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ContentsIntroduction–thePropheticPolybius

Chapter1PreludetoCataclysmicAdjustment

Chapter2TheRivals

Chapter3TheStateofItaly

Chapter4LiviusDrusus,theFailedReformer

Chapter5TheBreakingStorm

Chapter690BC–BackstotheWall

Chapter7Surrender–anOddWaytoWin

Chapter8Sulla’sMarchonRome–thisChangesEverything

Chapter9Sulla’sReturn–FightingforRome

Chapter10TerrorandSettlement

Epilogue–FromSullatoCaesar

Notes

Italycirca90BC.

TIntroduction–thePropheticPolybius

hisbook isa studyof someveryoddevents–ofnationssodesperate togiveuptheirindependencethattheyfoughtawaragainstthestatethatrefusedtotakeit;of

the Roman Republic losing that war – itself a rarity – then winning by giving theirenemieswhat theywanted. So the only instance in history of the opposite of awar ofindependence,wasalsooneofthefewcaseswheresurrenderbroughtvictorytothelosingside. It is also a study of how onewar can create the conditions for the next and thenmergealmostseamlesslyintoit.Insuchtopsy-turvycircumstancesitisappropriatetostartwithashorttextofwhateveristheoppositeofhistory.ThiswaswrittenbyPolybius,theGreekdiplomatandsoldier,whodescribes–prettyaccurately–eventsastheyhappenedbetweenthirtyandonehundredyearsinhisfuture.

Aristocracy by its very nature degenerates into oligarchy. Then the common peoplebecomeinfuriatedwiththisgovernmentandtakerevengeonitforitsunjustrule.Soweget thedevelopmentofdemocracy. Induecourse thepermissivenessand lawlessnessofthistypeofgovernmentdegeneratesintomob-rule,andthecycleiscomplete.

Polybius,Histories6.3

ThusPolybiussawsocietiesasrevolvingthroughsixstages–fromanarchytomonarchy,throughmonarchyto tyranny,fromtyrannytoaristocracy,fromaristocracy tooligarchy,andfromoligarchytodemocracy.Thenfromdemocracytoanarchyandroundandaroundagain.WritinginthelatesecondcenturyBC,atatimewhenRomewasthedominantpowerin theMediterranean,Polybiusbelieved thatoneof the reasons forRome’ssuccesswasthestabilityofthepoliticalsystem.This,heopined,combinedthebestpartsofthethreebestformsofgovernment.Thus:

If one focussed on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completelymonarchical and biased towards royalty. Again, if one concentrated on the senate itseemed aristocratic, andwhen one looked at the power of the common people [Rome]clearlyappearedtobeademocracy.

Polybius,Histories6.11

Theconsulsprovided themonarchicalelement,but theywereprevented frombecomingtyrants by the senate, which represented the aristocratic element. The senate wasprevented from becoming oligarchical by the people, whose democracy was preventedfromdegenerating intomobruleby themonarchicalandaristocraticelements,Yeteventhough thisconstitutionwasable to slow thecycleofhumangovernance,Polybiuswastoocynical(orrealistic)tobelievethattheprocesscouldaltogetherbestopped.

ThetruthofwhatIhavejustsaidwillbequitecleartoanyonewhopaysattention…eachform[ofgovernment]naturallyarisesanddevelops.Onecanseewhere,when,andhowthegrowth,peak,change,andendofeachformdevelops.AndIbelieve that,aboveall,thisformulacanbesuccessfullyappliedtotheRomanconstitution.

Polybius,Histories6.3

Formuchofhismini-treatiseof theRomanRepublic,Polybius lauds thebalanceof theelementsintheRomeofhisday.Heremarkshowthearistocracycompetedamongeachother to be of service to the state, how the consuls were chosen to lead the armies ofRome,andhowtheRomanpeoplethemselveswerepious,honourableandpublic-spirited.Romewas in control of theMediterraneanworld, andmore importantly, Romewas incontrolofitself.Yet, intheseglorydaysoftheRomanRepublicPolybiuslookedahead.HesawRome’sgovernmentdegenerating,thesystemgoingoutofbalanceandcollapsingintochaosandnear-anarchy.Inshort,heforesawthecenturytocome.

Ithinkitisprettyclearwhatisgoingtohappennext.Whenastateenduresgreatdangerandsubsequentlyrisestosupremacyanduncontestedsovereignty,prosperitywillbecomeenduring.Under its influence, lifestyleswill becomemore extravagant and the citizenswillcompetemorefiercelythantheyshouldforpublicofficeandallthatgoeswithit.Forasdegenerationbegins,thefirstsignsofthechangefortheworsebethecovetingofofficeandthebeliefthatobscurityisdisgraceful.

Polybius,Histories6.67

Withtheadvantageofhindsight,thisbookwilldescribetheunfoldingofthedevelopmentsthat Polybius predicted with such foresight. It will also concentrate on something thatPolybius, the soldier and statesman, took somuch for granted that hedidnot bother todescribeit–theroleofthearmy.

ForwhenPolybiustalksof‘thepeople’hemeansthepeopleoftheRomanRepublic,oroftheGreekcity-statesthatheknew.ForPolybiusthe‘people’inthesestateswerenottheslaves,thechildrenorthewomenfolk.Theywerenoteventhevoters,thoughvotingwasanimportantfunctionof‘thepeople’.Aboveall,thepeoplewerethearmy.IntheGreecethatPolybiusknew,andintheRomeofhisday,thearmywasmadeupofcitizensunderarms.Manyofthesecitizensenrolledinthelevyatthestartofthecampaigningseasonintheexpectationthattheywouldgohometotheirfamilyfarmsorbusinessesattheendofthe year.When ‘the people’ of such a state become disaffected, the result is not publicdemonstrationsandthehurlingofbrickbats,orevenrioting,whichmightbecontrolledbycalling in the army. When the army is the people, things much more substantial thanbrickbatsarethrown,andtheyarethrownwithorganizedprofessionalism–andsincetheyarethearmy,theonlythingthatcanstopthemisanotherarmy.

The peoplewill take the initiative, firstlywhen they feel aggrieved by individualswhohaveshownegregiouscovetousness,andsecondlywhentheyarepuffedupbytheflatteryofthoselookingtoholdoffice.Then,rousedtofury,andtheirdecisionsruledbyemotion,theywillnolongerconsenttoobeyoreventobetheequalsoftheirrulers.

Polybius,ibid.

Andthisiswhathappenedintheearlyfirstcentury.ThreatenedbythemigratingCimbrichordes,Romewasindeedingreatdanger.Thiswasovercomebyacombinationofgoodfortuneandgreatgeneralship.However,thestatethathadovercomethisperilwasalreadysick,and thesubsequentpeace led–asPolybiushadpredictedagenerationbefore– toviciouscompetitionforpublicoffice.Thearistocracyofthesenatehadalreadybegunthe

slidetooligarchyinPolybius’day,andwhatwasoncethemostopenandupwardlymobileofallancientsocietieshadbecomeexclusionaryandself-interested.Thistrendcontinued,andprovokedthecataclysmicexplosionof91BC.Yet,evenwhenRomanbackswere tothewallandthesurvivalofthestateitselfindoubt,thingscouldstillgetworse.

Polybius saw developmentsmoving only in one direction.Oligarchies do not reformand become aristocracies once more, and the Roman aristocracy obediently followedform.Andthepeoplerespondedoncue.Alienatedfromacorruptedpoliticalprocess,thepeople took matters into their own hands. And since the people in question were thetoughest, most merciless soldiers in the known world, when ‘roused to fury and theirdecisionsruledbypassion’ theresultwasnevergoingtobepretty.Bythe timethedusthadmoreor lesssettled in81BC,Rome’soligarchicalsenatorialclasshadquite literallybeenmorethandecimated.WhatstaggeredfromthewreckageoftheRomanconstitutionhadstillthehabitsoftheRomanRepublic,butthesystemwasirreparablydamagedanditsleaderstraumatized.

Thenamewillbethefairestofall,afreedemocracy,butitsnaturewillbechangedtotheworstthingofall–mobrule.

Polybius,ibid.

After81BCRomeconstantlytotteredonthebrinkofmilitaryanarchy,andin49BCitfelloff the edge altogether when Caesar led his army across the Rubicon. Assassinations,purges, and civil wars followed thick and fast, until from the chaos was producedAugustus – Rome’s first emperor and an undoubted autocrat. The Polybian cycle hadcomethefullcircleasitsauthorhadpredicted.Giventhetensofthousandsthatperishedin the process, it is unlikely that Polybiuswould have takenmuch satisfaction in bringprovenright.

Theaboveanalysisisofnecessityabbreviatedandsimplistic,butaccurate.Itprovidesaskeletonthatthisbookwillfleshout,sothattheeventsof91–81BCcanbeseennotasaseries of unrelated convulsions but as the violent resolution of a political process thateventuallydestroyedtheRomanRepublic.

TChapter1

PreludetoCataclysmicAdjustmenthedisasterof91BCdidnotcomeasaboltfromtheblue.TheproblemsfacingtheRoman state had begun developing soon after the end ofRome’s drawn-outwar

withHannibalofCarthage (218–201 BC).Twogenerations later, around150 BC, the factthat the Roman Republic was dysfunctional was obvious enough for contemporarypoliticianstobeawareofit,thoughnoonewaswillingorabletotakeaction.Whyactionwas difficult becamemore apparent in the following decadeswhen the politicianswhotriedtotakeitpaidwiththeirlivesformakingtheattempt.Thereaftertheproblemwasleftunsolved.Thiswasthesituationuntil91BC.

History tellsus that ifnoremedyisapplied toasituationoutofbalance,matterswilleventually resolve themselves by a process known as cataclysmic adjustment.‘Cataclysmic adjustment’ does not actually solve a problem but rather changes theproblemintosomethingcompletelydifferentandusuallymoresevere.Forexample,ifthefoundationsofahouseneedrepairsthattheydonotreceive,cataclysmicadjustmentwilleventually transform the problem into that of removing a collapsed house and buildinganother. This is roughly analogous with what happened to the Roman Republic. Anongoingstructuralproblemwiththestatewasnotaddressed(andaccordingtoPolybius,couldnotbeaddressed–seeintroduction),andtheresultwasthattheRepubliccollapsed,tobeeventuallyreplacedwithanewstructure.

The years between 150 and 91 BC tell the story of the failure to resolve Rome’sstructural problems, and theyears 91–81 BC describehow the first stageof the collapsetookplace.Itisfairtoarguethatbefore91BCtheRomanRepublicmighthavebeensaved.After81BCfailurewasinevitable;cataclysmicadjustmenthadalreadybegun.

ThereweremanythingswrongwiththeRomanRepublicofthelatesecondcentury,butmostofthesecouldbetracedtoonefundamentalproblemandonemajorsecondaryissue.Thesewere,respectively,thefailureofinclusivismanddispossessionfromtheland.Ifwearetounderstandwhathappenedin91BCitisimportanttofirstaddressthesetwoissuesatlength.

The fundamental problem was the failure of inclusivism. This itself had two parts.Firstly,afterthesecondPunicWartheRomanRepublic,originallyoneofthemostopensocieties in the ancient world, changed its policy of absorbing communities into theRoman citizen body. Instead Rome began to guard the citizenship jealously, creatingdivisionsbetween thosewhohad theprivileges and rightsof citizenship and thosewhowantedthem.Secondly,theRomanleadership,alsoonceopenandinclusive,fellintothehands of a largely closed community of aristocrats. This community defended itsprivilegesandcameincreasinglytoidentifyitsinterestsasbeingthoseoftheRomanstateasawhole.Thatis,theRomanpoliticalelite,whichuntilthenhadseenitsdutyasservicetothestate,nowincreasinglyadoptedtheviewthatthestateexistedtoserveit.Thiswasa

substantialchangewithfar-reachingeffectstowhichweshallreturn.

With inclusivism, therewasoncea timewhenaccess to theRomancitizenbodywasextremely easy.Mostly it was a matter of turning up and living in Rome for a while.Rome’s ‘open door’ policy was partly because from its earliest days the city was bynecessityexpansionist.RomewasfoundedatthelowestcrossingpointoftheriverTiber.Thisput it rightacrossanancient trade route that tooksalt fromthecoast to the Italianinterior–theviaSalaria.Furthermore,theTiberwastheunofficialborderbetweenLatiumand Etruria. Therefore the settlement of Rome managed to displease both Latins andEtruscans.LegendrecordsthatthefirstactofRomuluswhenhefoundedthecitywastobuildadefensivewall–itwasgoingtobeneeded.

Given unfriendly neighbours and local hill tribes with a penchant for pillage, earlyRomehad togetbigordie.Tosurvive,Romeneedednewpeople,and thecitywasnotfussy about how it acquired them.Volunteerswerewelcome – be they escaped slaves,disbandedmercenaries, reformedbandits ormen escaping their creditors. If not enoughvolunteers arrived, theRomanswere ready,willing and able to go out and recruit newmembersbyforce;entirecommunitieswereunwillinglyconscriptedintothecitizenbody.RomeevenconqueredAlbaLonga fromwhence legend says theoriginal colonistswhosettledRomehadcome.ThepeopleofAlbaLonga–includingthearistocraticfamilyoftheJulians–wereforciblytranslocatedtoRome.

Eventually, as Rome expanded, lack of space on the seven hillsmeant that bringinghome entire conquered populations along with the booty became unrealistic. Still, theRomansdidnotstopmakingcitizensoutofthosetheyhadconquered.Anewpolicyleftthose defeated by the legions in place, but now as involuntary Romans amid the still-smoulderingruinsofhomeswhichtheywerefreetorebuildasextensionsoftheRomanstate,farfromthecityofRome.

Recognizingthatdefeatedpeoplesmightharbourhardfeelingsaboutrecentevents,theconstitution instituted a special status for them. They became cives sine suffragio –citizenswithout the vote. Thismade a conquered people sort of probationary Romans,entitled to the legal protection of citizenship, but unable (for example) to vote for theimmediate execution of the generalwho had conquered them. If a community behaveditself–andalmostalldid– thenthevotewouldcomealonginagenerationor two.Bythattimethegrandsonsofthedefeatedwereinthelegions,enthusiasticallyexpandingtheRomanstateyet furtherand forcibly recruitingyetmoremembersof theRomancitizenbody.

Thisopennessworkedwonders forRomanexpansion–as theemperorClaudius laternoted. Facedwith objections to his giving citizenship toGauls of the Senones tribe hereplied:

IndeedIknowforafact,thatthe[noblefamilyofthe]JuliicamefromAlba[Longa],theCoruncaniifromCamerium,thePorciifromTusculum.Withoutgoingintodetailaboutthepast,newmembersoftheSenatehavebeenbroughtinfromEtruriaandLucaniaandthewholeofItaly.ThelandofItalyitselfwasextendedtotheAlps,justsothatthatnotonlyindividualsbutentirecountriesandtribescouldbeunitedunderourname…

OurfounderRomuluswassowisethathefoughtasenemiesandthenhailedasfellow-citizens several nations on the very same day. Strangers have reigned over us. Thatfreedmen’ssonsshouldbeentrustedwithpublicoffices…wasacommonpracticeintheoldRepublic.But,yousay,wehavefoughtagainsttheSenones.ThendoesthismeanthattheVolsci andAequi [now communities of solidRoman citizens] never stood in battlearrayagainstus?

Tacitus,Annals11

WhatappliedtothecitizenshipingeneralalsoappliedtothemostaristocraticRomans.AsClaudius said of the Julians and others, not only was access to the Roman citizenshipstraightforward(andsometimesnotevenvoluntary),membershipoftheRomangoverningclasswasalsohighlyaccessible.TheoriginsoftheRomanaristocracyareheredescribedbythelaterRomanhistorianLivy.

Itwastraditionalforthosefoundingacitytoassembleahordeoftheobscureandlowly-born and then make the fictional claim that these people had ‘sprung from the soil’.Followingthistradition,Romulusopenedaplaceofrefugeattheenclosedspacebetweenthe twogrovesof trees thatyoufindasyougodownfromtheCapitol.Thisbecameanasylum for an indiscriminate crowd of freedmen and [escaped] slaves looking to bettertheirlot.Thisinfluxwasthefirstsourceofstrengthforthenewly-foundedcity.Satisfiedwiththis,Romulustookstepstoseethatthisstrengthwasproperlydirected.Hecreatedahundredsenators,eitherbecausehefeltthatnumberwasenoughorbecausethecityhadonlyahundredheadsofhouseholds.

Livy,FromtheFoundingoftheCity1.1.18

HowmuchofLivy’searlyhistory is factual ishotlydisputedbyacademics.Yet just asthereislittledoubtthattheoriginalcitizensofRomewereasunsavouryabunchofriff-raffasanybetweenSicilyandtheAlps,theRomanswereequallyundiscriminatingaboutwhom theyadded to their aristocracy.Forexample, thenameof theMetelli,oneof thelargest of later Rome’s aristocratic families, appears to originate in the word for adischargedmercenary.OneServiusTullius,whofirstsawthecityasacaptiveslaveboyinatriumphalprocession,allegedlywentontobecomethefifthkingofRome.Incontrasttolateryears,theearlyRomannobilitywashighlyaccommodatingofnewmembers.

Aswellasthoserisingtothetopfromwithinthestate,earlyRomealsohadaristocraticimmigrants–forexampleoneAttusClausus(theancestoroftheaccommodatingemperorClaudius mentioned above) became disaffected with his native city of Regillum anddecampedtoRomewithallhishouseholdin504BC(Livy2.16.4).Aswithescapedslavesandbanditsontherun,RomewelcomedClaususwithopenarms.

Fourhundredyears later, thedescendants ofAttusClaususwereknownas theAppiiClaudii,andanyforeignaristocratwasunlikelytogetthetimeofdayfromthem,letalonean invitation to join the senate. True, the aristocracy was prone to regular bursts ofxenophobiawhen it came to outsiders becoming senators. But formost of the senate’sexistence, individual senators showed a preference for sons-in-law with money andinfluencewhatevertheirorigin.Sooutsiderscouldanddidjoinsenatorialfamiliesandin

time their descendants forced their way on to the benches of the senate house. As theemperorClaudiushadnoted,Volscians,theAequi,EtruscansandmanyotherseventuallybecameRomansenators–andintimebecameaswaryofoutsidersasothershadbeenoftheirancestors.

One reason for this exclusivity was that as the Roman state expanded, so did therewardsofbeingRomanandofholdingofficeinRome.ThisisnottosaythatRomewascorrupt, because ‘corruption’ implies an alternative system to be corrupted. In ancientRomenepotism,back-scratching,andtheexchangeoffavoursdidnotcorruptthesystem–theyactuallywere the system.Without them theadministrationcouldnot function.Thesenatewasverymuchan‘old-boynetwork’andtookprideinthatfact.Ifamanhaddoneasenatorafavour–suchasgivinghimaninterest-freeloan–notonlywouldthatsenatorsupportthatmaninpolitics,buthewouldfreelyadmitthereason.

ThisworkedwellwhenRomewasasmall,relativelyimpoverishedcitywithawarrioraristocracy.WhenRomecontrolledanempire thatstretchedacross theMediterranean,a‘favour’fromagovernororservingconsulcouldbeworthmillions.Suchfavoursmightinclude the right to collect taxes in a province, a trademonopolyor receipt of a publicworks contract. Naturally, the person bestowing such a favour expected a cut of thosemillions,oranequallyvaluablefavourinreturn.Atthispointthesystemstartedtobreakdown.

It is a truism that power andwealth generally go together, and through the perks ofoffice,thosewhoexercisedpoliticalpowerinRomebecameextremelywealthy.Theyhadto be, for Rome was still democratic (for a given definition of ‘democratic’) andcompetitionforvotesforpublicofficeanditsrewardsbecameferocious.Votersexpectedtobebribedwithgifts,circusesandfreedinners.Theyalsorewardedbyelectingtoofficethosewhobuiltcivicamenitiesfor themtoenjoy,suchasfountains,publicgardensandtemples.Theexpensesforsuchamenitiescameoutofacandidate’sownpocket.Ifhewassuccessfulinobtaininghighoffice,thecandidatecouldexpecttousethatofficetoregainthe money he had spent, and a lot more. Those who failed to be elected were oftenfinanciallyruined.

Thishadseveraleffects.FirstlypoliticsinRome–neveragentleoccupation–becameincreasingly cut-throat and the high stakes meant that elections became ever morecompetitive.Secondly,Romanaristocratshadtheirhandsfullcompetingwithoneanother.Theywereextremely reluctant towiden the fieldbyallowingoutsiders to join the fray.Thirdly, thosewhowereelected toofficewere thosewhohad the financial resources towoovoters,buyalliesandbuyoffcompetitors.Astimewentonandexpenseswentup,theonlypeoplewhocouldaffordtopayforallthiswerethosewhohadheldofficealreadyandhadreapedthehugefinancialrewardsthatcamewithit.Sincetheyhadheldoffice,thesemendidnotpayfortheirownelectoralcampaigns,butforthoseoftheirchildren.Atthispoint the top jobs inRomebecamevirtuallymonopolizedbyasmallgroupofverywealthyfamilies.

Families that regularlyhad theirmembersvoted to theconsulship– the topexecutiveofficeinRome–werecalledthenobiles;orasCicerodescribedthem‘thosemadeconsuls

intheircradles’.Suchfamilieswereimmenselywealthyandhugelyinfluential.Influencewas important, for a Roman’s auctoritas mattered at least as much as his money.Auctoritasisadifficultconcepttodefine,butitbasicallydescribedaman’spowertogetthings done and to prevent others doing things to him. It was a combination of beingrespected andhaving a knownability to helpothers –with theunderstanding that suchhelpcameataprice for thepersonbeinghelped.Auctoritas also included theability tocrush enemies. Political battles often spilled over into the courts, and in such strugglesauctoritas usually trumped both the law and issues of right and wrong.We shall later(p.78)see the fateof the tribuneVariusHybrida,1whowashimself accusedof theverysamechargeshefailedtopresshomeagainstanaristocraticRomanandcondemned.Thatwas auctoritas in action. In rather the same way, when one of the highly aristocraticMetelli was accused of fraud and peculation, none of the jurymen dared look at theaccountspresentedasevidencebecausethatwouldshowdisrespecttoMetellus.NaturallyMetelluswasacquitted.

ThroughoutRomanhistorythearistocracyhadbeenpowerful.OnceRomehadbecomea Mediterranean-wide empire, the aristocracy reaped a disproportionate share of therewardsandbecamemorepowerful still.Thenobiles controlledaccess topublicoffice,theadministrativefunctionsof thestate, the toppriestlyofficesandthecourts.But theyhadalwaysbeeninfluentialintheseareas.Theproblemcamewhenthenobilesbegantomonopolizelandownershipaswell.WhenRomeconqueredanenemy,especiallyinItaly,acommissionwassentbythesenatetoorganizehowthatconqueredstatewouldfunctionthereafter. If a city occupied a strategic location, it was highly likely that the originaloccupantswouldbedisplacedandthecityoccupiedbyretiredRomanlegionaries.Insuchan event, the city became an extension of Rome itself – a colonus.More often, Romemade the conquered city an involuntary ‘ally’ and was content to levy tribute on theoriginal population. This tribute often came in the form of soldiers who then foughtalongsidetheRomanlegionsinfurthercampaigns.Inthesecases,Romealsousuallytookforitselfapercentageofthelandoftheconqueredstate.

Thislandwascalledtheagerpublicus,the‘publicfield’,andaswithcolonia,theintentwastosettledischargedlegionariesorsoldiersfromtheItalianalliesonthe land,whichtheyrentedfromtheRomanstateatlowornominalrents.Intimethesonsraisedonthesesmallholdings themselves became eligible for recruitment to the army and the cycle ofconquest, settlement and recruitment was repeated. There was a general sentiment thatthesesturdysonsofpeasantstockwerethebackboneofthearmyandofRome’smilitarysuccess.

TheyoungmenwhostainedthePunicSeawithblood…

thosewhoassaultedPyrrhus,

andstruckatgreatAntiochus,

andfearsomeHannibal–

Theywereamanlybunchofrusticsoldiers

taughttodigthefieldswithaSabinehoe,

haulinginthefirewoodtheyhadcut

attheirstrictmothers’orders

Horace,Odes3.4

Bythe150sBCRomewasrunningoutofsuchprimemilitarymaterial.TherewasafeelingthatthepeasantfarmerswerebeingcrowdedoffthelandbytheRomanaristocracy.TheprocesswasdescribedindetailbythehistorianAppianwhowrotetwocenturieslater.HetellshowtheRomanscreatedthepubliclandandhowitwasrentedtosmallholders,andgoesontosay:

TheydidthesethingsinordertomultiplytheItalianrace,whichtheyconsideredthemostindustrious of peoples, so that they might have plenty of allies at home. But the veryopposite thing happened; for the rich, getting possession of the greater part of theundistributedlands,andbeingemboldenedbythelapseoftimetobelievethattheywouldnever be dispossessed, absorbing any adjacent strips and their poor neighbours’allotments,partlybypurchaseunderpersuasionandpartlybyforce,cametocultivatevasttractsinsteadofsingleestates,usingslavesaslabourersandherdsmen,lestfreelabourersshouldbedrawnfromagricultureintothearmy.

Atthesametimetheownershipofslavesbroughtthemgreatgainfromthemultitudeoftheir progeny, who increased because they were exempt from military service. Thuscertainpowerfulmenbecameextremelyrichandtheraceofslavesmultipliedthroughoutthecountry,while theItalianpeopledwindled innumbersandstrength,beingoppressedbypenury,taxes,andmilitaryservice.Iftheyhadanyrespitefromtheseevilstheypassedtheirtimeinidleness,becausethelandwasheldbytherich,whoemployedslavesinsteadoffreemenascultivators.

HistoryofAppian1.1.7,astranslatedintheLoebClassicalLibrary

1913

Theprocessofobtainingpubliclandwasrelativelystraightforwardforsomeonewiththepower and themoney to do so.Even though therewere laws that allowedonly limitedparcelsoflandtobeheldbyasingleindividual,thenobilitysimplyheldtheirhugeestatesunder thenamesofproxies,manyofwhomneverevensawthe land that theyallegedlyowned. Those on adjoining lands that the nobilitywanted for themselveswere literallymadeanoffertheycouldnotrefuse.Anyonewhodidmakeastandwasforciblydisplaced,andsincethenobilitycontrolledthecourts,therewasnowheretoappealforjustice.Andto add insult to injury, often the displacement was easily accomplished because themenfolkofasmallholdingwereawayservinginthelegionswhenservantsofthenobilitycametoforcetherestofthefamilyfromtheirhomes.

Notunexpectedly,thisledtoadegreeofstay-at-homesentimentamongthepeasantry.ThiswasexacerbatedbythefactthatatthattimeRomewastiedupinadrawn-outwarinHispania. Year after year levies went out to the Iberian peninsula, there often to serveseveral campaigns without release. Mostly the Romans were fighting impoverishedtribesmen who were very good at fighting back, so for the recruits the chance of an

untimelydeathwashighwhilethechanceofreturningfromthewarswithanyworthwhilebootywaslow.

Not justRomansbut their Italianallies suffered the injusticeofbeingdisplaced fromtheirlandwhiletheywerefightinginwarsthatbroughtprofitandgloryonlytotheveryaristocratswhotooktheirfarmswhiletheyweregone.InfacttheItalianssufferedworsethan theRomansbecauseaRomancitizenwasalsoavoter,and thearistocracycovetedthevotesofcitizens.Soifasubstantialblocofvotersinaparticularareafeltaggrieved,theycould take their case toRomeandget a sympathetichearing in exchange for theirvotesinthenextelection.

Italians hadno suchprotection.They could anddid complain loudly.However, therewerenovotestobeobtainedfromItalians,sonoaristocrathadanythingtogainbytakingtheir case.On the other hand, the aristocrat the Italianswere complaining aboutwouldcertainly take offence with anyone who listened to such complaints. Therefore anyonewhotookupthecauseofItaliansunfairlydispossessedoftheirlandswouldbemakingapowerful enemy of the aristocratic dispossessor and getting nothing in return. So theItalianshadfewdefendersinRome,andbythemiddleof thesecondcenturytheItalianpeninsulawassteamingwithresentment.

Thedispossessedhadtwochoices.Theycouldgotothetownsandtrytomakealivingthere,ortheycouldre-enrolinthelegionsforyearafteryear,rentingthelandthatwouldnominallygivethemthepropertyqualificationthatwasatthistimerequiredofaRomansoldier. (Being desperate formanpower, the army seldomenquired too searchingly intothesequalifications.)

Anotherproblemwasthatwhiletheestatesoftherichwereextensive,cashcropssuchaswine,figsandolivesprovidedhigherrevenuesthanthewheatandbarleyproducedbytheaveragesmallholder.Thereforetheamountoflandundergraincultivationfell,sothat‘the nourishing grain runs out and there is no bread for the common people’ as thecontemporarypoetLuciliusputit.2

Declining military manpower, an increasingly precarious food supply, massiveresentmentamongthecommonpeopleandever-moremutinousallies–theself-absorbedgreedoftheRomannobilityhadcertainlymanagedtocreateanabundanceofproblems.EvensomemembersoftheRomannobilitynoticedit.

The first to contemplate a political solution to theproblemwasoneGaiusLaelius, afriendofScipioAemilianus,thesoldierfamousfordestroyingCarthageandwinningtheintractableNumantineWarinIberia.ScipioAemilianushimselfmadeafewhalf-heartedattempts to approach thematter, but quicklywithdrewafterhediscovered that showingsympathyforlandreformmadeiteasyforenemiessuchashisrivalAppiusClaudiustoturnthesenateagainsthim.Laeliuswashardlymoreeffective.Inthe140sheintroducedtothesenateanagrarianbill thataddressedsomeof theworstabusesof thearistocracy,buthewasapparentlyunpreparedfortheuproarthatresulted.Hehastilybackeddown.

GaiusLaelius, a comrade ofScipiomade an attempt to rectify this evil, but thosewithinfluence resisted the proposals. Fearing the consequences which might follow, he

abandonedtheissue,andforsodoinghewasnicknamedSapiens(‘thewise’).

Plutarch,LifeofTiberiusGracchus8

However,forallthatthesenatestudiouslyignoredit,theissuedidnotgoaway.Thenextto raise thematter of land reform as a political issuewas a youngman from the veryhighest level ofRoman society.Thiswas a grandsonof the greatScipioAfricanus, theconqueror of Hannibal; the son of the prominent politician and general SemproniusLongus.HisnamewasTiberiusGracchus,andhehadanaxetogrind.

Likemanyyoungaristocrats,TiberiushadgonetofightintheIberianwars.Hisfather,Sempronius,haddonethistoo,andwonnotonlygreatdistinctionamongtheRomans,buteven the admiration of the Spaniards.Given thatmostRoman generals in Iberia had apenchantforwholesaleplunder,massacreandtreachery,allSemproniushadtodotogainareputationforfairdealingwiththeenemywastoshowrestraint,andactuallykeephiswordoncehehadgivenit.

ThiswasfortunateforRomeagenerationlater,becausethearmywithwhichTiberiuswas a junior officer was trapped by the Celtiberians in an untenable position. TwentythousandRomansoldiersfaceddeathbymassacreorstarvation,sonotunexpectedlytheRomangeneral attempted to negotiate.TheCeltiberianswould only dealwithTiberius,because they trusted his father’s reputation. Though still only a young man, Tiberiusmanaged to negotiate not only the safe withdrawal of the endangered army but anequitablepeacetreatywiththeCeltiberians.

Tiberius may have felt proud of his achievement. If so he would have been totallyunpreparedforthestormofexecrationthatgreetedhisreturntoRome.Nomatterhowfairthetreatyhehadnegotiated,thefactthathehadnegotiateditfromapositionofweaknessmadetheagreementtotallyunacceptabletothesenate.Insteadofbeingpraisedforsavinganarmyof twenty thousandmen,Tiberiuswas indangerofbeingprosecuted forbeingone of the officers who had got that army into danger in the first place. Only theinterventionofScipioAemilianussavedTiberiusfromthefateofhiscommandingofficer,whowasdeliveredinchainstotheCeltiberians.ThetreatytowhichTiberiushadpledgedhiswordandhishonourwasunequivocallyrepudiated.Havinggotitsarmybacksafely,thesenatesawnoreasonnottocontinueitswaragainstthepeoplewhohadsparedit.ForTiberius the shock, humiliation and dishonour were intense, and being as proud andstubbornasonlyaRomanaristocratcouldbe,hedidnottakeitlyingdown.

WhilethesenatemightsneeratTiberiusforbeingaturncoatCeltiberiansympathizer,the relatives of the twenty thousand common soldiers had a different perspective – andmany of those relatives were voters. Therefore, when Tiberius decided to stand forpoliticaloffice,thechoiceofwhichofficewasobvious.HewouldbecomeTribuneofthePlebs,Rome’sadvocateforthecommonman.

ATribuneof thePlebshadagreatdealofpowerifhecaredtouse it.Theofficehadbeen forced on the senate by the people of Rome as protection against abuse by thearistocracy. A tribune could present proposals to legislative assemblies. He could vetomotionsofthesenate.Inextremesituationshecouldevenarresttheconsuls.However,the

powers of a tribune did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Rome itself.Therefore tribunes had been of little value toRomans dispossessed of their land in thecountryside, and of no use whatsoever to Italians in the same position. This wasparticularly so because, as with almost all other institutions of the Roman state, thetribunatehadbeencapturedbythenobility.Tribunesofthesecondcenturywerenoblemenwhousedtheirpositionsmainlytoparticipateinthepoliticalstrugglesofthearistocracywithoutmuch regard for the purposes forwhich the office had originally been created.Tiberiusplannedtochangeallthat.

Therewasafactioninthesenatequietlypressingforlandreform.Thisfactionwasledby two brothers of the Mucius Scaevola family and their relative Licinius CrassusMucianus–allthreepersonsofnolittleinfluence.Verywell,Tiberiuswouldtakeuptheircauseandforcetherichtoreturnthelandstheyhadunfairlytaken.Bydoingthis,Tiberiuswould further endear himself to the common voter, correct a major problem that waspoisoningeconomicandpoliticallifeintheItalianpeninsulaandsimultaneouslydeliveravigorouskickto thehighlydeservingderrièresof thenobility in thesenate.Overall, theplanappeared tohavenodownside.Tiberiuswasaneloquent speaker, andhe setaboutpersuading thepeople tovote forhis legislation.ThebiographerPlutarchquotes fromaspeechattributedtoTiberiusGracchus,whichgivessomeoftheflavourofhisoratory.

ThewildbeastsofItalyhaveeachacaveoralairoftheirown.ButthemenwhofightanddieforItalyhavenopartofitbutthesunlightandair.Withtheirwivesandchildrentheywanderfromplacetoplacewithneitherhearthnorhome.

So the lipsof their generals liewhenbeforebattle they exhort the soldiers todefendtheirfamilytombsandshrinesfromtheenemy,becausenotamanoftheirlistenershasanhereditaryaltar,no,notoneofallthesemanyRomanshasanancestraltomb.Insteadtheyfight and die to support others inwealth and luxury.Yet they are calledmasters of theworld,thesemenwhohavenotasinglelumpofearthtocalltheirown.

Plutarch,LifeofTiberiusGracchus9

With eloquence, justice and the people on his side there seemed no way that Tiberiuscould not get hisway.But appearanceswere deceptive.TheRoman nobility hadmanyfaults,butweaknessandcowardicewerenotamongthem.Infactabelieverineugenicsmightpointoutthatby133BC(theyearTiberiusbecametribune)theRomanaristocracyhadbeenbreedingforstubbornness,ruthlessnessanddecisivenessforaboutfivehundredyears, and now were very stubborn, ruthless and decisive. Furthermore its membersregarded the ‘public lands’ as their private property. Some had been given them asdowries,otherswereusingtheselandsassecurityforloans.Manyhadreceivedthelandsas inheritance from fathers whose tombs were now on the property. They would notsurrendereasily.

Thefirst stepof thearistocratswas tosubornoneofTiberius’ fellow tribunes,amancalledMarcusOctavius.Thiswasnottoohard,asOctaviuswashimselfanoblewhohelda substantial tract of what should have been public land.When Tiberius proposed hisagrarianlaw,MarcusOctaviusexercisedhistribune’srighttovetolegislation,andforbadeits passing. Under the Roman constitution, a veto always took precedence over an

affirmativeactionsoTiberius’ legislationwaskilledon thespot.However,TiberiuswasalsoaRomannoble,andasproudandstubbornastherest.Heimmediatelywithdrewhisplanned law,andproposedanotherevenmoreseverebywhich thosewhohadoccupiedpublic landwere tobedispossessed in turn, immediatelyandwithoutcompensation.Bywayofencouragingacceptanceofhislaw,Tiberiusraisedthestakesyethigher.HeusedhisvetoagainstanyandallpublicfunctionsoftheRomanstate,sothatsalariescouldnotbepaidandlawcourtscouldnotfunction–inshortthegovernanceofRomewasbroughttoastandstilluntilthesenatepermittedapublicvoteonhisproposal.

Whenmattersdidcometoavote,thevotingurnsthatservedasballotboxesinancientRomemysteriouslyvanished, alongwith thevoteswithin them.AndOctaviusvetoed afurthervote.Tiberiusstillwouldnotbackdown,butinsteadtookthelegallydubiousstepof ordering a different vote – to have Octavius recalled from office. With Octaviusremoved,theagrarianlegislationwaspassed,butthemannerofitspassingleftasourtasteinthemouthsofmany,whofeltthatthemannerofOctavius’removalhadweakenedanddebasedthetribunate.TheenemiesofTiberiuswaitedeagerlyforhistimeinofficetobeover, for a tribune was sacrosanct – safe from prosecution and defended by the plebsagainst physical violence.As a private citizenTiberiuswas highly vulnerable.When itbecameapparentthat theturbulenttribuneplannedtostandforre-electionthefollowingyear the frustration of the nobility boiled over. When Tiberius was holding a publicmeetinghisenemiesinthesenatetookaction–decisivelyandruthlessly.

The senatorswrapped their togas about their left arms, and shoved aside those in theirway.No-oneopposedmenofsuchauthoritybutinsteadtheyfellovereachotherintheirattempts to get away. The servants of the senators brought clubs and staffs from theirhomes,butthesenatorshadalreadyseizeduponthelegsofbenchesbrokenbythefleeingcrowd.With these they attacked those trying to shield Tiberius, slaughtering some androutingtherest.Tiberiusturnedtorun,buthisclothingwasheld,soheshedhistogaandfledinhistunic,onlytostumbleandfalloversomebodiesonthegroundinfrontofhim.Ashestruggledtohisfeethetookthefirstblow…

Plutarch,LifeofTiberius19

Tiberiuswasbeatentodeathonthespotalongwithsomethreehundredofhissupporters.The leader of the senatorial lynch mob was Tiberius’ cousin, Scipio Nasica, PontifexMaximusandchiefpriestoftheRomanstate(andincidentallyalargelandholderofpublicland).HewasforemostamongthosewhothereafterledapurgeagainstthesupportersofTiberius.

Tiberiuswasdeadandhissupporterspersecuted,buthiscauselivedon.Thesenatorialsupporters of Scipio Nasica had gone too far. Public revulsion at the brutal slayingthreatened to tearRome apart, and cooler heads among the aristocracy intervened. Thesidesweretoopolarizedforanyonetoadmittalkingtotheiropponents,butall thesignsarethatadealwasreached.Tiberius’lawwaslaw,anditwouldstand,notleastbecauseitwas clear to most that land redistribution was needed. Many of those formerly inoppositionhadbeenopposedtoTiberiusandhismethodsratherthanwhathewastryingtoachieve.Now(asthelaterRomanwriterValeriusMaximusputit)boththeauthorofthe

problemandtheproblemitselfwereresolvedbythedeathofTiberiusandtheacceptanceofhislaws.

Inexchangeforacceptingtheirleader’slynching,Tiberius’supportersalsodemandedafurther sacrifice from their opponents – and got it. Although traditionally the PontifexMaximus did not leave Rome, Scipio Nasica the lyncher-in-chief was found duties toperform inAsiaMinor, and once there Scipiowas firmly instructed not to come back.Though no one called it such, this was exile. Scipio died shortly afterwards in theAnatoliancityofPergamon(foulplaywassuspected).

In Italy, the land redistributionwent ahead.Asmight be expected of a proposal thatrequired legislative support from the voters, Tiberius’ land legislation had been aimedprimarilyatRomancitizens.Aspopularenthusiasmforlandredistributiongatheredpace,opportunistRomanpoliticiansthrewtheirsupportbehindthemeasurebutalwayswithaneye to how many votes were in it for themselves. Not unexpectedly under thesecircumstances,thoseontheshortendofthestickwerethedisenfranchisedItalianalliesofRomewhowerenowworseoffthanbefore.WhenconqueredbyRomeindecadesorevencenturiespastmanyItalianswhohadtheirlandsconvertedintoagerpublicushadsimplycontinuedtooccupythoselandsastenants.Nowallthiswasthrownintoconfusion.

Whereveranewfieldadjoininganoldonehadbeenbought,ordividedamongtheallies,thewholedistricthadtobecarefullyinquiredinto,onaccountofthemeasurementofthisonefield,todiscoverhowithadbeensoldandhowdivided.Notallownershadpreservedtheir contracts, or their allotment titles, and even those that were found were oftenambiguous.When the landwas resurveyed, someownerswere obliged to give up theirfruit-treesandfarm-buildingsinexchangefornakedground.Othersweretransferredfromcultivatedtouncultivatedlands,ortoswamps,orpools.…TheItalianalliescomplainedof thesedisturbances, andespeciallyof the lawsuitshastilybroughtagainst them.…theconsulTuditanuswasappointedtogivejudgementinthesecases.Butwhenhetookuptheworkhe saw thedifficultiesof it, andmarchedagainst the Illyriansas apretext fornotactingasjudge,andnobodybroughtcasesfortrial.

Appian,CivilWars1.18astranslatedintheLoebClassicalLibrary,1913

Thedeadlockplayedintothehandsofthenobilitywhoeitherusedonepretextortheothertoavoidtransferringtitleofthepubliclandsthattheyoccupied,orbluntlyrefusedtogiveitup.OtherscededlandtoRomancitizens,butcompensatedthemselveswithillegallandgrabs from Italians. Those awarded title to disputed land had to go to court to obtainpossession,butnobodywashearingsuchcases.

EventuallyaGracchansympathizercalledFulviusFlaccusproposedasolution.Mostofthose protesting about the land redistributionwere the Italian allies; unsurprising sinceboththoseallocatingthelandandthecourts(whentheymadeadecisionatall)favouredRomancitizens.Thesolutionwasstraightforward.MaketheItalianalliesRomancitizens.After all, entire Italian communities had beenmade citizens in the past, andRomehadbenefitedmightilythereby.Whynotdoitagain?

Thiswouldhaveadoubleeffectonlanddisputes.Firstly,withtheprospectofRoman

citizenshipofferedascompensation,manyItaliancommunitieswouldbecontentwiththeinferiorlanddealstheywerecurrentlybeingoffered.Secondly,whenalanddisputecamebeforeaRomanmagistrate,bothplaintiffsanddefendantswouldbeRomancitizens,andthe magistrate – who was also a politician seeking re-election – would make a fairerdecisionifhealienatedonesetofvotersinthecourseofappeasinganother.Atpresentthemagistrateadjudicatinga landdisputecouldappease theRomansand let the Italiansgohang,andhegenerallydidjustthat.ThoseItalianswhowishedtoremainindependentofthe Roman body politic, proposed Flaccus, should have the right of appeal against‘tyrannical’decisionsbyRomanmagistrates.

Many Italians had already taken the shortest route to the citizenship possible. OncedispossessedfromtheirlandtheyhadmovedtoRome,andafterdwellinginthecityforanumberofyears theyapplied to thecensors forpermission tobeconsidered forRomancitizenship.Whilewaiting, theymade a point of turning up at political assemblies andhecklingspeakerswhomtheyconsideredunsympathetictotheircause.SomanytookthisstepthatJuniusPennus,thetribunefor126/5,passedalawforbiddingnon-Romansaccesstothecity,claimingthatitwasdrainingItalianmunicipalitiesoftheirpopulations.

The proposal of Flaccus that the citizenship be dramatically widened to include theItalianalliespresentedtheancientworldwitharadicalnewidea–thatamancouldbeacitizenoftwostatesatonce.PreviouslybeingmadeintoRomans–whethervoluntarilybyindividuals, or compulsorily under the cives sine suffragio system – had meant totallyabandoningone’sformernationalidentity.Theideathatonemightbeasolidburgherof–forexample–FidenaeandsimultaneouslybeaRomanvoterrequiredamentaladjustmentthatneitherRomansnorItalianswerepreparedfor.TheRomanpeoplewereconfusedbyFlaccus’proposalorindifferenttoit,andtheideafailedtogainmuchtraction.Thesenate,on the other hand, understood the proposal andwere downright hostile.When Flaccusappeared in the senate house to explain his proposals he received earnest imprecationsfromthesenatorstodroptheplan,andveiledthreatsaboutwhatwouldhappenifhedidnot.LikeLaeliusbeforehim,Flaccusdecided that thepersonalpriceofpushing reformwastoohigh.HeabandonedhisproposalandwenttotakeouthisfrustrationsagainsttheGaulsinamilitarycampaign.However,theideathatFlaccushaddroppedrippledthroughItalianminds, and over the decades that ripplewas to grow, and grow into a veritabletsunamithatalmostsweptawayRomeitself.

ItisnotasifRomewasnotwarned.AssoonasitwasclearthattheFlaccanproposalhadbeendropped,Romewasgivena tasteofwhatwas tocomeageneration later.TheItalians of the city ofFregellae rose in rebellion.On the left bankof theRiverLiris inLatium, situatedamid rich farmland,Fregellaewasnominorcitybutoneof the largestandmostflourishingcitiesintheregion.ThatsuchacitywaspreparedtoriskeverythinginarebellionshouldhavesetoffwarningbellsinthemindsofRomanpoliticiansthatthecitizenshipwasbecomingamajorissue.

Thiswarning should have been all themore urgent because until then Fregellae hadbeennonestofmalcontents,butinsteadoneofRome’smostloyalallies.WhenHannibalhadmarchedontheregionin212BC, thepeopleofFregellaesentwarningpost-haste to

Rome,andthendestroyedthebridgesacrosstheriverLirisbywhichHannibalwouldgetthere–eventhoughthismeantthatthedisgruntledHannibalwouldinsteaddevastatethelands of Fregellae (which he did indeed devastate comprehensively). Despite thisdevastation, in 209 BC when a dozenRoman colonies rebelled against Rome’s constantdemands formanpower to continue fightingHannibal, Fregellae led the delegates whowenttoRometopledgetheirloyalty.

ThereactionoftheRomansenatetoFregellae’sdefectionwaspredictable,anddidnotinvolve much soul-searching. Instead of pondering about how they had managed toalienateeventhismostfaithfulofallies,theRomansreactedinthewaytheyknewbest–decisivelyandruthlessly.ThepraetorLuciusOpimustookanarmyandflattenedFregellaesocomprehensively that todayarchaeologistscannotsay forcertainwhere thecityoncestood.TomakesurethatFregellaeneverroseagain,theRomansfoundedtherivalcityofFabrateria nearby, which then took over the lands and trade that had once sustainedFregellae. The grim example of Fregellae may have deterred other Italian citiescontemplating rebellion from putting the idea into practice, but it did not remove thereasonswhy rebellionwascontemplated in the firstplace.However, theuseofextremeforcetosuppressdissentboughtthesenatesometimetosortoutthetangleoflandrightsandcitizenshipthatbedevilledthestate.Itdidnotusethattimewisely.

Forastart,dealingwithbothlandreformandcitizenshipbecamevastlymorecomplexbecause, as so often happened in the Roman Republic, personalities interfered withpolicies.ThecauseoflandreformandRomancitizenshipwastakenupbysomeonewhowas inmanyways theworstman for the job–GaiusGracchus, thebrotherof the late,lynchedTiberius.NotthatGaiuswaslackinghonesty,energyandcompetence.Hehadallthree,andwasintelligentandpoliticallyastuteaswell.ButhewasthebrotherofTiberiusGracchus.ThismeantthatGaiuswasconsideredanenemyofthegroupinthesenatewhohadconnivedathisbrother’sdeath.ThisgroupwasinfactpartlydefinedbyoppositiontoanythingGracchan,anditsmemberscalledthemselvestheoptimates(thebestmen).NotonlydidtheyconsiderGaiusGracchusasbeingautomaticallytheirenemy,buttheywereright to do so.AnyRoman noblewho overlooked themurder of a brotherwould havebeenthoughtaspinelesswimpandpoliticallynegligibleinanycase.

