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G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MIKAEL MALMSTEDT,*defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Aneles for !efen!ant-

appellant.

PADILLA, J.:p

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt(hereinafter referred to as the accused) as char!ed "efore the #e!ional

$rial %ourt (#$%) of &a $rinidad, 'en!uet, 'ranch 1, in %riminal %ase o.89-%#-**+, for violation of ection , rt. II of #epu"lic ct */5, asamended, otherise knon as the 0an!erous 0ru!s ct of 19/, asamended. $he factual "ack!round of the case is as follos2

ccused Mikael Malmstedt, a edish national, entered the 3hilippines forthe third time in 0ecem"er 1988 as a tourist. 4e had visited the countrsometime in 198/ and 1985.

In the evenin! of Ma 1989, accused left for 'a!uio %it. 6pon his arrivalthereat in the mornin! of the folloin! da, he took a "us to a!ada andstaed in that place for to (/) das.

t around 2 o7clock in the mornin! of 11 Ma 1989, accused ent to thean!ono!an "us stop in a!ada to catch the first availa"le trip to 'a!uio%it. rom 'a!uio %it, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip ton!eles %it, then proceed to Manila to catch his fli!ht out of the countr,scheduled on 1+ Ma 1989. rom a!ada, accused took a kline "us ith"od num"er 85 and 3late num"er % 9/. 1

t a"out 82 o7clock in the mornin! of that same da (11 Ma 1989),%aptain len asco, the %ommandin! :fficer of the irst #e!ional%ommand (#%:M) stationed at %amp 0an!a, ordered his men to setup a temporar checkpoint at ;ilometer 1, cop, $u"la, Mountain

3rovince, for the purpose of checkin! all vehicles comin! from the %ordillera#e!ion. $he order to esta"lish a checkpoint in the said area as prompted" persistent reports that vehicles comin! from a!ada ere transportin!mari

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amon! the personal effects of accused and the same ere "rou!ht to the3% %rime &a"orator for chemical analsis.

In the chemistr report, it as esta"lished that the o"hen accused as investi!ated at the 3rovincial iscal7s :ffice,

he did not inform the iscal or his laer that the hashish as planted " the#%:M officers in his "a!. It as onl to (/) months after saidinvesti!ation hen he told his laer a"out said claim, denin! onership ofthe to (/) travellin! "a!s as ell as havin! hashish in his pouch "a!.

In a decision dated 1/ :cto"er 1989, the trial court found accused !uilt"eond reasona"le dou"t for violation of the 0an!erous 0ru!s ct,specificall ection , rt. II of # */5, as amended. 3$he dispositiveportion of the decision reads as follos2

>4B#B:#B, findin! the !uilt of the accused MikaelMalmstedt esta"lished "eond reasona"le dou"t, this

%ourt finds him =6I&$C of violation of ection , rticle 11of #epu"lic ct */5, as amended, and here" sentenceshim to suffer the penalt of life imprisonment and to pa afine of $ent $housand 3esos (3/,.), ithsu"sidiar imprisonment in case of insolvenc and to pathe costs.

&et the hashish su"

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case is pendin!, or has escaped hile "ein! transferredfrom one confinement to another.

In cases fallin! under para!raphs (a) and (") hereof, theperson arrested ithout a arrant shall "e forthithdelivered to the nearest police station or hile it is true that the #%:M officers ere not armed ith a searcharrant hen the search as made over the personal effects of accused,hoever, under the circumstances of the case, there as sufficient pro"a"le

cause for said officers to "elieve that accused as then and therecommittin! a crime.

3ro"a"le cause has "een defined as such facts and circumstances hichcould lead a reasona"le, discreet and prudent man to "elieve that an offensehas "een committed, and that the o"

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: :#0B#B0.

Melencio-#errera, $aras, %eliciano, Bi!in, Grio-A'uino, Me!ial!ea,Reala!o an! Davi!e, (r., ((., concur.

Sarmiento, (., is on leave.

Se$%&%'e O$(n(on)

NARASA, J., concurrin! and dissentin!2

$he ancient tradition that a man7s home is his castle, safe from intrusioneven " the kin!, has not onl found its niche in all our charters, from 19+5to the presentD it has also received unvarin! reco!nition and acceptance inour case la. 1$he present %onstitution 2declares that H

$he ri!ht of the people to "e secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects a!ainst unreasona"lesearches and seiEures of hatever nature and for anpurpose, shall "e inviola"le, and no search arrant orarrant of arrest shall issue e@cept upon pro"a"le cause

to "e determined personall " the

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felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed acrime, it is not onl the arrest hich is ille!al "ut also, the search on theoccasion thereof, as "ein! Athe fruit of the poisonous tree. 1In that event,an evidence taken, even if confirmator of the initial suspicion, isinadmissi"le Afor an purpose in an proceedin!.A 1!'ut the ri!ht a!ainst anunreasona"le search and seiEure ma "e aived " the person arrested,

provided he kne of such ri!ht and knoin!l decided not to invoke it. 1"

$here is unanimit amon! the mem"ers of the %ourt upon the continuin!validit of these esta"lished principles. 4oever, the %ourt is divided asre!ards the ultimate conclusions hich ma properl "e derived from theproven facts and conse?uentl, the manner in hich the principles hat is certain, hoever, is that the soldiers had no arrant of arresthen the conducted a search of Malmstedt7s person and the thin!s in hispossession at the time. Indeed, the %ourt a 'uoacknoled!ed that thesoldiers could Anot "e e@pected to "e armed ith a arrant or arrest nor a

search arrant evertime the esta"lish a temporar checkpoint . . . (and) no

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$he facts in Tanlibenere pronounced to "e different from those in $eoplev.Aminnu!in,supra. AIn contrastA toAminnu!inhere the %ourt perceivedno ur!enc as to preclude the application for and o"tention of a searcharrant, it as declared that the Tanliben caseH

. . .presente! urency. . . ($he evidence revealed) thatthere as an informer ho pointed to the accused-appellant as carrin! mari

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analsis, as identified as metamphetamine.$ia, &o and &im ere indictedfor violation of the 0an!erous 0ru!s ct of 19/. $ia as dischar!ed asstate itness. &o and &im ere su"se?uentl convicted and sentenced to lifeimprisonment. :ne of the ?uestions raised " them in this %ourt on appealas hether the arrantless search of their vehicles and personal effectsas le!al. $he %ourt, citinManipon, (r.v.San!ianbayan,1+ %# /*

(198*), 2"held le!al the search of the appellants7 movin! vehicles and theseiEure therefrom of the dan!erous dru!, considerin! that there asintelli!ence information, includin! clandestine reports " a planted spactuall participatin! in the activit, that the appellants ere "rin!in!prohi"ited dru!s into the countrD that the re?uirement of o"tainin! a searcharrant A"orders on the impossi"le in the case of smu!!lin! effected " theuse of a movin! vehicle that can transport contra"and from one place toanother ith impunit,A and Ait is not practica"le to secure a arrant "ecausethe vehicle can "e ?uickl moved out of the localit or ithout sucho"

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on the stren!th of its evidence and not on the eakness of the defense. $heunfortunate fact is that althou!h the e@istence of the hashish is an o"hat is here said should not " an means "e taken as a disapproval or adispara!ement of the efforts of the police and militar authorities to deterand detect offenses, hether the "e possession of and traffic in prohi"iteddru!s, or some other. $hose efforts o"viousl merit the support andcommendation of the %ourts and indeed of ever responsi"le citiEen. 'utthose efforts must take account of the "asic ri!hts !ranted " the%onstitution and the la to persons ho ma fall under suspicion ofen!a!in! in criminal acts. 0isre!ard of those ri!hts ma not "e as that pro"a"le causeG$heponencianotes that the militar had advance information that a%aucasian as comin! from the a!ada ith prohi"ited dru!s in hispossession. $his is hat the militar sas no, afterthe fact, to

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fact of ille!al possession that retroactivelyesta"lished the pro"a"le causethat validated the ille!al search and seiEure. It as the fruit of the poisonoustree that ashed clean the tree itself.

In :lmstead v. 6.., / 6.. +8, Justice 4olmes said si@t-four ears a!o2

. . . It is desira"le that criminals should "e detected, and tothat end that all availa"le evidence should "e used. It isalso desira"le that the !overnment should not itself fosterand pa for other crimes, hen the are the means "hich the evidence is to "e o"tained. If it pas its officersfor havin! !ot evidence " crime, I do not see h it manot as ell pa them for !ettin! it in the same a, and Ican attach no importance to protestations of disapproval ifit knoin!l accepts and pas and announces that in thefuture it ill pa for the fruits. >e have to choose, and form part I think it a less evil that some criminals shouldescape than that the !overnment should pla an i!no"lepart.

If " deterrin! the !overnment from plain! Aan i!no"le part,A I am Acoddlin!criminals,A I elcome the accusation and take pride in it. I ould rather err infavor of the accused ho is impaled ith outlaed evidence than e@alt orderat the price of li"ert.

