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Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e19

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Ocean & Coastal Management

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Review

Building legitimacy of the recreational fishing sector in mixed commercialerecreational fisheries

Cameron J.A. MacKenzie*, Sean P. CoxSchool of Resource and Environmental Management, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 29 January 2013

* Corresponding author. Present address: 441 WinM6C 3T4. Tel.: þ1 416 652 0571.

E-mail address: cmackenzie@mbl.edu (C.J.A. MacK

0964-5691/$ e see front matter � 2013 Elsevier Ltd.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2013.01.004

a b s t r a c t

To become legitimate fishery stakeholders alongside government and commercial interests, recreationalfisheries must operate in accordance with the rules, principles, or standards established for sustainablefisheries. These rules fall within the following fisheries management processes: (i) assessment of stockstatus relative to target or reference points, (ii) control of either total fishing effort (input control) or totalharvest (output control), and (iii) allocation of the harvest amongst stakeholders. Unfortunately, recre-ational fisheries are rarely subjected to the same standards as commercial fisheries. Aside from personalconservation ethics, there are no incentives for recreational fishers to meet any standards of catchreporting and assessment, limits on total fishery catch, and accounting for allocated catches. In contrast,commercial fisheries are often required to follow strict standards in each of the three managementprocesses. This paper demonstrates how such differences often contribute to a series of “legitimacy gaps”when compared to commercial fisheries that limit the scope of harvest rights attainable by the recre-ational sector. We use an urban, recreational-commercial fishery for Dungeness crab (Cancer magister) inBritish Columbia, Canada, as a case study to demonstrate how discrepancies in requirements and re-sponsibilities between the recreational and commercial sectors limit the scope of harvest rightsattainable by the recreational sector. Reducing these discrepancies would help justify the changes to themanagement framework required to increase recreational access.

� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Recreational fishing within fisheries resource management

Marine fisheries management is rapidly diversifying to includea wider range of stakeholders and interests, including recreationalfisheries. Although recreational fisheries have a long history on thePacific Coast and have developed alongside commercial interests,many have experienced an increase in magnitude of both fishingeffort and catch in recent decades, and are thus encroaching onwhatwere once considered commercial fishery resources (Colemanet al., 2004; Figueira and Coleman, 2010; Ihde et al., 2011). Thisdiversification presents new challenges to allocation and manage-ment of marine fisheries resources.

In fisheries management, it is expected that stakeholders whosupport the rules and practices of sustainability should generally berewarded with secure allocation rights. Recreational fishers havenot been required to contribute to sustainable fisheries manage-ment (e.g. catch reporting, cost recovery) to the same degree as the

ona Dr., Toronto, ON, Canada

enzie).

All rights reserved.

commercial sector, but they have not received many of the samebenefits in terms of harvest rights either. Management objectivesfor each sector are also often quite different (Goodyear, 2007; Ihdeet al., 2011; Walters and Cox, 1999). Such an apparent mismatch inharvest rights, management responsibilities, and objectives forthese different stakeholders leads tomisunderstanding and conflictbetween competing user groups (Borch, 2010; Goodyear, 2007;Mitchell et al., 2008).

A common task for fisheries resource managers is to identifystakeholders and determine their salience, or the degree to whichmanagers give priority to their competing claims (Mitchell et al.,1997). Salience depends on a combination of characteristics thatdefine the stakeholder. One key attribute of a stakeholder is thelegitimacy of their relationship in the management process.Legitimacy in this context is defined as “a generalized perception orassumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, orappropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,values, beliefs, definitions” (Mitchell et al., 1997). Apart from theirlegitimacy, two other defining attributes of a stakeholder are thepower of the stakeholder’s influence and the urgency of theirclaims (see Mitchell et al., 1997 for a broader description). Becauseof the diffuse nature of recreational fisheries on the Pacific coast,

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e1912

which typically consists of a diverse collection of individuals lack-ing a cohesive vision, their power of influence in the managementprocess is generally low. Similarly, due to the low economic impactcompared to commercial fisheries, the urgency of recreationalclaims is also perceived as moderately low. Therefore, recreationalfisheries frequently rely on the legitimacy of their relationship inthe management process as the defining characteristic of theirstake.

In this paper, we demonstrate how discrepancies in re-quirements and responsibilities between the recreational andcommercial sectors generally contribute to a series of “legitimacygaps” that, when compared to the commercial sector, limit thescope of harvest rights attainable by the recreational sector. Weargue that by reducing these inequalities, recreational fishers couldimprove their harvest rights and increase their recognition asstakeholders within the fisheries management process. First andforemost, the recreational fishery sector must ensure that individ-ual or collective groups of fishers meet acceptable standards ofcatch reporting, assessment, and limits on total fishery catch if theyare to become fully legitimate stakeholders in the resource allo-cation process. We critically examine the worldwide experience inrecreational fisheries management to suggest mechanisms thatmight reduce these legitimacy gaps, and we apply these lessons toa competitive mixed-use fishery for Dungeness crab in BurrardInlet, British Columbia.

2. Sustainable fisheries management

To become equitable stakeholders alongside government andcommercial interests, recreational fisheries must operate inaccordance with the rules, principles, or standards established forsustainable fisheries. We propose that, at minimum, these rulesgenerally fall within the following fisheries management processes(Flewwelling et al., 2002; Hilborn, 2007, 2008):

(i) monitoring and assessment of stock status relative to targetsand reference points,

(ii) control of either total fishing effort or total harvest, and(iii) fair allocation of the harvest amongst stakeholders.

The degree to which these processes are successfully managedwithin the recreational fishery should determine the level of accessto a particular fishery resource. Below, we give a detailed descrip-tion of these 3 management processes, and briefly compare theirgeneral level of implementation in marine commercial and recre-ational fisheries.

