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promulgated), contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to beproclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.

In its resolution of July 3, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied Garcia's prayer, citing the rulingin Republic v . De la Rosa 2 that a candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes inan election cannot be declared winner. Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120940. Petitionercontends that (1) the COMELEC en banc should have decided his petition at least 15 daysbefore the May 8, 1995 elections as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and thatbecause it failed to do so, many votes were invalidated which could have been for him had thevoters been told earlier who were qualified to be candidates; (2) that the decision of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final and executory and resulted in the automaticdisqualification of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need much time to decide the case fordisqualification against Reyes since the latter did not appeal the decision in the administrativecase ordering his removal; (3) that the COMELEC should have considered the votes cast forReyes as stray votes.

After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases, the Court resolved to dismiss them forlack of showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing theresolutions in question.

G.R. No. 120905

First . Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering himremoved from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.

It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of itsdecision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As thesecretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated in his certification, repeatedattempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, butReyes refused to receive the decision. Manzo's certification states:

On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila to furnish acopy of the decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V. Garcia,which said counsel refused to accept.

On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to the SangguniangPanlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again went to the office of

the Mayor of Bongabong to serve the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes,himself present, refused to accept the ORDER enforcing the decision citingparticularly the pending case filed in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman asthe basis of his refusal.

On [ sic ] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to the SangguniangPanlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER, mailed the same (registeredmail receipt No. 432) on the Bongabong Post Office to forward the ORDERto the Office of Mayor Renato U. Reyes.

On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned to the SangguniangPanlalawigan with the following inscriptions on the back by the Postmaster:

1) 1st attempt addressee out of town 9:15 a.m., 3-23-95

2) 2nd attempt addressee cannot be contacted, out of town, 8:50 a.m., 3-24-95.

3) 3rd attempt addressee not contacted out of town 8:15 a.m., 3-24-95.

4) 4th attempt addressee refused to accept 8:15 a.m., 3-27-95.

On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went to

Bongabong to serve the same ORDER enforcing the decision. MayorRenato U. Reyes was not present so the copy was left on the Mayor's Officewith comments from the employees that they would not accept the same. 3

Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgmentseither personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery,which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving itin his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is notknown. 4 Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioner's counselin his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of the SangguniangPanlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Althoughthe mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed fivedays after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995. 5

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service isdeemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as itcan be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or hiscounsel's refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had beenrendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigannot to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in theRegional Trial Court waspending. 6 His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on hispart to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with thepleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his

interests, enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before thedecision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading,notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge himwith receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect. 7

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that,rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to theOffice of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. 8 But petitioner did not do so.

Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service uponpetitioner.

The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petitionfor certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from


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attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interruptthe course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in theproceeding. 9

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during thependency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order ora writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lowercourt. 10

In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional TrialCourt, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining orderissued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to theservice of the decision upon petitioner.

Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at the hearing held onFebruary 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the counsel of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect service of the decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari .

The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and the Sangguniang Panlalawigancannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal . And it would have been no lessillegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried it out because R.A. No. 7160, 66 (a)makes it mandatory that "[c]opies of the decision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shallimmediately be furnished to respondent and/or interested parties." It was the SangguniangPanlalawigan's duty to serve it upon the parties without unnecessary delay. To have delayed theservice of the decision would have resulted in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to performa legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its decision served upon petitioner Reyes.

Second . The next question is whether there election of petitioner rendered the administrativecharges against him moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldov . COMELEC , 11 in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconductcommitted during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer'sprevious misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that wasbecause in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decisionremoving petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconductwas committed expired. 12 Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the allegedmisconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, hecan no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for

the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought anaction to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issuedin the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and itthereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of thePresident. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the LocalGovernment Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similarto 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground thathe has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldocase: 13

The COMELEC applied Section 40(b) of the Local Government CodeRepublic Act 7160) which provides:

Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any electivelocal position:

. . . . .

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992. . . . There is noprovision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operatesretroactively.

It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local Government Code is notapplicable to the present case.

Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier,the decision of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned bythe petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition remains unresolved.

At any rate, petitioner's claim that he was not given time to present his evidence in the

administrative case has no basis, as the following portion of the decision of the SangguniangPanlalawigan makes clear:

On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from respondent's counsela motion for extension of time to file a verified answer within 15 days fromNovember 23, 1994. In the interest of justice another fifteen (15) day periodwas granted the respondent.

On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing his answer, respondentinstead filed a motion to dismiss and set the same for hearing on December22, 1994.

. . . .

On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit andthe order of denial was received by respondent on January 7, 1995.Considering the fact that the last day within which to file his answer fell onDecember 5, 1994, respondent is obliged to file the verified answer onJanuary 7, 1995 when he received the order denying his motion to dismiss.

In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995, the counsel for thecomplainant manifested that he be allowed to present his evidence forfailure of the respondent to file his answer albeit the lapse of 19 days fromJanuary 7, 1995.

The manifestation of complainant's counsel was granted over the objectionof the respondent, and the Sanggunian in open session, in the presence of

the counsel for the respondent, issued an order dated January 26, 1995quoted as follows:


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"As shown from the record of this case, Mayor RenatoU. Reyes of Bongabong failed to file his answer withinthe time prescribed by law, after the motion to dismisswas denied by this Sanggunian. The Sangguniandeclares that respondent Mayor Renato U. Reyes failedto file his answer to the complaint filed against himwithin the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.Counsel for respondent requested for reconsiderationtwice, which oral motions for reconsideration weredenied for lack of merit.

Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to filehis verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receiptof the complaint shall be considered a waiver of hisrights to present evidence in his behalf.

It is important to note that this case should be heard inaccordance with what is provided for in the constitutionthat all parties are entitled to speedy disposition of theircases. It is pivotal to state that the SanggunianPanlalawigan will lose its authority to investigate thiscase come February 8, 1995 and therefore, in theinterest of justice and truth the Sanggunian mustexercise that authority by pursuing the hearing of thiscase.

Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto L.Manalo, et al., will present his evidence on February 2,3, and 6, 1995, and the counsel for respondent will begiven a chance to cross-examine the witnesses thatmay be presented thereat."

. . . .

On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel despite due notice inopen session, and by registered mail (registry receipt no. 1495) datedJanuary 27, 1995, failed to appear. No telegram was received by this bodyto the effect that he will appear on any of the dates stated in the Order of

January 26, 1995. Indeed, such in action is a waiver of the respondent towhatever rights he may have under our laws.

