latrines and bathing facilities, and overall

hygienepractices

breadth of the village becomes difficult.

Sometimeserodedvillagesmeansthereis

populationdisplacement.

issues they face and observe their

practices

Village

mapping

Map the general layout with local population

identifying the settlements, water sources,

important buildings and vulnerable areas. Also

note the defecation areas and drinking water

sourcessuchashandpumps.

Pre-planning the activity so that

researchercancarrynecessaryaids,may

notbetheaccuratescaleofdepiction

Whendonebychildren,canfindout

about what is the practice at their

household level and gives real

picture,theyhavefunwhiledrawing

aswell

Problem

ranking

Listthecurrentneedsandproblemsfacedbythe

community.Describehowtheseproblemsaffect

the community members, and list the priority

urgentneedsamongstall.Thecommunitythen

prioritisesbasedontheorderofsignificanceand

requirements such as shelter, drinking water,

sanitationfacilities,livelihoodopportunitiesetc.

Often difficult to get a consensus on

different perspectives based on income,

genderandaccesstoresources

Veryusefulandinformativeexercise.

To understand at what stage of

recovery the community is at the

presentstage,whataretheircurrent

needs and priorities? Should be

ideally undertaken with

representative groups – men,

women,andchildren.

Focus group

discussions

Mostfieldvisitswouldculminateinfocusgroup

discussionsorcommunityconsultations,where

Pre-determined protocol for discussions

restrictsthescopeforusefulandvaluable

Besttooltogetawiderconsensuson

issues faced by the community at

302

themembers–menorwomenwouldgatherto

providemewith information I am looking for.

The common areas that I would discuss them

wouldincludedifferentaspectsofrecovery,the

assistance they received, how has floods

changed/transformed their day-to day lives,

WaSH, infrastructure and other development

concerns, how do they perceive resilience and

whatstepscanbeundertaken.

discussion, best to keep it free-flowing

and let the community members voice

their feedback. Always leads to

expectationofsomekindofhelpbutdue

to lackofadequateresources tosupport

asactionresearchwasahugeriskofusing

thistool

large, often came up with solutions

thattheywantedtobeimplemented,

the challenges they faced and how

these could be overcome. Issues of

menstrual hygiene, hygiene

behaviourandprivacyconcernsover

use of water and latrine facilities

werediscussedwithwomengroups.

Children provided inputs as well on

WaSH practices and facilities in

schoolsandhouseholds.

303

Annexure9:InterviewGuide–Organizations

(Hello,thankyouforagreeingtotakepartinthisinterview.MynameisSnehaKrishnanandIam

undertakingresearchonbuildingcommunityresilienceduringpostdisasterrecoveryspecificallyin

water,sanitationandhygieneinAssam.HenceIwouldliketoknowmoreaboutyourorganization

andtheworkundertaken.Kindlyfeelfreetoaskforanyclarificationorelaborationofanyquestions

thatImayaskyou)

1. Nameoftheinterviewee

2. TimeandDateoftheinterview

3. Durationoftheinterview

4. Organization

5. Designation

A}OrganizationOverview

1. a)Pleasetellmebrieflytheorganization’sexperienceofworkinginthisregion.

b)Howlonghastheagencybeenworkinghere?

c)Whatarethedifferentdisasterresponsesthattheagencyhasbeeninvolvedinsofar?

d)Whatdisasterphasesdoestheorganizationworkin?Isdisasterrecoveryapriority?

e)Howwastheorganizationinvolvedduringthe2012floodsinAssam?Whatsectorswere

addressedwithintheresponse?

B}VisionandMandate

2. Whatistheorganizationalvisionfordisasterresilience?

3. Howdoestheworkdonebytheorganizationcontributetocommunityresilience?

4. Whatisthemandateofworkinginhumanitariansector,particularlyindisasterrecoveryand

rehabilitation?

5. Howdoyouthinkwastheemergencyresponseworkdonebytheagencyusefulinaddressing

needsofthecommunitiesforlong-termsustainability?

304

C}SpecificExpertiseandCapacities

6. Whatisyourexperienceofworkinginwater,sanitationandhygienepracticesinthepost-

disasterphaseinAssam?

7. Whatisthetechnicalexpertiseheldwithintheorganizationintermsofhumanresources

andexperiencein

a) Disasterrecoveryand

b) WaSH?

8. Whatkindoftrainingandskill-buildingexercisesspecifictodisastersandsectorsdothestaff

receive?Whatdoyouthinkarethegapsinbuildingtheircapacities?

D}LearningandKnowledge

9. HowwouldyoudescribethelocalattitudesandcommunitypracticestoWaSH,whichare

prevalentintheseareas?