2.1. Monitoring and assessment

Knowledge of the state of a fishery, both in terms of fish stockstatus and supporting ecosystems, is crucial for sustainable fish-eries management. Information on landings is commonly consid-ered the minimum data required for managing a fishery(Vasconcellos and Cochrane, 2005). However, lack of basic catchand effort reporting often impedes assessments of stock status andfisheries policy analysis. Where this information is available, sta-tistics such as catch, fishing effort, as well as size- and age-composition of the catch can be compiled and interpretedthrough fisheries stock assessment models to give an indication ofhow stocks have responded to fishing impacts in the past (Waltersand Martell, 2004). This provides some guidance on how to setharvest rates in the future so as to maintain a sustainable stock sizeand harvest.

Commercial fisheries in the developed world have well-established reporting standards and procedures (Hilborn et al.,

2005). For example, self-reporting in a log book is common incommercial fisheries and may be verified by on-board monitoringwith cameras or human observers, despite the fact that this level ofmonitoring creates significant challenges for the fishery. For indi-vidual self-reporting, total landed catch needs to be verified viaa dockside monitoring program; the fisher logbooks need to bedigitized and compared to landed catch from the dockside report;at-sea discarding reports have to be monitored with at-sea ob-servers or electronic systems. In the latter case, the many hours ofvideo have to be audited to ensure that reported activity matchesactual activity to within some reasonable tolerance. Therefore, fullyestablished monitoring programs involve large costs that are typ-ically funded by the harvesters. For example, in 2007, Pacific halibut(Hippoglossus stenolepis) fishing vessels paid an average of $62,000each for catch monitoring and licensing fees (DFO, 2010a).

In contrast, protocols for self-reporting and compliance mon-itoring are generally absent in marine recreational fisheries, and itis not uncommon for catch data to be entirely absent in most rec-reational fisheries (Figueira and Coleman, 2010; Ihde et al., 2011).Where catch data does exist for recreational fisheries, it is generallycollected through creel surveys that are funded from revenuegenerated through license sales. This information can be costly toacquire for recreational fishing management agencies. Therefore,obtaining accurate and cost effective information on recreationalfishing is an ongoing difficulty for recreational fisheries managers.

2.2. Control of harvest

Control over total harvest in recreational fisheries is increasinglyimportant, especially given the growth in the recreational fleet. Inrecent decades, 71% of United States marine finfish species haveexperienced an increase in the relative magnitude of recreationalharvest compared to commercial harvest (Ihde et al., 2011), includingan increase of over 20% between 1996 and 2000 alone (Sutinen andJohnston, 2003). While only 4% of total landings of finfish wereattributable to recreational harvest, when focussing on populationsof concern recreationalfisheries accounted for 23% of all US landings,and in the Gulf of Mexicowere as high as 65% (Coleman et al., 2004).

Marine commercial and recreational management agenciesemploy similar tools for controlling harvest. Limiting the totalharvest of fisheries in both sectors is typically attempted using“input control” measures such as limits on fishing effort, seasonlength, or area management, but can also be limited with outputcontrols in the form of catch and possession limits. However, thereare fundamental difficulties involved in establishing recreationalfisher acceptance and compliance with both input and outputcontrols. For example, although common approaches such as bag-and size-limits are accepted by the recreational community, theyare often viewed by recreational managers as inefficient for con-trolling total harvest because these measures do not restrict thetotal fishing effort (Cox et al., 2003; Lewin et al., 2006; Radomskiet al., 2001). Because open-access (i.e., no restrictions are placedon who can fish or how many fishers can access a particularresource) is a central tenet of North American recreational fishing,attempts to limit fishing effort through restrictive input controlsusually face sustained opposition from the recreational community(Walters and Cox, 1999). Similarly, in the rare cases where outputcontrols have been implemented for recreational fisheries, controlhas not been effective. For example, although total allowable catchlimits have long been established for each sector in the mixed-usered snapper fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico, recreational harvestoften exceeded both the commercial harvest and recreational totalallowable catch throughout the 1990s (Sutinen and Johnston,2003). Control of harvest therefore remains a fundamental prob-lem for many recreational fisheries.

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e19 13

2.3. Allocation of harvest

The principles of resource allocation that are being applied tocommercial fisheries worldwide are increasingly being applied torecreational fisheries. Harvest allocation for recreational fishers canbe categorized into open access, limited entry, individual quotas,and exclusive use access structures (as described for commercialfisheries in Hilborn et al., 2005). Most of these have examples inmanagement of marine recreational fisheries; however, open ac-cess is overwhelmingly the standard structure in recreationalfisheries. The guiding principle behind this allocation policy is thatcommon properties, including fisheries, require egalitarian accessrights across fishing sectors.

Limited entry, in which a fixed number of licenses are issued(Hilborn et al., 2005), is often cited as a potential strategy for sus-tainable recreational fisheries management (Cox et al., 2003; Lesteret al., 2003; Walters and Cox, 1999). However, because thisrestrictive form of access requires restricting fishing effort directly,it is rarely implemented anywhere in the world (Johnston et al.,2007) because it runs counter to a common objective, which is toincrease recreational fishing effort. One prominent exception is thelimited entry fishery for pink snapper (Pagrus auratus) in Shark Bay,Australia (Mitchell et al., 2008), where fishing is only permittedwith the purchase of a harvest tag. Modelled after limited entryhunting strategies, one tag permits a fisher to fish in Shark Bay toharvest a single snapper. This strategy, combined with seasonalspawning closure, has proven highly effective at controlling recre-ational pink snapper catches compared to conventional open ac-cess strategies (i.e., bag limits and size limits) employed for pinksnapper in other areas (Mitchell et al., 2008). However, the successof the novel tagging programs in Shark Bay is attributed largely topink snapper ecology, involving a constrained spatial range and lowrelease mortality. Applicability of this limited entry strategy toother species remains untested.

