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University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to The Journal of Politics.
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The Chinese Communist State System Under the Constitution of 1954Author(s): Yu-Nan ChangSource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1956), pp. 520-546Published by: on behalf of theUniversity of Chicago Press Southern Political ScienceAssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2127261Accessed: 16-11-2015 02:07 UTC
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THE
CHINESE
COMMUNISTSTATE
SYSTEM
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1954
YU-NAN
CHANG
I. COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
AND
THE
CONSTITUTION
OI ALL
THE EVENTS that
have
taken place in
China
in
the
past
six
years,
the
promulgation of the
Chinese Communist
Con-
stitution is
perhaps the
most
significant
phenomenon.
The
Con-
stitution of the People's Republic of China was adopted on September
20,
1954,
by
the first
National
People's
Congress (NPC)
of the
People's
Republic
of China
(PRC) at its first
session.' Its
adoption
marks a
logical
break in the
course of
the nation's
strife for
power.
The
Constitution,
while
embarkingupon a
new stage
toward social-
ism, provides
the nation with a
state
form and system
that is
meant
to
ensure the
political
monopolization of
power by
the
Communist
Party
of
China
(CPC), thereby
placing
China closer to the
camp
of
Communism.
The meaning
of this
political development
can
best
be
apprehendedby
a
proper
appreciation of the
state form
and sys-
tem
and by the
understanding
of
what
the
Chinese
Communists
themselves think.
In
the first
place,
the
Chinese
Constitution is
governed
by the
Communist
ideology
which
regards
a
constitution as
a
fundamental
law and
an instrument
of force.
In the second
place,
the pronounce-
ment of
the state form
of the
regime as a
democratic and unified
multi-national
state
implies the
monopolization of political
power
by the CPC. It means the demotion of the minorparties in Chinese
policies and the
strengthening
of
the
Communist rule over
the
national
minorities.
And in
the third place,
the
Communisticclaim
to a
one-power
state
system
that is
led
by
the
NPC
and
rests upon
the four
types
of
state
organs
-the
organs
of
legislative author-
'The
Chinese
text is
in
Chung-hua
jen-min
kung-ho-kuo
hsien-fa
[The
Constitution
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China]
(Peking,
1954).
The
English
text
is
in
Liu
Shao-chi,
Report
on
the
Draft
Constitution
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China and
Constitution
of
the
People's Republic
of China
(Peking,
1954). Comments on the Constitution in the Englizh language are found in
H. Arthur
Steiner's
article,
ConstitutionaL-sm
in
Communist
China,
The
American Political
Science
Review,
XLIX,
No. 1
(March,
1955),
1-21, and
in
Franklin
W.
Houn,
Communist
China's
New
Constitution,
The
Western
Political
Quarterly,
VIII, No.
2
(June,
1955),
199-233.
4
520
]
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3/28
1956]
THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTION
521
ity,
the
executive organs
of
state, the
people's
courts, and the
organs
of the people's procuratorates is a fallacy. This is evidenced by
the concentration
of
actual
power in
the Chairman
of the PRC
and
in 'the executive
organ
the State
Council and
by
the
subordi-
nation of
the
People's Courts
and
the People's
Procuratorates
to the
State Council.
As a
fundamental
law
of China,
the
Constitution
purports
to
enjoy full legal
force
and is the source
of law
sanctioned
by
the
state.2
In
contrast
to
the Western
idea
of a constitution,
the
Chinese
Constitution
does not intend
to limit the power
of the government;
rather,
it
aims to guarantee
the unrestricted
rule of the
government
and
to
augment
the
arbitrary
use of
power
for the benefit
of
the
ruling party.
This can be
explained
by
the fact
that the Constitu-
tion is totally
governed
by
the Communist
ideology
which
enter-
tains
the idea that
both
state (an organ
of
class domination)
and
law
(the expression
of the will
of the
dominating
class)
are instru-
ments of force.
Precisely,
the Chinese
Constitution
is conceived
as
a
weapon
of the state.
The Constitution is viewed by the Communistwriters as a super-
structure above
a definite
social-economic
structure
of a
society.3
It
is a
product
of and an
instrument
to serve
the
structure.
The
Constitution
thus serves as
a
legal document
formally
confirming
the past
victory
of the dominating
class
and legally
fixing
a new
political
and social
system
under the Constitution.
Through
the
adoption
of
the Constitution,
the draft of which
was prepared
by the
Central Committee
of
the
CPC,
a
state
system
is
instituted, pyra-
midal
in
structure
and extreme
in
its
centralization
of
power.
The
state
system
is
regarded
by
the
Communists4
as
an integrated sys-
tem
resting
upon
four
types
of
state
organs.
Each is a centralized
'This view is shared by many Chinese writers:
Mao
Tse-tung,
Hsin
min-chu
hsien-cheng [New Democratic Constitution]
(Peking,
1952);
Yu
Kwang-yfian,
The Conclusion
of
a
Victory,
Hsiieh
Hsi, [Study] 7, (July
2, 1954), 14;
Editorial,
Jen-min
jih-pao [People's Daily,
JMJP]
(September
21, 1954), p. 1.
'This view is similar to that
of
the Soviet writers. For
the Soviet view,
see Andrei Y. Vyshinsky,
The Law
of the Soviet State (The
Macmillan
Company, 1948), p.
13.
The Chinese view is expressed
in
Ch'in Chuan,
Effects of the Constitution in the Life of the State, Hsiieh Hsi (July 2, 1954),
15-17, and Chang Hung, Some Understanding of the Content of the Draft
Constitution, ibid., pp.
17-22.
'Hsiung Hsi-yUan, Principles of Organization and Operation
of Our State
System,
JMJP
(November 18, 1954), p. 3. Yang Hua-nan,
State Organs
in Our Draft Constitution,
Hsiieh
Hsi, p. 8, (August 2, 1954), 6-9.
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4/28
522
THE JOURNAL
OF
POLITICS
[
Vol.
18
unit and is
under
the sole leadership of the highest organ
of
state
power, which is the NPC. These organs form a powerful weapon to
uphold
the
Constitution,
to
enforce
the
laws, and
to
carry
out
the
struggle toward
the
building up
of
a socialist
state.
The
assimilation of the Communist ideology
in
the Constitution
also
leads
to
the inevitable transformation
of
the Chinese society
into a socialist
society. Such a transformation
is
the goal
and
the
spirit of the
Constitution. To pave the way
for
this arduousstrug-
gle, Chinese people of all nationalities are
called upon
for
unity
and are required
to
uphold discipline
at work
and
to
respect
social ethics. 5 These are perhaps
the most
decisive obligations
imposed upon the
people.
These
so-called
social ethics
imply
absolute obedience
to
the Communist
ideology by
the
people
and
subjugation of
all
the
people's rights,
as
guaranteed by the Consti-
tution,
to
Communist ethics.
