Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H
TITLE : CENTRAL DIRECTION OF RESEARCH AN DDEVELOPMENT : USSR
AUTHOR : Vladimir KontorovichHaverford Colleg e
CONTRACTOR : Yale University
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Peter Hauslohner
COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 803-1 8
DATE : November 1990
The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b ythe National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Theanalysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o fthe author .
NOTE
This Report is one of a series of .papers prepared in an interdisciplinaryresearch project on the political economy of the USSR, presented at aworkshop in March 1989, and in most cases updated since then . Almost allof the papers will be published by Cambridge University Press in a volum eentitled "Political Control of the Soviet Economy", David R . Cameron andPeter Hauslohner Eds . forthcoming.
Table of Content s
1. Introduction .
2. Performance of the Soviet R&D sector : an overview .
3. Productivity lag in R&D and in other sectors .
4. Causes of low productivity in R&D 1 1
4 .1 Direction of basic R&D 1 34 .2 Direction of applied R&D 1 74 .3 Coordination within the R&D sector 2 94 .4 Individual incentives 3 4
5 . Why Soviet R&D lags behind the West more than othe rsectors : summary 3 8
6. Reform and the prospects for R&D productivity . .
4 1
1
2
5
BIBLIOGRAPHY 45
1 . Introduction .
The distinguishing characteristic of modern economic growth i s
its "extended application of science to problems of economic pro-
duction ."' Science is no less important for the modern military .
The governments of all developed countries recognize the role o f
science in this regard and attempt to promote its progress . There
has been an explosion in the amount of resources allocated to re -
search and development since World War II . The Soviet state ha s
long recognized the crucial importance of science, allocating a
large (by international standards) and an increasing share of nati -
onal income to, this sector . The efforts to harness the power o f
science to achieve the economic and military objectives of th e
Soviet state has been described as "combining the scientific-tech -
nological revolution with the advantages of socialism ." 2 Unti l
very recently, the central direction of the economy has been con-
sidered chief among those advantages . As in the rest of the econo -
my, the central direction of R&D is effected through a hierarchica l
organization .
This paper presents evidence on the comparative performance o f
R&D under central direction in the USSR, and under alternative re-
gimes in developed capitalist countries . Differences in perfor-
mance are then traced to particular differences in the organization
of the sector under socialism and capitalism . The paper conclude s
with a discussion of the prospects for reform of Soviet R&D .
1Kuznets , 1966, p. 9.
2 E . g ., Berri, 1973, p . 134 .
2 . Performance of the Soviet R&D sector : an overview .
The purpose of research and development is the production o f
new knowledge . The quantity of knowledge produced per unit o f
resources employed in R&D characterizes the productivity of thi s
sector . (The use of standard terminology of -production theor y
should not obscure the fact that the process of producing knowledg e
is different from producing goods and services . 3 Indeed, this i s
one of the main points of this paper .) Here we are attempting to
compare the productivity of centrally directed Soviet R&D with tha t
of decentralized research sectors of capitalist countries . Thi s
raises a number of conceptual and measurement difficulties .
The measurement of inputs into R&D is relatively less contro -
versial than the measurement of outputs, with expenditures on R& D
and/or the number of researchers being generally accepted proxie s
for input . The problems with input data are similar to those wit h
other types of aggregate economic data . For example, definitions
of statistical concepts vary across nations : e . g ., persons, count -
ed as researchers in one country, are not counted in another . Re-
sources that are employed in R&D outside of formal institutions ar e
not counted, as is the case with informal activities in nationa l
income and other types of statistics . Inputs are not adjusted for
quality, but this only means that variations in quality of resear -
chers and instruments are reflected in productivit y measures.4
'See Kontorovich, 1987, ch . 2
On the general problems of measurement of R&D input an doutput, see Falk, 1982, and Miller, 1982 .
The problems with measurement of the output of R&D are peculi -
ar to this sector . There is no measure of newly produced know -
ledge . Studies comparing output of R&D across nations resort t o
such quantitative characteristics of output as patent counts, num -
ber of innovations, and bibliometric data . 5 None of these series
measures advances in knowledge, but each one is related to a broa d
subset of such advances, and can serve as their indicators . An in-
dicator, such as a patent count, is a function of the true outpu t
measure and a random disturbance . In order to separate the chang e
in output from noise, several different indicators need to b e
used .6 Intuitively, one can see how the use of several indicator s
together remedies such common shortcomings as incomplete coverag e
of R&D activity and lack of recognition of the variable importanc e
of particular results . Patent data relate mostly to applied R&D ,
while bibliometric data cover pure science better than applied .7
Citation data provide a check on the quality of publications ; ex-
pert evaluations and savings from implementation (in the Sovie t
case) do the same for inventions data . 8
Just as in the case of R&D inputs, the exact meaning of outpu t
5E . g ., Brooks, 1986, pp . 139-145 ; OECD, 1988, p . 44 .
6On the methodology of using output indicators, see Pakes an dGriliches, 1984, pp . 55-61 . Also, Pavitt, 1982, p . 34 .
7We use the term "patent" here to denote Soviet domesti cinventor's certificates .
8 E . g ., Comanor and Scherer, 1969 ; Soete and Wyatt, 1982 ;Evenson, 1984, pp . 107-114, and other papers in Griliches, 1984 .
indicators varies across nations . However, it is not feasible t o
reestimate indicators of one country according to definitions o f
another . Rather, one should keep in mind the likely direction o f
bias engendered by different definitions . In our case, patent sta-
tistics biases comparisons in favor of the USSR . - Soviet firms have
a strong incentive to patent all their inventions (the number o f
patents is one of the plan targets), while capitalist firms ma y
have reasons to rely on secrecy instead of patent protection fo r
their R&D results . On the other hand, citation data are believe d
to be biased in favor of English-language publications, hence ,
against the USSR in comparisons with English-speaking countries .
With these qualifications in mind, we present a summary of evidenc e
on comparative productivity of Soviet R&D .
There is a general agreement among the experts that producti-
vity in the Soviet R&D is lower than in the developed capitalis t
countries . The Soviet Union spends as much as the United States o n
pure science, but it lags behind significantly in terms of achieve -
ment . 9 The R&D effort in the Soviet machine tools industry wa s
found to be proportionately much larger than that in the same sec -
tor in Britain, though the latter was more advanced . A study by
the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR foun d
the Soviet establishments of applied R&D to be overstaffed compare d
to similar institutions in the developed countries .10 The evidenc e
9 Gustafson, 1980, p . 3] .
10Berry, 1982, pp . 99-100 ; Berry and Cooper, 1977 ; Pokrovskii ,1983, p . 80 .
4
presented in the next section strengthens this conclusion .
In the last 25 years, R&D productivity has been falling, an d
possibly lagging farther behind the West . Many leading Sovie t
scientists argue that Soviet achievement in pure science in th e
last twenty years increasingly lags behind that of the West . 11 The
decline in productivity of applied R&D can be deduced from th e
Soviet data on patents and prototypes of new equipment and instru -
ments, and from other information on thi s sector.12
Productivity lags behind the West more as one moves from theo -
retical to empirical research, and from pure science to applie d
R&D.13 This view is supported by the variability of the reciproci -
ty ratios of citations across different fields, and by the relativ e
number of periodicals in science and technology in the US and th e
USSR, presented below .
3 . Productivity lag in R&D and in other sectors .
Since the Soviet economy as a whole lags in productivity be -
hind the developed capitalist economies, it is not very surprisin g
that the productivity of R&D also lags . This may reflect just th e
general condition of the economy, and have nothing to do with spe -
cifics of production of new knowledge and the organization of thi s
activity in the USSR .
11Frank-Kamenetskii, 1988, p . 634 ; Sagdeev, 1988 ; Gol'danski iand Osip'ian, 1989 ; Marchuk, 1989 .
-See Kontorovich, 1987, and 1989 .
13Gustafson, 1980, p . 32 .
5
The extent of the lag varies across sectors, with industr y
lagging relatively less, and agriculture relatively more, than th e
whole economy (see Table 1) . Soviet railroads may even have a
higher level of productivity than in th e US.14
Table 1 . Soviet productivity level as a percentage of the US .---------------------------------------------------------------- -
Material
Non-farm
Industry Agricul -production
sector
tur e---------------------------------------------------------------- -Output per worker :1960, 1 44 2 01960, 2 26-41 33-58 6 11987, 1 55 2 5
Factor productivity :37-52 44-68 6 81960, 2
1970s, 3 50----------------------------------------------------------------- -1 : Soviet official estimates, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1987 q . ,p . 623 . 2 : Bergson, 1978, pp . 88, 111 . 3 : Johnson and McConnell ,1983, pp . 144-149, relative to comparable regions of the US an dCanada .
The main cause of the variations in productivity lag acros s
the sectors is the variable success of applying central directio n
to different production technologies.15 If Soviet R&D lags behind
the West less than does the economy as a whole, this would sugges t
that central direction is relatively more appropriate for this sec -
tor .
We will infer the productivity differential in R&D by compar -
ing ratios of inputs (Soviet/Western) to ratios of output indica -
14According to the official Soviet data, labor productivity i nthe railroads is almost as high as in the US, and traffic per mil eof track (a major element of capital stock) is much higher .
15See Kontorovich, 1988, p. 882-3.
6
tors . There are two alternative estimates of the number of scient -
ists and engineers in Soviet R&D according to the US definition .
They show that the USSR overtook the US in this respect in th e
early or late 1960s, and by the late 1970s had 60-100% of the US
number . 16 Soviet R&D expenditures exceeded those in the US in the
mid-1960s, and were about 50% higher in the late 1970s . 1 7
If inputs in Soviet R&D are larger than in the US, outputs are
smaller . In 1961, according to a world census of serials, the USS R
had slightly more than one-third as many scientific and technica l
serials as did the US (while the USSR had more science periodical s
than the US, it had far fewer technical periodicals) . The number
of Soviet periodicals was even lower than the totals for most deve -
loped countries with much smaller R&D establishments.18 The mos t
comprehensive collection of active scientific and technologica l
serials in the world, the British Library Lending Division, con-
tained 2 .5 times more American journals than Soviet ones i n 1973.19
These data imply roughly 2 .5-3 times lower productivity in Sovie t
R&D .