In fact Gaius, as he had to, pursued a dual agenda of harassing the optimates andpushingforfurtherlandreformandcitizenshipfortheItalianallies.Theoptimatespushedright back, resisting every step of the way, thus making land reform and citizenshippartisan issues just when a consensus was essential. Had young Gaius Gracchus beenkilledbyaSardinianrebelwhilehewasdoinghismilitaryserviceontheisland,mattersoflandreformandcitizenshipwouldnothavebeendropped.Insteadtheywouldhavefounda different, less divisive champion; and in fact onewas available. Thiswas none otherthan Fulvius Flaccus. It will be remembered that Flaccus had dropped the issue ofcitizenshipandgoneoff tocampaign inGaul.Well,hehadcampaignedso successfullythathewaslargelyresponsibleforsettingtheprovinceofGalliaTransalpinaonasecurebasis (a job ably completed by his successorQuintus FabiusMaximus). Nowwith theprestigeofatriumphovertheLiguriantribetoaddtohisauthority,andwithhispoliticalpotencysupplementedbythewealthofhisbooty,Flaccuswasreadyonceagaintotakeup

thecauseofenfranchisingtheItalianallies.ExceptGaiusGracchushadbeatenhimtoit.

Thiswasunfortunate,asFlaccushadneveralienatedtheoptimatesinthesenate.GaiushadaccomplishedthatsimplybybeingTiberius’brother,andthereafterhehappilyburnedany bridges that led to a reconciliation. As everyone expected, despite the strongresistance of the optimates – who accused him of anything they thought might stick,including fomenting the rebellionatFregellae–GaiusGracchusbecameTribuneof thePlebsinhisturn.AstribuneGaiuspersecutedthosebehindhisbrother’skillinganddroveintoexilePopillius,anex-consulwhohadledthepurgeofTiberius’followers.Gaiusalsoexpandedhisbrother’slandreformlegislationandcrackeddownonthosewhohadevadeditsprovisions.Itisuncertainwhetherthepainthiscausedthenobilitywasincidentalorthereasonforthenewlegislation,butitcertainlydidnotendearGaiustothesenate.

RatherthancompetewithGaiusforleadershipofhisfaction,Flaccusthrewhissupportbehindtheyoungtribuneandthetwobecameclosepoliticalallies.Socloseinfactthattheyear122BCsawtheunusualsightofanex-consulsittingonthetribune’sbench.FlaccushadchosentobeelectedtothepostalongwithGaiusGracchus.

It is uncertain to what extent Flaccus demanded that Gaius Gracchus give greaterweighttothecauseofcitizenshipfortheItalianalliesasthepriceforhissupport,andtowhatextentGaius–alreadyasupporterof theidea–promotedthemeasureonhisownaccount.Inanycase,in123GaiusGracchuspressedthecaseforenfranchisingtheItalianswithmoreurgency.EnfranchisingtheallieswouldhavebestowedonehugeadvantageonGaius–ifhegottheItaliansthevote,theywouldbeforevergrateful.Thatgratitudewouldtranslateintovotes,sonotonlyGaiusGracchusbuthisfamilyanddescendantswouldbeparamount in Italian politics for the foreseeable future. This prospect terrified theoptimates, and any chance of consensus on the citizenship issue became utterlyimpossible.

Nevertheless,GaiusGracchus felt he did not need consensus to get hisway.He hadalready pushed through a huge mass of legislation the previous year, which coveredeverything frombuilding roadsacross Italy, founding largenumbersofcolonies in Italyand abroad (including controversially, one on the former site of Carthage), and lawsrestrictingtheroleofthesenateinthelawcourtsandtaxcollection.Muchofthisalsotheoptimateshadresentedandresisted,butineffectually.ThereforeasJanuarybroughtintheyear122Gracchusmadehisfirstmovetowardenfranchisingtheallies.Thiswasnottobea sweeping measure such as Flaccus had unsuccessfully proposed almost four yearspreviously,butameasuredpaceintherightdirection.

There already existed a halfway house towards the Roman citizenship known as theLatinRight.ThisrightwasoriginallygiventothepeoplesofLatiumtocompensateforthedissolutionoftheLatinLeaguein338BC.ItallowedLatinsthesamemutualprivilegesasthey had enjoyed under the league – that is commercium, connubium and the iusmigrationis. Thismeant that anyonewithLatin rights couldmake a legal contractwithsomeoneelsepossessingsuchrights,couldlegallymarrysuchaperson,andcouldmovetoanotherLatincityandobtaincitizenship thereof.TheLatinRighthadbeenextendedwellbeyondLatiumastheRomanempireexpanded.

OnereasonwhytheLatinRightwassodesirablewasbecauseRomesponsoreditandtherefore theprivileges of theLatinRightwereprotectedbyRoman law.ConsequentlysomeonewiththeLatinRightwhoheldalandcontractcouldinsistthattheRomancourtsenforcethatcontract.IthasbeenseenthattheRomancourtswereoftenlaxintheirduty,buteventhiswasbetterthannothing.OtherItalianshadnoteventhatmuchrecourse.

SonowGaiusGracchusproposed that thepresentholdersof theLatinRightbecomeRomans, and the other Italian allies should get the Latin Right. From there, with theprecedent established, a process would exist by which conquered people could firstbecomeinvoluntaryallies,thenLatinsandfinallyRomancitizens.This,aswithmuchofGaiusGracchus’ other legislation,was reasonable, far-sighted and addressed one of thefundamental problems underlying the structure of the Roman Republic. Also, as withmuchofGaiusGracchus’other legislation, theoptimatesweredeterminedthat itshouldnotpass,iffornootherreasonthanitwasproposedbyGaiusGracchusandwouldgreatlybenefitGaiusGracchus.Sowhenthemeasurewasbroughttothevote,thetribuneLiviusDrususvetoedit.ItwasharderforGaiusGracchustogetridofLiviusDrususthanitwasforTiberiusGracchus toget ridofhisobdurate fellow tribuneOctavius.For a start theRoman people remained dubious of the legality of voting a tribune out of office andsecondly,itturnedoutthattheRomanpeopledidn’twanttovoteLiviusDrususout.

Thesenatewastryinganewtactic.TheywoulduseDrusustooutflankGaiusGracchuson the flank he least expected to have to defend. Drusus simply out-demagogued thepopulist Gaius. If Gaius proposed to found three colonies of Roman citizens, Drususproposedtwelve.IfGaiusproposedeasingtherentsonpublicland,Drususannouncedtherents should be abolished altogether. Not unexpectedly the Roman voters loved thisbiddingwarfortheirfavourandwerenotatallpreparedtoremoveanyoftheparticipantsfromthepoliticalstage.SoGaiusGracchushadtoputupwithLiviusDrusus,andwhileLiviusDrususwaspreparedtogofurtherthanGracchusinalmostanydirection,hedrewthe line at extending the citizenship. This he vetoed, and there was nothing GaiusGracchuscoulddoaboutit.

ThefranchiseproposalwasseenbythesenateastheweakestpointofGaiusGracchus’platform.TheRomanvotercouldnotseehowtheproposalcouldbeofdirectbenefit,andlikethesenate,thecommonRomanwasjealousofhisprivileges.EvenFannius,aformerallywhomGaiushadhelpedtotheconsulshipnowturnedonhissponsorinaspeechtotheRomanpeople.

SoyouwillgivecitizenshiptotheLatins?Andafterwardsdoyouimaginethattherewillbespacetodoasyouarenowdoingandlistentoapublicmeeting?Orfindroomatthegamesorpublicfestivals?Whydon’tyoustopandthink?Ifyoudidyou’dseethattheywillcrowdyououtofeverything.

Fannius,viaCiceroandIulusVictor6.4

Whenthecrucialvotecame,Fanniusasconsulorderedallnon-votersoutofthecity.ThisweakenedGaiusGracchus, as thoughnon-voters, the allieswerepowerful andeffectivehecklers.Seducedby thepromisesofLiviusDrusus andworriedby the insinuationsofFannius, thevotersdecided theydidnotneedmoreRomans than theyalreadyhad.The

franchisemotionwasquashed.

GaiusGracchuscontinuedinoffice,buthiswingshadbeenclipped.Theyear121wasapproaching, when Gaius’ tribunate would expire. As an ominous portent the grimOpimius, destroyer of Fregellae and avowed enemy of all things Gracchan, was votedconsulforthecomingyear.Asafurtherproofofweakeningsupportforhiscause,Gaiushimselfwasnotre-electedtribune.Actually,hisbiographerPlutarchsayshewaselected‘buthiscolleaguescheatedandproducedfraudulentreturns’.3Possiblywiththehindsightthatcomesfromwritingcenturiesaftersubsequentevents,PlutarchsaysGaiusGracchusturnedonthosemockinghimandretorted‘theirswassardoniclaughter[i.e.thelaughterofthedoomed]fortheycouldnotseethecominggreatdarknessthatwastheconsequenceoftheirmeasures’.

OnceGaiuswas out of office, his enemies circled, ever agitating, everwaiting for achancetostrike.Opimius,tonoone’ssurprise,immediatelycalledaseriesoflegislativeassemblies aimed at repealing the laws passed by Gaius while he was in office. (Thepopulist measures passed by Drusus appear to have been generally ignored and werequietly allowed to lapse.)GaiusGracchus and his partisans naturally opposed this, andtensions in Romemounted as violence and bloodshed between the factions intensified.Eventually the senate turned to the consulOpimius andurgedhim to ‘see to it that thestate tooknoharm’.Opimius took this announcement as tantamount to adeclarationofmartiallaw,withhimselfasjudge,juryandexecutionerunderthatlaw.

TheGracchanfactionwasarmedandreadytodefenditselfagainstmobviolence,butnotagainsttheorganizedforcethatOpimiusbroughttobear.Herejectedpeaceovertures,even when Flaccus sent his own son as an envoy. Cretan archers and militia easilyovercame the resistance of the Gracchan partisans who were offered immunity if theyabandonedtheirleader.ForGracchushimselfarewardwasofferedequaltotheweightofhisheadingold.Thoseclaimingtherewardhadonlytoofferthehead–theremainderofthe bodywas not required.OnceGracchuswas dead,Opimius reneged on his offer ofimmunity, and led a purge thatmade thewitch-hunt of Tiberius’ supporters look tame.SomethreethousandGracchansupporterswerearbitrarilysentencedtodeathinkangaroocourts–insuchcasesconsideredworththesemblanceofjudicialprocess.Ashehaddonewith Fregellae, Opimius was thorough and merciless. The property of the slain wasconfiscatedbythepublictreasury,andwiveswereforbiddentogointomourning.Then,toaddinsult to injury,Opimiususedtheconfiscatedfundstoerecta templeofConcordintheforumbywayofavictorymonument.

It was a comprehensive victory. TheGracchus brotherswere dead, and the cause ofItalian enfranchisement so poisoned that no onewould touch it for thirty years.Yet asGaiusGracchus had prophesied, the victory of his enemieswould bring only darkness.ThefesteringcauseofItaliancitizenshipwouldspreadintotheequallypoisonousrivalrybetweenthetwogreatestRomansofthenextgeneration.NotonlywouldthisbringdownacataclysmuponItaly,butitwouldalsowipeoutthesonsofthoseverysenatorswhonowrejoicedintheirtemporarytriumph.

TChapter2

TheRivalshe deaths of the Gracchus brothers put thematter of enfranchising the allies onhold.This did notmean that the issuewent away– it simplymeant that nobody

dared to deal with it. Certainly the Italian allies felt no more warmly towards Rome.However,thedeathsoftheirchampionsmeantthattherewasnoonetotakeuptheircausewithinRomeitself,andtheexampleofFregellaedemonstratedthatunilateralactionhaddisastrousconsequences.MeanwhileRomanarrogancecontinuedtoinfuriatetheItalians.GaiusGracchushadgivensomeexamplesofthisbeforehedied,andafterhisdeaththisconductcontinued.

Theconsulrecentlycameto[thetownof]TeanumSidicinum.Hiswifewishedtobatheinthe men’s baths. Marcus Marius, the quaestor [roughly ‘mayor’] of Sidicinum, wasinstructed tosendaway thebathers fromthebaths.Thewife informedherhusband thatthe bathswere not given up to her soon enough and that theywere not clean enough.ThereforeastakewasplantedintheforumandMarcusMarius,themostillustriousmanofhis city,was led to it.His clothingwas strippedoff,hewaswhippedwith rods.ThepeopleofCales,whentheyheardofthis,passedadecreethatnooneshouldthinkofusingthepublicbathswhenaRomanmagistratewasintown…

Iwillgiveyouasingleexampleofthelawlessnessofouryoungmen,andoftheirentirelackofself-control.Withinthelastfewyearsayoungmanwhohadnotyetheldofficeasa Roman magistrate was sent as an envoy from Asia. He was carried in a litter. Aherdsman, one of the peasants ofVenusia,met him, and not knowingwhom theywerebearing,jokinglyaskedthelitter-bearersiftheywerecarryingacorpse.Uponhearingthis,theyoungmanorderedthatthelitterbesetdownandthatthepeasantbebeatentodeath.

Orf2viaGellNA10.3

Withthecomplacencythatfollowedtheir‘victory’,theRomanaristocracysawnoneedtomendtheirways.TheItalianallieswereRomansubjects,andtheywouldsimplyhavetodo as they were told. Yet at the same time, the Romans insisted that the Italian alliessupplytheirarmywithtroopstrainedandarmouredtothestandardofRomanlegionaries.Theincompatibilityofthesetwopolices–treatingtheItaliansasaconqueredpeople,andsimultaneouslyinsistingthattheyhavelargenumbersofhighlycompetentsoldieryreadyforaction–neverappearstohavestruckthesenateasdangerousenoughtoworryabout.

Partly this was because the Italians themselves were not a homogeneous group thatmighteasilyformajointcauseagainstRome.Aswillbeseen,theItalianswereasdiverseasthepeoplesofmodernEuropearetoday.TheGreek-speakingpeoplesofthesouthhadverylittleincommonwiththeGaulsinthenorth,andneitherofthesetwonationscouldunderstand theSamnites of the central interior.Rome’s famed technique of ‘divide andconquer’continuedtoholddownItalyevenaftermostofthatpeninsulahadinfactbeenconquered. Individual Italians who reached a certain status within a community might

individually aspire to the citizenship that Rome denied to their fellow burghers, andindividual communities competed with one another for the Latin Right, or simply forRoman patrons among the aristocracy. Among the Italians mutual incomprehension ofeachother’slanguageandculture,togetherwithrivalryforRomanfavourpreventedthemfromworkingtogether,andtheRomanssmuglyassumeditwouldalwaysbeso.

Meanwhile, lacking any sort of check, the Roman aristocracy became ever moreoligarchic, self-interested and corrupt. This was highlighted by the appallingmismanagement of the Jugurthine war that broke out in Africa a decade after GaiusGracchus was killed. Jugurtha was the adopted son of king Micipsa of Numidia. OnMicipsa’sdeathJugurthabecamekingbyassassinatingoneofMicipsa’snaturalsons.ThesurvivingsonappealedtoRome,whichsentacommissiontodividethekingdombetweenhimandJugurtha.TheresultantsettlementsofavouredJugurthathatitseemscertainthatthecommission’smemberswerebribed.In113BCJugurthadeclaredwaronhisrival,anddrovehimintothecityofCirta.AdelegationcamefromRometotellJugurthatodesist,butallthathappenedwasthatthedelegateswenthomewealthymenandthesiegeofCirtacontinued.WhenJugurthatookCirta,hekilledhisrival,andalsoanumberofItalianswhowereinthecityatthetime.

With the Italians complaining furiously, Rome was forced to declare war. Jugurthaimmediately and enthusiastically surrendered, and in return was allowed withoutpunishmenttobasicallykeepallhehadgained.Againitseemscertainthattheconsulwhoarranged the peace settlementwasmassively bribed. The peace treatywas so blatantlyslantedinJugurtha’sfavourthatitcausedanuproarinRome,andthemiscreantkingwassummonedtoexplaintoacourtofenquiryhowhehadmanagedtoobtainsuchfavourableterms.However,twotribunes–evidentlyalsobribed–usedtheirvetotopreventJugurthafromtestifying,andconsequentlythecourtofenquiryfailedtounearthasinglefact.ForJugurthathetriptoRomewasnotatotalwaste,becausewhilehewastherehearrangedfortheassassinationofacousinwhohadfledtotheRomansforasylum.Orderedoutofthecityby indignantRomans, Jugurtha is said tohave lookedbackashedeparted,andremarked‘Thatentirecityisforsale.It’sdoomedifitfindsabuyer.’1

Next up for sale was the propraetor Aulus Postumius Albinus. Tired of Jugurtha’sbrokenpromisesandflagrantcontempt,RomesentanewarmytoNumidia tobring therenegade king to heel. Not unexpectedly, given that it was commanded by a Romanaristocrat, the armymade a bee-line for the city of Suthul, which was alleged to holdJugurtha’s very substantial treasury. The historian Sallust takes up the tale of whathappenednext.

Jugurthawellknewthatthecommanderwasbotharrogantandincompetent.Sohefurtherswelledtheman’sheadbysendingenvoyswhobeggedforpeacewhilehehimselfmovedhis army away through the woods and footpaths. Finally, by holding out hope of anagreement,heinducedAulustoleave[thesiegeof]Suthulandfollowhimashepretendedto withdraw into a remote region… Meanwhile the king’s most cunning emissariesworked day and night on the Roman army. Centurions and cavalry commanders werebribedeithertodesertortoabandontheirpostswhentoldtodoso.

Once he had everything set theway hewanted it, Jugurtha suddenly surrounded theRomancampinthedeadofnight…Thenfromthenumberofthosewhohadbeenbribed,(asIhavementionedabove),onecohortofLigurianswithtwosquadronsofThraciansanda number of individual soldierswent over to the king,while the chief centurion of theThirdLegionallowedtheenemytoenterthepartofthefortificationswhichhehadbeenappointedtoguard.AlltheNumidiansburstin…

Sallust,JugurthineWar38ff

Albinuswasforcedtosurrender.HeagreedthatheandhisarmywouldquitAfricawithintendays,andJugurthaforcedtheRomanstopassundertheyoke–aritualbywhichanancientarmyacceptedthatithadbeentotallydefeatedandsurvivedonlyattheenemy’ssufferance.Having an entireRoman army captured and humiliated certainly caught theattention of a people who had come to look on victory as their birthright. Naturallyenough,given itsprevious form, thesenatepromptly renegedon the termsof the treatymadebyAlbinus,andorderedthathisarmyshouldremaininAfrica.However,themenofthis army were utterly demoralized, and incapable of carrying out any further militaryoperations.ThecommonpeopleofRomewerefurious.

ThetribuneMamiliusLimetanusproposedalawthatacommissionshouldbesetuptoinvestigate and punish thosewhose greed and complacency had letmatters get this far.Not unexpectedly, the nobility did everything it could to prevent this commission fromstarting work, but the Roman populace was relentless. ‘They passed the bill withincrediblekeennessandenthusiasm;notfrompatrioticfervour,butbecauseitwouldcausetrouble for the nobility whom they hated,’ reports Sallust.2 ‘The investigation wasconductedwithharshnessandviolence,onhearsayevidenceandatthewhimofthemob.’ThepeopletookparticularpleasureinbringingchargesagainstL.Opimius.ThemanwhohadflattenedFregellaeandordered thekillingof thousandsofGracchansupporterswasaccused of enriching himself as one of the commissioners who had originally dividedNumidiabetweenJugurthaandthesurvivingsonofMicipsa.Thecourtfoundhimguilty–as he almost certainly was – and Opimius was forced from Rome, later to die as adisgracedexileinGreece.

Thereafter, the senatewas compelled to take drastic steps to dealwith theNumidiansituation. Previous generals had been chosen on their ability to politik their way to apositionofcommandfromwhichtheyhopedtoenrichthemselves.Nowthesenatehadtoselect a general for his ability to actually command armies, a man who was moreinterestedinwinningbattlesthanbooty.Atleast, thesenatorsconsoledthemselves, theywereable to findsuchamanamong theirownranks–oneQuintusCaeciliusMetellus.Electedconsulin109BC,Metelluswentofftothewar.Whetherhelikeditornot,hehadtotakewithhimashissecond-in-commandamancalledCaiusMarius.

Asoneof themainprotagonistsof thecatastrophethatstrucktheRomanRepublic inthe years 91–81 BC, CaiusMarius deserves our close attention. Hewas aman of greatenergyandambition,aswasdemonstratedbythefactthathehadforcedhimselfintothelargelyclosedranksofRome’sgoverningclass.Mariuswasalsoapoliticiantothecore,and the sort of politician who gives the breed a bad name. He was unscrupulous and

immoral,anddidnotcarewhatpersonsorprincipleshesacrificedsolongasthesacrificehelpedhisrisetothetop.OrdinarilyMariuswouldhavebeenindistinguishablefromthedozens of other minor politicians infesting Rome at the time, but Marius also hadintelligence, exceptional ability as an organizer and an opportunistic ability to pick hismoment.(Asittranspired,thesesamefactorslatermadehimaverygoodgeneral.)

Despite the claim of his biographer Plutarch that Marius’ father was a commonlabourer, it ismuchmore probable thatMariuswas from thedominobiles – the lesseraristocracy of the Italian cities. As such, though an outsider among the oligarchs whogovernedRome,Marius had contactswith the oligarchs as thesemen valued the dominobiles as clients of their patronage. Thuswe firstmeetMarius as a junior but valuedmemberoftheretinueofScipioAemilianuswhenhewenttowartoavengethedefeatbytheNumidianswhichsodisgracedTiberiusGracchus.(AnotherunderScipio’scommandinthatwar,leadingaunitofNumidiancavalry,wastheyoungJugurtha.ThissuggeststhatScipiopickedhismenforabilityratherthanscruples.)

AftermakinghisnameforhimselfinIberia,MariusreturnedtoRome.HerehewonthebackingoftheMetellusclanwhenhemadeabidforthetribunate.However,onceelectedtribuneMariuscheerfullyturnedagainsteverythingthearistocraticMetellistoodfor,andbecame unabashedly demagogic. Among other measures, he proposed a law thatpreventedthearistocracyfrominterferinginelectoralballots.ThesemeasuresweregoodforRomandemocracy,butitseemsimprobablethatMariuschosetoforcethemthroughonthatbasis.Rather,hehaddecidedthatthevotesofthecommonpeoplewereofmorevalue tohim than the support of theMetelliwhohadgot himhis office.Whenhewassummonedbeforethesenatetoexplainhimself,Mariusstoodhisground.WhentheconsulcalledonMetellusasMarius’patron to talksense intohisprotégé,Mariussignalled theend of that particular relationship by having Metellus arrested for interfering with atribuneinthecourseofhisduties.ThereafterMarius’lawwentthrough,buthehadmadeanenemyoftheMetelli,whoratherjustifiablyfeltthatMariushadbothstabbedtheminthebackanddemeanedthefamilynameinfrontoftheircolleagues.

Metellanenmitymadefurtherpoliticalprogressdifficult.Aftercompletinghisyearastribune,Mariustriedtogetelectedasaedile,andfailed.Itappearedthatabandoningthefavour of the Metelli in exchange for the favour of the common voters had been amisjudgement,butMariuspersevered.Heeventuallygainedtheofficeofpraetor,aranksecondonlytotheconsul,thoughhehadtobribehiswaytowinningtheelection,andtheMetellimadesurehewasprosecutedforit.ThetrialwentbadlyforMarius,soitcameasasurprisewhenthe juryfailedtocondemnhim.Almostcertainlyadealwasmadewithsomeonebehindthescenes,thoughweknownotwithwhom.Thereweremanypeopleforwhomitwasusefultohaveaservingpraetorowingasubstantialfavour.

As praetorMarius served capably but without great distinction in Spain, and on hisreturnhecastaboutforalliesinRome.HetookasawifeawomancalledJuliaoftheup-and-comingfamilyoftheJuliiCaesares,3andawaitedhisnextopportunity.Thedisastrouswar inAfricawas tailor-made forMarius to promote himself further.We do not knowwhatoddcombinationofpledgesgivenandcalledinresultedinMariusbeingselectedas

the foremost ofMetellus’ subordinates, but it is unlikely thatMariuswas theman thatMetellushimselfwouldhavechosen.Butchosenhewas,andthewaythesystemworkedmeant thatMetellushimselfhad tonominate that choice to the senate, sohemusthavereconciledhimself–howeverreluctantly–withhisrecalcitrantex-client.

ItwasnotlongbeforeMetellusregrettedhischoice.ItwasclearalmostfromthestartthatMariushadjoinedtheAfricanarmywiththelong-termaimoftakingcontrolofitforhimself.Sincethearmyalreadyhadageneralincommand,andfinallyarathergoodonetoo, Marius had first to set about undermining his boss. His first step was one thatMetelluscouldnotreallycomplainabout,sinceMariusworkedatwinningtheloyaltyofthemen. ‘It is amost agreeable spectacle for a Roman soldier to see a general eatingcommonbreadinpublic,sleepingonasimplepallet,orhelpingwiththeconstructionofsometrenchorpalisade’remarksMarius’biographerPlutarch,4andMariusdidallthisandmore.

Metellus had chosen to beat Jugurtha by a policy of methodically capturing hisfortresses one by one and subduing the surrounding countryside. It was a painstaking,unglamorous but highly effective campaign. Marius did his best to undermine it bysuggestingbothtothesoldieryandtohispoliticalfriendsinRomethathecoulddothejobinhalfthetimeifgivencommandofoperations.Perhapshefeltthatbymakinganuisanceofhimselfinthisway,MetelluswouldreleasehimfromhispositionaslegateandallowhimtostandfortheconsulshipinRome.(Commandofmajorcampaignsusuallywenttoserving consuls or ex-consuls).However, the idea of having the bumptious and openlyambitiousMariusasleaderoftheRepublichadlittleappealtotherefinedMetellus.InanycaseMetellushadbeeninfuriatedbythefactthatMariushadorganizedtheprosecution–fortreason–ofoneofMetellus’clients.Thisman,likeMarius,wasservinginthearmy,andwasthereforeconsideredbyMariusasarival.TheprosecutionwassuccessfulandacourtmartialfoundMetellus’clientguilty.Metelluswasforcedtocondemnhisownmantodeath–onchargesthatwerelaterfoundtobefalse.Whenthatinformationcameout,Plutarch tells us that ‘almost everybody sympathized with Metellus in his grief, butMarius,wasfullofjoy.Heproclaimedthatthecondemnationwashisownhandiwork,andunabashedlyannouncedthathehadforceduponMetellustheguiltofsentencinghisownmanunjustlytodeath’.5

Under the circumstances,Metellus could be forgiven formaking life as difficult forMariusashecould.HisfirstreactiontotheproposalthatMariuswantedtobeconsulwastomockingly suggest thatMarius shouldwait until his son,QuintusCaeciliusMetellus(whowaslatertogainthecognomenof‘Pius’),wasoldenoughtostandasacandidateonthesameballot.Sincethatwasduetohappeninaroundtwentyyears’ time,Mariuswasunimpressed.Hewas equally unimpressedwhenMetellus did give him leave from thearmytocampaigninRome.Hiscommanderhadtimedthingscarefully.BygivingMariusleavetogo,Metelluswasshotofhisturbulentlegate,whichdoubtlesscameasarelief.Byreleasingthatlegatewhenhedid,MetellusgaveMariusjusttwelvedaystoleaveAfrica,sailtoRome,conductanelectioncampaignandgetelected.

Thankstoafavourablewind,carefullypreparedtransport,andagentsandproxieswho

hadbeenalreadycampaigninghardforhiminRome,thatisexactlywhatMariusdid.Hispropagandistshad told theRomanpeople thatMetellus’careful, stolidcampaignwas infactdesignedbyMetellustoprolongthewarforMetellus’ownprofitandglory.Thiswasgrossly unfair, but given the recent performance of Roman aristocratic generals, it wasalsohighlycredible.Ifputinchargeofthearmy,announcedMarius,hewouldbringthewartoaspeedyconclusionandbringthetroopshomeforthwith.Thisagainwasgrosslyunfair, asMariusknew thatMetellushad alreadyprettymuchgot thewarwon and thetroopswouldbecominghomeinanycase.Butthepeopledidnotknowthat.

Thesenatedid,anditsmemberswereasunimpressedwithMariusthewould-beconsulas theyhadbeenwithMarius the tribune.Theydecided touse theirprerogative tokeepMetellusinhiscommandinAfricaandassignMariusconsulardutieselsewhere(inHadeswould have been the first choice, had there been away to get him there).Marius hadforeseenthismeasurealso.Oncehewaselectedconsulhearrangedforafriendlytribunetopropose that commandof theAfricanwarbe transferred toMariusby law.Thiswasbothlegalandhadprecedentdatingbackto131BCandbefore thento theSecondPunicWar.Metelluswas replaced andMarius got his army – furthermore, aswill be seen, itgaveMariusatechniqueforgainingcontrolofanarmyhewastore-attempttoapplyin88BCwithdisastrousconsequences.

Now, in 108 BC, the senate showed its disgust with Marius’ conduct by awardingMetellusatriumphonhisreturn.Hewasalsoawardedanhonorarycognomen,andwouldhenceforthbeknownasQuintusMetellusNumidicus.Thislatterhonourmadeclearwhomthesenatefelthadwonthewar,andwasashrewdblowaimedwithfullappreciationofthewide streak of jealousy running through Marius’ character. Another relatively pettymeasurewastoforceonMariusasubordinatehewascertaintodislike.Thiswasamancalled Lucius Cornelius Sulla, a man as drunken and dissolute as they come, but anaristocratthroughandthrough.

Thesetwoevents–theoverturningofasenatorialcommandbyapopularlaw,andthebringingtogetherofSullaandMarius–seemednotparticularlyextraordinaryatthetime.However,theyestablishedthefaultlinesalongwhichtheRomanRepublicwouldlaterberippedapart.Butuntilthecataclysmactuallycame,noonepaidmuchattention.Therewasa lot else going on. First there was the African war itself. While still in Italy Mariusmerrilystirredthepotofcontroversyfurther.Heannouncedinspeeches thathewasthetrue spiritual heir of the old Roman nobility, since like them, he hadwon his position‘becauseofhisdeeds,notbecauseofhisancestors’.Heannounced–probablywithsometruth–thattheRomansofoldwouldbeheartilyashamedofwhattheirdescendantshadbecome. Then, when taking his army to war, Marius – contrary to law and custom –recruitedmenwhofailedtomeetthebasicpropertyqualificationsformembershipofthelegions.

It is probable that there was good reason for this. The African wars had beenspectacularly unprofitable for the men who actually fought them, and no doubtdisillusionedveteransofpreviouscampaignshadpassedtheirimpressionsontopotentialmembersofthecurrentlevy.Iftherewasashortageofrecruits,itisdoubtfulifthesenate

didanything tohelpMariusoutofhispredicament,soMariusdoubtlessfelt justified intakingmenfromtheRomancommonswherehissupportwasstrongest.Afterall,whenthestatewasdesperateformentofightintheSpanishwars,thedoubtfulqualificationsofmanyastrappingyoungrecruithadbeencarefullynotexamined.Thismoveraisedafeweyebrows at the time, but no one noted the wider implications – that once they hadcompleted their timeofservice, thesemenwouldhavenosmallholdings togohometo,andtheymightlooktotheirgeneraltoprovidefortheirretirement.Twodecadeslaterthiswould be amajor issue,which further destabilizedwhat had become awildly unstablerepublic.

Contrary toprecedent,Metellusdidnot stay towelcome thearmy’snewcommander,butleftdirectlyforRome–notthatMariusmindedmuch.Hethrewhimselfenergeticallyintodelivering the results that hehadpromised theRomanpeople. Jugurthameanwhilehadalliedhimselfwithhisfather-in-law,Bocchus,thekingofMauretania.Bynow,thankstosuccessesunderMetellus,theRomanarmyhadhighermoraleandwasgettingbetteratdealingwith Jugurtha’s guerilla tactics.UnderMarius’ highly competent leadership theRomansspeedilydroveJugurthafromhislastcitadelsinNumidia.Someroughhandlingquickly persuadedBocchus to bow out of thewar.His diplomatsmade peacewith theRomans. According to that peace, Bocchus would receive part of Jugurtha’s formerkingdomonconditionthathehandedoverthepersonofJugurthahimself.

Thishandover requiredsomecare. If too largeacontingentofRomansshowedup tocollecthim,Jugurthamightmakearunforit.Toosmallacontingent,andBocchusmightnot feel confident of taking Jugurtha into custody and instead betray the Romans toJugurtha and his substantial bodyguard.Marius felt he had the perfect solution to thisconundrum.ThesenatehadwishedLuciusCorneliusSullauponhim.Excellent.Hewouldgetthedissolutescionofthenobilitytoshovehisheadintothelion’smouthbyorderinghim to go to Bocchus and collect Jugurtha. If Sulla did come backwith Jugurtha as aprisoner,thenMariuswouldhavethewarwonatastroke.IfSulladidnotcomebackwithJugurtha, he was very probably not going to come back at all – a less satisfactoryoutcome,butpretty satisfyinganyway.MariusdislikedSulla for several reasons.FirstlyMarius was a somewhat prudish minor aristocrat from Arpinum who boasted of hisignoranceoffoppishGreekliterature.Sullawasawell-educatedblue-bloodwhoexhibited(inPlutarch’swords) ‘a diseasedpropensity to amorous indulgence and anunrestrainedvoluptuousnessfromwhichhedidnotrefrain’.6

ThehistorianSallustfleshesoutthischaractersketchofSulla.

HewaswellversedbothinGreekandRomanliterature,andhadatrulyremarkablemind.Hewasdevotedtopleasurebutmoredevotedtoglory.Heneverallowedhisdebaucheriesto interferewith his duties (apart from his duties as a husband) but he devoted all hisleisuretimetothem.Hewasbotheloquentandclever,andhemadefriendseasily.Whenitcametohidinghisintentions,hismindwasincrediblyunfathomable,yetwithallelsehewasextremelygenerous;especiallywithmoney.

Sallust,TheJugurthineWar95

Anyway,Marius had a jealous nature, and it stung that the ambassadors fromBocchus

preferredthecompanyofSullatohisown.Theseambassadorsmighthavebeenlookingtothe long term, knowing that consuls held office only for a year, but the power of theRomannobility(asrepresentedbySulla)wasentrenchedandpermanent.ItmayalsohavebeenthatSullawassimplyamoreconvivialhost.Therefore,reasonedMarius,ifSullaandtheMauretanians liked each other somuch, then they should be allowed to enjoy eachother’scompanyabitmore.NorwasSullaaversetotheplan.Indeed,accordingtosomelater sources itwashewho suggested it.This shouldhavegivenMariuspause, but theopportunityof either getting Jugurthaor getting shot ofSullawas toogreat to passup.Besides,someonehadtoattemptthesuicidemission,sowhynotSulla?Havingmadehiscase to himself,Marius issued his orders. Sullawas sentwith oneAulusManlius as adelegatetoBocchus.

The mission proved that being decadent and debauched did not prevent Sulla fromhavingnervesofsteel,northeabilitytotakeshrewdgambleswiththeresolvetofollowthem through. In disguise the pair of ambassadors slipped past the patrols that thesuspicious Jugurtha had set up for the express purpose of preventing contact betweenBocchus and the Romans, and thereafter presented their case to theMauretanian king.BocchuswaveredforsometimebetweenhandingSullaandManliusovertoJugurthaorJugurthaover toManliusandSulla,but in theendSulla’seloquencewontheday.SullagotJugurthaashiscaptive,andMariushadtheAfricanwarwonatastroke.TheeventssurroundingthecaptureofJugurthaset inmotioneventsfarmoreconsequential.Firstly,Marius was deeply irked that although he had won the war, the Roman nobilitymademuch of the fact that itwas one of their ownwho had actually effected the capture ofJugurtha.Secondly,andmuchmoreimportantly,theRomanpeopledecidedthatMarius’exemplarygeneralshipmadehimuniquelyqualifiedtoleadthestateinitshourofperil.ForRomenowfacedadangerthatmadetheAfricanwarlooklikethesideshowitwas.Inthenorth,thebarbarianswerecoming.

OurinterestintheAfricanWarhasbeennotsomuchinthewaritself,butbecausethiswarillustratedboththevenalityoftheRomannobilityandbroughtaboutthefirstmeetingof Sulla and Marius. Likewise our interest in the Cimbric Wars is not in the warsthemselves,butinhowthesewarsforwardedtherivalryofMariusandSullaandsetbackthecomingcataclysmoftheItalianrevolt.Nevertheless,somebackgroundisneeded.

Forall thattheyoriginatedsomewhereinwhatisDenmarktoday,thebarbarianhordecalled the Cimbri were a Germanic people. From the Roman perspective, the two keythingsabouttheCimbriwerefirstlythattheywereverygoodfighters,andsecondlythattherewereagreatmanyofthem–bymodernestimatessomewherearoundaquarterofamillioninall.ItisuncertainwhatstartedthishugemigrationfromCimbri’shomeintheJutlandpeninsula(theirownlegendsspokeofrisingwatersthatcoveredtheirlands),butbythetimetheybumpedagainsttheRomanfrontier,thetribehadbeenonthemoveforatleastadecade,wreakinghavocinitsslowprogressthroughcentralEurope.Bynowthishuge mass of warlike humanity consisted of at least four major groups; the Cimbrithemselves, theTeutones, and the opportunisticAmbrones andTigurni tribeswhowerehitchingalongfortheride.

TheGermansbecamea threat to tribesalliedtoRomeoncetheycrossedtheDanube,and in 113 BC one of these tribes called onRome for help. The reaction of theRomancommanderwasprettymuch typicalandexplainswhynotonly the Italiansbutalso thecommonpeopleofRomeloathedthearistocracy.Thearistocratinchargeonthisoccasionwas a treacherous incompetent called Papirius Carbo. On hearing of the incursion, heorderedtheGermanstoleavetheareaforthwith.PerhapstoCarbo’ssurprise,theGermansdutifully agreed, and negotiated a peaceful departure. Treacherously, Carbo set up anambush to wipe out the tribesmen as they left. Incompetently, he failed to conceal hisintentions.ThefuriousGermanspromptlywipedoutCarbo’sarmyinabattleatNoreia.

FromtheretheGermanicbulldozermovedwest,flatteningthearmyofJuniusSilanusinTransalpineGaulin209BCandthearmyofCassiusLonginusatBurdigalainthesameyear.Twoyears later theTigurni tookonanotherRomanarmy inan independenteffortandagainwoneasily.Thisunbrokenstringofdefeatswasduemostlytobadgeneralshipand proved yet againMarius’ contention that the contemporaryRoman nobilitywere adisgrace to theirancestors.But itdoesprovidesomeexcuse for theconductofgeneralssuch asBestia inAfrica. In comparisonwith theGermanic threat, theAfricanwarwasliterallyasideshow.BestiaandhiscolleaguesmighthavearguedthattheirappeasementofJugurtha was not because of the latter’s massive bribes (or at least not only for thatreason), but also because Jugurtha couldwait, and the threat from the north could not.Therefore, rather thanwastemenand resources inAfrica, itwasbetter tocloseoff thatwaronwhatevertermsandleaveJugurthauntilafterRomehadseenofftheGermans.

While a viable excuse, this fails to explain why even after Marius had brought theAfricanwartoatriumphantconclusion,theRomanscontinuedtomakeapig’searoutoftheGermaniccampaign.Theendingof theAfricanwarmeant that in105BCRomewasabletoputtogetheramassivearmyofsome80,000mentodealwiththeCimbri.ThiswasthelargestsingleRomanarmytotakethefieldsincethebattleofCannaein216BCintheHannibalicwar.TheCimbri(atermthatisgenerallyusedasshorthandforboththeCimbriandtheirallies),foughtinprimitivetribalgroups.Rome’slegionshadbetterweaponsandarmour, a superior logistical system and greater tactical ability.Unfortunately they alsohadtwoparticularlybone-headedcommanders.

Oneofthesemen,MalliusMaximus,wasofanon-consularfamily,andwasthereforedespised by the other commander, highly bred Servilius Caepio. Relations between thetwo generalswere so poisonous that themen under their command camped separately.When the Cimbri approached, the Romans were on the border of the province ofTransalpineGaulnearthetownofArausioontheRhone.ItappearsthatMalliusopenednegotiationswith theCimbriwithoutconsultingCaepio,andCaepio launchedasurpriseattackon theCimbriwithout tellingMallius.So insteadof a combined armyof 80,000Romansactingtogether,theCimbrihadtocopewithtworatherconfusedarmiesof40,000menactingseparately,andtheCimbricopedrathereasily.ThebiggestRomanarmysincethebattleofCannaesufferedthegreatestRomandefeatsincethebattleofCannae.Almostallofthe80,000strongarmywerekilled.TwonotablesurvivorswerethegeneralsCaepioandMalliuswhobothfledfromthebattlefield.

With yet another of its armies wiped out, the Roman state was both exhausted anddefenceless.AllthatsavedItalyfrominvasionandsackthatyearwasthefactthatitwaslateinthecampaigningseason,andtheCimbrididnotfancytacklingtheAlpsinautumn.Instead, they turned off towards Iberia, giving the Romans valuable time in which toregroupbeforetheenemyreturned.OnceRomehadmusteredenoughofanarmytohavea sportingchanceof fightingoff theCimbri, it surprisednoone that theRomanpeoplewerevehementlyopposed toputtingaRomannoble in chargeof it. In fact, now that aprospectiveGermaninvasionofItalyhadputtheirnecksontheline,theRomannobilitywereinclinedtoagree.Soinsteadofpromotinganotherhighlybredidiot,thestateturnedforsalvationtoCaiusMarius.

Marius rose to the occasion. The changes made to the army in this period are nowknownas‘theMarianreforms’,butinfactmanyofthesereformshadbeenintroducedbyMarius’predecessorsorrepresentedtrendsalreadyevolvingintheRomanmilitarysystem.However, Marius certainly deserves the credit for hastening and systematizing thesechanges.ThefirstofthesechangeswasprobablytheresultofexperienceintheJugurthanwar.TheRomansdiscoveredthatchasingthehighlymobileNumidianswasfruitlesswiththearmyasitwascurrentlyconstituted.SoRomanflyingcolumnsdevelopedthehabitofloading onto individual soldiersmuch of the kit formerly carried on the baggage train.Now a Roman soldier went to war loaded down with some 60 pounds (27kg) ofequipment,includingrations,weaponsandentrenchingtools.

WhilefightinginAfricaandSpain,theRomanshadfoundthatsmallflexiblehandfulsofmenmade the best formations.However these ‘handfuls’ (‘maniples’ in Latin)wereeasilyoverwhelmedbyamassofbarbarians.SotheRomanlegionadoptedthecohort,aunitof480men.Thecohortwasnotatotalinnovation–itcertainlyexistedintheRomanarmypriorto105BC–butMariusmayhavebeenresponsibleformakingthisthestandardtacticalunit.Thereweresixcenturiesinacohort(despitethename,a‘century’containedaroundeightyfightingmen)apartfromtheFirstCohort,whichwasdouble-strength.Thelarger cohort allowed a legion to be more flexible than a phalanx, but the individualcomponents now maintained their internal integrity better under pressure than hadmaniples. Also at about this time – though it is uncertain how the implementationhappened–thelegionsabandonedotheranimaltotemstogiveprimacytotheeagle.

Having re-arrangedhis army, thenext thingMariusdidwas to takeadvantageof theCimbri’stemporaryabsencetotrainit.Previously,trainingintheRomanlegionshadbeenaratherhit-and-missaffairwithindividualcommanderstrainingtheirmenastheythoughtthesituationrequired.Thesituationnowrequiredhighlytrainedanddisciplinedsoldiers,so Marius adopted the technique first thought up by Metellus’ second-in-command inAfrica, and started training his men like gladiators. This rigorous regime, whichemphasized stamina, was constantly maintained throughout a soldier’s period ofenrolment,andkeptthetroopsataconstanthighleveloffitnessanddiscipline.Naturally,bothsincethesalvationofItalymadethisnecessary,andbecausenoRomancommanderwouldimaginedoingotherwise,theItalianallieswereorganizedinthesamemannerandtrainedwiththesametechniques.

Infactthe‘Marianreforms’formedthebasisfortheorganizationoftheRomanarmyforatleastthenextthreehundredyears,duringwhichtimethebulkoftheRomanempirewasconqueredand theonly force inEuropecapableofbeating the legionswasa forcecomposedofotherlegions.SowhentheCimbriresumedtheirassaultonItaly,Mariusandhisarmywerereadyforthem.Romehadbeenfortunateingettinganextendedperiodofgrace,forafterthedecisivedefeatoftheRomansatArausiotheCimbricarmyhadsplitupanddevoteditselftoplunderingIberiaandGaul.AstheywaitedfortheCimbritoresumetheir assault on Italy, the Roman people showed their faith inMarius by electing himconsulyearafteryear.

One of Marius subordinates in 104 and 103 was Cornelius Sulla, who repeated hisAfricansuccessbycapturingarenegadeGallicking.ThisrubbedsaltintothewoundsofMariuswhowasalreadyjealousthatSullasportedaringshowingthecaptureofJugurtha.According to Plutarch, ‘Marius, irritated by his [Sulla’s] successes, denied him furtheropportunityforactionandblockedhischancesofadvancement.’7Therefore,bythetimeof the return of the Cimbri, Sulla had transferred to the command ofMarius’ consularcolleagueLutatiusCatulus.UnderCatulus,Sullafoughtabriskandsuccessfulcampaignagainst alpine tribesmen and then forced the tribesmen to supply Catulus’ army withprovisionssoabundant that therewasasurplusforMariusandhismen.Farfrombeinggrateful for his former subordinate’s bounty, the jealousMariuswas said to have beenthoroughlyannoyedby it.Sullamayhavestillbeenworking inhisquartermaster’s rolewhen the first clash came with the returning Cimbri.Marius defeated them handily inGaul, but Catulus suffered a setback in Italy when his men refused to fight from theadmittedly poor position into which their general hadmanoeuvred them. ConsequentlyCatuluswasforcedtoretreatbeyondtheriverPoandtowaitforMariustoreinforcehim.

ThecombinedRomanarmiesmettheCimbrinearPiedmontinnorthernItalyin101BC.ThedecisiveclashwasatVercellaeinwhatissometimescalledtheBattleoftheRaudinePlain. Itwasahot summerday,and the tensof thousandsofmenadvancing intobattlestirred up such great clouds of dust that visibility was limited. This caused someembarrassment toMarius as he led his portion of the army at high speed into the dustcloud.Because the enemyhad – quite logically – concentrated their forces onCatulus’men, Marius missed the Cimbric army altogether. So while Catulus engaged thebarbarians inapitchedbattle,Mariusspentsome timemarchingbackandforth throughthedustcloudinanattempttoworkoutwheretheeventwastakingplace.Bythetimehearrived,thebarbarianshadbeenbroken.Muchofthevictorywasduetoabrilliantlytimedcavalry charge that broke the Cimbric cavalry and drove it back onto the ranks of theinfantry just as they were deploying. It is quite possible that it was Sulla who led thecavalry, thoughwhenPlutarchquotes fromSulla’snowlostmemoirs,wehearonly thatSullareportshimselfasbeinginthethickoftheaction–inmarkedcontrasttotheabsentMarius.

ItisrathertypicalofMariusthatonceRomehadbeensavedfromthebarbarianhorde,theaftermathofthevictorypassednotinjoyouscelebrationbutinapuerilespatoverwhodeserved themostcredit.Marius tried toclaimall thekudosfor thevictoryforhimself,butCatulustookimpartialobserversfromthecityofParmatothebattlefieldandshowed

them the bodies.ManyCimbri still had embedded in their corpses the pilums that hadkilled them, and the vast majority of these pilums carried the markings of Catulus’legionaries.(Thisisincidentallytheonlyindicationwehavethatpilumsweresomarked.)AsaresultthevictoryatVercellaewascelebratedbythejointtriumphofbothgeneralsinRome.Asoverallcommanderandasthevictorofpreviousengagements,Mariusreceivedthemostpraise.Nevertheless,itrankledwithhimthatCatulusandSullahadactuallywonthefinalbattleforRome,andsostolensomeoftheglorythatMariusfeltshouldrightlyhavebeenhis.Heneverforgaveeitherman.

FChapter3

TheStateofItalyaced with imminent disaster from an external threat, the peoples of the Italianpeninsula had pulled together to overcome the crisis. With the barbarians so

decisively defeated that the only Cimbri remaining in Italy were tens of thousands ofenslavedcaptives,thenon-RomansofItalyturnedtheirattentiontotheirnextproblem–theRomans of Italy.The self-inflicted disaster that hitRome in 91 BC could have beenrectifiedwith relativeeasehad theRomansacteddecisivelyadecadeearlier.Politicallyspeaking,thesituationthenwasratherclosetothewayithadbeenthreedecadesearlier.AlmostnoprogresshadbeenmadeintheenfranchisementoftheItalianssincethedeathofGaiusGracchusin121BC.Asonehistoriangloomilyremarks,‘Theperiodwasoneofdepression, when flaws in the fabric of the state were made uncomfortably plain, yetnothingworththementionwasdonetorepairthem.’1

However,‘almostnoprogress’doesnotmean‘noprogress’.TheRomanoligarchyhadsodisgraceditselfinthelastyearsofthesecondcenturyBCthatsomepublicbacklashwasinevitable.Fortheprovincials,thesignificantpartofthatbacklashwasameasurepassedinaround104BCcalledtheLexderebusrepetudis.Bythislawaprovincialadministratorcouldbe indictedand forced to returnanymonieshehad received from illegalactivity,even if he had not directly participated in the illegal activity. Admittedly, the Romanpeoplepassedthislawmoreoutofspiteagainstthesenatethanforconsiderationfortheprovincials, but it provided some relief nevertheless. Also it was encouraging that asuccessfulprosecutionwouldberewardedbythegrantofRomancitizenshiptothosewhobroughtthesuit.