Individual quotas are an evenmore exclusive access structure, inwhich the license not only allows access, but also entitles the li-censee (e.g. an individual or a vessel) to a proportion of either thetotal catch or total fishing effort (Hilborn et al., 2005; Parsons,1993). This quota entitlement is a means for economic ration-alization of fisheries (Parsons, 1993) and, when marketable andtransferable between licensees, may promote flexibility in thefishery (Scott, 1979). Individual quota strategies have not beenimplemented in recreational fisheries, but have been considered fora number of prominent mixed-use fisheries, particularly whererecreational fishing is mainly comprised of commercial guiding andresort operations (Abbott et al., 2009; Sutinen and Johnston, 2003).However, fundamental differences between commercial and non-commercial recreational fisheries make this strategy complicatedin a recreational context. Commercial fisheries are characterized byhigh catchability, low effort, and fewer fishers, whereas recrea-tional fisheries have low catchability, high effort, and many fishers.The costs and complexity of adequately managing a quota systemwithin such a large and diverse group of recreational fishers doesnot appear to be feasible.

Finally, exclusive use rights can be applied in recreational fish-eries management by closing certain fishing areas to the com-mercial sector. Exclusive use is the most restrictive means ofallocating harvest among sectors, and it is an increasingly commonmanagement strategy for mixed-use fisheries. For instance, in 2007,striped bass (Morone saxitalis) and red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus)were designated by US Executive Order 13449 as recreation-onlyspecies in all United States federal waters. More commonly, how-ever, exclusive use rights are enacted on small spatial scales byexcluding the commercial sector from fishing certain waters. Thereare many examples of this type of closure, including commercial

Dungeness crab (Metacarcinus magister) closures in Puget Sound,WA and Ucluelet Harbour, BC. In both of these cases, the benefits torecreational fishers are high because of dense human populationsand ease of access. Therefore, due to their relative ease of imple-mentation, exclusive-use access structures are more feasible allo-cation strategies for the recreational sector than limited entry andindividual quota strategies, and are increasingly applied where analternative to open-access is necessary.

Conflicts inevitably arise wherever there are overlaps in fisheryresource use between commercial and recreational sectors (Borch,2010; Cooke and Cowx, 2006; Goodyear, 2007; Jamieson, 1993;Kearney, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2008). Part of the reason for thisconflict may be that harvest allocation management for mixed-usefisheries generally follows the extremes of either open-access orexclusive recreational use. Weak control over recreational harvestunder open-access is often viewed as inequitable by commercialharvesters who are typically held to tight catch limits and com-pliance monitoring protocols (e.g. Mitchell and Baba, 2006). Pro-viding the recreational fleet with exclusive use of some fishingareas excludes commercial fishers, thus increasing their fishingcosts because they must travel to new areas and develop newtechnologies (Branch et al., 2006; Salas and Gaertner, 2004).Exclusive recreational use also increases competition and crowdingon the remaining commercial fishing grounds. The first step towardalleviating these intra-sector conflicts is to ensure that recreationalsector management processes are within the existing norms andstandards established for the commercial fisheries. Although this isa lofty goal, establishing legitimacy of the recreational sector wouldsubstantially improve the perception of equitability in the sharingof mixed-use resources. This can be achieved by altering the reg-ulatory structure of recreational fisheries, however managementmust include incentive structures that encourage both compliancewith regulations and an ethic of resource conservation within therecreational fishing community.

3. Incentives for sustainable fishery management

Development of commercial fisheries management initiallyinvolved similar access structures to today’s recreational fisheries.As management agencies unsuccessfully imposed input controlmeasures, output control strategies targeting the causes of over-exploitation were instituted (Parsons, 1993).

Strong incentive structures for sustainable biological and eco-nomic fisheries management have been built into commercialfisheries management that are generally absent from or notapplicable to recreational fishing. Such incentives fall into twomainclasses: direct, rights-based incentives and indirect, market-basedincentives. Direct incentives associated with harvesting rights,such as individual quotas, are established to eliminate over-capitalization in the fishing fleet (Moloney, 1979) and the “race-to-fish” incentive (Hilborn et al., 2005; Parsons, 1993). Rights-basedincentives create long-term asset value by appealing to commer-cial fishers desire to be economically efficient. When fishers areallocated harvest rights, improvements in income come not bycatching more fish, but rather by reducing costs and increasingproductivity and quality of the product (Hilborn et al., 2005). Thistends to motivate the commercial fishing industry to contributedirectly to all three fishery management functions.

Indirect, market-based incentives are increasingly used to pro-mote sustainability of capture fisheries. For example, non-governmental organizations such as the Marine StewardshipCouncil (MSC) attempt to influence seafood consumer choices by“...[using an] eco-label and fishery certification program to con-tribute to the health of the world’s oceans by recognizing andrewarding sustainable fishing practices” (MSF, 2010). Sustainable

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e1914

fishing practices are evaluated byMSCwith voluntary standardizedassessments of the entire fishery. One reward for participants isaccess to premium seafood markets all over the world. Althoughmarket-based incentives are likely to produce ecological benefits inthe long-term, most fisheries pursue eco-labels to reduce the im-mediate risk of losingmarket access. Thus, market-based incentivesbenefit long-term asset value as well as short-term value of thecatch.

In contrast to the incentives built into commercial fisheriesmanagement described above, aside from personal conservationethics, there are few incentives for recreational fishers to contributeto management. Recreational fishers do not respond to economicincentives, but rather are motivated to maximise fishing opportu-nities and quality (e.g., catch-per-unit-effort). Management objec-tives for each sector generally reflect this difference, wherecommercial management objectives generally seek to limit totalharvest and fishing effort, while recreational management objec-tives are more likely to be structured to maximise fishing partic-ipation and angling quality (Walters and Cox, 1999).

If direct and indirect incentives are improving sustainability ofcommercial fisheries, it is sensible to consider what types of in-centives might be applied to recreational fisheries in an effort toimprove their sustainability. In the following section, we examinea crab fishery as a case study to explore how the recreational sectorcan meet acceptable management standards and become fullylegitimate stakeholders in the resource allocation process.

