Canguilhem Power Point

8/2/2019 Canguilhem Power Point

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C A N G U I L H E M , F I C H T E A N D H E G E L

A N D Y J O N E S

0 8 0 2 4 7 3 8

Contemporary French

Philosophy


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This presentation will:

- Discuss Fichtes threefold ontology of the Ich fromthe 1794 Wissenschaftslehre

- Discuss Canguilhems ontology of health in relation

to Fichte- Discuss both Fichte and Canguilhem in relation to

Stones account of Hegel inPetrified Intelligence.


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1. First Absolutely unconditioned principle :AisA

Fichte begins with the identity proposition Ais A(A=A) which he claims is universally accepted as anempirical fact to consciousness. A is not asserted as

existing, only IfA exists, thenA exists (I,93). Whatis established in the proposition A = A is thenecessary connection between the two that is

posited absolutely, and without any other ground.

To this necessary connection I give the preliminarydesignation X. (ibid).


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Fichte: Ais (X) A

- The self judges according to X, as a law; which law musttherefore be given to the self, and since it is positedabsolutely and without any other ground, must be given tothe self alone. (I, 94).

- X is possible only in relation to an A; now X is really

present in the self: and so A must also be present in the self,insofar as X is related to it. (ibid)

- there is something that is permanently uniform, foreverone and the same; and hence the X that is absolutelyposited can also be expressed as I=I; I am I. (ibid).

- the proposition I am I is unconditionally and absolutelyvalid, since it is equivalent to the proposition X; it is validnot merely in form but also in content. In it the I is posited,not conditionally, but absolutely, with the predicate ofequivalence to itself; hence it reallyis posited, and theproposition can also be expressed asI am. (I,95).


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I am I

The selfs own positing of itself is thus its own pureactivity [...] the selfexists andposits its own existence by

virtue of merely existing. (I, 96).

That whose being or essence consists simply in the factthat it posits itself as existing, is the self as absolutesubject. As itposits itself, so it is; and as it is itself; andhence the self is absolute and necessary for the self. Whatdoes not exist for itself is not a self (I,97)

it is not the I am that is based on A = A but rather thelatter proposition that is based on the former

(I, 98)


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2. Second Principle: condition as to content:~A =~A

As with A, ~A = ~A means Ifthe opposite of A is posited,then the opposite of A is posited. (I, 102). Fichte expressesthe similarity between A and ~A as we should then beasserting absolutely the same connection (= X) as before(ibid).

~A is derived from, but not contained within A = A since theform of counterpositing is so far from being contained in thatpositing, that in fact it is flatly opposed to this. Hence it is anabsolute and unconditional opposition (ibid).

It is further presupposed that the self which acts in bothcases, and judges in both, is the same. If it could be opposedto itself in the two acts, ~A would be equal to A. Hence eventhe transition from positing to counterpositing is possible onlypossible through the identity of the self [...] opposition ingeneral is posited absolutely by the self (I,103).


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Nothing is posited to begin with, except the self; andthis alone is asserted absolutely (1). Hence there can

be absolute opposition only to the self. But that whichis opposed to the self = the not-self(I, 104).

Whatsoever attaches to the self, the mere fact ofopposition necessitates that its opposite attaches to thenon-self [...] the shallowness of this explanation can beeasily demonstrated . If I am to present anything at all,

I must oppose it to the presenting self [...] thisobservation is so striking, that anyone who fails tograsp it, and is not thereby uplifted into transcendentalidealism, must unquestionably be suffering from

mental blindness (I, 104-5)

Self =Not Self


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3. Third Principle: condition as to form

Insofar as the not-self is posited, the self is not posited; for thenot-self completely nullifies the self. Now the not-self is posited inthe self; for it is counterposited; but all such counterpositingpresupposes the identity of self, in which something is positedand then something set in opposition thereto. Thus the self is notposited in the self, insofar as the as the not-self is posited therein

(I,106)

Necessary for

Nullifies the self

Presu

pposed

for

Self

isnotposited

int

he

self


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For, if I = I, everything is posited that is posited in the self.But now the second principle is supposed to be posited in theself, and also not posited therein. Thus I does not = I, butrather self = not-self, and not-self = self (I, 107).

1) The opposites to be unified lie in the self, as consciousness.

So X too, must exist in consciousness. 2) Both self and not selfare alike products of original acts of the self, andconsciousness itself is similarly a product of the selfs firstoriginal act, its own positing of itself. 3) yet, according to ourprevious arguments [...] X itself must be a product, and of anoriginal act of self at that. Hence there is an act of the human

mind = Y, whose product is X. (I, 107) The opposition in question must be taken up into the identity

of the one consciousness (I, 108).