All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian aperiod of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resortedto dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, heneither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure ofthe respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receiptof the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to presentevidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementingthe Local Government Code of 1991). All persons shall have the right to aspeedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial , oradministrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Constitution).

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed todo so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and thathe (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date

set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion forpostponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay heemployed to render the case against him moot by his election.

G.R. No. 120940

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitionerJulius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimedwinner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. 14 The doctrinal instabilitycaused by see-sawing rulings 15 has since been removed. In the latest ruling 16 on the question,this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received theother votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. Hewas repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not beconsidered the first among qualified candidates because in a field whichexcludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantiallychanged. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under thecircumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast forReyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reasoncan not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. 17 The subsequent finding that he isdisqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

As for Garcia's contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in notdeciding the case before the date of the election, suffice it to say that under R.A. No. 6646, 6,the COMELEC can continue proceedings for disqualification against a candidate even after theelection and order the suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt isstrong. For the same reason, we find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should haveseen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing thedecision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have disqualified him beforethe elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. 120905 and G.R. No, 120940 are DISMISSED for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.,respondents.

FRANCISCO,J.: p

Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post ofQuezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.

Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before theCOMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United Stateswhere a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before theLos Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft andattempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from

justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of theLocal Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.

The COMELEC dismissed Marquez' quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in aresolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.

Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court viapetition for certiorari , docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition iswhether Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40 (e) ofthe Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal chargeagainst him (as previously mentioned).

In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs.COMELEC"' promulgated on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538of the SCRA and hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision , declared that:

. . . , "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after convictionto avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee toavoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. ..), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinaryconnotation of the term. 1

Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus givenwas not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC uponremand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatchconformably with the MARQUEZ Decision . Rodriguez sought a reconsiderationthereof. He also filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support ofthe Motion for Reconsideration" to which was attached a certification from theCommission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed againsthim before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a reconsideration ofthe MARQUEZ Decision .

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for thesame position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy viapetition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the sameallegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice ." This petition for disqualification(SPA No. 95-089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petitionfor certiorari (112889) from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court.

On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision , theCOMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 ( quowarranto case) and SPA NO. 95-089 (disqualification case). In justifying a jointresolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC explained that:

1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases

2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases

3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common issueof whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice"

4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc , the Commissioners unanimouslyagreed that a consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally flawed.

Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedlyhaving kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice" , foundRodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary

evidence consisting of

1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by theLos Angeles municipal court against Rodriguez, and

2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint

which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out ofthe hearing of the case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial ofRodriguez' motion for postponement. With the walk-out, the COMELEC consideredRodriguez as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez'aforementioned documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the followinganalysis:


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The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show thependency of a criminal complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in theMunicipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that there isan outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention thatthe respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look withfavor on respondent's defense that long before the felony complaint wasallegedly filed, respondent was already in the Philippines and he did notknow of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was beingproceeded against criminally. In a sense, thru this defense, respondentimplicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice,because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint,and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru thewarrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid andevade the warrant. This allegation in the Answer, however, was not evenfortified with any attached document to show when he left the United Statesand when he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion ofabsence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On thecontrary, the fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in theUnited States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid forrespondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption ofknowledge there is against the respondent. 2

And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:

WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitivefrom justice, he is hereby ordered disqualified or ineligible from assumingand performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. Respondentis ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is herebydisqualified from running for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8,1995 elections. Lastly, his certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995elections is hereby set aside.

At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995election for the position of governor.

On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board ofCanvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12, 1995.

The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 andthe May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise tothe filing of the instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995.

On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation ofRodriguez, To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers inContempt" before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089).

Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23,1995, nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the QuezonProvince Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited incontempt for disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution suspendingRodriguez' proclamation. But with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation, theCOMELEC deferred action until after this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R.No. 120099).

Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaidCOMELEC June 23, 1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation,respectively).

As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition(G.R. No. 120099) on July 13, 1995.

Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining OrderOr Preliminary Injunction" which sought to retain and enjoin Rodriguez "fromexercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon . . . ." Actingfavorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August 8, 1995 issued a temporaryrestraining order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order

And/Or For Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995Resolution. Another similar urgent motion was later on filed by Rodriguez which theCourt also denied.

In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court

. . . RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections("COMELEC") to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of theCOMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such legally admissible evidenceas herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way ofrefuting the evidence heretofore submitted by private respondentBienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which can tend to establish petitioner'scontention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from

justice." Private respondent Marquez may likewise, if he so desires,introduce additional and admissible evidence in support of his own position.The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may beapplied in the reception of the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELECshall have the proceedings completed and the corresponding reportsubmitted to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995,a report e ntitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION"wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared thatRodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion inthe MARQUEZ Decision , thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the

Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opinedthat intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition.Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has establishedthat Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminalcharge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describesas its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZDecision definition of "fugitive from justice" . So as not to miss anything, we quote theCOMELEC's observations in full:

. . . The main opinion's definition of a "fugitive from justice" " include not onlythose who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who,after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." It proceeded to state that:


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Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court inthe MARQUEZ Decision . To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice" :

. . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment butlikewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor thatanimates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only bean intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeingsubject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival inthe Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by theBureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing ofthe felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of theissuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five(5) months . It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felonycomplaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact nocomplaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away fromwith his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from

justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in thecircumstances of Rodriguez.

With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the sameanalysis in its ". . . COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, otherobservations consistent with such analysis made by the poll body that are equallyformidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:

It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to showRodriguez' intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admissiona voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of thecharges against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose ofestablishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have knownof said investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusionmisleads because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive orprolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the

advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged.Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be nothing shortof a well-publicized announcement to the perpetrators of the imminent filingof charges against them. And having been forewarned, every effort tosabotage the investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects. But ifprivate respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law atthe time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will benothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent toevade the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive.

The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez'departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn thepresumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing morethan the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that ofpetitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in

the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidenceof petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to

the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in thepolitical campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Forindeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheavalwrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurredresulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. TheEDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitatedchanges in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments,petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-BoardMember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, hewas elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in thesame capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-electionin 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period ofrelentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the governorship. And servingthe people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolutededication of one's time to the demands of the office.

Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filedagainst him at the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterialunder such construction to determine the exact time when he was madeaware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does notcountenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the

jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for hisarrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of thesame, petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When, in good

faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound,and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relativepeace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subjecthimself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright asa fugitive from justice.

The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a personthat he subject himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in hiscountry or else be disqualified from office, is more apparent when applied inpetitioner's case. The criminal process of the United States extends onlywithin its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said countrywhen the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardlypetitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the UnitedStates, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time thathe did and to return to the Philippines. Not justifiable reason existed to

curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United State andreturn home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to undulyburden and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be faultedfor the circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory at the timehe was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges filedagainst him.

Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to knowof the charges only later, and under his circumstances, is there a law thatrequires petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to themonetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before thecountry's courts?

It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as

to demand of political candidate the performance of duties and obligationsthat are supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an alleged


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"fugitive from justice" must perform acts in order not to be so categorized.Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against himor of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in the

jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said placeof commission. However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from theUnited States may not place him under a similar obligation. His subsequentknowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction ofthe former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically afugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and electedimmediately after his return to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had everyreason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office. He could nothave gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could hehave traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of thepublic he serves. The require that of petitioner would be to put him in aparadoxical quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions ofhis office.

However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" asearlier quoted) seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice" . Theyespouse the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign authorities (mainly ofU.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i .e ., that one becomes a "fugitivefrom justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pendingagainst him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the timeof his flight.

Suffice it to say that the " law of the case " doctrine forbids the Court to craft anexpanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance withthe MARQUEZ Decision ) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. Thevarious definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v . Pinuila , 103 Phil.992, 999, to wit:

"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a formerappeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocablyestablished as the controlling legal rule of decision between the sameparties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whethercorrect on a general principles or not, so long as the facts on which suchdecision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before thecourt. (21 C.J.S. 330)

It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence ona second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the firstor preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated onthe prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and willnot be considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)

In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after adefinite determination, the court has remanded the cause for further actionbelow, it will refuse to examine question other than those arisingsubsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the proprietyof the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded insubstantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action willnot be questioned on a second appeal.

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to bethe law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the

party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).

Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will beregarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although thequestions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as thepresumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decidedhave received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentionedin the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or notRodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" ) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and theinstant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (theMarquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also anappeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly withSPA No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore,what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZDecision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the conceptof "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZDecision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquezand the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.

Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision .

To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification orineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definitiongiven in the MARQUEZ Decision , to wit:

A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction toavoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid

prosecution . (Emphasis ours.)

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof thatthere has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at thetime of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannotbe denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED andthe assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (ConsolidatedResolution), May 11, 1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and June23, 1995 (Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the QuezonProvince Provincial Board and Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited incontempt) are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 117589-92 May 22, 1996

ROMEO R. SALALIMA, DANILO S. AZAA, JUAN VICTORIA, LORENZO REYEG, ARTUROOSIA, CLENIO CABREDO, VICENTE GO, SR., RAMON FERNANDEZ, JR., MASIKAPFONTANILLA, WILBOR RONTAS and NEMESIO BACLAO,petitioners,vs.HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, VICTOR R.SUMULONG, RENATO C. CORONA and ANGEL V. SALDIVAR, in their capacity asMembers of the Ad Hoc Committee, MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL, KGD. FRANCISCOALARTE, MAYOR ANTONIO DEMETRIOU; and DOMINADOR LIM, JESUS JAMES CALISIN,EVELYN SILVERIO, SILVERIO COPE, TOBIAS BETITO, MANUEL LANUZA, JAMESENRICO SALAZAR, RODOLFO ANTE, JUAN RIVERA, MARCIAL TUANQUI, DR.SALVADOR SAMBITAN, ATTY. EUTIQUIO NEPOMUCENO, in their capacity as ACTINGGOVERNOR, ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR, and ACTING MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGAN OF ALBAY, respectively, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: p

Petitioners seek to annul and set aside Administrative Order No. 153, signed on 7 October 1994by the President and by public respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,approving the findings of fact and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding thepetitioners administratively liable for the following acts or omissions: (a) wanton disregard of lawamounting to abuse of authority in O.P. Case No. 5470; (b) grave abuse of authority underSection 60 (e) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) in O.P. Case No. 5469;(c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160 in O.P.Case No. 5471; and (d) abuse of authority and negligence in O.P. Case No. 5450. The saidorder meted out on each of the petitioners penalties of suspension of different durations, to be

served successively but not to go beyond their respective unexpired terms in accordance withSection 66 (b) of R.A. No. 7160.

Prefacing the petition with a claim that the challenged administrative order is "an oppressive andcapricious exercise of executive power," the petitioners submit that:

I.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYTEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INSUSPENDING THE PETITIONERS FOR PERIODS RANGING FROMTWELVE MONTHS TO TWENTY MONTHS IN VIOLATION OF THECONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES ON LOCAL AUTONOMY AND SECURITYOF TENURE AND APPOINTING UNQUALIFIED PERSONS TO NON-VACANT POSITIONS AS THEIR SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE.

II.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYTEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INHOLDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY FORFAILURE TO SHARE WITH THE MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI THE AMOUNTOF P40,724,471.74 PAID BY NAPOCOR TO THE PROVINCE OF ALBAY,PURSUANT TO THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED JULY 29,1992.

III.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ACTEDWITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PETITIONERSBASED UPON THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE:

A. WHAT WERE NOT COMPLAINED OF;

B. UPON ACTS COMMITTED PRIOR TO ITSEFFECTIVITY; AND

C. WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES WHENFILED WERE ALREADY COVERED BYPRESCRIPTION.

IV.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN ITPREMATURELY DECIDED THESE CASES ON THE BASIS OF THE SAOREPORT NO. 93-11 WHICH IS PENDING APPEAL TO THE COMMISSIONON AUDIT SITTING EN BANC .

We resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on the basis of the pleadings thusfar submitted, after due consideration of the satisfactory explanation of the petitioners that hiscase has not been mooted by the expiration of their term of office on 30 June 1995 and the

comment of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case be resolved on the merits. Inseeking a resolution of this case on the merits, the office of the Solicitor General invites theattention of the Court to the following:

(a) While the periods of suspension have been served by petitioners andthat some of them have even been elected to other government positions,there is the primary issue of whether the suspensions were valid andgrounded on sufficient cause.

