Civil Society in Aceh – An Assessment of Needs to Build

Capacity to Support Community Recovery

July 2005

MDGs Support Unit UNDP Indonesia

This document represents a summary and interpretation of the findings from two interrelated but independent assessments of civil society organisations’ needs to build capacity to support community recovery in Aceh. The assessments were carried out by two teams during March – May, 2005. The UNDP provided guidance to the teams and effort has been made to accurately represent the findings from the assessments. Nevertheless, the information gathered and issues associated herewith do not constitute a decisive data set and do not necessarily represent the views of UNDP.

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Executive Summary Since the tsunami of 26 December 2005 ravaged parts of Aceh and caused widespread impacts on natural, human and economic resources in the province, various forms of support have been provided from individuals and organizations from around Indonesia and the world. Despite suffering losses themselves, local civil society organizations (CSOs) have been integral to the emergency response efforts, carrying out their own activities and working as partners and implementers for diverse national and international organizations. The UNDP’s Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR) was established to provide grant and technical support to recovery efforts of government and civil society in Aceh. As the response to the tsunami shifted from emergency relief to longer term reconstruction, the need to assess CSOs capacities to contribute to the reconstruction was identified as a precursor to further programmes of support. CSOs in Aceh are a diverse group comprising small, community-based organizations (CBOs), local groups affiliated with mass organizations (MOs), religious organizations, and non-government organizations (NGOs), including local groups and local branches of national and international groups. Past conditions have not been conducive to civil society development in Aceh, and since the tsunami many new groups have been formed - some with questionable intentions. Nevertheless, in the current era there are increasing opportunities for CSOs to fulfill their role in all spheres of public life, not only in relation to post-tsunami community recovery but also in the broader, democratic reforms happening in Aceh. Between March and May 2005, the UNDP supported two sets of activities that constitute an initial assessment of CSO capacities and needs for capacity development. The activities involved interviews and focus group discussions with CSO members, government workers and local communities, a survey, workshops and training related to sustainable livelihoods analysis. The later was used as a means to assess capacity and needs, while simultaneously providing resources that the participating representatives of 56 CSOs from Aceh could consider using in their work. The assessment teams found relatively weak organizational and technical capacities amongst all types of participating CSOs. Organisational capacities such as human resource management, operational and financial management, strategic planning and project management were minimal in most CSOs; practical abilities related to field data collection, analysis, facilitation, monitoring and evaluation were similarly underdeveloped. The assessment teams considered that local NGOs had slightly better organizational capacities than the CBOs, but that the CBOs were stronger than the NGOs in technical capacities related to community engagement and grassroots organizing. This reflects the reality that most NGOs in Aceh have traditionally been advocacy-focused and not community development-oriented. CBOs are typically groups focused on a single issue, and not connected to groups with other interests. However, while participation and empowerment have not been central strategies in most CSOs’ work in Aceh, the groups that participated in the assessment activities openly and enthusiastically embraced the tools they learned and were keen to make use of them in their respective fields and areas. Other traditional and religious-based organizations also existed and continue to exist in every village. They have considerable influence and are important to local communities. The findings summarized in this report present a picture of CSO capacity and needs, and serves as a resource primarily for the CSOs, donor partners in Aceh and UNDP.

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This report signposts directions for strengthening CSOs which include NGOs, CBOs and other traditional and religious institutions to enable them to participate meaningfully in reconstruction processes outlined in the government’s Master Plan for Aceh Reconstruction and to maximize their contributions to socio-economic and wider development in Aceh. Key priorities identified in this report for a future programme of support to local CSOs in Aceh include:

• strengthening of CSOs organizational and technical capacities, including but not limited to training trainers, holding short courses and training workshops;

• providing technical guidance and capital grants to CSOs for initiatives that contribute to community recovery, public participation and empowerment of local people;

• encouraging volunteerism and exchanges between CSO actors from different geographical areas and thematic sectors;

• fostering fora for dialogue, learning and input into policy and reconstruction decision-making; and

• developing processes and mechanisms for CSOs to independently monitor tsunami recovery programs and activities, and in the process building their organizational and technical capacities as organisations.

These priorities are interrelated and highlight the need for capacity development amongst CSOs to be approached through formal and informal training as well as through experiential learning to achieve sustainable outcomes. These priorities identified would together contribute to the creation of an enabling environment in which CSOs can maximize their role in post-tsunami as well as their contribution to community recovery, justice, freedom and poverty eradication in Aceh. This initial assessment also verified the need for a continuing dialogue with CSOs in Aceh to continue to improve the approach to building CSO capacity during the implementation of the programme.

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Table of Contents Executive Summary............................................................................................... 1 Abbreviations and Definition of Terms................................................................... 4 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 5

1.1 Brief background ...................................................................................... 5 1.2 Approach to the assessment.................................................................... 6 1.3 Report structure........................................................................................ 7

2. Overview of the assessment methods .......................................................... 8 3. Context and setting prior to the tsunami...................................................... 10

3.1 Economy and services ........................................................................... 10 3.2 Community assets and strategies .......................................................... 11 3.3 Civil society............................................................................................. 12

4. Civil society in Aceh – an overview of the post-tsunami situation............... 13 4.1 Types, numbers, distribution and scope of CSOs in Aceh..................... 14 4.2 Overview of Aceh’s CSO capacities....................................................... 16 4.4 Additional challenges due to tsunami (effects of disaster on CSOs) ..... 22

5. Key issues related to developing CSO capacities and sustainable community livelihoods post-tsunami............................................................ 23

5.1 Government’s Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh, Nias and North Sumatra .............................................................. 23

5.2 Livelihood recovery issues ..................................................................... 24 5.3 Major capacity development needs........................................................ 26

6. Recommendations for supporting civil society capacity development and sustainable community livelihoods in Aceh ................................................. 28

7. References cited and other sources of information..................................... 29

List of Tables Figure 1. Map of the assessment area .........................................................................7 Table 1. Overview of CSOs in Aceh ..........................................................................14 Table 2. SWOT analysis regarding CBOs in Aceh ....................................................17 Table 3. SWOT analysis regarding NGOs in Aceh....................................................18 Table 4. Overview of general CSO organisational conditions in Aceh ......................18 Table 5. Overview of general CSO networking conditions ........................................20 Table 6. Overview of general CSO program conditions ............................................21

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Workshop Participants..................................................... 30 Appendix 2: Draft sectoral action plans prepared by CSO participants in

workshop and SLF training activities (over page) ...................... 33 Appendix 3: Summary of findings from OCHA/MiSPI survey of local NGOs. 38 Appendix 4. Assessment workshop participants’ suggestions for CBO and

NGO strengthening ..................................................................... 40 Appendix 5. Assessment team suggestions for interventions to improve

capacities related to sustainable livelihoods .............................. 42

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Abbreviations and Definition of Terms ACE Association for Community Empowerment (formerly known as

Community Recovery Program/ CRP) BAPPEDA Regional Development Planning Agency BAPPENAS National Development Planning Agency CBNA Capacity-Building Needs Assessment CBOs Community-based organizations CSOs Civil Society Organizations DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Area) ERTR Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme HIC Humanitarian Information Centre IDP Internally displaced persons KSM Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (also known as CBO) LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (also known as NGO) MiSPI Missi Sejati Perempuan Indonesia MDG Millennium Development Goals NGO Non-Government Organization SL Sustainable Livelihoods SLF Sustainable Livelihoods Framework SOP Standard Operating Procedures ILO International Labor Organisation FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UN Habitat United Nations Habitat UNICEF United Nations Childrens’ Fund WHO World Health Organisation

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The four components of the ERTR programme are: • Immediate employment and

rehabilitation through cash for work; • Recovery of livelihoods; • Recovery of housing, settlements and

associated infrastructure; and • Capacity-building of Government and

civil society for sustainable recovery and risk-reduction.

1. Introduction 1.1 Brief background An earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale and resultant tsunamis on December 26 devastated the South Asia region and particularly the Indonesian provinces of North Sumatra and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) on the island of Sumatra. The estimated number of people killed exceeds 250,000 people, while close to 100,000 remain unaccounted for or missing. There were an estimated 574,054 displaced persons and those partially or totally losing their livelihoods were estimated at over 800,0001. The tsunami flooded coastal areas and washed away homes and buildings, roads and bridges, water and electricity supplies, crops, irrigation and fishery infrastructure, food and fuel networks. In the affected areas, economic life came to a halt as businesses, resource systems and infrastructure have collapsed. Millions of people saw their families and communities torn apart; the trauma caused by this devastating catastrophe has been severe. In the areas not directly affected by the earthquake and tsunami, economic and social impacts have also been significant, as the losses from affected areas were and continue to be experienced by the broader, surviving community. Various organizations and individuals responded rapidly to the emergency, with material, financial and human resource support provided locally as well as from throughout Indonesia and around the world. Two days after the tsunami, Aceh was opened to the international community to provide emergency relief services. Working with local government and local and national civil society groups, teams from foreign governments, multilateral development and finance organizations, and international non-government organizations (NGOs) provided emergency humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) was established as a UN Common Service to the humanitarian community working in Sumatra. It serves as the information sharing and data exchange platform in order to improve coordination and operational decision making related to tsunami and related disaster relief and recovery. Immediate support by UNDP in response to the Aceh crisis was linked to medium-term recovery programming, in order to support an effective transition from immediate emergency relief activities towards sustainable recovery from the crisis. The Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR) was established to provide grant and technical support to enhance the response and recovery efforts of Government and civil society in Aceh. It is being undertaken through partnerships with local and national Government authorities, national NGOs, local civil society groups, the private sector and international development organizations. Implementation of specific activities is undertaken in partnership with UN specialized agencies, including UN Habitat and ILO. The UNDP is also coordinating closely with agencies such as FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WHO and others. To support the ERTR Programme, UNDP established programme offices in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh (Aceh Barat), as well as a logistical support office in Medan. UNDP is currently establishing a presence in Calang (Aceh Jaya).