Se$%&%'e O$(n(on)

NARASA, J., concurrin! and dissentin!2

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U.S. Supreme Court

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE v. CITY OF

HIALEAH, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)

508 U.S. 520

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. v. CITY OF HIALEAH

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AEALS FOR

THE ELE!ENTH CIRCUIT

N". 91#9$8

A%&' N"v*+% $, 1992

D- '/ 11, 1993

Petitioner church and its congregants practice the Santeria religion, which

employs animal sacrifice as one of its principal forms of devotion. The

animals are killed by cutting their carotid arteries, and are cooked and eaten

following all Santeria rituals except healing and death rites. fter the church

leased land in respondent city and announced plans to establish a house of

worship and other facilities there, the city council held an emergency public

session and passed, among other enactments !esolution "#$%%, which noted

city residents& 'concern' over religious practices inconsistent with public

morals, peace, or safety, and declared the city&s 'commitment' to prohibitingsuch practices( )rdinance "#$*+, which incorporates the lorida animal

cruelty laws and broadly punishes '-whoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . .

kills any animal,' and has been interpreted to reach killings for religious

reasons( )rdinance "#$/0, which defines 'sacrifice' as 'to unnecessarily kill .

. . an animal in a . . . ritual . . . not for the primary purpose of food

consumption,' and prohibits the 'possess-ion, sacrifice, or slaughter' of an

animal if it is killed in 'any type of ritual' and there is an intent to use it for

food, but exempts 'any licensed -food establishment' if the killing is

otherwise permitted by law( )rdinance "#$#1, which prohibits the sacrifice of

animals, and defines 'sacrifice' in the same manner as )rdinance "#$/0( and

)rdinance "#$#0 which defines 'slaughter' as 'the killing of animals for

food' and prohibits slaughter outside of areas 2oned for slaughterhouses, but

includes an exemption for 'small numbers of hogs and3or cattle' when

exempted by state law. Petitioners filed this suit under *0 U.S.C. 14"5,

alleging violations of their rights under, inter alia, the ree 6xercise Clause of

the irst mendment. lthough acknowledging that the foregoingordinances are not religiously neutral, the 7istrict Court ruled for the city,

concluding, among other things, that compelling governmental interests in

preventing public health risks and cruelty to animals fully 8ustified the

absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice accomplished by the ordinances, and

that an exception to that prohibition for religious conduct would unduly

interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest, because any more

narrow restrictions would -/+" U.S. /0+, /01 be unenforceable as a result

of the Santeria religion&s secret nature. The Court of ppeals affirmed.

Held:

The 8udgment is reversed.

45% .0d /"%, 9C 11 1441: reversed.

;UST>67? delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts

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central element, animal sacrifice. That this religious exercise has

been targeted is evidenced by !esolution "#$%%&s statements of

'concern' and 'commitment,' and by the use of the words

'sacrifice' and 'ritual' in )rdinances "#$*+, "#$/0, and "#$#1.

Eoreover, the latter ordinances& various prohibitions, definitions,

and exemptions demonstrate that they were 'gerrymandered' withcare to proscribe religious killings of animals by Santeria church

members but to exclude almost allother animal killings. They also

suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve

their stated ends. The legitimate governmental interests in

protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could

be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition

of all Santeria sacrificial practice, such as general regulations on the

disposal of organic garbage, on the care of animals regardless of

why they are kept, or on methods of slaughter. lthough )rdinance

"#$#0 appears to apply to substantial nonreligious conduct and not

to be overbroad, it must also be invalidated because it functions in

tandem with the other ordinances to suppress Santeria religiousworship. Pp. /55$/*+.

9c: 6ach of the ordinances pursues the city&s governmental interests

only against conduct motivated by religious belief, and thereby

violates the reBuirement that laws burdening religious practice

must be of general applicability. )rdinances "#$*+, "#$/0, and "#$

#1 are substantially underinclusive with regard to the city&s interest

in preventing cruelty -/+" U.S. /0+, /00 to animals, since they

are drafted with care to forbid few animal killings but those

occasioned by religious sacrifice, while many types of animal deaths

or kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or

approved by express provision. The city&s assertions that it is 'self$evident' that killing for food is 'important,' that the eradication of

insects and pests is 'obviously 8ustified,' and that euthanasia of

excess animals 'makes sense' do not explain why religion alone

must bear the burden of the ordinances. These ordinances are also

substantially underinclusive with regard to the city&s public health

interests in preventing the disposal of animal carcasses in open

public places and the consumption of uninspected meat, since

neither interest is pursued by respondent with regard to conduct

that is not motivated by religious conviction. )rdinance "#$#0 is

underinclusive on its face, since it does not regulate nonreligious

slaughter for food in like manner, and respondent has not explained

why the commercial slaughter of 'small numbers' of cattle and hogs

does not implicate its professed desire to prevent cruelty to animals

and preserve the public health. Pp. /*0$/*%.

9d: The ordinances cannot withstand the strict scrutiny that is

reBuired upon their failure to meet the Smith standard. They are

not narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental

interests. ll four are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial

respects because the proffered ob8ectives are not pursued with

respect to analogous nonreligious conduct, and those interests

could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to

a far lesser degree. Eoreover, where, as here, government restricts

only conduct protected by the irst mendment and fails to enact

feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial

harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the governmental interests

given in 8ustification of the restriction cannot be regarded as

compelling. Pp. /*%$/*#.

=6>>67?, ;., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts

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- ootnote J @riefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for mericans

United for Separation of Church and State et al. by 6dward EcIlynn

Iaffney, ;r., Steven T. Ecarland, @radley P. ;acob, and Eichael G.

EcConnell( for the Council on !eligious reedom by Hee @oothby, !obert G.

>ixon, Galter 6. Carson, and !olland Truman( and for the !utherford

67? delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part

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!eligion, supra, at %%( E. Ion2ale2$Gippler, The Santeria 6xperience 1+/

914"0:.

Santeria adherents faced widespread persecution in Cuba, so the religion and

its rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Santeria and its rites

remains infreBuent. See #05 .Supp., at 1*#+( 15 6ncyclopedia of !eligion,supra, at %#( E. Ion2ale2$Gippler, SanteriaD The !eligion 5$* 914"4:. The

religion was brought to this >ation most often by exiles from the Cuban

revolution. The 7istrict Court estimated that there are at least /+,+++

practitioners in South lorida today. See #05 .Supp., at 1*#+.

B

Petitioner Church of the Hukumi @abalu ye, ext, the council approved

an emergency ordinance, )rdinance "#$*+, which incorporated in full,

except as to penalty, lorida&s animal cruelty laws. la.Stat. ch. "0" 914"#:.

mong other things, the incorporated state law sub8ected to criminal

punishment '-whoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal.'

"0".10.

The city council desired to undertake further legislative action, but lorida

law prohibited a municipality from enacting legislation relating to animal

cruelty that conflicted with -/+" U.S. /0+, /0# state law. "0".0#9*:. To

obtain clarification, ialeah&s city attorney reBuested an opinion from the

attorney general of lorida as to whether "0".10 prohibited 'a religious

group from sacrificing an animal in a religious ritual or practice,' and

whether the city could enact ordinances 'making religious animal sacrifice

unlawful.' The attorney general responded in mid$;uly. e concluded that

the 'ritual sacrifice of animals for purposes other than food consumption'was not a 'necessary' killing, and so was prohibited by "0".10.

la.)p.tty.Ien. "#$/%, nnual !eport of the tty.Ien. 1*%, 1*#, 1*4 914"":.

The attorney general appeared to define 'unnecessary' as 'done without any

useful motive, in a spirit of wanton cruelty or for the mere pleasure of

destruction without being in any sense beneficial or useful to the person

killing the animal.'

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use such animal for food purposes.'

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prohibition for religious conduct would 'Munduly interfere with fulfillment of

the governmental interest&' because any more narrow restrictions $ e.g.,

regulation of disposal of animal carcasses $ would be unenforceable as a

result of the secret nature of the Santeria religion. or could it.

lthough the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some,

'religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or

comprehensible to others in order to merit irst mendment protection.'

Thomas v. !eview @d. of

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T. Cooley, Constitutional Himitations *%# 91"%": 9reprint 14#0:( EcIowan v.

Earyland,5%% U.S. *0+, *%* , and n. 0 914%1: 9opinion of rankfurter, ;.:(

7ouglas v. ;eannette, 514 U.S. 1/#, 1#4 914*5: 9;ackson, ;., concurring in

result:( -/+" U.S. /0+, /55 7avis v. @eason, 155 U.S. 555, 5*0 91"4+:.

These principles, though not often at issue in our ree 6xercise Clause cases,

have played a role in some. ew ew

?ork City,54# U.S. %%*, %4% 914#+: 9arlan, ;., concurring:.