By limiting the
rights
of
the people,
governmental power
is
unlimited and
individual freedom
is
de-
stroyed.
Indeed, the Communist concept of
constitution is reproduced in
the Chinese version. In commenting on the Soviet constitutions,
Andrei
Y.
Vyshinsky stated,
Soviet
constitutions
represent
the
sum
total
of
the
historic
path along
which
the
Soviet
state
has
traveled.
At
the
same
time, they
are
the
legislative
basis
of the
subsequent
development
of state
life. 6
The
Chinese
Communist
writers
echo
this
interpretation
in stating that the Chinese
Constitution blazes a
path
for
China,
recording what has been won in China and what is
yet to be
conquered. This reminds us of the nature of the Chinese
revolution,which, according to Mao-Tse-tung,
is clearly divided into
two
stages
-
the
democratic revolution and
the socialist revolution
-
leading toward the establishment of a
communist society in China.
The
establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, marked the
conclusion of the
first stage of the
revolution,7 namely the New
Democratic
Revolution. Imperialism,
feudalism, and bureaucratic
'Article 100 of the
Constitution
should be read
together
with
Article
19,
which
indicates the
determination of
the
state to
suppress
all
treasonable
and
counter-revolutionary
activities and to
punish all
traitors
and
counter-
revolutionaries.
'Vyshinsky,
op. cit., p.
87.
'For
the
Chinese
interpretation of
the
revolutionary stages,
see
Wang
Hui-te,
Concerning
the Two
Stages of
Chinese
Revolution,
Hsfieh
Hsi,
(January
2,
1954), 3-5, and
Wang
Po-ming,
Studying the
Programmatic
Documents of
the
New
Democracy, Hsin
Chien
She [New
Construction]
7,
(July,
1953), 1-6.
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5/28
1956]
THE
CHINESE
CONSTITUTION
523
capitalism
were
largely destroyed;
the Chinese
society
was to be
converted from one of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society to one
of New Democratic
Society.
The Common
Programof
the Chinese
People's
Political Consultative
Conference
(CPPCC),8
adopted
on
September
29, 1949,
spoke of
what
was to be acquired
in
the future,
although
it functioned
as a constitution
having the
force
of a funda-
mental law.
Not
only did it
promise
to continue
the
people's war
of liberation to
the very
end, and
to ensure
the people's
rights
to
elect and
be elected ;
it also
prescribed the
organic
and functional
principles
of the
government.
However,
the spirit
of
the Common
Program
was to
launch the
country
into a stage
of revolution
pre-
paratory
to the
systematic
socialist
transformation
of the state.
The
entry of the
country
into a period
of planned economic
con-
sruction,
beginning
in 1953, apparently
marked the
conclusion
of
the
preparatory
period and
the
start of the
systematic
socialist
transformation.
It
is
stated9
that the elections
up
to 1953
of
13,637,000
people's
representatives
to the
All-Circle Represen-
tative Conferences
at all levels,
with approximately
75
per
cent
of the representativesfrom the worker and peasant classes, marked
the consolidation
of
the political
leadership
of
the
proletariat.
The
rapid
establishment
of
more
than
40,000 producers'
co-operatives
in
the
rural communities
at the end
of 1953
and
the
gradual
expan-
sion
of
state-ownership
in
the
industrial and
business
sectors of
the
economy indicated
the
development
of social
factors.10 Specifically,
8The English
text of the Common Program
of the Chinese People's
Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
is
in The
Important
Documents
of
the
First Session
of the
ChinesePeople's Political ConsultativeConference
Peking,
1949). The Constitution is regarded as being based on the Common Program-
me of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative
Conference
of
1949, and
is
an
advance on it. (Preamble).
This legal relationship
is seen in a law passed
by the NPC declaring
that laws and
decrees enacted
under
the Common
Program
are valid unless
they contravene
the Consitiution. Kuang-min
jih-
pao [Enlightenment
Daily,
KMJP]
(September
27, 1954), p. 1.
Other aspects
of their relationship are discussed
by
HsU
P'an-ch'iu, The Relation between
the Constitution
and the Common
Program, Hsueh-hsi hsien-fa
ts'an-k'ao
tzu-liao (Canton,
1954), pp. 15-19.
9Huan
Hsiang,
The Superior Characters
of the Electoral
Law of the
People's Congresses,
Hsin
Chien
She, 4, (April 3, 1953), 37-41.
0Conditions in China before the promulgation were explained in Chou
En-lai's report
of September
27, 1954, Cheng-fu kung-tso
pao-kao [Report
on
Government
Work] (Peking, 1954). English
translation in
Current Back-
ground (CB) 296 (November
28, 1954).
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6/28
524
THE
JOURNAL
OF
POLITICS
[Vol.
18
the
development
of social
factors
is
part
of the second
stage
of
revo-
lution. Mao Tse-tung explained this by saying:11
The entire
result
of
the Chinese
Revolution is
on the one
hand,
the
development
of
capitalist
factors,
whilst on the
other,
the
develop-
ment of
Socialist
factors. What
are
these
Socialist
factors?
They
are
the
proportional
growth of
the
proletariat
and the
Communist
Party
in
China's
politics, and the
possible
or the actual
recognition
of
the
leadership
of
the
proletariatand the
Communist
Party
by
the
peasan-
try,
intelligentsia and
petty-bourgeoisie.
All
these
are
the Socialist
factors.
After the basic socialist factors are realized and after the neces-
sary
conditions are
met,
the
foundation
is then
laid for the
under-
taking of a
systematic transformation
toward the
completion
of
the
second
revolution.
Thus,
the
Constitution serves
in the main
as
a
legal
document
outlining the
fundamental
tasks of
the
state
in
the
transition
period
before
the
building
up of a
socialist
society.
In
the
Preamble, the Constitution
sets forth the
fundamental
tasks
of
the
state:
. . .step by step, to bring about the socialist industrialization f the
country
and,
step
by step,
to
accomplish
the
socialist
transformation
of
agriculture,
handicraft and
capitalist
industry
and
commerce.
Article 4
to
Article
16
outline
the
basic
economic
policies
during this
period.
However,
the
Chinese
Communists
repeatedly
urge
that
their
goals
be
realized
over -a
reasonably
long
period.
The
Chinese
people
are
not
to
hope
for an
overnight
transformation,
but to
pro-
ceed
step
by step
in
the
light
of
the
experience
and
political con-
sciousness of
the
masses
and
in
accordancewith
what is
possible in
the actual
situation.
Perhaps
the
adoption
of
such
a
flexible
and
patient
attitude
is
necessary
because of
the
unfavorable
economic
conditions in
China,
which
limit
a
rapid
industrialization,
and
of
the
popular
resistance
against
drastic
actions.