The number of serials is restricted by administrative deci-
sions taken outside of the R&D sector . Many research results may ,
16Low estimate - Nolting and Feschbach, 1981, p . 44 ; highestimate - Campbell, 1978, p . 38 .
"Campbell, 1978, p . 24 ; 1980, p . 28 . Soviet expenditures ar eadjusted to conform to the US definition, but the comparison i sstill very tenuous, as explained in the source cited .
Parrott, 1981, p . 19 . The USSR had more scientific serial sthan the US, but far fewer technical serials .
19 Frame and Prokrym, 1981, p . 159 .
7
therefore, remain unpublished . Let us assume that the actua l
Soviet R&D output is larger relative to that of the US than indi-
cated by the publications . Some of the results that would hav e
been published in the US are not published in the Soviet Union fo r
lack of space . It is reasonable to assume that the results that d o
get published are relatively more significant . Then Soviet pub-
lications should be more frequently quoted (assuming similar dis-
tribution of the quality of scientific results in the two count -
ries) .
Citations data, presented below, do not bear out thi s
conjecture .
A Soviet study of citations-for the mid-1960s found that th e
USSR, while producing 20% of journal articles, was receiving onl y
3-4%, and never more than 5 .5%, of world citations.20 By contrast ,
the shares of English- and German-language citations is close to
the shares of their respective publications . A very low number of
citations of Soviet papers was also found by a study of th e
world's most highly cited papers .21 This holds true for al l
fields, and was confirmed by a number of other studies . 2 2
A study of scientific citations across the nations found tha t
the Soviet works were the least frequently cited, and depended re -
latively more on foreign-generated knowledge, than those of the US ,
UK, FRG, France, Japan, Canada, and the group of all othe r
20Nalimov and Mul'chenko, 1969, pp . 139-48 .
21Narin et al., 1983, p. 309 .
22Reviewed in Narin et al ., 1983, p . 310 .
8
countries in 1973-74 . 23 In 1976, the ratio of USSR citations o f
US publications to US citations of USSR publications (the reciproc -
ity ratio) was close to 1 in mathematics . The two countries ex -
changed equivalent amounts of knowledge in this field . The rati o
was 1 .7-1 .8 for physics and earth and space sciences, 2 .5 fo r
chemistry, 2 .9 for biology, and 3 for engineering and technology ,
indicating different lags of the respective Soviet fields behin d
the American ones . The overall US/USSR reciprocity ratio (2 .37) i s
significantly larger than corresponding ratios for the US and U K
(1 .14), West Germany (1 .7), France (1 .8), Japan (1 .64), and Canada
(1 .19), indicating indirectly the Soviet lag behind these count-
ries . The number of scientists per one publication cited in the U S
is below 1 in English-speaking countries, below 2 in Germany an d
France, 4 .76 in Japan, and 53 (!) in the Soviet Union . 24 The pro-
ductivity differential between the USSR and the West in terms o f
citations is larger by an order of magnitude than the differentia l
in terms of publications .
The last indicator of output at our disposal is the number o f
patents granted . In the USSR in 1980, this indicator per scienc e
worker was significantly lower than in France and Japan, somewhat
lower than in Germany, and commensurate with that in the US and
UK . 25 Yet the novelty or importance of a Soviet patent is signifi -
23Burke and Price, 1981, p . 371 .
24 Kruse-Vaucienne and Logsdon, 1979, pp . 4-6 .
25 Kontorovich, 1987, p . 8, and Evenson, 1984, p . 113 . ForWestern countries, input measure used is the number of scientist sand engineers . It is broader than the Soviet measure of science (cont. p.10 )
. 9
cantly lower than that of the Western patent . This is recognized
by both Soviet and Western experts, and is reflected in the ga p
between the ratio of patents obtained by Soviet nationals abroad t o
domestic patents, and similar ratios for developed countries . 2 6
In 1980, this ratio was O .028 in the USSR, 1 .46 in the US, 2 .16 in
UK, 0 .54 in Japan, 1 .48 in France, and 3 .43 in Germany . 27 If thes e
ratios are used for adjusting the number of patents for quality ,
the productivity of Soviet R&D in terms of patents would be smalle r
by two orders of magnitude than in the US .
There is a great deal of uncertainty involved in comparin g
Soviet and US productivity levels in industry and agriculture .
There is also a great deal of uncertainty in the estimates of com-
parative productivity in Soviet and US R&D . Comparing productivity
lags in R&D and other sectors compounds the uncertainty even fur-
ther . It would make no sense to try to compare the productivit y
lag in R&D with that in industry . For our purposes, it is enoug h
to know whether R&D productivity is larger or smaller than the ave -
rage for the economy . Productivity in the Soviet "material pro-
duction " sectors is 2-4 times lower than in the US, according t o
the estimates in Table 1 . Productivity in Soviet R&D is lower b y
an order of magnitude or two than in the US, according to the cita -
tions and quality-adjusted patent data presented above . Producti -
1 0
workers, so that Soviet productivity is upwardly biased in thi scomparison .
26Minin, 1980, p . 82 ; Evenson, 1984, p . 96 .
Evenson, 1984, pp . 93-5 .
vity estimates for Soviet material production and its sectors ar e
too high, because the relative size of the Soviet GNP is exaggerat -
ed . 28 But the likely magnitude of the correction for this bia s
does not even begin to close the gap between the productivity lags
in R&D and elsewhere . Productivity lag in R&D appears to be muc h
larger than in the other sectors . 29 In the remainder of thi s
paper, we will be trying to explain why this is so .
In fact, the crude measurement exercise that we have just car -
ried out suggests one explanation for the comparatively larger lag
in the productivity of Soviet R&D . Foreign citations and patenting
represent direct valuation of Soviet R&D output in the internation -
al "market" for knowledge . In this market, only the best products ,
i . e ., the latest, the most original results, have any value a t
all ; there is no demand for slightly substandard products . This i s
different from the international market for goods, where lowe r
quality goods can still find their buyers, if at reduced prices .
All sectors of the Soviet economy have difficulty in producing out -
put to international standards . But for R&D, being slightly behin d
matters more than for shoe manufacturing or the tractor industry .
This difference in valuation is quite appropriate for the nature o f
outputs being valued .
4 . Causes of low productivity in R&D .
In a pioneering study, Thane Gustafson sought the causes o f
28 See, e . g ., Ericson, 1989 .
29The same conclusion has been reached by Khanin (1989) .
11
low productivity of Soviet science in the organization of this sec -
tor and of the economy of which it is a part . He found the mai n
unit of research, the institute, to possess a host of productivity -
retarding characteristics : block funding ; narrow specialization
that concentrates much of the national effort in a certain field i n
one institute ; hierarchical structure within the institute, wher e
access to resources and freedom to choose research topics are re -
served for those occupying higher ranks ; low turnover of institute
heads ; their limited power to fire and hire ; and slow promotion .
The results are attenuation of competition, log-rolling, persis-
tence of barren and exhausted research directions, and underuti-
lization of the talents of youn g scientists.30
This paper also seeks the causes of low productivity of R&D i n
the organization of this sector . The organization of R&D has to
perform three functions : direct R&D efforts towards the socially
desirable objectives ; establish a division of labor within the R& D
sector ; and create incentives for individuals to realize their abi -
lities . 31 We briefly describe how each of these functions is orga -
nized in the West, and why it is so organized . In most cases, in-
stitutions described are those of the US . (American R&D, the mos t
productive in the West, is also organized somewhat differently tha n
in most other Western countries . 32 ) We then describe the Sovie t
30Gustafson, 1980 .
''31The fourth function, providing the R&D sector with necessaryinputs from the rest of the economy (educated manpower, materials ,instruments, etc .) is not considered here . See Gustafson, 1980 .
'32Brooks, 1986, pp . 140-1 ; OECD, 1988, p . 44 .
1 2
organization and analyze its impact on productivity .
4 .1 Direction of basic R&D .
The resource allocation mechanism in pure science does not fi t
the dichotomy of markets and hierarchies . Results of pure science
are a public good, and the market mechanism can be expected to al -
locate less than an optimal amount of resources to this area . 3 3
There is widespread agreement in the West that basic researc h
should be financed out of the government budget . Yet hierarchies ,
so common in administering the production of other public goods ,
are much less prominent in pure science . 3 4
Hierarchical organization performs well when both the objec-
tive and the means of reaching it are known to a single authority .
Yet there is an extreme degree of uncertainty in pure science abou t
the final result and the ways of achieving it . 35 Information abou t
the promising directions of research is dispersed among the scien -
tists themselves . An efficient allocation mechanism would there -
fore give scientists a large role in the process . This is accomp-
lished through various forms of peer review . 35 Participants i n
peer review are free both from the discipline of market competition
and from hierarchical supervision . What keeps their self-seeking
behavior in check and makes their collective opinion a reliabl e
33Brooks, 1986, p . 148 ; Nelson, 1978, p . 65 .
34Arrow, 1974, p . 64 .
35 See, e . g ., Nelson, 1984, pp . 7-8 .
36Nelson, 1978, p. 65; OECD, 1987, p. 10 .
13
guide for resource allocation? As in the other situations whe n
organizational controls over an activity fail, social norms, and i n
particular, professional ethics, fill the void . 37 Ethics is the
crucial element that makes peer revie w work.38
The direction of pure science in the USSR is similar to tha t
in the West in recognizing the large role of scientists in direct -
ing science . It is radically different in that this "self-govern-
ment" is conducted within a mammoth centralized hierarchy subjec t
to the close supervision of the party . To the degree that the par -
ty allows scientists to govern science, they do it as bosses ,
rather than a s peers.39
The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, charged with conducting
basic research, is subordinated directly to the Council of Minist -
ers . It is a "ministry of science", alongside ministries of coal ,
automobiles, etc . Academies of Sciences of the other fourteen
Union republics play analogous roles on the local level .40 The
Academy is ruled by the Presidium, which has four sections, over -
seeing 16 divisions along the lines of scientific disciplines, plu s
multidisciplinary Siberian and Urals divisions . Sections were
created in the late 1960s to cope with the growing number of divi -
sions, reflecting the increased specialization of research . R&D
1 4
37Arrow, 1969, p . 62, and 1974, p . 64 .
38OECD, 1987, p. 11 .
-The important issue of party control over science is no tanalyzed here .
