CHOOSING ETHICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES AND APPLYING … · CHOOSING ETHICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES AND APPLYING THEM ... means examining theories about the ability of ... argues

International Journal of Transdisciplinary Research Vol. 5, No. 1, 2010

Howell Pages 1-28

1

CHOOSING ETHICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES

AND APPLYING THEM TO THE QUESTION: ‘SHOULD

THE SEAS BE OWNED?’

Robert Howell

Council for Socially Responsible Investment

25 Kowhai Street

Kingsland, Auckland 1024

NEW ZEALAND

Tel.: +64-9-6236253

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

Grimond claims that the serious threat to the health of the oceans is best remedied

through ownership, and if that is not possible, regulation. This paper disagrees: what

is important is the relationship between humans and the ecological systems on which

we depend for survival and health. Changing this relationship to give humans a

chance to survive means discarding the Lockean right to property imbedded in

Western and Western-derived laws and constitutions, and codes such as the United

Nations Declaration of Human Rights. There are no ecological rights that guarantee

human right to life, liberty, health or property. To choose other ethical principles

means examining theories about the ability of key concepts to adequately generate the

moral responsibilities contained in schema such as constitutions and codes, and moral

discourse used in human-human and human-Earth relationships. Notions of respect,


Howell Pages 1-28

2

integrity, or intrinsic value, need to be incorporated into the prescriptions about the

use of the seas. These notions must lead to descriptions of obligations usually

captured by the terms ‘stewardship’, ‘guardianship’, ‘trusteeship’ or ‘fiduciary’, but

applied to the environment. This does not mean that there is no place for human

ownership of the oceans, but it needs to be within this wider constitutional and

regulatory context at local, national and global levels. Otherwise, the continued rape

and pillage of the oceans will continue, and the chances of human survival will

continue to diminish.

Key Words: Property, Lockean rights, Ethics, Nature, Respect.

I. Purpose

Grimond describes the depletion of life and degradation of the sea, and states that

humans must change their ways: the possibility of catastrophe is simply too great. He

argues that the tragedy of the sea is the tragedy of the commons, which is that anyone

with access to a common resource has an interest in exploiting it because if he or she

does not, someone else will.

“[A]bsence of ownership does not make for good management. The sea

needs owners, and where that is impossible it needs international

agreements for regulation, management and policing” (Grimond, 2009).

This paper disagrees with that conclusion. But in order to provide reasons and

alternative principles for sustainable resource use, it is necessary, first, to describe the

methodology for choosing ethical principles. Second, the current ethical principles


Howell Pages 1-28

3

underpinning the right to property ownership will be described and evaluated, and

alternatives outlined. Third, these principles will be used to assess policies advanced

by Barnes, advocates for the commons, the Georgists, and proponents of the rules of

the Ecuadorean constitution. In the fourth section of the paper, the foregoing analysis

is used to show that Grimond’s recommendation of ownership of the sea is not the

most important basic principle: it should be the caring, respectful relationship that

humans should have towards nature.

II. Methodology for Choosing Ethical Principles

Ethical theories aim to describe the meanings of moral language in everyday

discourse, and the schema in moral standards or sets of rules. Theories can also aim

to advocate for different understandings about how to behave where there are

contradictions between different discourse and behaviour, and between different

schema. (The Utilitarians, for example, were reformers in regard to such attitudes and

behaviour towards animals.) Everyday discourse includes words such as “right”,

“ought”, “duty”, “obligations”. Schema describe standards or sets of rules enshrined

in professional rules; organisational charters; national constitutions; policies; codes of

conduct; creeds and doctrines; and cultural customs through myths, stories, and

traditions. These sets of customs and rules are attempts to give system, clarity, and

intellectual power to everyday moral activity and discourse, but rely on certain

primary moral concepts or principles. Theories examine these concepts or principles.

Schema are to be distinguished from ethical theories: the latter identify and discuss

such concepts used in schema and everyday discourse. Ethical theories use a concept

or set of concepts to describe and explain schema and moral language.

Traditional ethical theorists or theories (such as Aristotle, Kant, and


Howell Pages 1-28

4

Utilitarianism), primarily focus on human-human relations. Kant relied on the notion

of duty, the Utilitarians on the concept of happiness or utility, and Rawls and the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the idea of equity (Howell, 2009).

Aristotelians use a set of concepts coordinated by eudemonia (Aristotle, 1948; Kraut,

2007). The limitations of these theories regarding the human-Earth relationship has

been dealt with elsewhere (Howell, 2008). Although the right to own property has a

long history, it received prominence in the history of thought with the social contract

tradition, and particularly, Locke. The notion of the right of individual ownership and

Locke’s influence was immense: the notion of rights influenced the French revolution

and the United States Declaration of Independence. The Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (1948) states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of

person (Article 3); the right to own property (Article 17); and the right to health and

well-being (Article 25).

In The Second Treatise of Government Locke develops his account of natural

rights and the social contract (Locke 2003). Natural rights are those rights which we

are supposed to have as human beings before government comes into being. Locke

argues that we have a right to the means to survive. If one takes survival as the end,

then the means necessary to that end are life, liberty, health and property. Since the

end is set by God, on Locke's view we have a right to the means to that end. These

are natural rights, that is, they are rights that we have in a state of nature before the

introduction of civil government, and all people have these rights equally. When

Locke comes to explain how government comes into being, he uses the idea that

people agree that their condition in the state of nature is unsatisfactory, and so agree

to transfer some of their rights to a central government, while retaining others. This is

the theory of the social contract (Locke, 2003; Tuckness, 2005).