10. Didyourorganizationundertakeinterventionstopromotesafewater,safesanitationand

hygienepractices?Whatwerethey

11. How effective were these interventions in leading behaviour change and/or building

systems’resilience?Whatwerethechallengesfacedineffectingthisbehaviourchange?

12. ParticularlyinWaSHsector,areyouawareofinstanceswheretechnologicalinterventions

complementinglocalindigenousknowledgewereusefulintheregionsofAssamforbuilding

disasterresilience?

13. Hastheorganizationundertakeneffortstoreviewandlearnfromthepreviousexperiences

inpostdisasterwork?Ifso,whataretheyandhowhavetheybeenincorporated?

14. Are there instances where local collective action in WaSH was formalised into the

institutionalpoliciesforfutureprogrammes?

15. Howcansuchlocallevelcopingandadaptivestrategiesbeformally/informallydocumented

forunderstandingcommunityresilience?

E}InstitutionalCapacitiesandParticipation

16. Generally,whatisthemale/femaleratioofyourstaffing?

305

17. Whatisthescopeforlocalrepresentationwithinyourorganization?

18. Howaretherolesandresponsibilitiesdelineatedwithintheorganizations?Aretheyflexible?

19. Howdoestheworkdonebytheorganizationpresentlocalactiontothepolicymakers?

20. Whatroledoesadvocacyplayintheorganization’swork?

21. Howdoestheagencyplanandallocateresourcestoworkinrecoveryandreconstruction?

22. Howimportantiscommunityparticipationasacomponentoftheorganization’sprojectsat

variousphases?

a) Duringdesignphase

b) Planningandoperationalphase

c) Monitoringandevaluationphase

23. Whatarethechallengesthattheorganizationhasfacedinensuringequalparticipationand

howdidyouovercomethese?

F}InformationmanagementandCollaborations

24. Whatsystemsofinformationcollectionanddissemination,arebeingusedwhileengaging

withcommunities?

25. Istheorganizationpartofanetwork/consortiumofNGOs?

26. Do you partner with NGOs, government agencies, for-profits for your projects at

district/stateornationallevel?

27. Howwouldyoudescribetheeffortsundertakenbysuchnetworksascontributingtodisaster

resilienceobjectives?

G}Integration

28. Before concluding, could youplease describe how can recovery objectives be addressed

duringthevariousstagesoftheorganization’swork?

29. What according to you are the most important aspects to build resilience within the

communities?

30. WithregardstoWaSH,whatmeasurescanbeundertakentoachievedisasterresiliencein

thesystemsandcommunities?

306

31. Howcanobjectivesofsafewaterandsanitation,andhygienepracticesbeintegratedwith

theworkthatyourorganizationisundertakinginothersectors?Whatarethepotentialsfor

achievingtheseandchallenges?

Thankyouforyourtime.Pleasefeelfreetogivemeanyfeedback.

307

Annexure10:SampleofaMindmap

308

Annexure11:BiswanathRevenueCircleHouseholdAssessmentData(Source:CircleOffice,BiswanathChariali)

Listofhousesdamagebyflood,2012District:SonitpurforFinancialYear2012-13(1stWave)BiswanathRev.Circle

NameoftheVillage

Classofland(PP/AP/Govt)

FullydamagedPuccahouses@35000INRperhouse

Fullydamagedkutchahouses@15000INRper

house

Severelydamagedpuccahouses@6300INRperhouse

Severelydamaged

kutchahouses@3200INRper

house

Partiallydamagedpucca/kutchahouses@1900INRperhouse

Hutsdamage/destroyed(both

puccaandkutcha)@2500INRperhouse

CatleShed

Damage@1250INRperShed

GrandTotal(inINR)

No. Amt No. Amount No. Amount No. AmountNo.

amount No. Amountpucca kutcha total

Solmari AP Nil Nil 1 15000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 15000

Do AP Nil Nil 2 30000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 30000

Do GOVT Nil Nil 2 30000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 30000

309

Annexure12:Listofdocumentsused

Typeofdocuments Assam Odisha

Governmentdocuments 30 40

AgencyAdocuments 25 45

AgencyAemailcommunications 10 30

OtherNGOdocuments 15 10

Journalarticles 50 25

Newspaperarticles 200 180

Publishedreports/studies 50 15

Unpublishedreports 15 10

310

Annexure13:DistrictMaps

Figure1:DistrictmapofSonitpur,Assam(MapsofIndia2007)

311

312

Figure2:DistrictmapofMorigaon,Assam(MapsofIndia2012)

313

Figure3:DistrictmapofPuri,Odisha(MapsofIndia2013b)

314

Figure4:DistrictmapofBalasore,Odisha(MapsofIndia2013a)

315