Thisgesture towards foreignerswaspartlybecauseonceMarius returned toRomehebecame involved in politics. Since the optimates remainedmore than cool toward him,Mariusstrovetomaintainthesupportofthemasses.SincethecommonpeopleofRomestillfondlyrememberedtheGracchi,Marius’alliesandpolicieshadasomewhatGracchanbent. The hopes of non-Roman Italians were further raised by the fact that Mariusunilaterally gaveRoman citizenship to a thousandmen of Camerinumwho had foughtparticularlywell for him.When reproached for this illegal action,Marius did not backdown but replied that the ‘din of battle had overwhelmed the sound of legalism’.Furthermore,whenMariusstartedlookingforlandforhisveteransoncethelegionswerestooddown,hisproposedcolonieshadnotonlyRomancitizens,butalsoholdersof theLatinRight(p.20),whichindicatesthatanumberofItalianveteranshadbeenputonthefasttracktocitizenship.

However,eventhoughontheropes,thecunningandunscrupulousnessoftheoptimatesmeant that they should never be underestimated. The most scrupulous of the bunch,MetellusNumidicuswasexiledforrefusingtoswearanoathtoobeyaMarian-sponsoredlaw thatnoneofhis fellowsenatorshadany intentionofobeyinganyway,buthis exilemarkedthelowpointofoptimatepoliticalweakness.ThesympathyshownbytheMarians

totheItalians–scantasitwas–wasusedbytheoptimatestoturntheRomanmobagainstMarius’allies,whileMariushimselfalsohadeithertodistancehimselffromthesemenorappeartoendorsethethuggeryandoccasionalmurderbywhichthosealliesheldpower.Eventually the senate felt strong enough to outlaw themost extreme of the ‘Gracchan’demagogueswhowerethereafterstonedtodeathbyamobincitedandledbyoptimates.Mariuswiselydecidedtoleavetown,suddenlyrecallinganoathhehadmadetovisitAsiaMinor.

Theoptimateswerebackinpowerandonaroll.TheyhadMetellusNumidicusrecalledfromexilewithbarelyamurmurofopposition.Then,giventhatItalyseemedpeaceful,thesenate decided to push its luck a little further. The Italians and other non-Romans hadplayedsomepart inpublicdisturbancesduring theMariansupremacyinRome.Thoughtheylackedavote,theyhadbeennumerousenoughtopacklegislativemeetingsofRomanvotersandmaketheirfeelingsclearthroughhecklingordownrightintimidation.ThiswasconsideredunwarrantedinterferenceintheaffairsoftheRomanpeople,sotheconsulsof95BCpassedalaworderingtheexpulsionofallLatinsandItaliansresidentinRome.Theyalso ordered those censors taking the next census to rigorously inspect the RomancitizenshipofanyItalianwithsuspectgroundsforclaimingit.

This law– theLexLiciniaMucia –was an insensitivemisjudgement, for it not onlyoutragedthethousandsofnon-Romanswhohadmadetheirhomesonthesevenhills,butithadasymbolicvaluethatwascleartoallItalians.DespitetheirsharedsacrificeintheAfrican and Cimbric wars, the Roman government had spelled out, as clearly andunambiguouslyaspossible,thattheItalianswerenotwelcome.TheyweregoodenoughtofightanddiealongsideRomanlegionariesinwarsdeclaredbyandforthegoodofRome,but in all other respects the Italianswere not even second-class citizens. Cicerowas ayouthwhen this lawwhich sowed thewindwas passed, but a youngmanwhenRomereaped the subsequent whirlwind. His opinion was unambiguous and bitter – ‘to banforeignersfromacityisinhumane’hesaid,2adding:

Thoughitwaspassedbytwoconsulswhowerethewisestofall,IobservethateveryoneagreesthattheLexLiciniaMuciawasnotonlypointlessbutdestructive.…thefeelingsofthe Italian peopleswere so alienated by this law that itwas themain cause of thewarwhichbrokeoutthreeyearslater.

Asconius67–8C

If the Roman senate had proposed the Lex LiciniaMucia with the express purpose ofunitingtheItaliansagainstRome,theycouldhardlyhavedoneabetterjob.Resentmentinthepeninsularosefromsimmeringtoboilingpoint.TheItalianpeoplewereadiverselot,but resentment of Rome in all its facets gave them common ground. Furthermore theleaders of the Italianswere linked by the bonds of guest-friendship (hospitium), whichjoinedmostof thearistocratsofancient Italy.Hospitiummeantmore thanprovidingforthe needs of an aristocratic traveller when he passed through the lands of anotheraristocrat, for once hospitium was established, the parties would work to represent theother’sinterestsintheircommunityand,naturallyenoughreciprocatethehospitalityinareturn visit. In short, hospitium meant that Italy’s leaders had already a social old-boy

networkinplace,andwiththeprovocationoftheLexLiciniaMuciathisnetworkevolvedfromasocialorganizationtotheprototypecommandstructureofanItalianrebellion.

ItishighlyprobablethattheleadersoftheItalianpeoplehadpreviouslydiscussedthepossibilitytheymightuniteinrebellionagainstRome,butconversationnowturnedfromtheoreticalafter-dinnerdiscussionstohighlypracticalplanningsessions.Itisnowtimetoturn to the issues thatwouldhavebeendiscussed at these sessions.Uniting the ItaliansagainstRomewouldnotbeeasy, forhostility toRomewasaboutall the Italianshad incommon.

Ethnically, linguistically and culturally the peoples of Italy were as diverse as theclimate and geography of the peninsula they shared. Just under 30 per cent of thelandmassofItalyismountainous,withtheAlpsrunningacrossthenorthandtheApenninemountain range extending over 1,300km (800 miles) from north to south to split thepeninsulaintwo.TheApenninesjusteastofRomespreadfromeasttowestacross190kmofthepeninsula–whichisonly240kmat itswidest.EventheApennineswerediverse.Thenorthernportionwasthicklyforestedonitslowerslopesandsupportedlargeflocksofsheepandgoatsevenwherethemorefertilevalleyshadnotbeenclearedforfarming.Butasonemovessouthwardthelandbecamedrierandmorebarren,withdustyplateausandhighmountainscontainingfewnaturalresourcesandfewerinhabitants.

The two-thirds of Italy thatwas notmountain ranges consisted of terrain that variedfrommarshes,especiallythePontineMarshesandthemarshesofEtruria;lakesofwhichtherewereoverathousand,withtheLacusBenacus(LakeGarda)beingthelargest;high,barren alpine plateaus, and forests and dense scrubland that covered much of theremainderofthepeninsula.Ataveryroughestimate,lessthan15percentoffirstcenturyItalywasfarmland,andmanyofthesefarmswerehiddeninsmallvalleysortuckedawayalongsidecoastalenclaves–hardtogettoandbarelyworththejourneyonceonedid.Themost fertile farmlands in Italy lay (and still lie) along the banks of theRiverPo in theplainwhichliesbetweenthenorthernendoftheApenninesandthesouthernfoothillsoftheAlps.Sodifficultdid theApennine rangemake travel to the region that in imperialtimesRomefounditeasiertoimportgrainfromEgyptthanfromthefarmlandsofthePoValley.

At the other end of theApennineswasApulia, the heel of the ‘boot’ shape of Italy.Apulia was another patch of rich farming land that was hard to reach by land, sincemountainsblockedoffApuliafromthelandsideandmanyoftheseaapproachesendedinsheer cliffs. Therefore the fertile region from which Rome drew its local resourcesconsistedofItaly’swesternuplandsandplains.Thesestretchedfromthefoothillsof theAlps in the east down through Etruria and past Rome to Campania in the south. ThisregioncomprisedtheRomanheartland–thechunkofItalythatRomewouldhavetoholdatallcostsifitweretosurvive.Apples,olivesandcerealsallgrewwellhere,butevenatthis relativelyearly stage in thecity’sdevelopment, theurbanmassofRomeconsumedmorethanthisregioncouldsupply.GrainhadtobeimportedfromSicilyandincreasinglyfromthenewcolonyonthesiteofCarthageinAfrica.

To pre-imperialRomans, Italywas a geographical description and not a nation. That

geographymeantthatpartsofItalywerehardertogettothanplacesabroadhundredsofmiles further away.And–aswould-beconquerors fromPyrrhus to theAlliesofWorldWarIIhavediscovered–theItalianterrainiseminentlydefensible.ConsequentlyGreeceandEgyptwere integrated into theRomanempirebefore the last bits of Italyofficiallybecame Roman. (Egypt was conquered in 32 BC, while some Alpine tribes were stillresistingthelegionsin6BC.)

InfactasfarastheRomansoftheearlyfirstcenturyBCwereconcerned,thenorthernbitofthepeninsulawasnotItalyatall.ItwasapartofGaul.Tobeprecise,itwasCisalpineGaul – ‘Gaul this side of the Alps’ – a region so wild and woolly that it was onlyorganizedasaproperRomanprovincein81BC,attheendofthedecadedescribedinthefollowingchaptersofthisbook.

As the name suggests, the population of Gallia Transalpina was largely Celtic,consistingoftheInsubresandtheLiguriansinthewestandtheVenetiintheeast.Noneofthese tribes had any great fondness forRome.TheRomans had occupied the InsubriancapitalofMilanin221andthetribesmenhadrespondedbyallyingwiththeCarthaginiansin theHannibalicwar.For the last century the Insubres hadbeen reluctant allies of theRomans, which ismore than could be said for the Ligurians. They too alliedwith theCarthaginians,buttheydidn’tstopfightingwhenHannibaldid.LigurialayacrossthelandroutetoHispania,andtheRomanshadbuilt theviaAureliaacrossLigurianlandsothattheycouldreachHispaniaatanytimeoftheyear.Naturallyenough,theRomanswantedtokeeptheroadtheyhadbuiltunder theircontrol,while theLiguriansdidnotwant theRomansthereatanyprice.Theresultwasanothereightyyearsofsporadicwarfare,whichonlycametoanendaroundthetimeoftheCimbricinvasion.

North-easternItalywasoccupiedbytheVeneti.Fragmentsoftheirlanguagefoundoninscriptions show strong Latin influence, but this may have been cultural rather thangenetic–thepeoplewereprobablyethnicallyclosetotheIllyriantribeswholivedalongtheAdriatic.BeinghabitualfoesoftheInsubres,theVenetialliedwiththeRomansintheHannibalicwarmainly because the Insubres chose the other side.The gratefulRomansresponded by colonizing the areawithout going through the usual preliminary stage ofconquest. Aquileia was founded in 161, and the ancient city of Patavium (Padua) wasincreasinglyRomanized.(ThehistorianLivylatercamefromhere.)Bythemid-90sBCtheVenetiwereclearlynotalliesoftheRomans,butsubjects.

Aswemovesouth, theeastsideof theApennineschangesfromTranspadeneGaultoRomanPicenum.TheareahadbeenRomansince240whenthelocalSenonestribehadbeen conquered and summarily ejected from all but a land-locked area around theircapital,Asculum.Notunexpectedly,PicenumhadsubsequentlysidedwithRomeagainstHannibal.Allegiance in theHannibalicwarappears tohavebeensomethingofa litmustest for events of a century later, because many of the areas that sided with Hannibaltended to also be anti-Roman a century later, while those sides that stuck with RomethroughtheHannibalicwarcouldgenerallybecountedonnottorebel,oratleasttodosoreluctantly. Therefore those plotting rebellion in the mid-90s BC probably knew thatPicenum would remain pro-Roman – Asculum and its environs however, were a

completelydifferentmatter.

OvertheApenninessouth-westofPicenumwasEtruria.ThisareahadbeendominatedbytheEtruscancultureinpreviouscenturies,butbythefirstcenturyBCRomaninfluencewas so strong that Etruscan was a dying language and the region was almost entirelyassimilated byRome.This regionwas of considerable strategic significance – not onlywas theagricultureof the regionvital toRome,but theEtruscanshadbuilt solidly,andcitiessuchasVolterraeweremassively fortifiedobstacles toany invader.Suborning theloyaltytoRomeoftheinhabitantsofthesecitieswastheeasiestwayofconqueringthem,and something that the would-be rebels of the embryonic Italian confederacy certainlycontemplated.

JustsouthofEtruriaandstillonthewesternsideoftheApennineslayLatium.ThisareawasthehomeoftheLatins,thepeoplefromwhomRomehadarisentoconquermostoftheknownworld.Theproblemwasthatintermsofarea,LatiumwastinyincomparisontotherestofItaly.Adeterminedmancouldriderightacrosstheplaceinaday,especiallygiven the abundance of local roads which led to Rome. This fact was particularlyworrisome to any Roman of a thoughtful disposition, for not muchmore than a day’smarch east of Rome were peoples whose loyalty was beyond doubt non-existent. Thenorth-eastwas less of a problem, becauseUmbriawas sparsely populated andmuchofthat population lived in colonies thatRome had founded – less out ofworry about thelocalUmbrians thanfromconcernsaboutGauls invadingsouthward through theregion.WeshallcometothemilitaryroleofRomancoloniesinduecourse.

South-eastofRomelivedadifferentkindofUmbrian–theSamnites.Ittellsusmuchofwhat we need to know about the Samnites that they were one of the earliest types ofgladiator to fight inRomanarenas.This stubbornand ferociouspeoplehaddisliked theRomanssincetheyhadfirstmettheminthefourthcenturyBC,andfirstcenturyRomansstillsmartedfromthehumiliationofthedefeatsinflictedbytheSamnitesattheCaudineForksin321BCandLautulaein315BC.Fightingalongthevalleyof theRiverLiriswasparticularly intense, and the Samnites proved astute diplomats as well as fighters. Atvarious times they successfully roped both Gauls and Etruscans into the anti-Romancause. However, those fighting the Romans gradually buckled under their opponents’tenacity and superior organization. In 291 the Romans captured the Samnite city ofVenusia,temporarilybringingSamniteoppositiontoanend.

TheSamnitesremainedsubduedforalmostadecade,untilthearrivalinItalyofPyrrhusthe would-be Epirote conqueror. The Samnites enthusiastically joined Pyrrhus andprovided some of the manpower lost in his infamous Pyrrhic victories. One of thesevictorieswasatAsculum,acitythatwastoplayalargepartinsubsequentevents.WhenPyrrhuswasforcedtowithdraw,theRomansagainsettledaccountswiththeSamnites,andforcedthemtosubmitafterashortbutpainfulwar.Thereafter,noonewassurprisedwhentheSamniteswere among the first towelcomeHannibal to Italy and among the last toabandonhiscauseonceheleftthepeninsula.ForthecenturythereaftertheSamniteshadbeen resentful allies of Rome, paying taxes and contributing manpower to the Romanarmies. No one doubted for amoment that, given the ghost of a chance, the Samnites

would riseagain.Samnitecountrywasaboutaweek’smarch from thecentreofRome,something that one might imagine the senate would factor into its geopoliticalcalculations,butwhichitinexplicablyappearstohavefailedtodo.

ThenthereweretheMarsi–apeoplecloselyrelatedtotheSamnites,exceptthattheywere somewhatmore ferocious and lived even closer toRome.By and large theMarsilivedpeacefullywiththeirRomanneighbours.TheMarsiweredeeplyannoyedin301BCbythefoundationoftheRomancolonyofCarsoliontheirborders,andittookabriskwartomakethemaccepttheimposition.ThereaftertheMarsiweresteadfastalliesofRome,and refused to submit to Hannibal despite his violent attacks on their territory. Thehistorian Appian says that Rome had celebrated ‘no triumph over the Marsi, and notriumph without them’,3 which shows how tightly the Marsi were integrated with theRoman army. The loyalty of the Marsi was taken for granted, even by those Romansenatorswhohelped themselves toMarsic landbecause itwas so conveniently close toRome.Inretrospect,thiswasamistake.

SouthernItalyconsistedofCampania,BruttiumandApulia,thesebeingtheankle,toeandheel respectivelyof the Italianboot.Campania, famous for itscavalry,hadbeenanearlyconquestoftheRomans.TheCampanianshadoriginallybelievedthattheRomanscame to thearea todriveout theSamniteswhowereexpanding into theeasterncoastalplain.Theywererightabout theRomansbeatingoff theSamnites,butwrongtobelievethat the Romans would go home afterwards. In fact the first part of Rome’s famousAppianWay was built in 312 BC with the precise purpose of delivering legionaries toCampaniaathighspeedshouldtheneedarise.Theneedaroseagainin298whenRomedecidedtodefendtheLucanians(intheareajustsouthofCampania)fromtheSamnites.TheSamnites,Etruscans,GaulsandUmbrianspromptlyjoinedforcesagainstRomeinawar that saw the Etruscans crushed, the Samnites temporarily subdued and theAppianWayextendedsouthtoLucania.

Unsurprisingly theLucanians resented falling underRoman sway and joinedPyrrhuswhenhearrived in281BC.Subjugated in272BC afterPyrrhus’departure, theLucaniansdemonstrated a laudably never-say-die approach by also supporting Hannibal when hearrived in216BC.ThewarringRomanandCarthaginianarmiesdevastated thearea,andleft a legacy of bitterness against Rome, which meant that should the Italians rise inrebellion, theLucanianscouldbecountedontobeintheItalianranks,gamelypreparedfor round three. From Lucania we move on to decidedly bumpy Bruttium, modernCalabria,themountainousregioninthetoeofItaly.TheBruttiiwerecloserelativesoftheSamnites.TheyconqueredtheareainthethirdcenturyBCandweredecidedlybitterabouthaving tocede sovereignty to theRomanswhen the legionsmarched inagenerationortwolater.TheRomansweretheretopunishtheBruttiiforassistingPyrrhus,buttheyhadsomehardfightingtodobeforetheysubduedthearea.Naturallyenough,whenHannibalarrived theRomans had to do it all over again, because theBruttii supportedHannibalrightuptohis lastdays inItaly.TheBruttiiwereseverelypunishedfor theirallegiance.Roman colonies were placed right across their territory, and Bruttii tribesmen wereforbiddentoservewiththeRomanarmy.Itisnotknownifthisdecreewaseverrescinded,and their misfortunes had left the Bruttii as a people severely diminished in any case.

Nevertheless,ifthenameoftheBruttiicamefromtheLucanianwordfor‘rebel’–anditprobablydid–thenwhenthetimecame,rebelagainstRometheBruttiiwouldcertainlydoonceagain.

The‘heel’ofItaly,Apulia,becameRomaninthesamewayasLucaniaandCampania.The Romans arrived to protect the people against the Samnites, and never left. ApuliasupportedHannibal,buthadlittlechoiceinthematter,asitwasatCannaeinApuliathatHannibalcameclosetodefeatingRomeitselfin216.However,bythentheRomanshadalready taken the precaution of extending the Appian Way to Brundisium (modernBrindisi)in264BCandwereconsequentlyabletofeedtroopsintotheregionandrecaptureitwith relative ease.NorwouldRome easily let go of the region again, as the port ofBrundisiumbecameItaly’sgatewaytoGreeceandpointseast intheRepublic’sgrowingempire.ThoseplanningrebellionagainstRomemightgetApuliaon the rebelsideoratworstwarilyneutral,butcouldexpecttheRomanstotrytoregainthisstrategicassetatthefirst opportunity. Another complicating factor in the south was cities such as Naples,Heraclea andHeraclea, which remained essentiallyGreek in their culture. No onewasquitesurewhichwaythisparticularcatwasgoingtojumpwhentherebellioncame,buttheRomanshadhedgedtheirbetsbymakingNaplesintoaLatinColonyandfoundingthecolonyofNeptuniarightnexttoTarentum.

OveralltheneveniftheGreeksstayedoutofthefight, thewould-berebelshadcauseforoptimism.EssentiallytheGallicnorthwouldprobablyremainquiescent–lessoutofsympathy for Rome than because the Gauls had too little in common with the otherItalians. Picenumwould probably stay loyal, andUmbria too, thoughUmbriawas lesscertain. Campania and Etruria had been Roman for so long that without yet moreprovocationfromtheRomangovernmentitwashardtoimaginethemjoininganyrevolt.ThatlefteverythingelsewestandsouthofRome–afairlycontiguousblockoflandandpeoples,allwithancientgrudgesagainst theRomansandseethingresentmentforrecentmistreatment. Beyond a doubt, the conspirators assured each other at their clandestinemeetings,theSouthwouldriseagain.

Therewasjustoneproblemwiththishappypicture.Romehadcarefullyinsertedagreatmanyfliesintotheointmentintheformofcolonies.ARomancolonywasnotoccupiedlandcultivatedforthebenefitofRome–itwasanextensionofRomeitself.ThepeopleofacolonywereRomancitizens,fullyentitledtovoteinelectioninRomeiftheycouldbebotheredtogothereforthatpurpose,andequallyentitledtoleavetheircolonyandtakeupresidence in Rome if the desire so took them.4 However, most Roman colonists werecontenttoremainwheretheywere,becauseRomancolonieswerefoundedonthreemaincriteria.Firstly, thesettlers tended tobe former legionariesand their families.Secondly,thelandtheyweresettledontendedtobetherichestandmostfertilelandsintheterritorytheRomanswereoccupying,andthirdly,evenmorethanrichfarmlands,Romancolonieswerefoundedondefensiblesitesofstrategic importance.Therewereagreatmanysuchcolonies, because theRomans had a great deal of Italy both to keep down and also todefend.ThereforesomecolonieswerenotRomanbutLatin,thoughmanyvolunteersforthesesettlementswereraisedfromthepoorofRomeitself.ALatincolonywasdifferentfromaColoniaCiviumRomanorum,andhadadifferentconstitutionandrightsinrelation

to Rome. However, both Latin and Roman colonies both had a tendency to grow intoflourishing cities and these cities, unlike those of the reluctant allies amongwhom thecolonieswereplaced,wereanswerabledirectlytoRomeandowedthecitytheircompleteallegiance.

RomancoloniesdevelopedasaconsequenceofthetraumaticLatinWar,whichfinishedin338 BC. Before thenRome had looked at the other states of Latium as colleagues inmutualdefence.ThefactthatthesestatessidedwithotherlocaltribesagainstRomewasasobering experience that convinced the Romans that they needed to look to their owndefence.Theideaofdoingsowithmilitarycolonieswasnotanewone.TherewereplentyofexamplesfromearlierGreekhistoryfromwhichtheRomanscouldlearn,thoughsomeaspectsofthefoundationprocessmadeRomanwritersthinkthat theoriginal inspirationcamefromtheEtruscans.5

Thatthesefirstcolonieswereprimarilydefensiveiseasilydeterminedbytheirlocation,whichtookcarefulconsiderationofterrain,bothinmakingthecolonieshardtoassail,butalso giving them command of strategic features such as choke points in landcommunications.IftherewasasinglelandroutetoanyareaofItaly,thechanceswerethataRomancolonylayacrossthatroute.Thesecoloniesalsoservedthesamepurposeasanymilitaryoutpost–togiveearlynoticeofenemyactivity,andtosloworblockitwhilethemainbaseprepareditsresponse.Becauseofthisprimarypurpose,Romancolonieswerenotjustfoundedinlandswithsurlyinhabitantsofadistinctlyanti-Romaninclination,buteven in places that had been Roman for generations but which had strategic locationsworthcontrolling.

Manyof theoriginal colonieswereLatin colonies,but theHannibalicwar convincedtheRomansbothoftheimportanceofcoloniesandtheimportanceofkeepingthemloyal(theloyaltyof theLatincoloniesheld throughthewar,butdefinitelywaveredat times).Most colonies after the war were settled by Roman citizens, and these colonies wereconsiderablymore substantial thanpre-warRomansettlements.Often thecolonieswerefounded on existing sites taken from recently conquered locals, and were renamed tosomethingthatthenewoccupantspreferred.ForexampleMalventum,whichsoundedlike‘bad event’ to Latin ears, became Beneventum, Nequinum on the river Nar becameNarnia,andsoon.

Among the more important colonies, Tarracina controlled the land route betweenLatiumandCampania,whileFabrateriaNovablockedtheapproachestoLatiumfromthesouth-east–ajobthathadbeenthatoftheLatincolonyofFregellaeuntilitwasflattenedformutinyagainstRome in125.CremonaandPlacentiacontrolledaccess to Italy fromthenorth-east–which iswhy inAD69 two invadingRomanrebelarmieseach foughtaseparatebattleatCremona.Bononia(modernBologna)didthesamejobinguardingthenorth-west,withwell-fortifiedMutina(Modena)assupportinCisalpineGaul.CosawasakeysiteinEtruria,andVenusiaoccupiedsuchastrategicpointthattheRomanshadmadeitacolonyassoonastheycaptureditfromtheSamnitesinthewarof291.BeneventumwasoneofastringofcoloniesthatseparatedtheSamnitesproperfromtheHirpinitribe,whileAeserniaandAufidenadida similar jobofkeeping theSamnitesandMarsi from

joiningup.InthefarsouthThuriihadthejobofcontrollingtherestiveBruttii.

Overall, there were almost a hundred Roman and Latin colonies scattered acrossstrategic locationsalloverItaly. In latercenturies thepoliticalcommentatorMachiavelliconsideredRomancoloniesasthemosteffectivesourceofRomanstrength.Notonlydidthe colonies have a strategic role, but they were also effective instruments ofromanization,theprocessthatwaslatertoknitItalyintoaunifiedculturalentity.Fromthepoint of viewof those plotting rebellion against the power ofRome, the colonieswerecollectivelyand individuallya royalpain in theneck.Theywere toonumerousand toowell-defendedtobedefeatedindividuallyandtoowellsituatedtobeignored.And,asitturnedout,theywerealsotooloyaltobesubverted–apartfromonenotoriousexception,whichwewill come to later. It is reasonable to claim thatwithout the colonies, Romemightwellhave lost theapproachingwar.With thecolonies,Romanarmies,even thosedeep in otherwise hostile territory always had a secure base onwhich to fall back andmountainpassesandrivercrossingsweresecuredforthemevenastheyweredeniedtotherebels.ItwastheexistenceoftheRomancoloniesasmuchasanylingeringsentimentsofmoderationthatmadetheItaliansofthelate90sBCdecidetogivepeaceonelastchance.At this time, their hopes that the coming cataclysm might be averted rested on theshouldersofoneman–LiviusDrusus.

TChapter4

LiviusDrusus,theFailedReformerheRomansenatehadlostgroundintheyearsbefore100BC.InhisstrugglewiththesenateGaiusGracchushadtransferredcertainpowersfromthataugustbodytothe

classastep lower inRomansociety– theequites.Theequitesaresometimescalled the‘middle class’ofRome,which theywerenot.Touse a roughanalogywith themodernwesternworld if the ‘senators’ are thepoliticians, the equites are thebankers, the sharedealers and theCEOsof transnational companies.That is to say, theequiteswereoftenimmenselyrichandthankstoGracchus,politicallypowerfulaswell.

It will be remembered that the repetundae courts were set up to punish any Romanmagistratewhousedhispowerstoenrichhimself–orwhotookacutoftheprofitsfromanyone else whom that magistrate allowed to illegally exploit Roman subjects. SincemanyRomansenatorsdreamedofbeinggivenchargeofaprovincetorapefinancially,thesenatewasalwaysgoingtobesympathetictoanyonechargedofextortionwhileinoffice.Therefore Gracchus gave charge of the repetundae courts to jurors from the equites.Regrettably,allthislegislationdidwastogivetheequitesthechancetoprovetheycouldbeasgreedy,short-sightedandblatantlycorruptaseventhesenateonabadday.

The equites finally out-did themselves with the trial of Rutilius Rufus, and soinadvertentlysetinmotionasequenceofeventsthatprecipitatedthelong-brewingItalianrevolt.WemeetRutiliusRufusonp.90asthesecond-in-commandwhohandedovertheAfricanarmytoMariusin107BC.ThisRufuswasalsothemanwhosetrainingtechniqueswere adopted byMarius and so helped the legions throw back the threat of a Cimbricinvasion.RufusextendedhisrecordofpublicservicebyservingaslegatetothegovernoroftheRomanprovinceofAsiainwesternAnatolia.Thegovernor,MuciusScaevola,wasan honestman, something so rare that the provincials there long afterwards celebratedfestivalsinhishonour.ScaevolaandRufuscrackeddownhardonthetax-collectors,slavedealers and other members of the equites who were long accustomed to looting theprovincewith impunityundermore complaisant governors.Given such a record,Rufusdeservedwellofthestatehehadservedsofaithfully.However,theRomeoftheearlyfirstcenturyofferedfewrewardsforhonestmen.

Thewealthyandwell-connectedScaevolawasseenbythecorrupttax-collectorsastoodifficultamantochallenge,butScaevolahadreturnedtoRomeafterninemonthsleavingthe remainderofhisgovernorship forRufus toconductalone.During that time,allegedtheequites,Rufushadextortedvastsumsfromthepopulaceoftheprovince.Thechargewassomanifestlyuntruethatnoonebelieveditforamoment.Inawaythatwasexactlythepoint.The trial in 92 BCwas to be awarning to the senate not to interferewith theactivitiesortheequites–orelse.Despitehisobviousinnocence,Rufuswasfoundguiltyandordered to repay themoneyhehadnot in fact extorted.Sincehehadnot taken themoneyRufuswasnaturallyunabletopayitandwasexiledfromRome.Hechosetoliveouthisexileintheveryprovincehewasaccusedoflootingandwaswelcomedthereasan

honouredguest.TurningdownlaterinvitationstoreturntoRome,Rufuslivedtotheripeoldageof80,universallyrespected,andoneofthefewgenuinelygoodguysofhisera.

Thattheequitesunabashedlycondemnedsuchamanwasunequivocalproofofmoralbankruptcy, which briefly united the people and senate of Rome in their distaste.Consequently senate and peopleworked together to elect as tribune amanwhowouldcorrectfutureabusesofthiskind.TheirchoicewasLiviusDrusus.ThisLiviusDrususwasthesonofthemanwhohadout-demagogedGaiusGracchusin121BC(p.22).ThepeoplestillrememberedtheolderDrusus’landgrantsfondly,forallthatthesenatehadrenegedonputtingthemintoeffect.FurthermoretheyoungerDrususwasamanofknownhonestyandintegrity.1

LiviusDrusus startedhis year inofficewith threepriorities – to sort out the conflictbetweenthesenateandtheequites,toresolvetheproblemsofexploitationandmisuseoftheagerpublicus,thepublicland,andtodealwiththemutinousdiscontentoftheItalians.AsDrususwaswellaware,thethreeissueshadtobedealtwithsimultaneously,fortheywere deeply interconnected. For example, reforming the use of the public land wouldentailmore of it being given toRoman citizens. Thiswould displace Italianswho stillusedthatland,eventhoughtheytechnicallyhadnorighttoit.CertainlytheItalianshadfarmed there forgenerations,but theyhad lost title to the landafter their ancestorshadbeenbeatenbytheRomansinwar.Soifthelandcommissionersstartedredistributingthatland,theItalianswouldloseout–unlesstheytoowereRomancitizens.However,makingRomancitizens,andthereforevotersoutoftheItalianswouldupsetthebalanceofpowerin Rome, where the aristocracy had generally stitched up the various constituencies ofvotingtribesthroughamixtureofbribery,intimidationandpatronage.Thelastthingthesenatewantedwashordesof voters flooding in from the countryside.Such rural voterswould be hard to intimidate, expensive to bribe and were more easily patronized andbullied by their own aristocracy. Those rural Italian aristocrats would also be Romansoncetheywereenfranchised,andwiththeirowncadresofruralvoterstheytoowouldbeabletostandforpublicofficeinRome.Andjuniorsenatorsfeltthatthosepublicofficeshadalreadytoomanycandidatescompetingforthem.

Sopublic landcouldnotbe sortedoutwithoutdealingwith the Italian issue, and theItalianissuecouldnotbedealtwithwithoutsortingoutthebalanceofpowerinthesenate,whichcouldnotberesolvedwhilethesenatewasfeudingwiththeequites.Itwasaprettyconundrum,andonemadeevenmoredifficultbytheviolentimpatienceoftheItalians,thepettyself-interestofthesenateandtheshamelessgreedoftheequites.Thereweremenofgoodwill on all sides, but by and large factionalism and intransigence ruled the day.Aconsiderablemajorityregardedcompromisenotasstatesmanshipbutweakness,andweredeterminedthatallconcessionsshouldcomefromtheothers.ItwouldtakeaSolomontosortoutthemess,butLiviusDrususwasdeterminedtogiveitasportingtry.

Atthispointacaveatmustbementionedbytheconscientioushistoriandescribingtheevents thathappenednext. In theearly firstcenturywehavesomethingofahole in thehistoricalrecord.Theever-dependablechronicleofLivyismissing,nodoubtbecausetheRomans of late antiquity had little interest in committing the deplorable events he

describes to the highly expensive parchment which would have preserved them forposterity.AndwithLivymissing,wehavenocontemporaryhistorianwhofills thegap,leaving us with fragments of evidence and the highly abbreviated and sometimescontradictoryaccountsofthelaterwritersAppianandVelleiusPaterculus.ThereforetheexactorderanddetailsofwhatDrususdidduringhistribunatearelost,thoughthegeneraloutlineremainsclear.Whatfollowsisbothadescriptionofthatoutlineandanattempttoflesh out the details without plunging into the minutiae of scholarly controversy thatsurroundsthetopic.

ItseemsreasonablyclearthatthefirstchallengethatDrusushadtoovercomewastheperceptionthathewasthesenate’schampion.Inpartitsayssomethingabouttheextenttowhich Romans accepted the aristocratic capture of public office that no one found itextraordinarythatthesenate’schampionshouldbeatribuneoftheplebs.This,despitethefactthatthetribunewasintendedtobethepeople’schampionagainsttheverysenatethatDrusus was considered to be representing. However, at this point the common peopleagreedwith the senate that the equites needed taking down a peg, so theywere happyenough toelect thesenate’schoiceofaman‘mostnoble,mosteloquent,entirelyabovereproach’todothetakingdown.2 In fact, itwas thatvenerable rogueAemiliusScaurus,leaderofthesenate,whofirstcalledonDrusustodothis(Scauruswasbeingtriedbytheequites for extortion at the time). So havingbeen chosenby senate andpeople,Drususwould have been aware that the general understanding of his intentions put the equitesimplacablyagainsthim.

The epitomator of Livy is unambiguous about what those intentions actually were,describingDrusus as ‘a tribuneof theplebswhowanted to reinforce thepowersof thesenate’(Epitome71).Unfortunately,whilethesenatewantedapartisanwhowouldfighttheir cornerwhether theywere right orwrong, and the plebswanted a scourge for theequites, Drusus wanted to actually put things right. Drusus probably foresaw that thiswouldinfuriateeveryonebuttheequites(whodidn’tcount,sincetheywerefuriouswithhimalready).NeverthelessDrususrejectedthesenateandpeople’sroleforhimandchosetorepresentadifferentconstituency–thefewmenofgoodwillonallsideswhostillhopedforapeacefulresolutiontotheentireghastlymess.PerhapsDrususwaspreparedtofacethe storm of outrage his actions would cause in the short term because he thoughteveryonewouldthankhimlater,onceitwasallsortedout.

OnceDrusus set towork, the first item on his agendawas the courts. TheseDrususcertainlysortedout,thoughnotwoofourhistoricalsourcesagreeonexactlyhow,andthedetailsofhisLexiudiciariaarenowlost.TheepitomatorofLivy(quotedabove)saysthatDrusus divided juries between senate and equites. Velleius Paterculus says that Drususrestored control of the courts to the senate. Appian agrees, but adds that this was acompromiseachievedbydoublingthesizeofthesenateto600throughrecruiting300ofthemost influential equites into the senatorial order. Of the various accounts, it wouldseemthatAppianislargelycorrect,simplybecausenoonelikedthelaw,andthesolutiondescribedbyAppianwouldcertainlysucceedinupsettingeverybody.Theequiteswouldbefuriousthatcourtsweretakenoutoftheircontrol,becausetheirinstrumentforkeepinggovernorsdocilehadbeenwrenched from theirhands; thesenatewasappalled that300

new rivalshadbeenadded to the competition formagistracies; and thepeople failed tounderstand howpromoting 300 equites to the senate constituted the punishment of thatgroup that theyhadbeen looking for.EssentiallyDrusushadprovideda solution to theproblemof partisan andunjust courts that the equites certainlydidnotwant andwhichfailedtosatisfythesenateandpeoplebecausetheywantedrevenge,notsolutions.TheLexiudiciariawasnotpopular.

Drususmayhavesuspectedthatthiswouldbethecase,forhequicklyfolloweduptheLex iudiciaria with another law, a Lex agraria. This ‘land law’ was a straightforwardmeasure. Itdealtwith thecolonies thatwere tohavebeen foundedwhenDrusus’ fatherwastryingtooutbidGaiusGracchusforpopularsupport.TheproposaltosettlesomeofRome’s population in new colonies had been very popular, but once the senate haddefeated Gaius Gracchus, the proposal had quietly been allowed to die. Now Drususwantedtoreviveitagain,andatthesecondtimearoundtheideaprovedtobeaspopularwiththeRomanpeopleasithadbeenwhenitwasfirstproposed.Furthermore,aseriesofminorbillswereproposedthatdealtwithexactlywhatlandwastobeallocatedandhow.ThiswasverypopularwiththeRomanpeople,butmuchlesssowiththesenate.Thiswasprobablybecause,likeTiberiusGracchusbeforehim,Drususintendedsomeofthatlandallocation to come from public land thatRoman aristocratswere squatting on illegally.CertainlyPhilippus, theconsulof thatyear,wasvehementlyopposed to theLexagrariaanddidallinhispowertoblockit.Thisledtowhatmightpolitelybecalledsome‘robustpolitics’.Forexample,ononeoccasionwhenPhilippuswasoratingagainsttheproposalsin theforum,Drususwentsofaras tograb theconsulby the throat.Hechoked the topmagistrate in Rome so savagely that blood from a nosebleed flooded down Philippus’chest. Drusus dismissed reproaches of his violent conduct with the contemptuouscommentthatwhathaderuptedfromPhilippuswasnotbloodbutthrushsoup.3Philippushadareputationasagourmet,whilethelifestyleofDrususwasfamouslyaustere.

The senate was in a dither as to whether to support their unpopular consul or theunpredictablechampion theyhadchosen in their tribuneof theplebs.Aswehaveseen,Drususwasalotmoreforcefulthanhiswaveringcontemporaries.Atonepointhecameclose to ordering another senatorial opponent of his measures to be thrown off theTarpeianrock.Thisrock,ontheCapitolinehill,overlookedaprecipitousdrop,anditwastheRomanpractice to throw traitors off it to their doom.Cicero tells a tale that neatlysumsupsenatorialbemusementatDrusus’activities.

WhenamancalledGraniusmetDrusus,Drususgreetedhimwith‘Quidagis?’[roughly‘Whatareyouuptothesedays?’].Graniusreplied‘NobyGod,Drususwhatintheworldareyouupto?’

Cicero,proPlancio33

ViolentthoughtheoppositiontoDrusus’reformsmighthavebeeninthesenate,itwasnotunanimous.Drusushadhissupporters,notablythegreatoratorL.Crassus.CombinedwiththeenergeticandforcefulDrusus,Crassusandhis factioncould justabouthold the linewiththesenate,butoppositiontotheagrarianbilldidnotendthere.NotjustsenatorswereillegalsquattersonRomanpublicland.TherewerealsotheItalians.Inwarsofprevious

centuriestheancestorsoftheseItalianshadpaidfortheirdefeatwiththelossoftheirlandtotheRomans(Romegenerallytookaroundone-third).However,apartfromdeclaringtheconfiscatedterritoryRomanpublicland,inmanycasestheRomanshaddonenothingelseaboutit,leavingthelandtobefarmedbyitspreviousowners,whowerenowtechnicallysquatters. Therefore the news that Drusus planned to dust off long-dormant plans toredistributethislandtotheRomanplebswasgreetedwithasmuchdismaybythepeopleofItalyasitwaswithenthusiasmbythepeopleofRome.

ThereforePhilippusandhiscroniesdidnotaddressawhollyhostileaudience in theirharangues in the forum. There were a goodly number of Italians to cheer him on,especially neighbouringEtrurians andUmbrianswho had come toRome tomake theirdissatisfactionknown.Naturally theseEtruriansandUmbrianshadnovote– somethingthat incensed them further – but they could make their voices heard with vociferouscheering and heckling of public speakers.When the rough-and-tumble of verbal debatedegenerated into rough-and-tumble of themore literal sort, as increasingly became thecase, theItaliansgaveasgoodas theygot.Naturallyenoughthisdidlittle toendear theRoman and Italian in the street to one another, and this further worsened the dilemmafacedbyDrusus.

Heneededthesupportofsenateandpeopleorhislegislationwouldnotberatified.Hecould control the senate if he had the support of the people, becauseRomewas still ademocracy,anditwasthepeoplewhoactuallyvotedlawsintoforce.However,his landlawswereessentialtokeepingthepeopleofRomeonhisside,yettopasshislandlawsDrusus would have to mortally offend the Italians. Offending the Italians would beextremelydangerous,foryearsofdelayandtherepeatedsideliningoftheircausehadleftthepeoplesofItalyinadangerouslymutinousmood.

Asawarningofwhatwastocome.PompaediusSilo,theleaderoftheMarsi(seep.47)collected 10,000 men whose land claims would not stand scrutiny by an allocationcommission.4Hisplanwastosurroundthesenatehouse,anddemandthecitizenshipforhis people. If the senate refused then thekniveswould literally beout, forPompaediusSilo’s10,000carriedweaponsconcealedundertheirtunics.Whatwouldhavehappenedifthishare-brainedplanhadactuallybeenexecutedwillneverbeknown,forthemarchersweremetbyapro-Drususaristocratwhopersuadedthemtoreturntopeacefullytotheirhomes.5However,itwasclearthatthepatienceoftheItalianswaswearingthin.

Drususdidwhathecould.Therewasnowaythathecouldretracthislandlegislationwithoutlosinghiscredibilityandhiscourtreformsaswell.However,theItaliansneededtobebroughtonsidewiththelegislation,soDrusustookthedangerousstepofpromisingthem theone thing thatwouldappease them. Just let thecurrent legislationgo through,DrususassuredtheItalianleadersinsecretmeetings,andoncetheturmoilhadsettledtheverynextitemonhisagendawouldbethegrantofcitizenshipforatleastthosecurrentlywiththeLatinRight,andthegrantoftheLatinRightforalltheotherItalians.Drususmusthave known that what he had promised the Italians would be very hard to sell to theRomanpeopleandsenate,butheevidentlyfelthehadnochoicebuttotry.Justtomakethings even more challenging, just a few days after a splendid speech excoriating the

consulPhilippus,L.Crassusdied.Suddenly, just asDrususwas facedwith thegreatestlegislativechallengeofhiscareer,hewasdeprivedofhisstrongestsupporter.

Drusus’popularitywiththeRomanpeoplewanedassuspicionsgrewthathehaddoneadealwith the Italians.Asamanofprinciple,Drusushad feltbound towarn theconsulPhilippus that Italian extremists were planning to assassinate him while he was on anexcursiontotheAlbanhillsjustoutsideRome.Asamanwithoutprinciple,Philippususedthewarningwhichhadsavedhis lifeasademonstrationofhowcompletelyDrususwasinvolvedwiththemostsecretplotsoftheItalians.Desperatetokeephisstandingwiththepeople,Drususresortedtobribery;thattried-and-trustedexpedientofthearistocracy.Heincreased the grain dole and decreased both the price and the criteria for eligibility forthosewhoobtainedit.Thisbribewasmorethanthestatecouldafford,andwaspaidforonlybydebasingthesilverdenarius,themaincurrencyofRome,byaddinganeighthofcopper.6 Thus through bribes Drusus appeased the people but further alienated thoseeconomicallyliteratesenatorswhoknewtheircurrencywasnowworthless.

AsSeptemberapproached, the reforming tribunewaswellaware thathewas runningoutoftime.WithoutCrassustohelpinthesenate,hislegislationwasboggeddowninanendlessseriesofproceduraldelays.Allthewhilethesupportofthecommonpeoplewasebbing away andDrusus had prettymuch run out of things to bribe themwith.As hegloomilyremarked,hehadnothinglefttogiveawaybut‘airandmud’(theLatinismorepoetic–‘airandmud’becomes‘caelumetcaenum’).7Itwastimetostakeeverythingonasinglethrowofthedice.Consequently,DrususrolledallhisplannedlegislationintoonesingleLex–reasonablyenoughgivenhowallthevariousissueswereintertwined–withtheintentionofpresentingittothepeopletoacceptorrejectforonceandforall.Whetherornotthepeoplewouldhaveacceptedthelawwasproblematic.Drususwasnowherenearaspopularasheoncewas,andwordofhisplanstoenfranchisetheItalianalliesassoonashis legislation had passed seems to have got out.However, plans forDrusus’ proposedcolonieswerestillpopular,andatleastsomeofthecommonpeoplefondlyrememberedtheir tribune’s past benefactions.And of course, therewere the Italians, still present inRomeinlargenumbersandveryimpatienttogettheentirelegislativeobstacleoverwithsoDrusus could get started on their enfranchisement. Though the Italians had no vote,theywouldcertainlybeabletoencouragewaverers,andblockanyattemptsatinterferencebythugsofopposingfactions.

Butintheevent,democracyneverhaditschance.JustthethreatthatDrususmightstillpush his legislation through allowed Philippus to unite the senate just enough for acrushingpre-emptivestrike.Thesenatewasaconsultativeratherthanalegislativebody,andcouldnotvotelawsintoeffect.However,thesenatewasentitledtoexpressitsopinion–infactthatwaslargelyitsjob–onlawsbeingpassedorpresentedtothepeople.Andthesenate ruled thatDrusus’ entire legislative programmewas unconstitutional.Thiswas adevastatingblow,becauseitnotonlyvoidedthecurrentomnibuslawthatDrususwantedthepeopletovoteon,butitalsoannulledallpastlegislationthatDrusushadalreadymadelaw. Exactlywhat justification the senate presented for its action is uncertain, but theirmainargumentseemstohavebeenthatDrusushadconsistentlyviolatedtheLexCaecilia-Didiaof98BC.This lawforbade‘tacking’– that is, theaddingofextraneous items toa

proposedlaw.Soabillaboutlandreformshouldnot,forexample,haveitemsaboutjurymembership includedwithin it. It is possible thatDrusus had indeed given hostages tofortuneinthisway,becausehewasayoungmaninahurry.Backwhenhewasstill thesenate’schampion,hecouldhavemerrilytackedextraitemsontohislegislation,knowingfullwell that the senatewould not challenge them. If so, his earlier haste to get thingsdonenowcamebacktobitehim.

PerhapstheknowledgethatthesenatehadhimdeadtorightsexplainswhatDrususdidnext.Hegaveup.Hecouldhavekeptfighting,becauseinRepublicanRomeatribunehadthe right tooverturn a senatorial decree.ButDrusus coulddo soonlyby alienating thesenateevenfurther,andsodictatorialastepastheuseofhisvetowouldalsocauseuneaseamong the general publicwhowere alreadywary of his long-term intentions. So,whatwasthepointoftryingtodotherightthingwhentheverypeopleyouweretryingtosavefoughtyoueverystepoftheway?

He chose not to use his power, knowing full well that they [the senators] would soonreceive payment in full for theirmisdeeds.…Thosewhose dog-in-the-manger attitudehaddestroyedhisreputationhadvoluntarilychosentoplacethemselvesathugerisk.