Howell Pages 1-28

5

In discussing the origin of private property Locke begins by noting that God

gave the Earth to all men in common. He points out, however, that we are supposed to

make use of the Earth ”for the best advantage of life and convenience”. In 1661

England passed the Enclosure Laws, which are the legal basis for property law in the

Anglo-American tradition. A person could own land in England only through buying

it from a previous owner. Land could not be just claimed. This contrasted with

America, where land was seen to be unowned (Scherer, 2003). Locke claimed that

owned land in America could be owned when someone had invested one’s labour:

with an agriculturalist’s investment in the land went an agriculturalist’s claim to

ownership. The large portion of the value of land was developed by cultivation by

agriculturalists. According to Locke, private property is created when a person mixes

his labour with the raw materials of nature. When one tills a piece of land in nature,

and makes it into a piece of farmland, which produces food, then one has a claim to

own that piece of land and the food produced upon it. The only limitation (the

Lockean Proviso) was that though individuals have a right to acquire private property

from nature, that they must leave "enough and as good in common ... to others"

(Tuckness, 2005; Friend, 2008).

Lockean rights are out of touch with current reality in several ways. They are

based on only a primitive understanding of the development of human communities

and societies, and on a religious framework that is inappropriate today. Natural rights

based on a pre-government state do not exist. Rights based on religious premises are

not relevant for a modern society that separates religion from politics, and tolerates

secular beliefs and diverse religions. Rawls in his modern use of the social contract

tradition with the development of his theory of justice does not use the notion of

natural rights (Rawls, 1973). Further, in an ecological sense, there is no inherent right


Howell Pages 1-28

6

that gives humans the right to life. Hence, if the current trend towards ecological

collapse continues, the human race has no inherent right to survive and will not do so.

It is conceivable that another human form could evolve in some other distant part of

the universe, but there are no ecological rights to human species survival.

One of the weaknesses of the Lockean approach is its emphasis on individual

ownership, and not acknowledging the place of public and communal ownership.

Development of an understanding of the place of public and communal ownership

should include a discussion of the tragedy of the commons story, the arguments of

Peter Barnes for the use of trusts, and Georgist economics. A further limitation of

Locke’s work is the absence of responsibilities of a human-Earth relationship. A

modern example using rights is Ecuador, which has recently amended its constitution

to include rights of nature, and part of that involves promoting respect towards all

elements that form an ecosystem. But communal or public ownership of property

does not necessarily deal with the limitations of the notion of human ownership of

natural resources. At a more fundamental level, the concept of ownership needs to be

rethought: ownership by itself will not achieve a non-exploitative management if land

and resources generally are seen in instrumental terms (being of value for human

purposes only).

None of the traditional ethical theories give adequate consideration to the

human-Earth relationship. But the concept of nature is ambiguous: at times nature

includes humans and other times it does not. In the literature, the human-Earth

relationship includes humans as part of the Earth, as well as separate from it.

Worster in Nature’s Economy describes and evaluates various streams of thought

which depict the development of nature’s economy and the science of ecology during


Howell Pages 1-28

7

the last few centuries. He classifies, broadly, two streams: the imperial tradition and

the arcadian stance. The former is where nature is a storehouse of raw materials for

man’s use, and man dominates over nature. An example of someone taking this

position is Linnaeus, who aimed to establish by reason and hard work, human

dominion of nature.

The second stream is where man seeks to establish a harmony between man

and nature, although there are many nuances within this tradition. Worster includes

White, Thoreau, Darwin, Clements, and Tansley. Gilbert White believed in seeking a

peaceful co-existence with nature. Thoreau is called a romantic ecologist, seeking

human accommodation to the natural order. Darwin’s contribution is the lesson of

the Galapagos, that no single or individual species can hold a particular place in the

economy of nature forever. The dispute between Clements and Tansley is

illuminating for our purposes. Clements developed the idea of the climax theory of

vegetation, where the natural landscape must eventually reach a vaguely final climax

stage. Clements said that the California dust bowl experience was where humans

tried to work against this. Tansley said that Clements looked to primitive nature as a

pure state. Tansley said that this was not relevant in Great Britain, where nature and

civilization can co-exist. The notion of nature in this narrative is ambiguous.

Sometimes humans are separate from nature, even in the arcadian stream (humans

must seek a peaceful co-existence, an accommodation with nature). In other

treatments humans are part of the natural order, as with Darwin. It is not clear how

Tansley uses the term.

The ethical theorist faces a choice between a concept or set of concepts that

cover human-human and human-Earth matters, or a concept or set of concepts for the

human-human matters, and another concept or set of concepts for the human-Earth


Howell Pages 1-28

8

issues. In deciding whether the choice and the subsequent theoretical description and

explanation are adequate, one needs to assess the potency of the notion or notions to

be able to include all the responsibilities and obligations that are necessary for

behaviours, relationships, attitudes and qualities that we normally call, or would want

to call, moral or ethical. An example of the first choice could be respect for both

nature and humans. Also the notion of integrity could be chosen, which could include

ecological integrity as well as the health and resilience of human societies (Leopold,

2003; Brown et al, 2009). An example of the second option could be ecological

integrity covering the human-Earth relationship, and another term, such as respect or

reverence or equity, covering the human-human relationship.

For instance, the mission of the International Union for the Conservation of

Nature is to influence, encourage and assist societies to conserve the integrity and

diversity of nature and ensure any use of natural resources is equitable and

ecologically sustainable (International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 2008).