4. Case study: an urban recreationalecommercial Dungenesscrab (Metacarcinus magister) fishery in British Columbia

4.1. Overview of the fishery

Calm conditions, easy access and a dense human populationmake Burrard Inlet, British Columbia a popular destination forfishing where a relatively intense recreational crab fishery hasdeveloped coincident with a small, but efficient commercial fishery.Crabbers exploiting these stocks range from local residents trap-ping from piers, docks, or private boats to tourists utilizing the inletas a yachting destination, and recreational trapping occurs in thesame areas as commercial fishing activity. Similar competitive,mixed-use fisheries occur throughout the Dungeness crab’s rangealong the Pacific Coast (e.g., California to Alaska) as well as for otherinvertebrate species such as blue crab (Callinectes sapidus) in theChesapeake Bay and Gulf of Mexico, and American lobster(Homarus americanus) in New England.

Equitable access to crab fishing is important in Canada, wheremanagement agencies are required to maintain recreational accesseven in areas of intensive commercial fishing pressure. One of theguiding principles for managing recreational fisheries is that Fish-eries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is “.responsible for providingsustainable recreational harvesting opportunities as part of inte-grated management plans consistent with its policies” (DFO, 2001).Under these principles, DFO will consider increased or priorityaccess for recreational use under the concept of “best use” of theresource, after obligations to conservation and First Nations aremet(DFO, 2001). To date, the management tools employed within therecreational sector to ensure equitable allocation of crab stockshave been open access policies coupled with input controls.

Management tactics for recreational Dungeness crab harvest arefairly uniform along their Pacific Coast range. Input control mea-sures are applied that do not control fishing effort directly, butinstead follow a “3-S” strategy, where harvest is limited by size, sex,and season regulations. Both commercial and recreational fisheriesare managed in the same way by limiting harvest to legal-sized(minimum 165 mm carapace width, measured from tip to tip of

the longest lateral spines) males only. However, in the lowermainland area of Vancouver, the recreational fishery is open year-round, while the commercial fishery is only open mid-June to lateNovember. In most cases, recreational crab fisheries remain open-access with neither limits on total catch nor strict catch reportingrequirements. While these management strategies are supportedby the recreational crabbing community, we argue that they un-intentionally limit access to the resource and hinder the recrea-tional fishery’s ability to attain broader stakeholder recognition andrights within the fisheries management framework.

4.2. Recreational trapping within Dungeness crab managementprocesses

Monitoring and assessment of crabbing activity are vastly dif-ferent for the recreational and commercial sectors in Burrard Inlet.Commercial vessels are monitored electronically by continuousrecording of: (1) vessel locations, speed, and direction; (2) hy-draulic activity on the trap hauler; and (3) scanning of uniqueradio-frequency identification (RFID) tags on the traps to monitortrap limits. Total commercial harvest is also enumerated inmandatory logbooks and landed biomass is reported by manage-ment area with commercial sales slips, issued by crab buyers. Thecommercial fishery pays all costs associated with this monitoring.In contrast, recreational crabbing total harvest and fishing effort arevirtually unknown because activities are not monitored andenforcement is low. This lack of data for the recreational fisheryseverely hinders attempts to assess the effect of recreational har-vest on the crab population or determine equitable recreational-commercial allocation by means of historical use.

Control over harvest and regulation compliance issues havearisen for the recreational crab fishery in part because harvest is notmonitored and regulations are not easily enforced. Convictions forpoaching and exceeding harvest limits by recreational harvestersdemonstrate lack of compliance with regulations (particularlyinput controls: size, sex, and bag restrictions). Recently, poor con-trol over recreational harvest prompted increased restrictions onrecreational crabbing by limiting trapping activity to daylight hoursonly, thus further diminishing recreational access to the resource.

Because of both greater efficiency and fishing effort, harvest bythe 3 commercial vessels operating in Burrard Inlet greatly exceedsthe recreational harvest each year. This inequality leads to claims bythe recreational sector that the current open-access policy does notprovide an equitable harvest allocation. Previous studies havedemonstrated that Burrard Inlet and surrounding crab fisherieshave been heavily exploited at rates over 90% (Jamieson andCampbell, 1998; Zhang et al., 2002). Our own surveys of legal andsub-legal crab stocks in the adjacent Indian Arm crab fishery showa similar level of exploitation (MacKenzie, 2010). Following thecommercial season opening, catch rate of legal-sized Dungenesscrabs declines rapidly, leaving much lower abundances for recrea-tional trappers. Intensive fishing effort on these crab stocks has alsobeen identified as a factor that can threaten the long-term yield ofcrab stocks due to reduced recruitment and discard/handlingmortality of sub-legal crabs from frequent catch-and-release(Zhang et al., 2002).

High exploitation of crabs by commercial harvesters createsconflict between the sectors, increasing calls for restrictions oncommercial trapping, and greater harvest access for recreationaltrappers (DFO, 2007). Ideally, an equitable approach would involvean allocation of total catch between the competing sectors (i.e.commercial, recreational and First Nations). In practice, however,there are very few documented cases inwhich multi-sector harvestallocation of any kind has been attempted for marine fisheries, andalmost never attempted for invertebrate stocks. In some mixed-use

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e19 15

crab fisheries, managers have addressed these access and allocationissues through seasonal or permanent commercial closure of someareas, thereby granting exclusive use of the resource to recreationalor First Nation crabbers. A notable application of this policy is theWashington State Dungeness crab fishery, where the harvest area isdivided equally between First Nations and non-First Nations usersin a significant proportion of Puget Sound (US v. Washington 1994).Thus, the challenge of allocating harvest among multiple sectors,along with a desire to change the status quo for recreational fisheryaccess, suggests that some form of exclusive harvest rights for therecreational sector may be the only feasible alternative.

