Troubled Waters:

Post 9/11 Challenges of Maritime Terrorism & Port

Security in New York City

Dawn O’Donnell, B.A. Criminal Justice, Graduate Student - Criminal JusticeApril 28, 2014

Agenda

Introduction – Purpose & Background Hypothesis/Methods Findings - Potential Targets, Modes of

Attack, Controversies - Interagency Challenges

Conclusion – Suggestions for Future Research, Lessons Learned & Research Limitations

Introduction

Maritime - Bordering or connected with the sea in relation to navigation, shipping, etc.

Introduction

PURPOSE - Why Study Port Security and the Maritime Terrorist Threat in NYC?

NYC - Prime Target (massive casualties, financial, basic infrastructure)

Population in NYC – 8.33 millionPort of NY & NJ - 1 of 3 centers for world economyNY NJ are Largest Ports on the East Coast

PURPOSE, cont..

60 known terrorist threats against the United States since 9/11 (NYC-16)

2003 - Brooklyn Bridge 2006 - Hudson River Tunnels – Bomb PATH train

2011 - USS Intrepid – Washington Heights “YouTube” Suspect 2013 - NYC & Atlantic City - Navy detonated a mine - 100 feet from the shoreline & 12 feet below

Introduction – PURPOSE OF STUDY

NYC CBRNE Budget– Kelly designated 1,000 “Anti-Terror Cops” with tanks, anti-aircraft capability (?)

Vessel - highly sensitive radiological detection equipment Bell 412 Chopper ($10 million, $4 million hi-tech equipment) detects radiation from altitude of 200 ft.

“Proactive Measures” since 9/112006 - Dubai Ports World proposal to control of 6 ports in the U.S. (including NY) - rejected2008 – Proposal to build a LNG Terminal in Long Island Sound - rejected

MARITIME FACTS/SCOPE

Background/Maritime FactsScope - includes Westchester County, Long Island2,073 “bridges” in New York City15M containers enter the U.S. each year2011 – CBP – Import/Export - $3.7 trillion

2002 Simulation - $58 Billion loss

MARITIME FACTS

Only 5% - 6% containers inspected – DHS & CBP

THINK INSIDE THE BOX – 40 ft.

“Targeting Strategy”- Intelligence/Risk Assessment

HISTORY OF MARITIME TERRORISM IN NY

WORLD WAR II ERA

Lucky Luciano – Alleged “deal” with OSS (Office of Strategic Services) German Saboteurs Invasion of U.S. - U-202 Submarine (50 miles off U.S. coastline) – used inflatable boats Planned Attacks - NY Central Rail Roads – Hell Gate Bridge, New York’s water supply

Hypothesis/Methods

Hypothesis – New York City is a prime target for maritime terrorism and inter-agency challenges complicate prevention and response

Methods – Qualitative study (content analysis) of public documents (peer reviewed journals, articles, books, speeches and interview transcripts) and videos

Results - Potential Maritime Targets in New York

Results/Findings

RisksNYC “Prime Location” – Devastating Consequences & Multitude of Potential Maritime TargetsCopycat syndrome – Oslo car bomb, Norway Youth Camp, “Mumbai-style” of attack (“wave of attacks”)

Results/Findings

Modes of Attack Attacking vessels, floating bombs, frogmen, transporting CBRNE’s, transporting saboteurs - “wave of attacks”

Results/Findings

Inter-Agency ChallengesNumber of agencies (Federal, state and local law enforcement, militia, etc.)Inter-agency rivalriesIntel Sharing - “Linkage Blindness”Jurisdiction - sharing credit and blame - Location of incident (Federal Property)

Federal Agencies

NIMS (National Incident Management System)&

NRF (National Response Framework)

NRF Provides

Structure & Mechanism

s for Incident

Management

NIMS National Approach to Incident Manageme

nt

NIMS – National Incident Management System

SYSTEMATIC & PROACTIVE APPROACH

GUIDE AGENCIES

AT ALL LEVELS OF

GOVERNMENT

NON-GOVERNME

NT

PRIVATE SECTOR

NRF – National Response Framework

PROVIDES STRUCTURE

& MECHANISM

S

• FOR NATIONAL LEVEL POLICY AND DIRECTION

INCIDENT MANAGEME

NT

• ENSURE TIMELY & EFFECTIVE

FEDERAL SUPPORT

• STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL RELATED ACTIVITIES

USED DURING INCIDENTS REQUIRING FEDERAL SUPPORT

Premise to provide the guidelines and procedures to integrate capabilities and resources into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for incident management

local jurisdictions retain command, control, and authority over response activities for their jurisdictional areas.

CIMS(Citywide Incident Management System)

Primary Agencies

Coordinating Agency

Supporting

Agencies

Primary AgenciesIncident Command Responsibilities

Incident Commander

Single Comma

nd Respons

e Multiple Incident Commanders

Single Incident Command PostMAY Designate Single Operations Section Chief

Unified Comma

nd Respons

e

Coordinating Agency: OEM

If Established

Unified Comman

d

Manages CIMS Protocol

Coordinate Resources

Relay messages to Mayor & Emergency Operations Center

Facilitate transition of command & RESULUTION OF INTERAGENCY DIFFERENCES

Multi-agency Incident

s

Supporting Agencies

Provides Personnel & Equipment

No loss of responsibility

for their resources or jurisdiction

May Join Unified Primary Agency

Depending upon

nature/location of incident

CIMS Matrix (Primary Agencies)Single Command

Boat in Distress – NYPD/FDNY*Explosive Device, Bomb Threat - NYPD

Fire - FDNY

Unified Command

CBRN/Haz-Mat Incident – NYPD/FDNYExplosion – FDNY/NYPD

Results/Limitations

New York City is an attractive target for maritime terrorism

Inter-agency challenges exist – Prevention & Response Over two dozen agencies can be on the water at

once Alleged inter-agency rivalries/jurisdiction

challenges Challenges with Intel sharing – nature of

intelligence Limitations of study

Public information

Conclusion

Introduction – Purpose & Background Hypothesis/Methods Results - Potential Targets, Modes of

Attack, Controversies - Interagency Challenges

Conclusion – Research Limitations

QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS?

Thank You!