As another example, the Earth Charter Initiative’s mission is to promote the transition

to sustainable ways of living and a global society founded on a shared ethical

framework that includes respect and care for the community of life, ecological

integrity, universal human rights, respect for diversity, economic justice, democracy,

and a culture of peace (Earth Charter Initiative, 2009). Both of these codes use more

than one notion (integrity and equity; respect, integrity, rights, justice) to cover both

human-human and human-Earth relationships. Ecuador’s new constitution included a

section giving Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, the right to

exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its

processes in evolution. Article 3 states that the State will motivate natural and

juridical persons as well as collectives to protect nature; it will promote respect


Howell Pages 1-28

9

towards all the elements that form an ecosystem (Community Environmental Legal

Defense Fund, 2008). The constitution uses the notion of respect to deal with the

human-Earth relationship.

It is conceivable that a society could have a sound human-Earth relationship,

such as ecological integrity, but an unacceptable human-human ethic. A dictatorship

or an inhumane society could have a human-Earth relationship that meets criteria for

ecological integrity. A society built on slaves may have an acceptable human-Earth

relationship, but an unacceptable human-human ethic. A society with an ethic of

survival of the fittest, a political realist approach, could develop a human-Earth

relationship that is sustainable. Such an approach could see wide spread poverty and

death as a natural consequence of evolutionary processes bringing specie

overpopulation back into some balance.

III. Discussion of the Options for Ethical Principles

There are at least three candidates for an ethical principle, or a necessary concept in a

set of ethical principles that includes a human-human and human-Earth perspective:

respect; intrinsic value; integrity (including ecological integrity). Are these concepts

rich enough to cover what would be included as ethical in the human-human and

human-Earth dimensions? To test these concepts requires consideration of personal,

community, organizational, and environmental matters.

Consideration of personal relationships and responsibilities involves the

generation of rules or precepts against such things as murder, theft, physical assault,

bribery, lying, but also to include parental obligations for children, and children’s

responsibilities for care of elders. The three concepts cover these responsibilities.

This is because if someone murders, steals, assaults someone else, they are not


Howell Pages 1-28

10

respecting them and they are not valued intrinsically or with integrity. (Integrity

means the state of being whole, entire, or undiminished, as well as truthful and honest,

and includes ecological integrity where the Earth is valued intrinsically, and not for

utility or ownership for human use.) These three concepts may not cover some of the

Aristotelian virtues: kind, generous, brave or heroic actions. While a comprehensive

ethical theory should be able to include these qualities, they are not critical to an

ethical theory concerned with establishing a proper human-Earth relationship, and

will not be dealt with further here.

Communities provide people with the means for social and group

participation. In addition to government and privately owned resources, there are

facilities and services for work, cultural, recreational, family and spiritual activities,

provided by many forms of communal ownership such as trusts, and non-profit

organisations. Bachman states that the values of community necessary for surviving

peak oil and climate change include cooperation, moderation, frugality, charity,

mutual aid, confidence, trust, courtesy, integrity and loyalty (Bachman, 2008), and

these can be accepted for the purpose of testing the three concepts. The notion of

respect can incorporate most of these: if some one is not cooperative, moderate,

frugal, charitable and so on, then they are not respectful. Respect may have to be

stretched to include ‘confidence’, but that is not fatal. The notions of intrinsic value

and integrity will also involve such community values. If one is not cooperative,

moderate, frugal in the sense of being economical, charitable, and so on then one is

not acting with integrity or valuing the community intrinsically.

In addition to the personal and community virtues, can the concept of respect

apply to the obligations and responsibilities of companies, government and

government agencies, and non-profit organisations? Respect should include rules for


Howell Pages 1-28

11

public information, organisational transparency, and accountability. Organisations

cannot be respected others if they do not show that their trust for the right use of

resources is justified. They cannot act with integrity if they are not transparent and

accountable. There needs to be an appreciation that a moral organisation is more than

just of utility to individuals. Can respect deal with the need to bring organisations

and groups to account, to enforce rules and regulations and punish offenders? It

should do because to have high regard for someone but behave badly towards them is

not being respectful, acting with integrity, or valuing them intrinsically, and public

notification of the offence and some form of retribution can be justified (although

what kind of punishment is necessary to stop the behaviour can be debated).

What about the financial reward systems that give excessive amounts to senior

executives in companies? Senior executives cannot respect others, or be respected,

when they receive such payments, especially when these do not benefit (and usually

disadvantage) other stakeholders. They cannot be considered as having acted with

integrity or to have valued others intrinsically. Rawls proposes the Difference

Principle to argue on the grounds of fairness that inequalities are justified only when

such inequalities raise the level of the least well off (Rawls 1971). If this principle

were rigorously applied today, very few pay differentials would be justified, It is

debatable whether the three notions can generate a similar principle to Rawls’, which

would indicate that the three principles are not sufficient to fully cover the range of

behaviour that is included in the notions of fairness, equity or justice. They are able to

deal with the extreme excesses, but not necessarily the not so extreme differences that

the notion of equity or fairness would catch.

Can the three concepts have the richness to assess the moral worth of the

laissez faire economic system that can lead to oligarchial and monopolistic structures


Howell Pages 1-28

12

and wide disparities of rich and poor? Beneficiaries of such an economic system,

knowing (and if they do not know, they should) that such impacts will or do result in

large differences in benefits, cannot be deemed to respect people, treat them with

integrity, or value them intrinsically. The three notions can be used to reject such an

economic system. Similar arguments can be used to reject a shareholder notion of the

firm, rather than a stakeholder understanding of the obligations of organisations.

If humans are to esteem and have high regard for the environment, then it

follows that their behaviour should enable nature not to die, but to flourish. The

behaviour of Chevron in Ecuador, that led the Ecuadoreans to revise their

constitution, is behaviour that does not respect the plants and animal life (including

fish, birds, insects and humans) and the ecology generally. The Chevron example is

one of disrespect (Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, 2008; Taylor,

2003). It is also where nature is treated solely for human utility, and not valued

intrinsically (Rolston III 2003). Nor does it show ecological integrity (Westra, L., K.