Although the benefits of allocating exclusive use to the recrea-tional sector would likely include a reduction in exploitation, aswell as fulfilment of DFOsmandate to provide access to high qualityrecreational fishing, there are also costs. For example, broad scalegranting of exclusive harvest rights to the recreational sector re-duces the diversity of employment in the resource harvestingsector as well as a sustainable and secure source of seafood forgeneral public consumption. From a management perspective,permanently closing the commercial fishery would involvereplacing a small, highly regulated fleet of commercial fishers witha large group of unmonitored and largely unregulated fishers. Thejustification for such a shift from a mixed-use fishery to an exclu-sively recreational fishery is made evenmore difficult by the lack ofrecreational data and the compliance problems; where exclusiveharvest rights have been attempted in other areas the catch andeffort data to support the decisions has been limited (DFO, 2007).

The problems with the Burrard Inlet recreational crab fisherydefined above constitute a general failure of recreational harvestersto participate in monitoring and assessment of stock status andcontrol of the harvest, which leads to an inevitable perception ofunfair allocation of the harvest amongst stakeholders. Recreationalcrabbers have not been integrated into the management frame-work established for commercial crabbers in the area and, despite

Table 1Table of common deficiencies in recreational management relative to commercial crab fishcrab fisheries allocation of full harvest rights seen in the commercial fishery. Included aipation, and examples for recreational fishers to close the gaps in the three functions of

i. Management tools ii. Obstacles

5.1. Reducing the gaps in monitoring and assessmentAccountability in catch

and effort reportingCatch reporting cards � Non-complianc

� Catch card retuCitizen Science � Lack of interest

resources

Accountability for discardreporting

Discard reporting oncatch cards

� Non-complianc� Not required fo

commercial sec5.2. Reducing the gaps in harvest controlIllegal harvest Deterrence

- Signage and increasedenforcement

� Limited effect

Increase regulatorylegitimacy- Co-management

� Requires definaassociations betrecreational use

� None of the priof integrated mhave been met

Increase regulatorylegitimacy- Education/outreach

� Effectiveness varegulation andexperience of fi

5.3. Reducing the gaps in harvest allocationOpen access fishery heavily

favours commercial fisheryExclusive Use- Commercial closure- Differential size limits- Temporal exclusion

� Deficiencies inmonitoring andrecreational har

� Losses to commharvest

the differences in participation with management, exclusive use isincreasingly contemplated for areas like Burrard Inlet for reasons ofequitable allocation and feasibility. This represents a shift in thehistorical status of recreational fisheries. In being given exclusiveuse of the resource, recreational fishers would shift from beinga dependent stakeholder to a dominant stakeholder, defined by thepower of their influence (i.e. they are the primary harvesters) andtheir legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997). Whereas the legitimacy ofrecreational fishing has historically been unquestioned in open-access mixed-use fisheries, by becoming the dominant stake-holders, their legitimacy is dependent on acting within the existingstandards of sustainability for the fishery.

5. Toward an equitable mixed-use crab fishery: reducing thelegitimacy gaps

Dungeness crab fisheries have been resilient to chronic highexploitation under “3-S” management (Messmer et al., 2012;Orensanz et al., 1998). However, what works for a relatively smallfleet of economically motivated commercial crabbers will notnecessarily work for a large group of recreationally motivatedcrabbers. Both management cost-sharing and the required in-centives to participate in management can be different. We suspectthat low-cost management incentives that motivate recreationalcrabbers to participate in management processes are likely to bemore successful at diminishing the gaps between commercial andrecreational management. Below, we evaluate the Burrard InletDungeness crab fishery within the context of the following criteria(Table 1):

(i) management tools that could be used to reduce the in-equalities that exist between recreational and commercialfisheries in each of the three management processes;

(ii) obstacles to implementing each of the described tools;

eries management in Burrard Inlet. Differences constitute a legitimacy gap impedingre potential management tools, obstacles to implementation, incentives for partic-fisheries management.

iii. Incentives Key examples

erns

� Regulatory� Exclusivity

- Puget Sound crab (WDFW, 2000)- Yukon salmon (DFO, 2010b)

and � Stewardship� Participation in

management

- Citizen science (Foster-Smithand Evans, 2003)

- Engaging recreational fishers(Granek et al., 2008)

er thetor

� Regulatory - Puget Sound crab (WDFW, 2000)

� Regulatory - Alberta lakes (Sullivan, 2002;Walker et al., 2007)

bleweenrsnciplesanagement

� Stewardship� Participation in

management

- Angling management organizations(Sutinen and Johnston, 2003)

- Local management(Pinkerton and John, 2008)

ries bywithsher

� Stewardship - Engaging recreational fishers(Granek et al., 2008)

- Minnesota lakes(Page and Radomski, 2006)

assessment,control ofvestercial

� Exclusivity - Incentives for commercialfisheries (Hilborn et al., 2005)

- Differential size limits(Phillips and Zhang, 2004)

- Puget Sound crab (WDFW, 2000)

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e1916

(iii) incentives that improve implementation success of thesemanagement tools.

5.1. Reducing gaps in monitoring and assessment

5.1.1. Accountability in catch and effort reportingMandatory logbooks and crab vessel electronic monitoring

systems provide high quality catch and effort statistics for stockassessment and monitoring of commercial fishing activities. Infor-mation provided in these datasets allows managers to individuallytrack fishing locations and success rates of each vessel. This preci-sion provides unprecedented monitoring of fishing activity, butcomes at significant cost to DFO and the fishing vessel owners. Bycomparison, there is no recreational crabbing catch and effort dataavailable. Moreover, while commercial fishers accept paying forbiological sampling and a portion of themanagement costs becauseof the economic payback, recreational fishers likely already incureconomic losses from their fishing, and therefore are unwilling toaccept high license fees that would enable harvest monitoring.Thus, relatively inexpensive options for obtaining reliable catch andeffort data from the recreational sector will be needed to ensurecompliance with this management process.