1 Data from SATKORLAK, Aceh. Other data cited in this report is taken from HIC statistics, unless stated otherwise.

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What is civil society? Civil society encompasses many disparate actors. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are made up of freely and formally associating individuals pursing non-profit purposes in religious bodies, recreation clubs, professional associations, action committees, unions, social movements and so on (see UNDP Civil Society Source Book, pg. 9). CSOs are part of the self-initiated, voluntary sector and include: Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) formed for mutual benefit or around a common interest; Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations (IPOs) formed for mutual or public benefit, according to shared ethnicity, language, culture or history; Public and Mass Organisations (Pos/ Mos) formed as federations or networks and usually formally registered; and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), also formally registered. Civil society in Aceh is detailed in Section 4.

In order to appropriately support CSOs in Aceh, including those local groups working to re-establish and improve livelihoods with and for local people in Aceh, the UNDP undertook an assessment of CSOs’ capacities and related needs. The assessment forms the basis of a detailed programme for supporting capacity development amongst CSOs in Aceh in relation, but not limited, to sustainable community livelihoods. 1.2 Approach to the assessment The assessment had several objectives, but was primarily intended:

• To facilitate self-reflection and assessment by CSOs of their own organisational and technical capacities;

• To enable ‘independent’ observation and evaluation of CSOs’ organizational and technical capacities;

• To assist CSOs in acquiring or improving knowledge and skills related to sustainable livelihoods and community development; and

• To promote constructive networking between stakeholders, in particular between CSOs.

As noted above, the ultimate purpose of the assessment was to provide information on current capacities and needs, so that an appropriate, detailed programme strategy and activities could be planned for the development of CSO capacities to support community recovery in Aceh. The assessment was conducted between March and May 2005 and involved a series of processes and activities carried out by two teams. The teams sought a locally-grounded understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities for developing CSO and sustainable livelihood capacities in Aceh. A series of processes and activities was necessary given the multiple objectives and the diversity of CSOs in Aceh, as well as the different ways the tsunami impacted on different geographical areas. One team of community development professionals from the Association of Community Empowerment (ACE)2 and a facilitator from the Aceh Development Fund worked with CSO participants in a two-day workshop held in Medan. Another team of local (Indonesian, including Acehnese) and international consultants worked with various government and civil society stakeholders, including community members, on a survey and week-long series of workshop and field-based training activities in and around Meulaboh in West Aceh (Aceh Barat), and Lhokseumawe in North Aceh (Aceh Utara). Whereas Meulaboh was severely and directly affected by the tsunami, Lhokseumawe was indirectly affected. The assessment areas are shown in Figure 1.

2 ACE has supported a total of 93 grants to NGOs and CBOs in all districts of Aceh since it launched operations there in 1999, reaching some 15,000 poor households (ACE Secretariat data, May 2005).

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Figure 1. Map of the assessment area

1.3 Report structure

This report presents the findings of the UNDP-supported assessment. The background and approach to the assessment are outlined in Section 1, and an overview of the assessment methods is provided in Section 2. The results of the assorted assessment activities are combined and summarised in Sections 3, 4 and 5, beginning with a picture of economics and livelihoods, government services and civil society in Aceh prior to the tsunami (Section 3). Assessment findings about the capacity of participating CSOs are presented in Section 4. This includes results of SWOT analyses done by CSOs, and discussion of leadership and resourcing issues, programs and networking, as well as the effects of the tsunami on CSO capacity. In Section 5, key issues related to developing CSO capacities and sustainable community livelihoods post-tsunami are discussed. Recommended considerations in plans to support CSO capacity development in Aceh are presented in Section 6, and references and links to other relevant documents are provided in Section 7.

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2. Overview of the assessment methods The assessment of civil society capacities related most particularly to community recovery and was designed as an inductive-qualitative inquiry. The main assessment activities were the workshops and training, in which individuals from CSOs participated, rather than entire organisations. An approach based on these activities, and combining multiple methods and tools, was selected given the need to engage and assess a diverse range of CSOs, and considering the time and resources available. As it was not possible to conduct detailed assessments of each CSO on an individual basis, the range of methods were selected to complement each other and to ensure the multiple objectives of the assessment were fulfilled. The main methods employed are summarised below, along with a brief explanation of how, why and when they were used.

• Rapid review of existing data. The teams conducted rapid reviews of post-tsunami data to complement their knowledge of existing literature and realities in Aceh. Accessing information through the media and the Humanitarian Information Centre, including that from other assessments and emergency response activities, provided essential perspectives on the context in which the assessment was to be conducted. Examples include the Survey on IDP Preferences, notes from the Livelihoods Working Group and the Directory of Local NGOs in Aceh Mapping Result by OCHA and MiSPI.

• Interviews and focus groups.

The team identified, met with and informally interviewed representatives from local government offices, universities, non-government organisations and communities in Banda Aceh, Meulaboh and Lhokseumawe in order to explain the purpose of the assessment, record relevant data and identify suitable participants for the survey, workshop and training activities. The team also interviewed participants and their target communities, women and youth, to clarify information collected in workshop and training activities. Focus group discussions were held with participating CSO representatives as part of the workshop activities to elicit information and share experiences related to sustainable livelihoods.

• SWOT analysis. An analysis of CSOs’ strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats was conducted as a participatory exercise in the workshop setting (see Appendix 1 for a list of participants). The SWOT record captured the CSOs’ views on their problems and potential (see Section 4.1). The process of doing the SWOT analysis enabled participants to share and learn of other perspectives and to reflect more critically on their capacities. As such, the process involved learning and capacity development for all who participated. The results of the SWOT analysis conducted as part of the assessment thus may incorporate some views and ideas from the assessment team, but is overridingly the analysis done by CSO participants.

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How are livelihoods conceived in theSustainable Livelihoods Framework? The Sustainable Livelihoods (SLFA)Framework is used to focus local actorson existing community assets andvulnerabilities, in order to understandboth constraints and opportunities fordevelopment. The SLF conceives ofcommunity livelihoods in terms of social,human, natural, financial and physicalcapital.

• Training in Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF).

The training components of the workshops were intended to more tangibly involve local people in the assessment process, engaging them in practical activities that create information and skills related to livelihoods. Training in SLF involved introducing participant CSOs and government representatives to the sustainable livelihoods framework and relevant methods and tools for participatory data collection, analysis, and action planning with communities.

• Field activities, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA).

Field activities were practical parts of the training in SLA and involved participants using PRA tools such as community sketch maps, transects, seasonal calendars and venn diagrams to explore and explain community resources, problems and potential (natural, physical, human, social and financial capital). Identifying stakeholders and dynamics, and using this and other information to develop plans and proposals, were structured activities conducted by CSO participants in areas around the Lhokseumawe and Meulaboh regions. The field activities also provided the assessment team with opportunities to directly observe CSO capacities, including individuals’ skills, attitudes and rapport in interacting with local communities.

• Evaluation activities.

Following the field training activities, a peer evaluation was facilitated whereby participants with similar sectoral constituencies (farmers, fishers, etc.) presented their experiences, shared their action plans and described the process through which the plans were created, discussed their needs and concerns with their peers, developed a common understanding of community needs and priorities, and collaborated to meet some of those needs, formulating draft action plans for each sector (see Appendix 2). A brief evaluation of the workshops by participants was also facilitated with the use of feedback forms and reflective discussion.

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3. Context and setting prior to the tsunami 3.1 Economy and services Aceh’s economy is based on subsistence traditional farming, forestry, fishing, and local craft activities conducted mostly by women, such as embroidery3. According to the Consultative Groups on Indonesia (2005:15), agriculture accounted for 32.2% of Aceh’s regional GDP and for 47.6% of the labour-force in 2003. In some areas, 85-90% of the villages’ populations of working age are engaged in farming activities. The fisheries sector is similarly critical to the local economy; it is the second most important economic activity in Aceh. However despite being rich in natural resources, poverty levels in Aceh remain on average at 29.8% (Human Development Report 2004:180; Progress Report on the MDGs, 2004:90). Peasant agriculture and fish farming are the mainstays of the people’s economy. Many local people raise cattle, goats and chickens as ‘savings’ that can be tapped for immediate cash needs, but they are mostly able to meet basic needs only and are vulnerable to sickness, natural disaster, and conflict. Indeed, violence and conflict contribute to local poverty. Particular problems that assessment participants revealed existed in Aceh prior to the tsunami include:

• Declining quality of, and reduced access to, natural resources; • Cultural norms that make women more vulnerable to poverty than men in some

regions; • Affordability of health and family planning services; • Affordability of post-primary schooling and skill development opportunities; • Exploitation of local people by other local owners of livelihood assets; • Anti-poor policies/regulations and lack of government commitment to poverty

eradication; • Threats, taxes, violence and access limitations imposed by the political and

economic conflict; and • Inability to protect one's livelihood from natural disasters.

Given the context of conflict and the restricted access and roles of the media and civil society in Aceh, detailed and accurate information on government services in Aceh is scarce. According to local people, a large gap in social service delivery between urban and rural or remote areas existed prior to the tsunami, and public health and education services were reportedly of lower quality due to poor infrastructure and the difficulty of attracting and retaining staff. As a result, there was low school attendance and low coverage of public health programs. Aceh’s power, transportation and irrigation networks were relatively poor. These deficiencies in basic services touched the vast majority of Aceh’s population - for example, only about 60% of the province’s households had access to electricity, and power cuts were common (CGI, 2005:18). During intense conflict periods, bus burning and widespread extortion on Aceh’s roads raised transaction costs

3 Data on the number of households headed by women in Aceh is not available, and no NGO is known to have conducted a comprehensive survey.