The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the

central element of the Santeria worship service was the ob8ect of the

ordinances. irst, though use of the words 'sacrifice' and 'ritual' does not

compel a finding of improper targeting of the Santeria religion, the choice of

these words is support for our conclusion. There are further respects in

which the text of the city council&s enactments discloses the improper

attempt to target Santeria. -/+" U.S. /0+, /5/ !esolution "#$%%, adopted

;une 4, 14"#, recited that 'residents and citi2ens of the City of ialeah have

expressed their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in

practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,' and

'reiterate-d' the city&s commitment to prohibit 'any and all -such acts ofany and all religious groups.' >o one suggests, and, on this record, it cannot

be maintained, that city officials had in mind a religion other than Santeria.

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See, e.g., !eynolds v. United States, 4" U.S. 1*/ 91"#4:( 7avis v. @eason, 155

U.S. 555 91"4+:. See also 6ly, Hegislative and dministrative Eotivation in

Constitutional Haw, #4 ?ale H.;. 10+/, 1514 914#+:. The sub8ect at hand does

implicate, of course, multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity, for

example, the suffering or mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed animals

and health ha2ards from improper disposal. @ut the ordinances, when

considered together, disclose an ob8ect remote from these legitimate

concerns. The design of these laws accomplishes, instead, a 'religious

gerrymander,' Gal2 v. Tax Comm&n of >ew ?ork City, supra, at %4% 9arlan,

;., concurring:, an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their

religious practices.

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singled out for discriminatory treatment. @owen v. !oy, *#% U.S., at #00 ,

and n. 1# 9ST6A6>S, ;., concurring in part and concurring in result:, id., at

#+" 9opinion of @urger, C.;.:( United States v. Hee, *// U.S. 0/0, 0%* , n. 5

914"0: 9ST6A6>S, ;., concurring in 8udgment:.

Ge also find significant evidence of the ordinances& improper targeting ofSanteria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more religious conduct than

is necessary to achieve their stated ends. ew ?ork City, 54# U.S., at %4%

9concurring opinion:. ere, as in eBual protection cases, we may determine

the city council&s ob8ect from both direct and circumstantial evidence.

rlington eights v. Eetropolitan ousing 7evelopment Corp., *04 U.S.

0/0, 0%% 914##:. !elevant evidence includes, among other things, the

historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of

events leading to the enactment or official policy in Buestion, and the

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legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements

made by members of the decisionmaking body. S, ;., concurring in 8udgment:, and

ineBuality results when a legislature decides that -/+" U.S. /0+, /*5 the

governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only

against conduct with a religious motivation.

The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a

-selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious

belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the ree

6xercise Clause. The principle underlying the general applicability

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reBuirement has parallels in our irst mendment 8urisprudence. See, e.g.,

Cohen v. Cowles Eedia Co., /+1 U.S. %% %%4$%#+( 91441:( University of

Pennsylvania v. 66)C, *45 U.S. 1"0, 0+1 9144+:( Einneapolis Star K

Tribune Co. v. Einnesota Comm&r of !evenue, *%+ U.S. /#/, /"/ 914"5:(

Harson v. Aalente, */% U.S., at 0*/ $0*%( Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Eary

6li2abeth @lue ull Eemorial Presbyterian Church, 545 U.S. **+, **4

914%4:.

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lthough the city has classified Santeria sacrifice as slaughter, sub8ecting it

to this ordinance, it does not regulate other killings for food in like manner.

Ge conclude, in sum, that each of ialeah&s ordinances pursues the city&s

governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.

The ordinances 'ha-ve every appearance of a prohibition that society isprepared to impose upon -Santeria worshippers, but not upon itself.'

lorida Star v. @.;.., *41 U.S. /0*, /*0 914"4: 9SCH

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PP6>7o. "#$%%, adopted ;une 4, 14"#,

providesD

'G6!6S, residents and citi2ens of the City of ialeah have

expressed their concern that certain religions may propose toengage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals,

peace or safety, and

'G6!6S, the lorida Constitution, rticle o. "#$*+, adopted ;une 4, 14"#,

providesD

'G6!6S, the citi2ens of the City of ialeah, lorida, have

expressed great concern over the potential for animal sacrifices

being conducted in the City of ialeah( and

'G6!6S, Section "0".0#, lorida Statutes, provides that

Mnothing contained in this section shall prevent any county ormunicipality from enacting any ordinance relating to animal control

or cruelty to animals which is identical to the provisions of this

Chapter . . . except as to penalty.&

'>)G, T6!6)!6, @6 7

CC

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'G6!6S, the residents and citi2ens of the City of ialeah,

lorida, have expressed great concern regarding -/+" U.S. /0+,

//+ the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices in the City

of ialeah, lorida( and

'G6!6S, the City of ialeah, lorida, has received an opinion

from the ttorney Ieneral of the State of lorida concluding that

public ritualistic animal sacrifices is -sic a violation of the lorida

State Statute on Cruelty to nimals( and

'G6!6S, the ttorney Ieneral further held that the sacrificial

killing of animals other than for the primary purpose of food

consumption is prohibited under state law( and

'G6!6S, the City of ialeah, lorida, has enacted an ordinance

mirroring state law prohibiting cruelty to animals.

'>)G, T6!6)!6, @6 7

CCo. "#$/0, adopted September ", 14"#,

providesD

'G6!6S, the residents and citi2ens of the City of ialeah,

lorida, have expressed great concern regarding the possibility ofpublic ritualistic animal sacrifices within the City of ialeah,

lorida( and

'G6!6S, the City of ialeah, lorida, has received an opinion

from the ttorney Ieneral of the State of lorida, concluding that

public ritualistic animal sacrifice, other than for the primary

purpose of food consumption, is a violation of state law( and -/+"

U.S. /0+, //1

'G6!6S, the City of ialeah, lorida, has enacted an ordinance

9)rdinance >o. "#$*+:, mirroring the state law prohibiting cruelty

to animals.

'G6!6S, the City of ialeah, lorida, now wishes to specifically

prohibit the possession of animals for slaughter or sacrifice within

the City of ialeah, lorida.

'>)G, T6!6)!6, @6 7

CC

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purposes where such activity is properly 2oned and3or permitted

under state and local law and under rules promulgated by the

lorida 7epartment of griculture.

'Section 0. !epeal of )rdinance in Conflict.

'll ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith arehereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

'Section 5. Penalties.

'ny person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the

provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not

exceeding L/++.++, or by a 8ail sentence, not exceeding sixty 9%+:

days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

'Section *. o. "#$#1, adopted September 00, 14"#,

providesD

'G6!6S, the City Council of the City of ialeah, lorida, has

determined that the sacrificing of animals -/+" U.S. /0+, //5

within the city limits is contrary to the public health, safety, welfare

and morals of the community( and

'G6!6S, the City Council of the City of ialeah, lorida, desires

to have Bualified societies or corporations organi2ed under the laws

of the State of lorida, to be authori2ed to investigate and prosecute

any violation9s: of the ordinance herein after set forth, and for the

registration of the agents of said societies.

'>)G, T6!6)!6, @6 7

CC

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appoint agents for the purposes of investigating and assisting in the

prosecution of violations and provisions -sic of this )rdinance, or

any other laws of the City of ialeah, lorida, for the purpose of

protecting animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.

'Section %. !epeal of )rdinances in Conflict.

'll ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are

hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

'Section #. Penalties.

'ny person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the

provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not

exceeding L/++.++, or by a 8ail sentence, not exceeding sixty 9%+:

days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

'Section ".

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any other laws of the City of ialeah, lorida, for the purpose of

protecting animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.

'Section %. This )rdinance shall not apply to any person, group, or

organi2ation that slaughters, or processes for sale, small numbers of

hogs and3or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption

provided by state law.

'Section #. !epeal of )rdinances in Conflict.

'll ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are

hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

'Section ". Penalties.

'ny person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the

provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not

exceeding L/++.++, or by a 8ail sentence, not exceeding sixty 9%+:

days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

'Section 4.

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discriminatory treatment, see owler v. !hode or, in my

view, does it matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if

the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens.

ad the ordinances here been passed with no motive on the part of any

councilman except the ardent desire to prevent cruelty to animals 9as might

in fact have been the case:, they would nonetheless be invalid.

;UST

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6mployment Security 7iv., */+ U.S. #+#, #1# 914"1:( ?oder, supra, at 00+(

Committee for Public 6d. K !eligious Hiberty v. >yBuist, *15 U.S. #/%, #40

$#45 914#5:( School 7ist. of bington v. Schempp, 5#* U.S. 0+5, 000 914%5:(

see also Ec7aniel v. Paty, *5/ U.S. %1", %0# $%04 914#": 9plurality opinion:

9invalidating a non$neutral law without using the term:. >or is there

anything unusual about the notion that the ree 6xercise Clause reBuires

general applicability, though the Court, until today, has not used exactly that

term in stating a reason for invalidation. See owler v. !hode

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conduct: with ?oder, supra, at 01/$004 9applying that test to a formally

neutral, general law:. )ther cases in which the Court has applied heightened

scrutiny to the enforcement of formally neutral, generally applicable laws

that burden religious exercise include ernande2 v. Commissioner, supra, at

%44( ra2ee v.