Nevertheless,
the
Chinese
Communists are
determined
to
employ
force
and
violence
for
the
realization
of their
goals;
for as
observed
by
Liu
Shao-chih,
in his
expanatory
report
on
the
Draft
Constitution,
the
idea
that
there
is no
struggle
in
China
is
completely
wrong.
3.
Mao
Tse-tung,
Chinese
Revolution
and the
Communist
Party of
China,
39.
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7/28
1956] THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION
525
II.
THE
UNITED FRONT AND
NATIONALITY POLICIES
Politically,
the
Constitution not only
endorses the state
machin-
ery as a powerful
weapon but solidifies
the ever-increasing dominat-
ing position of the CPC. This is accomplished
through the
gradual
elimination of minor parties and the
further consolidation
of Com-
munist power over
national minorities.
Article
1 of the Constitution declaresthe PRC to be a
democratic
state led by the
working class and based on the alliance
of workers
and
peasants. The Constitution also
calls for the continued
func-
tioning of the people's
democratic united front led by the
working
class and composed
of
various democratic
classes, parties,
groups,
and
people's organizations.
However,
these democratic elements in
China, particularly
the minor
parties,
are rapidly losing their
iden-
tity and are sinking
into obscurity.
With
the
promulgation
of
the
Constitution, the CPPCC
con-
tinues
to be
the
organization
of
the Chinese people's
democratic
united
front but ceases
to
be
a constitutional
organization.
Re-
organized in December, 1954, it exercises only assigned duties
and
its functions are merely administrative.12
Its previous
con-
stutional
functions are transferred
to the
newly
elected
NPC.
However,
due
to
the centralized
nature of
the
NPC
and
to the
greater arbitrary
power possessed by
the Chairman of its Standing
Committee, the importance
of
the members
of the minor
parties
in
the
NPC
is
greatly
limited.
Furthermore,
the
joint
selection of can-
didates through consultation
between
the
CPC
and
other
democratic
parties and organizations
for
the election
of
people's representatives
to the NPC further
reduces
the chance
for
free
participation
of
minor parties
in
political
matters.
The
fact
that people's
represen-
tatives
are
accountable
to the
people
and
not
to
their
parties
further
lessens
the
political
influence of the
minor
parties.
During
the
systematic transitory
stage
of
revolution under the
Constitution,
there
is
still
need for
the continued existence
of minor
parties
to
organize
and
to
persuade
all
segments
of
the
society-
the
industrialists,
the
intellectuals,
and
businessmen
to
participate
in the revolutionary process. The minor parties are to function
12The Chinese
text of the
Regulations
of the CPPCC
is in JMJP
(December
26, 1954),
p.
2. For
a
report
see
Ch'en Shu-t'ung's
in JMJP (December
22,
1954),
p.
22. Also Ma Hsii-lun,
Historical
Mission
of the Democratic
Parties,
Hsin-hua yfieh-pao,
2, (February
28, 1955),
35-36.
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8/28
526 THE JOURNAL
OF
POLITICS
[ Vol.
18
as any other mass
organization for uniting and arousing popular
support and participation in political activities directed by the CPC.
Eventually, they will no longer exist as political
parties in the ordi-
nary sense, because their political influence
will be reduced to little,
if
any, significance.
The CPC's effort
to infiltrate the minor
parties and to restrict
their
activities will
persist. It is worth
noting that while the
CPC has been willing to encourage the minor
parties to expand,
it
is also suggested as
early as May, 1951,
that Communist Party
members be included in the minor parties
up to ten or twenty
per cent of the total membership for the
purpose of assisting them
in organizational matters.13
This facilitates
the CPC's control over
the minor
parties
and
will bring about
their gradual extinc-
tion.
Furthermore,
the original restriction
on the activities
of the
minor
parties will
continue
to apply.
This restriction is
twofold:
the
establishment
of
minor
parties
is
allowed only
at
national, pro-
vincial,
and
municipal levels;
and direct
relationship
between
the
national committee and the local committees
is
not
permitted.
Na-
tional and local committees are independent organizations without
direct
jurisdiction
of one over the
other.
Furthermore,
with
the
retirement
of
their
aging
members and
the
complete
absence
of new
and
vigorous young members,
the
fate of the minor
parties'
ex-
istence is
doubtless
clear.
The
way
is
thus established for eventual
proletarian dictatorship
and
the
termination
of the
people's
demo-
cratic
united front.
Article 3
of the Constitution
affirms the
People's Republic
of
China as a unified, multi-national state. This multi-national state
is
characterized
by
the
promise
of
equality
among
all
nationalities,
the
freedom
to
preserve
and foster their
culture,
and
the
grant
of
regional autonomy
in
areas
entirely
or
largely inhabited by
national
minorities.
Unlike
the Soviet
Union,
where
the ethnic
groups
are
many
in number
and
form
the
backbone
of the
Soviet federation,
the
sixty-four
Chinese
ethnic
groups
constitute
only
six
per
cent
of
the whole
population,
with
only
a few
groups exceeding
four to five
millions
in
population.14
Historically,
due
to
their
geographical
13Chang Chih-i's article
in
Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao
[ Yangtze Daily, CCJP]
(May 10, 1951), p.
1.
Official reports
are
compiled
in
Min-tsu
cheng-ts'e
wen-hsien hui-pien
(Peking, 1953).
Discussions on the subject are
in National Minorities
of
Our Country,
HsAeh
Hsi, 7, (October
1, 1952),
34-35.
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9/28
1956]
THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTION
527
distribution,15 the
ethnic
groups
seldom create problems
of
great
political importance. The Communist nationality policies give
the
impression that the design for the national minorities is not so
much a cultural matter as a political and economic concern.
First,
the national minorities, though small
in
number,
occupy
fifty per cent of the Chinese
territory. This very fact may
illus-
trate the importance of the
nationality problem in China. Political-
ly, to have an effective nationality policy is to extend the political
power to over half the territory
of China. Although the past
Chi-
nese dynasties saw this necessity, they maintained no long-range
policies. By pursuing a policy
either of physical suppression or of
peaceful domination, the dynasties
exercised certain political
con-
trols over the nationality groups. Economically, the vast
area
occupied by minorities is very attractive. It is a region rich in
raw
materials and productive in
agriculture. Both Inner Mongolia
and
Northwest
China are known
to be areas of abundant economic
potentialities, and their economic
development has been greatly
publicized throughout China
in recent years. While Inner Mongolia
is a source of lumber,
salt,
and rare metals, Sinkiang offers one of
the most hopeful oil supplies in China. The reported discovery
of
uranium and other rare
metals in Sinkiang is a well-known
fact. From Sinkiang in Southwest China come asbestos,
mica,
and other metals important to
industrial development. Undeveloped
raw materials are no less significant. This economic fact
cannot
be ignored when China is engaged in large-scale industrialization.