(b) If the suspensions are found to be valid, petitioners are not entitled toreimbursement of salaries during their suspension period.

(c) If upheld, Administrative Order No. 15, would be used as a strongground in filing cases against petitioners for violations of the Anti Graft andCorrupt Practices Act.


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(d) Corollary [ sic ] to these issues is the issue of the interpretation andapplication of the [R]eal Property Tax Code and the Local GovernmentCode under the circumstances of this case.

(e) The resolution of these issues would finally put to rest whetherrespondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction for having suspended petitioners on the basis of their findings inthe four (4) administrative cases filed against the petitioners.

The factual antecedents are not complicated.

Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints against the petitioners, who were electiveofficials of the Province of Albay, were filed with the Office of the President and later docketed asO.P. Cases Nos. 5450, 5469, 5470, and 5471. Acting thereon, the President issued

Administrative Order No. 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the charges and tothereafter submit its findings and recommendations.

The Ad Hoc committee was composed of Undersecretary Victor R. Sumulong of the Departmentof the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Assistant Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona,and Presidential Assistant Angel V. Saldivar.

On 26 August 1994, after conducting hearings, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report to theOffice of the President.

On 7 October 1994, the President promulgated Administrative Order No. 153 quoting withapproval the following pertinent findings and recommendations of the Committee; thus:

The finding of the Ad-Hoc Committee in OP Case Nos. 547(1, 5469, 5471and 5450 are as follows

I. OP Case No . 5470

This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corralagainst Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, Vice-Governor Danilo Azaa, and

Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Arturo Osia, Clenio Cabredo, Vicente Go [S]r., Jesus Marcellana, Ramon

Fernandez, Jr. Masikap Fontilla, and Wilbor Rontas.

Docketed as OP Case No. 5470, the complaint charges the respondents formalversation and consistent & habitual violation of pars. (c) and (d) ofSection 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the "LocalGovernment Code."

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 4 June 1990, the Supreme Court in the case entitled "National PowerCorporation (NPC) v. The Province of Albay, et al.", G.R. No. 87479rendered judgment (Exhs. D to D-14) declaring, inter alia , NPC liable forunpaid real estate taxes on its properties in Albay covering the period 11June 1984 to 10 March 1987.

Citing the fact that its tax exemption privileges had been revoked, theSupreme Court held that NPC's real properties, consisting mainly ofgeothermal plants in Tiwi and substation facilities in Daraga, are subject toreal estate tax in accordance with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 464, asamended, otherwise known as the "Real Property Tax Decree."

Earlier, said properties were sold at an auction sale conducted by theProvince of Albay (the "Province") to satisfy NPC's tax liabilities. Being thesole bidder at the auction, the Province acquired ownership over saidproperties.

On 29 July 1992, the NPC through then President Pablo Malixi and theProvince represented by respondent Salalima, entered into a Memorandumof agreement ("MOA") [Exhs. 7 to 7-A] whereby the former agreed to settleits tax liabilities, then estimated at P214,845,104.76.

Under the MOA, the parties agreed that:

the actual amount collectible from NPC will have tobe recomputed/revalidated;

NPC shall make an initial payment ofP17,763,000.00 upon signing of the agreement;

the balance of the recomputed/revalidated amount(less the aforesaid initial payment), shall be paid intwenty-four (24) equal monthly installments tocommence in September 1992; and

ownership over the auctioned properties shall revertto NPC upon satisfaction of the tax liabilities.

On 3 August 1992, Mayor Corral formally requested the Province throughrespondent Salalima, to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and certainbarangays of Tiwi where NPC's properties are located ("concernedbarangays") relative to the payments made by NPC (Exh. B).

On the same day, 3 August 1992, the Tiwi Sangguniang Bayan passedResolution No. 12-91 (Exhs. G to G-1) requesting the Albay SangguniangPanlalawigan to hold a joint session with the former together with MayorCorral and the Sangguniang Pambarangays of the concerned barangays,for the purpose of discussing the distribution or application of the NPCpayments.

On 10 August 1992, respondent Salalima replied that the request cannot begranted as the initial payment amounting to P17,763,000.00 was only an"earnest money" and that the total amount to be collected from NPC wasstill being validated (Exh. 1).

Not satisfied with respondent Salalima's response, Mayor Corralcomplained to NPC about the Province's failure to remit Tiwi's and theconcerned barangays' shares in the payments made by NPC (Exh. 50-C).


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On 14 August 1992, President Malixi informed respondent Salalima that therepresentatives of both NPC and the Province have reconciled theiraccounts and determined that the amount due from NPC was down toP207,375,774.52 (Exh. 20).

Due to the brewing misunderstanding between Tiwi and the concernedbarangays on the one hand, and the Province on the other, and so as not tobe caught in the middle of the controversy, NPC requested a clarificationfrom the Office of the President as to the scope and extent of the shares oflocal government units in real estate tax collections (Exh. 6 to 6-A).

Meantime, the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No.178-92 dated 8 October 1992 (Exh. R) and Resolution No. 204-92 dated 5November 1992 (Exh. S) appropriating P9,778,932.57 and P17,663,431.58or a total of P27,442,364.15 from the general fund to satisfy "prior years"obligations and to implement certain projects of the Province. Theseresolutions were approved by respondent Salalima on 22 October 1992 and6 November 1992, respectively.

On 3 December 1992, the Office of the President through Chief PresidentialLegal Counsel Antonio Carpio opined that the MOA entered into by NPCand the Province merely recognized and established NPC's tax liability. Hefurther clarified that the sharing scheme and those entitled to the paymentsto be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under the law,

and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said tax liabilities, NPC may remit suchshare directly to Tiwi. The pertinent portion of Chief Presidential LegalCounsel Carpio's letter dated 3 December 1992 (Exhs. H to H-1) addressedto President Malixi reads:

xxx xxx xxx

The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by theProvince of Albay and NPC merely enunciates the taxliability of NPC. The Memorandum of Agreement doesnot provide for the manner of payment of NPC's liability.Thus, the manner of payment as provided for by lawshall govern. In any event, the Memorandum of

Agreement cannot amend the law allowing the paymentof said taxes to the Municipality of Tiwi.

The decision in the case of NPC v . Province of Albay (186 SCRA 198), likewise, only establishes theliability of NPC for real property taxes but does notspecifically provide that said back taxes be paidexclusively to Albay province.