DiodorusSiculus37.10

ForyearstheRomanRepublichadbeenslidingtowarddisaster.Ifwearetopickasinglepointwhentheentirecrumblingstructurelurchedpastthepointofnoreturn,itisprobablythemomentwhen the senate voted to undo all thatDrusus haddone andwas trying toachieve.Thosepresenthadnoideaoftheeventstheirvotewouldsetinmotion.Withinthenextdecadeahugenumberofthosesenators–bysomeestimatesbetweenhalfandthree-quarters – would be dead, and most would have died violently. Ironically this wouldincludeTitusDidius.ItwashisLexCaeciliaDidiathatwastheexcuseforthesenatorialvotethatunleashedthecataclysm.Asisoftenthecasewithworld-shakingevents,thefactonly became clear with retrospect, though the writer Obsequens (who had perfecthindsight,writing400yearslater)saysthatthegodsdidtheirbesttowarntheRomans.AtArretium,bloodflowedfromtheloavesaspeoplebroketheirbread,inRomethetempleofPietywashitbylightning,andatCumaethestatueofApollointhecitadelwasseentobreak intoa sweat.Finally (andofgreat interest tomodernUfologists), atSpoletium,agoldenfireballdescendedtoearth,andlatertookoffagainheadingeastward.8

Clearlythegodsweretryinghardtopointoutthatallwasnotwell,butinRomeatleast,noonewaslistening.Asfarasthesenatewereconcerned,theyhadsuccessfullyrestoredthestatusquo.Itwaslefttothesurvivorsandlatergenerationstorealizethatthiswasthestatusquoantebellum(‘Thewaythingswerebeforethewar’).TheItalianswerebeyondfurious.And being of a practical disposition, they prepared to vent their fury in a verypracticalway.Theirleadershadnointentionofsmashingchairsorvasesasanoutletfortheir temper. Instead they started seriously working to smash the entire Roman state.Thereinprobably lies theanswer tooneof theenduringmysteriesof theLateRepublic.After the failureofhis legislation,Drususwithdrew tohishousenear thePalatineHill,andseldomventuredout.However,Drususwasstillatribunewithadministrativeduties,andaRomanaristocratwithlargeestatesandswarmsofclientsseekinghisfavours.These

heattendedtowithinhisownhouse.

He regularly conducted business in a poorly-lighted cloister. One evening, as he wasdismissinghispeople,hecriedout thathehadbeenstruck.Hefell to theground,andacobbler’sknifewasfoundthrustintohisthigh.

Appian,CivilWars1.36

TheassassinationofLiviusDrususremainsoneofhistory’swhodunnits.Thekiller tookadvantageofthegeneralpanicandconfusiontomakehisescape.Despitethenicetouchof a cobbler’s knife (which suggested the killing was by one of the common people,perhapsadisaffectedclient),wecansuspectthatthebladewasguidedbyaprofessionalwhoknewexactlywheretofindthefemoralartery.Woundstothelegareseldomfatal,butthis one was, and almost certainly was intended to be. In asking who was behind thekillingweneedtolookatmotiveonly,sinceitwastheassassinwhofoundthemeansandthe opportunity. Probably we can put aside a personal grudge, as it seems highlycoincidentalthatforcenturiesDrususshouldbetheonlyRomanaristocratassassinatedforpersonal reasons. Ifweassumeapoliticalmotivation, it becomesclear thatDrususwasmurderedbyhisfriends–theItalianaristocracy.

There was no reason for any Roman senator to want Drusus dead. At this time thesenatedidnotdobusinessthatway.Drusushadalreadybeencomprehensivelydefeated,andhehadacknowledgedthefact.ThepropersenatorialprocedurewouldbeforDrusustoliveaslongaspossiblesothathehadplentyoftimetoappreciatehisdownfall.Maybeina few years time some up-and-coming aristocrat might make his name by prosecutingDrusus for some imagined crime. Then everyone could get a bitmore enjoyment fromwatchingDrususbeingpackedoffintoexile.Fromthesenate’spointofviewDrususwasnothreat,andtheycouldonlygetmoresadisticfunoutofhimifhewasalive.Thesenateplayedroughbut(thoughthiswasabouttochange)theRomanaristocracysentencedfewoftheirowntodeath,evenforheinouscrimes.

TheItalians,ontheotherhand,werewellawarethatDrususknewtoomuch.ThefactthatDrusushadknownoftheirplantomurdertheconsulPhilippusshowshisknowledgeoftheItalians’intimatecouncils.TheItalianshadprobablyrepeatedlyandverysincerelywarnedDrusus that they intended to rebel ifDrusus failed toget them the franchise. IndoingsotheItaliansintendedtogiveDrususmaximumincentivetoachievetheirmutualgoals.ButDrusushadfailed,thethreatofrebellionnowbecamerealandDrususknewit.Hehadalreadywarned theconsulPhilippusof theplan tokillhim.Could therebeanydoubtthatDrususwouldalsowarnthesenateofItalianplanstodestroytheentirestate?The last thing that the would-be rebels wanted was the Romans forewarned andforearmed,soforallthathewasafriendtotheItalians,therewasonlyonewaytoensurethatDrususkeptsilent.DrususwasintheendaRomanandhisfinalloyaltywastoRome.Ifhelived,hewouldhavehadtosoundthewarning.

Probablyall thatkeptDrususalive in thebriefperiodafterhis legislative failurewasthat he was in frantic secret negotiations with the Italians to avert war, and he wasreluctanttobetrayhisfriendsunlessthosenegotiationsfailed.TheItalianswantedtoseeifDrusushadanythingelsetooffer,butprobablyhadanassassinalreadyonstandby.From

theItalianviewpoint,killingDrususwasanactofessentialrealpolitik.Themanhadfailedandwasnowadanger.Whylethimlivewhentheywereplanningtokilltensofthousandsof his compatriots? So with their fatal vote, the senators had not only killed Drusus’legislationandpoliticalcareer,theyhadalsoinadvertentlykilledthemanhimself.Asthecomingyearsdemonstrated,manyhadsentencedthemselvestodeathaswell.

W

Chapter5

TheBreakingStormThey[therebels]werecompletelyjustified.Theywantedtobecomecitizensoftheempirewhose lands their arms defended. Every year and everywar they contributed twice theamount of infantry and cavalry [as theRomans].And yet theywere not allowed to becitizens.Itwastheireffortswhichhadraisedthestatetoitspinnacleofsuccess,andyetthatstatetreatedwithdisdainthoseofitsownraceandkin,rejectingthemasstrangersandforeigners.

VelleiusPaterculus2.15

henthehistorianVelleiusPaterculusdescribesthestruggleoftheItalianpeople,hisheartisclearlyontherebelside.ThisisbecausehewasofCampanianstock

and it is very probable that some familymembers of two generations backwere rebelsthemselves.1Theirswasacausewhosetimehadcome.ItisveryunlikelythattheItalianswaiteduntilthefailureofDrusus’legislationbeforestartingpreparationstogotowar.Itisfarmoreprobablethattheyhadbeencontemplatingrebellionsince–astheysawit–theRoman state haddeclaredwar on themwith the explicitly anti-Italian legislationof theLex LiciniaMucia of 95 BC (p.42). Drusus appears to have been the only Roman bothperspicaciousenoughtorealizethatfactandtohavethepowertodosomethingaboutit.BecausetheItaliansknewthestrengthofRome’sarmiesfromamoreintimateperspectivethananyotherpeoples,whenDrususofferedacrediblealternativetofightingtheItaliansweremorethanhappytotakeit.Theyputtheirplansonholdtoseewhatthereformingtribunecoulddo.WhenitturnedoutthatDrususcouldnotdoenough,theItalianspickeduptheirplottingwheretheyhadleftoff.

TheItalianleaderscouldplaninsecret,becausemakingplanssimplyinvolvedcarefullyscreeningthosewhoattendedandservedatdinnerparties.Turningtheseplansintoactionwasmoretricky.TherewasacadreofRomansresidentineveryItaliancity.Somehadgotthere by marriage, for most Italians had the connubium, the right to marry Romans(though the child took the citizenship of the father). Others had purchased farms orbusinesses from Italians andnow lived in the citywhere theyhadmade theirpurchase.OtherswerepeopleofnativestockwhohadobtainedcitizenshipthroughservicetoRome.This meant that if there were there any actual mobilization of troops, or other overtmilitary preparations, such as strengthening city walls, news was bound to eventuallyreachthesenate.AndforallthattheyhadbeenstupidenoughtorejectDrusus’proposals,thesenatorswerenotsostupidastoassumethattheItalianswouldtakethislyingdown.Attheveryleast,itwouldbeagoodideatocheck.

EmissariesweredispatchedtothecitiesofItalytoassessthemoodofthealliesandtonoteanysuspiciousactivity.ParticularattentionwouldhavebeenpaidtothetribeoftheMarsi. Thesewere a highlywarlike peoplewho lived close to Rome, and one of theirleaderswasQuintusPompaediusSilo.Silowasaknownfirebrand,themanwhohadled

his10,000protesterstoRomeandwhohadonlybeendissuadedfromviolenceatthelastmoment (p.58). Plutarch tells us a story that gives us another glimpse into that man’scharacter.

WhileCato[theyounger]wasstillaboy,theItalianalliesoftheRomansweretryinghardtogetthecitizenship.OneofthesewasPompaediusSilo,awarveteranandaristocrat.AsafriendofDrusus,hewasstayingathishouseforseveraldays.Becomingfriendlywiththechildren,heonceaskedthem‘Come,won’tyoubegyouruncletohelpustogetthecitizenship?’

YoungCaepiosmiledandagreed,butCatoremainedsilentandglaredattheforeigners.…Sincethelookonhisfaceindicatedaplainrefusal,PompaediusSiloheldhimoutofawindow and harshly ordered him to agree if he didn’t want to be thrown down. Hefrequentlyshooktheboyasheheldhimoutofthewindow,whichCatoenduredwithoutshowingpanicorfear.EventuallyPompaediusSiloputhimdown,remarkingquietlytohisfriends‘JustaswellfortheItaliansthatthisoneisjustaboy.Ifhewasamanwe’dhavelosthisvoteandeveryoneelse’s.’

Plutarch,LifeofCatotheYounger2

SiloappearstohavebeenmorethanoneoftheItalianleaders.Onemodernwriterreferstohimas ‘the soulof thewholeundertaking’.2His later record shows that hewas agoodcommander, skilled in ambush and subterfuge, and as his treatment of the youngCatoshows,hewasamanwhowouldstopat little togethisway.Whilehewasperhaps theoutstanding leader on the Italian side, hewas not the only leader. After him in statureamong the conspirators was Gaius Aponius Mutilus. Mutilus was a Samnite, and thatmountaintribewereeveramongRome’smostobdurateenemieswhenevercircumstancesgave them the chance. There were others, includingMarius Egnatius, another SamnitewhowastobeoneoftheoutstandingItaliangeneralsinthefirstpartofthewar.

There is a reason why the Italian side had names such as ‘Quintus’, ‘Aponius’ and‘Marius’,namescommon,orevenrenowned,amongtheRomans.Consider,forexample,Marius.GaiusMarius,theRomanwhohaddefeatedJugurthaandtheCimbricamefromcentral Italy, from the very Samnite town of Arpinum (modern Arpino). However, theplacewascapturedby theRomans in305BC, and thereafter itspeoplewereenrolledasinvoluntaryRomancitizens,sincethatwashowRomedidthingsatthetime.Aswasusualwithcitizensacquiredthroughwarfare,thepeopleofArpinumdidnothavethevote.Butthiswas remedied by 188 BC when it was decided that after almost 120 years of goodbehaviourthepeopleofthecitycouldbetrustednottodoanythingrash.

ThuswhileArpinumwas now aRoman town, nearbyAllifaewas not, and norweremanyothersintheneighbourhood.TheexampleofArpinumshowsthatwhetheranItaliancityortownwasItalianandRomanhadlittletodowithbloodoreventribalallegiance,anda lot todowithhappenstance, and thevagariesofwarandpolitics.Agood ruleofthumbinsouthandcentralItalywasthatthemorestrategicthelocationofasettlement,themorelikelyitwastobeRoman,becausewhentheRomansconqueredsuchalocationin war they generally refused to give it back. And after a while the population of theoccupiedcitystartedtothinkofthemselvesasRomansaswell.

Consequentlythereweretobenohardandfastbattlelinesinthecomingwar.Italiansand Romans were too thoroughly intermixed. Many Romans had Italian relatives, andmany ruralareashadpatchesofRoman landsurroundedby largerareasof Italian land,and vice-versa.Many Italianswhogot tired ofwaiting for theirRoman citizenship hadsimplyfakedit.TheycouldgetawaywithitbecausethemaindifferencebetweenRomanandItalianwasnotethnicityor religion. Itwasnoteven language,becauseby theearlyfirstcenturyLatineithersupplementedorhadsupplantednativetonguesacrossmuchofthe central peninsula. The main difference – and in many cases the only difference –betweenaRomanandan Italianwas thatonehad thevoteand theprivileges thatwentwithitandtheotherdidn’t.Thecomingwarwouldbeasclosetoacivilwarasitcouldgetandwouldendbyactuallybeingone.

We have no exact date for the death of Livius Drusus, but it was probably aroundOctober91BC.Alothadhappenedintheyearalready,butwegetnomentionofwhetherDrususintendedtostandforthetribunatethefollowingyear,sohisdeathoccurredbeforetheelectoralmeetingofthecomitiacenturiata,butwellaftertheLatinFestivalinMarchatwhichtheItalianshadplannedtoassassinatetheconsulPhilippus.Thefactthatitwasdusk when Drusus was stabbed is suggestive rather than conclusive, for Drusus had astrongworkethic,andcouldhavebeenworking late rather than theduskcomingearly.Nevertheless,itisprobablethatDrususdiedinautumn,andthetimeoftheyearthattheassassination took place is of great importance because it was to determine whetherhostilitiesshouldkickoffinthatyear–91BC–orwaitforthestartofthefollowingyear’scampaigningseason.(WhichwasusuallyinMarch,themonthofMars.)

Ideally,fromtheItalianpointofview,theRomansshouldbeunawarethatanythingwasamisswhileautumnslippedintowinter.Duringthewinter,theItalianscouldhammeroutand sign their final diplomatic treaties for military alliances. Hostages could beexchanged,andmilitarytargetsassignedtoeachoftherebelgroups.Theninspring,theItalian mobilization for all-out war would be masked by the usual spring levies thatcollectedrecruitsfortheRomanarmy.Allgoingwell, inMarch90BC theItalianassaultwouldcomeasaboltfromtheblueandRomewouldbeontheropesbeforethestateevenrealizeditwasindanger.AndifasuddenItalianattackimmediatelydroppedRomeintodeepmilitarytrouble,thenitwouldbepoliticallyeasierforItaliandiplomatstopeelawayRome’salliesbythesamejudiciousmixtureofbribesandthreatsthatRomeusuallyusedtokeeptheminlineinthefirstplace.

SothelastthingtheItalianswantedwastodeclarewarlateinthecampaigningseason.That would cost them the advantage of surprise without any benefit to compensate. Ifhostilitiesbrokeoutrightafter thedeathofDrususandlateintheyear, thentheItalianswouldhaveatbestamonth inwhich tocampaignbefore theharvestwas safelybehindRomancitywallsandoutof the reachof foragers.Thereafter thewetandsoggyItalianautumnwouldmake traveldifficult for individuals, let alone for armies.Little couldbeachievedbytheItaliansinjustonemonth,butifthewarstartedinautumn,Romewouldbe forewarned and would then spend the winter shoring up vulnerable walls in thecolonies and citadels, and shoring up shaky alliances in the surrounding countryside. ItalsomeantthatinsteadofexpectingtheItalianstoturnupintheirusualnumbersforthe

spring levy, the Romans would desperately raise troops from their own citizenry fromgroups of the population usually left untapped. Altogether then, it was best that theRomansbe left in ignoranceof thenasty surprise awaiting them in the springof90BC.And fortunately, that autumn circumstances had provided a typically Roman spat todistractthesenateandpeoplefrommattersoutsidethecity.

The inadvertentcauseof this spatwasKingBocchus, theMauretaniankingwhohadendedtheAfricanwarbyhandingJugurthaovertoSulla(p.33).Witheverythingthathadgone on since, what with the Cimbric invasion and the uproar over Drusus’ proposedreforms,BocchuswantedtomakesurethathiscontributiontoexpandingRome’sempirewouldnotbe forgotten.Thereforeheproposed tosetupa tableau in theRomanforum.Gildedstatueswouldshowthemostdramaticeventofthewar,whenkingBocchusloyallyhanded over the renegade king Jugurtha to the Romans. This would be a permanentreminder to the Romans of their diplomatic success and of the friendship of theMauretanians.WhoinRomecouldobjecttothat?

ActuallyMariuscould.Tohislastingchagrin,hehadnotbeenpresentatthehand-over.Therefore theRomanofficeractuallycommemorated in the tableauwouldbestowgloryonthewrongperson–thatis,onsomeonenotcalledCaiusMarius.AtthispointMariusalreadyhadratheralotagainstSulla.Sullaalreadyhadaseal-ringdepictingmoreorlessthe same scene that Bocchus was proposing to immortalize in stone, and that wasannoying enough. But (when seen from a Marian perspective) Sulla had also had theinsolencetohavecomeoutoftheclimacticbattleagainsttheCimbrilookingbetterthanhadMariuswho,itwillberecalled,hadgotlostwhilelookingfortheenemyandhadonlyturned up when it was all over. Then, once the war was over,Marius’ involvement indomestic politics had not been a success. He had allied himself with politicians of ademagogicinclination.Thishadproventobeadisaster,andthoughMariushadmanagedto stay alive while his populist colleagues had not, the same could not be said of hispolitical career. The aristocratic senators had never been fond of Marius, and thepoliticallypowerfulfactionoftheMetellipositivelyloathedhim.Withthesenatecurrentlyintheascendant,Mariuswasindangerofbecomingahas-been.

Hehadahousebuiltforhimself.Itwasneartheforumbecause,hesaid,hedidn’twantthosecoming tohim topay their respects tohave towalka longway.Alternatively,hemayhavethoughtthatdistancewasthereasonwhylargercrowdsflockedtothedoorsofothers. However, the truthwas somewhat different. He lacked both the skills of socialinteractionandthepoliticalability tobeuseful.Hewassomewhat likeaninstrumentofwarintimeofpeace.

Ofallthosewhoovershadowedhiminpopularesteem,nonefrustratedandangeredhimmorethanSulla,whowasrisingtopower….

Plutarch,LifeofMarius32

Therefore Bocchus’ statues, which glorified Sulla and ignored Marius, threw oil onresentment already smouldering.Once he heard exactlywhatwould be depicted in theproposedtableau,Mariusmobilizedhisalliesamongthecommonpeopleanddemandedthat the statues be taken down. The senate gleefully retorted that the statues were

authorized,andthefactthattheydidnothonourMariuswasinsufficientreasonfortheirremoval. The situation became rowdy ‘and the city was all but in flames’3 probablybecauseMariusv.Sullasoonbecameaproxyfightforthepeople’scontinuingangerandresentmentwiththesenate,whichwaschannelledthroughMarius,andthesenatestickingupforSullawhomtheyconsideredoneoftheirown.

However,insteadofthesituationinRometakingpeople’smindsoffaffairsinItalyasawhole,affairsinItalyinsteadendedupdefusingthesituationinRome.Thiswasduetothekeen observation of an agent of one Servilius Caepio, of the clan of the Caepiones.4Caepiowas one of the emissaries sent out by the senate tomake sure that all in Italyremainedcalmafter themurderofDrusus, andoneofhis sourceshadnoted somethingunusual.AgroupofmenhadarrivedinthecityofAsculum,collectedayouthfulscionofthelocalnobilityandtakenhimaway.AsculumwasinsouthernPicenum,Picenumbeingthe area near the mouth of the river Po in North-eastern Italy described in Chapter 3.Picenum was largely occupied by Romans who had displaced the original inhabitants.ManyofthosedisplacedinhabitantshadendeduplivingaroundAsculum,sosuspiciousactivityamongadispossessedandbitterpopulationmeritedcloseattention.

As it turned out that suspicion was warranted. What Caepio’s spy had seen was ahostage being exchanged with another group of Italian conspirators as a guard againstbetrayalanddefection.Caepiodidnotknowthis,butheknewthatsomethinguntowardwas happening, and he resolved to do something about it. The Caepiones have a longhistoryinRome,fromthefirstconsulin253BCallthewaydowntotheBrutusServiliusCaepiowhomurderedJuliusCaesar in44BC;andnotamanof theentireclanwaseverknownforhistactanddiplomacy.Thisparticularspecimenofthegenuswasnoexception.Caepioproceeded toAsculum,and found thecity in themiddleofa festival.Given theissueofchronologydiscussedabove,itishighlyprobablethatthiswasaharvestfestival,with merrymaking and the consumption of the previous year’s vintage among theattractions. Into this celebration Caepio rudely intruded; forcing his way to a suitablevantagepointfromwhichheproceededtoharanguethecrowd.AccordingtoAppianthegeneraltonewasthreatening,buttheexactcontextofhisspeechhasnotsurvived,becauseCaepiodidn’teither.His thememayhave involved thepowerof theRomanarmies, theperilsofdisobedience,andthefateofFregellae(whichhadbeenflattenedtothegroundfordisloyaltyinthepreviousgenerationp.18).‘Hetalkedtothemnotasalliesandafreepeople,butasthoughtheywereslaves’notesthehistorianDiodorusSiculus.5

Suchaspeechwasnevergoingtogodownwellifdeliveredtoapopulationmoderatelysousedwithwine, especiallyas thatpopulationhadadeservedlybadconscience inanycase.WhatresultCaepiowasexpectingtogetisunknown,butanyonewithouthisfamilialpig-headednesscouldhaveexpectedwhathegot.ThepeopleofAsculumassumedthatthegamewasup,andthatCaepioknewabouttheintendedrebellion.Sincetherewasnopointin dissembling any more, the townsfolk got right down to business and started therebellion right there and then. Caepio was the first item on the agenda, and hissubordinates were lynched alongside him. Then the people of Asculum turned on theRomanslivinginthecityandkilledthemandlootedtheirproperty.Therewasnokeepingthe secret after that, especially after word of the uprising reached other towns in the

locality,whichpromptlyfollowedtheexampleofAsculum.AsItalytrembledonthebrinkofwar,theItalianssentadiplomaticmissiontoRomeinonelast-ditchefforttomakethesenateseereason.Itispossiblethatthiswasatacticalmanoeuvre;thatthehopeofpeacewouldkeepRomepacifieduntiltheplannedassaultcouldbelaunchedinspring,butthisis unlikely. Whatever happened, Rome was forewarned. It is more probable that theItalians genuinely and desperatelywanted the Romans to let them have the citizenshipwithoutthemhavingtofightawartogetit.IftheRomanssaid‘no’,thentheplannedwarwouldgoahead.If,contrarytoallprecedent,thesenateactuallyagreedtonegotiate,thenperhapswhattheItalianswantedcouldbeachievedwithoutbloodshed.Inanycase,therewasnoharmintrying.

From the senate’s point of view, their response was completely reasonable. If theItalians wanted to talk, the senate would consider their request. But not until fullreparationshadbeenmadeforthekillingsanddestructionatAsculum,andnotuntilafterthosewhohadperpetratedthosecrimeshadpaidforthem.TotheItaliansthiswasnotsomuchanopeningpositionfornegotiationsasaflat refusal tonegotiateatall.Peacehadbeenaforlornhopefromthestart,andevenastheItaliandelegatesweredemandingtobeheardbythesenate,PompaediusSiloandhiscolleagueswerehurryingaroundthetownsandthecountrysideraisingthebannerofrebellion.

ThefirsttotakeuparmsweretheMarsi,andtheywerealwaysthemostdangerous,fortheViaValeriaranpasttheirlandstoCorfinium–whichcitywasnowalsoinrebellion.AMarsicarmyonthesmoothwell-pavedViaValeriawaslessthan100km(around62miles)from the centre of Rome itself. Probably the only thing that prevented theMarsi frommakinganimmediatemarchonthatlargelyunpreparedcitywasthefactthattheoutbreakof the rebellion took theMarsi almost asmuchby surprise as theRomans.TheMarsicleadershadassumedthattheeventwasscheduledforthecomingspring,andconsequentlytheirpreparationswerenotyetcomplete.TheMarsiwerefollowedintorebellionby theVestini, a Sabine tribe whom the Romans had forced into an alliance in 302 BC. TheSabineshadalwayshadcloseconnectionswithRome,aswitnessedbytheinfamousRapeoftheSabinesinthefirstyearsafterthecity’sfoundation,andmanyRomanswereproudoftheirSabineancestry.However,inscriptionsunearthedinVestinianterritoryshowthatboth in language and outlook, these particular Sabines hadmore in commonwith theirMarsicneighboursthanwithRome.

Onthetrans-Apennineside,anothertribeofMarsicneighboursalsopitchedin.ThesewerethePeligni.TheywereamountaintribeoccupyingmuchoftheregionofAbruzzoinmodern Italy. Most of the population occupied a high mountain valley, which wasseparatedfromtheMarsibytheFucineLake(abodyofwaterthatwastoproveofsomemilitarysignificancelater)andamountainridgethatprovidedthePelignialmostcompleteprotection from invaders. The only breach of the mountain range was the deep gorgewhichtooktheAternusRiver(themainriveroftheregion)tothesea.AndastheAternusvalley(themodernGizio)ledtotheterritoryofthePeligni’sfellowrebels,theVestini,thatroutewasalsosecure.

CloselyrelatedtothePeligniandtheVestiniwerethesmallertribeoftheMarruncini.

InfactbothVestiniandMarrunciniseemtohavesharedtheportofAternum(Pescara)onthewestcoastofcentralItaly.JusttothenorthofAternumandtheVestiniwasPicentineterritory.Thismeantthatinwest-centralItalyasolidblocoflandwasheldbytherebelsfromjustsouthofthemouthoftheriverPothroughsouthernPicentineland,theterritoryoftheVestiniandthenoftheMarruncini,finishingalmostatthe‘spur’abovetheheelofthebootofItaly.This tooka largebiteoutof the territoryoverwhichRomeheldsway,and with the addition ofMarsic lands, that bite extended right across the peninsula towithinreachofthecityofRomeitself.

ThisinitialwaveofrebelliondidmuchtoeasethemindsofthoseItaliansconsideringrebellion,butafraidtosharethefateofFregellae,whichhadbeenbrutallycrushedforthewantofallies.Thistimearound,asecondwaveofrebelswasnotlongincoming.NoonehadmuchdoubtedthattheSamniteswouldbeapartofthatwave,andindeedtheywere.Theywould have been a part of the first wave, but for the fact that theywere a ruralpeople living in mountainous territory, and they had to cope with a number of largeRomancoloniessituated inconvenientlyacross their lands.Like theMarsi, theSamniteswere probably expecting a spring event, so it took them even longer to get an autumnrebellionproperlyorganized.OncetheSamniteswentagainstRome,theircloserelativestheHirpini–whoselandssurroundedthestrategicRomancolonyofBeneventum–joinedintherebellion;andthenearbyLucanians(p.00)promptlyfollowedtheirlead.ThetideofrebellioncontinuedtosweepacrosssouthernItaly,andApulianowalsodeclaredagainstRome.WiththeadditionofthetribeoftheFrentani,whooccupiedthecoastnorth-westoftheSamnites,almosttheentireAdriaticseaboardofItalyapartfromRomanPicenumhadjoinedtheItalianrevolt.6

Thewestandsouthweresoonjoinedbypartsofthesouth-east,asrepresentedbythecity of Pompeii. The nearby city of Acerrae stayed loyal, and was to be an importantRoman military base in the years that followed. It was far from co-incidental that thepeopleofPompeiihadbeendeniedthecitizenship,whileAcerraewasthefirstcitytohavebeenmadeaRomancivitassinesuffragioin332BC,andtheinitiallyhostilecitizenstherehadbynowbeenRomansfortwocenturies.Therebellionintheeastwasnotunanimous.EventhoughUmbriaandEtruriatrembledonthebrink,theyeventuallypulledbackfromdeclaringwar,thoughthequestionofwhethertodosowasfiercelydebatedupanddownthe towns and cities of both regions. Nor was everyone in rebel territory a rebel. InCampania,thenativepeopleraisedamilitiatosupporttheRomans.InLucaniatheRomanemissary Servius Galba (an ancestor of the later emperor of AD 69) had apparentlymistakenthefriendlinessoftheladywithwhomhewaslodgingforthefriendlinessofthepeoplewhosemoodhewassenttoascertain.Hewascaughtbythesuddenrebellion,butwasfreedfromcaptivitybythegoodofficesofhisformerhostess.7Infactitisclearthatinmanycases,especiallyinApulia,influentialaristocratsmanagedtokeeptheirparticularcommunitiesloyaltoRomeevenastherestofthecountrysideroseinrebellion.

At this point of absolute and vital importancewas the attitude of the Latins and thecolonists.The‘Latins’werethosepeoplewhopossessedtheLatinRight,therighttomakecommercial agreements, to marry or transfer citizenship to another Latin state if theymovedthere.ThisrightgaveLatinsmanyoftheprivilegesofRomancitizenship.Though

Latinsdidnothavethevote,theywereprotectedbyRomanlawandwerethussafefromtheworstoftheabusesthathadbeeninflictedontheItalians.Thecolonies,thosefortifiedoutpostsscatteredaroundthehostile landsof thesouthandwestof Italy,weredesignedprecisely to hold those lands under Roman control. However, the populations of thesecolonies had large numbers of peregrini – foreigners living within the city walls. Andmanyofthe‘Romans’inthesecolonieshadneverevenseenRomebutwerecloselylinkedto neighbouring Italian cities throughmarriage, commerce and culture. Sowhether theLatins would stay loyal was already an open question, but it was a particularly mootquestion in the case of those colonies with a population of Latins, and these coloniestendedtobemuchlargerthanpurelyRomansettlements.

A good example of such a colonywas Venusia, in Apulia. This townwas allegedlyfoundedbyDiomedes,aGreekherofromtheTrojanwar.IthadbeenaLatincolonysinceitscapturebyRomein262BC,andthecityhadstoodsteadfastlywithRomethroughouttheHannibalicwar. Ithaddonesoeven though thatwarhadsodevastated thecity thatafterwards Rome had sent 20,000 citizens to repopulate the place, despite the Romansbeing somewhat short of manpower themselves at the time. However, in recent yearsVenusiahaddevelopedastrongApulianaccent,aspeoplefromthecountrysideflockedintosharethecity’sgrowingprosperity.Nowtheloyaltyofthepopulationwasabouttobeseverely tested.Whenwarbrokeoutnoonedoubted that thecoloniesweregoing tobeattacked.TheyoccupiedsomeoftherichestlandinsouthernItalyandhadbeenlocatedatchokepoints inoverlandcommunicationswith theexpresspurposeofbeingacripplingnuisancetoanyrebels.Whetherthecolonistswerepreparedtowithstandtheprivationsofsiege from peoplewithwhom they shared somany bonds, andwhether theywould bepreparedtokillandbekilledindefenceofadeeplyflawedandunjustRomanstatethathaddonelittletomeritsuchservicewasaquestionthatwouldultimatelydecidethefutureofItaly.TheVenusiansdeliberatedthesequestionsandfoundRomewanting.Theythrewin their lot with the rebels, and the whole peninsula held its breath while waiting todiscoverhowmanyothercoloniesweregoingtojointhem.

As it turned out, the defection of the Latins and the colonies started and stopped atVenusia. Had it not, Rome would not have survived. The military significance of thecolonies goeswithout saying. Themilitary significance of the other Latin tribes is lessremarkedupon, but theywere theweight that finally tipped the scales.Every tribe andregion that rebelled counted as double in this coming war, because apart from thesomewhatbemusedGallic regionsofnorthern Italy, therewere fewneutrals.Youeitherfought for Rome, or you fought against it. So every city that went over to the rebelsdeprivedtheRomansofthesoldiersthatRomewouldotherwisebeabletolevy.InsteadtherebelssuppliedthosesamesoldierstotheItalianside.So,ifforexample,theRomanslost the loyalty of 30,000 Latin soldiers and the Italians gained these men, then thedifferencebetweentheItalianarmyandtheRomanarmybecame60,000men.Giventhateachsidecameintotheconflictwithabout100,000menunderarms,that60,000madeacrucialdifference.

AnotherquestionweighedonthemindsofRomansofathoughtfuldisposition–whatabouttherestoftheempire,andofthelandsbeyond?Romeatthistimehadasubstantial

but untidy empire stretching from eastern Spain to beyond the eastern shores of theAegeanSea.Whathappenedifthepeoplesoftheselandstookitintheirheadstorebel,orevenworse, tomake common causewith the Italians?This last possibility at leastwasvanishinglyremote.Whatevertheirdifferencesathome,ItaliansandRomansabroadhadco-operated enthusiastically in exploiting the lands they had jointly conquered. Indeed,thisexploitationattimesapproachedthepointofpillage,andtheresentfulpeoplesbeingplunderedcaredlittleaboutthepoliticaldisagreementsoftheirhatedoccupiers.Theideathattheymightsidewithoneagainsttheotherlostitsattractiontoforeignerswhenbothsetsofoppressorsappearedequallyunsavoury.

RebellionagainstbothRomansandItalianswasadifferentmatter,butheretheRomans’best defencewas the conquered peoples themselves.Generally speaking, the SpaniardsandGreeksdidnotthinkofthemselvesinnationalisttermsassuch,butas,forexample,Celtiberians, Vascones, Athenians and Beotians. Local rivalries tended to trump anti-Romanfeeling,soiftheCeltiberiansweretorebel(andtheydideventually),thenitwasasure bet that the Vascones would immediately take the Roman side (as they did).Likewise, theAtheniansandBeotiansdidnotdeclare for the Italiansidebecause ifonedidso,theotherwouldimmediatelybecomepatrioticallyRoman.

This left invaders from outside the empire. Fortunately candidates for this rolewerefew,sinceinthedecadesleadinguptotheircivilwarRomeandtheItalianshaddoneaneffective job of beating up any potential foreign threats. Gaul was too disorganized tomountaninvasion,andtherecurrentlywerenolargetribalmovements thatmightcauseone.Thoughindependent,EgyptwaspoliticallyamessandlackedthewillandthemeanstointerveneinRomanaffairs.Parthiawasatthistimearemotecountrywithlittleinterestin Roman affairs. Indeed, the two empires had not yet even properly introducedthemselvesthroughaformalmeetingofambassadors,thoughthiswasabouttohappen.

ThatleftPontus.PontuswasoneofthosekingdomsthathadariseninAsiaMinoraftertheRoman-induced decline of the Seleucid empire. Pontuswas verywealthy, probablybecause the political andmilitary chaos of the failingSeleucid empire to the south haddivertedtheendpointofthefabledSilkRoadthroughthestableandwell-ruledkingdom.The current king was Mithridates VI, a man of considerable political ability andintellectual capacity. Mithridates was also cruel, ambitious and expansionist. He hadalreadyextendedhisruleintoArmeniaminorandthekingdomsonthenorthernshoreoftheBlackSea, andwas hungrily eyeing the neighbouring kingdomsofCappadocia andBithyniainAsiaMinor.Infact,evenaswarbrokeoutinItaly,ambassadorswereenroutetoPontustodemandthatMithridateshandbackcontrolofbothkingdoms.MithridateshadengineeredapalacecoupinBithyniaandanArmenianinvasionofCappadociaandsetupclientkingssubservienttohiminbothplaces.RomehadalonghistoryoftryingtokeepMithridates in check, and did so not by sweet reason butwith the threat of theRomanlegions.WhatMithridateswoulddoonceheheardthatthoselegionswereabouttostarttearingeachotherapartinItalywastoopainfultocontemplate.

SoasRomebeganurgentlytoprepareforwarinItaly,thesenatedidsowithnervousglanceseastward.NewsarrivedattheCapitolthattheItalianshadappointedgeneralsand

establishedtheirowncapitalinthecentralApenninecityofConfiniumattheotherendoftheviaValeria.Thiscitywasnowrenamed Italica to show theunityof the rebels,whonow laid siege to theRomancoloniesofAlbaandAesernia.Bymid-autumn91BC, thepeacehadirrevocablybrokendown.Diplomacyandnegotiationhadfailed;itwastimetogivewarachance.

FChapter6

90BC–BackstotheWallromthemannerofitsresponsetothecrisis,welearnmuchaboutthestateofmindoftheRomansenate.Romewasfacedwithathreatpotentiallymoredangerousthan

thatofHannibal in216BC.Hannibalhadmanaged toconquermuchof southern Italy–nowmuchof southern Italy had voluntarily turned againstRome.Hannibalmight havebeenamilitarygenius,butwithout thatgeniushis rag-tagarmyofGaulsandSpaniardswerenomatchforthemorenumerous,better-armedanddisciplinedRomanlegions.Thistimearound,theRomansfacedanenemyasnumerousastheywere,whowereeverybitas much disciplined and ferocious fighters, and who knew the Romanmilitary systemintimately.WhileitwastruethattherewasnoHannibalintheItalianranks,alltheRomansenate had to offer for leadership of their own armieswere the samepetty-minded andself-interestedindividualswhohadbroughtaboutthedisasterinthefirstplace.Thiswasproven by the fact that, with the city facing extinction, the immediate reaction of thepolitical class was to use the crisis for infighting and to settle scores with personalenemies.

Takingadvantageofpopulardisquiet at the Italianuprising, the tribune-electQuintusVariusHybridaproposedalawcalledthelexVariademaiestate.MaiestasalreadyexistedasanoffenceintheRomanstatutebooks.Itwasthecrimeof‘diminishingthemajestyoftheRomanpeople’.Thiswasasortofcatch-alllawdesignedtopunishthoseshenanigansofmorally lax senators forwhichno specific legal statute hadbeendesigned.Maiestascoveredissuessuchasforgingpublicdocuments,orderingthereleaseofprisonersjustlyconfined, occupying public spaces and showing undue favour to Rome’s enemies forwhatever reason.However the activities punishable bymaiestas legislationwerepoorlyspecified,preciselybecauseofthelaw’scatch-allnature.Basicallymaiestaswaswhatevera court and jury decided it was in the case of a particular individual.With a politicalsystemascynicallycorruptasthatinRomethepotentialforabuseofsuchlawswasvast.

Varius’takeonmaiestaswasthataspectsofthelawshouldberefinedtopunishthosewho had shown sympathy to the Italian rebels. Of course, no such sympathy need beexpressedonthepublicrecord,norneedthechargesbeparticularlyplausible.Thecourt’smainpurposewastodisposeoftherivalsandenemiesofthefactionbackingQ.Varius;and the Italian revolt had given that faction its excuse. The historianAppian explicitlysaysasmuch,accusingtheequitesofbackingVariusand‘hopingtobringallthesenatorsunder this shameful indictment, and themselves to sit in judgement on them’.1 Laterhistorianshavelookedatotherfactions,includingthatpartyinthesenatemostopposedtoLiviusDrususandnoweagerforrevengeonhisassociates.

As the near-contemporary legal commentator Asconius remarked, the court quicklygained a name for unjust condemnations.2 Lucius Memmius, an ally of Drusus, wasquicklycondemnedandhewasfollowedbysuchdistinguishednamesasAureliusCotta(arelativeofJuliusCaesarinthematernalline).CalpurniusBestiawasprobablyprosecuted,

thisbeingapopulistmeasureagainst thegeneralwhohaddisreputablyenrichedhimselfbytakingbribestogoeasyonJugurthaintheAfricanwarof112BC,andwhowaswidelyseenashavinggotawaywithit.However,inlookingforpopularesteembypunishingpastsinnersVariusdecidedtogoforbiggergamestill.IfhecouldgetBestia,whynotthatoldrogue Aemilius Scaurus who had not only avoided bribery charges, but had beenappointedtoleadtheinvestigationintothosecharges?Scauruswasadangerousfoe.AsamemberofRome’sgreatAemilianfamilyhehadthepowerandprestigethatcamewiththename,andhehadbuiltuponthattocreateanexusofpoliticalfriendsandconnectionsunequalledinRomeatthattime.Theactualtrialwasbrief.HereishowScauruspresentedhiscase:

QuintusCaepiohopedthathehadfoundthechancetodestroyhisoldenemyScaurus.HepersuadedthetribuneQ.Varius[Hybrida]tosummontheseventy-twoyearoldScaurustoface charges.…Scaurus appeared, supportedon the armsof youngmenof thehighestnobility. In reply to the charges, he had this to say ‘TheSpaniardQ.Varius alleges thatMarcusAemiliusScaurus,leaderofthesenate,hasincitedtreacheryinourallies.MarcusAemiliusScaurus,leaderofthesenate,deniesthecharges.Citizensofthejury,whomdoyouchoosetobelieve?’

AsconiuscommentaryonproScauro22C

Varius’ cognomen of ‘Hybrida’ was the source of Scaurus’ ‘Spaniard’ appellation. A‘hybridus’wasapersonofjointRoman-Spanishparentage,andScaurususedthenametopointout that themanaccusingRomansofconsortingwithforeignershadhimselfbeenborn of a foreignmother. It was a low blow, but it worked. Scaurus was acquitted bypopularacclamation.That is, soenthusiasticallydid theaudienceapplaud thedefendantthatVarius decided itwaswisest to drop charges on the spot. It did not help him.Thefollowingyear,whenhewas no longer protectedbyhis tribunicanoffice,Varius foundhimself hauled before the very court he had established andwas found guilty.He diedsoonafterwardsinmysteriouscircumstances,thoughaconscientiouscoronerwouldhaveput‘givingmortaloffencetoapowerfulRoman’onthedeathcertificate.

Meanwhilethewarwenton,andithadstartedbadlyforRome.Themainfeaturesofthehighly curtailed autumn campaign of 91were the Italian sieges ofAesernia inSamniteterritoryandAlbaFucensis,thelatterasitsnameimplies,beingontheviaValerianeartheFucinelake.Bothwerewell-defendedcitiesonsteephills,Aeserniaonacragrisingover300 metres between two rivers in the Volturnus valley, and Alba on one of the steepfoothills before Mons Velinus. Both garrisons had capable commanders, and no oneexpectedanimmediateresolutiontoeithersiege.Otherwisemilitaryactionwasminimal.Apartfrompreoccupationswithpoliticalback-bitinginRome,thetwosidesweremainlyengagedinpreparingforthemainconfrontationinthecomingyear.

TheItalianshadfollowedtheRomanpatternoftakingtwo‘consuls’,thoughthesewereconsulsintheoldRomansensebywhichaconsulwasprimarilyawarleader.Naturallyoneofthosecommanderswastheleaderandinstigatoroftheentirerebellion,PompaediusSilo.Theotherconsul,PapiusMutilus, represented theSamnites,whoalongwithSilo’sMarsimadeupthetwomostimportantrebelgroups.Silocommandedthe‘northern’group

– that is, the least southerlygroupof rebels thatoperatedclose toRome–andMutilustook the southern group of tribes. This was a very rough and ready division, but it isprobablethateachgroupfocussedononesiege,withageneralfromthe‘southern’grouptaking command of the siege of Aesernia in the south, and one of Silo’s commandersdoingthesameforAlba.3Thedivisionofcommandalsoreflectedthelinguisticdivisionofthetwogroups.Astheircoinageshows,thenortherngroupusedLatinastheirlinguafranca while the southerners spoke Oscan, and they called Mutilus, their commander,embratur–awordthatmaywellbetheoriginaloftheLatin‘imperator’fromwhichwetodayget‘emperor’.

The Romans meanwhile chose their generals with particular care. As consul for thecomingyear theyelectedoneof theJuliiCaesares,anancientfamilynewlycomeagainintopoliticalprominence.LuciusJuliusCaesarwasto takecommandof thewaragainstthesoutherngroupofrebelsandhiscolleagueRutiliusLupuswouldhandletheMarsiandothers close to Rome. This Rutilius was a relative of that Rutilius Rufus still incomfortableexileinAsiaMinorandwatchingalltheexcitementfromafar.UnsurprisinglythefeudingbutverycompetentSullaandMariuswereseparatedunder thecommandofdifferent consuls. Caesar didn’t getMarius, which is surprising as the pair were closefamily throughMarius’ marriage to a Julian wife. However Rutilius Lupus was also arelative,andoncehehadgotMariusinthenorth,CaesarperforcegotSullainthesouth.

Inselectingtheirgenerals,theRomansweremoreconcernedwithmilitaryproficiencythanpolitics.Thisledtosomeoddcombinations.AlsounderCaesar’scommandwasTitusDidius, the man who had authored the lex Caecilia Didia, which had been used todemolishDrusus’ legislationin91BC.YetsotoowasLiciniusCrassus,arelativeof thatCrassuswhohadsupportedDrususinthesenate.LikewiseRutilius’generalsincludednotonlythepopulistMarius,butthatCaepiowhohadbeenattheforefrontofthoseopposingthepopulistmeasuresofDrusus.AnotherofRutilius’generalsworthyofnotewasGnaeusPompeiusStrabo, a cynicalopportunist bestknown toposterity for fatheringa sonalsocalledGnaeusPompeius,who isbetterknown tous todayasPompey theGreat. ‘Theseweremenwhohadlearnedtheartofwar,notfrombooksbutfromactionandvictoryinthefield’remarksCicero,4andheshouldknow,sinceatthistimeCicerowasenrolledasayoungjuniorofficeronthestaffoftheaforesaidPompeiusStrabo.

The troops that Italians and Romans commanded were very much alike. Both sidesreliedonheavyinfantry towintheirbattles,andit isprobable thatbothusedthecohortformationsthathadbecomethestandardunitoftheirarmiessinceMariushademployedthem so effectively against the Cimbri. Some of the Samnites may have adopted theirtraditionalarmourofstiffenedlinen,butgenerallymostofthosecalledtoarmsoneithersidewouldhavedonnedthesamecoatsofchainmailthattheywouldhavewornhadtheyserved together inRome’sforeignwars thatyear.Eachsetof infantryreliedonaheavythrowing spear (pilum) to be used just before engaging in hand-to-hand combatwith asword.A surviving fragment of thework ofRoman historianCassiusDio tells us howsimilarthetwosideswere.TheMarsiwereabletospyontheRomans‘byminglingwiththeir forage parties and entering through their ramparts under the guise of allies. Theretheytooknoteofwhatwasseenandheardinthe[Roman]campandlaterreportedthisto

theirownside.’5Inotherwords,evenwhenthetwosideswereatwar,itwashardtotellthemapart.

Asageneralrule,theItalianshadmoreskirmishers,sincethehillmenfromalliedtribeswereaccustomedtothissortoffighting,andasabonusmanywerealsoexpertwiththesling. On the other hand, the Romans had the better cavalry, both because they couldrecruitwarriorsskilled in thisarmofcombat fromCisalpineGaul,andbecausemostofnorthern Campania had stayed loyal and this region traditionally provided the Romanarmywith the bulk of its cavalry. Nevertheless, with both sides so equallymatched inweapons,skillandnumbers,thewarwouldbedecidedbywhicheversidehadthegeneralsbetter able tooutmanoeuvre theiropponents, andwhichgrouphad thepoliticiansbetterable to maintain their own alliances and pick apart those of the other side. Given thewealthofmilitaryexperienceamong theRomangenerals,and thecolossal ineptitudeoftheirpoliticians(whowereoftenthesamepeople),onemightexpectvictoriesinthefieldtobecancelledoutbypoliticalsetbacks.Infactthereversewasthecase.Intheyear90BC,itwasRome’sgeneralswhobroughtthestatetothebrinkofcollapse,andthepoliticianswhopulledthemawayfromit.

The exact chronology of the war is lost to us for two reasons. One is that Rome’shistorians had little taste for telling stories ofRoman defeats, and thesewere themainstoriesof90BC.Theother is thatmostofRome’shistoriansof thisperiodareas lostaswere thebattles theywouldotherwisebedescribing.Livy’s superb anddetailedhistorysurvivesonlyasabrutallyeditedsynopsis,andtheusuallyreliablyback-up,CassiusDio,survives as a few fragments.Modern researchers can complainmost bitterly about thenear-totallossoftheHistoriaeofSisenna,acontemporaryhistorianwhowrotesodetailedanaccountofthewarthatothers,includingSallust,felttherewaslittletoaddandsoleftthetopicalone.SoweareleftwiththesomewhatarbitraryandunreliableduoofVelleiusPaterculusandAppian,bothofwhomrushthroughtheeventsof90BCasaprologuetothelatereventsof thatcentury.To this scanty reserveof informationwecanadd firstly theincidental comments of those present at the time, such as Cicero, and secondly thebiographerPlutarchwhowroteof the livesofbothSullaandMariusandalsowrote thebiographies of others who witnessed the events of the war as children or young men,including Cicero, Pompey, Crassus and Julius Caesar. Consequently, while a detailednarrativecannotberecounted,anoutlineof theyearcanbereconstructed,andfromtheRomanviewpointitisnotaprettytale.

Inthespringof90BC thelittlecityofPinnaintheterritoryoftheSabineVestiniwasone of the many communities that was violently divided as to which side to support.WhiletherestofthedistrictwasswayedbytheneighbouringMarsiintodeclaringfortherebels,PinnacamedownontheRomanside,albeitafteraprolongedperiodofcivilstrife.AswithAlbaFucensis,thecitycameunderimmediatesiegebytherebels,andlikeAlbaFucensis,thecitydefendeditselfspiritedly.Littleisknownabouttheopeningcampaignsoftheyear,thoughthestrategicaimsofbothsidesarereasonablyclear.FortheMarsiandtheirallies,theimmediateprioritywastobreaktheringofRomancoloniesthatdominatedthestrategiclandscape.Theexistenceof thesecoloniesmeantthat theItalianshadtobeconstantlyonthealertlesttheRomanssallyoutfromtheirwallsandattackMarsictowns,

farmsandsupplychains.Butevenmoreannoyingly,thecolonieshadbeensituatedwithmaliceaforethoughtacrossthemajorlinesofcommunicationincentralItaly.ThismeantthatRomanarmiescouldzipaboutwith relativeease,gettingsuppliesandasafehaveneachtimetheystoppedatacolony.TheItaliansontheotherhandhadtolaboriouslygetaround each of thesemunicipal roadblocks either by extensive detours or by strugglingthroughdifficultterrain.MilitarilytheItalianscouldnotoperatefreelyuntil thecolonieshadbeentakenoutofthewarsothecolonieshadtogoforthatreasonalone,buttherewasalsoapoliticalaspect, in that thecolonies representedRomandominationof thepeopleandthelandsaround.IftheItalianswerefightingtoberidofRomandominationthenthecolonies–theaspectofRomewhichmostimpingedontheirdailylives–wouldhavetogotoo.