The fact that the remote areas
also contain land for grazing and
agricultural production adds
to
their importance
to
the
Chinese
economy. Their contribution to the country's industrialization is
made more
meaningful by
the
fact
that
China's
main
exports
are
agricultural products
in
exchange
for industrial
goods.
Secondly,
the
geographical
distribution
of
the nationality
groups
holds
political and military
significance.
For
example,
along
the
three thousand kilometer boundary
in
southwestern
China,
adjoin-
ing Burma and Thailand,
reside
a
number
of
nationality
groups.16
5An xcellent article
reporting
recent developments
of the national
minorities
and
showing
their geographical
distribution
was written
by
Wu Wen-tsao,
Facts on National Minorities, China Reconstructs, IV, No. 3 (March, 1955),
9-12.
6Forexample,
a
Thai
regional autonomous
government was established
in
June,
1953.
It is
an
administrative
area of
9,652 square
miles with 200,000
population
of
which 70 per
cent
are
Thai
people.
They are
closely related
to
the
people
of Thailand
and
to
the
Shans
and
the
Karens
in
Burma. Chen
Han-seng,
Thai
People
of Yunnan, China Reconstructs,
5,
(September-
October, 1953),
38-42.
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528
THE JOURNAL
OF POLITICS
[
Vol. 18
Since
these national
minorities mingle
with peoples
of neighboring
nations, and since these autonomous areas are permitted under the
Constitution
to organize their
own security
forces, they can
play a
significant
part in
the Communist strategy
toward the Southeast
Asia
countries.
Likewise, from the
Chinese
Communist point of
view,
these autonomous
areas are
of
considerable importance
in national
defense.
Finally, due
to
the comparatively
undeveloped
conditions,
these
remote regions have
been in
the past a source of
domestic
insur-
gence
and resistance.
The several revolts
in
Sinkiang province
instigated
by the
Soviet Union in the past
decade
and those in the
Inner
Mongolia area by the
Japanese
in the thirties were
long a
concern
of the central government
of China.
Even the less political-
ly important areas
were used
in the past by armed
bandits and
dis-
senters as bases for
resistance.
The Chinese Communists
announced
at the end of 1950
that, in
Southwest China alone,
over one
million
counter-revolutionary
elements were
using these
areas
as their
base
of
operation.
It goes
without saying that the
establishment
of
Communist power in these remote areas has a very significant
meaning
in
both national defense and public
security.
The development
of the Communist
nationality
policy was long
and deliberate.
After the founding
of
the Communist
Government
in 1949,
the
policy
was immediately
included
in
the Common
Pro-
gram. The Constitution
reiterates
the
policy
in
a
more
complete
form.
The
most concrete
concession
to
the national minorities
is
the
grant
of
autonomous
status
to
the
nationality groups.
This
is
guaranteed by the establishment of organs of self-government
in
the areas,
the
only
instance
in
the
Constitution
where the
term
self-government
is
used. These
nationality
areas can
be set
up
according
to
ethnic
and
historical conditions
of
the
locality.
As
pre-
scribed by law,17
the national
autonomous
areas
may
be
established
under
three
types
of conditions. Where
a
single nationality
group
is
predominant,
an autonomous
status
may
be sanctioned.
An au-
tonomous
region
is
also
permitted
where
one
nationality
group
is predominant yet
other
ethnic
groups
of a
smaller
number
are
'7 Chung-hua
jen-min kung-ho-kuo
min-tsu ch'i-yU
tzu-chih
shih-shih
kang-yao
[ Basic
Principles
on
the Practice
of
Self-Government
in
National
Minorities
Areas ]
was approved
by the Government
Council of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
on
August
8, 1952,
in Min-tsu
cheng-ts'e
wen-hsien
hui-
pien,
pp.
164-170.
Other
documents
regarding
political participation
of
national
minorities
in ibid.,
pp.
183-192.
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11/28
1956 ] THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION
529
included in its composition. The third type is composed
of two
or more equally dominant national groups.
In addition to the establishment of national autonomous
areas,
at least two methods have been devised through which
the
national
minorities can participate in the administration of their own
affairs:
(1) the representation of the national minorities in
both
local
people's congresses
and
people's councils
where
Han
peoples
con-
stitute
an
absolute majority;
and
(2)
the
participation
of
the
national minorities in the organization of the Nationalities
Affairs
Committee at
all
levels
of
government.
Furthermore,
the
self-governing organs
of
the autonomous areas
exercise certain powers which are non-existent
in
other
local
organs.
They
not
only perform the general
functions
and
powers
of
ordinary
local organs of state, but they also administer
their own
local
finances (Article 69). They can organize
local
public
security
forces
in accordance with the military system of the country and
draw up
regulations governing the exercise of autonomy and other
special
regulations to suit their political, economic, and cultural
character-
istics (Article 70). Furthermore, their national culture and lan-
guages
are
promoted and are used
in
the
performance
of
their
po-
litical duties and in the people's courts. The higher organs
of state
are
required
to
safeguard the rights
of
local organs
of
all
autono-
mous regions, autonomous ckou,
and
autonomous counties;
to
exer-
cise the autonomy and to assist the various national minorities
in
their political, economic, and cultural development (Article
72).
Such
a
liberal
grant
of
self-governing powers
to
the au-
tonomous
nationalities is, however,
not
in
the
least unlimited by the
CPC and
by
the
central
administrative organs.
In
the
first
place,
all the
nationality self-governing
units
are
integrated
into the
cen-
tralized political system. They all obey and follow the central and
provincial governments, whatever the case may be. They
are com-
pletely subjected to the operations of other centrally
controlled
organs, the procuratorates, the public security offices, the
military
forces, and most important, the party apparatus. In this connec-
tion, the CPC has long been engaged in recruiting party members
and cadres from the nationality groups. The Nationality Institute,
established
in the
thirties at Yenan, has already supplied a large
number
of party members for the postwar work in the
nationality
areas, particularly in
Inner
Mongolia. The 'CPC's recruitment
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530
THE
JOURNAL
OF
POLITICS
[Vol.
18
among
the nationality
groups
and its expansion
in
these
areas
are
both aggressive and encompassing. As of 1954, in Inner Mongolia
alone,
Communist
party
branches have been
established
in
88.5
per cent
of
farm villages, 18 per
cent
higher than the
national aver-
age.18
There is no
doubt that
with the
complete control by the
CPC of
both
economic and
political
affairs in the
autonomous
areas,
Communist political
and
economic strength will
be maintained.
III.
THE NPC, ITS
STANDING
COMMITTEE,
AND THE
CHAIRMAN OF
THE
PRC
Chinese
Communist
writers have
proudly
asserted that the
Chi-
nese political
system is
one of people's
congresses and is
monolithic
and
truly
democratic. It is
democratic
in the sense
that
the
peo-
ple's
representation is
fully guaranteed
by the
Constitution.