Therefore, it is our opinion that the NPC may paydirectly to the municipality of Tiwi the real propertytaxes accruing to the same.

Please be guided accordingly.

Ve


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al Legal Counsel

Because of this opinion, President Malixi, through a letter dated 9 December1992 (Exh. I to I-1), informed Mayor Corral and respondent Salalima thatstarting with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly pay Tiwi itsshare in the payments under the MOA. He also invited the parties to aclarificatory meeting on 17 December 1992 at his Quezon City office todiscuss the matter in detail.

Only Mayor Corral attended the 17 December 1992 meeting with PresidentMalixi as respondent Salalima was indisposed. President Malixi thenprovided Mayor Corral with schedules (Exhs. J to J-2) of the paymentsalready made by NPC under the MOA and the computation and thedistribution of shares.

As of 9 December 1992, payments made by NPC to the Province reachedP40,724,471.74, broken down as follows:

Payment Dates Amount

July 29, 1992 P 17,763,000.00

Sept. 3, 1992 4,660,255.80

Oct. 5, 1992 6,820,480.02

Nov. 5, 1992 5,740,367.96

Dec. 9, 1992 5,740,367.96

Total P 40,724,471.74

On 19 December 1992, in an apparent reaction to NPC's decision to directly

remit to Tiwi its share in the payments made and still to be made pursuant

to the MOA, the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Ordinance No.09-92 (Exhs. K to K-1), which, among others:

authorized the Provincial Treasurer upon thedirection of the Provincial Governor to sell the realproperties (acquired by the Province at the auctionsale) at a public auction, and to cause the immediatetransfer thereof to the winning bidder; and

declared as forfeited in favor of the Province, all thepayments already made by NPC under the MOA.

Realizing from the actuations of the respondents that Tiwi's share in theP40,724,471.74 payments already made by NPC will not be forthcoming,Mayor Corral filed the present complaint with the Office of the President on25 January 1993.

In determining whether the respondents are guilty of the charges againstthem, the threshold issue of whether the payments to be made by NPCunder the MOA should accrue solely and exclusively in favor of theProvince, must first be resolved.

Sections 38, 39, 41, 86 and 87 of PD No. 464, as amended, prescribe the

authority of local government units to levy real property tax as well as thesharing scheme among local government units including the nationalgovernment with respect thereto. Said provisions read:

Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. There shallbe levied, assessed, and collected in all provinces,cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax onreal property , such as land, buildings, machinery andthe improvements affixed or attached to real propertynot hereinafter specifically exempted.

Sec. 39. Rates of Levy. The provincial, city ormunicipal board or council shall fix a uniform rate of real

property tax applicable to their respective localities asfollows :

(1) In the case of a province, the tax shall be fixed byordinance of the provincial board at the rate of not lessthan one-fourth of one percent but not more than one-half of one percent of the assessed value of real

property ;

(2) In the case of a city, the tax shall be fixed byordinance of the municipal board or city council at therate of not less than one-half of one percent but notmore than two percent of the assessed value of real

property ; and

(3) In the case of a municipality, the tax shall be fixedby ordinance of the municipal council subject to the


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Ordinance No. 25, series of 1974, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi, Albay,whose Section 2 provides:

That the tax rate of real property shall be one-half ofone percent of the assessed value of real property.

By the Municipality of Daraga

Ordinance No. 27, series of 1980, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Daraga,

Albay, whose Section 3 provides:

Rates of Levy The tax herein levied is hereby fixedat one-half of one percent (1/2 of 1%) of the assessedvalue of real property. (see Exhs. 50-G; Emphasissupplied).

Applying said rates of levy, the real property taxes collectible from the NPCare:

1. A basic tax of 1%, levied by the Province (0.5%) andTiwi (0.5%) on the one hand; and the Province (0.5%)and Daraga (0.5%) on the other; and

2. The additional 1% tax pertaining to the SEF.

or a total of 2.0% on the assessed value of NPC's real properties.

On the other hand, sharing on said taxes, shall be as follows:

1. On the basic tax:

Province 47.5%

Municipality 47.5%

Barangay 5.0%

Total 100.0%

2. On the additional tax pertaining to the SEF:

Province 25.0%

Municipality 55.0%

National Government 20.0%

Total 100.0%

In real terms, the P40,724,471.74 in payments earlier made by NPC shouldbe shared by the Province, Tiwi and Daraga, the concerned barangays andthe national government, as follows:

Province Municipalities Barangay Natl . Govt .

Basic Tax

P 9,672,062.04 9,672,062.04 1,018,111.79 none

SEF

4,072,447.18 10,181,117.93 none 6,108,670.76

Total

P13,744,509.22 19,853,179.97 1,018,111.79 6,108,670.76

=========== ========== ========= =========

This shows that the Province is entitled only to P13,744,509.21 of theP40,724,471.74 aggregate payments by NPC. On the other hand, thebalance of P26,979,962.52 represents the collective shares of Tiwi, Daraga,the concerned barangays and the national government.

The Province maintains, however, that considering that it acquiredownership over the properties of NPC subject matter of the auction, all thepayments to be made by NPC under the MOA should accrue exclusively to

the Province.

This is untenable. The law clearly provides that "the proceeds ofall the delinquent taxes and penalties as well as the income realized fromthe . . . disposition of real property acquired by the province or city at apublic auction . . ., and the sale of delinquent property or the redemptionthereof shall accrue to the province, city or municipality in the same mannerand proportion as if the tax or taxes have been paid in the regular course "(Sec. 87(c) supra .).

It is immaterial that the Province was the highest bidder and eventuallybecame the owner of the properties sold at the auction sale. What isessential is that the proceeds of the re-sale of said properties acquired bythe Province, be distributed in the same manner and proportion among the

rightful beneficiaries thereof as provided by law.


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This was the import and essence of Chief Presidential Legal CounselCarpio's opinion when he stated that the sharing scheme provided by lawcannot be amended by a mere agreement between the taxpayer, in thiscase NPC, and the collecting authority, in this instance, the Province of

Albay.

Likewise, it is axiomatic that while "contracting parties may establishstipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient",they may not do so if these are "contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order or public policy" (Art 1306, New Civil Code.).

Also relevant to the discussion are the following provisions of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991:

Sec. 307. Remittance of Government Monies to theLocal Treasury. Officers of local governmentauthorized to receive and collect monies arising fromtaxes, revenues, or receipts of any kind shall remit thefull amount received and collected to the treasury ofsuch Local government unit which shall be credited tothe particular account or accounts to which the moniesin question properly belong .

