26
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety CASE STUDIES © 2013 DEKRA Ian Pavey Principal Electrostatics Specialist Chilworth Technology Ltd

CASE STUDIES - Eventsforce · 2019. 9. 1. · • Ignition during FIBC discharge into silo. • 2 x FIBCs already discharged. ... pneumatic conveying of powders”. ... trials it

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    2

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    CASE STUDIES

    © 2013 DEKRA

    Ian Pavey Principal Electrostatics Specialist

    Chilworth Technology Ltd

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Incident Investigations

    • Flammable Atmosphere?

    • Ignition Sources - Which are impossible? - Which are possible? - Which are likely? - Which could have ignited the

    flammable atmosphere

    • Conclude which are most likely / likely / possible

    • Recommendations for future safe operation

    © 2013 DEKRA

    Static Electricity

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors

    • IEC/TS 60079-32-1 states in various places that all conductive

    items should be properly earthed.

    • Previous guidelines have said the same.

    • The concept is simple and straightforward.

    • The practice is almost always simple and straightforward.

    • So how does it still get missed?

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1

    • Ignition during FIBC discharge into silo.

    • 2 x FIBCs already discharged.

    • 3rd FIBC set to discharge and left.

    • Explosion shortly afterwards.

    • Severe damage to building.

    • FIBC all but melted away.

    • Minimal damage to silo.

    • No personnel hurt.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1

    • All ignition sources except static eliminated.

    • Powder MIE 15 – 20 mJ.

    • Post incident investigation found: - Grille over hatch only fortuitously earthed.

    - Some pipe sections in area not earthed.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1

    CONCLUSION – most likely scenario…

    • FIBC sagged during discharge to partially block grille.

    • Some powder dropped into workplace, some already there.

    • Isolated grille charged by powder or FIBC.

    • Spark discharge between grille and silo ignited dust cloud in

    and around FIBC.

    • Secondary explosion of powder in workplace.

    • Other isolated pipe section could have led to a spark discharge.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Reduce powder in workplace (improve housekeeping).

    • Positively earth all conductive items.

    • Never rely on fortuitous earthing.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2

    • Transfer of fine powder from IBC to hopper.

    • Platform-level IBC manually rodded.

    • Internal ignition during transfer.

    • Operator on platform next to IBC.

    • Internal damage only.

    • Operator unhurt.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2

    © 2013 DEKRA

    • All ignition sources except static eliminated.

    • Powder MIE up to 15 mJ.

    • Post incident investigation found: - Spool adaptor isolated.

    - Personnel issued with static dissipative footwear.

    - Platform floor epoxy-coated.

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2

    CONCLUSION – most likely scenario…

    • Powder falling through chute charged isolated spool piece.

    • Spark discharge from spool ignited powder.

    • Discharge from isolated operator via s/s rod to chute not entirely

    ruled out.

    • Operator protected by powder plug in IBC and loose fitting

    cover on hopper.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Positively earth all conductive items.

    • Where personnel must be earthed via footwear ensure floor

    surface is sufficiently conducting and earthed.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Flexible Hose Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

    • Transfer of powder through wire supported

    flexible hose.

    • During transfer cracking and bang heard.

    • Flexible hose blown off, smoke,

    internal blackening and burnt powder.

    • Nobody hurt and damage minimal.

    • Down time for cleaning and review.

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Flexible Hose Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

    • 2003 guidance (CLC/TR 50404) advised:

    “Conductive pipes with non-conductive linings … should not be used for the

    pneumatic conveying of powders”.

    because of the propagating brush discharge hazard.

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Flexible Hose Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

    • Through this and numerous similar incidents, and laboratory

    trials it has become clear that the earthed spiral in an insulating

    hose is enough to produce a propagating brush discharge.

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Flexible Hose Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • The inside of wire spiral supported flexible hoses for powder

    transport should always be static dissipative and earthed

    (

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    The Operation

    • Charge 10000 litres used toluene to vessel via dip pipe

    • Once impellor covered start agitator

    • Add water using hose via manway; typically 200 – 500 litres

    • Add phosphoric acid / sodium hydroxide as required

    • Stir for 10 minutes

    • Settle

    • Run off separate phases

    Liquid Mixing Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    The Incident

    • 4400 litres toluene already added

    • Water addition started

    • Phosphoric acid valve opened

    • Flash fire in head space

    • Remote witness reported “bang

    and whoosh”

    • Operator not seriously hurt

    Liquid Mixing Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    The Investigation

    • Pure toluene is highly insulating.

    • Used toluene found to be insulating.

    • Dispersed second phase significantly increases charge generation risk.

    • Other ignition sources discounted.

    Liquid Mixing Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Recommendations

    • Add a conductivity modifier to toluene.

    • Check conductivity OK before adding aqueous phases.

    • Ensure you do understand the hazards associated with the materials you are handling.

    • Even if you have been operating for some time, make sure there is a proper hazard assessment in place.

    Liquid Mixing Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    The Operation

    • Powder charged to vacuum dryer

    • Vacuum pulled with heating and

    agitation

    • Vacuum relieved, dryer inverted,

    powder discharged

    Vacuum Dryer Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    The Incidents

    • Some rapid / explosive

    decompositions as vacuum

    relieved

    • One resulted in loss of

    containment

    • Nobody hurt

    Vacuum Dryer Incident

    The Material

    • Highly insulating powder

    • Very sensitive to ignition

    • Actually, ignition starts as

    decomposition for which air is

    not necessary

    The Investigation

    • After extensive investigations,

    settled on static

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Repulsive Force of Charged Particles

    + +

    Increase Potential Energy by Forcing

    Charged Particles Together

    +

    + +

    +

    +

    +

    +

    +

    + +

    + +

    +

    + +

    +

    + +

    +

    + +

    + +

    +

    +

    +

    + +

    + +

    + +

    +

    +

    + +

    Cone Discharges

    Vacuum Dryer Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Paschen’s Curve

    0.1

    1

    10

    100

    1000

    10000

    0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000

    Product of Air pressure and Electrode Gap (bar.mm)

    Bre

    ak

    do

    wn

    Vo

    lta

    ge

    (k

    V)

    Vacuum Dryer Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Recommendations

    • Limit vacuum to 20 mbara

    • Ensure change control system is in place such that even the effects of “minor” changes are properly assessed

    Vacuum Dryer Incident

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety

    Electrostatic Hazards

    • Incidents due to static still regularly occur.

    • IEC/TS 60079-32-1 is an excellent review and advice document.

    • Anyone involved with handling flammable or unstable materials would be well advised to get a copy.

    • If you struggle with IEC/TS 60079-32-1 or are unsure get help – it could save lives.

    © 2013 DEKRA

  • The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety © 2013 DEKRA

    Thank You For Your Attention