It is
monolithic in
that the
state power is
one and
inseparable
and is
given
to only
one institution,
the
National People's
Congress
the
highest organ
of state
authority.
Communists
ridicule the
theory
of separation of powers. Article 2 of the Constitution specifies
that
the
NPC, the local
congresses,
and
other
organs
of state
-
the
executive, the local
people's councils, the
judicial
organs
and the
people's
procuratorates without
exception practice
democratic
centralism.
Thus,
the
state
system
is both
pryamidal
in
structure
and
centralized in operation.
Article
21
and
Article
22
grant
the state
power
to the
NPC.
While
Article
21
recognizes
the
NPC as the
highest organ
of
state
authority,
Article
22 affirms
the NPC
as the
organ
exercising
the
legislative authority of
the
state.
Since
all
power
in the
PRC be-
longs to the
people, and since
the NPC and the
local
people's con-
gresses
are the organs
through
which the people
exercise power, the
state power
is
placed
in
the hands
of
the
people's
representatives.
In
other
words,
other
powers
and authorities
-executive, judicial-
flow from
the
state
highest
organ.
Theoretically, the NPC is
the
only organ
to
legislate.
Since law
is
regarded
as the
expression
of
the
will of
the
dominating class
sanctioned by
the state, it
follows
that whatever law is passed under the name of the NPC requires
'8JMJP (July
7,
1954),
P.
3.
19Liu's
Report,
pp.
34-43. Other
discussions
in
Chao
K'o-ching,
The
Sig-
nificance of Our
People's
Congresses
System,
Hsin
Chien
She,
2,
(February
2,
1953), 1-3;
Hsiung
Hsi
yuan,
op.
cit.
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13/28
1956]
THE
CHINESECONSTITUTION 531
absolute obedience by the
people. It is precisely for
this reason
that the NPC becomes a mere instrument of the CPC.
It
is true that both the
NPC and its Standing Committee
are
vested
with enormous
powers
including sovereign
power, legislative,
executive, and judicial
powers of the state.
However, the
NPC
and
its
Standing Committee are
restricted in their performance
either
by the lack of means to
exercise the power or
by the fact that
the
power
is shared with other
organs. These
inconsistencies are
not
mentioned in the
Communist writings, but they are determining
factors in
evaluating the
true nature of the Chinese Communist
political
system. Prerogatives and functions
assigned
to the
NPC
and its
Standing Committee are mainly of two
types:
those inde-
pendently enjoyed by them and those jointly
shared
with
other
organs.
Among the thirteen
functions assigned to the NPC, only seven
are
independently exercised,
and the other six are powers only
to
decide ; namely, to make a
choice of other organs'
decisions.
The
power
to
decide on general
amnesties and on
questions
of
war and
peace is jointly shared with the Chairman of the PRC. The office
of
the
Chairman of the
PRC is a unique one and will be discussed
later. The power of
appointment and the
power of removal, al-
though they appear great, are
powers shared with
the Chairman
of
the
PRC, and
final
authority rests not in the
NPC but in the
office
of
the Chairman. While Article 27 (5)
and (6) grant to the
NPC
the
power, upon recommendation of
the Chairman of the
PRC, to
choose the Premier of the State
Council, the component
members of the State Council and the Vice-Chairman and mem-
bers
of
the Council
of
National
Defense,
the
power to initiate the
appointment
does not
lie
with the
NPC. The
power
of
removal
under
Article
28
follows
the
same
pattern.
Under
the
Constitution,
the
power
to enact
laws
is
granted
to
the
NPC as
its
principal
function.
However, law
is
very narrowly
defined;
hence,
laws are
few
and
are
prepared
in
advance by other
organs
of the
state, leaving little
legislative
authority to the NPC.
The
first session of the
NPC produced only five
organic laws, and
the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the PRC
who
were nominated
prior
to
the session
by
the
deputies
of the
NPC
from
organized groups.
The
election
of
the
Chairman
of
the
Standing Committee,
the President
of
the
Supreme
People's Court,
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532 THE
JOURNAL oi POLITICS
[ Vol.
18
and the Supreme People's Procuratorate
at the first session of the
NPC was such a haphazard process that it in effect prevented
members of the NPC from exercising sound
judgment on the
matter.
With
regard
to
the power to amend
the Constitution
and to
super-
vise
the
enforcement
of
the Constitution,
the
NPC
is
again
domi-
nated by the CPC. Since the draft of
the Constitution itself was
prepared by the Central Committee of the CPC, any amendment
to
it would follow the same procedure
as its adoption.
In
other
words,
the
CPC
is
the only organ to
initiate a constitutional amend-
ment.20 Furthermore, the NPC meets only once a year and
for a
very short period. Its actual legislative
function is a formality.
Other
powers which are granted to
the NPC are
those
of
decid-
ing on a national economic plan and examining
and approving the
state budget and financial report. These
are also purely formal.
It is unthinkable that the CPC-controlledNPC would reject its own
drafted economic
plan,
the state budget,
and the financial report.
(The draft of the first Five-Year Plan was passed by the National
Conference of the Communist Party in March, 1955, and by
the
NPC in July, 1955.)
Article
30
of the
Constitution designates
the
Standing
Commit-
tee
of the NPC as the permanent body
of the NPC. This implies
that
the Standing Committee may exercise some of the legislative
authority
of
the NPC. However, powers and functions granted
to
the
Standing Committee
fall into
the same category
as
that
of the
NPC, namely, powers jointly shared with
other
organs
and
powers
independently exercised by the Standing
Committee. The jointly
exercised powers are primarily shared with the Chairman of the
PRC. They are the functions of the
Chief of State dealing with
foreign affairs,
and of the
Chief
Executive in domestic affairs.
In matters
of
foreign affairs,
Article
41
provides that
the
Chair-
man of
the
PRC
represents
the
country
in its relations with
foreign
states, receives foreign envoys and,
in
accordance
with the decisions
of the
Standing Committee, appoints
or recalls
plenipotentiary en-
voys
to
foreign
states
and ratifies treaties concluded with foreign
states.
Article 31
(11), however,
concedes to the Standing Com-
mittee the power of confirmation. Another example of inconsisten-
cies
is
seen
in
Article
31
(12),
which
permits the Standing Com-
20Constitutional
mendments
require
a
two-thirds
majority vote.
(Article
29). However, the
procedure
of
initiating
amendments
s
not provided
for.
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15/28
1956] THE
CHINESE CONSTITUTION
533
mittee to decide
on
the ratification
and
abrogation
of
treaties
con-
cluded with foreign states; but here again, the Chairman of the
PRC has the
power to
ratify and
to
abrogate
treaties
(Article
41),
leaving only
the
Standing
Committee
to
endorse
action.