40 Beliaev and Pyshkova, 1979 .
establishments (institutes) are subordinated either to their par-
ticular divisions, or directly to the Presidium, or to regiona l
centers and branches, or disciplinary centers, most of which wer e
developed over the 1960s and 1970s . Centers are subordinated
directly to the Presidium, while scientific guidance is conducte d
by the divisions responsible for a particular discipline .
Management is very centralized, with the president, vice pre -
sidents, and the chief scientific secretary (all prominent scient -
ists) holding an inordinate amount of power . For example, academ y
members are given foreign currency allotments for subscription t o
foreign scientific literature . When price increases abroad forc e
an increase in the individual allotment, this has to be approved b y
the president himself.41 The director of an institute canno t
change its internal organization without the approval of the cor-
responding division of the Academy and its Presidium . 42 The insti-
tute itself is also very centralized . Purchasing instruments an d
materials, hiring and firing, business trips, and other managemen t
matters of all departments, laboratories, and sectors are decide d
by the institute administration . 4 3
Yet this seemingly tight centralized direction of pure scienc e
in fact turns into a lack of direction for a wide array of pro-
jects . Because of the degree of uncertainty in pure science, men -
41 Ginzburg, 1986, p . 43 . See Ginzburg, 1988, for other ex-amples .
42 Tursunov, 1986 .
43 Leiashvili, 1989, pp . 104-5 .
15
tioned earlier, those who are supposed to direct do not know wher e
to direct, and end up rubber-stamping suggestions of the directed .
This leads to several counterproductive outcomes . As noted by
Gustafson, many barren or exhausted projects are being continue d
because this suits scientists' interests . 44 The habit of continu-
ing one's own topic, disregarding its status in the field (prema-
ture, or obsolete and exhausted), is so ingrained in Sovie t
scientists that it hampers the adaptation of emigre scientists i n
the West, where mobility among topics is much greater . 45 There i s
also a great deal of spinning the wheels and some outright fraud . 4 6
These consequences of hierarchical failure in R&D will be discusse d
in greater detail for applied research, where they are mor e
dramatic . With all its failings, pure science remains the mos t
productive segment of Soviet R&D . It is the Academy, and not the
applied institutions in the corresponding fields, that is charge d
with solving the most important applied problems . 47 In some
fields, Soviet science is at the forefront of world science . Th e
failure of central direction of science is compensated by stron g
professional ethics .
Institutes of the Academy were usually organized at the outse t
44This is one of the several cases in which our analysi soverlaps with that of Gustafson .
45 See Azbel', 1984 .
46See Ushanov, 1986, for a report of the Academy of Scienc ephysics institute in Moscow that engaged in a fraudulent topic fo ra decade .
47 E . g ., "Rech' tovarishcha Usmanova", 1986 ; "Rech' tovarishchaKonareva " , 1986 ; Bliokov, 1984 .
1 6
around outstanding scientists, who combined creativity with organi -
zational abilities . The founders selected and promoted their fol-
lowers . The personality of a great scholar would leave an imprint
on the institution . 48 High professional standards are transmitte d
through tradition and maintained by selectivity in recruiting an d
elitism . But the hierarchical structure of the Academy may be de-
stroying the professional standards necessary for carrying ou t
first rate research ." It is argued that people who succeed th e
founders of the institutes are likely to represent a different se t
of values, detrimental to the ideals of science . 50 When this hap-
pens, the last redoubt of serious science is the personal ethic s -o f
the scientist . "Choice of direction and method of research, depth
and quality with which it is performed . . . for the most part depend
solely on the personal honesty and decency of the researcher . . .51
(I-n general, the economic importance of personal ethics in a
command economy is greater than in a market one . )
4 .2 Direction of applied R&D .
In capitalist economies, applied R&D is carried out largely i n
the laboratories of industrial firms . 52 Soviet applied R&D is als o
48Frank-Kamenetskii, 1988 .
49 Interaction between institutions and professional ethics i san important, but largely unexplored issue .
50 ibid .
51Leiashvili, 1989, pp. 103-4 .
52 Nelson, 1978, p . 67 .
1 7
subordinated to the producers, either ministries or enterprises .
Organizational proximity to production makes R&D more responsive t o
the needs of the users, and facilitates transfer of R&D result s
to the plants .
The main difference between the two systems in the organiza-
tion of applied science is the motivation of the users of its re-
sults . Capitalist firms undertaking R&D are driven by market com-
petition . In a command economy, there is no particular pressure o n
producers to innovate in order to cut costs or provide new product s
for customers . Production enterprises are interested in innovati-
ons that make their work easier, e . g ., ones that free them from
reliance on hard-to-get inputs, or make the production process mor e
reliable and predictable . They would accept innovations that sav e
current costs without a major overhaul of the existin g structure.53
Lack of interest in technological progress means lack of interes t
on the part of industry in the quality of output produced by the
R&D sector . {This, again, should be qualified ; no one wants t o
work with faulty, unintelligible designs . )
The ministries are charged with long-term technological polic y
in their sectors, and R&D institutions are supposed to help develo p
and realize such a policy . Yet ministries have the incentives tha t
are very similar to those of the production enterprises . They are
responsible to the superior administrative bodies (Council of Mi -
nisters, Central Committee) for meeting short-run production tar -
gets of their sectors and therefore, largely independent of thei r
1 8
53 "Tekhnologicheskii . . .", 1986, p . 49 .
customers . The ministries tend to neglect any concerns above an d
beyond their narrowly defined responsibilities, to the detriment o f
national goals and overall efficiency (so called "departmental -
ism") . Ministries obtain their resources for free, and therefor e
are always interested in getting more, but they are not necessaril y
interested in better utilizing what they have . 5 4
These incentives determine the producers' behavior with res-
pect to R&D . Since current production is more important than in-
novation, resources earmarked for R&D are diverted to numb er o f
non-R&D uses . (According to a Gosplan document, ministries are e -
located R&D funds before they compile the list of projects to be
performed . 55 ) To the degree that producers are interested in R&D ,
they direct it towards small, incremental, or even trivial pro-
jects .
Thus, ministries shift part of their administrative work t o
R&D organizations . The latter are charged with preparing drafts o f
reports for superiors, procuring supplies, organizing repair o f
factory equipment ; developing plans and programs ; developing and
implementing sectoral norms and standards, developing draft stat e
standards ; and a large number of other non-R&D functions . 56 Re -search institutes review and approve technological documentatio n
54 On ministries, their incentives, and i nnovation, see Ras -sokhin, 1985, pp . 31-47, and chapter 2 . Scathing criticism of th eministries can be found in the speeches at the 27th party congress ,Pravda, February 26 - March 8, 1986 .
55Vashchenko, 1986 .
56Bekleshov, et al ., 1986, pp . 39, 45, 71 ; Sominskii, 1986 ,p .15 ; Rassokhin, 1980, p . 55 .
1 9
(designs, etc .) for their subsector . For example, a plant that i s
going to produce consumer goods as a side line must have all de -
signs approved at the institute of the corresponding consumer-good s
sector . 57 The use of parts, materials, and devices in newl y
designed products must be approved by the sector producing thes e
items ; the functions of approval are frequently carried out b y
sectoral institutes . 58 Non-R&D tasks comprise 20-30% of the tota l
volume of work of research institutes in industry . 59 A survey o f
about 150 institutes in construction found that they devote an
insignificant portion of their time to their direct duties, bein g
burdened with producing standard designs, and other inappropriat e
tasks . 6 0
The ministries regularly divert resources from testing and
pilot production facilities to regular production . These faciliti -
es have low priority in the allocation of investment funds, receiv -
ing less, than 1% of the total investment in industry . In 4 1
ministries, this figure is 0 .3% of total investment, a proportio n
considered to be far too low for modern industry . 61 Investmen t
57Motorin, 1979 .
58Obtaining approval for the use of a standard bearing in apiece of newly designed equipment requires presenting six document sto the All-Union research institute of bearings for approval . Us eof mixers has to be approved by the research institute for chemica lmachinery . Bykov, 1981, p . 68 .
59 Sominskii, 1986, p . 15 ; Berliner, 1982, pp . 95, 98 ; see als oCherniak, 1985, p . 2 .
60Rassokhin, 1980, p . 55 .
61Anchishkin, 1986, p . 12 ; also, Rassokhin, 1985, p . 93 ;Glagoleva, 1983 .
2 0
funds that are allocated to testing and pilot production project s
do not command real investment resources to the same degree a s
funds allocated for the creation of production capacities . Con-
struction plans for experimental facilities are regularly under -
fulfilled by more than average margins . 62 Almost every year ,
machinebuilding ministries fail to use all the investment funds al -
located for this purpose.63 The existing experimental and testin g
plants are used mostly for boosting series production, despite ex -
plicit prohibition from doing so . In machinebuilding in the 1970s ,
small series production constituted 30-40% of the output of experi -
mental plants . In the chemical industry, the share of small serie s
production increased by 7% per annum in 1968-1978, while the shar e
of experimental work was declining by 4% a year . In the instru-
ments and computer industry, experimental units of R&D organiza-
tions had 40% of their capacity burdened by extraneous work i n
1975, and this share increased at the rate of 1-2 .5% a year ." The
result has been a large number of applied R&D institutions produc -
ing designs of machines and processes that have never been tested .
Only about half of R&D organizations, and a similar proportion o f
machinebuilding plants, have their experimental production facilit -
ies . Only 30% of design bureaus that were not part of an indust -
62 Ibid .
63Lyskov, 1982, p. 141.
64Rassokhin, 1985, p . 56, 97 ; Bliakhman and Mintairov, 1981 ,p . 92 ; Tverdokhleb and Bialik, 1984, p . 53, quoting M . L . Bashin ,Novaia tekhnika i opytnye predpriiatiia . Moscow : Mashinostroenie ,1979 . Not all of this is the ministrues' fault .
2 1
rial enterprise had their experimental plants, and these were burd -
ened by routine production . According to some estimates, 20% of
R&D results are not used because of lack of experimenta l plants.65
Local party committees give all organizations tasks unrelate d
to their direct responsibilities . Ministries and enterprises have
their own urgent needs, for which there are no hands available .