X is a product of Y


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Opposition and Striving between self andabsolute Self

Only now, in virtue of the concept thus established, can it besaid of both that they are something. The absolute self of the firstprinciple is not something (it has, and can have no predicate); itis simplywhatitis, and this can be explained no further (I, 109)

We shall encounter his (Spinozas) highest unity again in theScience of Knowledge; though not as something that exists, butas something that we ought to and yet cannot, achieve (I, 101).

insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is itself inopposition to the absolute self. And so all these oppositions are

thus united, without detriment to the unity of consciousness; andthis, in effect, is proof that the concept we proposed is the correctone. (I, 110)


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Fichte: to sum up

1) A = A

2) A = (X) A

3) X = I am (Y)

4) ~A = (X) ~A5) ~A = A

6) A = ~A

7) A and ~A are unified in Y; all opposition is unifiedin consciousness.

8) A = A + ~A


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Canguilhem & Fichte

Canguilhemsnaturalist system is analogous to Fichtestranscendentalism. According to Fichte, Canguilhemmust be suffering from mental blindness.

Canguilhem says: It is true that the term teleology hasremained too charged with implications of atranscendental kind to be gainfully employed; final isalready better; but what would be better still would beorganismic [...] This mode of expression is suited to the

present tendency in pathology and elsewhere to put thetotal organism and its behaviour again into the forefront(N/P, p.129)


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Canguilhem

Canguilhemsaccount is ontological: In our essay wecompared the ontological conception of disease, in whichdisease is portrayed as the qualitative opposite of health, withthe positivist conception, which derives it quantitatively fromthe normal state (N/P, p.171).

The reason for the polemical final purpose and usage of theconcept of norm must be sought, as far as we are concerned,in the essence of the normal abnormal-relationship. It is not aquestion of a relationship of contradiction and externality butone of inversion and polarity. (N/P, p.146).

Fichte uses the word Gagenteilhere, opposite orcontrary, not Widerspruch, the contradictory. If the selfand non-self were contradictory, that would be the end ofthat, and the end of Fichtes attempt at a system (Seidel,1993, p.48)


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Canguilhem

I am still running the risk of trying to establish the fundamental meaning of normal by meansof philosophical analysis of life understood as activity of opposition to inertia (non-ego) andindifference (absolute ego). Life tries to win against death in all senses of the word to win,foremost in the sense of winning in gambling. Life gambles against growing entropy (N/Pp.143).

When we say that continual perfect health is abnormal , we are expressing in fact thatexperience of the living indeed includes disease. Abnormal means precisely non-existent,

inobservable. Hence it is another way of saying that continual health is a norm and a norm thatdoes not exist. In this misconstrued sense, it is obvious that the pathological is not abnormal.(N/P, p.77)

Opposed to some doctors who are too quick to see crimes in diseases because those affectedcommitments some excess or omission somewhere, we think that power and temptation to fallsick are an essential character of human physiology. To paraphrase a saying of Valry, we havesaid the possible abuse of health is part of health (N/P, p.117)

In the long run a malaise arises from not being sick in a world where there are sick men [...]

Thus there arises in the normal man an anxiety about having remained normal, a need fordisease as a test of health, that is, as its proof, an unconscious search for disease, a provocationof it. Normal mans disease is the appearance of a fault in his own biological confidence inhimself (N/P, p.179)


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Stone (2005)Petrified Intelligence: Nature inHegels Philosophy. New York: SUNY Press

I shall perhaps use a suprising strategy: anextended comparison between thePhilosophy of

Nature and the theory of consciousness outline inthePhilosophy of Mind (p.31)

Although Stone maintains that there isfundamentally no difference between consciousnessand nature, she explains nature in terms of, and asan extension of, consciousness.

She begins from consciousness: According to Hegel,consciousness suffers from an initial opposition thatimpels it to proceed through various forms (ibid).


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Nature suffers?

For Stone, Hegel believes that the natural form which hecalls negativity (empirically, time) necessarily succeedsexternality (empirically, space) because negativityprovides the rationally necessary solution to the

contradiction (Widerspruch) from which externalitysuffers. (p.60)

Hegel often uses the notion of contradiction to denotemere tensions or oppositions [...] Hegel employs theterm contradiction in an extended sense to embrace

tensions of varying degrees (an extended usage reflectedin his regularly taking tension (Spannung) to besynonymous with contradiciton). (p.62)

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