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for transport in the province4. Bus transport was extremely important due to the low levels of household access to transport, yet unbalanced distribution and coverage of the province by roads, poor road conditions and an insufficient budget for road maintenance led to high costs for both passengers and goods, and for private and public transport alike. 3.2 Community assets and strategies Community conditions in Aceh prior to the tsunami are described here based on the assessment teams’ findings, which resulted for the most part from activities undertaken with and by CSO participants in the assessment after the tsunami. In learning and using the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, assessment participants documented livelihood conditions that reveal both pre and post-tsunami realities. These are described in terms of physical, financial, natural, social and human assets, and are summarized as livelihood strategies below5. Case study examples from the assessment are included here, as they depict some of the livelihood phenomena, and in particular the challenges, that people in Aceh experienced before the tsunami and that are important considerations for post-tsunami rehabilitation and support. As noted above, physical community assets are generally not well-developed in Aceh; much existing physical capital was damaged or destroyed by conflict and violence. In response to this situation, in some areas where the incidence of conflict and violence was relatively low, some communities built physical infrastructure such as bridges, paths or roads and public buildings with their own resources. Financial infrastructure such as banks and credit institutions are lacking in the province; the few such institutions have limited coverage beyond the cities and the east coast. These institutions’ procedures and mechanisms generally exclude the poor from any services and are not well-known or used by typical village populations. As also noted above, fishing and farming activities are central to local peoples’ economies and to that of the province. People living in rural areas particularly are highly dependent on natural resources and thus their livelihoods are vulnerable to the impact of resource exploitation and natural disaster. Natural resources such as oil, gas and fisheries are heavily exploited by national and multi-national companies in Aceh, in cooperation with the government. While human development indicators show human capital in the province to be low, field experiences give a different picture. Local people have the capacity to deal with problems and challenges even though they live at subsistence levels, just meeting their basic material needs. Local people demonstrate the ability to organize themselves into community-based organizations, analyzing their situations and making decisions for responsive action. Whereas relationships between local people and the government, military or NGOs varies, and are influenced by years of tension and pain, social ties within communities are strong. At the local level, people use ‘democratic processes’ to elect their leaders and make decisions, although women have little input to decisions taken in the public domain. At the same time however, their position and influence within the household and its economy is vital. Furthermore, women’s groups have special roles in many communities; especially during difficult times, they provide material and emotional support to one another, families and children in particular. Other social structures and systems also play important roles in peoples’ livelihoods, especially in rural areas. For example, the Panglima Laot is a person that has social and cultural authority to regulate marine resource use by communities in coastal areas. Other traditional and religious structures are also fundamentally important social assets in terms of community cohesion as well as livelihoods. They have considerable influence and are important to local communities. The prayer recital groups (yasinan) and the community mosque (meunasah), where a range of 4 Such activities are not a thing of the past in Aceh, as one of the teams witnessed during the assessment period. 5 Some effects of tsunami on livelihoods are discussed in Sections 1.1, 4.1 and 5.2.

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Case of fisher-folks’ debt and income (Rp.)

Payang Boat Pancing Boat Crew size 15 – 17 3 – 4 Earnings in 1 week 2,000,000 2,000,000 Distribution of earnings: 5% tax to market 5% to Tauke Expenses : cigarettes, food, fuel, repairs Total:

100,000 100,000

500,000

1,300,000

100,000 100,000

500,000

1,300,000

Percent to boat owner Remainder divided among crew

2/5 share 520,000 3/5 share 780,000/15 = Fisher salary/wk: Rp. 52.000

1/2 share 650,000 1/2 share 650,000/4 = Fisher salary/wk: Rp. 162,500

Source: Johan Pahlawan, Meulaboh Kecamatan office.

community events take place, are examples of informal community-based organizations that illustrate the interrelationship of social, financial and natural assets in sustaining community livelihoods in Aceh. Other structures that contribute to community welfare in Aceh include the organizations, both private and public, that set and implement policy and legislation, deliver services, purchase, trade and perform other related functions. In the public domain, government agencies, with the support from armed forces, are the most powerful bodies determining and implementing activities that affect livelihoods. In some areas, the Free Aceh Movement (known as GAM) effectively has authority and thus affects local people’s lives and livelihoods. In the private domain, a few very large corporations hold rights to explore and exploit resources in Aceh, along with some medium-sized businesses. The vast majority of private sector actors are small enterprises, and many operate in an informal economy. This diversity of structures and institutions means that coordination and collaboration between actors is often difficult, especially given the distribution of power and the context of conflict described earlier. The principle livelihood strategy pursued by people in rural areas is having a combination of multiple subsistence and income generating activities. They farm and do other agricultural activities to meet family food consumption needs, while raising cattle and chicken for savings that that are sold for cash when necessary. For other cash income sources, many village women make handicrafts and men make bricks. The outcome of this strategy is an ability of the villagers to meet the basic needs of the family although, as noted earlier, they remain vulnerable to situations with unforeseen demands or impacts on their finances, such as illness, natural disaster and conflict. Indebtedness is a common phenomenon amongst rural populations in Aceh, including farmers, fisher-folk and small industries. For example in coastal areas where fishing is the principle livelihood activity, many people are trapped in cycles of debt to the ‘tauke’ or rich man in the community who owns boats and equipment and extracts rents and commission from fish catches, as well as lending money at high rates of interest. As the chief financier in such villages, the ‘taukes’ monopolise sales and income-generating assets, yet are generally perceived as beneficial to a community rather than as part of the poverty problem. 3.3 Civil society For nearly 30 years before 28 December 2004, access to Aceh by the outside community, including the media and NGOs in particular, was restricted by a series of government regulations, military operations and Marshal Law. In such an environment, the development of civil society movements in Aceh was restricted and had particular characteristics. In general, recent growth in civil society freedoms can be linked to the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the ‘reformasi’ period. The euphoria of release from Suharto’s authoritarian grasp, when the Military Operation Area status (or Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) in Aceh was finally lifted, gave space and spirit for the birth of a student protest movement. During the short term regime of President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-

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2001), steps were taken to address problems in Aceh by initiating a peace dialogue between GAM and the Indonesian government. President Wahid revisited the issue of autonomy and drafted laws that gave Aceh a larger share of the profits from natural resources. The emergence of student movements also led to a movement for victims of the DOM to publicly speak of their experiences with violence, murder, rape, and disappearances6. In course, several types of civil society organisations emerged in Aceh, all linked specifically to the various levels of conflict7: NGOs, student groups and victim groups. Their domains of activity were primarily democracy-building, human rights advocacy, humanitarian support and rehabilitation, including advocacy and assistance such as counseling to victims of the 30 year old conflict. Their activities thus placed them in direct confrontation with a militarized government that generally left no room for differences of opinion or opposition. Community organizations in Aceh were formed mainly through government projects and through NGO facilitation. Traditional and religious-based organizations also existed and continue to exist in every village but their roles vary from one community to the other. The majority of CSOs in Aceh can best be described as alternative and independent actors who work for human rights, justice, and equity. Very few CSOs in Aceh have been active in efforts to strengthen communities or mobilize resources and create sustainable livelihoods. Since 28 December 2004, the region has been opened to international scrutiny with over 300 international non-government organsiations (NGOs) initially involved in the relief and reconstruction processes. On 19 May 2005 the state of emergency in Aceh was finally lifted. Thus, the devastation caused by the earthquakes and tsunami has opened the way for access and scrutiny and, in many respects, permitted the re-birth of a civil society movement. Under these new conditions, CSOs can have a degree of autonomy and independence and have the potential to provide alternative views, policies and actions to those promoted by the government.

4. Civil society in Aceh – an overview of the post-tsunami situation

The term ‘civil society’, introduced briefly in Section 1.3, refers to the set of “institutions, organisations and behaviour situated between the state, the business world, and the family. Specifically, this includes voluntary and non-profit organisations of many different kinds, philanthropic institutions, social and political movements, other forms of social participation and engagement and the values and cultural patterns associated with them. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups” 8. In Indonesia civil society is typically understood as non-state institutions including NGOs, community groups, professional associations, religious communities and other specific interest groups that are not profit-

6 Such stories are well documented on internet sites such as ‘www.acehkita.com’, and by the East-West Center and Human Rights Watch. Testimonies were also frequently related to the assessment teams during their time in the Aceh. 7 Ishak, Otto Syamsuddin. The Anatomy of Aceh Conflict. Unpublished Masters thesis, 2002. 8See London School of Economics, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm

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oriented. Organisations such as the media, unions and political parties are not generally considered as CSOs, although they are part of civil society. Definitions and categories of civil society actors and organistions are fluid and it is common for CSOs to fit more than one definition or category. For example, an indigenous peoples’ organization may also be a community-based organization or a non-government organization. 4.1 Types, numbers, distribution and scope of CSOs in Aceh Based on the UNDP and its partners’ experience and relationships in Aceh, civil society there is comprised of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), Mass Organisations (MOs) with local followings, and NGOs including local NGOs and local branches and affiliates of national and international NGOs. Explanation and examples of these different types of CSOs in Aceh is provided in Table 1 below. The exact number of CSOs in all of Aceh province is unknown. The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) has 192 registered CSOs in their database; the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and Missi Sejati Perempuan Indonesian (MiSPI) post-tsunami survey of NGOs recorded 175 NGOs, of which 17 are in Lhokseumawe9. Other estimates of NGO numbers vary as much as 200 to several thousand. The registered local NGOs are mostly concentrated in cities and the north east coast, thus in Banda Aceh and the Lhokseumawe areas. Table 1. Overview of CSOs in Aceh

Type of CSO in Aceh

Basic characteristics Examples of CSOs in Aceh

Community-Based Organisations (CBOs)

• Formed by community, some formed by local government or NGO

• No legal entity • Already existed for decades • The leader is elected, but usually the

community head or the religious leader of the community

• The group has some knowledge of delivering community based activities.

• Based on similarity of work, religion, gender, age, etc.

And / or

• Most formed through government or

NGO facilitation since the 1980s • Has a formal management structure • Covers clearly identified target

locations, or villages or small population clusters.

• Has some knowledge of documenting activities and accounting requirements and.

• Has basic knowledge of issues, community mobilization, community- based development.

Social gathering groups with revolving funds (‘Arisan’) Village and mosque-based cooperatives Prayer recital groups (‘Kelompok Pengajian’ or Yasinan) Perkumpulan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) Employment related organizations (Trade Unions, Professional Associations, Trade Associations) Student Organizations : OSIS, KAMMI Recreational/cultural organizations Lemabaga Panglima Adat Laot (also known as Panglima Laot) Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat Adat (JKMA)

Mass Organisations (MO)

• Has a formal management structure • Covers well identified target locations

nationwide. • Very broad membership base

Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Muhammadiyah

9 A summary of the February 2005 survey findings by OCHA and MiSPI is included as Appendix 3.

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• Has strong knowledge of finances, issues, community mobilization, community-based development for specific purposes.

• Strong bargaining position and can influence government.