R&D organizations and departments of enterprises receive a dispro -
portionate share of such assignments . Designers are used to swee p
the streets and work in construction and agriculture, take turn s
working as blue collar workers, and scrub pots at the plant cafete -
ria, spending 10-15% of their working time thi s way.66
Ministries are not interested in radical innovations, becaus e
they disrupt the flow of current production . Instead, they are in -
terested in minor improvements in existing technologies . There -
fore, ministries orient R&D toward increasingly more applied re -
search, away from research to development, and to increasingly les s
important projects . Preference for smaller innovations with a
shorter payoff period leads to an increase in the number of pro -
jects, which become shorter and more routine.67' Large established
firms in capitalist economies also direct research towards incre -
mental improvement more than toward radical breakthroughs . How-
65Kushlin, 1976, p . 82, 83, 87 ; Glagoleva, 1983 .
66"Tema . . . , 1985, p . 129 ; Kostin, 1983, pp . 26-7 ; Pushkarev ,1986, p . 114 .
67Gatovskii, 1971, p . 130 ; "Politicheskii . . .", 1986 ;Leont'eva,1986;Zavlin and Iudelevich,1985, p. 93,quotingPravda,Jun e23, 1983 ; Kozhanov, 1986 .
2 2
ever, there appears to be a difference in the degree of improvemen t
sought by the producers in the two systems .
The diversion of R&D resources and trivialization of researc h
are not the only outcomes of direction by a production hierarchy .
Ineffective, purely ritualistic direction gives wide discretion t o
the scientists themselves, a situation that we have already note d
in pure science . A massive planning apparatus tries to ascertai n
that the research and development needs of the government and it s
branches are satisfied by the institutes . The Council of Minis-
ters, State Planning Committee, State Committee for New Technology ,
and the Academy of Sciences are at the top of the planning pyramid .
Ministries oversee the research establishments and direct them to -
ward both the national objectives and specific objectives of thei r
sector . 55 Ministerial supervision over the size and interna l
structure of the institutes, and their finances, is quite tight .
An order (zaiavka) of glavk or ministry is necessary for a project
to be funded and included in the plan of a n institute.69
Yet it turns out that these elaborate planning procedures are
mostly a ritual . The projects originate with the research estab-
lishments, and the planning hierarchy simply rubber-stamps them .
The "Management of sectoral science by ministries and main admini -
strations increasingly degenerates into a mere registration of th e
accomplished facts . The supervising organizations lack expertis e
2 3
68See Nolting, 1978 and 1979 ; Gvishiani, 1973 ; Rassokhin, 1985 ;Bekleshov, et al ., 1986, pp . 92-97 .
69Semykin and Bocharov, 1986.
to do anything else . Instead, they issue rules and regulation s
prescribing in detail how R&D should be planned and financed, an d
guidelines for reporting, incentives, and controls ." 70
In the beginning of the planning process, R&D organization s
receive only general instructions as to the direction of work an d
problems to be solved . The exact topics are determined by the or-
ganization itself . There is practically no explicit publi c
selection of research topics ; research establishments never propos e
alternative choices . As some science policy analysts in the Wes t
argue, applied R&D should be directed by researchers themselves in -
stead of by the market guidance.72 To a large degree, this is wha t
happens in the USSR by default, because of the failure of the hier -
archical structure to discharge its responsibility .
How do researchers use this discretion? They suggest researc h
topics which best suit the specialization of existing personnel an d
the existing administrative structure of institutions (departments ,
sectors, laboratories) . Whether a particular direction of research
should be pursued at all is very seldom considered . 73 In mos t
cases, this means the continuation of a topic or direction of re -
search . Almost no changes in personnel deployment occur with eac h
70Lebedev, 1986, p . 89 . See also "Ob osnovnykh . . .", 1986 .
71Bekleshov, et at ., 1986, p . 108 ; Shchelishch, 1981, p . 132 ;Vashchenko, 1986 ; Leontieva, 1986 .
72Nelson, 1977, pp . 66-71 .
73Struminskii,1985.
2 4
new plan . 74 New directions of research are, as a result, slighte d
in favor of existing ones . 75 For example, in one of the leading
institutes of the Ministry of Fisheries, there is a departmen t
developing efficient methods of hunting sea animals . The animal s
themselves have been almost wiped out, and are now protected, no t
hunted . Yet the department continues its topic . 7 6
This is also true for contracts, since many research institu-
tes have stable relations with the same customers over long period s
of time . "Researchers find contracts with the enterprises that ar e
the best for them . The most important project for the sector wil l
be rejected on the grounds that the department [cf the research in-
stitute - V . K .] has already accumulated the required total sum o f
contracts ."77 Enterprises and ministries have funds in thei r
budget allocated for R&D, and must spend these funds in a given pe -
riod if they are to receive a new allotment . Therefore they go
along with the projects proposed by R&D establishments .
Besides inflexible and aging research portfolios, the failur e
of hierarchical direction gives rise to whole institutions spinning
wheels or engaging in fraud, faking research . Here are but a few
examples . The institute for biological testing of chemical sub -
74 The most complete account of project selection in branchministry institutes, based on a survey, can be found in Lakhtin ,1983, pp . 51-58 . Gustafson (1980) paints a similar picture fo racademy institutes .
75 Viunitskii, 1985 .
76 Rassokhin, 1985, p . 259 .
77 Leontieva, 1986 .
2 5
stances of the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological industries ,
with a staff of over 2000, spent more than 50 million rubles in the
last 12 years, without producing any results . . The All-Union insti -
tute for drilling technology of the Ministry of the Petroleum in-
dustry has for 30 years failed to develop improved drilling bit s
urgently needed by the industry.78 The head experimental-design
institute for straw and grass processing equipment of the Ministr y
of Machinebuilding for livestock farming performed 4 million rubles
worth of work (a two-year budget) without any practical result ,
while the equipment currently produced is obsolete and has not bee n
renewed for 20 years .79 Stories about R&D organizations that d o
not produce anything regularly appear in the press.80 There ar e
also establishments which engage in fraud, distort their reporting ,
or report the same project twice or an unfinished project a s
completed . 81
Direction by the researchers themselves is much less success -
ful in applied than in pure science . Pure science concerns th e
discovery of new phenomena, and scientists are best qualified t o
judge novelty . Applied science is about inventing useful things ,
but only the users can be judges of the usefulness of a product o r
a process . Also, professional ethics, which makes "self-govern -
78 Solomentsev, M . S ., Pravda, March 1, 1986, p . 3 .
79Grishkiavichus, P . P ., Pravda, March 1, 1986, p . 3 .
"See, e . g ., Prokhorov, 1985 ; Varavka, 1986 ; Ryzhkov, 1986 ,pp . 8-9 .
81Shalgunov, 1986 .
2 6
ment" work in the Academy is much weaker, and often non-existent ,
in applied R&D organizations .
Production enterprises and ministries are not interested i n
technological innovation and therefore mismanage R&D . But the po-
litical leadership is strongly interested in technological change ,
for the reasons outlined in the beginning of this paper . Soviet
applied R&D is strongest in the areas where the political leader -
ship plays the role of the customer : space, military, and othe r
high priority projects . If the Soviet leadership is so intereste d
in technological advances, why can't they be the customers of al l
applied R&D? In order to give effective guidance to a project, a
customer must be well informed both of his own needs and of th e
project's status . Hence the number of projects that can be effec-
tively directed by an interested customer is limited . The politi-
cal leadership can direct only a small share of the total R&D ef-
fort . The rest is guided through intermediaries (the ministries) ,
who, with the exception of the military, lack interest in the re-
sults of R&D .
Success in high-priority R&D does not necessarily mean hig h
productivity . In a centralized system, high priority means no t
only more attentive direction, but also more and better inputs . An
abundance of resources may easily give rise to their wasteful use .
Lower factor productivity in high priority sectors was formall y
deduced from models of command economy .
Emerging empirica l
evidence shows that factor productivity in defense industry sector s
2 7
is lower than in civilian sectors . 82 The laboratory concerned wit h
preserving Lenin's corpse from decaying in the open air can serv e
as an illustration of the case of high-priority R&D . It achieved
the unique advance demanded directly by the Soviet leadership, but
at a very hig h cost.83
Direct sponsorship by the top leadership might in theory be a
remedy for the failure of the central direction of applied R&D, bu t
it only has limited availability . The imitation of Western R&D is
a much more widely applicable remedy . Western R&D is guided by the
demands of users whose very survival is at stake in the competitiv e
market . By imitating the West, Soviet scientists and engineers in -
directly subject themselves to the same guidance . Soviet applied
R&D is strongly oriented towards copying foreign technological ad-
vances . 84 As a high Soviet official put it, "'Lazy brains', lac k
of initiative, and minimal demands on enterprises for original pro -
ducts, have frequently resulted in a proclivity to copy foreig n
technology . One may even encounter the following opinion concern-
ing novel projects : since there is nothing like this abroad, it ca n
hardly be of any use, it cannot work out . Some research insti-
tutes, instead of conducting advanced fundamental and applied re -
81Ericson,1988;Isaev,1989,p.25 .
83Shestakovskii, 1989 .
84For Western statements, see Sutton, 1968-73, Siemaszko, 1982 ,pp . 249-50 . Soviet references after 1985 are very numerous ; see ,e . g ., Silaev, 1986 ; Kovalenko, 1986 ; Rudoi, 1986 ; Sakharov, 1988 ,p . 52 .
2 8
search, just copy ." 8 5
Imitation provides only a very imperfect substitute for th e
direction of R&D by domestic industry . It makes one a perennia l
follower . Also, the needs of Soviet users may be quite different
from those in the West . Imitation of Western advances sometime s
leads to adoption of innovations that are not suitable in th e
Soviet conditions, as in the case with industrial robots . 8 6
4 .3 Coordination within the R&D sector .
Within the broad sector of R&D, researchers and institution s
specialize in particular narrow activities : pure or applied re -
search ; design ; testing . The successful performance of the secto r
requires "exchange", or transfer of results of one activity t o
another . In particular, ideas of independent inventors and pur e
scientists have be adopted by industrial laboratories for develop-
ment of usable innovations . Researchers in several fields have t o
coordinate their efforts when the project is interdisciplinary .
Independent inventors are responsible for the disproportionat e
share of major inventions in the West . 87 There are several reason s
85V . Trapeznikov, Pravda, March 20, 1980, quoted in : Rassokhin ,1985, p . 222 .