Among
the
seven
jointly shared powers
listed
under
Article
31 are
powers
be-
longing to the Chief
Executive
in
domestic
affairs,
such
as,
to de-
cide
on the granting of pardons; to decide,
when the
NPC
is
not
in session, on the proclamation of a state of war
in the event
of
armed
attack on the
country
or in
fulfilment
of international
treaty
obligations concerning common
defense against aggression;
to decide
on
general or
partial mobilization;
to decide
on
the enforcement
of
martial
law throughout
the
country
or
in
certain
areas;
and
to
ex-
ercise
such other functions and powers as
are
vested
in
it
by
the
National
People's Congress.
Powers that
belong
independently
to the
Standing
Committee
are in actual practice restricted
to
a mere
formality.
This is
caused
by
the
nature
of
the
organ
itself
and
by
the lack of means of
legis-
lating.
While the NPC is
the sole organ exercising the legislative
power, the Standing Committee is the only organ charged with the
duty
of
interpreting the Constitution
and
law
and
of
adopting
de-
crees.
However, these
powers are handicapped by two factors.
One
is
the wide use
of
decrees, decisions,
and
orders
issued by the
ad-
ministrative
organs. The
other is
the lack of means of
legislating.
The Chinese apparently
regard law as a
judicial force higher than
that of other state acts. Law
is
the
highest judicial
form
in
which
state
authority
is
manifested.
Hence it
is
the highest act of
state
authority and is reserved for the NPC only. However, this narrow
use
of
law
is
compensated for
by the wide use of decrees. Since
a de-
cree
is
considered as an
act of a higher
administration based on
law,
it deals with regulations
and details of
statements of principles
laid out by the law. By
means of decrees,
a law is extended to all
cases
embraced
by
its
meaning and content.
Under this
concept,
the
highest administrative organ, the State
Council, would
make
liberal
use of decrees
once they are adopted by the Standing
Com-
mittee.
Article 34
provides
that
the NPC establish a Nationalities
Com-
mittee, a Bills Committee,
a Budget
Committee, a CredentialsCom-
mittee, and
other
necessary committees.
But only the Nationalities
Committee and the Bills
Committee are
functional
committees
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THE
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[
Vol. 18
under
the direction
of the Standing
Committee when the NPC is
not in session. In other words, the Standing Committee has only
two
committees for legislation,21
plus investigation
committees
which
may be
constituted to
inquire into specific
questions
when
the NPC
or its Standing
Committee
deems it necessary.
Since the
Standing
Committee
is deprived
of means
of functioning properly,
bills submitted by the
State
Council cannot be thoroughly ex-
amined. This
in turn increases
the issuance
of decisions
and orders
by the State
Council.
Such decisions and
orders,
unless they are
contrary
to the 'Constitution,
laws,
or
decrees,
are fully
effective
and enjoy the
sanction
of the state.
This means
in effect that the
exercise
of
the
executive
powers is arbitrary
and is
not checked by
the legislative
power.
The only possibility
of legislative
check upon
the executive
organ is through supervision
of the work of the
State
Council and
the annulling of decisions
and orders
of
the State
Coun-
cil
where
decisions and
orders of
the State Council
contravene
the
Constitution, laws,
or
decrees.
Since the Standing
Committee
does
not have the
means of
supervising the
State Council
and other
administrative organs, this provision is meaningless.22 The annul-
ment
of decisions and
orders of
the State Council
could occur
only
when
an
obvious
violation
of
the Constitution,
laws,
or decrees is
committed
by
the State Council
and when
serious friction is
created
between
the two
organs. Such
a development
is most
unlikely
in
a
system
where
the
Party
controls
all these organs.
The Standing Committee
also
has the power
independently
to
conduct the election
of deputies
of
the
NPC, to
interpret the laws,
Judging by the smaller composition of these two Committees (85 for
Nationality
Committee
and
33
for Bills Committee
out
of 1226 representatives)
and their
minor political standing
in the regime, their inadequate
legislative
functions
are justifiably
doubtful.
A comparison
with
the United
States
Con-
gress
will show
the inadequacy
of
this arrangement.
While
the United
States
Senate has
a total
of 14 standing
committees,
the House
has 19 for
legisla-
tive purposes,
plus
more than 7
joint
committees
and
several
selected
and
special
committees
in
both Houses.
22The NPC
recently
dispatched
several
inspection teams
(Shih Ch'a
T'uan)
organized
by the representatives
of the
NPC
to different
regions
to examine
the work
of
the
country.
The
meaning
of
this
action
is
not
clear,
and its
result is uncertain. However, it can be stated that the reports of these super-
visory
groups
are not binding
to
the State Council
and that since these trips
were arranged
prior
to the
opening
of the second session
of the NPC,
it may
prove to
envisage
a propaganda
effect
on the
representatives,
a means to
arouse
renewed
enthusiasm
for
a national
program.
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17/28
1956]
THE
CHINESE CONSTITUTION 535
to adopt the decrees, to
institute military, diplomatic, and other
special titles and ranks, and to institute and decide on the award
of
state orders, medals,
and titles of honor. Except for the legisla-
tive nature of the adoption of decrees, all functions
are merely
administrative acts which
are part of the power of the collective
head
of
state.
An examination of the
organization and functions
of the Stand-
ing Committee provided
for in the Organic Law of the NPC23 fur-
ther strengthens the conviction
that the Standing Committee is not
meant to be an organization
for legislation. The Organic
Law sup-
plies no detailed regulations
governing the organization and func-
tions of the Standing Committee.
It is particularly silent on pro-
cedural matters relative
to legislative process and to the conduct of
meetings. Article 18 of
the Organic Law assigns to the Chairman
the
duty of presiding
over meeting of the Standing
Committee and
the functional committees. Article 19 vests in him
the power of
nominating component members and the Secretary-General
of the
Standing Committee, the position now
held
by
P'eng Chen, a
mem-
ber of the Political Bureau of the CPC and mayor of Peking.
These provisions enable
the Chairman of the Standing Committee
to exercise arbitrary power
over the Committee's affairs.
The Organic Law gives
no
impression
as to the assignment of
duties
to
the
members of
the
Standing Committee. Except that
their assignments
are determined by
the
Presidium
of the
NPC,24
their legislative duties
are
not
given.
One wonders
whether
the
members are
there
for
legislation,
as
the
Constitution calls
for;
or
whether they represent the people in name only, without real au-
thority.
It is
true
that the
Standing
Committee is endowed with
certain
prerogatives
which make
competition
with the State Coun-
cil
possible. Experienced
observers would discard this
possibility
simply
because
the Communist
Party
maintains the
unity
of
all
state
organs.