Sub-groups of the above, such as the youth and womens’ arms (eg Muslimat NU, Aisyah under Muhammadiyah and Ansor under NU)

Non-Government Organisations (NGO)

- Local • Mostly formed by former student/youth activists, some retired civil servants and professionals to address human rights issues and advocacy for victims of the conflict

• Has legal entity • Some started in early 90s – became

legal after ‘reformasi’ • Has a formal management structure –

usually led by founder. • Has satisfactory knowledge of

documentation and accounting requirements.

• Has general knowledge of related issues and community mobilization, community based development, monitoring and evaluation requirements.

• Sometimes receives funds from bigger NGOs (national or international), donors or the government.

Forum LSM Aceh Aceh Development Fund Yayasan An Nisa’ Yayasan Papan Flower Aceh

- National • Has legal entity and formal management structure

• Has branches throughout Indonesia • Is generally recognized and respected

by local community • Has knowledge of accounting,

community based development related issues and community mobilization, monitoring and evaluation requirements.

• Is currently receiving funds from bigger NGOs (local or international), donors or the government.

Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesian (WALHI) Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) World Wide Fund (WWF) Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi, Inisiatif dan Kemitraan Masyarakat (YAPPIKA) Perkumpulan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PKM)

- International • Has a formal management structure including technical and administrative staff.

• Has established accounting procedures per international standards.

• Covers a number of population clusters.

• Has thorough knowledge of related issues, community mobilization, community based development, monitoring and evaluation requirements.

• Has considerable years of experience in the country (or internationally) in particular thematic or sectoral areas.

Save the Children Oxfam Care International Catholic Relief Service Plan International

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Whereas NGOs are dominant in cities, in the other areas CBOs are the dominant form of CSO. Estimates of CBOs in Aceh, however, are not available. Within the category of CBO, very small, village and mosque (meunasah)-based organizations are likely to be the most numerous as they exist in every village. They are also arguably the most influential. Such CBOs in Aceh include community groups such as arisan and prayer recital groups which are small, informal and unregistered, but important associations within Acehnese society. Similarly, there are more formal, but yet unregistered, groups such as Panglima Laot, which are regional organizations that support coastal fishing communities and function as local coordinators for fishing activities and marine resource management. At the same time, there are also CBOs that are formal in as much as they have offices, but may or may not be registered. Examples include the Lembaga Panglima Adat Laot (which has a main office in Banda Aceh), organized faiths and professional associations. The other form of CBO that exists in Aceh is the cooperative, however the government cooperative movement in the early 1990s was not well regarded by most Acehnese and the assessment teams noted that most CSO participants and villagers seemed highly opposed to any notion of cooperatives, presumably because of their past, unfavourable experiences with them and the poor reputations of such organizations. As described in relation to the pre-tsunami setting, the majority of CSOs in Aceh are relatively young. Despite their involvement in a diversity of sectors, in reality their freedom to develop has been restricted and their roles have been similarly limited. Aceh’s CSOs are overwhelmingly experienced in human rights and advocacy work, and have minimal if any experience in community development, including livelihood-related work. Few network organizations exist or were active, so cross-sectoral and cross (geographic) area sharing was limited. The Forum LSM Aceh and Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil are examples of existing forums that in reality are predominantly networks of NGOs. Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil is another forum that exists but is not well institutionalized. In general, CSOs’ relationships with the government and private sector have tended to be either antagonistic, based on suspicion and mistrust, and there has been little to no collaboration. While exceptions to these generalizations surely exist, they are isolated and not known to the CSOs that participated in the assessments. Post-tsunami ‘mushrooming’ Both assessment teams found that in the post-tsunami environment, all types of CSOs were mushrooming – some had been rapidly formed from a legitimate desire to help communities cope and recover from the disaster, while others appear to have formed as a means of accessing cash, given the impressive amounts of funds potentially available to such groups through donor organisations. For example, some influential people in the Meulaboh area formed organizations such as the ‘fish sellers’ group’ (known as GAPI) as a vehicle for proposals for external funding. In addition to GAPI, the local government head (camat) of Meulaboh also formed the ‘chicken sellers’ group’ (GAPA), the ‘vegetable sellers’ group’ (GAPSU), the ‘poultry sellers group’ (GAPU), the ‘fruit sellers’ group’ (GAPBU), and the ‘(shoe) sole sewers’ group’ (Gabungan Penjahit Sol Sepatu) in March 2005, which were all provided with funding by an international NGO. 4.2 Overview of Aceh’s CSO capacities Participating CBO and NGO representatives conducted SWOT analyses, which are linked to suggestions for capacity development strategies described in Section 5. Results of the SWOT analyses by participants in one series of workshops are presented below, first for CBOs and then for NGOs. Analysis of CSO capacity by the assessment teams is then presented under the broad categories of organizational and technical capacities, and based on responses to the survey, as well as the workshop (focus group discussions) and field activities carried out as part of training. The teams’ assessment is less favourable

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than the CSO participants’ views, although both are quite critical overall. In relation to organizational capacities, leadership and resource management are discussed. In relation to technical capacities, networking and programs are discussed. Results of self-analyses using SWOT methods The SWOT analyses of NGOs and CBOs in Aceh revealed that NGOs are better organised in terms of organisational formality, staffing and operational capacities, as compared with CBOs. On the other hand, CBOs are better aware of local realities and better connected to local people ‘at the grass roots’, as compared with NGOs. In some regards, this portrait mirrors the generic definitions of these types of CSOs and thus merely confirms that in Aceh they look much as they could be expected to. However the analyses also show that communication and coordination between different types of CSOs is limited and that both are relatively inexperienced in different aspects of programming. While implementation of their activities is hindered by the social and political situation that they operate in, both CBOs and NGOs appear optimistic about future developments and perceive opportunities to grow and improve in the post-tsunami context. Table 2. SWOT analysis regarding CBOs in Aceh

Strengths Weaknesses • Best knowledge of local situation and

‘field’ conditions • Have a genuine basis amongst mass

populations • Quite strong social and moral ties • “Extraordinary” solidarity between

themselves • Some have programs and abilities to

lobby and negotiate

• Networks between CBOs are grossly inadequate

• Poor access to information • Limited understanding of management

(leadership, human and natural resource management, administration and program management)

• Weak bargaining position • “Money-oriented” at the group level • Donors tend to support CBOs that can

market themselves but they are not necessarily good implementers; good CBOs not good at promoting self and accessing donor support

• Bad coordination and communication between NGOs and CBOs

• Relatively low human resource capacity • Limited interaction with other CBOs • Cadre system more or less not working

Opportunities Threats • Direct access to the ‘grass roots’ • UU No 18 on Special Autonomy • UUD amendment that guarantees

empowerment of adat communities • Presence of international NGOs and

donor organizations in Aceh • The opportunities created by tsunami

(CBO existence is more free and there is greater room to move)

• Positive public perceptions of CBOs

• Disaster, political and social situations • Civil emergency and military emergency

behaviours in Aceh • Community negative perceptions of CBOs

and NGOs • Domination of CBOs by NGOs

Note: translated from ACE’s report on April workshops.

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Table 3. SWOT analysis regarding NGOs in Aceh

Strengths Weaknesses • Have active partner groups in

communities (with or without programs they still have networks and then use them when the time is right)

• Public trust (when there is a program, communities respond positively)

• Have networks • Have clear organizational profiles

• Dependent on donors • Minimal staff loyalty to the organization • Organisational rules are not followed • Lack of human resources/poor human

resources • ‘Divorce’ from partner groups in communities

once programs are finished • Little coordination and communication

between NGOs and CBOs Opportunities Threats

• Democratising processes including public participation

• Get donor community trust • With clear work programs it will be easier

to make activity recommendations to donors

• Reliable human resources amongst staff (promotion of cadres)

• Lack of gender equity • Intervention from outside parties (individuals,

previous managers, security forces, government and donor institutions)

• Disasters, political and social situations • Efforts to bad-name NGOs and the creation

of ‘rogue NGOs’

Note: translated from ACE’s report on April workshops. Results of team assessment of organisational capacities Although organisational capacities amongst CSOs in Aceh were found to vary, overall they were deemed to be quite weak. The assessment teams considered how the CSOs were formed, what management and organizational structures were in place, the existence of clear statements or understanding of the CSOs’ mission, vision or scope, systems and processes used for deciding these fundamental organizational parameters, as well as for recruitment, decision-making, networking and financing. An overview of some aspects of CSO organizational capacity in Aceh is presented in Table 4. Table 4. Overview of general CSO organisational conditions in Aceh

NGOs in Aceh CBOs in Aceh • NGOs are formed by several individuals • Senior positions tend to be filled by founders • Decision-making through:

• Internal/exclusive meetings • Leadership decisions

• Weak support and networking capacity • Project-based funding so reliant on external donors • Lacking recruitment/ personnel system • Low transparency • Positions or job roles within the NGO are based on

projects (no project, no job, or jobs change depending in the project at hand)

• Recruitment process highly subjective, based on friendship

• Staff status linked to donor contracts and relationships with external financiers

• No reward/punishment or staff development systems • Access to information but usually not used/ shared

(limited knowledge transfer)

• CBOs are formed by government or NGO projects

• Senior positions tend to be filled by election but mainly filled by local community figures

• Membership-based so funding from membership dues

• Decision-making through: • Open, consultative meetings • Leadership decisions

• No deliberate strategic planning • Lack of access to information • Weak coordination • Staff or member development only when

provided through NGO or government projects

The team found that NGOs and CBOs tend to have formed by different means and processes, but both are highly reliant on the senior position-holders to direct and maintain all activities. The leader is usually the founder of the organization in the case of NGOs, or the village head in the case of CBOs, and there is a tendency for both types of CSOs to run as ‘one person shows’. Understanding the vision, mission, and organizational functions