Bosselmann, and R. Westra, Eds, 2008). Each of the three concepts is able to

generate the ethical human behaviour necessary for an adequate human-Earth

relationship, because they all involve recognition of the need for human life to be part

of the biosphere.

How can humans have respect for life that is essential to human life? How

can humans treat with integrity, and value intrinsically, vegetables necessary for food,

and trees that provide shelter? Eating food is necessary for survival and an integral

part of nature. How can one be disrespectful of a cabbage? There is a distinction to

be made between the individual and a species. Respect for species means valuing it

intrinsically and with integrity and the ecology essential for species survival, health

and resilience. Actions taken to preserve the continued existence of a species is not


Howell Pages 1-28

13

incompatible with eating a particular member of that species. Humans need to eat to

survive and over the centuries have domesticated and cultivated plants for human use.

Nature has been controlled for human benefit. As long as the ecology is respected, do

we need to value intrinsically the individual vegetable we eat, and the particular tree

we cut down for our houses and tools? Acting with integrity towards the particular

item necessary for our nourishment is not inconsistent with the death of the particular

plant or animal. For instance, a number of religions and indigenous cultures have

rituals and prayers where food (both animal and vegetable) is thanked and

acknowledged to show and encourage human respect.

Valuing a species means giving its existence and health priority over other

options that threaten its life and resilience. It means not proceeding with, stopping or

reversing the changes to an ecology (where that is possible) that will lead to such a

result. Sometimes it may mean transferring an endangered species to other locations

such as island sanctuaries for birds (Department of Conservation, 2009). It may be

argued that the concept of evolution means that species will evolve and some

disappear for that is the natural order of an evolving universe. To give value to all

species so that humans have a moral obligation to protect them regardless of

evolution, is to be unrealistic about the nature of the evolving world. However, it

can be countered that the option (on evolutionary arguments) of choosing or allowing

which species may or may not co-exist with the current economic and ethical systems

that we have chosen to exploit the oceans, is now hypothetical. The threat to the

oceans has reached a stage where such major change is predicted to ocean systems

and species, that they will no longer be able to support human life, except perhaps in

minimal numbers and very reduced and miserable circumstances.

If we classify the human species as an endangered one, then it is morally


Howell Pages 1-28

14

obligatory to protect the ecological systems that give humans life and health. But the

UN Declaration of Human Rights does not talk about human species, rather it refers

to individual humans. Should respect for nature mean that we have to also value the

individuals within each species? But does this mean that when species populations

grow beyond the limits of food supplies, we have a moral obligation to respect each

individual as well as the species? Clearly this is impossible to expect, and this

principle must include the human species. So, it is unrealistic to have an unchecked

human population growth with the expectation that there should be a moral obligation

to respect (and preserve) each individual human regardless of the food capacity of the

world.

Is there a distinction to be made between plants and animals? Does respect

require that humans should be vegetarians? Animals are different from plants in that

they experience pain, and many are able to play, work and engage with others

(Haraway, 2006). There have been arguments against the cattle industry on grounds of

inefficiency and cruelty (Rifkin, 1993). Does that mean as long as animals are bred

and killed humanely, then it is acceptable to eat meat? An argument for

vegetarianism is that it is a much more efficient to use land and water to grow plants

rather than animals (Porrit, 2006; Kirby, 2004). However, there are land soils and

conditions where animals are more suitable for cultivation than plants. Not all non-

human animals are vegetarian. If it is accepted that humans can respect plants even

though they eat them, then it should also be accepted that there are scenarios where

humans can respect animals and eat them. However, this may mean that eating meat

takes less prominence in one’s diet for more pragmatic and strategic reasons.

If there is respect for the Earth (including the oceans), then humans have a

stewardship responsibility to protect the ecology. Stewards are people who are given


Howell Pages 1-28

15

responsibilities for particular duties, or care of items that they do not own. An

example is where house stewards in medieval times were responsible for bringing

food and drink into a castle dining hall. They did not own the food or drink but had

to look after it prior to and during its transportation. Another term that can be

considered is ‘guardian’. A legal guardian is a person who has the legal authority and

duty to care for the personal and property interests of another person, often called ‘a

ward’. Parents are guardians of their children: they do not own them, but have

obligations and responsibilities towards their care and upbringing. Although the term

‘guardian’ is usually used in the case of the care of another human, Guardians of Lake

Manapouri are given responsibilities for the oversight and care of the lake (Save

Manapouri Campaign, 2009; Mark, 2001). Barnes does not like the notion of

stewardship, saying that the obligations for care of an asset under stewardship are

voluntary and vague; he prefers the concept of trustee. A fiduciary is someone who

has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter in

circumstances that give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. But Barnes

overlooks the fact that tasks within a work context can be specific, and hence the

notion of stewardship is applicable. However, whatever term is chosen in the context

of human responsibility for the impact of human behaviour on nature, (steward,

guardian, trustee, fiduciary), it is important to have clear details of responsibilities and

obligations so that the current destruction of the planet does not continue.

The rights of nature promoted by Ecuador are a worthwhile initiative to use

existing legal and constitutional frameworks to counter the abuse of nature by human

individuals and corporations. The state, through Article 3 of the constitution, has a

responsibility to motivate people to respect nature. However, the issue is whether or

not this right has enough legal authority to counter human property and other rights.