Sec. 308. Local Funds. Every local government unit

shall maintain a General Fund which shall be used toaccount for such monies and resources as may bereceived by and disbursed from the local treasury. TheGeneral Fund shall consist of monies and resources ofthe local government which are available for thepayment of expenditures, obligations or purposes notspecifically declared by law as accruing and chargeableto, or payable from any other fund .

Sec. 309. Special Funds. There shall be maintainedin every provincial, city, or municipal treasury thefollowing special funds :

(a) Special Education Fund (SEF) shall consist of the

respective shares of provinces, cities, municipalitiesand barangays in the proceeds of the additional tax onreal property to be appropriated for purposes prescribedin Section 272 of this Code; and

(b) Trust Funds shall consist of private and publicmonies which have officially come into the possessionof the local government or of a local government officialas trustee, agent or administrator, or which have beenreceived as a guaranty for the fulfillment of someobligation. A trust fund shall only be used for thespecific purpose for which it was created or for which itcame into the possession of the Local government unit .(Emphasis supplied).

These provisions are restatements of Sec. 3(4) and (5) of PD No. 1445 andboth Sec. 43, Book V and Sec. 2(4) of Book V(B) of Executive Order No.292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987."

It is unmistakable from the foregoing provisions that the shares of Tiwi,Daraga, the concerned barangays and the national government in thepayments made by NPC under the MOA, should be, as they are in fact, trustfunds. As such, the Province should have, upon receipt of said payments,segregated and lodged in special accounts, the respective shares of Tiwi,Daraga, the concerned barangays and the national government for eventual

remittance to said beneficiaries. Said shares cannot be lodged in, norremain part of, the Province's general fund. Moreover, the Province cannotutilize said amounts for its own benefit or account ( see also Sec. 86, PD No.464, as amended).

Therefore, the balance of P26,979,962.52 representing the collective sharesof Tiwi and Daraga, the concerned barangays and the national government,cannot be appropriated nor disbursed by the Province for the payment of itsown expenditures or contractual obligations.

However, in total disregard of the law, the Province treated theP40,724,471.74 NPC payments as "surplus adjustment" (Account 7-92-419)and lodged the same in its general fund. No trust liability accounts werecreated in favor of the rightful beneficiaries thereof as required by law.

Report No. 93-11 (Exh. N), prepared and made by the Special Audit Office(SAG) of the Commission on Audit (COA) further support our findings, thus

xxx xxx xxx

Part II . Findings and Observations

The audit findings, which are discussed in detail in the attached report, aresummarized below:

1. The remittances of the NPC of the P40,724,471.74

from July to December 1992 representing partialpayments of real tax delinquencies from June 22, 1984to March 10, 1989, were not shared with theMunicipalities of Tiwi, Daraga, and the concernedbarangays and the National Government in violation ofPD 464 . The Memorandum of Agreement entered intobetween the Province of Albay and Napocor cannotamend the provisions of PD 464 which specifies thesharing scheme of the real property tax among theprovince, city or municipality where the property subjectto tax is situated and the National Government.

xxx xxx xxx

2. The collection of P40,724,471.74 was fully treated assurplus adjustment (Account 7-92-419) being prior


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years income, without creating a trust liability for themunicipality and barangays concerned and nationalgovernment. As of December 31, 1992, the balance ofthe account was only P25,668,653.12 thus, stressingthat P15,255,818.62 was spent. . . . Under the GeneralFund, cash available was only P4,921,353 .44 leaving

practically no cash to answer for the shares of theMunicipalities of Tiwi and Daraga and their barangayswhere the properties are located . (pp. 4 and 16;(Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

As pointed our earlier, the Province was entitled only to P13,744,509.21 ofthe P40,724,471.74 in payments made by NPC. Thus, it may onlyappropriate and disburse P13,744,509.21. Any disbursements exceedingthis amount would therefore be illegal.

This Committee particularly notes the factual finding of COA that as of 31December 1992, the actual cash balance of the Province's general fund wasonly P4,921,353.44. This means that of the P40,724,471.74 actually paid bythe NPC and lodged in the Province's general fund, P35,803,118.30 wasdisbursed or spent by the Province. This exceeds the P13,744,509.21 shareof the Province by P22,058,609.09.

The foregoing may be illustrated as follows:

NPC Payments received bythe Province P40,724,471.74

Less Actual Cash Balancegeneral fund

as of 12-31-92 4,921,353.44

P35,803,118.30

===========

Less Share of the Province 13,744,509.21

Amount Illegally Disbursed

by the Province P22,058,609.09

===========

We have already shown that Ordinance No. 09-92 (Exhs. K to K-1)declaring as forfeited in favor of the Province the entire amount ofP40,724,471.74 paid by NPC to be patently illegal as it unlawfully deprivesTiwi and Daraga, the barangays concerned, and the national government oftheir rightful shares in said payments. Being illegal, said ordinance may notbe used or relied upon by the respondents to justify the disbursements offunds in excess of their share.

Neither may Resolution Nos. 178-92 and 204-92 be used to justify thedisbursements considering that the appropriations made thereunder totalling

P27,442,364.51 are to be funded by the P40,724,471.74 "surplusadjustment" that includes the "trust funds" not belonging to the Province.Even assuring that Resolution No. 178-92 authorizing the expenditure ofP9,778,912.57 were to be taken from the Province's share amounting toP13,744,509.21, the rest of the disbursements still have no legal basis.Clearly, this is violative of the fundamental rule that "(n)o money shall bepaid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriationordinance or law" (par [a], Sec. 305, Republic Act No. 7160).

Respondents raise the common defense that the findings obtained in SAOReport No. 93-11 are not yet final as they have filed an appeal therefrom.

It is important to stress that the exceptions (Exhs. 50-B, 50-I, & 50-J) raisedby the respondents to COA merely involve questions of law, i.e., as towhether the Province alone should be entitled to the payments made byNPC under the MOA, and whether the shares of Tiwi and Daraga, theconcerned barangays, and the national government, should be held in trustfor said beneficiaries.

Considering that the factual findings under SAO Report 93-11 are notdisputed, this Committee has treated said factual findings as final or, at thevery least, as corroborative evidence.