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is highly reliant on few individuals. As such, in NGOs and CBOs alike, there tends to be a gap between the leadership and staff/membership, and a related lack of organizational ‘ownership’ by staff/members. Where there is a good leader, the organization grows and develops but, in general, the hierarchical nature of local CSOs is such that management and decision-making is often top-down. Stability of such organizations, for example in their ability to maintain their membership and work activities through a period of leadership change, is tenuous. In organizations that do not have a good leader, there is often stagnancy. For example, in CBOs such as village-based women’s organizations, the leader is typically the wife of the village head or community figure. In general, this means that leadership is based on that person’s position in the community rather than on their ability. Power relations in the community are often such that people may officially be members of certain CBOs but in reality have little or no understanding of, involvement in or loyalty to the organization and its activities. NGO staffing similarly appears to be based overwhelmingly on friendship and favoritism, rather than on abilities or qualifications. As such, ‘capacity blocks’ are common, where the specific skills required for the organization to respond to a situation or act in accordance with professional standards do not exist. Organisational issues such as recruitment and staff development are not expressed within organizational plans and thus appear not to be perceived as critical to the organization’s being. In general, personnel development is seen as taking place when there is an opportunity to participate in an external organisation’s activity (such as a workshop or course). Such opportunities, while undoubtedly valuable for individuals, do not necessarily meet an internally-recognized need for capacity development. They similarly do not translate into improved organizational capacity as when staff do attend training workshops, there is rarely a deliberate effort to transfer knowledge upon return to work. The main distinction between CBOs (including those associated with MOs) and NGOs in Aceh is most apparent when considering their financial resourcing. The majority of CSOs that responded to the survey stated their lack of consistent monetary support as the greatest obstacle to achieving their objectives. With very few exceptions, NGOs in Aceh are almost 100% dependent on external assistance. They do not mobilize any significant resources to meet their operational costs, and instead draw their non-project expenses from the budgets for programmes funded by donors. The NGOs are thus project-driven organizations that can easily stray from their original missions or intentions. For some CSOs that do not have clear missions, visions or sphere’s of activity, their financial dependency - and the resultant affect on their activities and identity - is not felt as a burden in the post-tsunami because so many external agencies are looking for NGOs (and some CBOs) to run their projects. However in other areas where the tsunami assistance and related funding are not concentrated, most NGOs are unable to maintain their activities when external funding stops. Their activities change, whether in nature, location or intensity, because of the reliance on donors. Recognition of this dependence as a problem in terms of achieving sustainable development outcomes also varies between the groups. As Aceh CSO’s basic management skills and systems are not well-developed, they are vulnerable to all forms of mismanagement. In general, the assessment team considered that most CSOs would not stand up if standards of accountability and good governance were applied to them.

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Results of team assessment of technical capacities As with their organizational capacities, CSOs in Aceh vary in terms of technical capacities but are generally not strong. Generic development knowledge and capacities, for example related to participation and empowerment, as well as those related to specific fields (health, education, livelihoods and so forth) are not demonstrated in the ways CSOs approach networking or programming. Table 5. Overview of general CSO networking conditions

NGOs in Aceh CBOs in Aceh • Lack of trust between NGOs and government • Network support between NGOs limited and

based on similarity of issues (background) • Networks initiated by other organizations • Majority of NGOs are members of an existing

“umbrella organization” , BUT • Umbrella organization often then becomes an

NGO itself and the network system loses its strength because the ‘network’ is then focused on maintaining its own existence as an NGO rather than supporting the network

• Top-down relationship between government or NGO and CBO/GRO

• Weak, limited links between CBO and NGO or government

• Mass Organizations (MOs) have strong support and networking capacity

• Other CBOs have very weak support and networking capacity

• Lack of support beyond very specific issues • Networking based on similarity of issues

(background) or program from other organizations • Very weak external communication systems

The assessment teams found that CBOs, for the most part, do not have established networking or communication systems. Except for CSOs associated with MOs, networking in general was found to be a temporary arrangement, based on specific or shared issues, rather than a long-term, institutionalized practice that CSOs see as integral to their organizational and technical capacities (see Table 5). Historically, and partly due to the animosity between NGOs and government, networking between organizations was necessary for increased advocacy and alliance-building between groups, and between an organization and its beneficiaries, its partners, or other organizations within similar fields. However, networking was not used as a means to:

• Facilitate and/or coordinate, with a view to benefit from each other’s experience and expertise;

• Facilitate exchange of views and ideas between partner and other like-minded organizations; or

• Expand and strengthen civil society linkages to facilitate coordination in training, communication, information and other related areas and activities.

Where established communication networks exist, many CSOs are in the position of ‘recipient’, thus passively receiving information from a ‘provider’. This is likely because of the relatively poor infrastructure and CSOs’ lack of experience participating in networks to date. Even the region-wide CBOs such as Panglima Laot tend to have very weak communication and networking systems with their regional offices. Neither central nor regional offices were able to explain what the other is doing and regional branches only contact the Banda Aceh office when they require specific legal support. Networking for other purposes, such as to create or expand marketing networks, provide information on current market rates, share experiences or provide support with other communities, is also limited. Overall, CSOs in Aceh lack of experience in sustainable and integrated community development. Whereas CBOs and MOs are chiefly organised around a particular interest or activity (often related to culture and religion), NGOs are chiefly experienced in advocacy work targetting institutions or working with individuals but not at the community level. Only the CBOs that were funded by NGOs had programs, which were clear but very narrow in

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scope. Many CBO however, have ‘activities’ which are small in scope but are well-regarded by the people involved. At the same time, many NGO programs in Aceh are seen by their proponents as ‘charity’, and/or are designed to fulfill donor output requirements. In their lack of a target community focus, many local NGOs show minimal capacity to organize at the grass roots level and to empower their community partners. While most begin with fair intentions, in practice they are highly constrained by the need to cover routine organizational costs, such as salaries and office costs, and by their lack of knowledge about good practice development methods. That they do not use networks to address these short-comings itself demonstrates the problem. Table 6. Overview of general CSO program conditions

NGOs in Aceh CBOs in Aceh • Organization-focused strategic planning • Designed by 1-2 people with 3-6 month

horizon • Implemented and monitored by the NGO staff • Accountable only to donors • Program funding 100% linked to donor • Good grass roots links (where there are

programs) • Regional and political conditions limit program

implementation

• Limited focus, thus well-handled within structural constraints such as the limited capacities in management, administration, strategic planning

• Good communication with beneficiaries/ participatory approaches function within ‘traditional’ limitations

• In general they are their constituency • Very open to better ways of strengthening their

communities • Have realistic vision of what needs to be done and

how to do it simply. • Relatively inactive cadres

Some NGOs are very well versed in the ‘discourse’ of participation, yet in their programs very limited participatory philosophy or practices are apparent. In the assessment workshops and training, most participants’ understanding of community participation involved very narrow definitions and did not extend to capacity-building or empowerment. In fact, on several occasions the assessment team was told outright that if program ‘beneficiaries’ were to become self-reliant then they would not need the NGO workers, which would be a problem (for them) as they would lose their funding. CSO participants’ knowledge of participatory methods and tools for development work, and in particular for supporting the development of sustainable livelihoods, was similarly limited. Most participants had not heard of the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) and were not familiar with the concepts or processes of holistic, community-driven analysis or the importance of fostering local potential/assets to achieve sustainable livelihoods. They have relatively weak skills in community organising and facilitation. This does not mean that they were not interested or able to benefit from the training, but rather that there is not a strong or established competency base amongst CSOs in Aceh to support sustainable livelhood development with local communities. The assessment teams found the lack of knowledge on SLF or participatory methodologies not an obstacle, but rather an asset - in all cases, participants were impressed by the new ways of looking at their lives and work, and were open and enthusastic about the analytical and practical options made clear through the SLF. CBOs were not familiar with SLF concepts and tools, but were quick and enthusiastic in embracing them as they could see the utility to their constituents. NGOs, on the other hand, showed highly variable relations with local people in the field activities, presumably due to their lack of experience interacting in community settings. The vast differences in access to education, information, development knowledge and life experiences between the NGO workers and village residents also hindered their engagement. NGO participants were noted to have rather top-down communication styles towards villagers, as compared with participants from CBOs. Specifically linking their own roles to the SLF was

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particularly new and challenging for the participants (from NGOs and CBOs alike), in the relation to the following:

• Conserving the resources used by their target communities; • Preventing the destruction of natural resources and the environment by externally

based industries/forces; • Recognizing that essential health and education services are crucial to

sustainability; and • Strengthening and improving the contribution of women to community

development. As most CSOs in Aceh do not have the knowledge, confidence and/or financial independence to respond assertively towards outside funding bodies (including local NGOs) that engage them to implement programs or activities without adequate baseline information, consultation or preparation, there exist numerous examples of ineffective development programs and interventions around the province. In one post-tsunami example, there was a rush to replace boats for fishing communities along the west coast, so international NGOs placed large orders with a boat-making cooperative in Bireun. Upon delivery, the target fishing communities would not accept the boats because they were designed and made according to east coast traditions, not west coast traditions10. Such examples reflect the context of rapid response to the emergency, and highlight the importance of using baseline social and cultural information when donor or funding parties try to support local CBOs in recovery projects. Supporting livelihoods initiatives being implemented through CBOs (such as Cash for Work to reclaim farming lands and roads, and replace lost boats, fishing nets, tractors and other such essential equipment) is necessary, however to for the initiatives to be appropriate and sustainable it is important to be realistic about the capacities of the CSO community in Aceh. Targeting capacity-development assistance to respond to the capacity limitations outlined above is discussed in Section 5. 4.4 Additional challenges due to tsunami (effects of disaster on CSOs) According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Indian Ocean tsunami extensively damaged Indonesia's coastal environment, causing $675 million in losses to natural habitats and important ecosystem functions. In Aceh and North Sumatra, 25,000 hectares (ha) of mangroves, some 32,000 ha of previously existing coral reefs, and 120 ha of seagrass beds have been damaged. The livelihood impacts of such environmental devastation are enormous and far-reaching. Since Aceh was opened to international assistance 2 days after the tsunami on 28 December 2004, the demand on local CSOs as implementing partners by the international community and national organizations has been enormous. As previous assessments found immediately following the tsunami, local CSOs were severely constrained by the extensive loss of personnel by mortality and displacement. Many old NGO/CBO linkages were similarly broken. Nevertheless, local CSOs in Aceh swiftly mobilized themselves to assist with relief efforts, as well as to prepare for participating in the longer-term reconstruction and recovery activities. 10 Team member’s personal communication with FAO’s Banda Aceh office and verified by fisherfolk in Meulaboh.

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The Master Plan promotes:

• locally and culturally appropriatesolutions;

• community participation and broadstakeholder input;

• holistic and integrated approaches; • transparency; • accountability; and • effectiveness.