ForthesouthernrebelstootheRomancolonieswereahugeinconvenience.However,the tacticof theSamnitecommanderPapiusMutiluswassomewhatdifferent.While theMarsi concentratedonbreaking the ringof colonies that surrounded them, the southerngroupaimedatconsolidatingandextendingtheterritoryundertheircontrolbytakingthecountrysideandsmallertownsawayfromRome.TheexampleofVenusiahadshownthatopinioninthesoutherncolonieswasnotunanimouslypro-Roman.ThefurtherfromRomeitwas,themorelikelyitwasthatthepopulationhad‘gonenative’astheVenusianshaddone.ThereforecoloniesinthesouthofItaly,cutofffromRomeandwiththeItaliansincontrol of the countryside, might decide to re-think their loyalties. Furthermore, noteveryoneinacolonyhadtojointherebelside.Withabitofluckandalotoftreachery,allitmight takewasafewdozenmenpreparedtoopenacriticalgateat theright time.SoMutilus’ operations had the focus of beating the Romans in the field, but not simplybecausefromtheItalianpointofviewthiswasagoodthinginitself.Victoryalsohelpedto sway the hearts andminds ofwaverers, andwhere sympathy for the rebelswas notenough, Mutilus was happy to add a healthy dose of terror by demonstrating theconsequencesofresistance.

TheRoman strategy on the other hand could be summarizedwith thewords defend,consolidate,survive.Thatis,theRomanshadtodefendtheircoloniesforexactlythesamereasonsastheItaliansneededtotakethemoutofthewar.Thismeantmakingsurethatthecolonieswere strong enough inmateriel andmorale towithstand assault.An importantaspectofmoraleforcoloniesthatmightcomeundersiegewastheprobabilityofrelief,sofortheRomanspreventingthefallofthoseplacesalreadyundersiegewasapriority.Aswellasdefending theircolonies, theRomanshad toconsolidate theareas theycurrentlyheld. This involved keeping a close eye on those Etrurians and Umbrians who weresympathetic to the rebel cause, and taking direct action against those areas such asAsculumwhichwerealreadyinrevolt.Aboveall,RomehadtokeepagriponCampania.Thisareawashorriblyexposedtotherebels,withtheMarsitothenortheast,theSamnitestotheeastandrebelPompeiirightonthedoorstep.YetwithoutCampaniaRomehadfewresourcesinItalywithwhichtofightthewar.AsCicerolaterremarked,‘don’tforgetthepowerful armies we maintained on the Campanian harvests when all other sources ofrevenuehadbeenlost’.6

With the heartlands secured, it would thereafter be a war in which the Romans

attempted togrinddown the Italians inmuch the samewayas theRomanshadgrounddownHannibal a century previously. The trickwas not somuch towin victories as toavoiddefeat.Romehadanempireandcoulddrawonitformoneyandmanpowerandifnecessary simply outlast the Italians. This technique hadworkedwithHannibal, and itwouldworkontheItalians,sinceafterall theItaliansthatRomewasnowfightingwerepretty much the same Italians who had allied with Hannibal in that previous conflict.However,inordertoweardowntheItaliansinthelongterm,Romehadtosurvivefortheshortterm–andthatwastoprovenonetooeasy.

Thecampaigningseasonkickedoffwithanearlyandobscureengagementbetweenthearmies of one of Rutilius’ subordinates, a commander called Gaius Perpenna, and anItalian general called Presentius. Since Perpennawas under Rutilius’ commandwe canassume that, likeRutilius, Perpennawas engaged in fighting theMarsi and their allies.Therefore Perpenna’s engagement must have taken place in central Italy, but exactlywhereisunknown.WhateverhappenedtoPerpenna’sarmywascertainlyadefeat,for itresultedin4,000Romansdeadandmanyotherscaptured.EvidentlyPerpenna’shandlingof the army was at fault, because Rutilius relieved Perpenna of his command andtransferredtheremnantofhisarmytoMarius.Mariusandhismenwerethenmergedintoalargerarmy,whichRutiliusintendedtoleadagainsttheMarsi.Meanwhilethingswerenot going well on the southern front either. In Lucania, Caesar’s subordinate, LiciniusCrassus, took a beating. From a reference in an unrelated text7 we find that Crassuspitchedcampindrywoodland.TheItaliansunderageneralcalledMarcusLamponiussetfire to the woods, and in the subsequent confusion killed some 800 of Crassus’ men.Thereafter Crassus and his forces narrowly escaped being trapped by the Italian forcesthrustingintoCampaniaandhadtotakerefugeinHannibal’soldheadquarters,thetownofGrumentum(nearGrumentoNovainthemodernprovinceofPotenza).8

Marius’ brother-in-law was Sextus Julius Caesar, a relative and subordinate of theLucius Julius Caesar who was currently consul. Sextus’9 attempt to head offreinforcements to the Italians besieging Aesernia came to a sorry end with the loss of2,000men.ThisleftAeserniawithmajorproblems.LiketherestofItaly,Aeserniahadnotbeen expecting hostilities to break out in 91 BC so the city had little in the way ofprovisionswithwhichtowithstandasiege.Starvationhadbecomeaseriousproblem.HadSextus JuliusCaesarmanaged to defeat the Italian reinforcements hemight have had achanceofrelievingthesiegeinconjunctionwithasallyfromthoseRomanspennedwithinAesernia’s walls. As it was, having seen off Sextus Julius Caesar the Italianreinforcements made direct for Aesernia. Once the extra Italians arrived, the city wasdoomed. Sulla was operating in the area and did the best he could against the morenumerousenemy,whichgavetheAesernianshope.Consequently,thegarrisonheldoutaslongasitcould,buthungereventuallyopenedthegates.ItwassomeconsolationtoRomethattheItaliansfailedtocapturethetwomenwhohadledthedefenceofthecity.Thesemen – Lucius Scipio and Lucius Acilius – disguised themselves as slaves and slippedawayundetected.

AeserniawasfarfromtheonlytownwhichtheRomanslostintheopeningmonthsofthewar.OnceAeserniahadfallenthewaylayopentoVenafruminCampaniaatthemid-

point between Latium and Samnite territory. It was taken through treachery by theSamniteMariusEgnatius(whowaspossiblyadescendantoftheMariusEgnatiuswhohadinflictedtellingdefeatsontheRomansinthewarsofthethirdcenturyBC).Meanwhile,theSamnite‘consul’PapiusMutiluswassweepingthroughthetownsandcountrysidefurthersoutharoundPompeii.

TheRomanshopedthatMutiluscouldbestoppedatNola,acitystrategicallysituatedbetweentheApenninesandMtVesuvius.Hannibalhadsomuchtroublewiththiscitythatno fewer than three battles were fought outside its walls during the Hannibalic war.However,Mutilus had laid his plans well, and he had arranged that the city would bebetrayed to him as his army approached.AlongwithNola,Mutilus captured the city’sgarrison of 2,000 men. These men were offered the opportunity of changing to thewinning(Italian)side,andgratefullytookit.Theirofficers, includingthepraetorLuciusPostumus,refusedtoabandontheRomancauseandweresubsequentlystarvedtodeathasademonstrationthatMutilusrefusedtotolerateresistance.

Mutilus used terror as a tactical weapon.When he took a town, the leading Romancitizens were executed, and presumably any who sympathized too openly with them.MutilussoviciouslyplunderedthecountrysidethatAppiansays‘thetownsinthevicinitywereterrifiedandsurrenderedtohim’.10 InquickorderStabiaeandHerculaneumonthecoast, thenearbyRomancolonyofSalernumand several other towns fell to the Italianleader,who forcibly recruited theavailablemanpower intohisarmy, thusgainingabouttwo legions and a thousand cavalry. NextMutilus headed for Acerrae, a town situatedinlandsomethirteenmilesfromNaples.TheconsulLuciusCaesarnowenteredthefray.Thankstotheenergeticrecruitingofanup-and-comingofficerinCisalpineGaul,CaesarhadacquiredreinforcementsoftenthousandGallicwarriors.RecruitmentelsewhereintheempirehadaddedaformidableforceofNumidianhorse,cavalrygenerallyreckonedthebestlighthorseintheworld.ButMutilushadalsoforeseenthearrivaloftheNumidiansandhadtakenstepstoneutralizethem.

ItwillberememberedthattheLatincolonyofVenusiainApuliahaddefectedearlytothe Italian side. In Venusia the Romans had been holding hostage one of the sons ofJugurtha,andthismanhadfallenintoMutilus’handsalongwiththecity.NowthisscionoftheNumidianroyallinewasdisplayedtohisfather’sformersubjects.TheNumidianswereinvitedtodesertRomeandfightforamemberoftheirownroyalfamily.Somanytook that invitation thatCaesarwas forced to consider the restofhisNumidiancavalryuntrustworthyandhethereforesentthembacktoAfrica.

ThingshadbeengoingsowellforMutilusthathemightbeexcusedforgettingalittlecocky. He now decided that his own men were still buoyed by their victories aroundAeserniawhile theNumidiandefectionmust have loweredRomanmorale even further.The Samnite leader therefore decided to make a direct assault on Caesar’s camp.AttackingaRomanmarchingcampwasariskyventurebecausetheRomanshadalotofpractice both at building and defending these camps. However, if the attack wassuccessful,notonlywouldittakealargeproportionoftheRomanarmyoutofthewar,butlosingthousandsoftheirmenmightmaketheCisalpineGaulsconsiderablylesseagerto

supplytheRomanarmywithrecruitsinthefuture.TheItaliansattackedferociouslyandmadeabreachonthepalisadeononesideofCaesar’scamp.

Their understandable concentration on enlarging and forcing their way through thisbreach led to the Italians’ undoing, because no one was watching the other gates. (ARoman camp usually had four.) Lucius Caesar had not lost all his cavalry. Apart fromnative Campanians, a substantial Mauretanian contingent had arrived along with theNumidians, and the Mauretanians and their king Bocchus were enthusiastically pro-Roman.SoLuciusCaesar andhis cavalrymade theirwayout of oneof the unguardedgatesandsweptdownon the flanksandrearof the Italianattackers.The resultwas thefirst substantial Italian defeat of thewar. The campwas saved and some 6,000 Italianswerekilled.ThiswasnewssocheeringthatwhenitreachedRomethesenatedecreedthatthepopulationshouldresumewearingthe togas theyhadstoppedwearingasasignthattheir countrywas struggling atwar.Less encouragingly,Caesar took a hard look at theforcesarrayedagainsthimatAcerraeanddecided thathe lacked thestrength toopposethem.Hewithdrew,leavingAcerraetostandsiegebyMutilusandhisItalians.

AtthesametimenewsarrivedthatthetownofCanusiumhadfallentotherebels,whichmeantthatBrundisiumwastheonlysubstantialtownintheareastillinRomanhands,andBrundisium was now isolated. Nor was this merely the isolation of a single city, forBrundisium was the port which served as Rome’s access to Greece and Asia. WithcommunicationtoBrundisiumcutoff,accesstotheeasternempirehadsuddenlybecomemuchmore difficult. Norwere things goingwell in the rest of eastern Italy. PompeiusStrabohadbeengiventhejobofbringingAsculumtoheel.Thiswasanobviouschoice,forStrabowasamajorlandownerinthemoreromanizedpartofPicenumtothenorth.Heknewboththeterrainandthepeople,andhehadplentytolose,forwhiletherebelsheldAsculumtheyhadaspringboardtoattackhisownlandsinPicenum.InfactAsculumwasatanexusofroadcommunications.FromAsculumnotonlyPicenumbutalsoUmbriaandCisalpineGaulwerehighlyaccessibletotherebels.ApartfromAsculum’sstrategicvalue,therewereother reasons forwanting the towncapturedas soonaspossible,namely thepoliticalandpropagandaprizethattheRomanswouldgainiftheycapturedthetownandavengedthemassacreofRomancitizenstherewhentherevolthadfirstflaredup.

However,disappointmentawaitedanyRomanswhohopedthatAsculumwouldproveto be the one bright spot in a year ofmilitary setbacks. PompeiusStrabowas nomeangeneral, but the oddswere stacked against him. For a start, the opposing commanders,particularlyoneVettiusScato,wereprettygoodatgeneralshipthemselves.VettiusScatowas a lively commander and it was he (or a relative) who had prevented Caesar frombeing able to lift the siege ofAesernia on the southern front. In Picenum, Scato had astrong force of Marsi eager to prove that their ferocious reputation was justified. Thepeople of Asculum were themselves a warlike bunch, and they had a generation-oldgrudgeagainsttheRomansfortakingtheirlandstothenorth.Furthermore,Asculumitselfwasahardnut tocrack. It satona large rocky ledgewhere themodernTronto river isjoinedtotheriverCastellano.Infactthecityhadwaterwaysonthreesidesandasteephillontheother.ThereisalsoasuggestioninOrosiusthatAsculumhadaloosealliancewithpirateswhohelpedwithsupplies–somethingnotcompletelyimprobablealthoughthecity

wasfarenoughfromthecoastfordirectsupplytobeimpracticable.AfragmentofCassiusDio11suggeststhatimmediatelyaftertheiruprisingthepeopleofAsculumwentontotheoffensive:‘Theyovercamethosewhohadnotyetjoinedtherebellion…andtoretheskinofftheheadsoftheirwivesalongwiththehair.’

PompeiusStrabo’schargetotherescuewasnotasuccess.HewashaltedinhistracksbytheMarsi,andforcedtoretreatnorthwardstothemountains.Therebelsfollowedup,andforcedPompeiusStraboandhisbatteredarmytotakerefugeinthetownofFirmumontheAdriaticcoast.SoPompeiusStraboendedupsome40kilometresnorth-eastofthecityhewasmeant toassault,andinsteadofrestoringRome’statteredmilitaryglory, thewould-beconquerorofAsculumhadaddedFirmumtothelistofpro-RomancitiesunderItaliansiege.

VettiusScatodidnotstaytopressthesiege.Leavingthisinthehandsofasubordinateheheadedback intocentral Italy,whereRutiliusLupuswasabout tomakehisbigpushintoMarsicterritory.AftertheactionwithPerpenna,thewarincentralItalyhadbeenlittlemorethanskirmishingalongtheviaValeria.Thiswasabout tobereplacedwithseriousaction,becauseRutiliusLupuswantedtostrikeatellingblowagainsttheMarsi.Notonlywere these people the elite forces on the Italian side, but they were the enemy groupclosest toRome.Also,RutiliusnowhadPerpenna’s setback toavenge.Accordingly,hemarchedout against theMarsicenemywithanarmyofundisclosed size,butwhichwecanroughlyestimateasbeingfourlegions,or(becauselegionsweregenerallybelowtheirtheoreticalstrengthof6,000)ataveryroughguess,20,000men.

Ashis second-in-commandRutilius hadMarius.Even if he haddone so before, it isdoubtful thatRutilius still considered it a blessing to haveMarius as a subordinate.AsanyonewhoknewMariusmighthave supposed, the six-timesconsuldidnotworkwellunder another’s command. As Marius no doubt frequently informed his commandingofficer,hewasbyfarthemoreexperiencedgeneral,andwasfreewithhisadvice.Mariuswas also by nature a very cautious campaigner, and the fact that he was personally incommandofmenwhohadrecentlysufferedamorale-breakingdefeatmadehimyetmoreso.‘Mariuswasconstantlysuggestinginprivatethatadelaywouldprovebeneficialtotheconduct of the war and that the young recruits ought to be drilled in camp’ the writerOrosiustellsus.12AslowapproachwasinanycaseMarius’preferredformofcombat;todelay battle, keep close to the enemy, wait for a mistake and then force an action onfavourable ground. In the meantime, skirmishing and minor clashes would harden thenerves of themen and accustom them to the enemy and their tactics.With theMarianmethod, the foe seemed familiar and less terrifyingwhen the crunchcame, and successwasmorelikely.

Rutiliuswasmoreofa traditionalist,andthetraditionalapproachofaRomangeneralwas tomarch hismen to the battlefront, point them at the enemy army and thereafterencourage them to victory through the ensuing carnage. Besides tradition, there wasanother reason for thebull-at-a-gate strategy.AlbaFucensis remainedunder siege.LikeAesernia the citadel townhadnot been expecting awar in 91 BC, andhadno reason tohavelaidinsuppliesforone.Ifthisstrategiclocationwasnotrelievedinthenearfuture

then itwould probably fall to theMarsi. ThereforeRutilius did not intend to be subtleaboutbreakingthesiege.HeadvanceddirectlytotheRiverTolenus,probablyarrivingatapointjustnorthoftheViaValeria,nearthecityofCarsoliandlessthan50kilometres(30miles)fromAlba.HeretheMonteBovepassiscreatedbytheriverasitflowsdownfromthemountainsmaking thisoneof the twonaturalapproaches intoMarsic territory fromLatium.Naturally,theMarsiintheirturnpreparedtoheadtheRomansoffatthepass.Thecrossing of the riverwas contested by theMarsic army under the command ofVettiusScatowho,asmentionedabove,hadreturnedfromPicenumtotakecharge.

Perhaps surprisingly, Rutilius chose to divide his army, keeping half under his owncommand andgivingMarius a free handwith his ownunit.The twoparts of the armyseparatedandeachbegan toattempt to forceacrossingatadifferentpointof the river.ThismanoeuvrewaspresumablytoforceScatotodividehisownforcesaccordingly,sinceheotherwisewouldhave toconcede thecrossing towhicheverarmyhewasnot facing.However,thereisalsoasneakingsuspicionthatforRutiliustheactofdividinghisforceshadtheaddedadvantageofgettingMariusoutofhisfaceforat leastawhile.Atfirst itlookedasthoughScatoplannedtositonthefence,forhepositionedhisarmybetweenthetwo Roman forces. This was sensible enough, since if the Roman crossing was notperfectly co-ordinated, Scato could defeat the Romans in detail by moving againstwhomevercrossedfirst,and thencomingback todealwith theremainingRomanforce,andallthewhilehavingtheadvantageofnumbers.Eventuallythough,Scatoappearedtochangehismind,andshiftedhisarmytoopposethecrossingofMarius,leavingRutiliusto crossunopposedupstream.However, thiswasonly an appearance. In fact the troopsfacingMariuswerea thinlymanned screen, forScatoknewhisopponent.ThecautiousMariuswouldonlyadvanceoncehehadascertainedthatScatowasbluffing,anditwouldtakehoursofcarefulprobingandreconnaissancebeforeMariuswassurethattheenemyhadtoofewmentopreventhimfromreachingtheothersideoftheriver.

The majority of theMarsic army was gone. The soldiers had withdrawn during thenight,andwerenowwaitinginambushincrevassesandravinesnearthenewlycompletedbridge of Rutilius. Scato knew that Rutiliuswasmuchmore likely to advancewithoutcautiousreconnaissance,beingbotheagertorelieveAlbaanddeceivedintobelievingthatthebulkoftheenemyarmywasdownstreamwatchingMarius.Andsoitproved.Onthefateful morning of 11 June, Rutilius led his men across the river and straight into thecarefullylaidtrap.TheRomanswereexpectingminimalresistance,andinsteadtheygotalmosttheentireMarsicarmy.

We can assume that theMarsi fell on their victims before the Romans had properlyorganized tomove inland, for theywere quickly drivenbackon to the river. Scato hadwaiteduntiltheRomanswereallacross,becauseoncetheambushwassprung,therewasno way that such a large body of men could manage an orderly retreat across onemakeshiftbridge.InsteadtheywerecaughtbetweentheMarsiandtheRiverTolenuswithneithertimetoorganizeadefencenoranywheretorun.Casualtieswerehorrendous.Itdidnothelptheco-ordinationoftheRomandefencethatthecommanderRutiliuswashit inthe head by a missile and died in action, while the second-in-command, Marius waselsewhereandatthispointunawarethattherewasevenabattletakingplace.Accordingto

thepoetOvid–writingseveraldecadeslaterwithperfecthindsight–thedeathofRutiliushadbeenforetoldbytheRomanGoddess,theMagnaMatua(thegreatmother).

Theysaysheaskedyou,Rutilius,‘Whereareyourushing?Asconsulyou’llfalltotheMarsianenemyonmyday.’13Herwordswerefulfilled,theTolenusFlowedpurple,itswatersmixedwithblood.

OvidFasti6.555

Itwasinfactthispurpleflow,andthebodiesthatcamefloatingdownalongtheriverthatalertedMariusthatmattersupstreamwerenotgoingwell.(ItisthesesamebodiesthatletlaterhistoriansknowthattheRomanswerepushedbackagainsttheriver.)ThenumberofcorpsesmadeitcleartoMariusthatthemajorityofScato’sarmywascommittedupstreamagainst the otherRoman force. Therefore by simple deduction, the force facingMariushadtobemerelyaflimsyscreen,whichcouldbesmashedthroughwithease.OnceMariushaddonethemathheactedwiththespeedandenergyhealwaysdisplayedwhenheknewtheenemywereatadisadvantage.HeswiftlycrossedtheriverandafterascertainingthewhereaboutsofScato’scamp,hecapturedthatwhiletheMarsicleaderwasengagedwiththestubbornremnantsofRutiliusLupus’force.

IfwearetobelieveOrosius,awriterwhodescribedeventsfromaperspectiveoffourcenturies afterwards,Marius then swiftly counterattacked. If he did so, and caught theMarsiunpreparedthenthebody-countof8,000Marsideadinthebattleisquitecredible.What is lesscredible is that themuchearlierhistorianAppian,writing inaboutAD 155,doesnotmentionthismostdramaticRomanvictoryofthewartodate,andhisisthebestcontinuoushistoryofthewarstillextant.However,whethertheMarsisufferedadefeatormerelyaminorsetback,ineithercaseScatohadtowithdraw.Weknowfromanotherofthose informativefragmentsofDio that theRomanswere thebetter-suppliedof the twoarmies, and the loss of theMarsic camp and the rations stored within could not havehelpedScato’slogisticalsituation.Hewithdrew,leavingthefieldtoMarius,whowasnowtemporarilyincommandofbothhisownmen,thatistheformersurvivorsofPerpenna’sdefeat,and thepresentsurvivorsofRutilius’defeat.Perhapsbecausehefelt thatmoraleamonghismenwasunsustainably low,orperhapsbecausehehadafter allnotwon thecrushingvictoryattributedtohimbyOrosius,MariusnowwithdrewtoRome,takingwithhimforaproperfuneralthedeadwhomhehadretrievedfromthebattlefield.

As it turnedout, inbringingback thebodiesMariusdidRomeagreat service, for itbrought the reality ofwar home to thepeople of the city.At the timehowever,Mariusreceived no thanks for doing so. The sight of the fallen consul and the bodies of hisofficersmadeademoralizingsight.‘Itwasapiteousspectacle,andthemourningwentonformanydays’saysAppian.Thesenatedecreedthatthereafter,evenifitwaspossibleforthebodiesofthefallentobebroughtbacktoRome,theyshouldinsteadbeinterredonthebattlefield.TheItaliansdecidedthatthiswasasensiblemeasureandoncetheyheardofittheypassedasimilarresolution.ButinRomethedamagehadbeendone–thecorpsesofRutiliusandhismencouldnotbeun-seen,and thiswas toproveofvital importance inturning the population against thewar and toward the previously unpalatablemeasures

requiredforpeace.

BChapter7

Surrender–anOddWaytoWinecause theconsulCaesarhadhishandsfullwithcopingwith therebellion in thesouth,itwasnotpossibleforhimtoreturntoRometosupervisetheelectionofa

replacement consul for the fallen Rutilius. Therefore it appeared that command of thenorthernsectorwouldfallbydefaulttoMarius.

ThenthegloomymoodinRomeinducedbythedisplayofthefallenfromthebattleoftheTolenusriverwasabruptlylightenedbyreportsofaRomanvictory.CaepiohadscoredasuccessoverthePaeligni,arebeltriberelatedtotheMarrunciniineastcentralItaly.Allwehavebywayofdetail isa terseobservationby theepitomaterofLivy1 that ‘Servius[ServiliusCaepio]routedthePaeligni’.ThisinformationwasenoughforthesenatetotakesolecommandofthenorthernfrontawayfromMariusandmakeCaepioandMariustheco-commanders, a decision made all the easier by the fact that most senators wereunhappy about givingMarius sole command because they never liked him in the firstplace. HowMarius felt about this, history does not record. Nor did Caepio’s elevationmattermuchinthelongrun,becausetheItaliansweredelightedtobeopposingsomeonemoreimpetuousandgulliblethanthecautiouslysuspiciousMarius.TheypromptlysetupadaringtesttoseejusthowcredulousCaepioactuallywas.Appiantakesupthestory:

The opposing general, Q. Pompaedius [Silo] deserted to Caepio (though this was apretence).Asapledgeofhis sincerityhebroughtwithhimhisown twosons (or sohepretended.Theywere in fact slavebabiesdressedwith thepurple-borderedgarmentsoffree-bornchildren.)Asfurtherconfirmationofhisgoodfaithhebroughtmassesofgoldandsilver(whichwereactuallylead,platedwithpreciousmetal.)

Pompaediuspointedoutthatwithhis‘defection’hisownarmywascurrentlyleaderless.If Caepio made haste and followed him he could capture the entire enemy force.Completelydeceived,CaepiofollowedtowherePompaediussaidthearmywouldbe.Thisarmywasinfacthiddeninambush,andwhenPompaediusranupahillasthoughtolookforhismen,thiswasthesignalforthemtospringfromconcealment.Caepiowascuttopieces,andsoweremostofhismen.

Appian,CivilWars1.44

By default, this débâcle leftMarius in sole command of the northern front against therebellion.Hehadanarmynowcomposedof theremnantsofPerpenna’sdefeatedforce,theremnantsofRutilius’defeatedarmy,andthesurvivorsofthemassacrethathadkilledCaepio.Duringtheweeksthatfollowed,Mariuswasaccusedofbeingbattle-shyevenbyhisownexceptionallylowstandards.Giventhetatteredmoraleofthemenhecommanded,notonlywas it commendableofMarius toavoidputting their fragilemorale to the testimmediately, itwas quite an achievement just to keep that army intact in the field.AnincidentrelatedbyMarius’biographerPlutarchprobablydatestothisperiod.ItseemsthatMarius had managed to outmanoeuvre the enemy, but his men retreated instead of

attacking.Thisallowedtheenemytobackoffundamagedfromtheconfrontation.Mariusafterwardsupbraidedhismenwiththecomment‘It’shardtotellifyouortheenemyarethebiggercowards.Theydidn’tgettoseeyourbacksonlybecausetheyhadturnedtheirstoyou.’2

WhenMarius was finally ready to advance, theMarsi were prepared, and had theiralliestheMarrunciniinattendance.ShadowingtheMarrunciniwasSulla,whothusfoundhimself forced to work in tandem with his old commander. Whatever their personaldifferences, the pairwere perhaps the best generals of their day, and theyproved it yetagain.Wedonotknowthedetails,butitappearsthatMarius,aswashiswont,goadedtheenemyintoattackinghimongroundthatfavouredthewilyRomancommander.Thereafterthe Italianswere forced into retreat, and foundSullawaiting. The disorganized Italianswereforcedtochangetheirangleofretreatintoanareaofvineyardssurroundedbyhighstonewallsfromwhichitwasasimpossibletoescapeasitwastoorganizeadefence.IfthefirstmajoractionattheTolenushadbeenatbestadrawandatworseadefeat,heretheRomansavengedboththisandtheambushthathadkilledCaepio.Some6,000MarsiandMarrunciniwereslain,alongwiththeMarruncinegeneralHeriusAsinus.TheMarsiwereinfuriatedbythedefeat,butthoughtheyraisedanotherarmy,theydidnotyetdareputitinthe field. Meanwhile the leaderless Marruncini retreated, presumably taking Sulla inpursuit, andMariuswhowas65 and feeling the effects of avigorous campaign, lapsedintoinactivity.(WhatbecameofAlbaFucensisisunrecorded,butitisgenerallybelievedthatthecityfinallysurrenderedaroundtheendoftheyear.)

Therewasstillplentyoflifeleftinthewar,asdemonstratedbyeventsonthesouthernfront. Justas thestressofcampaigningwas taking its tollonMarius, theconsulCaesarwasalsofeelingthestrain.ForawhilenowCaesarhadbeenforcedtodohiscampaigningfromalitter.Thisseverelylimitedwhathewasabletodoinperson,andoneofthethingsmostRomangeneralslikedtodoforthemselveswastoinspectthelandthattheirarmieswere to cross. To make things worse for Caesar, he had lost his Numidians and theirinvaluablescoutingskills.ThismadetheRomansvulnerabletoambush,especiallyasthemountainouscountryofcentralItalymadeitinevitablethatanarmyonthemarchwasatsomepointexposedtoattack.

At Mons Massicus in the Volturnus valley on the road to Aesernia the predictableambushwasdulysprung.MariusEgnatiusattackedfromcoverastheRomanarmymadeitswaythrougharockydefile.Sincethiswasnotacompletelyunexpecteddevelopment,the Roman army managed to fight its way out of the trap. The legionaries struggledtowards the nearby town of Teanum,which occupied a highly defensible position. Theproblem was that, by definition, defensible positions are hard to approach. The onlyapproach toTeanum layover theponsCampanus, anarrowbridgeover the riverSavo,and by harrying the rearguardmercilessly, the Italians gave their Roman enemies littletime to negotiate this bottleneck. The result for the Romans was a mitigated disaster.Caesarlostsome8,000ofhis30,000infantry,butthearmyanditsinfirmcommanderhadasafehaventoholeupinwhiletheyrecoveredandwaitedforreinforcements.

Oncethesereinforcementsarrived,CaesarhurriedtoAcerrae,whichwasstillbesieged

bytheItalians.Caesar’searliersuccessinthrowingbacktheattackonhiscamphadgiventhecitytimetostockuponsuppliesandreinforceitsdefences.ButwithouthelpAcerraecouldnotholdoutindefinitely,anditwasakeyelementintheRomandefencestrategyinCampania. Like the Roman army of which they had recently been a part, the ItaliansbesiegingAccerraehadmade themselvesasecurecamp,andCaesarhimselfhadearliergivenanobjectlessononthefollyofassaultingoneofthese.TheItalianshadlearnedthatlessontoo,andonceCaesarhadestablishedhisowncamp,theyleftitstrictlyalone.Asortofthree-waystalematefollowed.TheItaliansandRomansweresecureintheirowncampsand thepeopleofAccerrae securebehind theirwalls, but noneof thesegroupshad thestrengthtobudgetheotherfromitssecureposition.Andsothepositionremainedasthelastdaysofthecampaignseasondrewtoaclose,andCaesarreturnedtoRometoresumethestruggleonthepoliticalfront.

Overall,therebelshadasmuchreasontofeelpleasedwiththemselvesastheRomanshadtobeworried.InthefieldtheItalianshadshownthattheyweremorethanamatchforRome’ssupposedlyinvinciblearmies.TheItalianshadmadeterritorialgainsinsouthernCampaniawhilebloodyingRomannoseswhentheyattemptedtopokethemintoMarsicterritory or around Asculum. One way or another, a number of Roman and LatinsettlementshadfallenintoItalianhandswhiletheItalianshadnotlostasinglesettlementof any significance. Perhaps the only bad news was that Pompeius Strabo’s army hadbrokenoutofconfinementinFirmumonthePicentinecoast,andhaddrivenawayItalianreinforcementsbyattackingthemsimultaneouslyinthefrontandrear.NowitseemedthatAsculum,wheretherebellionhadoriginallybrokenout,wasgoingtobethefirstItaliancitytoendurethesameexperienceofbeingbesiegedwhichtheyhadinflictedonsomanyofRome’sallies.

Nevertheless,Asculumwasinastrongsiteandwaswellprovisioned.TheItalianshadanumberofpromisingsiegesoftheirownunderwaythatmightyetaddtotheirnumberofcapturedtownsas thewinterworeon,while theRomanshadnogains toshowfor theiryear’s campaign and a frighteningly long butcher’s bill of slain citizens, including aconsul,apraetorandanex-consul.Toadd toRomanworries, the fact that the rebellionhadgrown stronger rather thanbeingpromptlyquashedhadbeennotedwith interest inEtruria and Umbria. These areas had seen no fighting, but the struggle for hearts andmindswasintense,andtheRomanshadasinkingfeelingthattheywerelosingthisbattletoo.InthelaterpartofthesecondcenturyRomanarrogancehadbecomeaby-wordintheMediterranean basin. The Roman people expected victory as a right, and refused toabandonanystrugglethatdidnotendwiththedefeatorsurrenderoftheiropponents.Yetitwas beginning to dawn on even themost enthusiastic ofRome’s allies that this timearoundtheRomanswereindangeroflosingtheirwar.TheItalianswerenotabarbarianpeopleeasilyoutmanoeuvredandout-foughtbysuperiorRomanarmyandlogistics.Norcould the Roman army rely on the contempt the legionaries felt for ‘Graeculi’ (littleGreeks) or decadent ‘orientals’. In foreign wars this feeling, however misplaced, hadtranslated toa real advantageofmoraleon thebattlefield.But the legionariesknew theSamnites and Marsi from fighting alongside them, and knew there was nothingcontemptibleabouttheiropponents.Intermsoffightingabilitytherebelsactuallyseemed

tohavetheedge.

This isbecausewarwasessentiallyoneof therebelsattemptingtocaptureordestroytheRomancoloniesontheirlands.Thereforetherebelswereessentiallyoperatingintheirhometerritoryastheylaidsiegetothecolonies.ToliftasiegetheRomanshadtoventureon to land the rebels knew intimately. This partly explainswhy the attempts to relievebesiegedcitieswereuniformlyunsuccessful,andwhy,withtwoequallymatchedsidestheItalianshadthemorevictoriestoshowfortheyear.Through90BC,Rome’srelativelackofsuccesshadtranslatedintoapropagandadisadvantage.Itbegantolookasthough,forallits arrogant self-confidence, Rome might after all be beaten. As that view grew inpopularity among those still on theRoman side theredevelopedavery realdanger thatcomespringin89BCUmbriaandpartsofEtruriamightabandontheRomancauseandjointherebellion.AsAppianreports:

WhiletheseeventstookplaceontheothersideofItaly,thepeoplesofEtruria,Umbriaandsurroundingplacesheardof themand sentiment for revoltwaswhippedup.The senatefearedtheywouldbesurroundedbywar,andhelplesstoprotectthemselves.

Appian,CivilWar1.49

Itwasaveryrealfear.IfEtruriawent,thenRome’salreadyover-stretchedarmieswouldstruggletoholdCampaniainthesouthwherealreadymanpowershortageshadledtoex-slavesbeingrecruitedtomanthedefencesofCapuaandthecoastalcities.WithUmbriatooinrevolt,Romewouldbecutofffromthereinforcementsthat theever-ableQuintusSertoriuswassupplyingfromCisalpineGaul.AlreadytheGallicSaluviiontheothersideof theAlpshadbecomedangerously restive.Should the Italian tidegainmomentumbytheendof89BC‘RomanItaly’mightconsistofnorthernPicenumandLatium–andmayhaveceasedtoexistaltogetherby88.

WhenCaesarreturnedtoRomefromCampaniatoholdelectionsfortheconsulsofthefollowing year, he found a desperately worried city. The willingness to compromise,whichLiviusDrusushadfoundsosadlylackingin91,wassuddenlythereforCaesartoworkwith.Itmayhavebeenatthepointofasword,buttheRomansenateandpeoplehadindeedfinallygotthatpoint.Thesenate’smemberswerewellinformedenoughtoknowthatstrategicallytheywereinapoorposition,andpoliticallyawareenoughtoknowthatEtruriawastremblingonthebrink.Thecommonpeoplemighthavebeenmorereluctantto share their prized citizenship, but here Marius had done the senate an inadvertentfavour.BydisplayingthecorpsesofthewardeadfromthebattleofTolenusinRome,hehad forced the Roman people to confront the grim reality of what their obstinacywascosting thecity.Therewas little senatorialorpopular resistance toCaesar’s final act asconsul,whichwastopasstheLexJulia,alawthatgaveRomancitizenshiptoanyItalianwiththeLatinRight,andmadeeligibleforthecitizenshipanyotherItalianswhowerenotcurrently killingRomans to get it. In short theRoman senate and people conceded theverypointonwhichtherebellionwasbased.

Thismarked the turningpointof thewar.Upto thispointRomehadbeen losingandwasinactualdangerofextinction.IneffectRomesaveditselfbygivingwhattheenemywasdemanding,thoughtheRomanswerenotpreparedtoactuallygivethecitizenshipto

theenemy–yet.Thefact that theLexJuliaspecificallyexcludedcommunitiesinrevoltshows that the legislationwas particularly aimed at keepingEtruria andUmbria on theRomanside.Andthisitdid,thoughitwasaclose-runthing.ItisclearthatagitatorsfromAsculumhadbeenbusy in theirattempts toseducebothregions to therebelcause.TheItalian rebels had already prepared a flying column which would come in from theAdriaticcoasttoreinforceanEtrurianrebellionwhenithappenedinspring.

OnthenewsthatRomehadofferedtheEtrurianscitizenshipthiscolumnsetoutinthedead ofwinter. Presumably the hopewas that a rebel army on Etruscan soilmight yetmake a convincing counter-argument to the Lex Julia. After all, why accept RomancitizenshipifthatsimplymeantgoingdownindefeatalongwiththerestofRome?Fifteenthousandmensetoutinthecolumn.TherouteovertheApennineswaslonganddifficulteveninsummer.Inwinterthedifficultywascompounded,evenwithouttheinterventionofPompeiusStrabo.Strabohadbeenelectedconsulfor89onthebasisofhissuccessatbreakingoutofFirmumattheendofthecampaigningseasonof90.NowhejustifiedthefaiththeRomanshadplacedinhimbyattackingthecolumnandkilling5,000rebels.Thisattack dispersed the rebel force and around another 5,000 men died miserably in thetrackless mountain wastes as they struggled to survive on windfall acorns and thegleanings remaining from autumn. The historianOrosius tells the striking story on onesuchdetachmenttakingastandonamountainsidewheretheydiedfromexposure.‘Someleanedontreestumpsorrocks,othersontheirweapons.Theireyeswereopenandtheirteeth bared. They appeared alive and only the fact that they remained so immobilebetrayedtomoredistantobserversthattheywereactuallydead.’3

SooneofRome’sconsulshadprovidedapropagandavictorytopresenttotheEtruriansalong with the citizenship. For their other consul the Romans elected Porcius Cato, acommander already on the ground in Etruria, ready with an army to provide a verypracticalreasonwhytheRomanofferofcitizenshipshouldnotberejected.ForCato,newsof theLex Julia came in the nick of time, for thoughCatowas kept busy copingwithdisturbances in the region, being given the citizenship proved sufficient to keep theEtrurians froma full-scaleuprising. Itwouldalsoappear that thepeopleofUmbriahadbeen watching events in Etruria closely. Had Etruria rebelled, Umbria would probablyhavegonetotherebelsideaswell.Asitwas,EtruriachosetobecomeRomanandUmbriadidthesame.

TheLexJuliaappliedspecifically tocommunities.EachItaliancityhad toconveneameeting and formally pass a decree announcing that it was now Roman. This showedcareful forethought.A city couldnot becomeRomanwilly-nilly bydefault.Thepeoplehad to standupandexplicitlydeclare themselves.Andevery timea citydeclared itselfRoman,itputmorepressureonneighbouringcitiestodothesame.Inshort,theRomansleveragedthedesireforthecitizenshipinmostcitiesagainstaminorityofEtrurianswhowantedtobeshotofRomealtogether.ThustheLexJuliahadthedifferentfactionsinthecities of Etruria and Umbria in competition against each other. This was ‘divide andconquer’ – the patented Roman technique of bringing enemy confederations to defeat.Nowthatthestickingpointofgrantingcitizenshiphadbeenovercome,Rome’spoliticianshadsomethingtodotheirdividingwith,andtheyuseditwithenthusiasm.Twotribunes

next passed an eponymous law that built on the observed effects of the Lex Julia onwavering communities.However,while theLex Julia focusedon communities, theLexPlautia Papia was aimed at individuals. A sub-provision of the Lex Julia had alreadygrantedcitizenshiptoanyItalianfromwhereversolongashewasservingwithdistinctioninRome’sarmies.SonowtheLexPlautiaPapiatookthisastepfurther.

Any Italian, so long ashewasdomiciled in Italy andwason the electoral roll of analliedcity–andnomatterwhatsidethatcitywascurrentlyon–couldmakeapersonalapplicationtobecomeaRomanbyapplyingpersonallytothePraetorinRomewithinthenext sixtydays.Or toput itanotherway, those Italianswhowanted thecitizenship thatmostofthemwereinrebelliontogetcouldnowobtainitbydowningspearsandreportingtoRomebeforethestartofthenextcampaigningseason.Thislegislationisgenerallyseenas being aimed at community leaders and opinion-formers in the various Italian cities.However,thecynicmightnotethatonceanaveragepeasantsoldierhadreportedtoRomeandbecomeaRoman,hewasnoweligibleforrecruitmentintoaRomanlegion.TheLexPlautiaPapiawasnotjustdesignedtosplitcommunitiesintoRomanandrebelfactions,itwasalsoahandyrecruitingtool.

Asthewarlaunchedintoitssecondcampaigningseason,itbecameclearhowdesperateRomewasfornewrecruits.MariushadfailedtofollowuponthesuccesshehadwoninconjunctionwithSulla.Inparthedidnottrusthisownmen,andalsohisownhealthwassuspect.Accordinglyhesteadfastlyrefusedtoengagetheenemy,probablyreasoningthatan undefeated army in the field still tied up resources the Italians needed elsewhere,whereasifhegambledonabattlehemightlosehisdemoralizedmentoanItalianarmythatwouldthenbefreetowreakhavocelsewhere.

Heneverallowedtheenemytogettogripswithhim.Hebidedhistimeandshruggedoffinsultsandchallenges.WearetoldthatPublius[Pompaedius]Silo,thegreatestandmostpowerfuloftheenemyoncechallengedhim‘Soifyouaresuchagreatgeneral,Marius,whynotcomedown [fromyour fortifications]and fight itout?’To thisMarius retorted‘Well,ifyouthinkyouareanygoodasageneral,whydon’tyoutrytomakeme?’

Plutarch,LifeofMarius33

WhilePompeiusStrabowasabletobulkuphisarmyfromtherichrecruitinggroundsofPicenum,his fellowconsulCatodiscovered thathisonly recruitsavailable tohimwerethosewhohadbeenrecalledtothestandardsafterservingtheirtime.Thesemenwerenotparticularlypleasedathavingtoreturntothearmy,andweretruculentaboutdoingso–evenwiththeircommandingofficer.

The men were somewhat too old to be serving in the legions, and at best Cato couldexercise little authority over them. They did not obey orders readily, and were notpreparedtobeworkedhard.WhenCatodaredtorebukethemforthishewaspracticallyburiedunder the showerofmissiles they threwathim. If stoneshadbeenavailable,hewouldcertainlyhavebeenkilled.Butthemenweremusteredonasoggyploughedfield,soCatosurvivedtheclodsofearthunharmed.

FragmentofCassiusDio31.100

Havingfinishedhisstintasconsul,LuciusCaesarhadhandedovertohissuccessorsanddeparted for Picenumwhere he served as the legate (second-in-command) to PompeiusStrabo. The situation in Picenum was very different from a few months ago whenPompeiushadbeenholedupinFirmum.SincethenareinforcingItalianarmyhadbeenbeatenoff,theflyingcolumntoEtruriahadbeendestroyedandthegrantofcitizenshiptoRomanalliesandneutralskeptformerlypotentialalliesofAsculumoutofthefray.Caesarkept Asculum under siege, but the same ill-health that had dogged him through hissoutherncampaignagainst theSamnitesforcedhimtohandovercommandandretiretoRome.4 The Romans later rewarded his dogged service for their cause bymaking himcensor,themosthonourableofficeofalltheRomanmagistracies.

The rebel cause in southern Picenumwas led by oneVidacilius.5 Thisman gatheredtogethereightcohorts,orjustunderalegion’sworthofrecruits.WiththishemarchedtothereliefofAsculum.Hesentwordaheadthat thepeopleofthecityshouldprepareforhis arrival, and at a given signal they should sally out against the Romans even as heattackedthemfromtheotherside.However,eveninAsculumtheRomantacticofdivideand rulehad itseffect.Thereweresomewhohoped thatbydisavowing the rebelcausetheymightyet survive thewar andbecomeRomancitizens.Civil dissentparalysed thecity,andwhenVidaciliusappearedoutsideAsculum’swalls thevacillatingpopulacedidnothing. Vidacilius was by then committed to his attack, and by vigorous fighting hepushedhiswaythroughthesiegelinesofthesurprisedRomansandenteredthecity.Hewas well aware that all he had done by his attack was to add to the number of thosealreadytrappedwithinAsculum’swalls,andwasunderstandablypeevedatthefailureofthe city to support what might otherwise have been a successful operation. Vidaciliusproceeded tokilloff thosehe felt responsible for thedébâcle,butknew thatheand therebel cause in Asculum were now doomed. Accordingly he had a pile of his mostflammablepossessionsstackedinoneofthetemples,andorderedhisfriendstojoinhiminonelastepicdrinkingbout.ThelastcupfulofwineVidaciliuseverenjoyedwaslacedwithalethaldoseofpoison.Ashefelttheeffects,Vidaciliusorderedthepileignited,andthrewhimself into it. Itwasamove(asonehistoriandrylyputs it) ‘widelyadmiredbutno-whereimitated’.

Resistance outside Asculum was virtually extinguished by the ‘ex-consul SextusCaesar’ (Appian’s inability to tell his Sextus from his Lucius is a continual source offrustration, since his reference is to either the ex-consulLucius, or the yet-to-be consulSextus,butitishardtotellwhich.)Some20,000Italianswereintheprocessofshiftingtonewcamp-groundswhenwhicheverCaesar fell upon them,killing8,000 and scatteringthe rest. A considerable quantity of weaponry was also seized, an indication that theformerownersofthisweaponrydecidedtoabandonitinthecourseofreturningtotheirhomesandlaterregisteringaspeaceableRomancitizens.6

Throughout the Italian peninsula the flames of rebellion were dying down.While agoodly number of die-hard rebels remained under arms, itwas unclearwhat theywerefightingfor. If itwasfor theRomancitizenship, thebestway toobtain thiswas tostopfighting. If itwas todestroyRome, thisput the remaining rebels indirectopposition tothosewhohadbeenfightingtobecomeRoman.Thislefttheideathatthedifferentpeoples

werefightingfortheindependenceoftheirtribe,yetthiswassomewhatnullifiedbythefact that the tribes had formed a confederation, and made Corfinium their capital,subsuming individual tribal identity into a largerwhole in any case. Sowithout a clearreasontokeepgoing,agoodmanyItalianrebelsstoppedfighting.Itishardtoagreewiththestatementthatthey‘surrendered’,sinceitwasactuallytheRomanswhohaddoneso.Afterall,thesenatehaddoneexactlywhattheItalianshadpressedLiviusDrusustomakeitdo–giveRomancitizenshiptoanyItalianwhoaskedforit.Oncethesenatehadbeenforcedbyarmedrebelliontoabandonitsresistancetothisissue,therewaseffectivelynocaususbelli. ‘Itwas the one thing they all desired… . Itmade the loyal evenmore so,stiffened the wavering, and softened the enemy with the hope of receiving similartreatment.’ remarksAppian.7What remainedof thewar in89BCwas essentially a hugemopping-upoperation.

Thisdidnotmeanthattheremainingrebelswentquietly.OneoftheproblemswasthatRomancommanders remainedRomanaristocrats ina systemwheremilitaryglorywenthand-in-hand with political success. Victory in battle earned many more votes than aquietlyhandleddiplomatic solution, soCatopushedonwithhisplans to invadeMarsicterritoryinthespring.Hademissariesbeensentinstead,itispossiblethattheMarsicouldhavebeentakenoutoftherebellionbynegotiation.Suchnegotiationswerecommonplaceatthispoint:

IwastherewhentheconsulCnPompeius[Strabo]metfortalkswiththeMarsianleaderP.VettiusScato.…AfterScatohadgreetedPompeius,Pompeiusasked‘AndhowshouldIgreetyou?’