Respondents' contention that COA's factual findings, contained in SAOReport No. 93-11 cannot be considered in this investigation is untenable.For no administrative or criminal investigation can proceed, if a respondentis allowed to argue that a particular COA finding is still the subject of anappeal and move that the resolution of such administrative or criminal casebe held in abeyance. This will inevitably cause unnecessary delays in theinvestigation of administrative and criminal cases since an appeal from aCOA finding may be brought all the way up to the Supreme Court.

Besides, the matters raised by the respondents on appeal involve onlyconclusions/interpretation of law. Surely, investigative bodies, such as COA,the Ombudsman and even this Committee, are empowered to make theirown conclusions of law based on a given set of facts.

Finally, sufficient evidence has been adduced in this case apart from thefactual findings contained in SAO Report, 93-11 to enable this Committee toevaluate the merits of the instant complaint.

We also reject respondent Azaa's defense that since he did not participate

in the deliberation and passage of Resolution No. 09-92, merely signing thesame as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and only


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certifying that the same had been passed, he did not incur anyadministrative liability.

The fact remains that as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganand being the second highest official of the Province, respondent Azaa is

jointly responsible with other provincial officials in the administration of fiscaland financial transactions of the Province. As presiding officer of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent Azaa has a duty to see to it thatresolutions or ordinances passed are within the bounds of the law. Hecannot merely preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganunmindful of the legality and propriety of resolutions or ordinances beingproposed or deliberated upon by his colleagues.

This collective responsibility is provided under Secs. 304 and 305 ofRepublic Act. No. 7160, thus

Sec. 304. Scope. This Title shall govern the conductand management of financial affairs, transactions andoperations of provinces, cities, municipalities, andbarangays.

Sec. 305. Fundamental Principles. The financialaffairs, transactions, and operations of localgovernment units shall be governed by the following

fundamental principles:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all thoseexercising authority over the financial affairs,transactions, and operations of local government units ;and

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It cannot be denied that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has control over theProvince's "purse" as it may approve or not resolutions or ordinances

generating revenue or imposing taxes all well as appropriating andauthorizing the disbursement of funds to meet operational requirements orfor the prosecution of projects.

Being entrusted with such responsibility, the provincial governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, must alwaysbe guided by the so-called "fundamental" principles enunciated under theLocal Government Code, i .e ., "No money shall be paid out of the localtreasury except in pursuance of an appropriations ordinance or law; localrevenue is generated only from sources authorized by law or ordinance andcollection thereof shall at all times be acknowledged properly; all moniesofficially received by a local government officer in any capacity or on anyoccasion shall be accounted for as local funds, unless otherwise providedby law; and trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out except infulfillment of the purposes for which the trust was created or the fundsreceived" (Sec. 305, R.A. 7160).

All the respondents could not claim ignorance of the law especially withrespect to the provisions of PD No. 464 that lay down the sharing schemeamong local government units concerned and the national government, forboth the basic real property tax and additional tax pertaining to the SpecialEducation Fund. Nor can they claim that the Province could validly forfeitthe P40,724,471.74 paid by NPC considering that the Province is onlyentitled to a portion thereof and that the balance was merely being held intrust for the other beneficiaries.

As a public officer, respondent Azaa (and the other respondents as well)has a duty to protect the interests not only of the Province but also of themunicipalities of Tiwi and Daraga and even the national government. Whenthe passage of an illegal or unlawful ordinance by the SangguniangPanlalawigan is imminent, the presiding officer has a duty to actaccordingly, but actively opposing the same by temporarily relinquishing hischair and participating in the deliberations. If his colleagues insist on itspassage, he should make known his opposition thereto by placing the sameon record. No evidence or any sort was shown in this regard by respondent

Azaa.

Clearly, all the respondents have, whether by act or omission, denied theother beneficiaries of their rightful shares in the tax delinquency paymentsmade by the NPC and caused the illegal forfeiture, appropriation anddisbursement of funds not belonging to the Province, through the passageand approval of Ordinance No. 09-92 and Resolution Nos. 178-92 and 204-

92.

The foregoing factual setting shows a wanton disregard of law on the part ofthe respondents tantamount to abuse of authority. Moreover, the illegaldisbursements made can qualify as technical malversation.

This Committee, thus, finds all the respondents guilty of abuse of authority,and acccordingly, recommends the imposition of the following penalties ofsuspension without pay:

a. Respondent Salalima five (5)

months; and

b. All the other

respondents four (4)

months each.

II . OP Case No . 5469

This refers to the administrative complaint filed against Albay GovernorRomeo Salalima, Vice-Governor Danilo Azaa, Albay SangguniangPanlalawigan Members Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana,

Arturo Osia, Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap Fontanilla,Vicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer contract for


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legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand,and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other,and the disbursement of public fund in payment thereof. The complaint wasdocketed as OP Case No. 5469.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Because of the refusal by the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to payreal property taxes assessed by the Province of Albay ("the Province")covering the period from 11 June 1984 up to 10 March 1987 amounting toP214,845,184.76, the Province sold at public auction the properties of NPCconsisting of geothermal power plants, buildings, machinery and otherimprovements located at Tiwi and Daraga, Albay. The Province was thesole and winning bidder at the auction sale.

As NPC failed to redeem its properties sold at the auction, the Provincepetitioned the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay to issue a writ ofpossession over the same.

Sometime in 1989, NPC filed a petition with the Supreme Court, which wasdocketed as G.R. No. 87479, questioning the validity of the auction saleconducted by the Province. NPC claims, inter alia , that its properties are notsubject to real property tax.

On 17 May 1989, the Province, through Atty. Romulo Ricafort, the legalofficer of the Province, filed it; comment on the NPC petition with theSupreme Court.

On 2 June 1989, the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan adopted ResolutionNo. 129-89 (Exhs. B to B-1) authorizing respondent Governor to engage theservices of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case against NPC.

On 25 August 1989, Atty. Jesus R. Cornago entered his appearance withthe Supreme Court as collaborating counsel for the Province in G.R. No.87479. The entry of appearance of Atty. Cornago bore the conformity ofrespondent Governor.