Howell Pages 1-28

16

It needs to be noted that these are legal, not natural or moral rights, and are therefore

not relying on the Lockean natural rights framework. Nussbaum has written about the

limitations of the social contract framework:

‘More deeply, we may need to call into question the whole idea of a social

contract for mutual advantage as a way of thinking about choosing basic

political principles. It simply cannot sufficiently express the dignity of those

who give and receive care. Instead of a Kantian image of people, which

stresses rationality and reciprocity, we may need to move more to an

Aristotelian image, which sees dignity and need as subtly intertwined.

Instead of picturing one another as rough equals making a bargain, we may

be better off thinking of one another as people with varying degrees of

capacity and disability, in a variety of different relationships of

interdependency with one another’ (Nussbaum, 2001).

While the Ecuadorean initiative is commendable, ‘respect’ can only be

justified if it generates the obligations for community behaviour and attitudes

captured by such terms identified by Bachman above, and for the range of

interdependencies mentioned by Nussbaum.

The three notions of respect, intrinsic value, and integrity, meet the majority of

our criteria regarding the question of including all the responsibilities and obligations

that are necessary for behaviours, relationships, attitudes and qualities that we

normally call, or would want to call, moral or ethical. In regard to the notion of

‘fairness or equity’, certainly as argued by Rawls, the differential reward systems

cannot be justified, but Rawls does not adequately deal with ecological matters. It is


Howell Pages 1-28

17

questionable if ‘equity’ also covers Bachman’s community values and Nussbaum’s

interdependencies. It is argued elsewhere that, in regard to climate change, equity

cannot be the sole or main moral criteria, because the time has past where poor and

developing countries can be left out of calculations for emission reductions: they must

be treated unfairly (Howell, 2009). This means that while terms such as ‘respect’,

intrinsic value’, ‘integrity’ can be used as core concepts for describing the moral

obligations necessary for adequate human-human and human-Earth relationships, they

are not individually both necessary and sufficient; they need to be supplemented by

other terms. These would include ‘equity’ to cover the poor-rich divide.

IV. Application to the Question of Ownership of the Seas

If the notions of respect, intrinsic value, or integrity, have the potency to lead to

descriptions of the moral obligations of humans towards nature, that protect the life

and health of ecological systems, what are the implications for ownership of

resources, such as the sea? In the discussion above about stewardship, it is not

ownership but the exercise of care that is important: ownership is not critical to the

proper care of nature. In fact ownership has often been associated with domination of

nature, and the reckless disregard of obligations to protect species. The problem with

current property rights in the neoclassical economic model is that the model adopts

Utilitarian principles and values nature in instrumental terms for human utility.

Utilitarianism states that an action is right when its outcome produces the maximum

utility or happiness (Brink, 2007; Frankena 1942).

It is short term in approach and primarily ignores ecological integrity. The

current market approach allows speculative activity where assets are valued and sold


Howell Pages 1-28

18

in terms of profits able to be made, often at the expense of the environment. This has

been the pattern of the use of the land resource. It is hard to see how the ownership of

the seabed and resources within the sea as claimed by Grimond, is going to provide

long term sustainability and ecological integrity when ownership within the current

neoclassical economic system has failed to protect the integrity of land. If ownership

is to have any chance of rescuing oceans, it needs to be placed within a system that

has different scientific and ethical principles from the neoclassical economic model

and the Lockean-derived concepts of property ownership (Howell, 2008; Howell

2009).

At the heart of a different model needs to be the notion of respect or intrinsic

value or integrity, incorporating stewardship, guardianship, trusteeship or fiduciary

duties in the human-Earth relationship. These notions describe obligations that entail

different behaviour that is not just concerned about the longer-term perspective (a

quantitative consideration) but a difference in the human-Earth relationship (a

qualitative factor).

The introduction of a market economy and private property generally means a

deterioration of common-pool resources and communities (Dolak, N et al 2003). In

1967, Pardo asked the United Nations to establish international regulations to ensure

peace at sea, to prevent further pollution and to protect ocean resources. He proposed

that the seabed constitutes part of the "common heritage of mankind" and asked that

some of the sea’s wealth be used to bankroll a fund that would help close the gap

between rich and poor nations. It was Pardo who initiated the fifteen-year process that

would culminate in 1982, when the Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for

signatures. He continued a dedicated effort to promote the issue, but was unhappy


Howell Pages 1-28

19

with the final instrument's provision for an Exclusive Economic Zone, lamenting that

the common heritage of mankind had been whittled down to "a few fish and a little

seaweed” (Centre for War/Peace Studies, 1999/2000). Although Pardo sought to

prevent pollution and protect ocean resources, the underlying values are of their utility

to humans. The International Seabed Authority has responsibility for organizing and

controlling all mineral-related activities in international waters, but both national and

international authorities can permit exploitation of resources using a neo-classical

economic model and a Lockean notion of property ownership. So Pardo’s proposals

do not necessarily conform to the principles of respect, intrinsic value, or integrity.

Barnes offers a solution to the tragedy of the commons: protect it by giving it

property rights and strong institutional managers (Barnes, 2006). He observes that a

third of the land in the United States is government owned. But government agencies

charged with the responsibility of protecting the commons have been captured by

commercial operators. Barnes proposes the commons trust. This is a market-based

entity with the power to limit use of scarce commons, charge rent, and pay dividends

to everyone. Barnes quotes examples such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, The

Tennessee Valley Authority, Marin Agricultural Land Trust, and Pacific Forest Trust.

The trusts he envisages have fiduciary responsibility to act for beneficiaries with

mandatory obligations. They act with long time horizons and legal responsibility to

future generations.