‘AtheartIamafriend,bynecessityafoe’saidScato.Thetalkswerecalm,withoutfearormistrust,andindeedwithverylittlehatred.The[Italian]alliancedidnotwanttorobusofourstatebutwantedtoenteritascitizens.

Cicero,Philippics12.27

ButCatohadboastedhowhewouldout-performMarius, andwasdetermined tomatchdeeds with action, so he marched his army to the vicinity of Alba Fucensis. It isreasonably certain that the city had fallen by this time, so Cato was evidently settinghimself up as the avenger of the city’s defenders. It also gave the Marsi a reason tocontinue fighting, for discussions of eligibility for citizenship seem relatively arcane incomparison to the need to defend home and family from an invading army. TheyaccordinglymetCato’sarmywithanarmyoftheirownsomewhereneartheFucineLake,whichgaveAlbaFucensisitsname.AllweknowoftheactionthatfollowedwasthatCatowaskilledinanattempttostormtheMarsiccamp.ThatCatowasthedrivingforceofthewarinthatpartofItalybecomesclearintheaftermathofhisdeath.ThatdeathwasswiftlyavengedinaseriesofsharpengagementsbythelegatesCinnaandMetellusPius(menofwhomwewill hearmuchmore anon) but thereafter the Roman legates were happy toexchange arms for dialogue when theMarsi suggested peace talks. No doubtMetellusPius andCinnawerewell aware that the lateCato’s armyconsistedmostlyof reluctantsoldierswhowerelesseagerforglorythanforthechancetoreturnhomeintact,andtheykeptactiontoaminimum.OncetheRomansstoppedfightingtherewaslittleneedforthe

Marsi to continue doing so, and the war in central Italy was allowed to die of benignneglect.BytheendoftheyeartheMarsiwereapartoftheRomanpolity.

Asculumontheotherhandhadnaileditscolourstotherebelmast,andinthecity’scasenonegotiationwaspossible.PompeiusStrabotookthetown,andexecutedallitsleadingcitizens,presumablyonthebasisthatVidaciliushadalreadydonethesamewithanypro-Romans among them. Among those present at the taking of the city was PompeiusStrabo’s sonGnaeusPompey (laterknownas ‘theGreat’)whowas laterprosecuted forhelping himself to plunder that should have belonged to the state. ThenwithAsculumcrushed,PompeiusStrabousedhispositionasconsultopushthroughaLexPompeiathatconsolidatedRome’spositionamongthetribesfurthernorth.PeoplessuchastheVenetoreceived the Latin Right, which meant that their leading men could shortly expect tobecomeRoman citizens, and the remainder had the right to tradewith Roman citizensunder the protection of Roman law. Even the surviving rebels in southern Picenumeventually became Roman citizens. One interesting vignette resulting from this is thatwhenPompeiusstagedhistriumphon25December89BC,amongtheprisonersdisplayedwasaboycalledPubliusVenditius.Fifty-oneyearslaterVenditiuswasbackinatriumphalparadeinRome,butthistimebeinghonouredastheonlygeneraloftheRomanrepublictotriumphovertheParthians.

With Asculum fallen and the north now either pro-Roman or making itself actuallyRoman as fast as humanly possible, Strabo was able to turn his attention to thedemoralized remnants of the rebellion further south. The Vestini and Marruncini‘surrendered’–thatistheyagreedtostopfightingintheexpectationthatthesenate’sofferof citizenship would be extended to them in due course – and the Paeligni so tookexception to Scato’s efforts to make them keep fighting that they arrested him. ScatowouldhavebeenturnedovertotheRomanshadhisslavenotslainhimfirst.8Asquicklyas ithad rebelled, south-eastern Italy returned to itsRomanallegiance.Brundisiumwasrelieved asMetellus Pius now advanced from central Italy and quickly broughtApuliaunderRomancontrol,forcingPompaediusSilotofleetohisnativeSamnitepeople.Thesepeoplewouldat leastkeepfighting,partlyoutof tribal loyalty to their leaderandpartlyoutofvisceralanti-Romansentiment.

BynowMariuswasoutof thewar.Eitherhehadwithdrawnunder thepretextof ill-health because he felt his efforts to date had beenunderappreciated, or because hewasgenuinelyill.Itwascertainlytruethathisrecenteffortshadbeenuninspired,anditmaybethatwhenhiscommandlapsedattheendof90BCthegovernmentinRomesimplydidnotrenewit.Inanycase,Mariuswasoutofajob.Inretirementhehadplentyoftimetowatch his rival and ex-subordinate Lucius Sulla cover himself in glory. Sullawas nowpraetorandoperatinginthehillsnearPompeii.WhenhisopponentCluentiuspitchedhiscampalmost on topofSulla’s own, an infuriatedSulla immediately launched an attackuponit.Thisattackpossessedmoreimpetuositythanplanning,forinthiscaseSullawasliving up to his publicly stated dictum that he did his best work on the spur of themoment.9 He very nearly came to grief, but eventually prevailed thanks to some last-minutereinforcementbytroopswhoreturnedfromforaging.

WhenthetwoarmiesmetinamoreformalengagementtheshakiermoraleoftheItalianarmybetrayeditsleader.Cluentius’armydidnotwaitfortheRomanstofalluponit,butbegan a spontaneouswithdrawal toward the nearby city ofNola. Sulla followed up hisunexpected win with great vigour and killed some 3,000 men before the rest of hisenemiesevenreachedthecitywalls.There,Nola’scautiouscommanderonlyallowedthefleeing Italians to get in through a single gate, for the Romanswere pressing so closebehindthathefearedthattheywouldbeabletopushintothecityontheheelsofthementowhom hewas giving shelter. An estimated 20,000 rebelswere cut downwhile theyqueued for entry, among them Cluentius himself. Sulla did not settle down to besiegeNola,althoughhemighthavedonesosuccessfullyas thecityhadnotbeenplanningontakinginsuchaninfluxofextramouthstofeed.MoraleamongSulla’smenwashighandhewantedtokeepupthemomentumofsuccess.

He turned on the Hirpini further north. There was already considerable pro-Romansentimentinthatrebelnation,asshownbythefactthatoneMinatiusMagiushadraisedalegionfromtheHirpiniwhichwasalreadyservingontheRomanside.Sullaencouragedthissentimentbysparingthosetownsthatsurrenderedtohim.Onehostiletownthathopedfor rebel reinforcements askedSulla for time inwhich to consider surrender. Sullawaswellawareofthereasonsforthedelay,andnotedthattheplacehadwoodenwallssoheordered his men to spend that time preparing firewood. The moment the allotted timeexpired he had his men pile the firewood against the walls and ignite it. Bereft of itsdefences the town surrendered – but too late. Sulla plundered it anyway. With thatexamplebeforethem,theremainingtownsquicklysurrendered,andanotherrebelnationwasbackwithinRomancontrol.

NextonSulla’sagendawere theSamnites,and theSamnitecommanderMutiluswhohad spent the previous year creating havoc in the towns around Pompeii and southernCampania.Mutilus was well aware that Sulla had him in his sights, and had preparedforcesblockingSulla’sway.ExceptSulladidnotgothatway.Eschewingthemainroadshe took his army by a circuitous route and arrived to find the enemy still awaiting hisarrival from another direction.Mutilus’men quickly buckled from the surprise Romanattackandthosewhowerenotcutdownonthespotfledindisorder.Mutilushimselfwaswounded,butwasabletowithdrewwithafewfollowerstoAesernia.Thistownwaswellabletowithstandsiege,astestifiedbyitslongresistancebeforetheItalianshadcapturedit.NowMutilus intended touse the town’s securedefences forhisownbenefit. In factAesernianowbecamethedefactoItalianbaseintheregion,foronceagainSulladeclinedtogetboggeddowninasiegeandmovedagainstBovianum,whichhadbeenthepreviousItalian headquarters.Again, therewas no siege. Sulla knew that he had already brokenMutilus’armyandthat thecityhadtobepoorlygarrisoned.Heorderedhismentotakewhicheverof thecity’s strong-points seemedweakest, and thenused thecaptureof thatstrong-pointasaspringboardtotaketherestofthecityinaferociousthree-hourassault.

The Samnites were feeling the pressure elsewhere as well. One of Sulla’s fellowpraetors,Cosconius,advancedasfarsouthasCannae(oncethesiteofRome’sdevastatingdefeat at thehandsofHannibal).Herehis attempt at taking the townofCanusiumwaspreventedbySamnitereliefforceswhohandedCosconiusabruisingdefeat.Thetwosides

ended up on opposite sides of a river, and the Samnite leader chivalrously proposed towithdraw so that the Romans could fight on his side, or alternatively that the RomanswithdrawsothattheSamnitescouldfightontheotherside.Cosconiusagreedtothelatterproposal,butfakedhiswithdrawal.HismencaughttheSamnitearmyinmid-crossingandwipedout15,000ofthem.CosconiusleftCanusiumandtheremnantsoftheSamnitearmyfor later and resumed his southward drive. This allowed Metellus Pius to recaptureRome’soneandonlyrebelcolony,Venusia,alongwith3,000prisoners.Meanwhile, thedeathinactionofMariusEgnatiusremovedthemandescribedbyLivyas‘themostnobleleader’fromtherebelside.

EvenworsenewsawaitedtheSamnites.WithanarmypartlyraisedfromfreedslavesPompaediusSilo had re-takenBovianum fromSulla, but thiswas his last success. In aspiritedattempttoejectMetellusfromApulia,PompaediusSilonotonlyfailed,butdiedintheattempt.SooftheItalianleadersCluentiuswasnowwounded,MutiluswaspennedupinAesernia,ScatoandEgnatiusweredeadandPompaediusSilo,the‘heartandsoul’oftherebellion,hadjustdiedalso.ItwaslittleconsolationtotherebelcausethattheRomanshadalso lostmoreof their own leaders.The legateGabiniusdied attempting to re-takeGrumentum(whichhadfallentotherebelsinthepreviousyear),andTitusDidiusfellinbattleshortlyafterhehadbroughtHerculaneumbackunderRomanauthoritybyaviolentassault. Presumably Pompeii surrendered at around this time, for now only Nola andAesernia remained in rebelhands in the south-west.The last firesof the rebellionwereflickeringout.

WChapter8

Sulla’sMarchonRome–thisChangesEverythingiththeSamnitesstillholdingoutinthefield,itwouldbewrongtosaythattheItalianwarwasover,buttheRomanscouldatleastnowfeelthattheyhadagrip

on things. This was just as well, for there were other urgent matters demanding theirattention,bothathomeandabroad.Athome the Italianshaddiscovered that the senatehadpartlycheatedontheirgrantofcitizenship,andfromthisdiscoveryapoliticalcrisisblewupthatrequiredfurtherhastyconcessions.Butthegreatermenacelayabroad.

Mithridates VI of Pontus had been contemplating Rome’s problems in Italy withconsiderable interest. It was evident that with Italians and Romans locked in a life-or-deathstruggletherewouldbefewlegionsavailabletofightinAsiaMinor.Thiswasjustaswellfor thePonticking,becauseMithridateshadbeenparticularlyprovocativeintheyearsleadingupto90BC.Mithridateswaseagertogainsuzeraintyovertwoneighbouringkingdoms;Cappadocia andBithynia. In thepast hehad tried installingpuppet rulers inCappadocia(includinghissisterandyoungson)andhadevenresortedtodirectinvasionwhenlesssubtleformsofcoercionfailed.Everytimehetookcontroloftheneighbouringkingdom, emissaries from Rome had arrived and told him to back off and leaveCappadociaalone. Inoneof thesediplomatic incidents, forcessponsoredbyMithridateshadclashedwiththegovernorofCilicia,whoatthattimewasCorneliusSulla.EventuallyMithridateshadtiredofcompetingwithNicomedesofBithyniaforcontrolofCappadocia.HearrangedforapalacecouptodriveNicomedesfromhisthroneandinstalledapuppetking inhis rival’splace.He thenhadhis son-in-law, theequallyambitiousTigranes theGreatofArmenia,invadeCappadocia.ThereafterMithridatesinstalledanotherclientkinginCappadocia,andwithbothCappadociaandBithyniaunderhisthumb,hesettledbacktoawaittheinevitableRomandelegation.

PerhapsMithridatesfeltthatwiththeirlocaldifficultiesinItaly,theRomanswouldbesomewhatmoreconciliatorythistimearound.Ifso,hehadforgottentheadvicegiventohimbyMarius(whohadvisitedtheregioninthepreviousdecade)thatheshouldeitherbestronger than Rome, or dowhat hewas toldwithout complaint.1 TheRomanswere asuncompromisingas ever.Mithridateswasbluntly told toputback thedeposedkingsofCappadociaandBithyniaandtoleavethesetwokingdomsaloneinfuture.

TheRomansdelegationwasledbyoneManliusAquillius,theformerRomanconsulof101BC.ManliusAquilliuswasaRomanoftheoldschool.Thatistosayhewascorrupt,greedy(hehadalreadybeenprosecutedformaladministrationinSicily)andincompetent.TheRomanfirmnessthatsononplussedMithridateswasdeliberatelyprovocative,becauseAquilliuswantedawar.TheRomanemissaryknewthatPontuswasanenormouslyrichkingdom, not least because his father had been governor of the former kingdom ofPergamon (now the Roman province of Asia), where he had become rich through theruinouslyhightaxeshehadunjustlyimposedonitspeoples.ThesonfeltthatMithridateswas a paper tiger whose vaunted armies would quickly collapse under the assault of

RomantroopsfromtheprovinceofAsiaandthearmiesofRome’sAnatolianallies.So,withhopesofashortandprofitablewarbeforehim,itwashighlyfrustratingforAquilliuswhen Mithridates decided to back down while he investigated what lay behind thisconfident Roman approach. Both puppet rulers were displaced and the rightful kingsrestoredtotheirthrones,soAquilliuswasleftwithnopretextforwar.

However,Aquilliuswasnotgoingtoallowhischanceforwealthtoslipawaysoeasily.HeintimatedtoNicomedesofBithyniathatthepriceforhisrestorationtopowerwasthatheshouldinvadePontus.Withdeepreluctance,theBithyniankingdidso,thusprovokingawaragainstPontusinwhichRome,asaBithynianally,couldlegitimatelyparticipate.ItshouldhavecomeasawarningtotheRomanswhentheBithynianinvasionwascrushed,notbythemainPonticarmybutbyastrongreconnaissanceinforceledbyanopportunistPonticcommander.ThereprovedtobenothingpaperaboutthePontictiger.ThearmyhadbeenhardenedbyfightingMithridates’warsofconquestinthekingdomstothenorthofthe Black Sea, and their king was intelligent, ruthless and well-prepared. The plannedRoman invasion crumpled under the Pontic onslaught, and as Mithridates counter-attacked,AquilliushadtofleeforhislifethroughacountrysidethatjubilantlythrewoffRoman rule.But theRoman did get his gold in the end.Captured by local people andhanded over to Mithridates, Aquillius died from gold melted to liquidity which waspoureddownhisthroatasasymbolofhisgreed.

Itwasahorribleway todie,yetonemight forgivecontemporaryRomans for feelingthat Aquillius deserved it. For personal gain he had precipitated a war that Rome hadneither themen nor the resources to fight. Preoccupied by the war in Italy, the senatecoulddonothingasRomewasdrivenfromAsiaMinor.Then,asMithridatesfolloweduphis conquests,Romewas forced out frommuch ofGreece aswell – andworsewas tocome.EvenastheRomansbegantogettheupperhandintheItalianwar,MithridateshituponawayofensuringthatnoneofthecitiesinhisnewempirewoulddefectbacktotheRomanside.HearrangedthateveryLatininhisdomains,bethatpersonItalianorRoman,wastobeexecutedononesingleday.ItsayssomethingofhowheartilytheRomanswerehated in the region thatnoone received the slightestwarninguntil themassacrebegan,andwhenitdidbeginthekillingwasdonewithbloodthirstyenthusiasm.Between80,000and150,0002 ‘Romans and Italianswere killed,with theirwives and children and theirfreedmenof Italianbirth,and theirbodies thrownoutunburiedand theirgoodsshared.’Appianremarks‘ItwasveryclearthattheseatrocitieswerecommittedeverybitasmuchoutofhatredfortheRomansasfromfearofMithridates.’3

FromtheRomanperspective,iftherewasoneredeemingfeaturefromthisentirestoryofgreed,defeatandmassacreitwasthatRomansandItalianshadsufferedequallyatthehandsofacommonenemy.Atonepoint,whenMithridateshadfirstgonetowarwiththeRomans, the Italians had considered askingMithridates to invade Italy on their behalf.4Nowgrievingfamiliesupanddownthepeninsulalookedtoavengelovedoneswhohaddiedintheeast,andtheywerepreparedtoworkwithRometodoso.YetevenassharedgriefandangerdroveRomansandItalianstogether,politicalchicanerybythesenatewaspullingthemapart.

InRome,themainlegislativeassemblywasnotthesenate.Infactdespiteitsimmense(thoughrecentlydiminished)authority,thesenatewastechnicallyonlyanadvisorybodyto theRomanpeople.Lawswere actually passed by several different assemblies of theRomanpeople, butmost legislationwent through theconciliumplebis, and the comitiatributa.The‘tributa’refersto‘tribes’,althoughthesetribeswerenotfamily-linkedbandsintheusualanthropologicalsense,butratherhereditaryvotingconstituenciesintowhichallnewRomanswereenrolled.

OverthecenturiestheRomanaristocracyhadmanagedtogaincontrolofvotinginthe‘tribal’assemblies.Thishadbeendonepartlythroughpatronage,whichworkedforboththe aristocrat and hismany clients among the common people. (Clients voted for lawsfavouringtheirpatronbecausethemorepowerapatronhad, themorehecouldhelphisclients.) More blatant control was exerted through bribery, and when all else failed,throughoutrightintimidation.OneofthereasonswhyMariuswassounpopularwiththesenatewasthathislegislationhadmadeitharderforthearistocracytobullypeopleintovoting theway they ‘should’.Nevertheless, throughbriberyof thepeopleenmasseandselectiveintimidationtokeepcertaingroupsfromvotingatall,thesenategenerallyhadagrip on the legislative process. That grip had slipped on occasion in previous decadeswhenthegeneralpopulacehadbeensimplytoofuriouswiththesenatetobetoldwhattodo, but despite this neither senate nor the people of Rome were enthusiastic aboutadmittingamassofnewvoters.ThesewouldbeoutofthecontrolofthesenateandalsounlikelytovoteforlawsfavouringthosecitizenslivinginRome.

SoasItaliansgainedthecitizenship,newvotingtribeswerecreatedforthem.Thishadin fact been theRoman practice until 241 BC, andwe can suppose the new tribeswereadded two at a time to keep the number uneven. (This was to prevent deadlock if thenumberoftribesvotingforabillexactlybalancedthenumbervotingagainst.)However,the new tribes would vote after the current tribes, and as with the comitia centuriata(whichelected topRomanmagistrates)onceavotehadbeenreachedbyamajority, thevotingwasstopped.SinceRomehadalreadythirty-fivetribes,andamaximumoftennewtribeswascontemplated,itwasunlikelythatthenewcomerswouldhaveasayotherthanacastingvoteinclosedecisions.AnylegislationfavouringtheolderRomancitizenswouldbepassedasadonedealwithoutthenewcitizensgettingthechancetosomuchasvoteonit.

That at least seems to have been the intention. As is often the case, our two mainsources,AppianandVelleiusPaterculus,areatvariancehere,withAppianclaiming thecitizenswereputintotennewtribesandVelleiusstatingthatthethousandsofnewcitizenswerejammedintojusteightoftheexistingtribes.WeevengetafragmentarycontributionfromSisenna,theonlyhistorianwhowasactuallyaroundatthetimeandwhoisthereforetheonlyhistorianwhodefinitivelyknewwhathewastalkingabout.Sisennareferstotwonewtribes,soitispossiblethatwhatactuallyhappenedisthatthenewcitizenswereputintoeightoftheoldtribesofVelleiusandtheoverflowintotwonewonesasperSisenna,thusmakingthetentribesthatAppianbelieveswerecreated.Ineithercasewegetthenewcitizens in ten tribes (at most) and if those tribes voted last, the existing arrangementbetween Roman aristocrats and voters would remain unchanged with the Italians

effectivelydisenfranchisedfromlegislation.

Thehopemusthavebeenthat theItalianswouldbecontentwithhavingavoteinthecomitiacenturiataandwiththeprotectionofRomanlaw.Afterall,thecomitiacenturiatadecidedmajor issues suchas the electionof thenextyear’s consuls andwhetherornotRomeshouldgo towar,andRomanlawprotectedacitizenanywhere in theempire.Soperhapsthenoviciveswouldacceptaverylimitedsayinlegislation?However,afteroveradecade spent struggling for their rights thenoviciveswere not naïve.They knew thepoliticalprocessalmostaswellastheaverageRomanvoter,andknewthatwithoutasayin legislation theycouldbeslowlymarginalizedonceagainbyselective legislation.Forexample, thequestionofwhoservedon jurieshad recentlybeen resolvedbya law thatallowedeachtribetovoteforanumberofjurors,whetherthesewerecommoners,equitesorsenators.Futurelegislationmight‘fine-tune’thetribesthatcouldsovoteandexcludethenewcitizensfromthesejuries,whichwoulddenytheItalianstheveryprotectionofthecourtsthattheyhadfoughtsohardtogain.SotheItalianswerehavingnoneofit.Theydemanded tobe registered in the existing tribes,5 andonce itwas clear that the Italianswould vote in electoral assemblies for whomever backed them up on this, a flock ofopportunistRomanpoliticianshastenedtoannouncetheirsupportforthemeasure.

Oncethedusthadsettled,itisclearfromtheresultsthatthesenatemanagedtoeffectacompromise.Thefour‘urban’tribesthatmostlyheldpeoplewhoactuallyresidedinRomehad no new citizens added to their number. Those peoples who had not rebelled werespreadmoreorlessevenlyamongtheothertribes,whichpreventedthemfromunitingtoactasasinglegrouponanyissues.However,asrebelpeopleswereabsorbedtheywereeachlumpedintoasingletribe.Thougheachtribemightberecalcitrantonagivenissue,sincetherewereonlyeightmajorrebelgroupseveniftherebelsvotedasabloc,andeveniftheyattainedamajorityintheirowntribe,theywerestilltoofewtoprevailagainsttherest of Italy. In fact it might be those ‘eight tribes’ that the slightly confused VelleiusPaterculuswasactuallytalkingabout.6

TheforeignwarwithMithridatesandthelegislativearrangementswiththenewcitizens–thetwoissuesseemedatfirstunrelated.However,aseventsunfoldedin88BCtheyweretocombineinadisastrousconjunctionthatmadetheentireItalianwarmerelythefirstpartofacontinuingcataclysm.TheRomanaristocracyhadlostmanyoftheirnumberinbattle,includingservingand formerconsuls.As thewar slowly randown, the survivorsmighthavefeltreliefthatthestormhadfinallypassed.Infacttheworstwasyettocome.

Romans,botholdandnewlycreated,hadthreemajorissuestodealwithintheyear88BC.Issueonewehavepartlydiscussed,asthatwasthequestionofsmoothlyabsorbingahugemassofextracitizensintotheRomanlegislativeandconstitutionalframework.Issuetwowas that of sorting out themess from thewar.An estimated 300,000Romans andItalians had perished in the fighting, and with those on both sides in the process ofbecomingthesamenation,therewerequestionsoflandownership,inheritanceandtreatyrights to laboriously sort through and decide. Not to mention that some bits of Italy,especially theSamnites, hadgivenuponRomancitizenship anddoggedly continued tofightforindependence.ForthisreasonSulla,oneoftheconsuls-electfor88BC,aimedto

leave Rome soon after the elections to continue with the immediate business on handwhichwasthesiegetoretakeNolainCampania.IssuethreewasthematterofMithridates.Thankstohim,GreeceandAsiaMinorwerenowenemyterritory.ItisalsoprobablethatMacedoniawaslost,oratbesttheRomangriphadbeenseverelyweakened.TheselossesconstitutedagoodlychunkofRome’sonce-growingempire,andtheRomanswantedthemback,notleastbecausetherewasnoreasontobelievethattheexpansionistandpredatoryMithridateswouldrestcontentwithwhathehadgot.SowhileSullawasmoppingupinCampania,thesenatewouldbusyitselfwiththelevyforwhatwasintendedtobethemaineventoftheyear–thereconquestoftheeast.

At this point the Roman people were introduced to a somewhat bizarre sight. TheelderlyandcorpulentMariushadlefthisluxurioushomeinBaiaenearMisenumandnowexerciseddailywith theyoungmenon theCampusMartius, ignoring thosewhokindlyadvised him that he would be better off in the public baths nursing his rheumatism.Rome’s old war-horse was burnishing his image with the public to put himself in therunningforone lastcampaign.Hewanted to lead thewaragainstMithridates.Thiswasallegedlysothathecouldinstructhissoninwarfare;areasonthathisbiographerPlutarchfranklydismissesas‘silly’.Therealreasonwas,‘Hedidn’tunderstandthelimitsofgoodfortune, andwas not content to enjoywhat he had and to be admired forwhat he haddone.’7ApartfromthefactthatMariuswasaroundseventyyearsoldandhisrecordintherecentwarwasmediocre,therewasoneover-ridingdifficultyabouthisleadingthearmytowarinAsia–thesenatehadalreadyawardedthatcommandtoSulla.ThathisrivalhadbeengiventhisopportunitywasundoubtedlyoneofthereasonswhyMariuswantedit.Hecouldget it too, because he had found a politicianwhowanted something fromhim inreturn.

P.SulpiciusRufuswasanaristocratictribuneoftheplebs,andaformerfriendofLiviusDrusus. He had started the year with a relatively unassuming legislative programme,unassumingthatis,apartfromonemajorandcontroversialproposal.Sulpiciuswantedallnew citizens to be redistributed evenly across the thirty-five tribes of Rome, andfurthermore that all manumitted slaves should be enrolled on the same basis. ThisproposalwascertainlyinthespiritofLiviusDrusus,anditwouldironouttheinequalitiesofthecurrentarrangementandsowasworthdoingforitsownsake.However,cynicsalsonotedthatthiswouldalsogiveSulpiciusthesupportofthegratefulItaliansandfreedmenfortherestofhispoliticalcareer.Naturallyenoughthesenatewasappalled,aswerethevoters in the ‘urban tribes’, which were not scheduled to be diluted by new voters.ThereforeSulpiciusfacedveryconsiderableoppositiontohisbill.SoheaskedforandgottheendorsementofMarius.MariuswasstillimmenselypopularwithRomanvoters.Theyrememberedhowastribunehehadpassedlawsthatmadevotingfreer,andhowasconsulhe had defeated Jugurtha and fended off the Cimbricmenace. The newly enfranchisedItalians also saw Marius as sympathetic to their cause. With Marius campaigning atSulpicius’side,therewasagoodchanceofSulpicius’legislationbecominglaw.Thequidproquo forMariuswasanother lawthatwas tobepassed immediatelyafterwards.ThislawwouldstripSullaofhisAsiancommandandtransferittoMarius.

Notunnaturally,Sullaandhisalliesthrewthemselvesintothetaskofpreventingeither

lawfromcomingintoforce.Sulpiciuswasatribune,butSullawasaconsulwhohadmostofthesenatebehindhim.Theresultwasdeadlock.Sulpiciusmighthavehadthevotes,butbeforevotingcouldtakeplacethesenatedecreedaniustitium–anindefinitesuspensionofpublicbusiness.Itremainscontroversialtothisdaywhetherthesenatehadtherighttoover-ruletheprogrammeofatribuneinthisway.ButasPlutarchremarks‘Sulpiciuswasnotamanofhesitation’andhewasnotpreparedtowaitfortheconstitutionalprocesstoresolvetheissue.Thetribunehabituallysurroundedhimselfwithagangofbravoswhomhe called his ‘anti-senate’ and for this occasion he also raised amilitia of some 3,000armedfollowers.Withthesehesetaboutoverturningtheiustitiumbyforce.Dependingonone’spointofviewthiswaseitherarobustresponsetoanillegaldecreebythesenateoritwasanactofarmedsedition.Ineithercase,Sulpiciushaddramaticallyraisedthestakesandthereaftermattersquicklygotoutofhand.

The consuls were addressing the people in the forum when Sulpicius and his menarrived and a full-scale riot quickly developed, with the senate’s supporters swiftlyoverwhelmedbythebetter-preparedfollowersofSulpicius.PompeiusRufus,Sulla’sco-consul,barelyescapedwithhislife.Hisson(whowasalsoSulla’sson-in-law)wasnotsolucky;hewasbutcheredbythemob.Sullahimselfgotawaybydoingtheunexpected.HeduckedintothehouseofMarius,somethingwhichheexplainedawaylater–withsomediscomfort – by claiming he had gone to consult with his rival on the disastrous civicsituation. Negotiations followed that led to Sulla going to the forum and enduring thehumiliationofpubliclyrescindingthesuspensionofpublicbusiness.WithSulpiciusnowthemasterofRome,bothhislawswerebrisklyvotedthrough.Mariushadhisarmy,andSullatookhimselfbacktothesiegeofNola,whichwasnowhisonlyremainingmilitarybusinessoftheyear.

What happened next, as Plutarch perceptively remarks ‘brought to a head the secretdiseasefromwhichthestatehadlongbeensuffering’.Inessence,theproblemwasthattheancientconstitutionofRomenolongerreflectedthecurrentcircumstances.InthepasttheRomanvoterandtheRomansoldierhadbeenessentiallythesameperson.IftheRomanassemblieshadvotedforthecommanderofanarmy,thevotersinthatassemblywerethesamemenwhowouldlaterserveinthatarmyunderthatcommander.Thiswasnolongerthecase.AnyonewantingtovotehadtodosoinRome,inperson.ItwasonethingifacitizenfeltstronglyenoughaboutanissuethathehadtotraveltoRometomakehisvoiceheard,butitwascompletelyanotherissueifacitizencouldnottraveltoRomeandvotetherebecausehewasalreadyservinghiscountryelsewhereasasoldier.

Itwasalwaysgallingforthearmytofindthatithadvotedanincompetenttocommandit,butatleastthevotersinthearmyhaddonethattothemselves.NowtheRomansinthearmyfoundthatpeopleinRome(whodidnothavetodothefighting)hadvotedthemageneralwhomtheydidnotwantandhadthrownoutthegeneralthattheydid.AgaphadopenedbetweentheRomanvoterandtheRomansoldier,effectivelydisenfranchisingthelatter.This‘secretdisease’hadbeenmadeallthemorevirulentbytherecentwar,asthelegionsnowcontainedsoldierswhohadneverevenvoted(becausethecensorshadnotyetgot around to putting them on the voter’s roll). The soldiers gathered for the Asiancampaign expressed their opinion of theRoman voters and of Sulpicius’ legislation by

lynching theofficers sentbyMarius to takeover.With thatmutiny itbecameclear thatMariusdidnothavehisarmyafterall.ButSullahadone,andhewasbringingittoRome.

Sulla had been publicly humiliated, and hewas not the forgiving kind.He had beenborn of a noble yet impoverished family and unlike many of his contemporaries hadreached his current position through a combination of luck, hard work and ability –ironically,characteristicsthathesharedwithMarius.BecauseMariushadbeenforcedtofightsohardforwhathehadachievedhewasconstitutionallyunabletorestonhislaurels.If that meant Sulla had to lose out, then, given Marius’ jealous disposition, that wassomethingofabonus.However,Sullahadfoughtjustashardtogettowherehewas,andhewas not going to letMarius take it all away – and the fact thatMarius hadmade apromisingstartatdoingsomadehimallthemoregrimlyfurious.Sulla’sargumenttothearmy appealed to a mixture of patriotism and greed. Asia was immensely rich, andplunderingitscitieswaspracticallyadutyafterthepeoplesofthosecitieshadmassacredRomansandItaliansbythetensofthousands.

YetifMariustookcontrolofthecampaign,hewouldgowithhisownofficers,andanySullanloyalistswouldbeshoulderedasideandliketheirerstwhilecommander,leftatthesiegeofNola.AndtherewasRomeitself,currentlyrunbyademagogictribunewhousedthemobtoover-rulethesenateandwaspreparedtokillanyone–includingaconsul’sson–whostoodinhisway.Again,itwasthedutyofthearmyassoldiersandgoodcitizenstoproceedtoRomeandputmattersright.ItisimprobablethateitherSullaorhismensawwhattheyweredoingasapower-graboracoup.Ifanything,theyfeltthatthecouphadbeen already accomplished. Sulpicius had taken control of the city by violence and thearmywasneededtorestorelegitimategovernment.

Yetthiswasnolongertrue.ThesenatehadindeedbeensubjecttothedictatesofMariusandSulpicius,butonthenewsthatSullawasmarchingonthecitywithsixlegions,senateand people came together in the face of the impending threat. Even all of Sulla’s ownofficersapartfromonequaestorweresohorrifiedbySulla’s intentionsthat theyleft thearmyandfledtoRome.There,thesenatesenttwopraetorstoinformSullathathismarchon Romewas forbidden. By an effort Sulla prevented his over-enthusiastic army fromlynchingthepraetors,buttheirfasces,thesymbolsoftheirauthority,werebrokenandthepraetors’ senatorial togas were stripped from them. If ever Romans needed a graphicimageof thewaythingswouldbefromnowonwards, thiswasit.Thearmyhadindeedbroken the power of the senate and stripped it of its authority, and the comingdecadeswouldprovethisagainandagain.

WhenSulla and his army arrived outsideRome, itwas clear hewas not bluffing.Afurther delegation came from the senate and Sulpicius bearing notice of surrender. Thesenatehadvoted thatSullawouldhave ‘all his rights’ – aphrasepresumably includingSulla’srestorationtothecommandofthewaragainstMithridates.ButSulladidnotjustwanthisrights,hewantedrevenge.Furthermorehesuspectedthatthecapitulationwasaruse to gain time in which the city might be further fortified against an assault.Accordingly Sulla pretended to accept the senate’s capitulationwhile he sent a speedyadvancepartytocapturethegatesandthewallsneartheEsquilinehill.Thepeopleofthe

Esquiline fought back, but roof-tiles and brickbats were little use against determinedveteransoldiers–especiallyafterSulla threatened toburndown thehousesbeneath thetile-throwers.

TogethiswayagainstthesenateSulpiciushadraisedthestakesbybringinginthemob.Sulla had not backed down but raised the stakes again by bringing in the army. NowSulpiciusandMarius tried to raise thestakesagainbypromising freedomtoanyslaveswhojoinedthe impromptuarmytheywere tryingtoraise todefendthecity.Thiswasamistake.Firstlybecauseevenifeveryslave in thecityheededthecall forfreedom(andthe vastmajority sensibly did not), it is unlikely that they could have prevailed againstveteran legionaries, soSulla’sgripon the citywouldhave remained firm, even ifmorebloodstained. Butmore importantly, attempting to raise a slave rebellion was a capitalcrime. Marius and Sulpicius would already have to face charges of overthrowing theauthorityoftheconsulsbyviolenceandofcollusioninthemurderoftheconsul’sson.Tothiswasnowaddedtheoffenceofoutrightseditionbecause(accordingtoAppianatleast),Marius and Sulpicius had led whatever troops they could muster into combat againstSulla’s men ‘not in factional mob fighting, but with regular troops under militarystandardsorderedbytrumpetcall’.8

Mobviolence,lynching,armedrebellionandattemptingtoraiseaslaverebellion:thesewere the charges thatSulla invited the senate to consider againstMarius,Sulpicius andtheir followers.Therewas also the fact that theperpetrators had chosennot to face thevictor’s justice – they had fled rather than argue their case. Sulla was completely incontrol,asprovenbyhissummarytreatmentofthoseenterprisingsoldierswhotriedabitof freelance looting and pillaging. Like the rest of Rome, the senate was completelycowed,andpassedadecreedeclaringMarius,SulpiciusandMarius’sontobeenemiesofthestate.Sulpiciuswasquicklydisposedof–hewasfoundhidinginavillaafteroneofhisown slavesbetrayedhim to the informerswhowere alreadyonhis track.Typically,Sullarewardedtheslaveaspromised,thenhadhimkilledforthebetrayalofhismaster’strust.Mariuswashardertotrackdown.Rome’ssix-timeconsulremainedapopularheroto many. Few had yet realized exactly how vindictive Sulla could be, so they werepreparedtogivethefleeingex-consulfoodandshelter.InRomeSulpicius’legislationwasdecreed as invalid, havingbeenpassedpervim – that is, through violence. Sulla had akeensenseofironyandwasnodoubtawareofitinthefactthathehadappliednolittleviolenceofhisowningettinghisopponent’slawsdisqualified.

AtthispointSullahadfewfriendsoutsidehisarmy;afactthatheblithelypretendedtoignore.Aswashisdutyasconsul,Sullaheldtheelectionsforhissuccessor.Hepretendedtobepleasedthathisowncandidateswererejectedoutofhandbyanelectoratethatwasatpains to vote for those candidatesmost calculated to annoy him.This, Sulla accuratelypointedout,showeddemocracyinaction.Hewas,however,abletosecuretheelectionofoneOctaviusasconsul.Octaviuswasa steadycharacter anda solid supporterofSulla,andthereforeavitalcounter-balancetotheothermanelectedasconsul,LuciusCinna,afirebrandwhowasviolentlyopposedtoeverythingSullawasandhaddone.Havingmadethe two new consuls swear to keep the peace, Sulla took himself and his army off toGreece.AsfarashewasconcernedgoingtocampaignagainstMithridateswasthewhole

pointoftheexercise,yethecanhardlyhavebeenunawareofthefar-reachingsignificanceofhisactions.

Basically,Rome had been conquered. True, it had been conquered by a duly electedconsulwithaproperly leviedarmy,but thatwashardly thepoint.WhileSullahadbothreasonandexcuse,whathehaddonecouldbedoneagainwithlessreasonandnoexcuse,providedthatthesoldiersfeltstronglyenoughaboutit.ThatarmywasnolongeracorpsofsoldiersbornandraisedonthesevenhillsofRome.Now,alegionarymightaseasilycomefromMilan,orfromBrundisiumhalfathousandmilesaway,orfromanywhereinbetween. For these soldiers the right to a vote inRomewasmeaningless.Yet – as thecontretempsoverthecommandoftheMithridaticwarhadproven–thedecisionsof theRomanelectoratecouldhaveaverymarkedeffectonevery soldier’s life.Now that theRomanelectoratewasnolongerrepresentativeoftheRomanarmy,whatSulla’scouphaddone(anddespiteeverything,itwasindeedacoup)wastoassertthearmy’sprimacyovertheRomanvoterindecisionmaking.Oncethisprimacyhadbeenasserted,therewasnogoing back, and to a very real extent, theRomanRepublic after 88 BC was a sham. Inreality,Romewasamilitarydictatorshipthathadjustnotrealizedityet.

JusttoprovethatSullawasasymptomratherthanacauseoftheproblem,oncehewasoutofthewayandcampaigningagainstMithridatesinGreece,Romandemocracydidnotsettledown,butinsteadwenttohellinahandcart.CinnahadsworntokeepthepeaceandtorecognizethesettlementthatSullahadimposedonRome.YetbarelyhadSullaleftthepremises thanCinna broke his promise and began to undo Sulla’swork. The firebrandconsulannouncedthatheintendedtoreviveallthelegislationofSulpiciusthatSullahadoverturned,andhintedatplans toprosecuteSullaforhisactions.Naturallyenough, thiswasopposedbyOctaviusandtheconservativeelementamongboththesenateandvotersinRome.Whenthemattercametothevote,atribunicanvetowasinterposed.Nowsofar,thesituationwasworkingastheRomanconstitutionwassupposedto.Thatis,theconsulswere deadlockedwith opposing programs and a tribune had prevented thematter fromgoingany further.This iswhyallRomanmagistracieswere collegial. If those inofficecouldnotworktogether,thenthesystemwasdevisedsothattheyshouldnotworkatall.However, Cinna was not prepared to leave matters at that. He tried, as had Sulpiciusbefore him, to use the mob to push through his legislation. However, this time theconservativeswereprepared,andCinna’sfaction lost theensuingriot.ThenlikeMariusbeforehim,Cinnacalledforaslaverebellion–andwhenthatfailed,hefledthecity.

Likeatruetraditionalist,Octaviannowusedconstitutionalforms.Heproposeddecreesin thesenate thatdeclaredCinnaapublicenemyanda replacementconsulwaschosen.ForOctaviusthecrisiswasnowover.Cinnahadabettergraspofthenewreality,andonceexpelled from Rome, he started to look for an army. Already a corps of anti-Sullandissidentswasbeginning toformaroundhim.OnememberwasSertorius, themanwhohaddonesowellinfeedingasteadysupplyofGallicrecruitstoRome’sarmiesduringtherecentwar.AnotherwasMariusGratidianus,anephewoftheexiledMarius.Thesemenarrived at the camp of the commander of the Roman army in Campania, and throughrousingspeechestothemen,basicallyhijackedthecommander’sarmyfromunderhim.

Marius had escaped to Africa. There had been a close shave at Minturnae, whereMariushadbeencaptured,butnoonewaspreparedtokillRome’sformerhero.Notsurewhatelse todowithhim, theMinturniansputMariusonashipand(afteranothernear-death experience in Sicily), Marius had ended up skulking near Carthage when newsreachedhimofdevelopmentsinItaly.WhenheheardthatCinnahadfoundanarmyandwasmarchingonRome,Mariushastened to join in. It isquestionable towhatextenthewasstillsane.Certainlyhiscloseencounterswithdeathwhileontherunhadaffectedhimdeeply, andMarius had spentmuchof his time in exile broodingon real and imaginedwrongs.On his arrival in Italy he raised recruits by offering freedom to slaves and byprofessingdevotion to the legislativeprogramofSulpicius,buthewasreally fixatedonrevenge– thebloodier thebetter.Cinnaprofessed tobedelightedathavingapersonsoveneratedjoinhisside,butSertoriusandothershadtheirreservationsevenbeforeMariuscapturedOstia–asensiblemeasurethatcutoffRome’sfoodsupply–andthenpillagedthe place and killedmost of the inhabitants, apparently because he could. For the firsttime,aRomantownwastreatedbyaRomangeneralasifitwereenemyterritory.

The battle lines were taking shape. Belatedly, Octavius had realized that the matterwouldbesettledwithforceratherthansenatorialdecrees,andhadfoundanunlikelyallyinPompeiusStrabo, thegeneralwhohaddefendedPicenum forRome in the civilwar.LikeSulla,PompeiusStrabohadanarmythatwasloyaltohimselfratherthantoRome,andthisarmytoohadprovenitscontemptforthecentralauthoritybylynchingthemansenttorelievePompeiusStraboofhiscommand.Thislynchingwasnowpolitelyignoredby Octavius who was desperate for manpower. Even with the fill-up provided byPompeiusStrabo’sarmyOctaviusstillneededmoremen.ConsequentlyhehadthesenatepassadecreeenfranchisinganyofthoseItalianswhowerestillfightingagainstRomeonthesoleconditionthatthosemennowfoughtontheconservativesideinstead.SincethefranchisehadpreviouslybeengivenonlytothosenotactuallyinarmsagainsttheRomans,thisdecreewaswelcomedbyanumberofrebelItalianswhorealizedthattheirwarwasnowalostcause.ThisnumberdidnotincludetheSamnites,whoambushedandsavagedalargegroupofdefectorsfromtheircause.MetellusPius, thesonofMetellusNumidicus(p.31), brought the rest to Rome, but their number was more than balanced by theSamniteswhowentovertotheCinnanside.ThustheembersoftheItalianwarcametolifeagainandmergedwiththenewconflagration.

Romewasbesieged,butcapablydefendedbyOctaviusandPompeiusStrabo.Weknowfew details of the actual siege, but it is clear the defenders of the city were greatlyoutnumbered. Then Pompeius Strabo died at the crucial moment; probably of illness,thoughAppiansayshewasstruckbylightning.9HisdeathleftthedefenderswithamajorproblembecausePompeius’mendespisedOctaviusandrefusedtoserveunderhim.Theonlyothercrediblegeneral,MetellusPius,punctiliouslyrefused to replace theconsul incommand.WholesaledesertionstotheCinnansquicklyresolvedtheimpasse,forOctaviusquicklyranoutofanarmywithwhichtodefendthecity.Hewasforcedintounconditionalsurrender.For thesecondtimein twoyears,Romehadfallen toaRomanarmy.Yet thetwo conquests were not the same. Sulla maintained to the end that he was a consulrestoringorderinthecityafteranoutbreakofmobrule.Whateverhisinclinations,apart

frompunishingthoseheconsideredguiltyofincitingthatmobrule,hehadrefrainedfromvengeance. Vengeance, on the other hand was what Marius was all about. Guilt orinnocencehadlittletodowithit.Hisintentionwasnottorestoreorder,buttomakesurethatthosewhomheconsideredashavingbetrayedhimnowpaidforitwiththeirlives.

Octavius was lynched in front of the senate house before Marius had even enteredRome.The consul had refused to abandon the city, and stayed at his post until hewaskilled.Hisheadwascutoffanddisplayedonaspearatthenearbyrostra–thestartofagrim tradition thatwas often to be emulated in the dying republic.Mariuswas not yetpresent for the occasion because he pretended that as an exile he had no right to enterRome before the people voted for his recall. A frightened populace immediatelyassembledandbeganvoting,butby thenMariushadgrown impatientwith the charadeandenteredanyway, accompaniedbyabodyguardof freed slaves,whichhecalled ‘theBardyaei’.

These thugs needed only the word of command before they summarily slew Romancitizens.Infactsometimesittookamerenod.FinallyAncharius,amanofsenatorialandpraetorianrank,metMarius.Whenhis salutation receivedno reply, thiswasconsideredenoughofasignalforthemantobecutdownrightthereinthestreet.Asaresult,evenfriendsofMariuswere filledwith fearandhorrorwhen theycame togreethim.As thekillingwenton,Cinnalosthisappetitefortheslaughter,butthethirstofMariusforbloodwouldnotbesated.Dayafterdayhisangerincreasedandhekilledanyonewhomhehadeversuspectedofanything.

Plutarch,LifeofMarius44

Among thecasualtieswasLutatiusCatulus, themanwhosomefifteenyearsbeforehadthe impertinence todefeat theCimbri in abattle inwhichMariushadplayed the lesserpart.NowCatulus paid for taking a share of the glory, despite pleas even fromMariansupportersthatanex-consulwhohadsharedatriumphwithMariusdeservedwellofthestate.AllMariuswouldstubbornlyreplywas‘Hemustdie’;andsoCatulusdid.10Therewere other casualties among those senators who did not wisely make an early escape.MetellusPiuswasamongthelatter,andalsoLiciniusCrassus(themanwhowaslatertobeatriumviralongwithJuliusCaesarandPompey).Othersweresavedbyfriendsorevenslaves, such as an aristocrat called Cornutus, whose servants dressed a suitable corpse(therewereplentytochoosefrom)astheirmasterandburnedit.Sulla’swifeandfamilyescaped,thoughnotwithoutrisk.However,oneredeemingfeatureofthelateRepublicisthat for all the mayhem unleashed on their menfolk, the women were considered asoutsidethepoliticalstruggleandwedonothearofanylosingtheirlives.However,Sulla’spropertywasdeclaredforfeitandthevindictiveMariushadhishouserazedtothegroundevenashecontinuedtohuntdownandkillanyonesuspectedofbeingSulla’sfriend.

WhileMariuswasdecoratingtherostrawiththeheadsofslainaristocrats,hisBardyaeiwere losinghisfactionsupportamongthecommonpeople. ‘Theyslaughteredfathers intheirownhomes,andviolated thewivesandchildren inanunchecked rampageof rapeandmurder’ reportsPlutarch.11 Fortunately, given their conduct, theBardyaei had to allsleep inoneplaceformutualprotection,since theoutragedRomanswouldhave torn to

pieces any member of the group they caught alone. This made it easy for Cinna andSertorius to have armed men surround the open ground where the Bardyaei wereencamped.After a sustained shower of javelins had rained down on the sleepingmen,Romehadonelessproblemtoworryabout.

NorwasMariusto longoutlivehisBardyaei.At thestartof thenewyear,hebecameconsulforarecord-breakingseventhtime,aneventcelebratedbyanothersupposedenemyofMariusbeing throwntohisdeathfromtheTarpeanrockon theCapitolinehill.Wornoutbytheexertionsandstressofthepreviousyear,Mariusdiedwithinthefirstmonthofhis latestconsulship.Hehadmanaged todemonstrate thepoint thathehad indeedbeentotally unfit for the command of theMithridaticWarwhich had sparked off this latestcrisis,butbythenfewofSulla’ssupporterswerealiveinRometotellCinna‘Itoldyouso’.Exactlyhowmanyperishedinthisboutofbloodlettingisunknown,forthehistoriansofthetimearemoreconcernedwithrhetoricalexpressionsofoutragethanwithsupplyinganexactbody-count.Itis,however,veryclearthattheoccupationofthecitybythearmyofMariusandCinnawasanaltogethergrimmerbusinessthantheoccupationbySullahadbeen.WithinmonthsRomehadgonefromacityruledbylawandconstitutiontoacityundermobrule,followedbyarmyoccupationunderSulla,followedbysiegeandconquestbyMariusandCinnaandasubsequentreignofterror.Notjustthepeopleofthecity,butRomansacrosstheempiremusthaveaskedthemselveshowthiscouldhavecomeabout.