Studies have shown that data collected directly by the recrea-tional community can be low cost and effective (Cooke et al., 2000).Where creel surveys are not realistic due to the effort and expense,alternative management tools such as catch cards and citizen sci-ence can be used to promote accountability in catch and effortreporting.

5.1.1.1. Catch cards. Recreational harvesters are required to recordtheir catch on catch cards in a number of freshwater and marinefisheries. In marinewaters, for example, catch cards are used on thePacific Coast to account for catch of Pacific salmon (DFO, 2010b)(Oncorhynchus spp.) and for recreational Dungeness crab catch andeffort in Puget Sound, WA. Washington Department of Fish andWildlife (WDFW) began issuing catch cards to the recreationalcrabbers after their State Fish and Wildlife commission grantedexclusive use for the recreational community during the peaksummer period in three management areas (WDFW, 2000). Thedata on recreational harvest is used in estimating in-season catchrelative to area harvest quotas and total harvest after the end of theseason (Sonntag, 2010). WDFW are therefore able to assess harvesteffects on the crab population from the recreational sector, evaluatetradeoffs, and support fishing rights for the recreational users.

Catch cards are a promising tool for collecting data on recrea-tional crabbing in Burrard Inlet; however, the accuracy of reportingis an important consideration. High rates of card return are criticalto the success of this type of program, leading to issues withwhether mandatory or voluntary reporting should be required.Voluntary reporting has been shown to be cost effective and reli-able for estimating some basic fishery statistics (Gerdeaux andJanjua, 2009), given appropriate program design and application(Cooke et al., 2000). However, the effectiveness of these voluntaryreporting programs is not assured and can depend on the indi-vidual fisheries. One study evaluating voluntary catch cardreporting in Mississippi lakes found that only 5% of catch cardswere voluntarily completed and returned, increasing to 13% whenagency personnel verbally requested participation (Walker andSchramm, 2004). They also found a bias in reporting in whicholder and more experienced anglers were more likely to partic-ipate. For these lakes, voluntarily completed catch cards were notfound to be a viable substitute for more expensive creel surveys.

Catch card return rates are important, even where returns aremandatory. In the Puget Sound crab fishery, for instance, catch cardreturn rates have never exceeded 33%, despite incentive programs

such as reminder post cards, free fishing licence draws, and internetreporting options. Therefore, in an effort to link catch reporting toan economic incentive, WDFW began fining crabbers $10 in 2009before re-issuing a license to improve participation (Sonntag,2010). Thus, catch card reporting is unlikely to be accepted byrecreational crabbers without significant incentives to participate,such as exclusive use being conditional on catch reporting.

5.1.1.2. Citizen science. Engaging the public in scientific researchhas a long history in North America where the practice is commonin a diversity of scientific monitoring programs (Cohn, 2008;Devictor et al., 2010), including fisheries studies. “Citizen scientists”are individual volunteers or networks of volunteers, often un-trained in scientificmethods, who helpmonitor animal populationsand ecosystems (Cohn, 2008). Volunteers in these types of projectshave been shown to be very capable of accurately collecting simpleforms of data (Foster-Smith and Evans, 2003). The subset of rec-reational fishers who are inherently interested in conservation andmanagement therefore constitute a social group with great po-tential for positively enhancing fisheries management throughstewardship (Arlinghaus, 2006; Granek et al., 2008).

Citizen science could be a valuable monitoring approach inBurrard Inlet. Estimating fishing effort in a crab trap fishery isa simple operation that requires no equipment, aside from a boat,and a little experience. Because all recreational traps are connectedto a buoy, estimating fishing effort is a simple matter of countingtrap buoys following an unbiased sampling design. This requirescertain assumptions about the type of trap being fished (i.e. prawntrap or crab trap); however, this uncertainty can be evaluated bypulling random traps, classifying traps by depth (i.e., prawn trapsare generally set in deeper water), or simply requiring relevantlabelling on the buoy. If volunteers can be found to conduct thesurveys, tapping the individual and community desires to getinvolved in environmental stewardship would produce benefits forthe fishery and increase recreational accountability.

5.1.2. Accountability in discard reportingHandling mortality has been highlighted as an important issue

for Dungeness crab fishery sustainability. In high exploitationfisheries, such as the Burrard Inlet crab fishery, the discard rateduring the summer period is estimated to be at least 10 sub-legalcrabs discarded for each legal sized crab retained (DFO, 2007).Even moderate handling mortality under such conditions couldnegatively affect overall Dungeness crab yield (Zhang et al., 2002).

Estimating the lethal and sub-lethal effects of handling mor-tality is not easily accomplished (Zhang et al., 2002) and, similar toreporting catch, recording discards on catch cards would improvethe quality of data available to scientists and managers. However,given that the commercial fishery in Burrard Inlet is not required toreport discards, and general difficulties experienced with catchcard reporting, implementing discard reporting would likely needto be a regulatory condition for license.

5.2. Reducing gaps in harvest control

5.2.1. Improving compliance with regulationsThere are no output harvest limits or targets for Dungeness crab

under the current management framework. Total harvest is onlylimited by compliance with input control fishing regulations. Whilefairly restrictive monitoring controls (e.g., electronic monitoring)exist to ensure compliance of commercial vessels fishing in BurrardInlet, controlling recreational harvest remains difficult, as demon-strated by persistent convictions for illegal possession of femaleand under-sized crabs, as well as possessing more legal crabs thanthe daily limit.

