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The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
CASE STUDIES
© 2013 DEKRA
Ian Pavey Principal Electrostatics Specialist
Chilworth Technology Ltd
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Incident Investigations
• Flammable Atmosphere?
• Ignition Sources - Which are impossible? - Which are possible? - Which are likely? - Which could have ignited the
flammable atmosphere
• Conclude which are most likely / likely / possible
• Recommendations for future safe operation
© 2013 DEKRA
Static Electricity
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors
• IEC/TS 60079-32-1 states in various places that all conductive
items should be properly earthed.
• Previous guidelines have said the same.
• The concept is simple and straightforward.
• The practice is almost always simple and straightforward.
• So how does it still get missed?
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1
• Ignition during FIBC discharge into silo.
• 2 x FIBCs already discharged.
• 3rd FIBC set to discharge and left.
• Explosion shortly afterwards.
• Severe damage to building.
• FIBC all but melted away.
• Minimal damage to silo.
• No personnel hurt.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1
• All ignition sources except static eliminated.
• Powder MIE 15 – 20 mJ.
• Post incident investigation found: - Grille over hatch only fortuitously earthed.
- Some pipe sections in area not earthed.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1
CONCLUSION – most likely scenario…
• FIBC sagged during discharge to partially block grille.
• Some powder dropped into workplace, some already there.
• Isolated grille charged by powder or FIBC.
• Spark discharge between grille and silo ignited dust cloud in
and around FIBC.
• Secondary explosion of powder in workplace.
• Other isolated pipe section could have led to a spark discharge.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 1
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Reduce powder in workplace (improve housekeeping).
• Positively earth all conductive items.
• Never rely on fortuitous earthing.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2
• Transfer of fine powder from IBC to hopper.
• Platform-level IBC manually rodded.
• Internal ignition during transfer.
• Operator on platform next to IBC.
• Internal damage only.
• Operator unhurt.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2
© 2013 DEKRA
• All ignition sources except static eliminated.
• Powder MIE up to 15 mJ.
• Post incident investigation found: - Spool adaptor isolated.
- Personnel issued with static dissipative footwear.
- Platform floor epoxy-coated.
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2
CONCLUSION – most likely scenario…
• Powder falling through chute charged isolated spool piece.
• Spark discharge from spool ignited powder.
• Discharge from isolated operator via s/s rod to chute not entirely
ruled out.
• Operator protected by powder plug in IBC and loose fitting
cover on hopper.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Earthing of Conductors – Incident 2
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Positively earth all conductive items.
• Where personnel must be earthed via footwear ensure floor
surface is sufficiently conducting and earthed.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Flexible Hose Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
• Transfer of powder through wire supported
flexible hose.
• During transfer cracking and bang heard.
• Flexible hose blown off, smoke,
internal blackening and burnt powder.
• Nobody hurt and damage minimal.
• Down time for cleaning and review.
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Flexible Hose Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
• 2003 guidance (CLC/TR 50404) advised:
“Conductive pipes with non-conductive linings … should not be used for the
pneumatic conveying of powders”.
because of the propagating brush discharge hazard.
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Flexible Hose Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
• Through this and numerous similar incidents, and laboratory
trials it has become clear that the earthed spiral in an insulating
hose is enough to produce a propagating brush discharge.
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Flexible Hose Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The inside of wire spiral supported flexible hoses for powder
transport should always be static dissipative and earthed
(
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
The Operation
• Charge 10000 litres used toluene to vessel via dip pipe
• Once impellor covered start agitator
• Add water using hose via manway; typically 200 – 500 litres
• Add phosphoric acid / sodium hydroxide as required
• Stir for 10 minutes
• Settle
• Run off separate phases
Liquid Mixing Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
The Incident
• 4400 litres toluene already added
• Water addition started
• Phosphoric acid valve opened
• Flash fire in head space
• Remote witness reported “bang
and whoosh”
• Operator not seriously hurt
Liquid Mixing Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
The Investigation
• Pure toluene is highly insulating.
• Used toluene found to be insulating.
• Dispersed second phase significantly increases charge generation risk.
• Other ignition sources discounted.
Liquid Mixing Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Recommendations
• Add a conductivity modifier to toluene.
• Check conductivity OK before adding aqueous phases.
• Ensure you do understand the hazards associated with the materials you are handling.
• Even if you have been operating for some time, make sure there is a proper hazard assessment in place.
Liquid Mixing Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
The Operation
• Powder charged to vacuum dryer
• Vacuum pulled with heating and
agitation
• Vacuum relieved, dryer inverted,
powder discharged
Vacuum Dryer Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
The Incidents
• Some rapid / explosive
decompositions as vacuum
relieved
• One resulted in loss of
containment
• Nobody hurt
Vacuum Dryer Incident
The Material
• Highly insulating powder
• Very sensitive to ignition
• Actually, ignition starts as
decomposition for which air is
not necessary
The Investigation
• After extensive investigations,
settled on static
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Repulsive Force of Charged Particles
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Increase Potential Energy by Forcing
Charged Particles Together
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Cone Discharges
Vacuum Dryer Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Paschen’s Curve
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000
Product of Air pressure and Electrode Gap (bar.mm)
Bre
ak
do
wn
Vo
lta
ge
(k
V)
Vacuum Dryer Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Recommendations
• Limit vacuum to 20 mbara
• Ensure change control system is in place such that even the effects of “minor” changes are properly assessed
Vacuum Dryer Incident
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety
Electrostatic Hazards
• Incidents due to static still regularly occur.
• IEC/TS 60079-32-1 is an excellent review and advice document.
• Anyone involved with handling flammable or unstable materials would be well advised to get a copy.
• If you struggle with IEC/TS 60079-32-1 or are unsure get help – it could save lives.
© 2013 DEKRA
The Global Experts in Explosion & Process Safety © 2013 DEKRA
Thank You For Your Attention