On 14 November 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes of the Cortes & ReynaLaw Firm sent respondent Governor a letter (Exhs. D to D-1) informing himthat Atty. Jesus R. Cornago, as collaborating counsel for the Province, hasfiled a memorandum with the Supreme Court, suggesting that a retaineragreement be signed between the Province, on the one hand, and Atty.Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other hand, and setting forththe conditions of the retainer agreement, thus:

As collaborating counsels for the respondents in theaforementioned case, our law firm and that of Atty.Jesus R. Cornago request that you pay us an

Acceptance Fee of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)PESOS, while the aforementioned case is pending inthe Supreme Court. Thereafter, we will charge you acontingent fee equivalent to eighteen percent (18%) ofthe value of the property subject matter of the casewhich is P214 million, payable to us in the event that we

obtain a favorable judgment for you from the SupremeCourt in the case. Xerox expenses for copies ofmotions, memorandum and other matters to be filedwith the Supreme Court in the case, together with xeroxcopies of documentary evidence, as well as mailingexpenses, will be for your account also.

On 8 January 1990, the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan passedResolution No. 01-90 (Exhs. C to C-1) authorizing respondent Governor tosign and confirm the retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.

Respondent Salalima signed the retainer agreement.

On 4 June 1990, the Supreme Court issued a decision dismissing the NPCpetition and upholding the validity of the auction sale conducted by theprovince to answer for NPC's tax liabilities.

Subsequently, the following payments amounting to P7,380,410.31 (Exhs. Eto N-1) were made by the Province to Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes and Atty.Jesus R. Cornago:

Particulars Claimant/Payee Amount

Disbursement Cortes & Reyna P 60,508.75

Voucher (DV No. 4,Jan. 8, 1990 Check No.931019

DV No. 1889 Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes P 1,421,040.00

Aug. 13, 1992;Check No. 236063-S

DV No. 1890 Atty. Jesus R. Cornago P 1,736,300.00

Aug. 13, 1992;Check No. 236064-S

DV No. 2151 Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes P 838,851.44

Sept. 28, 1992;Check No. 238174-S


Oct. 8, 1992;Check No. 239528-S

DV No. 2227 Atty. Jesus R. Cornago P 341,024.00


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Oct. 8, 1992;Check No. 239529-S


Nov. 6, 1992;Check No. 250933


Dec. 9, 1992;Check No. 253163


Dec. 9, 1992;Check No. 253163


Dec. 9, 1992;Check No. 253164

TOTAL P 7,380,410.31

Disbursement Voucher Nos. 2474 and 2475 were approved by respondent Azaa. The rest were approved by respondent Governor.

In a letter dated 31 May 1993 (Exh. O) and certificate of settlement andbalances dated 17 May 1993 (Exh. P), the Provincial Auditor of Albayinformed respondent Governor that payments made by the Province asattorney's fees amounting to P7,380,410.31 have been disallowed by theCommission on Audit (COA) with the following notation:

The disbursement vouchers detailed hereunderrepresent payments for attorney's fees of Cortes &Reyna Law Office for Legal services rendered re: G.R.No. 87479 "NAPOCOR, Petitioner vs. The Province of

Albay, et al., Respondent," Supreme Court, en banc .Total payments of P7,380,410.31 are disallowed forlack of the requisite "prior written conformity andacquiescence of the Solicitor General . . . as well as thewritten concurrence of the Commission on Audit" asprovided for and required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, re: "Inhibition againstemployment by government: agencies andinstrumentalities . . . of private lawyers to handle theirlegal cases," viz .

The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer agreement withprivate lawyers and paying P7,380,410.31 to the said private lawyers,respondents violated several provisions of law which warrants theimposition of administrative penalties against them. It is to be noted thatrespondents Victoria, Reyeg, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia were not yetmembers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Resolution No. 129 waspassed. However, the complaint alleges that these respondents werenamed in the complaint because they approved the supplementalbudget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment of the attorney'sfees.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondents have incurredadministrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty.Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making paymentspursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with theSupreme Court against the province.

We find merit in the complaint and hold that under the circumstancessurrounding the transaction in question, the respondents abused theirauthority.

Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (RA. No. 7160) requires theappointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include thefollowing:

Represent the local government unit in all civil actionsand special proceedings wherein the local governmentunit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is aparty; Provided , That, in actions or proceeding where acomponent city or municipality is a party adverse to theprovincial government or to another component city ormunicipality, a special legal officer may be employed torepresent the adverse party.

The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et al . v . Manotok ,93 Phil 173 (1953), that local governments [ sic ] units cannot be representedby private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfullyrepresent them, thus:

Under the law, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and hisassistants are charged with the duty to represent theprovince and any municipality thereof in all civil actions. . .

It would seem clear that the Provincial Fiscal is the onlycounsel who can rightfully represent the plaintiffs andtherefore, Attys. Alvir and Macapagal [the privatelawyers hired by the Province of Bulacan] have nostanding in the case. The appeal herein interposed inbehalf of the plaintiffs cannot therefore be maintained.

This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the

Local Government Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised


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Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in theabovecited case of Municipality of Bocaue, et al . v . Manotok .

In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondentsexceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the LocalGovernment Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, thedisbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowedby the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the

prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrenceof the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-255dated 2 April 1986.

The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the SolicitorGeneral's conformity dated 15 July 3993. This conformity was, howeverobtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992.What is required by COA Circular No. 85-255 is a prior written conformityand acquiescence of the Solicitor General.

Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution No.01-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainercontract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E.Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by

respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna LawFirm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 TomasMorato Avenue, Quezon City. That Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes &Reyna Law Firm are two separate entities is evident from the retainercontract itself:

As collaborating counsels for the respondents in theaforementioned case, our law firm and that of

Atty . Jesus R . Cornago request that you pay us an Acceptance Fee of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)PESOS, while the aforementioned case is pending inthe Supreme Court. Thereafter, we will charge you acontingent fee equivalent to eighteen percent (18%) ofthe value of the property subject matter of the casewhich is P214 Million, payable to us in the event weobtain a favorable judgment for you from the SupremeCourt in the case. Xerox expenses for copies ofmotions, memorandum and other matters to be filedwith the Supreme Court in the case, together with xeroxcopies of documentary evidence, as well as mailingexpenses, will be for your account also.

xxx xxx xxx

Ver y tr


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CORN

AGO

Jamecca Building

280 Tomas Mor at

o Avenue

by:

(

Sg

With my conformity:

(Sgd) GOV. ROMEO R. SALALIMA

Province of Albay

(emphasis supplied.)

In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna LawFirm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago, respondent Governor exceededhis authority under Resolution No. 01-90.

Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is thefact that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel ofrecord of the Province in the Supreme Court case (G R. No. 87479).

Documents

Cases Angie