The term "Georgist philosophy" refers to the economic analysis and social

philosophy advanced by the North American economist Henry George in the

nineteenth century (Council of Georgist Organizations, 2009; Gaffney et al 1994;

Georgism 2009). The Georgist philosophy advocates equal rights for all. It affirms a

universal right for all to share in the gifts and opportunities provided by nature.


Howell Pages 1-28

20

George was struck by the widespread poverty of his time that he believed was

significantly caused by the unfair ownership of property. He proposed the public

appropriation of land rent. He proposed that the only tax should be a land tax, and

his proposal became known as The Single Tax. (The notion of a single tax goes back

to the French Physiocrats, particularly Mirabeau (Physiocrats 2009), and also Ricardo

and Mill (Hooper 2008).) The proposal is actually a user fee or payment to society

for the use of land whose value is determined by the market. It is not an arbitrary levy

upon labour, as is the case with most taxes. George argued that his proposals would

remove the disastrous tendency for valuable sites to be held out of use. More land

would become available, lowering rents and prices, allowing producers to keep more

of what they produce. Relying on land rents to finance public services would free

labour and capital from taxation. Hong Kong is perhaps the best example today of a

successful implementation of a high land value tax (Council of Georgist

Organizations, 2009).

Hardin popularised the story of the tragedy of the commons, using the

metaphor of a pasture open to common use by herdsman (Hardin, 1968). At an

individual level, a herdsman will continue to add another animal to his herd, without

taking into account the overall effect on the health of the common resource. The

moral taken from this parable in the neoclassical economic tradition is that individual

ownership is necessary if the commons is to be protected. As a result of the interest

generated by Hardin’s article an International Association for the Study of the

Commons was established devoted to understanding and improving institutions for

the management of resources that are (or could be) held or used collectively. A recent

review of this research


Howell Pages 1-28

21

“has shown that Hardin’s conclusion that centralized government or

private solutions must be imposed on harvesters is not the only solution to

the dilemma that Hardin identified. Many alternative forms of property

have repeatedly been found to work effectively when well matched to the

attributes of the resource and the harvesters themselves, and when the

resulting rules are enforced, considered legitimate, and generate long-

term patterns of reciprocity. Cumulatively, we now provide an

acknowledged and large set of viable alternatives to these appealingly

simple but often faulty policy prescriptions. In spite of Hardin’s persistent

metaphor, today many people, ranging from policy makers, donors,

practitioners, and citizen activists, to scientists from different disciplines,

have begun to appreciate that there is a world of nuances between the

State and the Market” (Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007).

Barnes, the Georgists, and researchers of the commons assert that ownership is

acceptable: humans have a right to own and use resources for their benefit. Barnes,

the commons’ researchers, and the Georgists state that the problem is that the use is

not done fairly: the benefits are to select groups within current society rather than all

humans within that society, and future generations are ignored. If all humans are to be

considered, then the human use of resources needs to be rethought. There is still the

assumption that humans have rights in regard to property ownership, except that this

time the ownership is to include public and communal ownership; benefits are to be

extended to all current humans and future generations; and the commons are to be

protected and preserved for human use. Some Georgists claim that land value taxation

provides a "green tax shift" that promotes conservation of natural resources and


Howell Pages 1-28

22

encourages sustainable economic development (Council of Georgist Organizations,

2009). But both Barnes and the Georgists have not addressed the matter of an

overpopulated human world and the need to have an upper limit to use of resources.

In identifying how an human-Earth relationship based on respect, intrinsic

value or intregrity, is to be established, human societies may well allocate individual

humans (or organisations) care or responsibility of individual portions of a resource

(example: fish quotas) through ownership. There is evidence from New Zealand

(Yandle and Dewees 2003) and Iceland (Eythorsson 2003) that fish stocks under a

Quota Management System can improve but at the loss of equity between

stakeholders. Local small fishers, staff and the fishing community tend to be

disadvantaged. But owning is not the important characteristic: it is instead the caring,

respectful relationship. Minerals on the seabed are not like fish stocks that are

renewable, and need to be dealt with as recommended by the Natural Step (The

Natural Step, 2009). Daly stated that humans should not use natural resources faster

than they can be replenished by the planet, and not deposit wastes faster than they can

be absorbed (Daly, 2008).

In July 7, 2008, Ecuador adopted a new constitution that included a section

giving Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, the right to exist,

persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes

in evolution. Every person, people, community or nationality will be able to demand

the recognitions of rights for nature before the public agencies. Nature has a right to

integral integration and restoration, and these are the responsibility of the State

(Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, 2008). The Ecuadorean initiative

does not deny human right to own property, but weighs human right to property with

nature’s right to integral integration and restoration. It has yet to be established how


Howell Pages 1-28

23

human property rights are to be weighed over rights of nature.

Human respect for nature recognises that humans are part of a natural system.

It describes the responsibilities that humans should have towards the Earth if human

life is to continue and flourish. Respect can cover the concerns of Leopold (who

stated that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty

of the biotic community); Carson (who stated that humans should not see nature as

something to dominate for their benefit); and many other arcardian ecologists who

have argued for a similar regard for the Earth (Leopold, 2003; Carson, 1963; Worster,

1994).

Traditional ethical theories can be criticized for ignoring the human impact on

our environment. It was left to people such as Thoreau, Leopold, Schweitzer, and

Carson to advocate for an environmental ethic. Yet it is not just a matter of choosing

a core concept that describes the right human-Earth relationship and also claiming that

it will be adequate for human-human relationships. Nor is it a matter of choosing a

core concept or set of concepts for the human-Earth relationship, and then dealing

independently with human-human matters. They must be integrated. Equity cannot

take priority over ecological integrity because we are now at a critical stage in global

warming where developing countries cannot be treated fairly. Moreover, equity in

the human dimension has implications for the planet. Diamond has shown that

societies that are inequitable have suffered ecological collapse in part because the

wealthy elites have become insulated from the ecological threats (Diamond, 2005).