OnereasonwasthatallconcernedwereRomans,andtheRomansoftherepublicwereverybadatcompromise.TheresponseofaRomantoasetbackwastoraisethestakesandtry again, and to keep escalating the situation until his opponent backed down. ThisworkedwellenoughwithmorereasonablepeoplesinGreeceandeventherestofItaly,butwhenRomanconfrontedRomanmatterscouldgetveryquicklyoutofhand.Thesenatehad refused to negotiatewith theGracchus brothers, even though doing sowould havedefused the coming crisis a generation before it broke. The senate had also refused tocontemplate the legislative program of Livius Drusus in 91 BC, even though thisrepresented the last chance to avertwar and the lossofhundredsof thousandsof lives.OnlywhenthealternativewasextinctiondidthesenateandpeopleofRomefinallybackdown,butbythenthepoliticalprocesshadbeencontaminatedandcoarsenedbyviolence,and men accustomed to warfare were less patient with the inevitable setbacks,compromises and back-room deals that are an unavoidable part of peacetime politics.WhenSulpicius,SullaandCinnawerethwarted,theyinstinctivelyresortedtotheviolencethathadbeentheirstock-in-tradesincetheoutbreakoftheItalianwar.

Yetnowwith thedeathofMarius,peaceofa sortbrokeout.Orat leastwhatCicerorefers toas the trienniumsinearmisor ‘threeyearswithoutwarfare’–a rareevent inabloodydecade.Warfaretherewas,ofcourse.ButithappenedoverseasinGreecewhere,despitebeingdeclaredapublicenemyandstrippedofhiscommandandfundingforhisarmy,SullacontinuedtosuccessfullyprosecutethewaragainstMithridates.TherewasnotalotthatthegovernmentinRomecoulddoaboutthis,becauseSulla’sarmycouldhandilysupport itselfon the land,andSullakept themenpaidby taking thesacred treasuresofDelphi into ‘safe-keeping’. The senate could and did send out an army of its own tocampaignintheeast,butinasadreflectionofthetimes,itscommanderwaskilledbyan

ambitious subordinate called Fimbria. Rome now had two armies in the east, each ofdubiousloyalty,butatleastcommittedtofightingMithridates.AthomeinItaly,peaceofasortprevailed.Overall,bythestandardsofrecentyears,thiswasdefinitelyprogress.

Chapter9

Sulla’sReturn–FightingforRomeWhileSullawasawaycampaigningagainstMithridatesanuneasycalmprevailed.Withthe fortuitous death of Marius a semblance of normal government returned to Rome.Cinna pushed through a badly needed debt relief programme which, not incidentally,furthersecuredforhimselftheloyaltyofthecommonpeople.HealsotooksensiblestepstodealwithacurrencycrisiscausedbyLiviusDrusus’debasementofthecoinageandthefinancialravagesoftheItalianwar.GnaeusPompeywasprosecutedonchargesofhavinghelpedhimselfillegallytospoilsfromAsculumafteritscaptureintheItalianwar,thoughit is probable that the real charge against him was that of being the son of PompeiusStrabo,whohadledhisarmyagainsttheMarians.ThefailureofthisprosecutionsignalledthatCinnahadnointentionofprolongingthewitchhuntforSullansupporters.MetellusPiushad taken refuge inAfrica, andhewas allowed to remain there inpeace thoughadecreeofexilewasprobablypassedagainsthim.

TherearesignsthatareconciliationwithSulla’ssupporterswasattempted.MariushadexecutedLuciusCaesar, but his close relativeCaius JuliusCaesar – the future triumviranddictator–waspromotedtothechiefpriesthoodinRome,theofficeofflamendialis,andlinkedbymarriagetoCinna.Philippus,oneofthechiefopponentsofLiviusDrusus,wasmadecensorin86BC(andonPhilippus’watchtheSulpicianpromisetodistributethenew Italiancitizensevenly throughall the tribeswasquietlydropped.) Itwasevidentlyclear to Cinna and the senate that eventually somethingwas going to have to be doneaboutSulla,butwhiletherewasachanceofanegotiatedoutcometherewaslittlepointininflamingthesituationfurther.

SullalaterclaimedthatFimbria’sarmyhadbeensentouttotheeastinordertodefeathim,butthisisprobablylaterpropaganda.Foralongwhilethissenatorialarmyandthearmy of Sulla campaigned against Mithridates, if not together then at least withoutseriouslyinterferingwitheachotherLikewise,bothSullaandasenate-appointedgeneralclaimtohavecampaignedagainstopportunisttribalraidersinMacedonia,buttherearenoreportsofclashesbetween the twoRoman factions. In factweknowfrom twoseparatesources1thatSullaandthesenatewereagreedthatdealingwithMithridatescamebeforeinternal political disagreements. The problem came in 85 BC when it became clear thatMithridateswas,ifnotdownandout,atleastontheropes.ThesenatorialarmyofFimbriasucceeded inbottlingMithridatesup in theportofPitane inAsiaMinor.EscapebyseawasblockedbyafleetcommandedbySulla’sloyalsubordinateLucullus,2soitappearedthatthecaptureoftheenemykingwasinevitable.

Sullahaddifferentplans.HewasalreadynegotiatingwithMithridatestobringthewartoanend.Therewasnoguaranteethatthewarwouldendwiththecaptureoftheking,butnegotiations certainly would end, leaving Sulla to start negotiating again from thebeginningwithwhomevertookoverfromMithridatesinPontus.Thiswasunacceptable,asSullawantedthewardonewithsothathecouldgetbacktopressingmatterswaitingfor

him in Italy.As the campaigning seasondrew to a close,Sulla andMithridatesmade adeal.Mithridateswould give up all the conquests that the Romans had not taken backfromhimalready,andhewouldmakereparationwithships,moneyandsuppliesforthemassacreofRomansandItaliansperpetratedonhisorders.SullaintendedthatthecitiesofAsiaMinorthathaddonetheactualmassacringwouldalsopayinduecourse,butforthemomentMithridates’penancegavehisarmyahandyfill-upofmoneyandresourcesforthecomingcampaigninItaly.

TheoutbreakofpeaceinAsiaMinorleftthesenatorialarmyofFimbria’smenwiththechoiceofeitherfightingSullaorjoininghim.Theychosetojoin,thoughfromthearmy’slaterperformanceitisclearthattheychoseSullalessfromenthusiasmthanasthelesserof two evils. Sulla had nothing against Fimbria and even offered to allow the nowunemployedgeneraltosailbacktoRome,butFimbriaoptedforsuicideinstead.Afterall,he had killed a serving consul to take commandof his army, so his reception inRomewouldhavebeenproblematicatbest.

Sullanowwrotetothesenate:

In a high-handedmanner he recounted his deeds while still a mere quaestor in AfricaduringthewaragainstJugurtha,hisservicesintheCimbricwar,aspraetorinCilicia,andintheItalianwarandasconsul.…HemadethemostofrelatinghowthosebanishedfromRomebyCinnahadfledtohimandhadreceivedhishelpandsupport in theirdistress.3Yethe[Sulla]hadbeendeclaredapublicenemy,hishousehadbeendestroyed,hisfriendsexecutedandhiswifeandchildrenforcedtofleefor their lives.Onhisreturnhewouldtakerevengeforthisonallthoseinthecitywhowereguilty,butallothers,includingthenewcitizens,hadnothingtofearfromhim.

AppianBC1.77

Itisuncertainhowthesenatewereexpectedtoreceivethismissive.QuitepossiblySullaintendeditinthespiritthatthesenatereceivedit–astheopeningpositioninaroundofnegotiation. The senate’s reply was in kind. They acknowledged Sulla’s service to hiscountrybothpreviouslyandinthedefeatofMithridates,andtheyostentatiouslyorderedCinnanottoraisetroopsagainstSulla.ThesenatealsourgedSullatorespondatoncetotheirovertures,andassuredhimthat theywouldguaranteehissecurityinthemeantime.Sullawouldundoubtedlyhavenotedtheimplicitgambitthatifthesenatehadtoguaranteehis security thiswould be because hewas no longer a proconsul in charge of an army.Thus,indiplomaticlanguageSullawasinvitedtolaydownhisarmsandthrowhimselfatthe mercy of the senate. The two sides were far apart, but at least they were talking.Optimistsmusthavehopedthatafurtherroundofbloodshedcouldbeaverted.

Cinnaenteredinthespiritofthething.Appianclaimsthathepanicked,disregardedthesenatorialinstructionandimmediatelybeganmusteringanarmy.Thisisunlikely,thoughCinnamusthavebeenawarethatSulla’sintentionsforhimwerefarfrombenign.Cinnadidindeedbeginmusteringanarmy,yettheinterestingthingisthathebeganmusteringiton the eastern seaboard of Italy at Ancona.4 As the modern historian Badian hasconvincinglyargued,5 the reason formustering an army at this port could be neither todefendItalynor,assomehaveclaimed, tolaunchapre-emptiveinvasionofGreece.An

armyatAnconacouldonlycrosseast toonepoint–Liburniaon theBalkancoast.TheLiburnianswere notorious pirates and it is highly improbable they had not been takingadvantage of the recent crisis to plundermerchant shipping to their heart’s content. SoCinnawouldraiseanarmyand take it toLiburnia topunish thepirates.Sullacouldnotcomplain about a Roman consul conducting standard military operations whilenegotiations went on, even though such operations would also leave Cinna with anexperienced army under his command should negotiations fail. But failure was notinevitable. Sulla’s next reply went a long way towards meeting the senate’s implicitdemand.Allheclaimed towantwas toberestored toRome,alongwith thosewhohadfledtoexilewithhim.Theresthewouldleavetothesenate.

Atthispointfateintervened.Itwasnowearlyin84BC–infacttooearlyforasafeseacrossing to Illyria, but Cinna was in a hurry. He needed to get his army trained andexperiencedby the timeSullabroughthisveteransback fromAsia.ThisSullacertainlywould do, because even if the political issueswere peacefully resolved, thesemen hadfoughttheirwarandwereduetobedisbanded.IfSulla’snegotiationswiththesenatewentwell,hissoldierscould justifiablyexpect tocelebratea triumph inRomefor theirhard-fought victories in Greece. If negotiations went badly, these men could expect to dofurther fighting in Italy. Cinna knew this, and his men did too. They felt, reasonablyenough,thatCinnawasriskingtheirlivesonaroughoceancrossingtotakethemtofightanunnecessarywar,which left theirhomesat risk shouldSulla returnbefore theyweredisentangled from the campaign over the Adriatic. Cinna did what he could to restoreorderwithhisdisgruntledarmy.Hecalledthestrikingsoldierytoanassemblyinwhichhemisjudgedthemoodofhismen.ItshouldberememberedthatRomanarmieshadrecently,on two separate occasions lynched commanders who were not to their liking. PerhapsCinnafeltthatasaconsulofRomehismenwouldnotdaretodothesametohim.Hewaswrong. A tussle between one of his attendants and an obstreperous soldier quicklydeveloped into a full-scale riot in which Cinna was killed.WithMarius already dead,Romehadnowlosttwoservingconsuls,andwithCinnawentthelastdecentchanceofapeacefulresolutiontothecrisis.

Gnaeus Carbo, the consul who had replaced Marius, was unable to maintain order.Carbo quickly fell outwith the senate,which insisted on him coming toRome for theelectionofa replacement forCinna.Forwhatever reason,Carbowas reluctant to do soand only turned upwhen forced by the threat that the tribuneswould rescind his ownpowers.EvenwhentheyhadgottheirconsultoRome,thesenatefoundthatgettinghimacolleaguewasnoteasy.Carboandhissupportersconsistentlyfoundunfavourableomensthatpreventedtheelectionsfromtakingplace.EventuallytheattemptwasabandonedandCarboremainedsoleconsulfortherestoftheyear.

In a further attempt to speed up negotiations with Sulla, the senate decreed that allarmies shouldbedisbanded,amove intendednot somuch tomakeSulla’sarmy illegalthanasaresponsetoCarbowhowasbusilybuildingupanarmyofhisown.ResentmentatgovernmentrecruitingeffortsinPicenummeantthatnotroopswererecruitedthereuntillaterwhentheyoungPompeyexploitedthatresentmenttogatherhisownprivatearmy.InAfricaMetellusPiusdeclaredhissupportforSullaandapparentlytriedtobringoverthe

provincetothatcause,butthegovernorhadbeenexpectingthis,andMetelluswaseasilythwarted.

Nevertheless,thegovernmentwasatoddswithitself;therewasunrestintheprovinces,privatearmiesspringingupandaconsulhadbeenmurderedbyhisownmen.Nomatterthat the root cause of most of this disruption was Sulla himself. That Rome was in aparlousstatewasallthejustificationthatSullaneededtotakemattersintohisownhands.Ashehaddonein88BCinhisearliermarchonRome,nowinthespringof83BCSullasetoutforItalypubliclyannouncinghisintentionof‘restoringorder’.

AlettersentaheadtothesenatesaidthatSullahadnointentionofbeingreconciledwithhisenemies;however,ifthesenateinsisted,hewouldsparetheirlives.Furthermore,Sullawouldprotect thesenate, includingthosemembersof thatbodywhohadbeendriventotakerefugewithhiminGreece.Thisoffertoprotectthesenateneatlyreversedthesenate’soffer toprotectSulla,andamounted toa rejectionof thesenate’searlierproposal.Sullahimselfwould not need protection because he could rely on the loyalty of his troops –which meant that any suggestion that Sulla would disband his men was now off thenegotiatingtable.Thisdidnotmeanthat talkshadbrokendown,butwithCinna’sdeathandthesubsequentoutbreakofdisorder,Sulla’spositionwasstrongerandhisnegotiatingpositionhadchangedtoreflectthis.

TheconsulsforthenextyearwereL.ScipioAsiaticusandC.Norbanus.Thepairwereless sanguine than the senate about a negotiated settlement, but in any case, as theexecutiveofficersofthestate,itwastheirjobtopreparefortheworstshouldthingscometothat.Theformerconsul,CarbotookcommandoftheprovinceofCisalpineGaul.Thissecuredthenorthforthegovernmentandleft thenewconsulstomanagethedefenceofthesouth.Warwasstillnotinevitable.NoattemptwasmadetopreventSullareturningtoItaly and he landed unopposed at Brundisium. Technically speaking, this was not aninvasionbutmerelyanex-consulreturningwithhisarmyfromasuccessfulforeignwar.Thiswasasitshouldbe,buttheomensweredire.Literallyso;therewereearthquakes,thetempleofJupiteron theCapitolinehillwasdestroyed inafire,andstrangeeventswerereported,suchasawomaninEtruriawhogavebirthtoalivesnake.6

SullacrossedtoCampaniawherematterscametothecrunch,fortheconsulNorbanusmoved toblock theprogressofSulla’sarmywithoneofhisown.Untilnow,Sullahadbeenanobstreperousex-consulwhohadtakensomelegallydubiousactions.Anyway,thekillingofOctaviusandthepersecutionofSulla’sfriends,nottomentiontheexcessesofMariusbeforehisdeath,allmeantthatthegovernmentcouldhardlyclaimthemoral,legalor constitutional high ground. Ideally, itwould be best if the events of the past decadecouldbe,ifnotforgotten,atleastleftindisreputableobscurity.Sullalaterclaimedtohavehoped for asmuch– it is almost certainly fromhismemoirs thatweget the report thatNorbanus arrested the envoys sent by Sulla for last-minute negotiations, and insteadpreparedforbattle.ItmaybethatNorbanusrejectedthislastchanceforpeacebecausehefanciedhisprospectsagainstanarmyofaround10–12,000men,whichisallSullaissaidtohavehadwithhimatthetime.

SothenextroundofRome’scivilwarsformallyresumedsomewherearoundCanusium,

or possibly at the crossing of the River Volturnus where Norbanus took the chance ofcrushing the Sullan threat for once and for all. He quickly discovered that a well-generalled veteran army coming off a hard campaign can punchwell above itsweight.Despite its superior numbers the government army was soundly defeated, and theremnantsfledtoCapua,whichhadrecentlybeenmadeaRomancolonyinaneffortbythegovernmenttosecurethecity’sloyalty.NorbanuscampedatMtTifanaaboutamilefromCapua’swallsandthereawaitedthearrivalofL.Scipio,hisfellow-consul.WhenScipioturnedupwithhisarmy,Sullaimmediatelyattemptedtoopennegotiationswiththenewarrival. This may be an example of Sulla being reasonable, or it may simply indicateopportunismonSulla’spart.SullaknewthattheloyaltyofhisownarmyhadbeenforgedandtestedinthefirstmarchonRomeandintheMithridaticwarsthathadfollowed.HealsoknewthatScipio’sarmyhadnosuchpersonalbondwithitscommander.Furthermore,Scipio’smenweredeeplyuncomfortableaboutfightingSulla’smen,partlybecausetheydidnot reallywant to fight fellowRomans,andpartlybecause theyhadawell-foundedsuspicion that those fellow Romans would comprehensively defeat them if they tried.Therefore, should he reject Sulla’s overtures Scipio would be cast in the role of theaggressor,themanwhowanteddeathandbloodsheddespitethebesteffortsofSulla,andtheearnestwishofhisownmen.

Matters were further complicated by Sertorius, who was becoming thoroughlyfrustratedwith how his superior officerswere conducting thewar. Itwas very clear toSertoriusthatSullawasplayingthepeacemakerinordertosubvertScipio’sarmy.Scipiohimselfappears tohavehadhopesthat thenegotiationswouldactually leadsomewhere,sohe sent amessenger toNorbanus toholdoffhostilitieswhile talkswere inprogress.ThatmessengerwasSertorius,whowhileenroutetoNorbanus’campdeliberatelybroketheceasefire(andincidentallysecuredthearmy’slineofretreat)bycapturingthetownofSuessafromSulla.Scipiowastakenabackbythisunilateralmove,andbywayofapologyreleasedthehostagesSullahadgivenasanearnestofhisgoodfaith.However,thedamagewasdone.Scipio’sarmywasoutragedatthusbeingcommittedtoabattleitdidnotwantandeverymandefected toSulla.Appian tellsus, ‘Scipioandhissonwere leftalone intheir tent, themselves the last remnant of their entire army.While theywerewonderingwhattodo,Sullacameupandcapturedthem.’7

WithScipioandhisarmypainlessly removedfromthewar, thegovernmentsidewasnow represented by Norbanus and Marius, the son of the deceased Marius.8 ThegovernmentusedtheyoungerMariusheavilyintheirpropaganda,relyingonthefondnessthecommonpeoplestillfeltforthefather.Thepromotionandhonoursforamanwhohaddone little to merit them (apart from his choice of parent) was something else thatinfuriatedthemoredeservingandcapableSertorius.SincethedébâcleatSuessa,Sertoriusandtherestofthegovernmentleaderswerenolongeronspeakingterms,soSertoriustookhimselfoutof thewar in Italy andwent–orwaskicked– to Iberia;9which is anotherreason why only Norbanus and Marius (jnr) were left to fight Sulla. The governmentforceshadastrongposition,forMtTifanacommandstheapproachestoCapua.Forthisreasontherehadbeenamajorbattle200yearspreviouslyatthesamelocationwhentheCampanianshadduginonthemountaintodefendthecityfromadvancingSamnites.

Alwaysonthelookoutforwaystoincreasemorale,Sullaclaimedthatanapparitionoftwogoats fighting in theskywasa favourableomen, thususingwhatmayhavesimplybeen a fortuitous combination of cloud shapes to get his men speedily into position.Norbanus probably expected a more cautious approach, and the sudden arrival of theenemycaughthisarmy inmid-deployment.Sullaandhisexperiencedmen immediatelyseized themoment and fell upon the government armywithout breaking stride for theusualpre-battlepreliminaries.Thefightwasshortandnasty,with7,000menkilledonthegovernmentsideforfewcasualtiesamongtheirveteranopponents.Norbanushadsufferedhisseconddefeatofthewar,andhenowretreatedintoCapuaitself,andallthatpreventedSulla fromadvancingonRomewas theearlyarrivalofwhatwas toproveanunusuallyseverewinter.

Mt Tifana and its prelude at Canusium was not the only military action of 83 BC,becauseSullanowhadallies.Asmentionedabove,PompeyhadraisedhimselfatidylittlearmyofthreelegionsinPicenum.WiththesehesetouttojoinSulla.Onthewayhewasconfrontedby threegovernmentdetachments,whichdeployedtosurroundhim.Nothingdaunted, Pompey assembled his army into a compact formation and routed thatdetachment immediately before him. This caused consternation among the governmentcommanderswhofailedtoagreeonwhattodonext.Intheend,theymarchedoffandleftPompey alone, not least because large numbers of their men were enthusiasticallydefectingtoPompey’sside.Soonafterwards,attheriverArsisontheborderwithUmbria,Pompey received a useful reinforcement of cavalry. This had been sent against him byCarbo.ShowingofftheskillshehadpickedupfromhisfatherintheItalianwar,Pompeymanoeuvred this cavalry on to unfavourable ground where unable to fight or flee, thehorsemensurrenderedandjoinedtheSullanside.10WhenPompeyfinallyjoinedSulla,thelatter ordered his army’s standards to be lowered. This was the customary salute of aRomancommandertoafellowgeneral,eventhoughnoonehadpromotedPompeytohiscommandbutPompeyhimself.

Otherareasalsofell toSullansupporters.Afterhismisadventures inAfrica,MetellusPiushadmovedtoLiguriainthefarnorth-westoftheItalianpeninsula.Therehestartedraising troops forSulla.L.Philippus, the formercensorandveteranopponentofLiviusDrusus,nowrevertedtohisconservativerootsbydeclaringforSulla,takingwithhimtheprovinceofSardinia,whichhehadbeensent tohold for thegovernment.However, themost significantmilitary action in the northwas fought byLucullus, the brother of theofficerwhohadbeenwithSullafromthebeginning.AtFidentia(modernFidenza)hetookonfiftyenemycohortswithjustsixteenofhisown,andwon,mainlyduetothesuperiormoraleofhistroops.11

Thus,bythetimewinterbroughtcampaigningtoanendin83BCSullanowcontrolledLiguria,Sardiniaand isolatedareasofnorthernItaly,andalsohadPicenum,ApuliaandmostofCampania–with theexceptionofCapuawhereNorbanus remained stubbornlybehindthewallsrejectingeveryovertureofpeace.ThereactionoftheItalianstoSulla’sarrivalwouldbecrucialtosuccessorfailurein82BC,soSullaspentmuchofthewinterindiplomaticoverturestoRome’snewestcitizens.Hehadalreadymadeastartbyinsistingon rigid discipline among his men, who were firmly instructed to treat the Italian

countrysideas friendly territory.Therewasno lootingorpillageandanything thearmytookwas paid for. (Another advantage of the huge fines levied onMithridates and thecitiesofAsiaminorwasthatSullaandhismencouldaffordtodothis.)NowSullawentfurther,andannounced thatwhatever thegovernmenthadoffered the Italians,hewouldhonour–whichmeantthattheItalianswerefinallyevenlydistributedthroughthevotingtribes,astheyhadalwaysdemanded.OnlyoneItalianfactionfailedtobeconvinced.TheSamnites and Lucanians had been pretty much left to their own devices by a Romangovernment,whichconsideredithadenoughonitsplatewithoutunnecessarilyprovokingsomeof thebest fighters in Italy.Thesemountain tribes sawSullaasa threat, and theyalliedwith thegovernment armies in a fervent effort tokeep thede facto independencetheyhadenjoyedformostofthepreviousdecade.

InRomeitself,positionshardened.Sulla’sundisguisedintentiontotakecontrolofthecity focussed the minds of those who had joined with Marius in persecuting Sulla’sfriends.Sulla tried to showmoderationby releasingScipiounharmed,but for82BC thepeopleneverthelesselectedasconsulstwohard-linerstocontinuethestruggle.ThesewereC.Carbo(again)andthecompletelyunqualifiedsonofMarius.Sulla’sfeudwithMariuswas thus set to continue into the next generation. The younger Marius decided topersonally take on the job of containing Sulla at the start of the campaigning season,which began in an ill-omened spring marred by frequent and heavy rains. Despite theweather, Sulla took the offensive andbegan amarchup theViaLatina in order to joinreinforcementsunderDolabella,anotheraristocratwhohaddefectedtohim.Hisarmywasshadowedon thewaynorthby that of theyoungerMariuswhowas, in thebest familytradition,reluctanttoofferbattleuntilhecaughthisenemyinavulnerableposition.Sullainhisturnwaseagerforbattlebecausehewasastrongbelieverinomens,andhadbeeninformedbyasoothsayerthatthiswasthebesttimetofight.SincehewantedhisforcestobecombinedwiththoseofDolabellabeforeanybattlebegan,Sullapushedhismenharddespite the unfavourable marching conditions. Even if not aware of Sulla’s date withdestiny,theyoungerMariusknewthatitwouldbeagoodideatokeepSullaandDolabellaapart for as long as possible, so his skirmishersworked hard to slowSulla up – a taskmadeeasierbytheweatherandterrain.

Sulla’spushforwardendedataplacecalledSacriportus,somewhereintheuppervalleyof theRiverTrerus(themodernSacco)nearwhere thecityofFregellaehadoncestood(p.18). At this point Sulla’s officers showed him some of the men collapsed on theirshieldsthroughsheerexhaustion.Sullawasforcedtoconcedethathisarmycouldgonofurtherandgaveorderstomakecamp.ItseemedthattheyoungerMariushadfinallygothis enemy where he wanted him. Sulla’s army was dog-tired and seemed demoralizedafter a day spent grapplingwithMarian skirmishers. Just to let their enemies get evenmoreexhausted,theMarianswaiteduntiltheiropponentshadspentmoreenergydiggingthe standard ditch that usually surrounds aRomanmarching camp.Then, as theSullanarmystartedworkonthecampramparts,theMariansattacked.Therearereportsthatsaythat the youngerMarius was as exhausted as the Sullans by the day’s events and wasalreadyasleepbythetimetheattacktookplace.YetothersallegethattheyoungerMariuswasattheheadofhisarmy,ridingbeforethelinestoencouragethemen.12Thesecontrary

reports illustrate the difficulties faced by historians studying this period, both now andlaterinantiquity.Notonlyaresourcesscarce,butsopartisanthatitissometimespossibletotellfromthebiaswhetheralaterwritersuchasPlutarchisdrawingfromananti-Sullansource or from the writings of one of Sulla’s supporters. Certainly one of the mostinfluentialsourcesinantiquityis–andwasintendedsotobefromthestart–theMemoirsofSullahimself.

It is probably from the latter source that we discover that Sulla’s men were notdemoralized, as theMarians believed, but instead frustrated by their inability to get togripswiththeirenemy.Sowhenthesourceofthatfrustrationattackedthemdirectly,theSullans gladly downed their entrenching tools in exchange for swords.Not having hadtime tobuilda rampart, themensimply inserted theirheavy throwingspears [‘pilums’]intotheearthtoformamakeshiftpalisadeandswiftlyorganizingthemselvesbehindthis,they went directly at the enemy with swords. Again the progress of the actual battledependsonwhichsourceonebelieves.ThehistorianPlutarchreportsthat‘theenemydidnotholdtheirgroundforlongbeforetheyfled’–andthisreportisgivengreatercredibilitybythefactthatthroughoutthewarMarianmoralewasalwaysfragile,withsoldiersreadyto either flee from or surrender to the more determined and experienced Sullan army.However, by other accounts13 the army fought stubbornly.This is also possible, for theMarian ranks now included a goodly contingent of Samnites and Lucanians, and thesemenwereamatchforanybody.However,thegreaterexperienceoftheSullanarmytold,and either speedily or slowly theMarian left began to buckle. That was all the signalneededforfivecohortsofMarianinfantryandsomeofthecavalrytochangesidesandgoover to the Sullan army. This in turn caused a general collapse, and theMarian armyscatteredinrout.

Sulla’smenprovedthatthestimulusofanunexpectedvictorywasasovereigncureforfatigue,fortheyandtheirgeneralfollowedupthebeatenenemymercilesslyandhoundedthebeatenarmythroughthecountryside.Sullahimselfreportsthathisarmykilled20,000menandcapturedanother8,000(afigurethatmayincludethe5,000whodesertedtohiminmid-battle), while he himself lost only twenty-threemen. This latter figure is eithersuspectorproofthatSulla’ssoldierswereexceptionallygoodatcaringforthemselves–Sullagivesasimilarlylightcasualtytollforhisarmyin86BCafterthebattleofChaeroneaagainstthePonticarmyinGreece.Inthiscase,thepursuitofthebeatenMarianstooktheSullanarmyrighttothewallsofthecityofPraeneste,just35km(22miles)fromRome.Asoftenhappenedinthesesituations,thecity’sdefenderswerereluctanttoholdopenthegatesforthefleeingarmybecausetheirfoeswerepressingsocloseontheirheelsthatitwould prove impossible to close the gates against a torrent of men, and the city itselfwouldbecaptured.SothegateswereclosedinthefaceoftheMarianrefugees,leadingtomany being slaughtered directly beneath the walls. Ropes were flung down so thatindividuals could be pulled up to the ramparts, and this is how the younger Mariuseventuallyescaped.However,hewasnowbottledupinPraeneste,andtheMarianarmyinthesouthwaseffectivelydestroyed.

ThingswerenotgoingmuchbetterfortheMariansinthenorth.MetellusandPompeyhad an effective rivalry going, whereby a success by one general spurred the other to

greaterefforts.InhiseffortstoholdnorthernItaly,CarbohadmadehisbaseatArimimum(Rimini) and from there sent his generals Carrinas and Censorinus against their Sullancounterparts.MetellusdefeatedCarrinasonthenorthernbordersofPicenum,notfarfromPompey’s earlier victory at the riverAesis, and Pompey himselfwent on to take SenaGallicaandthenbrutallysackedthetown.Carbodecidedtotakethefieldpersonally,butwas checked by the news of the defeat of the youngerMarius at Sacriportus. By nowNorbanushadescapedfromCapua,soCarbohandedovercommandofthenorthernarmytotheformerconsulandheadedsouthtoseewhatcouldberetrievedofthesituationthere.The youngerMarius decided that his personal situationwas probably irretrievable and,againinthebestfamilytradition,wasdeterminedtoatleasttakepersonalrevengeonhisenemiesnomatterhowdetrimentalthiswastothestate.

HewrotetoBrutus,thecityPraetorandtoldhimtoinventsomepretextortheotherforsummoning the senate. There he was to kill Publius Antistius [the father-in-law ofPompey]andtheotherPapirius[theoriginalbeingCarbohimself],LuciusDomitiusandthePontifexMaximus,MuciusScaevola.Assassinsbroughtintothesenatehouseforthispurposekilledthefirsttwoofthesemenintheirseatsasarranged.DomitiusmadearunforitbutwaskilledatthedoorwhileScaevoladidnotmanagetogetmuchfurther.Theirbodieswere thrown into the Tiber, for it was by now the custom not to bury those sokilled.

AppianBC1.88

This is what it had come to – senators, even the Pontifex Maximus himself – beingassassinated in thesenatehouseonaconsul’sorders.Manysenatorswhowitnessed theoccasionwouldhavebeenpresentjustunderadecadepreviously.Atthattimethesenatehouse had rejected the legislation of Livius Drusus, legislation that might well havepreventedtheentiresordidtragedybeforeitgotstarted.Formanyyearsashrinetovictoryhadexistedinthesenatehouse.OnthatdayashrinetoNemesiswouldhavebeenmoreappropriate,asthesenatecontinuedtosufferthebitterconsequencesofitsprideandfollyin91BC.Drusushadpredictedthatthesenatewouldpay–thesenatewaspayingnow,andstillthefullpricehadnotbeenmet.

Most of southern Italy now belonged to Sulla, though some cities such as Praenesteremained under siege. The Sullan faction tended to be brutal toward such placeswhentheywerecapturedsoas tostrikefear intoother townscontemplatingresistancefurthernorth. Neapolis (Naples) fell to the Sullans through treachery, and virtually the entirepopulationwasmassacred.Consequently,AppianremarksthattownsnearRomepromptlysurrendered to theSullans‘withfearand trembling;atOstia thecityopened itsgates tothem’.14ThewarmovednorthintoEtruria,wherearmiesledbySullaandCarboclasheddirectly. Sullawas successful in aminor cavalry action againstCeltiberian cavalry sentfrom Hispania to reinforce theMarian army. This led to a few hundred of these mendeserting toSulla,whereuponCarboexecuted thosewhohad remained loyal.Thoughaminor incident in itself, this demonstratesCarbo’s extreme frustrationwith the constantflowofdesertions fromhisarmy to theSullanside.Thepunishmentwas itselfcounter-productive,inthatunitsstilldeserted,buttheynowtendedtoleavenoonebehindtoface

theircommander’swrath.

Furthernorth,thingsweregoingnobetterforNorbanusthantheyhadforCarbowhenhe commanded there. M. Lucullus was besieged at Placentia, but broke the siege andscattered his opponents with a successful sortie from behind the walls. ThereafterNorbanus attempted to get the better ofMetellus by a forced march, only to have hisSullanopponentfallonhisexhaustedarmyattheendofit,anddestroyallbutathousandmen. In Etruria Sulla andCarbo fought an indecisive all-day action against each othersomewhere near the town of Clusium. Though Carbo thereby succeeded in checkingSulla’snorthwardadvance, it appearsheachieved thisbypullingmanpower fromothergovernmentforcesoperatinginthenorth.Certainlyhisothergeneralshadaroughtimeofit, and lack of manpower could not have helped. Pompey and Crassus were workingtogether at this point (as they would later do when, together with Julius Caesar, theydominated Rome as the so called ‘first triumvirate’). Carbo’s general Carrinas wasseverelydefeatedbythepair,losingsome3,000men.AfterthebattleCarrinastookrefugein the nearby town of Spoletium and called on Carbo for help. As the steady flow ofdefectionstohissidedemonstrates,Sullahadalargenumberofsympathizerswithintheenemycamp.Withadvanceintelligenceoftheenemy’sintentions,hesetupanambushforthe reinforcing troops andkilled a further 2,000whenhe caught themunawares on themarch.Carrinasthereaftertookadvantageofthevilespringweathertoescapewhileheavyraincloakedhismovements.

Good intelligence and poorMarianmorale also led to the downfall of an attempt torelieve Marius at Praeneste. Eight legions were sent by Carbo to break the siege, butPompeywaswaiting.TheMarianswere again ambushed, and though their commandermanaged toextractmuchof thearmy intact, themoraleof themen tookaheavyblow.OnelegionsimplyabandoneditscommanderandtookitselfbacktoAriminumwhilemostoftherestquietlydesertedandwenthome.JustsevencohortsreturnedtoCarbo,leavingPraenesteunrelievedandincreasinglysufferingfromhunger.EachdefeatsufferedbytheMarianshadaknock-oneffectleadingtoothersetbacksasbothofficersandmensawtheircauseasincreasinglyhopeless.OneAlbinovanuswastheleaderofaLucanianlegionthatdefected toSulla.Toprove thathepersonallywas loyal,Albinovanus invitedNorbanusandhisseniorofficerstoabanquet.Norbanuswasunabletoattendthefeastbuthisseniorofficers attended. In the course of themeal, as he had previously arrangedwith Sulla,Albinovanus put his guests to death. This in turn led to the revolt ofAriminum to theSullan side. With the loss of his senior officers to treachery, Norbanus had now hadenough.Likemanyof themen fightingonhis side, heno longer believed that thewarcouldbewon,soheabandonedhisarmyandfledtotheeast.Helatercommittedsuicidein Rhodes, very publicly in the market-place as a reproach to the citizens who weredebatingwhethertohandhimovertoSulla.Carbosoonfollowedhiscolleague’sexample.HehadtriedandfailedyetagaintobreakthroughtoPraenestewithtwolegions,andthisfinalfailurecombinedwithNorbanus’defectionfinallybrokehiswill.ThoughhestillhadlargeforcesavailabletohiminEtruria,hehadlostfaithintheMariancause,andhealsofled,inhiscasetoAfrica.

Thismeant that theSullanswerenowdominant innorth Italy,Campania,Apuliaand

much of the south. The only unfinished business appeared to be the Marian army inEtruria,whichnowlackedaleader,andtheyoungerMariusinPraeneste,wholackedanarmy. However, what was good news for the Sullan cause was terrible news for theSamnites,whorealizedthatonceSullahadsecuredRome,thereconquestoftheirterritorywould be his next item of business. And as Sulla had already given earnest of hisintentions by executing such Samnite prisoners as he captured, the Samnites justifiablyfearedthattheRomanreconquestoftheirhomelandwouldbeabrutalandbloodyaffair.SothecurrentcivilwarandthelastremnantsoftheItalianwarnowcombinedintoafinalconvulsion, which was to determine the fate of Rome. In the absence of Carbo andNorbanus,theSamniteleaderPontiusTelesinusbecamebydefaulttheleaderoftheanti-Sullancause.Byrallyinghisownpeopleandgatheringalliesfromwhereverpossible insouthernItaly,heraisedanarmyof70,000men.Ifthesewerethescrapingsofthebottomoftheanti-Sullanbarrelitshouldberememberedthattheywerefromaveryformidablebarrel indeed.Many of the men in Telesinus’ army were veterans who had repeatedlydefeatedtheRomanlegionsinthewarof90BCandwereready,willingandabletodosoagain.

ThefirsttaskfacingTelesinuswastounitethearmyinEtruriawiththeyoungerMariusin Praeneste, sincewhile Telesinuswas sure of the loyalty of his ownmen, hewas anunlikely representative of what was still the government of Rome. To command non-SamnitetroopssuchasthoseabandonedbyCarbo,heneededaRomanconsul,andtogetthatRomanconsul hehad to lift the siegeofPraeneste.Thatwasno easyundertaking,because the Sullans entrustedwith the siege of that city had spent their time raising amassive series of earthworks,which stretched deep into theAlban hills. Praenestewasverydefensible,buttheveryfactorsthatmadeithardtoattackalsomadeithardforrelieftroops togetnear–especially sinceSulla, currentlywithnootherpressingbusinessonhand,hadputhimselfandhisarmysquarelyacrossTelesinus’route.TheyoungerMariustried toplayhispart andsallied from thewallsandestablisheda large fort close to theRomansiegelines,buthiseffortwasinvain.EvenTelesinusandhisSamniteswerenotpreparedtopushtheissueagainstSullaoncehisveteranarmyhaddugitselfintoasecureposition.ThesiegeofPraenestecontinued.

MeanwhileNorbanus’generals,Censorinus andCarrinas, driven from thenorth, nowtook control ofwhatever remained of the forces abandoned byCarbo inEtruria. TheseattemptedtojoinupwithTelesinustoformthelast,butveryformidable,MarianarmyinItaly.

Matterswerenowcomingtoahead.Sullaandhisarmybracedthemselvesforafinaldesperateattemptby theenemytobreak through thesiege linesandrelievePraeneste–butthisdidnothappen.TelesinusrealizedthatPraenestewasatrap.HehadSulladuginbefore him, and Crassus and another army closing in from behind. Being a highlyexperiencedsoldier,heswiftlychangedobjectives,brokecampbynightandunexpectedlymarchedonRome.

Theprizeofthewar,thecityofRomeitself,hadbeenlargelyuntouchedbytheconflictthusfar.AfterthebattleofSacriportushadbrokenthegovernmentarmyinthesouthand

led to Marius being penned up in Praeneste, Rome had been virtually defenceless.Appian15 reports thatSulla hadbrieflyvisited the cityon thewaynorth to engagewithCarbo in Etruria. On arriving in Rome Sulla discovered that the Marian governmentofficialshadfled,sohecalledanassemblyofthepeopleandassuredthemthattheyhadnothing to fear fromhim.He then appointedmen to continue theessential functionsofcityadministrationandrushedoffnorthwardtore-engagewithhisenemies.Bytherulesofwar, Sulla’s brief stopover and appointment of officialsmeant that from theMarianperspective,Romewasnowanenemycity.FromtheSamniteperspectiveofcourse,Romehadseldombeenanythingbut.Now,becauseSullaandhissubordinateshaddoneagoodjobofpreventingthenorthernMariansunderCarrinasandCensorinusfromunitingtheirtroopswiththeSamnitearmy,theforcemarchingtowardRomewaslargelycomposedofSamnitesandotherswhoborethecitynothingbutill-will.

It is true thatRomehad little strategicvalueat this time,but in another sense itwaswhatthewarwasallabout.Touseamoremodernanalogy,itwasasthough,inagameofchess Telesinus had been working to aid his embattled queen when he had suddenlyswitched tacticsandattackedhisopponent’sking.TheSamniteswerewellaware thataSullan victory would see their lands devastated and their cities sacked by a vindictiveRoman army. By hitting Rome, Telesinus was offering his men a chance to get theirretaliationinfirst.However,therewasalsoacool,rationalaspecttohisplanning–withtheSamnitesintheirpresentmood,therewasnowaythatSullacouldholdstationbeforePraeneste and let the enemy have their way with the city he claimed to represent.Tactically, he should remain where he was, keeping the enemy armies apart andmaintaining the siegeofPraeneste.Politically,Telesinushad forcedhishand.Sullawascompelled toabandonhis carefullydugearthworksandmakea forcedmarch todefendRome.

This is not to say that Sulla was unhappy that Telesinus had brought things to thecrunch.Sullahadanunwaveringfaithinhisowndestinyandanequalfaithinthearmyhecommanded.Throughout theMithridaticwars that had forged his army into the superbfighting force that it currently was, Sulla had sought to engage with the enemy at theearliestopportunity.However,inallhismajorbattlestodateSullahadgenerallybeenabletopreparedeploymentsandevenearthworksinadvance.Thistimehewasgoinginblindagainst an enemy who was ready and waiting for him. Nevertheless, offered theopportunity to bring a decade of warfare to an end, Sulla unhesitatingly took thatopportunityandfollowedtheSamnitesontheirnightmarchtoRome.

Atdaybreak,theappearanceoftheahostilearmyjustoveramilefromRomecausedconsternation in thecity. ‘Naturally therewas tumult,withwomenshriekingandpeoplerunningbackandforthas thoughthecityhadalreadybeentaken’remarksPlutarch.16AscionofoneofRome’snoblestfamilies,AppiusClaudius,joinedaforceofcavalrywhorodeout todelay the attackers.Thosewatching from the rampartswere appalled to seetheirwar-hardenedopponentsswiftlyandprofessionallychoptheimpromptuRomanforce–andAppiusClaudius–topieces.HoweverthedelaydidallowsevenhundredhorsemensentaheadbySullatocatchtheirbreath,organizeandbeginharassingtheSamnitearmy.Sevenhundredcavalrycoulddolittleagainstanarmythatoutnumberedthemahundredto

one,but theirpresencesignalled to those inRomethatSullawasawareof thesituation,andwasonhisway.ThisstiffenedRomanspinesandpreventedanyprematuresurrenderanditalsostoppedTelesinusfromdoinganythingpremature.EvenifstormingthelightlydefendedwallsofRomewouldbe littlemore thana formality, theSamnitearmywouldhardlywantSullaturningupattheirbackswhiletheyweredoingso.ThereforeTelesinusdeployedhisforcesslightlyawayfromtheCollineGate(literally the‘HillGate’) to thenorth-eastofthecity,andwaitedforSullatoarrive.

ForSulla, the choiceof battlefieldwas fortuitous.Sulla claimed to be theprotégéofVenus,andhertempleofVenusErycinawaswithinsightofthegate,andtheothermajortempleinthevicinitywastoFortuna,thegoddessonwhomSullahadreliedallhiscareer.Andindeed,whenSullaarrivedwithhismainarmyataroundnoon,thetempleofVenuswaswherehetookhisstand.

Thiswasthecriticalmoment,andnotjustforSulla.SinceHannibalhadmadehiscampwithin the thirdmilestone [fromRome] thecityhad facednogreaterdanger thanwhenTelesinuswentfromranktorankofhisarmysaying‘NowtheRomansfacetheirlastday.’LoudlyheexhortedhisarmytodefeattheRomansanddestroytheircitysaying‘ThesearethewolveswhohavebeentearingatthelibertyofItaly.Theywillnevergoawayuntilwehavecutdownthewoodthatsheltersthem.’

VelleiusPaterculus,History2.27.

Sulla’scommanderswereconcernedbythestateofthetroopsaftertheirrapidovernightmarchastheyattemptedtocatchupwiththeSamnites.Theofficerspointedoutthattheywere not up against the generally demoralized and disorganized soldiers of Carbo orMarius, but Samnites and Lucanians – highly motivated, experienced and warlikeopponents.TheyurgedSullatowait,atleastovernight.ButSullahadfaithinFortuna,andonlyallowedhismena fewhours to restand takeameal.Thenheorganizedhisbattlelines,andatfouro’clockthatNovemberafternoon,withthesunalreadysinking,thefinalbattleoftheItalianandcivilwarwasbegun.Asmightbeexpectedgiventhehighqualityofthetroopsinvolved,thebattlewasacloseanddesperateaffair.Sulla’slegionarieswerearguably thebest soldiers in theworldat that time,but theyhadmarchedallnight,andwereoutnumberedbyanenemyalmostasgoodastheywere.

TheRoman leftwing began to buckle. Sulla’smenwere forced backward until theyliterallyhadtheirbackstothewall–thatbeingthewallofRomebesidetheCollinegate.Thoseintherearmostranksbegantoseekshelterwithinthecity,buttheveteransmanningthewallswerehavingnoneof it.Theydropped theportcullison themen streaming in,killing not a few and forcing the rest to turn and fight. Sulla realized the situationwasdesperateand rushed to the sceneonhisdistinctivewhitehorse.Sodistinctivewas thishorsethateventheenemyrecognizedit.Twoadvantageouslypositionedjavelineerstookadvantage ofSulla’s distraction and attempted to impale theRoman commanderwith apairofwell-flungspears.Sullawasunawareofhisdoomsailingthroughtheairuntilthegroom riding alongside desperately slashed Sulla’s white horse across the rump. Thestartledanimalleaptforward,losingafewhairsofitstailtothespearswhichflewbehindSulla’sbackasherushedunharmedintotheranksofhisfragmentingarmy.InvainSulla

pleadedwithhismen, threatenedsomeandevenphysically laidhandsonothers to turnthembacktofacetheenemy.

There is a story that Sulla had a little golden image of Apollo from Delphi which healwayscarriedwithhiminbattle.Nowhetookitoutandkisseditaffectionatelysaying‘Apollo,insomanystrugglesyouhaveraisedSullatheFortunatetogloryandgreatness.Didyoudoitjusttobringhimhere,tothegatesofhisnativecitywhereheandhisfellow-countrymenaretobecastdowntoashamefuldeath?’

Plutarch,LifeofSulla29

Itcertainly looked thatway, forSulla’seffortswere invain.Therankshewas trying tokeepinplacewerecompletelyshatteredwithheavycasualties.Sullaendedupbackinhiscampwithonegroupoffugitives,whileothersfledtothedetachmentstillkeepingguardon Praeneste to tell the commander there that the battlewas lost. As Plutarch remarks(ibid.)‘Itlookedasthoughitwasallover.’

ThatwaswhenmessengersarrivedfromCrassus,whohadtakencommandoftherightwingwithhisarmywhileSullagavehisfullattentiontotheleft.Crassusreportedthathismenhadtotallydefeatedtheenemyfacingthemandchasedthembackpast the townofAntemnae two miles down the Via Salaria. Crassus wanted to know if he could havesupplies so that hismen could now break for supper. This, to put itmildly, put a newperspectiveon things. InsteadofSullacommandingabrokenarmyon thebrinkof totaldefeat,thebattlewascurrentlyafifty-fiftydraw.Infactthesituationwasevensomewhatbetterthanthat,becausethemoraleofSulla’sremainingmensoaredonthenewsthatthebattle was not yet lost, while the Samnites facing themwere dejected to discover thatdespitetheireffortsthebattlewasnotyetwon.Furthermore,Crassuswasbringingtothesecondinstalmentofthebattlemenwhohadbeatentheirenemyonceandwerethereforemoreconfidentofbeingabletodosoagain.

Whether these men got their well-deserved supper before returning to action isunknown.Infact,notmuchotherinformationsurvivesofthebattlethereafter,apartfromsomereportsthatitwentonallnight.Itmusthavebeenagrimaffair,withtwoarmiesofveteransoldierswhoknewthattheywerefightingnotjustforthemselvesbutthesurvivalof theirhomeland.Asanightaction, thefightingwasconfusedand thecommandersoneach side could do little in the way of tactical manoeuvre. It was down to the menthemselves fighting sword-on-sword in a bitter, drawn-out conflict. It was afterwardsestimated that some 50,000men lost their lives in that one battle.17 Some time beforedawnTelesinuswasmortallywounded,andaRomansurgecapturedtheSamnitecamp.Itbecame clear that the Romanswere going to emergewith a hard-won victory, and theSamnite force divided itself into those slain, those fled and those taken prisoner – thelatter,byvaryingaccountsbetween6,000and8,000innumber.