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with the principle that religious conduct may be regulated by general or

targeting law only if the conduct 'pose-s some substantial threat to public

safety, peace or order.' Sherbert v. Aerner, 5#* U.S., at *+5 ( see also United

States v. Hee,*// U.S., at 0/# $0/"( @ob ;ones University, *%1 U.S., at %+5 (

?oder, supra, at 05+. nd Iobitis, after three ;ustices who originally 8oined

the opinion renounced it for disregarding the government&s constitutional

obligation 'to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities,' ;ones

v. )pelika,51% U.S. /"*, %0* 914*0: 9opinion of @lack, 7ouglas, and Eurphy,

;;.:, was explicitly overruled in Gest Airginia @d. of 6d. v. @arnette, 514 U.S.

%0*, %*0 914*5:( see also id., at %*5$** 9@lack and 7ouglas, ;;., concurring:.

Since holding in 14*+ that the ree 6xercise Clause applies to the States, see

Cantwell v. Connecticut,51+ U.S. 04% ,the Court repeatedly has stated that

the Clause sets strict limits on the government&s power to burden religious

exercise, whether it is a law&s ob8ect to do so or its -/+" U.S. /0+, /#+

unanticipated effect. Smith responded to these statements by suggesting that

the Court did not really mean what it said, detecting in at least the most

recent opinions a lack of commitment to the compelling interest test in thecontext of formally neutral laws. Smith, supra, at ""*$""/. @ut even if the

Court&s commitment were that palid, it would argue only for moderating the

language of the test, not for eliminating constitutional scrutiny altogether. )! reached the same result as the ma8ority by applying, as the

parties had reBuested, 'our established free exercise 8urisprudence,' *4*

U.S., at 4+5 ,and the ma8ority never determined that the case could not be

resolved on the narrower ground, going instead straight to the broader

constitutional rule. @ut the Court&s better practice, one supported by the

same principles of restraint that underlie the rule of stare decisis, is not to

'Mformulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is reBuired by the

precise facts to which it is to be applied.&' shwander v. TA, 04# U.S. 0"",

5*# 9145%: 9@randeis, ;., concurring: 9Buoting Hiverpool, >ew ?ork K

Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of 6migration, 115 U.S. 55, 54

91""/::. Ghile < am not suggesting that the Smith Court lacked the power toannounce its rule, < think a rule of law unnecessary to the outcome of a case,

especially one not put -/+" U.S. /0+, /#5 into play by the parties,

approaches without more the sort of 'dicta . . . which may be followed if

sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.' umphrey&s 6xecutor

v. United States, 04/ U.S. %+0, %0# 9145/:( see also =astigar v. United States,

*+% U.S. **1, */* $*// 914#0:.

< do not, of course, mean to imply that a broad constitutional rule announced

without full briefing and argument necessarily lacks precedential weight.

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)ver time, such a decision may become 'part of the tissue of the law,'

!adovich v. >ational ootball Heague, 5/0 U.S. **/, *// 914/#: 9rankfurter,

;., dissenting:, and may be sub8ect to reliance in a way that new and

unexpected decisions are not. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, /+/ U.S. "55, "/* $"// 91440:. Smith, however, is not

such a case. @y the same token, by pointing out Smith&s recent vintage, < do

not mean to suggest that novelty alone is enough to 8ustify reconsideration.

'-Stare decisis,' as ;ustice rankfurter wrote, 'is a principle of policy, and

not a mechanical formula,' elvering v. allock, 5+4 U.S. 1+%, 114 914*+:,

and the decision whether to adhere to a prior decision, particularly a

constitutional decision, is a complex and difficult one that does not lend

itself to resolution by application of simple, categorical rules, but that must

account for a variety of often competing considerations.

The considerations of full briefing, necessity, and novelty thus do not

exhaust the legitimate reasons for reexamining prior decisions, or even for

reexamining the Smith rule. )ne important further consideration warrants

mention here, however, because it demands the reexamination < have inmind. Smith presents not the usual Buestion of whether to follow a

constitutional rule, but the Buestion of which constitutional rule to follow,

for Smith refrained from overruling prior free exercise cases that contain a

free exercise rule fundamentally at odds with the rule Smith declared. Smith,

indeed, announced its rule by relying -/+" U.S. /0+, /#* sBuarely upon the

precedent of prior cases. See *4* U.S., at "#" 9')ur decisions reveal that

the . . . reading' of the ree 6xercise Clause contained in the Smith rule 'is

the correct one':. Since that precedent is nonetheless at odds with the Smith

rule, as < have discussed above, the result is an intolerable tension in free

exercise law which may be resolved, consistently with principles of stare

decisis, in a case in which the tension is presented and its resolution pivotal.

Ghile the tension on which < rely exists within the body of our extant case

law, a rereading of that case law will not, of course, mark the limits of any

enBuiry directed to reexamining the Smith rule, which should be reviewed in

light not only of the precedent on which it was rested, but also of the text of

the ree 6xercise Clause and its origins. s for text, Smith did not assert that

the plain language of the ree 6xercise Clause compelled its rule, but only

that the rule was 'a permissible reading' of the Clause. ibid. Suffice it to say

that a respectable argument may be made that the pre$Smith law comes

closer to fulfilling the language of the ree 6xercise Clause than the rule

Smith announced. '-The ree 6xercise Clause . . ., by its terms, gives special

protection to the exercise of religion,' Thomas, */+ U.S., at #15 ,specifying

an activity and then flatly protecting it against government prohibition. The

Clause draws no distinction between laws whose ob8ect is to prohibit

religious exercise and laws with that effect, on its face seemingly applying to

both.

>or did Smith consider the original meaning of the ree 6xercise Clause,

though overlooking the opportunity was no uniBue transgression. Save in a

handful of passing remarks, the Court has not explored the history of the

Clause since its early attempts in 1"#4 and 1"4+, see !eynolds v. United

States,4" U.S., at 1%0 $1%%, and 7avis v. @eason, 155 U.S. 555, 5*0 91"4+:,

attempts that recent scholarship makes clear were incomplete. See generally

EcConnell, The )rigins and istorical Understanding of ree 6xercise of

!eligion, -/+" U.S. /0+, /#/ 1+5 arv.H.!ev. 1*+4 9144+:. % The curious

absence of history from our free exercise decisions creates a stark contrast

with our cases under the 6stablishment Clause, where historical analysis has

been so prominent.#

This is not the place to explore the history that a century of free exercise

opinions have overlooked, and it is enough to note that, when the

opportunity to reexamine Smith presents itself, we may consider recent

scholarship raising serious Buestions about the Smith rule&s consonance with

the original understanding and purpose of the ree 6xercise Clause. See

EcConnell, The )rigins and istorical Understanding of ree 6xercise of

!eligion, supra( 7urham, !eligious Hiberty and the Call of Conscience, *0

7ePaul H.!ev. #1, #4$"/ 91440:( see also )ffice of Hegal Policy, U.S. 7ept. of

;ustice, !eport to the ttorney Ieneral, !eligious Hiberty under the ree

6xercise Clause 5"$*0 914"%: 9predating Smith:. There appears to be a

strong argument -/+" U.S. /0+, /#% from the Clause&s development in theirst Congress, from its origins in the post$!evolution state constitutions

and pre$!evolution colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to

which the ramers adhered, that the Clause was originally understood to

preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one&s duty to one&s

Iod, unless those activities threatened the rights of others or the serious

needs of the State.

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interpret the Clause to accord with its natural reading, as applying to all laws

prohibiting religious exercise in fact, not 8ust those aimed at its prohibition,

and to hold the neutrality needed to implement such a purpose to be the

substantive neutrality of our pre$Smith cases, not the formal neutrality

sufficient for constitutionality under Smith. " -/+" U.S. /0+, /##

The scholarship on the original understanding of the ree 6xercise Clause is,

to be sure, not uniform. See, e.g., amburger, Constitutional !ight of

!eligious 6xemptionD n istorical Perspective, %+ Ieo.Gash.H.!ev. 41/

91440:( @radley, @eguiledD ree 6xercise 6xemptions and the Siren Song of

Hiberalism, 0+ ofstra H.!ev. 0*/ 91441:. nd there are differences of

opinion as to the weight appropriately accorded original meaning. @ut

whether or not one considers the original designs of the Clause binding, the

interpretive significance of those designs surely ranks in the hierarchy of

issues to be explored in resolving the tension inherent in free exercise law as

it stands today.

III

The extent to which the ree 6xercise Clause reBuires government to refrain

from impeding religious exercise defines nothing less than the respective

relationships in our constitutional democracy of the individual to

government and to Iod. '>eutral, generally applicable' laws, drafted as they

are from the perspective of the nonadherent, have the unavoidable potential

of putting the believer to a choice between Iod and government. )ur cases

now present competing answers to the Buestion when government, while

pursuing secular ends, may compel disobedience to what one believes

religion commands. The case before us is rightly decided without resolving

the existing tension, which remains for another day when it may be sBuarely

faced.