As well as making their own efforts, CSOs in Aceh have been working with approximately 300 international NGOs. These organisations are able to attract the best and brightest of local staff away from their CSOs, which also impacts their capacities. As the assessment teams found that CSOs in Aceh tend to be highly dependent on individuals, the loss or movement of key people since the tsunami has major impacts on the functioning of the organization. Much as the international organizations compete to partner with local CSOs, the local CSOs are also competing for access to the new funding sources available since the tsunami. As noted in Section 3, many new CSOs have formed since the tsunami. In some cases, Banda Aceh-based NGOs are juggling several international donor contracts simultaneously, which may involve them using questionable methods and may lead to unfortunate outcomes. The local CSOs’ organizational capacities in managing funds, cooperating and networking across sectors, and technical capacities in designing and implementing participatory programs, based on a functional understanding of sustainable livelihoods and community organizing, have not been comprehensively addressed.

5. Key issues related to developing CSO capacities and sustainable community livelihoods post-tsunami

Since the tsunami led to the opening of Aceh to international access and scrutiny, political freedoms and civil liberties that were weak or missing in the province for more than 30 years are taking root. Although the devastation caused such transition and created a sense of freedom and safety for much of the general population, it also resulted in new demands on all segments of society for their participation in the post-tsunami reconstruction process, and in economic, social, and political life more generally. In the Indonesian Government’s Master Plan for Aceh Reconstruction there is commitment to, and scope for, collaboration across different sectors and groups in society, as well as for public participation. The government has allocated funds and created an office to specifically monitor and coordinate the reconstruction through participatory principles. It has even created a tax-deductible status for contributions to NGOs through the ‘Aceh Recovery Fund’. Thus, there are clear opportunities for CSO strengthening in general, as well as related to sustainable livelihoods work specificially. Key issues arising from the assessment are discussed here in relation to post-tsunami civil society capacity development and sustainable livelihoods support in Aceh. 5.1 Government’s Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh, Nias

and North Sumatra BAPPENAS, the National Development Planning Agency, coordinated the development of the Government of Indonesia’s Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh, Nias and North Sumatra (‘the Master Plan’). The Master Plan seeks to strike an optimal balance between the interests of key stakeholders and key public policy objectives. It is informed by the vision of an advanced, just, safe, peaceful, prosperous, and environmentally-sustainable Aceh, in which local culture, regional autonomy, and national unity are upheld and respected.

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The Plan states that “Under the oversight of the new Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), local governments are to facilitate the participation of the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process” (Master Plan Summary, 2 May 2005). Some operational notes from the Master Plan include:

• From village to provincial levels, establish Development Councils (DCs) with representatives from the public and private sectors and NGOs. This structure will allow horizontal and vertical coordination in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process; and

• The primary mandate of communities and NGOs is small-scale activities. However, local governments and the private sector must involve communities in decisions concerning large- and medium-scale activities.

The inclusion of a participatory basis for reconstruction through local cross-institutional collaboration provides an excellent opportunity for a broad-based and interactive collaboration among government and civil society, with support from the international community. However, while stressing the role of community participation in rebuilding affected areas, the Master Plan acknowledges that it can be difficult to put the principle into practice, because the concept has not yet been successfully institutionalized in the development process throughout Indonesia. Much as CSOs in Aceh are not strong in participatory development approaches, government actors are generally not knowledgeable or experienced in methods of engagement that constitute effective public or community participation. Empowering local non-government actors is arguably a new concept for government in Aceh. The assessment results thus highlight two issues that will be important in terms of implementing these aspects of the Master Plan, namely:

• Poor relations, including the lack of trust, and a lack of experience in coordination and cooperation between actors; and

• The gaps in organizational and technical capacities, which will affect fulfillment of roles and quality of input in participatory processes.

5.2 Livelihood recovery issues The assets of many self-employed persons including fisherfolk and farmers, small vendors and micro-enterprises were largely wiped out by the tsunami. Knowledge, skills, networks and other forms of social capital that are integral to peoples’ livelihoods were also affected by the tsunami. In all areas visited, the assessment team found that most aid organizations were still acting in ‘emergency’ mode, providing special programs to replace working capital and materials. Initially and at the time of this assessment, local people’s livelihood recovery needs were being met through grants, Cash for Work, retraining, and replacement of basic livelihood materials or equipment. In general, the team found that assistance was overwhelmingly focused on the most basic of livelihood needs (food, water, housing, money) and that consideration of future livelihood sustainability was limited. In order assist people and communities to restart farming and economic activities, to improve the general welfare of the population, and to establish sustainable development and diversification of livelihoods, the initial activities would appear to have been helpful, but further considerations are important for long term support. The livelihoods conditions of the province must be recognized as having only been at subsistence levels prior to the tsunami. As outlined in earlier sections, there were numerous constraints on local livelihoods, including conflict, poor government services, relations in the community and reliance on traditional money-lenders. Livelihoods were generally neither ‘good’ nor sustainable, and poverty was widespread. Such recognition

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raises the question of whether future livelihoods programs aim merely for a ‘recovery’ of the pre-tsunami situation, or for authentically sustainable livelihoods in Aceh. The will to employ a sustainable livelihoods approach and support the related outcomes has implications for the type of support provided to communities, CSOs and government. The SL approach offers insight as to the ways forward when considering types of support to provide CSOs (and government) in order to assist with livelihood recovery and longer-term improvement. For example, while restoring the material assets and skills of people engaged in farming activities is essential for Aceh’s recovery, in order to develop the agricultural sector, broader land reforms are also necessary. Aspects of land administration, land and water rehabilitation, and sub-sectoral strategies are all part of this ‘package’. It requires strengthening the capacities of local provincial/district officials as well as field workers in technical (extension) roles. It also involves developing local expertise through the education system. Diversifying production and market access requires the support of skilled extension officers, as well as supporting infrastructure. Activities include seed and machinery/equipment provision, communication and transport, training and recruitment, project prioritization, planning, implementation and coordination. Micro-finance and small enterprise support is similarly critical and supportive policies are essential. CSOs, in cooperation with local officials, should take the lead in such activities, but are likely to require training and support to assist assessing and developing market options and identifying investment opportunities, organizing and mobilizing communities, and providing relevant production and marketing skills. In particular, advocacy for policies to assist Acehnese people to compete with the more organized and professional Medan-based suppliers will be required. Promoting food security and local supply as the priority in Aceh-based markets, for example, requires deliberate policy intervention, otherwise the tons of food aid imports will continue to impact on market prices and competitiveness, and ultimately undermine efforts to develop sustainable livelihoods for the majority of Acehnese people that work in agriculture and fisheries. In general, the assessment teams found that such an holistic perspective of livelihood recovery was lacking in CSO work in Aceh and in the government’s reconstruction planning and activities. Copies of draft sectoral plans developed by CSO participants in the assessment are included as Appendix 3. Other suggested inclusions in programs of support for sustainability of livelihoods Aceh are:

• Exploring and addressing the multiple factors that influence livelihood quality; • Highlighting the impacts of policy and institutional practices on livelihoods; • Explicitly relating program outputs to improved livelihood outcomes (not just to

resources or sectoral outputs such as yields, boats, tractors, etc, but to changes in local actors networks, skills, critical awareness, and importantly, consumption and incomes);

• Incorporating principles of flexibility and responsiveness to people’s changing needs in the design (through, for example, adopting process approaches and conducting participatory reviews on a regular, perhaps seasonal basis);

• Seeking and strengthening partnerships with organisations that can benefit from, and ‘mainstream’, using a SL approach in other work; and

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• Reorienting existing programs to produce more integrated and sustainable livelihood outcomes.

5.3 Major capacity development needs Major capacity development needs outlined here relate to Acehnese CSOs’ ability to:

• operate as effective organizations; • contribute to the achievement of sustainable development outcomes with

communities in their areas of work; and • participate meaningfully in the processes open to them through the government’s

Master Plan for Aceh Reconstruction, particularly interfacing effectively with government and private sector actors.

The needs relate primarily to individual and institutional change, and include an assumption that improvements in CSO capacities occur as a result of both individuals’ knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours, and the systems, procedures and facilities used by the institution that such individuals work in. The capacities that require developing and/or strengthening are interrelated, however they can be broadly categorized as organizational capacities and technical capacities. Assistance to develop these capacities is required by most known CSOs in Aceh, all the while recognizing that some NGOs have slightly better organizational capacities than CBOs and that some CBOs have slightly better technical capacities than NGOs, particularly in areas that rely on community engagement. The required foci for support to developing capacities to promote community recovery in Aceh are as follows:

• Organisational capacities - o Strategic planning o Human resource management and human resource development o Financial systems and reporting o Information technology, including records management and databases o Writing and reporting, including proposals, profiles, newsletters o Networking, including building and maintaining external communications o Programme development o Project / program management, including monitoring and evaluation

• Technical capacities -

o Participation and empowerment, in terms of ethos, objectives and processes o Participatory methods of stakeholder engagement, for example in dialogue, in

data collection or analysis, other planning activities, program implementation, monitoring, evaluation

o Community organizing, including facilitation and presentation o Conflict resolution o Advocacy and lobbying o Negotiation and decision/agreement facilitation o Training and education

These technical capacities may be seen as generic to human or social development, whereas as other specialized technical capacities exist in relation to particular disciplines (for example, health, education, agriculture or trauma counseling). Depending on the CSOs’ particular mission or mandate, assistance for strengthening particular or specialized technical capacities may also be required. For example, further training coupled with experiential learning and coaching in the use of the sustainable livelihoods framework

27

(SLF) over an extended period would be appropriate to develop certain CSOs’ capacities in the area of community livelihoods. The other major area for supporting capacity development amongst CSOs to promote community recovery is with capital, either as grants or as access to credit. Fostering supportive networks and processes of dialogue and engagement between actors across Aceh, rather than around issues, is similarly important. The ways in which support and assistance are provided are critical to ensuring capacities are genuinely developed. Recommended approaches and methods are discussed in the final section below.