Essentially thisbattleended thewars,bothcivil and Italian.Sulla’svictorybroke theSamnitesandLucanians–thelastbastionofItalianresistance–anddemoralizedthearmyofCarrinasandCensorinus.Onnewsof thedefeatof theircause,bothMariangeneralsattempted toemulate theexampleofCarboandNorbanusandfleeabroad,but theyhadleft it too late. They were quickly captured and brought to Sulla. Sulla had nothing

personalagainstthesetwomen,whohadfoughtonbehalfofalegitimatelyelectedRomangovernment and had supported their cause to the last.Nevertheless, Sulla intended thatthesemenshouldnowservehispurposesandthattheywoulddosobetterdeadthanalive.Bothmenwere killedwithout trial, becauseSullawanted their heads.These heads andthatofTelesinus(thelatterwithhisdyingexpression‘morelikeaconquerorthanabeatenman’18)weredisplayedonspearstoMariusatPraenestetomakeitabundantlycleartohimthatallhopewaslost.

There are conflicting accounts as towhat happened toMarius thereafter. The SullantraditionisthatMariusattemptedtoescapelikearatthroughtunnelscarefullydugforthatpurpose.However, theexits to the tunnelshadbeendiscovered longbefore,andMariuspopped up only to be cut down again by guards stationed for that purpose. In thealternative tradition,once theysaw thatescapewas impossible,Mariusand theyoungerbrotherofTelesinusagreedonasortofmutualmurderpact.Eachrushedattheotherwithadrawnswordandwasstabbedthrough.SoperishedthelastofSulla’senemies,aman,asonehistorianputsit‘notunworthyofhisfather’.

WChapter10

TerrorandSettlementithhisvictoryattheCollineGate,Sullahadfinallyovercomeallopposition.AswithMithridates before them, the Samnites andMarians had fallen to Sulla’s

veteranlegionaries.Soonafterthefinalbattle,thesenatewassummonedtomeetitsnewmasteratthetempleofBellona.Thisvenuemayhavestrucksomeasapositivesign.TheRomansenatewasabodyofmenratherthanaplace,andcouldlegallyassembleinanytemple(infact,technicallyspeaking,thesenatehousewasatempleofVictory).However,the important thing about the temple of Bellonawas that the Romanwar-goddess wasdomiciledoutsidetheofficialboundaryofRome.Sullawasaproconsulreturningwithanarmy, and hewas therefore legally banned from entering the city until he had formallydischargedhisdutiesandcelebratedatriumphifonewasdue.SoSullawasstickingtotherules.1Maybeareturntotheconstitutionalstatusquoantebellumwaspossibleafterall.

Sullahadotherideas.Hehadattemptedtheforgiveandforgetapproachbefore,afterhehadmarched onRome in 88 BC. At that time he had (in his opinion) passed the deathsentenceontheminimumnumberofthoseresponsibleforillegallegislationandtheevenmoreillegalriots,seditionandinsurgencythathadfollowed.Asarewardforhisrestraint,Cinna had taken power andMarius had stalked the streets of Rome slayingwhomevertook his fancy. Sulla had been outlawed, and his friends persecuted, hunted down andexecuted.Evenhiswifeandfamilyhadbeen in fearof their lives.Verywell.This timeSulla would do it differently. Instead of the customary office of proconsul, he wouldrevivetheancientofficeofdictator,unusedforthepast120years.Thenasdictatorswereappointedtodo,hewouldsetRometorights.Andnoonewouldobject,becauseanyonelikelytoobjectwouldbedead.

AsSullaaddressedthesenate,therecamesoundsofconfusionfromtheVillaPublica,anearbyestablishmentontheCampusMartius.Usuallythebuildingwasthecensors’baseofoperationsinRome,butthewidespacearoundcouldholdalargenumberofpeople;sohere the thousands of Samnite prisoners from the recent battle were being held. Sullacontinuedto talkcalmlyas theshoutscomingfromoutside thesenatehousechangedtoscreams as Sulla’s menmethodically slaughtered every prisoner. As a signal of intent,nothing could be clearer. Constitutional government had not returned yet to Rome –instead the Romans had exchanged the haphazard Marian killings for the more cold-blooded,thoroughandprecisepurgeofSulla.

The initial bout ofmurders set the entire city on edge, for nooneknewwhomSullaplanned to kill andwhomhe intended to spare.A relative of thatCatulus killed by theMariansputthequestiontoSulladirectly.‘Sowhoarewegoingtolivewiththen,ifwekillarmedmeninwartime,andunarmedmenwhenatpeace?’2Metellusaskedthesamequestion,bothasasolidSullansupporterandperhapstheonlydecenthumanstillinvolvedin Roman politics. ‘Punish those you must,’ he urged, ‘but at least put out of theiruncertaintythosewhomyouhavedecidedtospare.’WhenSullagrumpilyrepliedthathe

hadnotyetdecidedwhomtospare,Metellussaid‘Wellatleastletusknowwhichpersonsyouaredefinitelygoingtopunish.’3

Moreorlessonthespot,Sullaproducedalistofeightynames.Thesemenweretobekilledonsight, immediatelyandwithout trial.Furthermore,anyoneassistingthemensonamed would automatically append their names to the list by so doing. These totallyunlawfulexecutionordersproducedwidespreadindignationattheirillegality,andhorrorattheproposednumberofvictims.HorrorchangedtofearthenextdaywhenSulla,afteranevening’scontemplation,producedalistwithafurther220names,andthenagainthefollowingdayheproducedanotherlistwiththesamenumber.Thatwaseveryonehecouldremember,Sullasaid,buthewouldaddmorenamesifanycametomind.Thelistof500nameswascalledthe‘proscriptionlist’–anamethatsentshuddersdownRomanspinesevenagenerationlater.

That terribleword– ‘proscription’.Ofall themercilessnessofSulla’sdomination,whatcrueltyhasmorebeen seared intoourminds? I believe it is those punishments decreedwithouttrialformenwhowereRomancitizens.

Cicero,Dedomo57BC

Sullahada longmemory.He recalled the legislativeand judicial anticsof senatorsandequestrians leadingupto thecatastropheof91BC.Thoseequestrianswhohadterrorizedthe senatewith their dominanceof the lawcourtsnowexperienced the terrorof a statewithnolawcourtswhatsoever.AnyonewhohadillegallyputtodeathasupporterofSullanow experienced the fear of death for himself at first hand. Furthermore, while Sullaseemed purely focused on the twin goals of purging the state and exacting personalrevenge,themotivesofotherswerenotsopure.Rumourscirculatedofmenfirstkilledfortheirmoney,andtheirnamesappendedto theproscriptionlistsafterwards.Whenamanwith little interest in politics discovered that he had been prescribed, he remarkedsardonically,‘Ah.IseemyAlbanfarmhasinformedonme.’AfarmintheAlbanhillswasaprestigepossessionamongtheRomanaristocracy,anddemandfarexceededsupply–amatter that those ‘helping’ Sulla with the proscriptions were intent on resolving. Thisrampant illegality, remarks the historianVelleiusPaterculus indignantly, tookplace in astatewherenormallyanactorcouldsuefordamagetohisfeelingsifhewasbooedoffthestage.4

Mariuswasdead, andhis sonwithhim.This left anephew,MariusGratidianuswhohadbeenamongthemostbloodthirstyMariansduringtheirtimeoftriumph.Hesufferedagrislydeath,andhiscorpsewasmutilatedagainthereafter.LackingMariushimselftokill,Sullatriedtokillhismemory.TheashesweredisinterredandscatteredintotheriverAnio,and monuments and statues commemorating Marius up and down the country wereoverthrownanddefaced.Overall,ithasbeenestimatedthatsome5,000peopleperishedintheproscriptions,thoughthisnumberdoesnotincludethosekilledcollectivelyaswillbeseeninthefateofPraenesteandNorba.Furthermore,thegeneralchaoslentitselftoextra-curricularkillingsaswartimegrudgesweresettledandprivatelandgrabstookplace.(Weseeanexampleof thelatter,painstakinglydescribedinCicero’sProRoscioAmerino, inwhich a young man was accused of murdering his father by the real killers, who had

seizedhisestate.)

Crassus,theherooftheCollineGate,didmuchtobesmirchhisreputationatthistime.He had slain family members to avenge, but it was noted that he took his vengeancemostly from thosewith property he could seize. The particularly egregious killing of amanwhoseonlycrimewas tohavesomethingCrassuswantedfinallydrewacomplaintfromSulla, amanwhousually stoodbyhis friendsnomatterwhat.CrassuswasneveremployedbySullaonpublicbusinessagain.

Most of our reports from this period are byRoman aristocrats and thosewriting forthem, so the decimation of the Roman aristocracy attracts much of the interest in oursources. But Sulla’s death lists were far beyond individuals. At Praeneste, the garrisonsurrenderedon theyoungerMarius’ death.ThatMarius’ headwas already adorning theRoman forum, where Sulla sarcastically quoted a line from the Greek playwrightAristophanesatit:‘firstlearntorowashipbeforeyoutrytosteerit’.NowSullatravelledout toPraeneste todisposeof the restof the town.Romans,Samnitesandnativesweredividedintoseparategroups.FromamongthenativepeopleofPraeneste,Sullapickedoutthosefewwhomheowedafavour.TheresthehadkilledalongwithalltheSamnites.TheRomansdeservedtodieaswell,Sullatoldthem,butbecausetheywereRomans,hewouldsparethem.Thetownitselfwasthencomprehensivelyplundered.ReportsofthisreachedthepeopleofNorba,thefortressguardingtheroutethroughthenearbyPomptinemarshes.Thesepeople toohadbeenholdingout againstSulla, andwhen itwas certain the townwouldfall,thepopulationindulgedinanorgyofmutualmassacrebeforesettingfiretotheplace, so that therewas littlebutbonesandashes left for theSullanarmywhen it tookpossession.ThecityofVolterraeinEtruriatooknotealso,andhungonstubbornlyuntil80BCuntilresistancewascrushedpersonallybySullainhisfinalmilitarycommand.

Sulla arbitrarily rearranged matters in municipalities across Italy. Lands were takenfromsomepro-MariancitiesandgiventoSulla’ssoldierswhoweresettledassomethingbetweenretirementandastandbyreserveincaseoftrouble.Othercitieshadtheircitadelsorwallsdemolished,orhad topaysubstantial fines (whichwent to restore thedepletedRomanexchequer,as thepropertyandotherassetsof theproscribedwerealsoproperlysupposedtodo.)WhilemuchofItalysufferedfromSulla’swrath,asexpected,thepeopleofSamniumtookthebruntofit.

Sulla’sproscriptionsonlycametoanendwhenallwhocalled themselvesSamniteshadbeen killed or driven from Italy. When asked the reason for his terrible anger, SullaexplainedthathehadlearnedfromexperiencethatnoRomanwouldeverbesafesolongastherewereSamnitestodealwith.Sowhatwereoncetownshavebecomevillages,andsomehavevanishedaltogether.Boeanum,Aesernia,Panna,VenafrumnearTelesia,noneofthemcanproperlybecalledtownstoday.

Strabo,Geography5.4.11

ThenameofAeserniainthislistshowshowlittlerewardthecityreceivedforitsvaliantdefenceagainst the Italian rebels.After its surrender ithadbecomeastronghold for theSamnites and Marians, and when the Sullan army reconquered Aesernia they sodevastatedthecitythatitonlyrecoveredsomeofitsformersizeundertheemperorTrajan,

almosttwocenturieslater.

Deathwasnottheonlypunishmentinflictedbythenewregime.Dozensofleadingmenwereexiled,andtheirsonsbarredfromholdingpublicoffice.(‘OnlySullacoulddreamupwaysofpunishingthoseyetunborn’remarkedthelaterconsulLepiduswhileinthecourseofundoingthatlegislation.5)Sulladidnotlookkindlyondisobedience.Ofella,thegeneralwho had served Sulla well in maintaining the siege of Praeneste, decided to run formagisterialofficedespitebeingfirmlytoldbySullathatthiswasoutofthequestion.Thiswas becauseOfellawas an equestrian, and Sullawas determined to restore at least theappearanceoftheoldconstitution.WhileOfellapubliclyputhiscasetothepeopleintheforum,Sullahadhimcutdown,andbrieflydismissedthemurderwiththewords,‘Know,people of Rome, that this man disobeyed me.’ Another who disobeyed Sulla was theyoung Julius Caesar. He stubbornly remained married to Cornelia, the daughter of theMarianleaderCinna,despitehavinghadstrictorderstodivorcehimselffromher.InsteadCaesarwentontherun.He, likemostof thoseonthewantedlist,wasquicklycapturedand only the fact that a number of Sulla’s allieswere alsoCaesar’s relatives saved theyoungmanfromimmediateexecution.(ThecoupleremainedmarriedforanotherdecadeuntilCornelia’suntimelydeath.)

While Sulla remained organizing matters in Rome and Italy, young Pompey wasdispatched to clean up the remnants ofMarian resistance in Sicily andAfrica. Pompeyconductedhimselfwithgreatrestraintwithregardtothegeneralpopulation;goingevensofar as to have soldiers’ swords sealed in their scabbards as a disincentive for untowardbehaviour. However, those senior Marians whom Pompey captured (including the ex-consulCarbo)heexecutedwithagrimenthusiasmthatearnedhimthenickname‘carnifexadulescens’–theyoungbutcher.(Nooneneededtoaskwhothe‘oldbutcher’was.)AfricacamequicklyunderSullancontrol,butIberiawastoprovemoreproblematic.ThejuniorMarian leader Sertorius came into his own as governor of the peninsula. He provedhimselfamasteratbothbringingthelocaltribesunderhiscontrolandindeployingthemin guerrilla warfare against Sullan armies sent to bring him down. So prolonged andstubborn was Sertorius’ resistance that the last of the Marians eventually had thesatisfactionofoutlivinghisnemesis,Sulla.

Sullahadtakenhisrevenge,andintheprocesshadsystematicallyremovedanyonewhomightstandinthepathofhisintendedreforms.WithItalycowedandmostoftherestoftheempireagainunderRomancontrol,itwasnowtimesetaboutrepairingthedamagedcountry and constitution. Here Sulla seemed determined that the disasters of the pastdecade would never be repeated. Whatever his personal feelings towards givingcitizenshiptotheItalians,Sullaknewthatparticulargeniecouldneverbeputbackintothebottle.Thiswasnotleastbecausemanyofthe‘Roman’soldiersunderhiscommandhadbeen Italians at the start of 91 BC. Now these men were settled on Roman land andenjoying the privileges of Roman law and citizenship. Revoking that citizenship wasperhaps the only thing that Sulla could do that would break the fierce loyalty his ex-soldiers felt for him, so Sulla did not even try. Pragmatically, he accepted thatmost ofItalysouthoftheAlpswaseitherRomanorwouldsoonbecomeso.

ItwasatthispointthatSullasetaboutformalizinghisposition.Aftertheelectionoftheconsulsforthecomingyear,theprocesswasstartedthatwouldofficiallymakeSullathedictatorthathealreadywasinpractice.ThoughSullatooktheancientnamehesetanewprecedent, forpreviousdictatorshadstrict termsof referenceand limits to their time inoffice.Sulla’sdictatorshipwasopen-ended.Furthermore,thelegislationwasproposedbytheofficialoverseeingtheelectionoftheconsuls,theinterrex,intheoneandonlytimeinRomanhistorythatthisofficialhaseverproposedlegislation,letalonealawofsuchfar-reaching significance. The legislation was through a lex rogata – that is, by a directproposal to thepeopleofRome.Thisdeliberatelybypassed thesenate,either toabsolvethat body from involvement, to forestall objections, or tomake it seem that Sulla wasdictator by popular demand. The same law incidentally gave formal absolution for anyextra-legalactivitiesSullamighthaveconductedinthepast.

Therewasnowthequestionofthesenate.ThishadbeenconsiderablydepletedbytheItalianwar,forwhateverthesinsoftheRomanaristocracy,theircouragewasundoubted.Senatorshadservedinthefrontlinesthroughoutthewar,andhadtakendisproportionatecasualties. Then, evenwhile senatorswere still being killed by the Samnites and otherItalianholdouts,therecametheructionsof88BC.AfterhismarchonRomeSullakilledahandful of senators, includingSulpicius, and thereafterCinna andMarius killed a goodmanymorewhentheygotbackintopower.ThenwhenSullareturnedandcivilwarflaredupagain, stillmoresenatorshadperished in the fighting.ThenSullahadconductedhisownverystrictpurgewhichbyitselftookoutoverahundredsenators.Overall,ithadnotbeenagooddecadefortheconscriptfathersoftheRomanRepublic,andsincemattershadbeenindisarray,thecensorshadbeenslowtoreplenishthesenate’sdepletedranks.

Sullasetaboutnotonlybringingthesenateuptoitspropernumber,butalsoproposedtheadditionof threehundrednewsenators.Thiswasoriginally thebrainchildofLiviusDrususwhohadintendedtobringtheequestrianclassmoreintotheranksofgovernment.Atthetimethesenatehadrejectedthatideawiththesamevehemencethatithadrejectedthe idea of citizenship for the Italians. Now the measure was accepted with hardly amurmur.Recentyearshadprovidedaharshrealitycheck,andthesenatewaslesspreparedtodefyreality.Sullaalsomadeofficialwhathadlongbeenstandardpractice–thatonceamanwasvotedtomagisterialoffice,hewasautomaticallyadlectedintothesenate.Sincethe first step in a magisterial career was the quaestorship, Sulla raised the number ofquaestorstotwenty.ThisbothmettheneedforjunioradministratorsinRome’sgrowingempireandappearstoreflectthenumberofsenatorswhommodernestimatesofRomanmortalityratesindicatewouldbeneededtokeepthenumberstable.

Sullanowturnedtothetribunate,theofficethathedeemedresponsibleformanyoftheevils thathadafflictedRome.Afterall, theGracchusbrothers,LiviusDrusus, andmostrecently thewretchedSulpiciushadcausedhuge turmoilby ‘abusing’ thepowersof thetribunate, soSullawasdetermined to strip theofficeof itspotential formischief.Stageone was to make the office a dead end rather than a springboard to power. So Sullaarranged it so that a man who had held the tribunate was not eligible for any othermagistracy.AtastrokethismeantthatnoRomanwithplansforapoliticalcareerwouldeven consider the job. Also the power of tribunes to propose legislation was severely

curtailed–neveragainwouldaSulpiciususehispoweroverthemobtopasslawsforcingalegallyappointedgeneraltorenouncehiscommand.Whilethetribuneskepttheirrightto save individual citizens frommagisterial persecution, their ability to veto legislationwaslimitedtoparticularcircumstances.NofutureTiberiusGracchuswouldusehisvetotobringstatebusinesstoahalt.

Inshort ‘Sulla left the tribunateasan insubstantialshadowof itself’.6 It seemsnot tohaveoccurredtoSullathatthetribuneswereattheirmostdisruptivewhenreflectingtheneeds of the people they represented, and curtailing the powers of the tribunes did notsolve the huge social problems to which the tribunes gave a voice. Instead Sullasuppressed even discussion of the very issues which the Roman state most needed toresolve.Andsuppressingtheissuesdidnotmakethemgoaway,asdemonstratedbythesupportgivenbythelowerclassestothegladiatoruprisingofSpartacuslessthanadecadelater.Yetevenmorecrucially,itwasthelowerclasseswhomadeupthebackboneofthelegions.Iftheyweredeniedaroleintheformalworkingsofthestate,theywerecertainlyable to make their wishes known in an extra-constitutional manner. Caesar, and laterOctavian, grasped this point. The odd thing is that Sulla, who used his legions to rideroughshodoverthegovernmentinRome,appearsnottohavedrawnthelessontaughtbyhisownactions.

Outside Italy Sulla, thanks to his campaigns against Mithridates, was aware thatcorruptionandmisgovernmentbyRomangovernorswasnotjustwronginitself,butledtooppressed provincials giving whole-hearted support to foreign invaders. Thereforemisgovernmentwasa security issue.Sulla’s responsewas tomakeprovincialgovernorsmoreanswerable to the senate.While in thepastprovincialgovernorsmightbe servingpraetorsorevenconsulsiftherewasanexpectationofmilitaryactioninaprovince,afterSullathereisanotedtendencyforprovincialgovernmenttobelefttothoseconsulsandpraetorswhohadalreadyservedtheiryearinoffice.Apartfromanythingelse,thismeantthattherewassomeonemindingtheshopinRomeandcouldtakeimmediatechargewhensomethingliketheMithridaticwarbrokeout.Andtomakeit lesslikelythatsuchawarwouldbreakout,Sullamademisbehaviourbyaprovincialgovernoratreasonableoffence.This was done by re-working the already existing law on maiestas (the crime of‘diminishingthemajestyoftheRomanpeople’).Astandingcourtnowsatinjudgementofgovernorswhocrossedtheboundariesoftheirprovince–especiallythosewhotooktheirarmywiththem.Declarationsofwaragainstanallyandtheillegaldetentionofprisonerswerealsocovered,aswasthecrimeoftamperingwiththeloyaltyofthearmy.Sulladidnotwantanyonerepeatinghisownactions.Regrettablywedonotknowthefullextentofthe law and whether it covered peculation by governors within their own province –thoughdoubtlesstherepetundaelawswerealsore-examined.Ourignoranceoftheexactprovisions of the Lex Cornelia de maiestas are partly through gaps in the sources butpartlybecausetheprovisionsofthelawweredeliberatelyimprecise.Theactualpurposeofthelawwastoallowthesenatetoactagainstagovernorgonebad,andtheprovisionsofthelawwereleftflexibleenoughtobeadaptedtofit thecaseagainstthegovernorinquestion(orindeedagainstanyoneelsethesenatehappenedtobegunningfor).7

Sulla’sconstitutionalmeasuresaresometimesdescribedastheknee-jerkresponseofa

dyed-in-the-woolconservativedeterminedtoholdbacktheforcesofchange,andthereissomejusticeinthecharge.Afterall,theRomanstatehadundergoneconsiderablechangein the past ten years, and none for the better. (Apart from the very large exception ofcitizenshipfortheItalians,butinSulla’stimethejurywasstilloutonwhetherthiswasagoodthing.)Acloserexaminationoftherecordshowsthatwhennotbeingacold-bloodedagent of human extinction Sulla could be both thoughtful and reasonable. His legalreformsareacaseinpoint.ItishighlyprobablethatSullaincreasedthenumberofservingpraetors from six to eight.8While the original job of the praetor had been to commandarmies when Rome’s military commitments made it impossible for the consuls to beeverywhereatonce,thepost-SullanpraetorhadhisresponsibilitiesinRomeitself.Thesewerebothjudicialandadministrative,andinthelatterroletookoversomeoftheworkofthecensors.UnlikeotherRomanmagistracies,censorswerenotelectedeveryyear,andtheir responsibilitieshad increasedas theRomanstatehadgrown incomplexity.BeforetheSullanchange,apairofcensorscouldspendtheirtimeinofficeworkingthroughanaccumulated backlogwithout ever getting to the business on hand.Nowpraetors coulddealwithmattersastheyaroseand,oncetheiryearinofficewascomplete,praetorswereavailable – and suitably trained in law and administration – for the running of minorprovinces.

We can quickly pass over Sulla’s attempts to legislate for public morality.ContemporaryRomans saw little point in being lecturedonproper behaviourby amanrenownedforspendthriftdrunkenpartieswithactorsandprostitutes,andwhodidn’tevenobeyhisownlawsaftertheywerepassed.Itis,however,worthnotingthatinlateryearstheserialadultererAugustusalsotriedhardtoappearasthecustodianofpublicmorality.ThisparticularformofhypocrisyisbynomeanslimitedtoancientRome,butonenotesthat Romans of questionable character were particularly prone to pass moralizinglegislation, thus confirming the observation of one ancientwriter that ‘themore amanlacksethics,themoreheneedslaws’.

Whilehissumptuarylegislationquicklybecameredundant,amorelastingchangewasSulla’senlargementofthepomerium,theofficialboundaryofthecityofRome.SincetheRoman world was divided into Rome, places ruled by Rome and places due to beconqueredbyRome,theenlargementofthe‘Rome’bitwasaveryseriousbusiness,whichinvolved considerable research and legal and religious rituals. (For example certaintemplesofforeigngodswerenotallowedwithinthepomerium,andbodiescouldonlybeinterred there in exceptional circumstances.) The complexity involved in suchenlargementsandtheconflictinginterestsofall involvedmeantthatenlargementsofthepomeriumhappenedseldom,andusuallywhentherewassomeonelikeSullawhohadtheindisputablefinalwordondisagreements.

Towardstheendof81BCSullabegantodisengagefromautocracy.Asatransitionheresignedhisdictatorshipand immediately stood for electionas consul for the followingyear. Sulla campaigned as might any other candidate, greeting potential voters in theforumandcheerfullyarguinghiscasewithanyonewhocalledhimtoaccount.

Heputmoretrust inhisgoodfortunethaninhisaccomplishments,andalthoughhehad

slaingreatnumbersof its citizens and introducednumerouschangesand innovations toRome’sgovernment,herelinquishedtheofficeofdictatorandputtheselectionofconsulsintothehandsoftheelectorate.Hewalkedupanddownintheforumlikeaprivatecitizen,exposinghispersonfreelytothosewhowantedtochargehimwithhispastactions.

Plutarch,LifeofSulla34

SullawasdulyelectedwithMetellusPiusashiscolleague.Then,oncehisyearinofficewascomplete,Sullaretiredfrompubliclife.

Onthefaceofit,allwaswellafteratumultuousdecade.Romehadovercomethethreatofextinctionat thehandsofrebelliousItalians,andpeacehadreturnedtothepeninsula,withmostofthepopulationeithercontentwiththeprospectofcitizenshipor(especiallyinthecaseoftheSamnites)dead.TheflawsintheRomanconstitution,whichhadledtoanoverweening and self-interested senate, had been corrected by making that body moreinclusiveandmoreanswerabletothepublic.ThethreatposedbyMithridateshadbeen,ifnotquashed,atleastforcedintodormancy.(ASullansubordinatecalledMurenahadmadea second, quasi-official attempt to attack Pontus but the Roman government swiftlydisavowedMurenaafterhisattackfailedmiserably.TheresolutionofthePonticquestionremainedfora futuregeneration.)Sullahimselfwashappilymarried toawifewhohadjustbornehimtwinchildren.Thefutureseemedbright–butitwasn’t.

TwoyearsafterSullaretiredintoprivatelife,hewasdead.Fromaccountsofhisdeathitseems that a gastric ulcer exacerbated by years of alcohol abuse had become infected.Unnoticed at first, the corruption spread until Sulla almost literally rotted away fromwithin. ‘All his clothing, baths, hand-basins and food were tainted with the flood ofcorruption,soviolentlydid iterupt.He immersedhimselfmanytimesaday inwater towashawaytheinfection,butinvain.Theinfestationgainedrapidlyonhimanddefiedallpurification.’9Finally,aftersufferingaviolentinternalhaemorrhage,Sulladiedin78BC.His illness anddeath are an appropriatemetaphor for theRepubliche left behind.ThatRepublicwas to last another twenty-nine years, but aswith Sulla in 80 BC, despite theoutward appearance of health, insidious internal rot had already passed the point of noreturn.

SEpilogue–FromSullatoCaesar

ulla’sreformshadputthestatebackonanevenkeel,buthehadrightedashipthatwas already sinking. In the event, few of Sulla’s changes to the system were to

endure–butthentheRomanRepublicwouldnotlastverymuchlongereither.ThereweretworeasonsforthefailureoftheRomanRepublicevenafterSulla’sattemptstomenditsills.Onewaspsychologicalandtheotherwassystemic.

Thesystemicproblemwith the republicwas that itno longer represented itscitizens.When every male Roman citizen was also a practising Roman voter, the needs of thepeoplefoundavoicein the legislature.LikewisewhenalmosteveryRomansoldierwasalsoapractisingRomanvoter,thewillofthepeopleandthewillofthearmywereprettymuch the same thing.However, as theRoman state expanded, an increasingnumberof‘Romans’ lived their liveswithout even seeing the city ofwhich theywere technicallycitizens.AndsinceallvotingbyRomanshadtobedonepersonallyinRome,thismeantthatanever-increasingnumberofcitizenswereeffectivelydisenfranchised.Thisproblemresultedinveryliteralclasswarfare.

Thereisalargelydiscreditedideafromthemid-twentiethcenturythatfromthetimeofthe Gracchi the Roman state was divided into two political parties. These were thedemagogicpopularesandtheoligarchicoptimates.Bythistheory,thetwopartiesoperatedas proto-forms of modern political parties, with assumed manifestos and a roughhierarchy. More recent scholarship has dismissed this idea, pointing out that Romanaristocrats were as individualistic as cats and socially incapable of subsuming theirpersonalambitionstoalargerpoliticalorganization.Themodernopinionisthatindividualpoliticians tookdifferent routes topower, beingpopulareswhen it seemedexpedient toappeal to the people, and optimates when the best option was through the use offriendships andpersonal connections in the senate.Somepoliticians favouredone routemore than theother,but their choicesweredictatedmorebypragmatism than ideology,andothersonthesamepathweremorelikelytobeconsideredrivalsthanbrothers-inarms.

Nevertheless,thepopularesversusoptimatestheoryhassomevalidity.Thisisbecauseafter the Italian war, and despite the efforts of Sulla (himself widely considered anoptimate), the constitutional balance of power was decisively tipped in favour of thewealthy.ApeasantinthemountainsofUmbriacouldnotaffordtotakeamonthofftogotoRomeandcasthisvoteonlegislationthatnobodyhadbotheredtoinformhimaboutinthefirstplace.However,thewealthylandownernextdoorwouldbewelluptospeedonproposedlegislationthataffectedhisinterests,andhadthemeanstogotoRomeandtheconnections and money to influence the vote in his favour when he got there. Solegislation tended to favour the wealthy and well-connected. The poor of Italy lackedpoliticalsophistication,anditisdoubtfulwhetherourtheoreticalUmbrianpeasantwouldhavebeenabletoarticulatetheproblemswiththesystemthatstoppedhimfromgettingafairshake,butitisclearthatagreatmanyofthoseinItalyknewthatthesystemwasnotworkingintheirfavour.

This is one of themajor causes of the unrest in the countryside between the time ofSullaandCaesar.AlmostassoonasSullawasdead,theconsulLepidussoughttooverturnmuch of Sulla’s constitutional handiwork. Rebuffed in Rome, he took his cause to thecountry and above all to the army. Soon afterwards Spartacus and his gladiators led arebellion.Thenihilist styleof theuprisinghadavisceral appeal for the lowerclasses–therewereprobablyatleastasmanyofthefreepoorinSpartacus’armyasgladiatorsorescaped slaves, and Spartacus had literally to turn awaymore volunteers. This popularendorsementofamanwhosecauseconsistedalmostentirelyofpillageandrapinewasasymptom that theRomansocialorder lackedgrass-roots support.EvenSulla’sveterans,once established on the land, found that the system was not designed to favoursmallholders. This, added to the fact that many ex-soldiers did not take naturally tofarming in the first place,made Sulla’s veterans natural recruits for seditiouslymindedindividualssuchasCatilineinthesixties.

Butperhaps themost resoundingcondemnationof thepost-SullansystemcamewhenCaesarcrossedtheRubiconin49BC.BythistimePompeywasaseniorstatesmanandthemilitaryleaderoftheRomansenatorialparty.Hehadboasted,‘IfIstampmyfoot,Italywillrise.’ButwhenitcametothecrunchandPompeyneededthesupportof theItalianpeople, Italy didn’t rise. It yawned. The people of Italy were simply not vested in thesystemasitstood.Fewsawmuchbenefitintakingthesideofonearistocratoranotherinasenatorialsquabblethatwasonlygoingtomakeeveryone’slifeworsenomatterhowitturned out. Thus we see one aspect of the systemic problem in Italy – thedisenfranchisement and subsequent alienation of the poor. The second aspect of thisdisenfranchisementwasthatthoughtheyhadalmostcompletelylosttheirrepresentationinformal politics, this certainly did not mean that the poor lost their ability to influenceevents. If thedominiatioSullaehad taughtanything, itwas that theswordwasmightierthantheconstitution,andthemenwieldingthoseswordsweretheverymenwhowerenolongerrepresentedintheformalpoliticalprocess–thecommonpeopleofItaly.

Again, theenfranchisementof the Italianpeoplescame too late to solve theproblem,andinfactexacerbatedit.FornotonlywerethelegionsofPompey,CaesarandOctavianpackedwithmenwhohadnevervotedinRome,manyofthosemenhadrelativeswhohadvery recently fought against Rome, if indeed they had not been on the opposite sidethemselves. Such men had little inhibition about supporting a general who claimed torepresenttheirinterestsinawaythatthesenateandRomanvoterscouldnot,orwouldnot,do.

ThemostsignificantoftheseinterestslayinwhathappenedtoaRomansoldierafterhewasdischarged.IntheearlyRepublic,apeasantlivingclosetoRomewouldsimplyreportfor the seasonal campaign and return to his smallholding after the season was over,probably taking time tovote in theannualelectionsenroute.After theMarian reforms,thepropertyqualificationformembershipof the legionswaswaived.Whenstooddown(whichnowmightbeafteruptoadecadeservingunderthestandardsinIberianorAsiaMinor) thesesoldiershadnowheretogo,andaskillset incompatiblewithmostciviliancareers, since itbasically involvedbeingverygoodatkillingpeople.With little faith inthe senate or government, these men looked to their general to provide them with a

smallholding,preferablyinItaly,fromwhichtheycouldsupportthemselvesattheendofwhat now amounted to a military career. And whatever the general said that his menneededtodotogettheirpensions,thelegionarieswerequitepreparedtodo.Aswiththeother common people of Italy, they had little interest in supporting a senate andconstitutionthatdidnotsupportthem.

Thus themajor changesof thedecade91–81 BC came too late to repair the damagedfabricofRomanpoliticallife,andinsteadthemannerinwhichthosechangescameaboutmeantthattherewerenowevenmoreRomanstobedisenchantedwithRomangovernancethan before, and more Romans to serve under military commanders whose owncommitment to the political systemwas suspect(see below). The systemic flaws in theRomanstatehad,ifanything,beenexpandedratherthanfixedbytheviolentconvulsionsofthedecade.

And then there was the psychological aspect. A government that had been blatantlyusedasthetoolofaself-interestedaristocracyintheyearsupto91BCwashardlygoingtoinspire faith in the system. Then, after the Italianwar erupted as a direct result of theincompetenceof theoligarchicgovernment inpower, thiswarbecame subsumed into acivilwarfoughtbetweenRomanaristocratswithmotiveswhichwerehardlyinspiringtothe average citizen.Yes, Sulla had been displaced from command of his army but ‘putSulla back in charge of theMithridaticwar’was hardly a slogan to die for. In fact theabsenceofacompellingideologyoneithersideoftheMarian/Sullanconflictwasoneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofthewar.

Sulla’smenhadaclearideaofwhattheywerefightingfor–ageneraltheybelievedin,andthechanceofadecentpost-campaignsettlementforthemselves.Thoseintheranksofthe army opposing Sulla lacked a compelling reason why they should be there. AfterMarius’ arbitrary executions in Rome, and the cheerful disregard of all sides for once-veneratedconstitutionalconventions,theideathattheMariansrepresentedlibertyagainstSullan tyranny was a tough one to sell. And while Censorinus might really not likeCrassus, this was not a compelling reason to die for Censorinus. Hence the massivedesertions thatwere a feature of thewar against Sulla.Men deserted because they hadnothingtofightfor.TheexceptionwastheSamnitesandLucanians.Theysawclearlythattheywere fighting for their freedom, their homeland and their very lives. And so theyfought, fought well and came very close to winning. If all Italy had been similarlymotivated,SullawouldnothavemadeitpastBrundisium.

ButinfactclaimsthattheMariansrepresentedproper,legitimategovernmentweresoweakthatfewwriters,modernorcontemporary,bothermentioningthem.CertainlySullawas brutal to his opponents (as were theMarians in their less organized way) but theSullanwarwasavendettaamongthearistocracythathadlittletodowithlibertyversusautocracy.ThebasicfactwasthatoutsidetheRomansenateandequestrianclasstherewasprecious little libertygoingabout.Writerson theearly empirewerewont to lament the‘loss’ofRepublicanfreedoms.Yetthesenateandequestriansdidnotsharethatfreedomwith their fellow Romans, nor with the Italians and certainly not with the provincials.AlmostwithoutexceptioneverypartofItalywasbetteroffundertheruleoftheCaesars

thanitwasinthelastcenturyoftheRepublic.AstowhetherthepeopleofItalylosttheirfreedomundertheimperialautocracy,well,perhapstheghostsofFregellaearebestplacedtoanswerthat.

ThusweseethatthecommonpeopleofItalywerelargelyshutoutoftheconstitutionalprocessbutverydynamicallyinvolvedintheextra-constitutionaleventsthatsoenlivenedthelastyearsoftheRomanRepublic.Wenowturntotheleadersofthepost-Sullanstate,whichwasonceagainthearistocracy,albeitanaristocracyinwhichtheRomanelementwasmuchdepletedandtheItalianelementgreatlyexpanded.Thedominobiles–theruralaristocracy of Italy – were now to play an ever-increasing role in Roman politics, asdemonstratedbythecareerofoneofthefore-runners;theconsulof63BC,MarcusTulliusCiceroofArpinum.However,theleadershipinRomehadbeenasdamagedbytheeventsof 91–81 BC as had the people of Italy. This was not simply in the appalling attritionsufferedby senatorial families over the decade.Casualties in theHannibalicwar of thethirdcenturyhadbeenatleastashigh,andtheRomanstateandaristocracyhadreboundedstronglyfromthis.Theissuelayinthemannerthatthesecasualtieshadbeeninflicted.

TheItalianwarwasdamagingenough–inthiswartheRomanfoughtcountrymenwithwhomtheysharedtiesofmarriage,commerceandfriendship.Furthermore,itwascleartoeveryone from the beginning that this war was a self-inflicted injury caused by self-interestandshort-sightedpolitics.Consequentlythedamagewroughtbythiswarhadbothanapparentsideandaninsidiousone.Firstly,itintroducedtheideaofresolvinginternalpolitical questions by military force. This was not how issues had been previouslyresolvedwithintheRomanstate,andtechnicallyitwasnotwhathappenedintheItalianwar, because the Italianswere not Romans – but asmentioned above, theywere closeenoughthatitalmostcounted,sotheideawasintroduced.

With the ideaestablished, it followednaturally thatSullashouldusemilitary force toresolvetheissueof‘mobanarchy’inRome,andthatthoseinRomeshouldtrytoorganizeamilitaryresponsetoSulla.Then,whentheMariansretookRomeafterSulla’sdeparturefor the east, this was yet another extension of military force into the area of politicaldisagreement.Norwasithardtonoticethatthemilitaryforcebecamemoreextremeandextra-constitutional with every application. By the time that Sulla returned, the use offorcetocompelpoliticalsubmissionwassoestablishedthatSullafoughtalmostastandardcampaign of conquest notmuch different from that by which he had extracted GreecefromtheclutchesofMithridates.Asmilitaryforcebecamearecognizedmeansofgainingpoliticalpower, constitutionalconventions sufferedaccordingly.Things thatwouldhavebeen unimaginable in 91 BCwere standard practice a decade later. Thismeant not onlyirregularitiessuchastheyoungerMariusbeingmadeconsulalthoughtotallyunqualifiedforthejob,orSullabeingmadedictatorinanovelmannerwithunprecedentedtermsofreference. Itwasalsomatters suchasanelectedconsul (Octavius)being lynched in theforum when the opposing faction took the city, another elected consul (Carbo) beingsummarily executed by Pompey in Sicily, and the head of another consul (the youngerMarius)beingplacedonapikeintheforumfortheedificationofthevoters.

Intheseandnumerousotherways,theRomanconstitution,onceaveneratedinstrument

of state, became an increasingly ignored irrelevance. Not just the younger Marius butmanyofhiseldercontemporariesfinishedtheirpoliticalcareersuponpikes.Forthepost-Sullangeneration,theeffectofseeingtheirfathers,unclesandotherkinsmensodisplayedcannot but have undermined faith in the political process. What we see in the lastgeneration of the Roman Republic – cynical abuse of governmental and religiousinstitutions,areadinesstoresorttoviolenceandagrimdeterminationtowinatallcosts–are features that were always present in the Roman character but magnified out of allproportionbythetraumasof91–81BC.TheRomanaristocracynolongerbelievedthatthestateor theconstitutioncouldprotect themor theirfamilies.Howcouldtheywhentheyhadseensuchdramaticprooftothecontrary?

Before91BC,apoliticalresolutionofItaly’sproblemswasachievable.Drususandhispredecessors pushed hard for such a resolution and despite occasional outbreaks ofviolence,thestruggleforreformwaslargelythroughconstitutionalmeans.Infactitwasthoseopposedtoreformwhowerefirstandreadiest toresort toviolencewhentheyfelttheir interestswere threatened.Even so, the Italianspressed their case in the legislatureand senate for decades before they eventually turned to armed rebellion. If theRomanRepublic had suffered from a sudden attack of statesmanship and brought the Italiansgradually and peacefully into the body of the Roman state, this would have set aprecedent.Theresolutionofothermajorissues,suchasthealienationofthearmy,mightalsohavebeenpeacefullymanaged.

Let it not be forgotten that the Roman state had already achieved one conceptualbreakthrough in the hitherto unthinkable idea that aman could be a citizen of one citywhilepermanentlydomiciledandactiveinthepoliticsofanother.Givengoodwillonallsides, something approximating representational government through senators fromdifferentregionswasentirelypossible.Atleast,possiblebefore91–81BC.Thatcalamitousdecade destroyed the faith of the people of Italy not just in the senate and Romangovernment (as there was little faith there to begin with), but in negotiation and thepoliticalprocessasawhole.

Thatdisastrous time left thepost-Sullangenerationofaristocratswithagrimmerandmore cynical outlook, and they were much readier to believe that change, or theprevention of change, could only be achieved by naked force – within or without theconstitution.Thisiswhyin49BC thesenatewaspreparedtoviolatetheconstitutionandover-rideatribunicanvetoinordertobringdownCaesar,andwhyCaesarwaspreparedtoignoretheconstitutionandmarchonRomeallegedlyindefenceoftribune’srights.Thatsequenceofeventsmarkednot just the finalcollapseof theRomanRepublic,butproofthat the Republic had been unsalvageable for decades. The Republic did not collapsebecauseCaesarcrossedtheRubicon.Itcollapsedbecausenobodybelievedinitanymore.

FINIS

NotesChapter1

1.‘Hybrida’meantaRomanofSpanishstock.

2.LuciliusasquotedinFragmentsofOldLatinLoebUniversityPress.5.14.

3.Plutarch,C.Gracch12.

Chapter2

1.Sallust,JugurthineWar35.

2.Sallust,JugurthineWar40.

3.ThisJuliawastheauntoftheJuliusCaesarfamousforlateroverthrowingtheRomanRepublic.

4.Plutarch,Marius7.

5.Ibid.8.

6.Plutarch,Sulla2.

7.Ibid.4.

Chapter3

1.CambridgeAncientHistoryIX.S.A.Cook,F.E.Adcock,M.P.Charleswortheds.

2.InDeofficiis3.47.

3.Appian,BC1.46.

4.Thiswasnottrueofsomeoftheearliestmaritimecolonies.Thesecoastalsettlementsweredesignedtodeterpiracyandtheinhabitantswereexpectedtoremaininsitu.

5.e.g.Varro,DeLinguaLatine5.143.

Chapter4

1.Asanaside,thisDrususwasprobablythegrandfatherofLivia,wifeofAugustus,justasRutiliusRufuswasJuliusCaesar’sgreat-uncle.TheRomansenatorialclasswereaveryclose-knitgroup.

2.InthewordsofVelleiusPaterculus,History2.13.

3.Devirisillustribus66.

4. Alternatively itmay have been theirRoman citizenship thatwould not stand scrutiny, as some frustratedItalianshadtakentounilaterallyawardingthemselvescitizenship,andtheRomanauthoritieswerecrackingdownonthis.

5.TheincidentisrelatedinDiodorusSiculus37.13.

6.Pliny,NaturalHistory33.3.46.The‘LiviusDrusus’PlinyreferstomayhavebeenthefatherofourDrusus,butthesonseemsmuchmorelikelyacandidate.

7.Devirisillustribus66.

8.Obsequens,Prodigies114.(54).

Chapter5

1. His immediate ancestors included Decius Magius, a highly pro-Roman citizen of Capua during theHannibalicWarwhosenamesakewasdeeplyinvolvedinthewarof90BC.

2.SmithsDictionaryofGreekandRomanBiographyp.3158.

3.Plutarch,LifeofSulla6.

4.Appian,BC1.38saysthatthisCaepiowastheformerconsulnowadministeringthearea,butthisseemstohavebeenAppianconfusingbothhisServiliiCaepionesandtheadministrativesystemin91BC.

5.Diod.37.13.

6.Exactlywhichtribesrebelledandwhenisamatterofcontinuingcontroversy.HereIpresentasynthesisof

modernresearchandaresolutionofconfusingandcontradictoryancientevidenceratherthanadefinitelist.

7.EpitomeofLivy72.

Chapter6

1.Appian,BC1.37.

2.Asconius74.

3.Aswiththetribesinrevolt,thequestionofwhichItaliangeneralswereincommandandwhenisunclearandcontroversial.

4.Cic.,ProFonteio43.

5.Dio29.98.

6.Cic.,Deleg.Agr.2.80.

7.FrontinusStratagems2.4.16.

8.Appian,BC1.42.

9.AtleastAppiansaysitwasSextus,buthemighthaveconfusedhisCaesarsforthecontextworksbetterifhemeanttheconsulLucius.

10.Appian,1.43.

11.Diofr98.3.

12.Orosius,ContraPag.5.18.

13.ThefeastdayoftheMagnaMatuawastheMateraliaof11JuneonwhichdaymarriedwomenofferedcakesbakedinclaypotstotheGoddess.

Chapter7

1.Periochae73.5.

2.Plutarch,LifeofMarius33.

3.Orosius5.18.

4.AppianinBC1.48alsomaintainsthatthisCaesardiedwhilebesiegingAsculum,whichisimprobable.

5.ThismanissometimescalledJudaciliusinothersources.

6.Appian,BC1.48.

7.Ibid.1.49.

8.Macrobius,Saturnalia1.11.24.

9.Plutarch,LifeofSulla6.

Chapter8

1.Plutarch,LifeofMarius31.

2.ValeriusMaximus11.4.2andPlutarch,LifeofSulla24.4.respectively.

3.Appian,Mithridatica23.

4.Diod.37.2.11.

5. Though not into the tribe Pollio, because for reasonswe need not go into here, this tribewas too largealready.

6.CfthemoredetailedargumentbySalmon1958.

7.Plutarch,LifeofMarius34.

8.Appian,BC1.57.

9.Appian,BC1.68.

10.Plutarch,LifeofMarius44.

11.Ibid.

Chapter9

1.Memnnonfr24JandPlutarch,LifeofSulla24.

2.LuculluswasalmostcertainlythatquaestorwhoremainedwithSullaonhismarchonRome,thoughdefiniteproofislacking.

3. Who thesemenare isuncertain.Metelluswas inAfrica,Crassuswas in Iberia,Pompey inPicenum,andLucullushadbeenwithSullathroughout.ThusnoneoftheleadersofthelaterSullanicouldhavebeenamongthosewhofledtoSullainGreece.

4.ValMax,Virill69.4.

5.Badian,‘WaitingforSulla’.

6.ObsequensProdigies57.

7.Appian,BC1.85.

8.Vell.Pat.2.15.

9. Wherehissubsequentcareer is recorded inSertoriusand thestruggle forSpain,Matyszak,Pen&Sword2013.

10.Plutarch,LifeofSulla25.

11.Ibid.28.

12.Appian1.87,Florus2.9.23.

13.Appian,BC1.87.

14.Ibid.1.89.

15.Ibid.1.89.

16.Plutarch,LifeofSulla29.

17.Appian,BC1.93.

18.VellPat2.27.

Chapter10

1.EvenonhisvisittoRomeearlierintheyear,weonlyhearofSullaattheCampusMartius,likewiseoutsidethecityboundary.

2.Contrapag.Orosius5.21.

3.Plutarch,LifeofSulla31.

4.VelPat2.28.

5.Sallusthist1.55.6M.

6.VellPat2.30.

7.cfColunga2011,JournalJurispudence.

8.Thereisnorecordforhimdoingthis,butthereweresixpraetorsbeforeSulla’stimeandeightareattestedthereafter,sothelogicalpresumptionisthatSullaisresponsibleforthechange.

9.Plut.Sull.36.