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#epu"lic of the 3hilippinesSPREME +ORT

Manila

$4I#0 0III:

G.R. No. 9930# Noe/e& 13, 1992

STATE INESTMENT HOSE, IN+., petitioner,vs.+ORT OF APPEALS %n SAINA DA. DE

+EN+A, respondents.

MELO, J.:

$he 0ecision and mended 0ecision of the %ourt of ppeals in %-=.#. % /++9, "oth reversin! and affirmin! in part the 0ecision of'ranch 9 of the #e!ional $rial %ourt of ueEon %it in Aa"ina da.de %uenca vs. tate Investment 4ouse, Inc.A (%ivil %ase o. -/55/), for declaration of nullit of the foreclosure sale ith analternative praer for redemption of the foreclosed propert, areassailed in the instant petition on ?uestions of la.

s ma "e !leaned from the pleadin!s of the parties, the antecedentfacts are as follos2

:n e"ruar 1+, 199, private respondent a"ina da. de %uenca(%uenca) o"tained a loan from petitioner tate Investment 4ouse,Inc. (I4I) under a promissor note for 31*,., secured " amort!a!e on %uenca7s propert at $andan! ora, ueEon %it.

:n ovem"er 15, 199, %uenca o"tained another loan of35,.. $his loan as secured " a real estate mort!a!ee@ecuted " %uenca on another propert located alon! $imo!,ueEon %it, ith para!raph * of the contract e@pressl !ivin! I4Ithe option of e@tra-

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folloed " another letter (B@hi"it 5-D also B@hi"it J, p. /, ol. I,#ecord) from %uenca on Jul 1, 198 herein she si!nified herintention to redeem the propert for 35,., paa"le in thefolloin! manner2

1. 31,. paa"le ithin thirt (+) das uponreceipt of (I4I7s) approval of this proposal.

/. $he "alance of 3,. shall "e paid in ei!ht(8) monthl installments. Bach installment pamentshall "e due on the +th da of each month, the firstmonthl pament to "e reckoned from the date theamount stated in o. 1 has "een paid.

In a letter dated u!ust 1*, 198 (B@hi"it ;, p. // ol. I, #ecord),I4I re

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%ertificate of $itle o. $-1/*8 (B@h. ') in the nameof plaintiffD

(d) 0irectin! defendant I4I to refund to plaintiff thesum of 3/,5.1, hich as the overpament shemade on account of her loans ith I4I, ith interestat 1/Lper annumfrom the date of the filin! of thecomplaint until the same is full paidD

(e) 0irectin! the defendant I4I to pa to plaintiff thesums of 35,. as moral dama!esD 35,.as e@emplar dama!esD and 35,., asattorne7s feesD

(f) 0irectin! defendant I4I to pa plaintiff the sumof 3*/,9+.18 as a refund of the penalties hich ithad collected from plaintiff, ith interest thereon at

*Lper annum from date of this decision until thesame is full paidD

(!) 0irectin! plaintiff to pa to defendant I4I thesum of 31,*5., in reim"ursement of I4I7se@penses in the foreclosure of the mort!a!edpropert, hich includes attorne7s fees, ith interestthereon at *Lper annumfrom date of the decisionuntil it is full paid, hich amount shall, hoever, "eoffset " an e?uivalent amount for the amounts duefrom I4I to plaintiffD and

(h) 0irectin! defendant I4I to pa the costs of thissuit.

ll other claims hich the parties ma have a!ainsteach other are here" denied and dismissed.

I4I appealed the decision to the court of ppeals in %-=.#. %o. /++9. In its :ri!inal 0ecision, the %ourt of ppeals (%ampos3N, &antin, empio-0i,(() rectified several errors committed " thetrial court in its computation of %uenca7s account ith I4I, "ut

nevertheless affirmed the trial court7s findin! that at the time of theforeclosure sale, %uenca had alread paid in full her inde"tednessso that the foreclosure sale and the transmission of title to I4I erenull and void.

'oth parties asked for a reconsideration of the appellate %ourt7srulin!.

I4I7s Motion for #econsideration contended that on the "asis of thecomputations made " the trial court and as corrected " the %ourtof ppeals in its decision, the net result shoed that as of the date ofthe foreclosure sale on u!ust 8, 198+, %uenca as still inde"ted toI4I, and such "ein! the case, the foreclosure sale as valid.

In her Motion for #econsideration, %uenca asked the appellate courtto reconsider its findin! that she had o"tained a third loan from I4Ifor 3*1,5.. he further asked that she "e credited to amounts

hich ere disalloed " respondent court.

:n pril +, 1991, respondent court promul!ated its mended0ecision, reversed its earlier rulin! and held that in accordance ithits on computations, %uenca as still inde"ted to I4I in theamount of 3/9,9*+./ as of the date of the foreclosure sale. $hedispositive portion of this mended 0ecision reads2

$he decision of this court is here" modified asfollos2

a) 3laintiff-appellee is ordered to pa defendant-

appellant the sum of 3/9,9*+./, consistin! of theunpaid "alance of her outstandin! o"li!ation ithin+ das from receipt of this mended 0ecision ithpament of interest at the le!al rate from date of thisdecision until final

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c) $ransfer %ertificate of $itle o. +/+/ issued inthe name of I4I is declared null and void and the#e!ister of 0eeds of ueEon %it is ordered toreinstate $ransfer %ertificate of $itle o. 1/*58 inthe name of plaintiff.

d) o pronouncement as to pament of dama!esand attorne7s fees.

: :#0B#B0. (p. 9, Rollo.)

0issatisfied, I4I filed the instant petition and as clarified in pa!es and 5 of the petition, the appeal is limited to the folloin! aspects2

(i) $he ori!inal 0ecision in %..-=.#. % o. /++9,Aa"ina da de %uenca, plaintiff-appellee v. tateInvestment 4ouse, Inc., defendant-appellant,A

promul!ated " respondent %ourt on /8 e"ruar1991, onl insofar as the decision voided theforeclosure sale of the mort!a!ed propert andI4I7s title ac?uired " virtue of such foreclosuresale, the challen!ed part of the dispositive portionreadin! as follos2

(") 0eclarin! the sale of themort!a!ed propert of plaintiff underthe foreclosure proceedin!s and ofthe resultant %ertificate of alee@ecuted and issued " the

foreclosin! heriff " reason of suchforeclosure to "e null and voidD

(c) 0irectin! the #e!ister of 0eedsof ueEon %it to cancel $ransfer%ertificate of $itle o. +/5+/(B@hi"it ) in the name of I4I, andto reinstate $ransfer %ertificate of$itle o. $-1/*8 (B@hi"it ') in thename of the plaintiff.

(ii) nd the mended 0ecision in the same appealedcase, promul!ated on + pril 1991, onl insofar asit ad >4B I$ #B6B0

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$: 0B%B $4B :#B%&:6#B3#:%BB0I= &I0 0B3I$B I$ :>0B$B#MI$I: $4$ #B3:0B$ %6B%> $#6&C 0 =B6IB&C I0B'$B0 $:3B$I$I:B# >4B $4B :#B%&:6#B3#:%BB0I= >B#B I$I$6$B0.

&$B#$IB =#:60

4:6&0 $4B 63#BMB %:6#$ I#M $4B:I0I= : $4B :#B%&:6#B &B 0 :3B$I$I:B#7 $I$&B, 3B$I$I:B# I B$I$&B0,I &> 0 B6I$C $: $4B 3CMB$ :&B=& I$B#B$ : $4B 3#I%I3& 6M :3/9,9*+./ ($4B 6M 0J60=B0 I3B$I$I:B#7 :# 'C #B3:0B$%:6#$) %:M36$B0 #:M $4B 0$B : $4B:#B%&:6#B &B 63 $: $4B 0$B :%$6& 3CMB$ : $4B 3#I%I3& 6M. (pp.15-1*, Rollo)

:n Jul /5 1991, shortl after she filed her %omment, %uencaconsi!ned ith this %ourt Metro 'ank %ashier7s %heck o. %%-1+ in the sum of 3/9,9*+./, representin! the amount ordered" the %ourt of ppeals (in its mended 0ecision) to "e paid to I4I.$hereafter, I4I filed its #epl on u!ust 15, 1991, to hich a#ee find no reason to distur" the same.

$he o"vious implication is that, at the time of the foreclosure sale onu!ust 8, 198+, %uenca had defaulted in the pament of3/9,9*+./. $hus, I4I had the option under the afore?uoted

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provision of the #eal Bstate Mort!a!e, to foreclose on the mort!a!edpropert. I4I cannot "e faulted for havin! chosen that option.