C.J.A. MacKenzie, S.P. Cox / Ocean & Coastal Management 75 (2013) 11e19 17

Because recreational fishers may respond to declining fishstocks by increasing illegal harvest (Sullivan, 2002), ensuringcompliance with regulations becomes increasingly important forstocks in need of rebuilding. Research into compliance with regu-lations in recreational fisheries is limited; however, there are a fewexamples from both marine and freshwater fisheries suggestingthat multiple factors contribute to a manager’s ability to controltotal harvest. Kuperan and Sutinen, (1998), for instance, demon-strated that an individual fisher’s decision to comply with regula-tions is influenced largely by their perception of deterrence (i.e.,a risk-like measure defined as a product of the detection probabilityand punishment severity) and the regulatory legitimacy (note thatlegitimacy in this specific context is a measure of public support forregulations rather than a key attribute of a stakeholder, as definedabove). Therefore, managers could improve compliance with reg-ulations by: (a) boosting the perception of deterrence; or (b)boosting the perceived legitimacy of regulations within the recre-ational community via co-management frameworks or increasededucation and outreach.

5.2.1.1. Deterrence. An empirical relationship between complianceand deterrence was found in Alberta lakes where enforcementpatrols, combined with signage, reduced rates of non-compliancewith fishing regulations (Walker et al., 2007). Enforcement pa-trols appeared to affect angler perceptions about probability ofdetection, while signs provided clear indications of the punishmentseverity. However, the effects of patrolling were limited as indi-cated by an asymptotic maximum perception of detection whenconservation officers approached more than 3% of anglers. Theseresults suggest that continued use of appropriate signage andmodest enforcement in the Burrard Inlet can have considerableimpact on illegal harvest. As the stock of legal-sized crabs isdepleted over the course of the fishing season in Burrard Inlet,increased enforcement patrols could help deter potential increasesin illegal harvest.

5.2.1.2. Increasing regulatory legitimacy. In the absence of strongenforcement, authorities need to obtain acceptance of and com-pliance with policies and regulations (Pinkerton and John, 2008).The recent series of violations by Burrard Inlet recreational crabberssuggests that there are few incentives to follow regulations. Pro-viding participants in a fishery a stake in management is onepotentially powerful mechanism to increase regulatory legitimacy.Pinkerton and John (2008), for example, describe a processwhereby the legitimacy of harvest regulations and management ofa clam fishery adjacent to a First Nations community in KyuquotSound, British Columbia increased through establishing a co-management structure with the First Nations harvesters in thecommunity. Traditional command-and-control style managementwas devolved to a more local management framework (Pinkertonand John, 2008), which improved all of the management pro-cesses for the fishery. Prior to this policy change, similar concernswere described for this fishery as are present in the Burrard Inletcrab fishery, namely poaching, a depleted resource (certainly truefor Dungeness crab soon after the commercial opening) and anopen access “race to fish” style of harvest management. The fisherywas also structurally similar, with recreational fishing activitygenerally visible and confined to small areas close to access points.Although the similarities of these two fisheries suggest that co-management could be a useful management tool in Burrard Inlet,there are key differences in community characteristics that makeco-management unlikely to be as successful as the Kyquot Soundclam fishery.

In Kyuquot Sound, the First Nations harvesting community issmall and remote, with strong cultural ties and dependence on the

clams as food source. This is almost completely opposite to theurban recreational community in Burrard Inlet (i.e. large, disparategroup of recreational harvesters with weak cultural ties and nodependence as a food source). A co-managed fishery necessitatessome sort of representative association to put forward manage-ment issues. Sutinen and Johnston (2003) describe how anglingmanagement organizations (AMOs) might be used to facilitatemanagement devolution, and strengthen harvest rights and co-management for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery, in a sim-ilar fashion to Kyuquot Sound. They argue that AMOs wouldimprove recreational management because they meet seven prin-ciples of integrated management. DFO collaborates with the rec-reational community through the Sport Fish Advisory Board (SFAB),composed of representatives from recreational fishing and busi-ness/industry organizations and regional resource managers. TheSFABmeets regularly with DFO resource managers to discuss issueswith recreational fisheries, and it is through this process that manynew policies are developed for the recreational community. It isconceivable that the SFAB could act as a Sub-regional recreationalmanagement council (as described in Sutinen and Johnston(2003)), should data and harvest control improve in the recrea-tional crabbing community. However, none of the conditionsrequired for co-management (Sutinen and Johnston, 2003) arepresent in the Burrard Inlet recreational crab fishery. Therefore, co-management is an implausible option at present, and unlikely bea useful tool for increasing regulatory legitimacy.

Another option for increasing regulatory legitimacy is toincrease education and outreach to the recreational community.Assessments of environmental education programs consistentlyshow that environmentally knowledgeable people are more likelyto behave in pro-environmental ways (Angermeier, 2007). Fisheriesmanagers use education to disseminate knowledge and to attemptto change attitudes within the fishing community. Identified edu-cational requirements include promotion of general environmentalstewardship (Granek et al., 2008), improvements in regulationawareness (Page and Radomski, 2006) and sponsorship of bestfishing practice guidelines for reducing the impacts of fishing onecosystems (Cooke and Suski, 2005; Lewin et al., 2006).

Educational tools for recreational fisheries include regulationsummaries, public access signs, local media, word of mouth, andcommunity-based participatory restoration projects (Angermeier,2007; Page and Radomski, 2006). The effectiveness of such edu-cational tools varies depending on how they are applied. Forexample, when considering ways to increase regulatory awarenessinMinnesota fisheries, Page and Radomski (2006) found that not alltypes of angling groups were informed about the regulations andnot all regulations required the same amount of promotion. Reg-ulation awareness was maximized when groups that receive littleexposure to regulation information (e.g., generalist anglers or non-residents) were targeted and managers concentrated on promotingnew regulations.

Another similar option for increasing regulatory legitimacy is toincrease outreach with the recreational community. Three impor-tant factors determining the type of involvement and the likelihoodof recreational fisher interest in involvement (Granek et al., 2008).First, presence of an environmental stewardship ethic amongstfishers facilitates support for conservation measures and solidifiescommitment from fishers. Second, the scale of the fishery isimportant because the smaller the fishery, the more likely fishersare to perceive that their actions directly influence fishery sus-tainability, making involvement in management more likely.Finally, whether the management issue comes directly from rec-reational fishing will influence involvement. When the combina-tion of factors leads to high likelihood of fisher involvement ina range of management activities, recreational fishers can be

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engaged in a meaningful and transparent way within an efficientmanagement process that increases support for harvest policies(Irwin et al., 2011).