88 E . g ., Koshkin, 1988 ; Volchkevich, 1988 .
87 lndependent inventors include "full-time free lancers, peopl eon university staffs working on other contract or grant-finance dresearch programs, government personnel, and non-R&D business emp-loyees . . . Some of the work of many small-scale industrial opera-tions should also be included because of the similarity of th ekinds of work and factors that motivate it ." Nelson, et al ., 1967 ,pp . 56-58 .
2 9
for that . Large firms direct their researchers to less risky pro-
jects with shorter expected payoff periods . The bureaucratic rigi -
dity of large research laboratories repels creative individuals .
The potential rewards from a radical invention are much larger fo r
an independent inventor than for a corporate scientist . The multi -
tude of independent inventors makes it possible for a wide variet y
of approaches to be explored under conditions in which the potenti -
al promise of each approach is not known ." On the other hand, in-
dependent inventors usually lack resources and expertise necessar y
for developing their ideas into marketable products . For thi s
reason, the successful developments of independent inventors ar e
often acquired, through licencing or merger, by larger firms, whic h
carry out the final stages of development ." It has been claimed
that independents produce the most radical inventions in the USSR ,
though the basis for this claim is not known . 90 Yet research
establishments in industry are not receptive to the ideas of `
independen t inventors.91
Independent inventors, by definition, are outside of the cent -
ral direction, and this may account for some of the difficultie s
concerning the transfer of their results . Academies, however, are
3 0
88 Hamberg, 1966, Chapter 5 ; Williamson, 1975, pp . 199-203 ;Nelson, 1981, pp . 105-108 .
89See Williamson,1975,Chapter 10 .
90Dudkin and Shimanovich, 1980 .
91Other problems of independent inventors are discussed in th enext section .
fully within the system . It was intended that Academies would de-
velop new ideas, to be transferred to sectoral institutes for ela -
boration and development . Yet the recommendations of academic in-
stitutes for further development of their results are, as a rule ,
ignored by sectoral institutes . Only 30% of these recommendations
are accepted for further development . 9 2
One reason for the refusal of applied R&D institutions to de -
velop the ideas of outsiders is to suppress competitors so as t o
promote one's own solution . Academic institutes are considered t o
be competitors for funds by the sectoral institutes, jealous o f
outsiders' results and imbued with narrow departmental ambitions .
Not infrequently (according to one account, typically) the head in -
stitute will initially block outsiders' ideas, only to promote them
later under its own name . 93 Another reason for rejecting outsid-
ers' ideas is the orientation of applied R&D towards incrementa l
improvements in technology, explained by the interests of th e
production ministries and enterprises . Utilization of new result s
of fundamental research often requires redeployment of resource s
among topics and organizations, which is hard to manage unde r
current arrangement . Preoccupation with small improvements leave s
few resources
for the development of the results of the Acade-
my . 94
92Sokolov and Reimers, 1983, p . 73 ; "Tekhnologicheskii . . ." ,1986, pp . 55-6 ; Shemiakin, 1986 ; Derevianko et al ., 1985, p . 186 .
.'Rassokhin, 1984, p . 53-55 .
94Bliokov,1984.
3 1
What allows the applied R&D institutions to successfully re-
ject and even block the results of the outsiders is their monopol y
position in their own fields . It stems from the notion of "unifie d
technological policy ." One of the chief official reasons for orga-
nizing the economy along sectoral lines is that sectoral ministrie s
develop and carry out such a policy for their sectors . 95 Leading
sectoral institutes of the ministries are legally charged with de-
termining the technological policy of the sector . After all, those
who create new technology are the best qualified to evaluate it .
Their statutory task is to conduct intra- and inter-departmenta l
coordination of R&D, and monitor execution of tasks by other orga-
nizations of corresponding specialization or working on the sam e
topic . 98 All research, development, and implementation in th e
field, irrespective of where it is performed, requires their appro -
val ." Thus, all R&D on metalworking has to be approved
(soglasovan) by the Experimental institute of metal-cutting machine tool s
of the Ministry of Machine tools (Minstankoprom) . The enterprises
are often reluctant to experiment with technologies that do no t
originate in the research institutes of their sector . 98 The Mono -
poly position of R&D organizations is but a logical extension o f
the monopoly position of the ministries charged with production o f
95E .
g .,
Rassokhin , 1985, p .
51 .
96Gvishiani,
1973, p . 97 .
97This dates fromPyshkova,
1979,
p .
72 .
98Riabov, 1986.
the late
1950s
- early 1960s .
Beliaev and
32
certain goods .
R&D performance depends not only on the transfer of result s
between the stages, but also on cooperation of researchers from
different fields at each stage . Since most of applied R&D is plan-
ned and directed by the numerous sectoral ministries, while man y
important R&D problems have an intersectoral nature, the problem of
intersectoral coordination of R&D arises . The main tool for such
coordination is the complex programs, oriented towards the so-
lution of large scientific and technological problems . The Stat e
Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) compiles such program s
and chooses the establishments that carry out particular tasks .
GKNT has no power over the executors of the programs, who remai n
subordinate to, and financed by, their ministries and academies .
This characteristic of hierarchical organizations renders the pro -
grams largely ineffective . Ministries have to approve programs ,
which gives them veto power.100 Some ministries do not includ e
the program tasks into their own plans (in a fifth of all cases o f
un-fulfilled tasks), and divert program resources to other pur-
poses . Some sectoral R&D institutions do not even know that the y
are participating in a program . Nor is GKNT the best judge of wha t
the important problems are, or of ways for solving them .
The
quality of programs is low : the tasks are formulated in a diffuse ,
3 3
S3 The English-language source on this is Cooper, 1982, pp . 477 -490 .
100Rassokhin, 1985, p. 175.
abstract way, and often diverge from customers' requirements . 10 1
Another instance of the breakdown of coordination within the
R&D sector is presented by the utilization of scientific instru-
ments . Soviet science experiences a severe shortage of instru-
ments . At the same time, the capacity of moder n -instruments ofte n
exceeds the needs of even the large research institutes . The ob-
vious solution to both problems is renting and timesharing of in-
struments . These are widely practiced in the US . In the Sovie t
Union, renting and "collective use" of instruments were promote d
for several decades, yet success has been only marginal . Insti-
tutes charged with researching important problems are high priority
claimants, and are able to secure instruments for themselves . Once
an instrument is obtained, the owner has little incentive to shar e
its use with others ; indeed, considerations of competition would
lead the owners to deny access to othe r researchers.102
Actors in hierarchies look upward . Their goals, resources fo r
meeting these goals, and personal advancement all come from thei r
superiors . There is little that can be gained from actors on th e
same level of hierarchy, hence the breakdown of cooperation .
4 .4 Individual incentives .
The main input into R&D is individual creativity . Any amount
of funds and any number of personnel can be employed in this secto r
with negligible result, if this crucial input is missing . Creativ -
101Fomin, 1985.
102Kara-Murza,1989;Veingardt and Untura,1988, pp.146-7 .
34
ity is an attribute of an individual that can be stifled or stimu -
lated by the organizational environment . Here we look at the in-
centives faced by individual researchers both inside and outsid e
the formal R&D establishments .
In the previous section, we discussed the importance of inde -
pendent inventors in capitalist economies, and the difficultie s
that the Soviet independents have with transferring their result s
for further development and testing . There are also significan t
difficulties with patenting and obtaining royalties for independen t
inventors . The patenting system is oriented towards the "planne d
inventions", made in the course of performing a planned R&D pro-
ject . Patenting officials see it as their task to deny a patent t o
an individual inventor . This discourages many inventors .103' A n
individual inventor who disagrees with the expert's ruling on hi s
application finds himself fighting a huge organization . He can
appeal to three more bodies, each of which is, however, subordinat e
to the same State committee for inventions as the original expert .
Negative responses that later turned out to be wrong constitute 1 -
4%6 of positive responses, according to the chairman of the paten t
office.104 But many positive rulings are issued only after a
lengthy dispute between the expert and the applicant .
One of the reasons for the prominence of independent inventor s
in a capitalist economy is the possibility of large monetary gain s
3 5
103Glavatskii, 1982, p . 26 ; Parfionov, 1985 ; " Vklad novatorov" ,1985 ; Danilov, 1980, p . 98 .
104Dudkin and Shimanovich, 1980, pp. 86-9; L'ianov, 1985.
offered by the market . The incentives for the Soviet inventor are
significantly weaker . The enterprise or ministry that was th e
first to implement an invention has to pay royalties to the inven-
tor for itself and all the subsequent users in other ministries .
The latter have to reimburse the former for the-part of royaltie s
paid on their behalf . But the original users have to pay the ful l
amount of royalties irrespective of reimbursment by othe
r users.105 Therefore, enterprises fail to notify inventors of the
fact of . implementation (as they are required to do by law) and
intentionally underestimate the economic effect of implementatio n
to make royalties smaller.106 Many disputes over royalties of in-
dividual inventors end up in court . The cases drag on for many
years, partly because they require a lot of expert testimony, an d
experts often procrastinate . The Supreme Court of the USSR
instructs lower courts to take the side of inventors . However ,
according to at least one lawyer, courts usually balk at awardin g
the large sums of money involved, and experts, who are intereste d
in repeat invitations, often adapt their findings to the courts '
known bia s
against awarding disputed royalties.107 Apparently, there is no
punishment for managers who refuse to pay royalties . Payment o f
royalties is often delayed for up to 10 years .108 Difficulties i n
3 6
105Sbornik, 1983, p. 319.
106 Reut, 1985 ; also Chubarov, 1984 and Obukhov, 1986 .
107Chertkov, 1985.
'"Parfionov, 1985 ; Orlov, 1986, p . 38 .
obtaining a patent, getting the industry to develop, test, and im -
plement the inventions, and in getting paid for it, combine to mak e
independent inventors "Soviet martyrs" . 10 9
A large number of scientists in the formal R&D sector fin d
themselves at the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid . As is the
rule in such organiations, the rank and file carry out orders o f
their superiors . Rank and file researchers work on the projects o f
their superiors.110 This means working on a project one did not
choose and does not like . Sociological surveys of researchers in
two institutes found that only 20-30% of the projects were deter -
mined by personal preferences of researchers .111 Working on supe-
rior's projects could be regarded as a necessary period of appren -
ticeship, akin to graduate study in the United States . However ,
two factors do not allow for such a benign interpretation .