$he %ourt of ppeals, therefore, erred in concludin! that despite%uenca7s default, the foreclosure sale and the resultant issuance ofthe certificate of sale " the foreclosin! heriff ere null and void.oreclosure is valid here the de"tor is in default in the pament ofhis o"li!ation (%f, 'icol avin!s and &oan ssociation vs. %ourt ofppeals, 11 %# *+ 1989N). In a real estate mort!a!e hen theprincipal o"li!ation is not paid hen due, the mort!a!ee has the ri!htto foreclose the mort!a!e and to have the propert seiEed and sold

ith the vie of applin! the proceeds to the pament of theo"li!ation (%ommodit inancin! %o., Inc., vs. JimeneE,91 %# 5199N). :nce the proceeds have "een applied to the pament of theo"li!ation, the de"tor cannot anmore "e re?uired to pa, unless, ofcourse, there is a deficienc "eteen the amount of the loan and theforeclosure sale price, "ecause the o"li!ation has alread "eene@tin!uished.

>e no come to the second issue posed " the parties2 ith theauction sale havin! "een done on u!ust 8, 199/ and the certificateof foreclosure sale havin! "een validl re!istered ith the #e!ister of0eeds of ueEon %it onAuust 12, 3456, as %uenca a"le toredeem the propert in the manner and ithin the period provided "laG

>ith the afore?uoted provision of the #eal Bstate Mort!a!e havin!e@pressl authoriEed I4I to e@tra-

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%uenca, hoever, as not a"le to e@ercise her ri!ht of redemptionon or "efore u!ust /+, 198. lthou!h she rote to I4I tice onJul 1 and u!ust /+, 198 and offered to redeem her propert,these offers ere not accompanied " simultaneous bona fi!etenderor deliver of the redemption price to I4I. In Belisario vs.7nterme!iate Appellate )ourt (1*5 %# 11 1988N), this %ourt,

throu!h Justice Medialdea, held2

$he !eneral rule in redemption is that in makin! arepurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offerin!to redeem make manifestation of his desire torepurchaseD this statement of intention must "eaccompanied " an actual and simultaneous tenderof pament, hich constitutes the le!al use ofe@ercise of the ri!ht to repurchase (n!ao vs.%lavano, 1 3hil. 15/). &ikeise, in several casesdecided " this %ourt (ructo vs. uentes, 15 3hil.+*/D #etes vs. uelto, / 3hil. +9D #osales vs.

#ees, et al., 98 3hil. 95) here the ri!ht torepurchase as held to have "een properle@ercised, there as definite findin! of tender ofpament havin! "een made " the vendor. $hetender of pament must "e for the full amount of therepurchase price, otherise the offer to redeem ill"e held ineffectual. (#um"aoa vs. rEa!a, 8 3hil.81/). 'ona fide redemption necessaril imports areasona"le and valid tender of the entire repurchaseprice. $here is no co!ent reason for re?uirin! thevendee to accept pament " installments from theredemptioner, as it ould ultimatel result in an

indefinite e@tension of the redemption period(%onee further e@plained.

$his case is different from 8y ee vs. )ourt ofAppeals, suprahere the action to compelredemption as filed after the lapse of the period ofredemption. $hus, the %ourt held in said case, to it2

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It is clear that the mere sendin! ofletters " vendor imeon e@pressin!his desire to repurchase thepropert ithout an accompanin!tender of redemption price fell shortof the re?uirements of la. 4avin!

failed to properl e@ercise his ri!htof redemption ithin the statutorfive-ear period, the ri!ht is lostand the same can no loner berevive! by the filin of an action tocompel re!emption after the lapseof the perio!.

$he same factual antecedent o"tained in )one+ero,et al. vs. )ourt of Appeals, supra,here thecomplaint seekin! to "e declared entitled to redeem

as filed after the e@piration of the statutor period

of redemption. >hat as proper for determinationthen in said cases as hether or not the ri!ht ofredemption sans e earlier stated, this amount as neverproperl delivered to I4I in accordance ith la. $here is thus noproof at that time that %uenca possessed the a"ilit to pa theredemption amount she as offerin!. $his is especiall true in theli!ht of the fact that in her first letter she merel offered to pa ininstallments.

If onl to prove the veracit of her claim that at that time she ascapa"le of pain! I4I the full amount of hat she thou!ht as areasona"le redemption price, the least that %uenca could have done

as to consi!n pament in court simultaneous ith her filin! of theaction to redeem on u!ust /, 199/. In so statin!, >e do not heredepart from our consistent rulin! that a formal offer to redeem,accompanied " a "ona fide tender of the redemption price, althou!hproper, is not essential here the ri!ht to redeem is e@ercisedthrou!h the filin! of a here, as in the instant case, the action isfiled after the statutor period has e@pired, the determination of

hether the plaintiff consi!ned the redemption price ith the court

simultaneous ith the filin! of the action is necessar to see if theri!ht of redemption sans

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In )one+ero, et al. vs. )ourt of Appeals, et al. (1* %# 5 19**N),>e precisel stated that Aa "uer can not "e e@pected to entertain anoffer of redemption ithout attendant evidence that the redemptionercan, and is illin! to accomplish the repurchase immediatel. different rule ould leave the "uer open to harassment "speculators or crackpots, as ell as to unnecessar prolon!ation of

the redemption period, contrar to the polic of the la. . . . :fcourse, consi!nation of the price ould remove all controvers as tothe redemptioner7s a"ilit to pa at the proper time. (at pp. 81-8/.)A

>e further stated in Basbas vs. 9ntena(/8 %# **5, *1 19*9N)that2

. . . the ri!ht of le!al redemption must "e e@ercisedithin specified time limits2 and the statutor periodsould "e rendered meanin!less and of eas evasionunless the redemptioner is re?uired to make anactual tender in !ood faith of hat he "elieved to "ethe reasona"le price of the land sou!ht to "eredeemed. $he e@istence of the ri!ht of redemptionoperates to depress the market value of the landuntil the period e@pires, and to render that periodindefinite " permittin! the tenant to file a suit forredemption, ith either part una"le to foresee henfinal

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#epu"lic of the 3hilippinesSPREME +ORT

Manila

B '%

%& M%''e& No. !!3 June 17, 1993

MARI+IO +. LEP, petitioner,vs.THE LEGAL +LINI+, IN+., respondent.

# B : & 6 $ I :

REGALADO, J.:

3etitioner pras this %ourt Ato order the respondent to cease anddesist from issuin! advertisements similar to or of the same tenor asthat of anne@es AA and A'A (of said petition) and to perpetuall

prohi"it persons or entities from makin! advertisements pertainin! tothe e@ercise of the la profession other than those alloed " la.A

$he advertisements complained of " herein petitioner are asfollos2

Anne: A

B%#B$ M##I=BG35*. for a valid marria!e.Info on 0I:#%B. 'B%B.6&MB$. I.

$4B 3lease call2 5/1-* &B=& 5/1/+/,5///1 %&II%, I%. 82+ amH *2 pm -lr.ictoria 'ld!., 6 ve., Mla.

Anne: B

=6M 0I:#%B.

0: 3#;I:

an ttorne in =uam, is !ivin! #BB '::; on=uam 0ivorce throu!h $he &e!al %linic "e!innin!Monda to rida durin! office hours.

=uam divorce. nnulment of Marria!e. Immi!ration

3ro"lems, isa B@t. uotaKon-?uota #es. Opecial #etiree7s isa. 0eclaration of "sence.#emarria!e to ilipina iancees. doption.Investment in the 3hil. 6Korei!n isa for ilipinapouseK%hildren. %all Marivic.

$4B ictoria 'ld!. /9 6 ve., &B=& Brmita,Manila nr. 6 Bm"ass %&II%, I%. 1$el. 5/1-/+/D5/1-/51D 5//-/1D 5/1-*

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It is the su"mission of petitioner that the advertisements a"overeproduced are champterous, unethical, demeanin! of the laprofession, and destructive of the confidence of the communit in theinte!rit of the mem"ers of the "ar and that, as a mem"er of thele!al profession, he is ashamed and offended " the saidadvertisements, hence the reliefs sou!ht in his petition as

herein"efore ?uoted.

In its anser to the petition, respondent admits the fact of pu"licationof said advertisement at its instance, "ut claims that it is not en!a!edin the practice of la "ut in the renderin! of Ale!al support servicesAthrou!h parale!als ith the use of modern computers and electronicmachines. #espondent further ar!ues that assumin! that theservices advertised are le!al services, the act of advertisin! theseservices should "e alloed supposedlin the li!ht of the case of(ohn R. Bates an! ;an

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@@@ @@@ @@@

. $he use of the name A$he &e!al %linic, Inc.A !ivesthe impression that respondent corporation is "ein!operated " laers and that it renders le!alservices.

>hile the respondent repeatedl denies that it offersle!al services to the pu"lic, the advertisements in?uestion !ive the impression that respondent isofferin! le!al services. $he 3etition in fact simplassumes this to "e so, as earlier mentioned,apparentl "ecause this (is) the effect that theadvertisements have on the readin! pu"lic.