While the matter of ownership is of secondary importance for determining a

better human-Earth relationship, this does not mean the question of ownership is

unimportant. Ownership is used to determine wealth and control. Excessive reliance

on individual property rights can lead to an unjust allocation of wealth, a short-term


Howell Pages 1-28

24

perspective on ecological health, and an undermining of the need for communal and

state management of resources for the public good. But, there are examples of

private owners taking a long-term-environmentally-responsible approach, and

communal and government owners doing the opposite. The significant factor is the

ethics not the ownership. Barnes’ advocacy of trusts promises to lead to more

responsible use of resources, but his recommendations are not without risk.

Appointments for long terms will not necessarily lead to good trusteeship. His

proposals are worth adopting, but it is important that the legal framework for trustees

is determined by notions such as respect and fairness.

There is a more pragmatic argument. If we start with the notion that nature is

mainly to be seen for instrumental utility for humankind, but subject to certain limits,

it is much harder to develop a relationship with nature that enables a fit that works for

humans, and where nature is able to provide a sustainable place for human life. It is

the same as having a competitive ethic for business, but within some limits. If the

basic value of business is maximization of self-interest, it is very difficult for a

business executive to leave the office for home and change into a loving, caring

spouse or parent. And to develop a society as a whole that is a loving and caring

place to live in, while a significant portion of it works to contrary standards, is very

difficult. People do not find it easy to be schizophrenic. Aristotle talked about

phronesis or practical wisdom that is a complex, learned and nuanced ability to be

virtuous. It is like an apprenticeship. It is not something that can be switched on and

off. If humans value nature intrinsically, but recognise that it is also of utility for

food, shelter, and warmth, it will be much easier to design an economy and society

that has the right relationship with nature, than if we start with the belief that the

world is primarily for our use, but within certain limits. Rather than start at one end


Howell Pages 1-28

25

(the world is for us to exploit) but then impose some limits, start at the other end (we

should ensure nature’s health and resilience are paramount) and then see what

resources are needed for humans and how they can be used.

VI. Conclusion

The health of the oceans is seriously threatened by human impact. Yet the answer is

not to assign human ownership to it. The seas are no different from other resources

in the planet, and ownership has not proved the way to ecological health in land use.

This assessment applies to individual, communal or state ownership. There are many

common-pool resource use examples that offer useful models for policy other than

privatisation or government control. But the critical factor is a change in the human-

Earth relationship where humans do not see nature in instrumental terms for their own

utility, and claim a right to property ownership over other obligations. This will have

major consequences for constitutions, codes, charters, policies, creeds and other

formulations that have principles based on human rights and human superiority over

nature. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights with its assertion of human

rights to life, liberty, security and property ownership must be countered by the

realisation that there are no ecological rights to guarantee such human rights.

Ecuador has changed its constitution to recognise rights to nature. But it is not

clear that this will lead to a healthy human-Earth relationship unless human rights are

subjugated. Ecuador’s constitution assigns a responsibility for the state to promote a

respect for nature. But the concept of respect does not depend for a rights framework

or a social contract approach for its application. Nussbaum has provided convincing

arguments that such a framework constrains our ability to adequately understand and

provide for the appropriate responsibilities and obligations we humans have to each


Howell Pages 1-28

26

other. (Although according to Grove, Rousseau’s version of the social contract

inspired followers in Mauritius and other colonies to develop a concern of

deforestation and began the modern environmental awareness (Grove, 1995)).

Options for describing a healthy human-Earth relationship rest on notions such

as respect, integrity or intrinsic value. If one of these concepts is at the core of a

human-Earth relationship, then the responsibilities contained in such notions as

steward, guardian, trustee or fiduciary, when applied to nature, can be defined. Equity

issues need to be considered as secondary ethical principles. If the human-Earth

relationship is where the health and resilience of ecologies take priority over human

use of nature, then there is a possible future for the oceans and the planet to provide

an environment where humans could have some form of sustainable and healthy life.

Otherwise, the chances of human life on earth are bleak.

Footnote. These ethical concepts are important for working out policies, rules and

responsibilities based on a human society that is not in serious, perhaps fatal, conflict

with its natural environment. However, when benign, planned and managed

transitions to a sustainable society are not likely, then other moral and difficult

choices face humans that involve lifeboat ethical choices and other dilemmas.

References

Aristotle, trans. Thomson, J.A.K. (1948). Ethics. London: Penguin.

Bachman, M.Q. (2008). “Thriving in Community; Surviving Peak Oil and Climate

Change.” Friends Journal. October: 12-13, 54.

Barnes, P. (2006). Capitalism 3.0: A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons. San

Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Brink, D. (2007). “Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” Retrieved 18 July, 2009

from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political.

Brown, P.G., Garver, G. et al. (2009). Right Relationship Building a Whole Earth

Economy. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Carson, R. (1963). Silent Spring. London: Hamish Hamilton.


Howell Pages 1-28

27

Centre for War/Peace Studies. (1999/2000). “Global Report.” Retrieved 18 July,

2009 from http://www.cwps.org/old/global56.htm

Council of Georgist Organizations. (2009). Retrieved 18 July 2009, from

http://www.cgocouncil.org/cwho.html

Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (2008). Articles approved by

Ecuador’s Constitutional Assembly, April 10th

, 2008. Retrieved 18 July 2009,

from http://www.celdf.org/Default.aspx?tabid=538

Daly, H. E. (2008). “Life in a Land Without Growth.” New Scientist. 2678, 15

October.