5.3. Reducing gaps in harvest allocation

5.3.1. Status quo heavily favours commercial fisheryThe “3-S” strategy prescribed for Dungeness crab management

has been very resilient to very high exploitation rates and recruit-ment variability (Helliwell, 2009; Orensanz et al., 1998). However,in a mixed-use fishery with open access, the recreational sector isoutmatched by the effectiveness of the commercial vessels. Addi-tionally, the difficulty of applying limited entry or quota strategiesto recreational fisheries leaves very few options for resource shar-ing amongst sectors. Therefore, commercial fishing exclusion areasare increasingly being granted to both recreational and First Na-tions fisheries to mitigate the inequalities in allocation.

Area-based exclusivity (i.e. commercial closure) is only onepossible way of limiting commercial access. Two more moderateforms of exclusivity are possible: (a) differential size limits; and (b)temporal exclusion.

5.3.2. Differential size limitsDifferent size limits for BC commercial and recreational Dung-

eness crab fisheries have not been tried, but have been effective atproviding access to recreational fishers in other important inver-tebrate fisheries (e.g. abalone stocks in Western Australia; Mitchelland Baba, 2006). For BC crab fisheries, increasing the commercialsize limit has been suggested as an equitable alternative to totalcommercial closures (Phillips and Zhang, 2004). The current legalsize class would remain the same for non-commercial harvesters,providing stable and equitable access to the resource. Phillips andZhang (2004) estimated that increasing the commercial size limitby 5 mmwould produce a 22% loss in total harvest for commercialcrabbers in the Vancouver area during the first season. However,they suggest that reducing exploitation on the previously harvestedsize classes may reduce future losses to the commercial fishery byincreased recruitment and crab growth. Recreational crabbers alsohave a much lower exploitation rate than commercial crabbers,potentially producing future dividends for all sectors by increasingthe abundance of larger crabs and increasing larval production byallowing a greater proportion of larger crabs to breed (Phillips andZhang, 2004).

The major obstacle to this management strategy is the initiallosses to the commercial harvest. However, the current situation incompetitive mixed-use fisheries (e.g. Ucluelet, Burrard Inlet) is notperceived to provide reasonable access for recreational fishers.Differential size limits would likely provide reasonable allocation tothe recreational community, without major structural changes tothe management framework.

5.3.3. Temporal exclusionRestricting commercial crabbing to off-peak periods of the year

is another option for equitable resource sharing between sectors, asan alternative to total commercial closure. For example, restrictionson commercial fishing are lifted in the Puget Sound crab fishery inthe fall, after the recreational and First Nations fishery have con-cluded. This policy is away of ensuring that the legal sized crabs arefully utilized and provides access to the recreational and First Na-tions fisheries.

Similar to differential size limits, an argument against imple-mentation of temporal exclusion is the economic losses to thecommercial sector. However, unlike differential size limits, theexclusion would not be mitigated by potential future gains fromincreased growth and recruitment. Commercial crabbers with

a harvest history in Burrard Inlet would have their activities dra-matically curtailed.

6. Conclusion

Legitimacy of the recreational sector in growing recreationalecommercial fishery management processes is dependent on act-ing within existing standards for sustainable fisheries, includingmonitoring, assessment, and control over harvesting activities. Adeficiency of performance against these standards indicates a fail-ure to fully participate, and be responsible for, management ofrecreational fishery resources, thus further contributing to thelegitimacy gap between recreational and commercial fisheries.Existing incentives such as regulations, enforcement, and stew-ardship do not appear to be closing this gap. Similar to past expe-rience with commercial fisheries (Hilborn, 2002), incentives suchas firm allocations and exclusive fishing rights (e.g., direct quotaallocations, differential size limits, or spatial/temporal zoning) arepotentially promising means of closing the legitimacy gap if theycan motivate greater recreational fishery participation in morecostly and difficult management activities.

Responses of recreational fisheries to novel incentive schemesfor improving sustainability and legitimacy will undoubtedly becomplex and challenging to predict. Although research from anapplied ecological perspective will continue to be needed on in-centives that alter fishing behaviour and exploitation of fish stocks,amore substantial socio-economic research avenue is neededdue tointeractions of exclusivity incentives (e.g., quotas, spatial zoning)with the prevailing open-access model governing individual har-vesters. Despite a reasonably long record of commercial fishery dataon activity and behaviour, we are only nowbeginning to understandthe socio-economic consequences of incentive schemes such asindividual transferable quotas (ITQs) that were adopted by somecommercial fisheries in the 1980s and 1990s.While some responsesto ITQs were predictable (e.g., reduced fleet size), other responses,such as perverse quota leasing behaviour were not (Pinkerton andEdwards, 2009; Yandle and Dewees, 2008). At the present time, itis difficult to predict even the basic catch outcomes of entrenchedrecreational fisherymanagement regulations such asminimum sizelimits (van Poorten et al., 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to saywhether research on the consequences of adopting novel sustain-ability incentives will be practical, or even possible, for recreationalfisheries in the future. Nevertheless, a concerted research effort,perhaps via many small-scale management experiments linkedthrough large-scale research networks, could demonstratewhetherparticular incentives for closing the legitimacy gaps would providemeasureable and robust benefits to the recreational sector.

Acknowledgements

We appreciate the thoughtful reviews of two anonymous ref-erees, as well as comments on earlier drafts by Evelyn Pinkerton,Bridget Ennevor, Brett van Poorten, and James Nelson. Funding forthis project was provided by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, CanadaFoundation for Innovation, and a Natural Sciences and EngineeringResearch Council Discovery Grant to S.P.C.

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