$he impression created " the advertisements in?uestion can "e traced, first of all, to the ver name"ein! used " respondent H A$he &e!al %linic, Inc.Auch a name, it is respectfull su"mitted connotesthe renderin! of le!al services for le!al pro"lems,

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entered into accordance ith la forthe esta"lishment of conorse, thisparticular advertisement appears to encoura!e

marria!es cele"rated in secrec, hich is su!!estiveof immoral pu"lication of applications for a marria!elicense.

If the article A#@ for &e!al 3ro"lemsA is to "erevieed, it can readil "e concluded that the a"ove

impressions one ma !ather from theadvertisements in ?uestion are accurate. $heharon %uneta-=a"" %oncepcion e@ample aloneconfirms hat the advertisements su!!est. 4ere itcan "e seen that criminal acts are "ein! encoura!edor committed(a "i!amous marria!e in 4on! ;on! or &as e!as)

ith impunit simpl "ecause the

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presentl offers, or, at the ver least, from offerin!such services to the pu"lic in !eneral.

$he I'3 is aare of the fact that providin!computeriEed le!al research, electronic data!atherin!, stora!e and retrieval, standardiEed le!al

forms, investi!ators for !atherin! of evidence, andlike services ill !reatl "enefit the le!al professionand should not "e stifled "ut instead encoura!ed.4oever, hen the conduct of such "usiness "non-mem"ers of the 'ar encroaches upon thepractice of la, there can "e no choice "ut to prohi"itsuch "usiness.

dmittedl, man of the services involved in thecase at "ar can "e "etter performed " specialists inother fields, such as computer e@perts, ho "reason of their havin! devoted time and efforte@clusivel to such field cannot fulfill the e@actin!re?uirements for admission to the 'ar. $o prohi"itthem from Aencroachin!A upon the le!al profession

ill den the profession of the !reat "enefits andadvanta!es of modern technolo!. Indeed, a laerusin! a computer ill "e doin! "etter than a laerusin! a tperiter, even if "oth are (e?ual) in skill.

'oth the 'ench and the 'ar, hoever, should "ecareful not to allo or tolerate the ille!al practice ofla in an form, not onl for the protection ofmem"ers of the 'ar "ut also, and more importantl,for the protection of the pu"lic. $echnolo!icaldevelopment in the profession ma "e encoura!ed

ithout toleratin!, "ut instead ensurin! prevention ofille!al practice.

$here mi!ht "e nothin! o"

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le!al profession, "ut "efore alloance of suchpractice ma "e considered, the corporation7s rticleof Incorporation and '-las must conform to eachand ever provision of the %ode of 3rofessional#esponsi"ilit and the #ules of %ourt. !

/. $hilippine Bar Association2

@@@ @@@ @@@.

#espondent asserts that it Ais not en!a!ed in thepractice of la "ut en!a!ed in !ivin! le!al supportservices to laers and lamen, throu!he@perienced parale!als, ith the use of moderncomputers and electronic machinesA (pars. / and +,%omment). $his is a"surd. 6n?uestiona"l,respondent7s acts of holdin! out itself to the pu"licunder the trade name A$he &e!al %linic, Inc.,A andsolicitin! emploment for its enumerated services fall

ithin the realm of a practice hich thus ields itselfto the re!ulator poers of the upreme %ourt. orrespondent to sa that it is merel en!a!ed inparale!al ork is to stretch credulit. #espondent7son commercial advertisement hich announces acertainAtty. Don $ar0insonto "e handlin! the fieldsof la "elies its pretense. rom all indications,respondent A$he &e!al %linic, Inc.A is offerin! andrenderin! leal servicesthrou!h its reserve oflaers. It has "een held that the practice of la isnot limited to the conduct of cases in court, "utincludes drain! of deeds, incorporation, renderin!opinions, an! a!visin clients as to their leal rihtan! then ta0e them to an attorney an! as0 the latterto loo0 after their case in courtee Martin, &e!aland Judicial Bthics, 198 ed., p. +9).

It is apt to recall that onl natural personscanen!a!e in the practice of la, and such limitationcannot "e evaded " a corporation emploin!

competent laers to practice for it. :"viousl, thisis the scheme or device " hich respondent A$he&e!al %linic, Inc.A holds out itself to the pu"lic andsolicits emploment of its le!al services. It isan o!ious vehicle for deception, especiall so henthe pu"lic cannot ventilate an !rievance

for malpracticea!ainst the "usiness conduit.3recisel, the limitation of practice of la to persons

ho have "een dul admitted as mem"ers of the 'ar(ec. 1, #ule 1+8, #evised #ules of %ourt) is tosu"

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and for its unethical, misleadin! and immoraladvertisin!.

@@@ @@@ @@@

#espondent posits that is it not en!a!ed in thepractice of la. It claims that it merel renders Ale!alsupport servicesA to ansers, liti!ants and the!eneral pu"lic as enunciated in the 3rimar 3urpose%lause of its rticle(s) of Incorporation. (ee pa!es/ to 5 of #espondent7s %omment). 'ut its advertisedservices, as enumerated a"ove, clearl andconvincin!l sho that it is indeed en!a!ed in lapractice, al"eit outside of court.

s advertised, it offers the !eneral pu"lic its advisorservices on 3ersons and amil #elations &a,

particularl re!ardin! forei!n divorces, annulment ofmarria!es, secret marria!es, a"sence and adoptionDImmi!ration &as, particularl on visa relatedpro"lems, immi!ration pro"lemsD the Investments&a of the 3hilippines and such other related las.

Its advertised services unmistaka"l re?uire theapplication of the aforesaid la, the le!al principlesand procedures related thereto, the le!al advices"ased thereon and hich activities call for le!altrainin!, knoled!e and e@perience.

pplin! the test laid don " the %ourt in theaforecited !rava %ase, the activities of respondentfall s?uarel and are em"raced in hat laers andlamen e?uall term as Athe practice of la.A7

. 8.$.omen a"yers< )ircle2

In resolvin!, the issues "efore this 4onora"le %ourt,paramount consideration should "e !iven to theprotection of the !eneral pu"lic from the dan!er of

"ein! e@ploited " un?ualified persons or entitiesho ma "e en!a!ed in the practice of la.

t present, "ecomin! a laer re?uires one to take ari!orous four-ear course of stud on top of a four-ear "achelor of arts or sciences course and then to

take and pass the "ar e@aminations. :nl then, is alaer ?ualified to practice la.

>hile the use of a parale!al is sanctioned in man

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hich are in essence, le!al matters , ill "e !iven to themif the avail of its services. $he #espondent7s name H$he &e!al %linic, Inc. H does not help matters. It !ives theimpression a!ain that #espondent ill or can cure thele!al pro"lems "rou!ht to them. ssumin! that#espondent is, as claimed, staffed purel " parale!als, italso !ives the misleadin! impression that there are

laers involved in $he &e!al %linic, Inc., as there aredoctors in an medical clinic, hen onl Aparale!alsA areinvolved in $he &e!al %linic, Inc.

#espondent7s alle!ations are further "elied " thever admissions of its 3resident and ma

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firms or travel a!encies, hether run " laers ornot, perform the services rendered " #espondentdoes not necessaril lead to the conclusion that#espondent is not unlafull practicin! la. In thesame vein, hoever, the fact that the "usiness ofrespondent (assumin! it can "e en!a!ed in

independentl of the practice of la) involvesknoled!e of the la does not necessaril makerespondent !uilt of unlaful practice of la.

. . . . :f necessit, no one . . . .actin! as a consultant can rendereffective service unless he isfamiliar ith such statutes andre!ulations. 4e must "e careful notto su!!est a course of conduct

hich the la for"ids. Itseems . . . .clear that (the

consultant7s) knoled!e of the la,and his use of that knoled!e as afactor in determinin! hat measureshe shall recommend, do notconstitute the practice of la . . . . Itis not onl presumed that all menkno the la, "ut it is a fact thatmost men have considera"leac?uaintance ith "road features ofthe la . . . . :ur knoled!e of thela H accurate or inaccurate Hmoulds our conduct not onl hen

e are actin! for ourselves, "uthen e are servin! others.'ankers, li?uor dealers and lamen!enerall possess rather preciseknoled!e of the las touchin! theirparticular "usiness or profession. !ood e@ample is the architect, homust "e familiar ith Eonin!,"uildin! and fire prevention codes,factor and tenement house

statutes, and ho dras plans andspecification in harmon ith thela. $his is not practicin! la.

'ut suppose the architect, asked "his client to omit a fire toer, replies

that it is re?uired " the statute. :rthe industrial relations e@pert cites,in support of some measure that herecommends, a decision of theational &a"or #elations 'oard. rethe practicin! laG In m opinion,the are not, provided no separatefee is char!ed for the le!al advice orinformation, and the le!al ?uestionis su"ordinate and incidental to ama

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corporate emploers, it has "eenthe practice for some ears todele!ate special responsi"ilit inemploee matters to a mana!ement!roup chosen for their practicalknoled!e and skill in such matter,

and ithout re!ard to le!al thinkin!or lack of i t. More recentl,consultants like the defendants havethe same service that the lar!eremploers !et from their onspecialiEed staff.