Department of Conservation. (2009). Island Sanctuaries. Retrieved 18 July 2009,

from www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/about-doc/concessions-and-

permits/conservation-revealed/island-sanctuaries-lowres.pdf

Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse. NY: Penguin. Dolsak, N and Ostrom, E (Eds) (2003). The Commons in the New Millennium Challenges

and Adaptation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Earth Charter Initiative. (2009). Retrieved 18 July 2009, from

http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/

Eythorsson, E. (2003). “Stakeholders, Courts, and Communities: Individual

Transferable Quotas in Icelandic Fisheries, 1991-2001.” In: Dolsak, N and

Ostrom, E. (Eds.) The Commons in the New Millennium Challenges and

Adaptation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 130-167.

Frankena, W. (1942). “Utilitarianism.” In: Runes, D. (Ed.) Dictionary of Philosophy.

Retrieved 18 July 2009, from http://www.ditext.com/runes/u.html

Friend, C. (2008). “Social Contract Theory.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Retrieved 18 July, 2009, from http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/soc-cont.htm

Gaffney, M., Harrison, F., and Feder, K. (1994). The Corruption of Economics.

London: Shepheard-Walwyn Publishers.

Georgism. (2009). Retrieved 18 July 2009 from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgism.

Grimond, J. (2009). “Troubled Waters: A Special Report on the Sea.” Economist. Jan.

3, 3-18.

Grove, R. (1995). Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens,

and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Haraday, D. (2006). “Encounters with Companion Species: Entangling Dogs,

Baboons, Philosophers, and Biologists.” Configurations. Retrieved 18 July,

2009, //muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v014/14.1.haraway.html

Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science. 162, 3859, Dec 13,

1243-1248.

Hooper, C. (2009). “Henry George.” retrieved 18 July

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/George.html

Howell, R (2008). “Globalization and the Good Corporation: Whither Socially

Responsible Investment?” Human Systems Management, 27(3): 243-254.

Howell, R. (2009). “Talking Past Each Other: Economics, Ethics, The IPCC and the

UNFCCC.” International Journal of Transdisciplinary Research. 4(1): 1-15.

International Union for the Conservation of Nature. (2008). A 2020 vision for IUNC.

Retrieved 18 July 2009 from

http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/2020_vision_for_iucn_en.pdf

Kendall, C (2008). “A New Law of Nature.” Guardian. 24 September.


Howell Pages 1-28

28

Kirby, A. (2004). “Hungry world ‘must eat less meat’.” BBC News. Retrieved 18

July, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3559542.stm

Kraut, Richard, (2007), “Aristotle’s Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Retrieved 18 July, 2009 from http//plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/

Laerhoven, F Van, Ostrom, E. (2007). “Traditions and Trends in the Study of the

Commons.” International Journal of the Commons. 1(1): 3-28.

Leopold, A. (2003). “The Land Ethic.” In: Light, A. and Rolston III, H. (Eds.)

Environmental Ethics An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 38-46.

Locke, J. (2003). Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration.

Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Mark, A. (2001). “Integrating conservation with hydro-electric development of Lakes

Manapouri and Te Anau, New Zealand: an exercise in complexity.” Complexity

International Vol 08. Retrieved 18 July, 2009 from

http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol08/mark01/mark01.pdf

Nussbaum, M. (2001). The Enduring Significance of John Rawls. Retrieved 18 July,

2009 from http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i45/45b00701.htm

Pardo, A. (1968). “Who will Control the Seabed?” Foreign Affairs. October.

Porritt, J. (2006). “Hard to Swallow.” Guardian. Jan 4. Retrieved 18 July, 2009

from

http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/jan/04/guardiansocietysupplement3

Physiocrats. (2009). “The Free Dictionary.” Retrieved 18 July from,

http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/physiocrats

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, M A: Harvard U P.

Rifkin, J. (1993). Beyond Beef: The Rise and Fall of the Cattle Culture. NY: Penguin.

Rolston III, H. (2003). “Value in Nature and the Nature of Value.: In: Light, A. and

Rolston III, H. (Eds.) Environmental Ethics An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell

Publishing. 143-153.

Save Manapouri Campaign. (2009). Retrieved 18 July, 2009 from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Save_Manapouri_Campaign

Scherer, D. (2003). “The Ethics of Sustainable Resources.” In: Light, A. and Rolston

III, H. (Eds.) Environmental Ethics An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell

Publishing. 334-358.

Swing, J. T. (1976). “Who Will Own the Oceans?” Foreign Affairs. 54(3): 527-546.

Taylor, P. (2003). “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” In: Light, A. and Rolston III,

H. (Eds.) Environmental Ethics An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

74-84.

The Natural Step™. Retrieved 18 July, 2009, from www.naturalstep.org/.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1948). Retrieved 18 July, 2009, from

www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.

Tuckness, A. (2005). “John Locke.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved

18 July, 2009 from //plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/.

Westra, L., K. Bosselmann, and R. Westra (eds.) (2008). Reconciling Human

Existence and Ecological Integrity: Science, Ethics, Economic and Law,

London: Earthscan.

Worster, D. (1994). Nature’s Economy. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2nd

ed.

Yandle, T. and Dewees, C. (2003). “ Privatizing the Commons … Twelve Years

Later: Fishers’ Experiences with New Zealand’s Market-Based Fisheries

Management.” In: Dolsak, N. and Ostrom, E. (Eds.) The Commons in the New

Millennium Challenges and Adaptation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

101-127.

Documents

CHOOSING ETHICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES AND APPLYING … · CHOOSING ETHICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES AND APPLYING THEM ... means examining theories about the ability of ... argues