On
the other
hand,
both the NPC and its
Standing
Committee
serve as a
symbol
of
popular unity
and as a
legal
instru-
ment
of
the
Party.
23Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo
ch'iian-kuo
jen-min
tai-piao
ta-hui
tsu-
chih fa [Organic
Law
of
the National
People's
Congress
of
the
People's
Re-
public of
China]
(Peking,
1954).
English
text
in CB, 302 (November
5,
1954).
24Members
of
the presidium
are elected
at each
session
of the NPC
and
perform
their
duties
during
the
session.
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18/28
536
THE
JOURNAL
0F
POLITICS
[
Vol.
18
The office
of the
Chairman
of
the PRC
exercises
the
power
de-
rived, in theory, from the NPC. It is here that all powers are
brought together.
The
Chairman
of the
PRC
is a
part
of the
col-
lective
head of state
representing
the
state
in its
relations
with
foreign
states
and
acting
as
the Chief Executive
in promulgating
laws
and
decrees
in accordance
with
the decisions
of the NPC
or
its
Standing
Committee.
He is
also
empowered
to
proclaim
general
amnesties,
martial
law,
a state
of
war,
to
order
mobilization,
and
to grant
pardons.
The Chairman
of the
PRC commands
the
armed
forces
of
the
country
and is
the
Chairman
of the Council
of
Na-
tional
Defense,
which
is the
organ
actually
in command
of
the
armed forces.
Through
the
power
of appointment
and
removal
over
the Vice-Chairman
and
members
of the Council
of
National
Defense,
he
retains
a
close
control
over that body.
By
far the
most
important
aspect
of his strength
lies
in
his
power
to convene
a
Supreme
State
Conference
whenever
necessary
and
to act as
its
Chairman (Article
43).
The
organization
and
the
power
of the
Supreme
State Conference
are
not provided
for
in
the
Constitution. It is simply stipulated that the SupremeState Council
is
to
be
attended by
the
Chairman
of
the Standing
Committee
of
the NPC,
the
Premier
of the
State Council,
and
other
persons
con-
cerned.
The Chairman
of
the PRC
is to
submit
the views
of
the
Supreme
State
Conference
on
important
affairs of
state
to
the
NPC,
its Standing
Committee,
the
State Council,
or other
bodies
con-
cerned
for
their
consideration
and decision.
This short
article
per-
haps
sums up
the
basic spirit
of the Chinese
state system,
which
in
all
its features
is a
truly
monolithic and
totalitarian
state.
It is
worth noting
that the
Supreme
State
Conference
is
attended
by
the
chiefs representing
the
executive and
legislative
organs, plus
the
most
influential
figures
in
the
Chinese
Communist
hierarchy.
It fol-
lows
that
the
concentration
of the
decision-making
power is
further
reduced from
one
organ to
that
of one
man.
One
who
knows
the
Communist documents
well cannot
help conceding
that the
least
described
office
is also
the
most
powerful.
The
office
of the
Vice-Chairman
may be
briefly
mentioned
at
this point. The provision having the greatest political importance
is
contained in
Article 46, which
grants to
the
Vice-Chairman
the
constitutional right
to
succeed
to the office
of the
Chairman
of
the
PRC,
should
it fall vacant.
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19/28
1956] THE
CHINESE
CONSTITUTION
537
IV. THE STATE
COUNCIL,
HE PEOPLE'S OURTS,
ANDTHE PEOPLE'SROCURATORATE
Article
2
provides
that the principle of
democratic
centralism,
as
the
basic
principle
of all political organs, governs
the
relationship
and operations
of all organs, the NPC, the local
people's
congresses,
and other organs of
state. This
principle, stated by Mr.
Liu Shao-
chi,
is explained by the
fact that the exercise
of state
power
is
unified
and concentrated
in the
system
of
people's
congresses.
Spe-
cifically,
it means two
things: that the state
power
is based
on
peo-
ple's representation
and
that the political system
rests
on
a unified
and centralized system.
The accent
apparently
rests on the
word
centralization.
Democratic
centralism applicable
to the state administration
is
said
to
contain
the
following principles:25
(1)
Deputies
of all
people's congresses
are elected
by
the
people,
supervisedby
them,
and can be recalled
by
the
people
at
any
time
in accordance
with
law.
(2) The appointmentof the Premier of the State Council and its
component
members is
decided
by
the NPC. Members of
the
People's
Councils
are elected
by
the
local
people's
congresses.
The NPC
and all
the
local
people's
congresses
eservethe
right
to
recall the elected officers.
(3)
Initiative
and aggressiveness
oth
in
the
central
and local
govern-
ments
are
encouraged.
However,
the
lower echelon
of
command
obeys
the
upper,
the local organs obey the
central organs.
In
other
words,
laws enacted by the NPC
require
unconditional
observance by
all
state organs,
government
workers, and all its
citizens.
Local
people's
councils
are
accountable to
the local
people's congresses,and the administrativeorgans are to make
reports
of
their
work to the people's congresses.
This principle
endorses
a
political
system, under which
all the administrative
organs,
local and
central,
are
included
in
a
unitary and integral
system.
This
system
also enables the participationof all
peoples
in
the
administration
of
national affairs.
It
is
true that
China has always been a
unitary state
and that
the
degree
of
centralization
depends
on the strength of the
central
government.
However, the nature
of the centralized
system under
the
new
Constitution is revolutionary,and its
scope is undoubtedly
wide.
The centralization of executive power
is
visible
in
the State
Council,
which
is
the
executive organ of the
highest state
authorit)
2 Chu
Lo-ping, Concerning Democratic Centralism
in
Our
State
Structure, ,
JMJP (September 21, 1954), p. 3, and Yang Hua-nan, op.
cit., p. 8.
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20/28
538
THE
JOURNAL OF POLITICS [
Vol. 18
and the highest administrative organ of state.
The State Council
under the Constitution has much more authority than its predeces-
sor, the Government Administration Council of
the Central People's
Government
of
1949.
The
present State Council is
in
itself the
Central
People's Government, whereas under
the
Common Pro-
gram, the Government Administration Council
was only an organ
subordinate to the Central People's Government.
The great expansion of governmental control
over all walks of
life has placed under the State Council the
complete direction and
administration
of
government
activities.