The length of the subordinate status is indeterminate, and may
be very long . According to an impressionistic estimate a young per -
son entering science in the 1980s will have to wait 15 years unti l
being able to do independent research . 112 In the institute of the
petroleum refining and petrochemicals sector, researchers are pro-
moted to a higher paying position on average once in 20 .7 years ,
and get pay raises at the same position once in 4 .7 years . 113 I n
3 7
109As termed by Masarskii, et al ., 1989 .
110See " Pochemu stareiut . . .", 1985 .
111 Shcherbakov, 1975, p. 76.
112Gukasov, 1984.
113Kugel' , 1983, p. 41. The data are apparently for the 1970s.
one eyewitness account of a machinebuilding institute, youn g
researchers were able to advance themselves only in the areas wher e
the older ones completely lacked competence (e . g . , computers).114
Individual
creativity is wasted when researchers spent . the mos t
productive years of their lives working on
projects in which
they have little interest .
The extent of power that bosses wield over the work of rank-
and-file scientists also stifles creativity . Soviet writers speak
of the feudal organization of the research institutes, where hig h
ranking employees are able to appropriate research results of thei r
subordinates in one form or another.115 Superiors routinel y
become co-authors with their underlings, irrespective of their con -
tribution . 116 Superiors are also included in patent application s
for the inventions of their subordinates . Out of all inventors ,
55 .9% were in administrative positions, while no more than 31% wer e
science
workers, engineers, and graduate students.117 The rank-and-fil e
researchers benefit from the situation since they need the sponsor -
114Agursky, 1976, p. 42.
115E . g ., Kara-Murza, 1989, p . 111 .
116Kitaigorodskii (1985), contrasting the organization o fscience in the West and in the USSR, notes that in the West ,scientists have more independence in their research, and scienceadministrators do not become co-authors . See also Kresin (pp .21-2) ; Baram, 1988 .
117Gliazer, 1975, p . 154, quoting G . Gukov, Sotsialisticheskai aindustriia, Aug . 17, 1973 .
ship of the superior for their own advancement . 11 8
5 . Why Soviet R&D lags behind the West more than other sectors :
summary .
Soviet R&D, like agriculture, performs worse than the rest o f
the economy . Agriculture has been deprived of resources in th e
past, so that its failure cannot be ascribed solely to its presen t
organization . R&D failed despite the high priority accorded the
sector, a tremendous infusion of resources, and high prestige whic h
allowed it to attract the best people. Organizational arrangement s
are clearly at fault here .
The organization of R&D in a capitalist economy is varied :
government financed, largely self-governed pure science ; applied
R&D of profit-seeking industrial firms ; and independent inventors .
Each type of organizations specializes in the functions that i t
performs relatively more efficiently.119 The organization of th e
Soviet R&D sector is much more uniform . Like other sectors of th e
economy, it is centrally directed through a hierarchical pyramid .
Central direction makes sense only if the center knows (or can for -
mulate) operational objectives of economic development and means o f
achieving these objectives . The task is then to deduce appropriat e
subgoals for the sectors, and make sure that these subgoals ar e
met . Specifically, the center must be able to derive the target s
for the R&D sector based on the needs of the economy and th e
" "Kara-Murza, 1989 . P . 1 1 1 .
119Williamson,1975, ch. 10.
3 9
promise held by various fields of science and technology, an d
direct resources so as to assure that these targets are met .
Soviet arrangements for national planning of science and technolog y
and the notion of a "unified technological policy" for each secto r
embody the belief that the detailed objectives of R&D and means fo r
their achievement are known to the superior administrative bodies .
This belief is expressed in a planning textbook when it states tha t
identifying the main prospective problems of science and technology
and forecasting the time of their resolution can be done with high
degree of reliability at the present time . This certainty about
the future outcomes of R&D stems from the fact that almost al l
research is concentrated in the state institutions, and the
forecast can be based on the plans of thes e institutions.120
If R&D is organized along the same lines as the rest of th e
economy, why is its performance worse? An effective way of orga-
nizing one set of production processes often proves a failure fo r
a different set of technologies . Large supermarkets are much bet -
ter at selling packaged goods than at selling fresh perishable pro -
duce, e . g ., raspberries . Farmers' markets are better suited t o
the latter task . If all retailing is done through the supermar -
kets, one can expect to see fresh raspberries only infrequent -
ly . 121 Central direction is practiced uniformly through th e
Soviet econo-my .
But the main premise of central direction -
knowledge of objectives and means for their achievement - holds t o
Berri, 1973, p . 135 .
See Kontorovich, 1988, pp . 882-3 .
40
a different degree for different activities . As we mentioned
above, research and development is characterized by a significantl y
greater uncertainty than production . For this reason, it is les s
amenable to central direction than other sectors . If centra l
direction is nevertheless imposed, performance has to suffer .
(Even if the architects of the Soviet system had held less deter-
ministic views of scientific progress, they probably would hav e
been unable to organize R&D differently, given the difficulties i n
running a particular sector of a command economy along non-comman dlines.122
)
Successful R&D projects require direct intervention of th e
highest leadership, which is necessarily limited to a small numbe r
of projects (comparable to a raspberry farm supplying the buffets
in the Central Committee building) ; or tradition, ethics, and se-
lectivity that can only survive in relatively independent, small -
scale institutions . But this is not enough for the needs of th e
modern military and the economy .
6 . Reform and the prospects for R&D productivity .
The story of reforms in the R&D sector is very similar to tha t
for the whole economy . Numerous reforms before 1987 left the sys -
tem described above intact, even when they aimed at radica l
changes . The increase in the rights of directors of applied R&D
institutes decreed in 1967 did not materialize .
The shift fro m
122 Grossman, 1963 .
4 1
budget financing to contracts in industrial R&D over the 1970s an d
the introduction of intersectoral coordination through program s
were mainly ritualistic changes . 123 In many cases, reform s
actually hurt the performance of R&D . The transfer of the insti-
tutes of the former Technical division of the Academy to industri-
al ministries, merger of research and production units (where no t
ritualistic), and the spread of the system of planning, managemen t
and incentives first tried in the Ministry of Electrotechnical in-
dustry all caused the degradation o f R&D.124
Changes adopted early in Gorbachev's rule had a simila
r effect. Allowing easier termination of designers so as to rais e
salaries of the remaining ones did not work . R&D managers lack in-
centives to terminate unproductive employees, and only insignifi-
cant pay raises can be afforded.125 An increase in the power o f
directors of academic institutes led to a purge of independentl y
minded researchers.126
Since 1987, changes in R&D are becoming increasingly more ra-
dical . Switching applied R&D institutions to self-financing may b e
premature or ritualistic in the absence of markets . Also, even i n
the full-fledged market economies, the profit-making contract re -
123 See Kontorovich and Shlapentokh, 1986, pp . 18-28, onritualistic organizational change and its explanation .
124 Rassokhin, 1985, pp . 105-6, 153-4 ; Khurshudov, 1986 ; Zavli nand Iudelevich, 1985, p . 93 ; Orlov, 1986, p . 36 ; Babanin, 1986 ;Gliazer, 1979, p . 30 ; Lakhtin, 1986 ; Shcherbakov, 1975, p . 113 .
125 M111, 1989, pp . 121-2 .
''`Frank-Kamenetskii, 1988, p .
42
search firm is not a successful organizational form .127 Emerging
cooperative (i . e ., private) R&D organizations, though still margi -
nal, are apparently very productive . For the first time, Sovie t
inventors obtained an interested customer - cooperative firms . 12 8
For these forms to spread and increase productivity of the R&D sec -
tor, a competitive market economy has to be established .
The President of the Academy of Sciences announced the inten-
tion to supplant the existing rigid centralized system with a flex -
ible one . The future system should have higher "mobility", an d
such features as more varied types of organizations ; financing tie d
to projects, rather than institutions ; alternative sources o f
financing ;a high degree of professional mobility and competi-
tion . 129 These suggestions for reform of pure science sound pro-
mising, but are also exceedingly vague . One would have to see th e
detailed proposals for new organizations in order to pass any judg -
ment . Still, several general considerations may be applied here .
The successful reform of pure science would require the bosses o f
a highly centralized organization to relinquish their power . Ex-
perience tells us that this does not occur easily . Also, the flex -
ible organization of science can only exist within a flexible eco -
4 3
127Nelson et al . , 1967, p . 62 ; Hanson and Pavitt, 1987, pp .14-15 .
128Masarskii, et al., 1989 .
129 Marchuk, 1989 .
nomy . Professional mobility of scientists presupposes the exist-
ence of a housing market . "Mobility" of organizations (i . e , easy
exit and entry) assumes the existence of a real estate market, mar -
kets for instruments, materials and equipment . While market shoul d
not direct pure science, existence of markets is-necessary for th e
appropriate guidance mechanisms to work .
Establishment of a market economy is a necessary condition fo r
increasing R&D productivity in the USSR . Such an increase in pro-
ductivity would come in part from the reduction in the scope of th e
R&D establishment . Yet this is not the only possible outcome, nor ,
as of today, the most likely one . Today, Soviet R&D becomes smal-
ler without much evidence of productivity gains . Declining GNP ,
accelerating inflation, and increasingly impassable supply channel s
are forcing the decline in real R&D effort . Research organization s
have difficulty in obtaining even those resources that have been
earmarked for them . Highly trained R&D personnel is leaving fo r
jobs in cooperatives.130 As foreign travel restrictions are lift-
ed, Soviet scientists and engineers start to trickle into the West -
ern laboratories . One can expect a substantial exodus of some o f
the best R&D personnel, if Soviet economy continues to deteriorat e
and travel is further liberalized.131 If Soviet R&D gets smaller
4 4
130E. g., Mosin, 1990, Knorre, 1990, Monin, 1990 .
131Katasonov, 1990.
by losing its most productive workers, productivity may actually
decline .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Afanas'ev, Iu . N ., ed ., Inogo ne dano . Moscow : Progress, 1988 .
Agursky, Michael, The Research Institute of Machine-Building Tech-
nology . Soviet Insitutions Series Paper no . 8 . Soviet and
East European Research Centre, Hebrew Univeristy, Jerusalem ,
Sept . 1976 .