28

6. Recommendations for supporting civil society capacity development and sustainable community livelihoods in Aceh

Both CSOs and local government require comprehensive and strategic approaches to capacity development, recognizing the context of their existing (pre-tsunami) and emerging (post-tsunami) needs. Issues associated with previous capacity development in Aceh should be taken into consideration. According to participants from NGOs, CBOs and government, activities in the past have generally been:

• formulated without sufficient prior assessment of needs and did not build on existing projects;

• not participatory in design or implementation. Stakeholders and by capacity-building institutions involvement was minimal;

• without regional or national coordination, and thus a missed opportunity for establishing formal and informal networks of information dissemination that could greatly improve efficiency and help to empower actors in Aceh;

• inefficient in terms of the financial mechanisms and funds usage, such that implementers’ accountability to participants or beneficiaries was low;

• not results-oriented, in that the activities were not planned or carried out in a way that would produce a change or intended impact on the target beneficiaries;

• not meaningfully evaluated. With a more systematic use of indicators or benchmarks, the monitoring of and building on successes would lead to greater capacities over time.

Key priorities identified in this report for a future programme of support to local CSOs in Aceh include:

• strengthening of CSOs organizational and technical capacities, including but not limited to training trainers, holding short courses and training workshops;

• providing technical guidance and capital grants to CSOs for initiatives that contribute to livelihood improvements, public participation and empowerment of local people;

• encouraging volunteerism and exchanges between CSO actors from different geographical areas and disciplinary sectors;

• fostering forums for dialogue, learning and input into policy and reconstruction decision-making; and

• developing processes and mechanisms for CSOs to independently monitor tsunami recovery programs and activities, and in the process building their organizational and technical capacities as organisations.

These key priorities are interrelated and highlight the need for capacity development amongst CSOs to be approached through formal training as well as through experiential learning to achieve sustainable outcomes. These priorities identified would together contribute to the creation of an enabling environment in which CSOs can maximize their role in post-tsunami as well as their contribution to justice, freedom and poverty eradication in Aceh. This initial assessment also verified the need for a continuing dialogue with CSOs in Aceh to continue to improve the approach to building CSO capacity during the implementation of the programme.

29

7. References cited and other sources of information Human Rights Watch. Indonesia: Human Rights Abuses in Aceh. December 27, 1990. Ishak, Otto Syamsuddin. The Anatomy of Aceh Conflict. Unpublished Masters thesis, 2002. OCHA and MiSPI. Directory of Local NGOs in Aceh. Mapping Result, End of February, 2005. Page iii. UNDP. Civil Society Source Book www.acehkita.com http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_INDONESIA_LAYOUT.pdf http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6DU466?OpenDocument

30

Appendix 1: List of Workshop Participants Participant List: Lhokseumawe

Name Position Organization Address Gender 1. Boy Iskandar Representative Panglima Laot Jl. Ujong Blang/

08136044313 M

2. Muzakir Member CDIS Jl. Merdeka No. 150 085261078460

M

3. Dodi Sahril Manager Program

SIA Jl. Air Bersih No. 7 081360275823

M

4. Ibrahim Puteh Director Karam Laot Jl. Ujong Blang M 5. Iskandar AR Director JKMA-Pase Jl. B. Rahma No.1

081360254963 M

6. Darwis Representative Panglima Laot Dewantara

B. Jaya Dewantara M

7. Ridwan Idris Director ANTRA B. Jaya Dewantara M 8. Cut Bahagia

Bayu Staff LIMID Jl. Merdeka

085261178912 F

9. Jufri Sulaiman Manager of Programs

BIRATA Jl. Kenari 72, 631096 Birata@telkom.net 08126387401

M

10. Yuli Asbar Representative LIENTAS Jl. Panglateh 08126962121

M

11. Ir. Salahuddin Director Programs

Dinas Pertanian K.B Duta No. 7, U. Bayi 08126957033

M

12. Dahlan Director AKAI Keluarga Cunda/46104 M 13. Murdani Member CDIS Cunda

085261300843 F

14. Sri Sugiana Staff LPLH Jl. Darussalam Gg. Satria 13, 081360046766 sri_sugiana@yahoo.com

F

15. Safwani Member MADIKA Jl. Baiturachman No.1 085261413171

F

16. Ir. Yusuf R Kasubid Research

Bappeda Banda Masen 48271 M

17. Fauzari Member SAHARA Lhokseumawe auzri@yahoo.com

M

18. Safnur SE Director Peternak Sejahtera Desa Alue Awe M 19. Wahyuddin Director Inkubator Bisnis Jl. Panglateh No. 10

0811676967 whachyoe@yahoo.com

M

20. Muhammad Secretary JKMA Pase Alue Awe 0811678867 musya_04@yahoo.com

M

21. Zoelnaved Secretary JCAR Jl. Blaing Muh 085260091904 flocesred@plasa.com

M

22. Yusriadi SE Finance JCAR Lancang Garam 085261484266

M

23. Kamaruddin H Secretary General

LIPMAGA Monbeudong 081360268430 lipmaga.nad@yahoo.com

M

24. Fauzi Ali Director YAMIRA Jl. Stasiun Kereta Api Cunda 081361734447

M

25. Elfira Ilany/ Cut Jauhari

Member/Director Kelompok Bordir Permai

Jl. Kenari No. 2, Kt Blang 0645-47845

F/F

26. Md. Saleh St K. Public LBH APIK Jl. Medan B. Aceh 085260010195 visicomputa@yahoo.com

M

27. Mukhlis Secretary Panglima Laot Kabupaten

Pusang Ban Lhokseumawe M

31

Particpant list: Meulaboh

Name Position Organisation Address Gender 1 Ali Basyah Staf Yayasan Papan 2 Armawati Staf YPK Jl. Abadi No. 66 Meulaboh 3 Cut Laibah Bendahara UPKsi Kec. Johan Pahlawan 4 Cut Minong

Dewi Kasie Pembangunan

Ktr. Camat Arongan Lambalek

5 Cut Mitqi Wood Kasie Pembangunan

Ktr. Camat Johan Pahlawan

Jl.Cut Mutia No. 16 Meulaboh. Hp. 081533827109

6 Rahman Panglima Laot Adat Laot Lhok Bubon-Samatiga 7 Deddy

Gunawan Staf YPK Jl. Abadi No. 66 Meulaboh.

Hp. 08126445850

8 Dedy Oranta Pimpinan Medan Peduli Jl. Imam Bonjol No. 57 Meulaboh. Hp. 08126445850. meulaboh_mp@yahoo.com

9 Effendi Adm Yayasan An Nisa' Jl. Manekroo, Lr. Paro Meulaboh

10 Elfa Suhaimi Ket. Kelompok Yayasan An Nisa' Jl. Manekroo, Lr. Paro Meulaboh.

11 Eva Mahnizar Ket. PKK Kec. Johan Pahlawan Jl.Cut Mutia No. 16 Meulaboh. Tel. 0655-7006261

12 Fatmawati Bendahara KSM Tunas Baru Mesjid Baro-Samatiga 13 Kurniafizar Angg. Kelompok KSM Lhok Bubon-Samatiga 14 M. Yatim Staf Ktr. Camat Johan

Pahlawan

15 Mahyuddin Ket. Kelompok GAPI Lr. Pasar Ikan Meulaboh. Hp. 081369223857

16 Mardhiah Angg. Kelompok KSM Lueng Rubek Pucok Lueng-Samatoga Hp. 081533827109

17 Marlisni Staf YPK Jl. Abadi No. 66 Meulaboh. Hp. 081585312976

18 Muhammad Ridwan

Anggota Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil (KMS)

Simpang Peut-Kuala, Nagan Raya. Hp. 081370495223

19 Mustafa Kamal Sek. Kecamatan Ktr. Camat Samatiga 20 Nani Erlinda Anggota Koalisi Masyarakat

Sipil (KMS) Simpang Peut-Kuala, Nagan Raya

21 Rini Sek. Kelompok Yayasan An Nisa' Ranto Panyang Barat 22 Ruswaidi,

S.STp Staf Ktr. Camat Meurebo Meureubo

23 Safrijah Kelompok Yayasan An Nisa' Ujong Tanjong 24 Saniati Pemandu UPKsi Kec. Johan Pahlawan 25 Suwitno Ket. Kelompok YPK Tanjung Bunga-Kaway XVI 26 Syamsul Rizal Ketua BP Gapencak Jl. Garuda No. 23 A

Meulaboh

27 T. Adian Ket. Kelompok Pandan Jaya (Kel. Tani)

Suak Pandan-Samatiga

28 Tgk. M. Din Sek. Kelompok Yayasan Papan 085260134711 29 Zulyadi Miska Direktur Eksekutif Yayasan Papan 08126936119

33

Appendix 2: Draft sectoral action plans prepared by CSO participants in workshop and SLF training activities (over page)

Draft sectoral plan

Target communities : agricultural

Location : North Aceh

Timing :

Objective Strategy Activity Timing Human resources

Other resources Indicator

a 25 farmers up-skilled b Groups created

1 Training (agriculture intensification) 1.1 Prepare skilled workers based

on demand (need) 3 months

Government, Campuses, NGOs, consultants, community

Meeting place c Farmers understanding of

agriculture

d Strong farmers groups 2 Farmer organisation 2.1 Form farmer groups

Technical assistance Prepare plans e Understanding of org/mgt

(Pendampingan) a Routine meetings

3.1 b Participatory preparation

of plan

Raising funds and resoruces

a Private contributions b External contributions c Proposals

3

3.2

d Other support

1 year

NGO, local government, other social institutions

Group members, location, facilitators, computer and writing equipment

4.1 Form a farmer forum

4.2 Consult with partners

Increase farming families’ incomes

4 Building networks

4.3 Sharing information

1 year

NGOs/CBOs, orgs with related visions and missions, other partners

As above

34

Draft sectoral plan

Target communities : Aquaculture (pertambakan)

Location : North Aceh

Timing :

Objective Strategy Activity Timing Human resources Other resources Biaya Indikator

1.1 Cultivate ‘kerapu’ fishlings

Nets and storage pots

Cultivate:

Household head (wive and children)

Scissors

Kerapu, Rp. 15 juta per KK a

Bertambahnya pendapatan masyarakat 1 Create activities for

community economies a Bandeng fish

1 0-30 days, once per harvest. 3-9 months for cultivate period Maintenance equip

(sikat tali)