An
examination
of the
growth in the size of the Government Administration Council since
its
establishment
in
October,
1949,
may also
illustrate the rapid
expansion
of
government activities. The Council in 1949 was com-
posed
of
twenty ministries,
three
commissions,
and
six
other
or-
gans.26 They were grouped under the direction
of four
Committees
-
Political and Legal Affairs,
Financial and
Economic
Affairs, 'Cul-
tural and Educational Affairs, and People's Supervision. With the
increasing tendency toward centralization, the
Council was
expanded
in 1952 at the outset of the First Five-Year Plan to a total of twen-
ty-eight ministries,
five
commissions,
and
four
other
organs.27
Under
the
present
State
Council,
there are
thirty-four
ministries
and
five
commissions.28
Article
6
of
the
Organic
Law
of
the
State
Council29 also
permits
the
establishment
of
administrative
offices
under
the
Council,
without
the confirmation of the
Standing
Com-
mittee,
to assist the
Premier
in
the
direction
of
the work of the
State
Council. There are
already eight
administrative offices
with
duties ranging
from the
co-ordination and
direction
of
public se-
curity, foreign trade, heavy and light industry, to cultural and edu-
cational
affairs, embracing
all
the functions of
the State Council
except foreign
affairs
and
national defense.
Article
7 of
the
Organic
Newspaper
Reader's Manual,
(Hankow, 1950), pp.
75-104.
7Organizational changes
were
summarized
in
Ta-kung Pao
(Hongkong,
December
1, 1952), p. 7; CB, 263
(October 1,
1953).
28A list of the
ministries numbered 31
plus 4
commissions as
reported
in
Jen-min
shou-ts'e (Tientsin, 1955)
and also in
CB,
316 (March 7, 1955).
Five
additional ministries have been
added to the
original 31 since 1954. The
Third
Ministry of Machine Building was established in April, 1955, Wen-hui Pao,
(Hongkong, April 19, 1955), p. 1; the
ministries
of
Coal Industry, of
Electric
Power,
of
Petroleum
Industry,
of
Agricultural Products
Procurement
were
established
in
June,
1955.
The
Ministry
of
Fuel
Industry was abolished;
see
KMJP
(June 24, 1955), p.
1.
29Chung-hua jen-min
kung-ho-kuo
kuo-wu-yiian tsu-chih
fa
[Organic
Law
of the State
Council] (Peking,
1954).
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21/28
1956]
THE
CHINESE
CONSTITUTION
539
Law
of the
State
Council
further
sanctions
the
establishment
of
sub-
ordinate organs directly under the State Council to administer spe-
cific affairs.
However,
their
activities
and resolutions
are
subject
to the approval
of the
Standing
Committee
of the NPC. The
di-
rectly
subordinate
organs
number
twenty-three,
ranging
from
the
Bureau
of State Statistics,
and
the
People's
Bank,
to the
Personnel
Bureau
of
the State
Council,
and
the
Foreign
Exports
Work
Bureau.
This
expansion
of
the
State
Council
both
in
organization
and
in
operation
no
doubt enhances
the
power
of the
Council.
The
out-
standing
expansion
of
government
activities
is
evidenced
in
the
planning
and administration
of
economic
affairs.
Out of
the
thirty-
four ministries
and
five commissions,
there
are
twenty-four
ministries
and two
commissions
engaged
in
the
administration
of
economic
affairs. Even
the State
Planning Committee
which
was
established
in
November,
1952,
for economic
planning
was placed
directly
under
the State
Council.
The abolition
of the
committee system,
which under
the previous
Government
Administration
Council
was
an intermediate
organ
of
control between the Premier and the ministries strengthens the au-
thority
of the
Premier.
The
newly
established
administrative
offices
cannot correspond
to
the
previous
committees
under
the Premier.
The
previous
committees
were
few in
number,
and
their
functions
were
to
direct
the
work
of the several ministries,
with a
considerable
degree
of
independence
from the Premier.
Furthermore,
the
seniority,
in
Party
standing,
of the
previous
committee
chairmen
contributed
to
their
power
to
direct
the work
of
the
ministries.
Quite
to
the
con-
trary, the present heads of the administrativeofficesare mostly
sen-
ior
ministersof the
State
Council,
who may
act
as co-ordinators
and
as
channels
through
which the
work
of the
ministries can
be
better
unified
under the
Premier.
The
Premier's
power
of appointment
and removal
is now
con-
siderably
greater.
Not only
can
the
Premier
recommend
the
ap-
pointment
of
the
Vice-Premiers,
ministers,
and
other key persons
in
the
administration,
subject
to the
decision
of
the
NPC,
but he
also
exercises complete power
over
the
appointment
and
removal
of the
Deputy Secretary-Generalof the State Council, deputy ministers,
assistant
ministers,
and
other
personnel
of the State Council, depart-
ment
heads under
the provincial
government,
heads
of a
district,
consular officers,
and
other
diplomatic
officers.
In
brief,
the
Premier
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22/28
540
THE
JOURNAL
OF
POLITICS
[Vol.
18
of
the
State
Council
is
the single head of the
growing
bureaucracy
and is the administrator of a centralized organ which exercises im-
measurable executive
power
without
legislative
check.
However,
he
is
responsible, as
any
other
heads
of the
state
organs,
to
the Chair-
man
of the
PRC
and
to the Chairman of
the
Central
Committee
and
the
Political Bureau of the
CPC, and,
theoretically,
to the
NPC
and
its
Standing
Committee.
The
constitutional provisions governing the
relationship between
the
central and
provincial
and
local
governments
are
actually
con-
tained
in all
sections
in
Chapter
II
-
the
State Structure with
the
exception of Section 2: the Chairman of the
PRC.
This relation-
ship
is
a
centralized one with no
powers left to the local governments
at
all. Article 49 (1), (4), (6),
(7), (9), (10),
(12), (15)
and
(16) of the
Constitution will
suffice to explain this point. This must
be
read with the
Organic Law
of
the State Council and the
Organic
Law of the
People's Congresses
and the People's Councils.30 How-
ever,
the
centralized
character of
Chinese
institutions
can
be spe-
cifically illustrated
by
a
random selection of
some provisions
from
the above-named Organic Laws:
(1) The State
Council leads, while
the local governments obey.
Ar-
ticle 49 (4)
of
the
Constitution, Article 66 and Article
24
of
the
Organic
Law of
the
People's
Congresses
and
the
People's
Coun-
cils.
(2)
The
higher
organs enjoy the right to revise or
annul inappropri-
ate
decisions
and
orders of the
next lower level.
Articles 31 (7),
49
(6), 60,
65
of
the
Constitution,
and
Article 6
(9), (10)
of
the
Organic
Law of
the
People's
Congresses
and
the People's Councils.
(3) The higher organs possess certain
power
of
appointment and re-
moval. Articles 49 (16), 65 of the Constitution. Article 9 of the
Organic
Law of
the State Council makes note of
the appointment
of
provincial
department heads
and other local officials by the
State
Council.
Under
the
principle
of
democratic
centralism,
local
organs
are
encouraged
to
develop
aggressiveness and initiative
in administering
local
affairs.3'
This is provided
for in Article 58 of the Constitu-
80Chung-hua
en-min
kung-ho-kuo
ti-fang
ko-chi
jen-min
tai-piao ta-hui
ho
ti-fang ko-chi
jen-min