Amann, Ronald, Cooper, Julian, and Davies, R . W ., eds . ,
Technological Level of Soviet Industry.New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1977 .
Amann, Ronald, and Cooper, Julian, eds ., Industrial Innovation i n
the Soviet Union . New Haven, Conn . : Yale University Press ,
1982 .
Anchishkin, A ., "Novoe kachestvo ekonomicheskogo rosta", Voprosy
ekonomiki, no . 9, 1986 .
Arrow, Kenneth J ., "The Organization of Economic Activity : Issues
Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocati-
on", in : U . S . Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Analy-
sis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure : The PPB System .
vol . 1 . Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1969 .
Arrow, Kenneth J ., The Limits of Organization . New York : W . W .
Norton & Co ., 1974 .
Azbel', Mark, "Pis'ma iz Izrailia . Pis'mo pervoe : nauka po ievrei-
ski i nauka po-amerikanski", Dvadtsat' dva, no . 39, Nov .-Dec .
1984 .
Babanin, B ., "Tormoz vmesto stimula", Sotsialisticheskaia indus-
triia, June 21, 1986 .
4 5
Baram, I ., " Chislom pobolee . . .", Pravda, Jan . 27, 1988 .
Bekleshov, V . K ., Mintairov, M . S ., Puzynia, K . F ., and Saraev ,
lu . D ., Organizatsiia i planirovaniie deiatel'nosti otrasle-
vykh NII i KB v priborostroenii . Moscow : Mashinostroenie ,
1986 .
-
Beliaev. E. A . N.S. Pyshkova, Formirovanie i razvitie seti
nauchnykh uchrezhdenii SSSR . Moscow : Nauka, 1979 .
Bergson, Abram, Productivity and the Social System - the USSR and
the West . Cambrdige, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1978 .
Berliner, Iu ., "Organizatsiia nauchnykh issledovanii v otrasli" ,
Planovoe khoziaistvo, no . 6, 1982 .
Berri, L . Ia ., ed ., Planirovanie narodnogo khoziaistva . Moscow :
Ekonomika, 1973 .
Berry, M . J ., "Towards an inderstanding of R and D and innovatio n
in a planned economy : the experience of the machine tool in-
dustry .", in : Amann and Cooper, 1982 .
Berry, M . J ., and Julian Cooper, "Machine Tools", in : Amann ,
Cooper, and Davies, 1977 .
Bliakhman, L . S ., and Mintairov, M . S ., eds ., Normativnye osnovy
planirovaniia nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa . Leningrad :
Nauka, 1981 .
Bliokov, E . N ., "Vnedrenie dostizhenii akademicheskoi nauki v prak -
tiku", Vestnik ANSSSR, no . 8, 1984 .
Brooks, Harvey, " National Science Policy and Technological Innova-
tion", in : Landau and Rosenberg, 1986 .
Burke, Clare E ., and D . de S . Price, "The Distribution of Citati -
4 6
ons from Nation to Nation on a Field by Field Basis - a Com-
puter Calculation of the Parameters", Scientometrics, vol . 3 ,
no . 5, 1981 .
Bykov, V . A ., "Intellektual'nyi potentsial konstruktora", Ekonomika
i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 2, 1981 .
Campbell, Robert W ., Reference Source on Soviet R&D Statistics 195 0
- 1978 . Washington, DC : National Science Foundation, 1978 .
Campbell, Robert W ., Soviet R&D Statistics 1977 - 1980 .
Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1980.
Cherniak, A ., "Perestroika", Pravda, July 16, 1985 .
Chertkov, V ., " Tiazhba o voznagrazhdenii", Pravda, Oct . 17, 1985 .
Chubarov, K ., "Ideia ne po profiliu", Pravda, Oct . 19, 1984 .
Comanor, William S ., and F . M . Scherer, "Patent Statistics as a
Measure of Technical Change", Journal of Political Economy ,
vol . 77, Dec . 1969 .
Cooper, Julian, "Innovation for innovation in Soviet industry", in :
Amann and Cooper, 1982 .
Danilov, B . F ., "S tochki zreniia izobretatelia", Ekonomikai
organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 12, 1980 .
Derevianko, A . P ., and S . S . Kutateladze, eds . ,Metodologicheskie
problemy sovershenstvovaniia vzaimodeistviia nauki i proiz -
vodstva . Novosibirsk : Nauka, 1985 .
Dudkin, L . M ., and M . A . Shimanovich, n o predlagaiemoi sisteme pri -
znaniia izobretenii", Ekonomika i organizatsiiapromyshlennogo
proizvodstva, no . 12, 1980 .
Ericson, Richard E ., Priority, Duality, and Penetration in th e
4 7
Soviet Command Economy . N-2643-NA . Santa Monica, CA : The Rand
Corporation, Dec . 1988 .
Ericson, Richard E ., "The Soviet Statistical Debate : Khanin vs
TsSU " , in : Henry S . Rowen and Charles Wolfe Jr ., eds ., The De-
fense Sector and the Soviet Economy . San Francisco : Insitut e
for Contemporary Studies, 1989 .
Evenson, Robert E ., "International Invention : Implications for
Technology Market Analysis", in : Griliches, 1984 .
Falk, Charles E ., "The Measurement of Productivity of Science an d
Technology", in : Fusfeld and Langlois, 1982 .
Fomin, B ., "Lavry i ternii", Pravda, Sept . 5, 1985 .
Frame, J . D ., and D . R . Prokrym, "Counts of U .S . and Soviet Scien -
ce and Technology Journals", Scientometrics, vol . 3, no . 3 ,
1981 .
Frank-Kamenetskii, M ., "Mekhanizmy tormozheniia v nauke", in : Afa -
nas'ev, 1988 .
Fusfeld, Herbert I ., and Richard N . Langlois, eds ., Understanding
R&D Productivity . New York : Pergamon Press, 1982 .
Gatovskii, L . M ., Ekonomicheskie problemy nauchno-tekhnicheskog o
progressa . Moscow : Nauka, 1971 .
Ginzburg, V ., "Neskol'ko zamechanii ob uskorenii nauchno-tekhni -
cheskogo progressa i uluchshenii raboty Akademii nauk SSSR" ,
Vestnik AN SSSR, no . 4, 1986 .
Ginzburg, V ., "Protiv burokratizma, perestrakhovki i nekompetent-
nosti", in : Afanas'ev, 1988 .
Glagoleva, G ., "Razvitie opytnykh proizvodsty", Ekonomicheskaia qa -
4 8
zeta, no . 29, 1983 .
Glavatskii, "Napravleniia korennoi perestroiki", Ekonomika i orga -
nizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 4, 1982 .
Gliazer, L . S ., "Opiata truda v nauke : problemy i eksperimenty" ,
Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no .
4, 1975 .
Gliazer, L . S ., "Nauka i proizvodstvo : etapy stanovleniia siste-
my", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva ,
no . 4, 1979 .
Gol'danskii, V ., and Iu . Osip'an, "Pochemu otstaem?", Pravda, Apri l
5, 1989 .
Griliches, Zvi, ed ., R&D, Patents, and Productivity . Chicago : Uni -
versity of Chicago Press, 1984 .
Grossman, Gregory, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy " ,
Soviet Studies, vol . 15, Oct . 1963 .
Gukasov, G ., "O stepeniakh i rannem vzliete", Izvestiia, June 21 ,
1984 .
Gustafson, Thane, "Why Doesn't Soviet Science Do Better Than I t
Does?", in : Lubrano, Linda L ., and Susan G . Solomon, eds . ,
The Social Context of Soviet Science . Boulder, Colorado : West -
view Press, 1980 .
Gvishiani, D . M ., ed ., Osnovnye printsipy i obshchie problemy
upravvleniia naukoi . Moscow : Nauka, 1973 .
Hamberg, Daniel, Essays on the Economics of Research and Develop-
ment . New York : Random House, 1966 .
Hanson, Philip, and Keith Pavitt, The Comparative Economics of Re-
4 9
search Development and Innovation in East and West : A Survey .
London : Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987 .
Isaev, A ., "Reforma i oboronnye otrasli", Kommunist, no . 5, 1989 .
Johnson, D . Gale, and Karen McConnell Brooks, Prospects for Sovie t
Agriculture in the 1980s . Bloomington : Indiana Universit y
Press, 1983 .
Katasonov, V ., "'Utechka mozgov' - problema ne chuzhaia", Ekonomika
i zhizn', no . 14, April 1990 .
Kara-Murza, S . G ., "Uroki nerealizovannogo proekta", Ekonomikai
organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 2, 1989 .
Khanin, G ., "Pochemu probuksovyvaet sovetskaia nauka?", in : Posti -
zhenie, Moscow : Progress, 1989 .
Kitaigorodskii, A ., "Plodotvorno? Vygodno!", Literaturnaia gazeta ,
July 24, 1985 .
Knorre, D ., "lest' li budushchee?", Pravda, March 5, 1990 .
Kontorovich, V ., and V . Shlapentokh, Organizational Innovation .
The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies no .
507, Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh, 1986 .
Kontorovich, V ., Research and Development Productivity in the USSR :
Causes of Decline Since the 1960s and the Prospects for the
1980s . CER, Inc . : 1987 .
Kontorovich, V ., " Organizational Innovation in a Command Economy" ,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol . 144 ,
Dec . 1988 .
Kontorovich, V ., "The Decline in R&D Productivity and the Defens e
Secto r " , in : Henry S . Rowen and Charles Wolfe Jr ., eds ., The
5 0
Defense Sector and the Soviet Economy . San Francisco : Insti-
tute for Contemporary Studies, 1989 .
Koshkin, L ., " Indul'gentsiia na razorenie?", Pravda, Aug . 22, 1988 .
Kostin, K . F ., "Zavodskoi konstruktor : polozhenie, problemy, voz--
mozhnosti", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvod -
stva, no . 7, 1983 .
Kovalenko, Vitalii, "Dogoniat'? Net, operezhat'", Sotsialistiches-
kaia industriia, April 25 and 26, 1986 .
Kozhanov, N ., "Kinematograf i vremia", Pravda, Aug . 28, 1986 .
Kresin, Vladimir Z ., "The State of Natural Sciences in the USSR .
A Physicist's Point of View", Paper # 5 in the "Soviet Scien -
ce and Technology Eyewitness Accounts" Seminar, Harvard Rus-
sian Research Center, Cambridge, MA (no date) .