Communities economic situation better than previously

b prawns

Household head in IDP camps Rope/string

Udang, Rp. 10 juta per KK b

Aktifnya kembali roda perekonomian masyarakat

1.2

c crabs a 1-4 months

(twice a year) Pond owners Sewing machine d Gizi keluarga meningkat 2 Develop community

awareness of needs 1.3 Sewing and embroidery Pond managers Cloth and thread

Bandeng, Rp. 8 juta per KK

Increase in per capita incomes Livestock

b 1-3 months (3 times a year) Cooperatives Kiosk and space

e Taraf pendidikan anak-anak meningkat

a Chicken Women Animal pens Kepiting, Rp. - per KK f Peran Perempuan

meningkat 1.4

b Ducks

2

c Not fixedd (sometimes monthly) CSO

Bordir dan Jahit Rp. 1,5 juta

Community needs fulfulled

1.5 Selling/ trading Traders

3 Coordinate community groups to find sources of income

Family harmony

a Chickens – 4 mth; producing eggs, 25 months

3

b Ducks – 5 mth; producing egs, 25 months

4 Understanding of gender equality, rights and responsibilities

1.6Training on human rights from a gender perspective

4 1 month

35

Draft sectoral plan Target communities : livestock Location : North Aceh Timing :

Objective Strategy Activity Timing Human resources Other resources Indikator

Local people land Community empowerment 1 Regular meetings with

community / members 1 Identify community needsNGO

Rp. 4 jt

2 Develop work schedule Government a

Tercovernya seluruh kegiatan pemberdayaan masyarakat

Donors

cash (no local credit sources) Rp. 2 jt

b Adanya klp mandiriIncrease per capita income

2 Training on specific activities 3 Implement planned

activities Business persons Livestock feed

Animal pens Rp. 44 jt c Mengurangi angka

pengangguran

4 Carry out monitoring and evaluation activities Lifting equipment d

Terciptanya SDM lembaga yang handal Create employment

3 Extension services for livestock activities

5 Develop follow up plans

Sources of funding

Raise organizational

staff capacities

Private, local government, and donors (external)

4 Improve CSOs’ managerial, financial and marketing skills

5 Training to improve other

capacities

6 Build Links with local govt, private sector and donors

6 months

36

Draft sectoral plan

Target communities : Marine fisheries

Location : North Aceh

Timing :

Objective Strategy Activity Timing Human resources Other resources Biaya Indikator

1 Strengthen groups 2 months 2 groups (80 males; 105 females)

Office and office equipment Rp. 25 juta

1 Create employment opportunities

2 Post harvest management 12 months 1 group(65 females) Ancak, Cold Storage Rp. 455 juta

aTerbentuknya kelompok-kelompok nelayan yang mandiri

2 Stimulate existing businesses 3 Provide boats and

fishing equipments 2 months 25 fishermen (40 boats) Boat equipment (wood and tools) Rp. 750 juta

4 Build an refrigeration facility 3 months 1 technician; 5

fishermen; 15 labourers Construction materials; ice making equipment Rp. 85 juta

b Terserapnya hasil tangkapan

3 Process catches 5 Dredge the bay 3 months 68 males; 12 females Dredging machine, Beko Rp. 11 Milyar

6 Training 2 months 80 males; 105 females Equipment Rp. 120 juta

4 Diversify products 7 Strengthen marketing

networks 4 months 10 group organisers Telephone, land transportation Rp. 150 juta

5 Find new markets 8 Provide business licenses (SPBU)

12 months 4 ‘tauke’ money lenders; 12 labourers Storage tanks Rp. 500 juta

9 Sanitation and clean water 3 months 54 labourers Hydrant Rp. 270 juta

6 Networking (between fishermen and with markets)

Improve community welfare, increase well being, fulfill basic needs and reduce unemployment

7 Streamline coordination with government and donors

37

Draft sectoral plan

Target communities : embroidery

Location : North Aceh

Timing :

Objective Strategy Activity Timing Human resources Other resources Indikator

1 Sewing training 3 months 20 trainers Rp. 130 juta a Terdapatnya 40 perempuan yang mahir menjahit dan membordir 1 Provide sewing

training 2 Embroidery training 3 months 40 participants

Training and work equipment

45 days 2 Provide embroidery

training 3 Training in motifs and colour combinations

b Meningkatnya penjualan

dari hasil produksi 3 Provide production

equipment

c Terdapatnya tempat

penjualan/promosi

4 Provide marketing and promotional equipment and skills

Women empowerment (housewives and young women/youth) to increase incomes by giving skills in sewing and embroidery

5 Provide additional operational funds

39

Appendix 3: Summary of findings from OCHA/MiSPI survey of local NGOs

“The December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami affected local NGOs and civil society organizations in Aceh in a very profound and personal manner. Of the 189 groups documented in this mapping exercise (including those in areas not directly hit by the tsunami): 27% have lost their own staff (dead or missing) to the tsunami. 25% were left with their offices totally destroyed or badly damaged by the earthquake/tsunami. 52% have staff whose own houses have been damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. 64% cite ‘mission drift’, i.e. have been too pre-occupied with relief work to focus on their normal organizational mandate. 20% have lost executive members of their staff to recruitment by international aid organizations in Aceh. 88% cite rising market prices (of property, salaries and vehicles) as having significantly hindered their ability to meet day-to-day operational costs. Many of these NGOs also cited other factors that have adversely affected their post-tsunami capacity, including: lack of access to the field; loss of strategic partners or contact persons; loss of equipment; loss or damage to documents and files.” Source: Directory of Local NGOs in Aceh. Mapping Result, End of February, 2005. Page iii.

40

Appendix 4. Assessment workshop participants’ suggestions for CBO and NGO strengthening

Suggested CBO strengthening strategy

Weakness Strategy • Networks between CBOs are grossly

inadequate • Poor access to information • Limited understanding of management

(leadership, human and natural resource management, administration and program management)

• Weak bargaining position • “Money-oriented” at the group level • Donors tend to support CBOs that are well-

managed • Bad coordination and communication

between NGOs and CBOs • Relatively low human resource capacity • Limited interaction with other CBOs • Cadre system more or less not working

• Develop a clearing house, form or strengthen CBO communication forums

• Database, create informal access between CBOs, information centers, community radio, communication tools/equipment, information support from NGOs

• Organisational strengthening: training (community-based management, lobbying and negotiation, leadership), staffing, maximising local wisdom and potential, promoting policies that give CBO recognition and room to move

• Strengthening organizational performance: critical education, strengthen community relations, have partnerships with NGOs, civic education

• Make the most of existing potential, develop volunteerism, self help and mutual assistance systems

• Diversification of fund-raising: efforts at self reliance including organisations’ own productive activities, trust funds, cooperation, diversifying donors, seeking public funds and logistical support

• Develop a communication forum, clarify roles and functions of each party

Threat Strategy • Disaster, political and social situations • Civil emergency and military emergency

behaviours in Aceh • Community negative perceptions of CBOs

and NGOs • Domination of CBOs by NGOs

• Situation analysis and response, disaster management, early warning system, analysis of opportunities

• Security management, strategic activities • Build solidarity, self acknowledgement,

institutional ethos, develop trust, improve research activities into negative perceptions

• Divide CBO and NGO roles, CBO to have self confidence, develop independence, build trust between CBOs and NGOs, synergise programs

41

Suggested NGO strengthening strategy

Weaknesses Strategy • Dependent on donors • Minimal staff loyalty to the organization • Organisational rules are not followed • Lack of human resources/poor human

resources • ‘Divorce’ from partner groups in communities

once programs are finished • Bad coordination and communication

between NGOs and CBOs

• Diversification of fund-raising: efforts at self reliance including organisations’ own productive activities, trust funds, cooperation, diversifying donors, seeking public funds and logistical support

• Involving staff in decision-making: be selective recruitment of staff, require clear staff commitment, give adequate work conditions, foster openness

• Have reward and punishment mechanisms, SOPs, socialize the rules

• Increasing capacity: training, apprenticeships, job swap or rotating positions

• Develop sustainable programs: have indicators for partner group self reliance, empower partner groups as part of program implementation, training for partner groups, develop feelings of mutual ownership, strengthen economic resources

Threats Strategy • Lack of gender equity • Intervention from outside parties (individuals,

previous managers, security forces, government and donor institutions)

• Disasters, political and social situations • Efforts to bad-name NGOs and the creation

of “rogue NGOs”

• Socialise and mainstream gender, prioritise gender justice policies, gender studies

• “Istiqamah”: adhere strongly to principles, rules and truth

• Develop early warning systems: situation analysis and responses, training in conflict management, lobbying and negotiation, disaster response and social analysis

• Build trust, transparency and public accountability: organization integrity, issue management

Suggested outputs and indicators for CBO and NGO strengthening

Output Indicator 1. CSOs activities are

consolidated 1.1 Number of meetings with constituents and/or

stakeholders 1.2 Number of CSO visits to their constituents and/or

stakeholders 2. Increased institutional work

effectiveness 2.1 Division of implementors’ roles and functions in

accordance with their responsibilities 2.2 Job descriptions 2.3 Timely program reporting 2.4 Have a secretariat or office, minimal 1 year

3. Instutional work plans 3.1 Draft work plans 3.2 Plans with timing and schedules for cooperation or

partnerships with other parties

42

Appendix 5. Assessment team suggestions for interventions to improve capacities related to sustainable livelihoods

CSO type Priorities Examples of interventions Community Based Organization (CBO) And local groups of Mass Organisations (MO)

• Capacity to develop and modernize the organization

• Livelihood skills development to enhance and reactivate their roles

• Household economics & livelihoods to support members

• Access to resources: finance, market, and information

• Legal & regulatory framework for their existence & roles

• Continuous facilitation

• Capacity building on self help group (SHG) management, household economics, and livelihood development

• Provide access to micro finance services, market, and information

• Advocacy on legal 7 regulatory framework

• Connect with other service providers

Non Government Organization (NGO)

• Capacity to manage the organization sustainably and professionally

• Skills in community organizing, community development, and facilitation

• Develop income generating activities (fund raising)

• Build partnership with other service providers

• Access to information on livelihoods and community

• Capacity building on non profit management, fund raising, community & livelihood skills, and networking/ building coalitions

• Provide CBO access to information