$he handlin! of industrial relationsis !roin! into a reco!niEedprofession for hich appropriatecourses are offered " our leadin!universities. $he court should "e

ver cautious a"out declarin! thatNa idespread, ell-esta"lishedmethod of conductin! "usiness isunlaful, or that the considera"leclass of men ho customarilperform a certain function have nori!ht to do so, or that the technicaleducation !iven " our schoolscannot "e used " the !raduates intheir "usiness.

7n !eterminin "hether a man is

practicin la", "e shoul! consi!erhis "or0 for any particular client orcustomer, as a "hole. I can ima!inedefendant "ein! en!a!ed primarilto advise as to the la definin! hisclient7s o"li!ations to his emploees,to !uide his client7s o"li!ations to hisemploees, to !uide his client alon!the path charted " la. $his, ofcourse, ould "e the practice of the

la. 'ut such is not the fact in thecase "efore me. 0efendant7sprimaril efforts are alon! economicand pscholo!ical lines. $he laonl provides the frame ithin hichhe must ork,

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ri!ht-of-a and the principal role ofthe ne!otiator is to assess thepro"a"le outcome of the disputeand persuade the opposite part tothe same opinion, then it ma "ethat onl a laer can accept the

assi!nment. :r if a controvers"eteen an emploer and his men!ros from differin! interpretationsof a contract, or of a statute, it is?uite likel that defendant shouldnot handle it. 'ut I need not reach adefinite conclusion here, since thesituation is not presented " theproofs.

0efendant also appears torepresent the emploer "efore

administrative a!encies of thefederal !overnment, especiall"efore trial e@aminers of theational &a"or #elations 'oard. na!enc of the federal !overnment,actin! " virtue of an authorit!ranted " the %on!ress, mare!ulate the representation ofparties "efore such a!enc. $hetate of e Jerse is ithoutpoer to interfere ith suchdetermination or to for"id

representation "efore the a!enc "one hom the a!enc admits. $herules of the ational &a"or #elations'oard !ive to a part the ri!ht toappear in person, or " counsel, or" other representative. #ules and#e!ulations, eptem"er 11th, 19*,. /+.+1. 7%ounsel7 here means al icensed attorne, and therrepresentative7 one not a laer. In

this phase of his ork, defendantma lafull do hatever the &a"or'oard allos, even ar!uin!?uestions purel le!al. (uer"acherv. >ood, 5+ . /d 8, cited intatsk, Introduction to

3arale!alism 19N, at pp. 15-15*.).

1.8 rom the fore!oin!, it can "e said that a personen!a!ed in a laful callin! (hich ma involveknoled!e of the la) is not en!a!ed in the practiceof la provided that2

(a) $he le!al ?uestion is su"ordinate and incidentalto a ma

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securin! a marria!e license, and makin!arran!ements ith a priest or a T#9 R9$R9S9=TAT7= A=DAD;7S7=G % A $ART7)8AR$9RS= 7= A $ART7)8ARS7T8AT7=.t most the "ookassumes to offer !eneral advice oncommon pro"lems, and does notpurport to !ive personal advice on a

specific pro"lem peculiar to adesi!nated or readil identifiedperson. imilarl the defendant7spu"lication does not purport to !ivepersonal advice on a specificpro"lem peculiar to a desi!nated orreadil identified person in aparticular situation H in theirpu"lication and sale of the kits, suchpu"lication and sale did notconstitutes the unlaful practice ofla . . . . $here "ein! no le!al

impediment under the statute to thesale of the kit, there as no proper"asis for the in

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modification of the inder, +8, C /0 / 19+N,cited in tatsk, supraat p. 11.).

1.1/. #espondent, of course, states that its servicesare Astrictl non-dia!nostic, non-advisor. AIt is notcontroverted, hoever, that if the services Ainvolve!ivin! le!al advice or counsellin!,A such ouldconstitute practice of la (%omment, par. *./). It is inthis li!ht that I0 su"mits that a factual in?uir ma"e necessar for the

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o"li!ations, preparation for clients of documents re?uirin! knoled!eof le!al principles not possessed " ordinar laman, andappearance for clients "efore pu"lic tri"unals hich possess poerand authorit to determine ri!hts of life, li"ert, and propertaccordin! to la, in order to assist in proper interpretation andenforcement of la. 1

>hen a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as alaer, he is in the practice of la. 1!:ne ho confers ith clients,advises them as to their le!al ri!hts and then takes the "usiness to anattorne and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicin!la. 1"=ivin! advice for compensation re!ardin! the le!al status and ri!htsof another and the conduct ith respect thereto constitutes a practice ofla. 17:ne ho renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of astatute, and receives pa for it, is, to that e@tent, practicin! la. 1#

In the recent case of )ayetano vs. Monso!, 19after citin! the doctrinesin several cases, e laid don the test to determine hether certain actsconstitute Apractice of la,A thus2

'lack defines Apractice of laA as2

$he rendition of services re?uirin! the knoled!eand the application of le!al principles and techni?ueto serve the interest of another ith his consent. It isnot limited to appearin! in court, or advisin! andassistin! in the conduct of liti!ation, "ut em"racesthe preparation of pleadin!s, and other papersincident to actions and special proceedin!s,conveancin!, the preparation of le!al instruments

of all kinds, and the !ivin! of all le!al advice toclients. It em"races all advice to clients and allactions taken for them in matters connected ith thela.

$he practice of la is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(&and $itle "stract and $rust %o. v. 0orken , 1/9 :hio t. /+,19+. B. *5). person is also considered to "e in the practice ofla hen he2

. . . . for valua"le consideration en!a!es in the"usiness of advisin! person, firms, associations orcorporations as to their ri!ht under the la, orappears in a representative capacit as an advocatein proceedin!s, pendin! or prospective, "efore ancourt, commissioner, referee, "oard, "od,

committee, or commission constituted " la orauthoriEed to settle controversies and there, in suchrepresentative capacit, performs an act or acts forthe purpose of o"tainin! or defendin! the ri!hts oftheir clients under the la. :therise stated, one

ho, in a representative capacit, en!a!es in the"usiness of advisin! clients as to their ri!hts underthe la, or hile so en!a!ed performs an act oracts either in court or outside of court for thatpurpose, is en!a!ed in the practice of la. (tate e@.rel. Mckittrick v. %.. 0udle and %o., 1/ . >. /d895, + Mo. 85/).

$his %ourt, in the case of $hilippines a"yers Associationv.Arava(15 3hil. 1+, 1*-1),stated2

$he practice of la is not limited to the conduct ofcases or liti!ation in courtD it em"races thepreparation of pleadin!s and other papers incident toactions and special proceedin!s, the mana!ement ofsuch actions and proceedin!s on "ehalf of clients"efore

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of the le!al effect of facts and conditions. (5 m. Jr.p. /*/, /*+).

3ractice of la under modern conditions consists inno small part of ork performed outside of an courtand havin! no immediate relation to proceedin!s in

court. It em"races conveancin!, the !ivin! of le!aladvice on a lar!e variet of su"

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mana!ement of la offices, or the computeriEation of research aidsand materials, these ill not suffice to hat is palpa"l clear is that respondent corporation !ives out le!alinformation to lamen and laers. Its contention that such function

is non-advisor and non-dia!nostic is more apparent than real. Inprovidin! information, for e@ample, a"out forei!n las on marria!e,divorce and adoption, it strains the credulit of this %ourt that all therespondent corporation ill simpl do is look for the la, furnish acop thereof to the client, and stop there as if it ere merel a"ookstore. >ith its attornes and so called parale!als, it illnecessaril have to e@plain to the client the intricacies of the la andadvise him or her on the proper course of action to "e taken as ma"e provided for " said la. $hat is hat its advertisementsrepresent and for the hich services it ill conse?uentl char!e and"e paid. $hat activit falls s?uarel ithin the

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ill, then ou ould need a liti!ator, ho knos hoto arran!e the pro"lem for presentation in court, and!ather evidence to support the case. 21

$hat fact that the corporation emplos parale!als to carr out itsservices is not controllin!. >hat is important is that it is en!a!ed in

the practice of la " virtue of the nature of the services it rendershich there" "rin!s it ithin the am"it of the statutor prohi"itionsa!ainst the advertisements hich it has caused to "e pu"lished andare no assailed in this proceedin!.

urther, as correctl and appropriatel pointed out " the 6.3.>I&:%I, said reported facts sufficientl esta"lish that the mainpurpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts forvarious le!al pro"lems herein a client ma avail of le!al servicesfrom simple documentation to comple@ liti!ation and corporateundertakin!s. Most of these services are undou"tedl "eond thedomain of parale!als, "ut rather, are e@clusive functions of laers