Kruse-Vaucienne, Ursula M ., and John M . Logsdon, Science and
Technology in the Soviet Union . A Profile . Washington, DC : Gradu-
ate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy, Georg e
Washington University, 1979 .
Kugel', S . A ., Professional'naia mobil'nost' v nauke . Moscow :
Mysl', 1983 .
Kushlin, V . I ., Uskorenie vnedreniya nauchnykh dostizheniiv
proizvodstvo . Moscow : 1976 .
Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth . New Haven : Yale University
Press, 1966 .
Lakhtin, G . A ., Upravlenie v nauchnom uchrezhdenii . Moscow : Energo -
atomizdat, 1983 .
Lakhtin, G ., "Puti intensifikatsii", Pravda, Nov . 15, 1986 .
5 1
Landau, Ralph, and Nathan Rosenberg, eds ., The Positive Sum
Strategy. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986.
Lebedev, Iu . V ., "Aktual'nye voprosy upravleniia otraslevoi nauko i
na sovremennom etape", Izvestiia AN SSSR . Seriia ekonomiches-
kaia . no . 1, 1986 .
-
Leiashvili, G . R ., "Finansirovanie fundamental'nykh issledovanii" ,
Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 2 ,
1989 .
Leont'eva, Ie ., "Melkotem'e", Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, Jul y
10, 1986 .
L'ianov, B ., "Chto v portfele izobretatelia?", Ekonomicheskai a
gazeta, no . 49, Dec . 1985 .
Lyskov, B . P ., "GKNT : analiz obnadezhivaet", Ekonomika i
organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no. 1, 1982.
Marchuk, G ., "Fundament progressa", Pravda, March 7, 1989 .
Masarskii, M ., A . Galiulov, and G . Tsitlanadze, "Kooperatsiia i
biurokratiia : kto kogo?", Literaturnaia gazeta, May 3, 1989 ,
p . 12 .
Mill, T . E ., "Iesli otoiti ot kul'mana . . .", Ekonomika i
organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no. 1, 1989.
Miller, Roberta Balstad, "Measurement Issues in R&D Productivity" ,
in : Fusfeld and Langlois, 1982 .
Minin, B . A ., "Predlozheniia po reorganizatsii sovetskoi patentno i
sistemy", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvod-
stva, no . 12, 1980 .
Monin, A ., ""Izyskivaite sredstva . . ."', Pravda, March 5, 1990 .
5 2
Mosin, I ., "Pravo na poisk", Pravda, March 5, 1990 .
Motorin, I ., "Tsena original'nosti", Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, no .
19, May 1979 .
Nalimov, V . V ., and Mul'chenko, Z . M ., Naukometriia . Moscow : Nauka ,
1969 .
-
Narin, Francis, J . Davidson Frame, and Mark P . Carpenter, "Highl y
Cited Soviet Papers : An Exploratory Investigation", Socia l
Studies of Science, vol . 13, 1983 .
Nelson, Richard R ., Merton J . Peck, and Edward D . Kalachek, Techno-
logy Economic Growth and Public Policy . Washington, DC : The
Brookings Institution, 1967 .
Nelson, Richard R ., The Moon and the Ghetto . New York : W . W . Norto n
& Co ., 1977 .
Nelson, Richard R ., "Assessing private enterprise : an exegesis o f
tangled doctrine", The Bell Journal of Economics, vol . 12, no .
1, Spring 1981 .
Nelson, Richard R ., High-Technology Policies . A Five-Nation Compa -
rison . Washington, DC : American Enterprise Institute, 1984 .
Nolting, Louvan E., "The Planning of Research, Development, and In -
novation in the USSR", Foreign Economic Report no . 14, Wash -
ington, DC : US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census ,
July 1978 .
Nolting, Louvan E ., "The Structure and Functions of the USSR Stat e
Committee for Science and Technology", Foreign Economic Repor t
no . 16, Washington, DC : US Department of Commerce, Bureau o f
the Census, November 1979 .
5 3
Nolting, Louvan E ., and Murray Feschbach, Statistics on Research
and Development Employment in the USSR . International Popula -
tion Reports, Series P-95, no . 76 . Washington, DC : Bureau o f
the Census, June 1981 .
Obukhov, V ., " Izobresti i ispol'zovat'", Pravda-, Jan . 7, 1986 .
OECD, Evaluation of Research . Paris, 1987 .
OECD, Science and Technology Policy Outlook . Paris, 1988 .
Orlov, A ., "Sozdanie vysokoeffektivnoi tekhniki", Voprosy ekonomi-
ki, no . 1, 1986 .
Pakes, Ariel, and Griliches, Zvi, " Patents and R&D at the Fir m
Level : A First Look", in : Griliches, 1984 .
Parfionov, Vasilii, "Veter - v parusa", Pravda, Oct . 28, 1985 .
Parrott, Bruce, Information Transfer in Soviet Science and Engin -
eering . A Study of Documentary Channels . R-2667-ARPA . Sant a
Monica, CA : Rand Corp ., 1981 .
Pavitt, Keith, "R&D, Patenting and Innovative Activities", Re -
search Policy, vol . 11, 1982 .
"Pochemu stareiut 'molodye uchenye'?", Literaturnaia gazeta, March
27, 1985 .
Pokrovskii, V . A ., Uskorenie nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa .
Moscow : Ekonomika, 1983 .
" Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII s'ezdu Kom-
munisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza", Pravda, Feb . 26 ,
1986 .
Prokhorov, V ., " Uravnenie s bakenbardami", Pravda, May 13, 1985 .
Pushkarev, G . A ., " Anatomiia konstruktorskogo prestizha " , Ekonomika
5 4
i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 6, 1986 .
Rassokhin, V . P ., "Nuzhna chetvertaia sistema nauchnykh uchrezh -
denii", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvod
stva, no . 1, 1980 .
Rassokhin, V . P ., Mekhanizm vnedreniia dostizhenii nauki . Moscow :
Nauka, 1985 .
"Rech' tovarishcha Konareva N . S .", Pravda, March 4, 1986 .
"Rech' tovarishcha Usmanova G . I .", Pravda, March 3, 1986 .
Reut, Viktor, "Sdelano izobretenie", Pravda, Sept . 16, 1985 .
Riabov, S ., "Iesli budete nadoedat' . . .", Pravda, May 14, 1986 .
Rudoi, M ., "Priamoi kontakt", Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, June
3, 1986 .
Ryzhkov, N . I ., O Gosudarstvennom plane ekonomicheskogo i
sotsial'nogo razvitiia SSSR na 1986-1990 gody.Moscow: Politizdat ,
1986 .
Sagdeev, R ., "Gde my poteriali temp", Izvestiia, Apr . 28, 1988 .
Sakharov, V . A ., "'Vymiraiushchaia' professiia?", Ekonomika i orga -
nizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 10, 1988 .
Sbornik normativnykh aktov po izobretatel'stvu i ratsionalizatsii .
Moscow : Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1983 .
Semykin, N . and Bocharov, V ., "Glavnyi kriterii", Sotsialistiches-
kaia industriia, April 29, 1986 .
Shalgunov, V ., "Peizazh s pripiskoi", Pravda, July 6, 1986 .
Shchelishch, P . B ., Dinamika nauki . Leningrad : Nauka, 1981 .
Shcherbakov, A . I ., Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy effektivno -
sti nauchnogo truda
Novosibirsk : Nauka, 1975 .
5 5
Shemiakin, Ie ., "Sibir' gornaia", Pravda, Sept . 2, 1986 .
Shestakovskii, A ., "Podvig uchenykh", Pravda, April 5, 1989 .
Siemaszko, Z . A ., "Control instrumentation for industrial proces -
ses " , in : Amann and Cooper, 1982 .
Silaev, I ., "Mashinostroenie - osnova rekonstruktsii", Sotsialis-
ticheskaia industriaa, June 24, 1986 .
Soete, L . G ., and Sally M . E . Wyatt, "The Use of Foreign Patentin g
as an Internationally Comparable Science and Technology Outpu t
Indicator " , Scientometrics, vol . 5, no . 1, 1983 .
Sokolov, B . S ., and Reimers, N . F ., "Effektivnye formy upravlenii a
naukoi", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodst-
va, no . 9, 1983 .
Sominskii, V . S ., "NTP : 'zri v koren' . . .'", Ekonomika i organizat-
siia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no . 7, 1986 .
Struminskii, "Ataka na bar'ery", Literaturnaia gazeta, Sept . 18 ,
1985 .
Sutton, A . S ., Western Technology and Soviet Economic Develop-
ment . 3 vols . Stanford, Ca . : Hoover, 1968-1973 .
"Tekhnologicheskii proryv v budushchee", Ekonomika i organizatsii a
promyshlennog proizvodstva, no . 2, 1986 .
"Tema, vzvolnovayshaia mnogikh", Ekonomika i organizatsiia promysh -
lennogo proizvodstva, no. 4, 1985.
Tursunov, A ., " Potentsial nauki", Pravda, Aug . 3, 1986 .
Tverdokhleb, V . A ., and Bialik, B . M ., Naukovedenie i informati-
ka, issue 25, 1984 . \
Ushanov, S ., "Nichto, prikinuvsheesia metallom", Literaturnaia qa -
5 6
zeta, June 25, 1986 .
Varavka, V ., "O chem mychal Sudar'?", Pravda, Jan . 5, 1986 .
Vashchenko, V ., "Nauka : neibezhnost' perestroiki", Literaturnaia
gazeta, June 4, 1986 .
Veingardt, V . F ., and G . A . Untura, "Nauchnye pribornye tsentry" ,
Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, no .
11, 1988 .
Viunitskii, V ., "Planirovat' poisk", Pravda, Dec . 17, 1985 .
"Vklad novatorov " , Pravda, March 29, 1985 .
Volchkevich, L . I ., "Ternistyi put' gibkoi avtomatizatsii", Ekono-
mika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva . no . 6 ,
1988 .
Williamson, Oliver E ., Markets and Hierarchies . New York : The Fre e
Press, 1975 .
Zavlin, P . N ., and Iudelevich, M . A ., Nauchnyi trud v usloviiakh
NTR : effektivnost' i kachestvo . Moscow : Ekonomika, 1985 .
5 7