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COUNTERTERRORISM OPD PROFESSIONAL READING AND THE LESSONS THAT APPLY FROM “SECURING THE CITY” BY CHRISTOPHER DICKEY 2009 SIMON & SCHUSTER 1 LTC Mark S. Leslie – EUCOM CT/CN Planner

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COUNTERTERRORISM OPD

PROFESSIONAL READING AND THE LESSONS THAT APPLY

FROM “SECURING THE CITY”

BY CHRISTOPHER DICKEY 2009 SIMON & SCHUSTER

1LTC Mark S. Leslie – EUCOM CT/CN Planner

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PURPOSE The purpose of this brief is not to provide a “book review” of “Securing the

City”. One must read the book to discover all that is valuable in it. The purpose is to explore the methods, techniques and lessons that the

NYPD Counterterrorism Division has developed post 9/11. To turn the academic, conceptual knowledge in this book into operational knowledge in framing the CT problem set.

This will assist us in interfacing with our interagency partners and potentially allow us to see different solutions to CT problem sets in our AOR in terms of interagency partners, host nation and other assets that we currently have available to us.

“Challenge assumptions, broaden your perspectives, and look for lessons to apply yourself and to your units.”

General Martin E. Dempsey18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(in regards to professional reading)

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“The challenge is to convince the cops, the FEDS, and the spooks that they are fighting the same enemies – the forces of chaos, if you will – and to make them understand that if those enemies cooperate informally, quickly, and easily, the government institutions that are up against them have to learn to do the same thing.”

Alain BauerFrench Criminologistfrom “Securing the City”

CHALLENGES

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BOOK MAIN PERSONALITIESNYPD Police Commissioner - Raymond W. KellyBrought back by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg for a second tour of duty in the wake of 9/11 (he had served as commissioner under Mayor Dinkins in 1992 and ’93)

Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence -David Cohen, the C.I.A.’s former head of clandestine services.

Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism -Michael Sheehan, a former Green Beret and counterterrorism expert.

Formed the most ambitious intelligence operation ever organized by a metropolitan

police department

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BOOK OVERVIEW (1 of 2)

278 Pages *with notes

NYPD Police Commissioner, Raymond W. Kelly, created a new counterterrorism bureau that today numbers more than 1,000 officers. Recognized that to battle terrorism he would need to go beyond the traditional methods of law enforcement. Prevention depends on human intelligence.

Commissioner Kelly recognized that his counterterrorism bureau was going to have to be different from the federal agencies - the city’s team would have to be “an organization with minimal bureaucracy and maximum freedom of movement, able to anticipate threats and to act on that information.”

The result was basically a combination of crime-fighting and intelligence-gathering, a hybrid approach that has since become known as “intelligence-led policing.” (vs. preventive of reactive policing)

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BOOK OVERVIEW (2 of 2) Established overseas offices for the NYPD, now in over 17 countries – many in the European AOR. Different from the FBI LEGAT located in the embassy. NYPD FSO is partnered at the tactical level to work with HN investigators to determine threats to the city. (Scotland Yards headquarters in London, Paris, Lyon in Interpol headquarters, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi, Singapore, Toronto, Montreal, Santo Domingo and Amman, Jordan, etc)

Many view the NYPD as the gold standard for counterterrorism operations and a model for even the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.

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NYPD CT Mindset: Preemptive counterterrorism is offensive methods against terrorism. Terrorism is a dirty and complex business that requires unorthodox methods (out of the box thinking).

Regardless of CT success, NYPD criticized for:- Use of undercover agents and informants to spy on Americans in other cities and Islamic community

- rounding up and arresting protestors before 2004 convention- using confidential informants (CI) that may be more adept at terrorism than those they inform on

NYPD justifies methods by referencing their CT charter and is reinforced by federal and state law as well as the U.S and NY state constitutions

NYPD FSO are not administered by the DoS/CoM –=friction with FBI/CIA/DOS

NYPD - SUCCESS AT A COST

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FRAMING THE PROBLEMThe NYPD categorize terrorism as one of the city's highest-priority and highest-risk hazards and ensures city-wide preparedness. Where does CT rank in EUCOM/SOCEUR?

Assess AOR risk vulnerabilities to strengthen resilience to high-priority and high-risk hazards. What is our biggest risk/threat for terrorist incidents? Where can we have the most offensive impact through the IA and HN and what are we doing through our own, PN and IA active and passive measures to prepare for an attack defensively (AT) = CT/AT synchronization

Preparedness is not a linear or divergent process. Preparing for our biggest vulnerability is bound to strengthen our Counterterrorism mission of defending the homeland.

Can we glean helpful strategies based on what the NYPD does on a regular basis?

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LESSONS LEARNED Quality of life enforcement (QOL)– “take care of the little things, big things will take care of themselves”

- discounted by some - “graffiti enforcement does not transform a neighborhood into a crime free zone”. Flawed perspective of the problem and effort

- QOL enforcement works to reduce crime because it allows the cops to catch crooks when the crooks are off duty. Small infarctions warrant arrest, nail for bigger crimes. Potential method for EUCOM – know HN laws being violated, use international law to interdict terrorist

- Hawalas – CTF efforts, international banking laws, HN financial proprietary laws etc.

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LESSONS LEARNED Counterterrorism Deployment – Random, visible and unpredictable deployments of NYPD personnel to suspected templated and vulnerable sites “show of force deterrent”. More of an AT function. Questions to ask: Which of our PNs do this – if any? Can we influence them to do this in support of our AT?CT efforts? Can we use this technique as a “canalizing tool” for CT into a region?

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LESSONS LEARNED Intelligence Led Policing – Hampered by lack of intel sharing of suspects. Maryland state trooper stopped 9/11 hijacker two days before – was on a watch list already – was not know by Maryland State. Federal agencies reluctant to release information to other non-federal Police due to sensitivity. Compartmentalization is necessary, but can lead to failure.

- Our AOR challenge is to release intel to PN and OGA to enable them to arrest and prosecute. Can we have SJA and FDO look at nominated individuals on a “deep dive” to find a method to engage/prosecute/nominate these targets?

Public Affairs – NYPD uses PA effectively to publicize success and create discontent as well as publicize the NYPD state of readiness = drive them elsewhere.

- IO/PAO – Deliberate publicizing of successes in regards to CT in order to canalize nominations/targets. IO/SC manipulate messages for effects. CT plans need to have a phased PAO/IO/SC method/end-state that is synchronized with overall CT approach.

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UNCLASSIFIEDLESSONS LEARNED

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LESSONS LEARNEDWhere is our target/effort/ CONOP in this process?

How to stop it?

No way to stop it – but we can disrupt / divert

-NYPD answer – send in the spies -spy vs. spyQOL policing- Identify the “catch” –targeting networks not people

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The NYPD believes that the “criminal standard” for federal investigators, allowing more leeway watching, infiltrating and recruiting among members of incipient terrorist cells who have, in fact broken no laws, but may be headed in that direction will/must be lowered in regards to counterterrorism.

Our challenge is to determine the “terrorist standard” in our PN countries in regards to our definition of terrorist as well as the “criminal standard” and determine the nexus of the two in order to effect arrest, detention or deportation by PN or OGA. This should be a effort of the CT SJA representative for every nomination on the target list. Integrate into the targeting process..

CRIMINAL STANDARD vs.

TERRORIST STANDARD

LESSONS LEARNED

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RISKDHS has a list of cities at risk in the US. Divided into two Tiers:

Tier 1 – Top 6 cities at risk for terrorist attack Tier 2 – Dozens of cities & no set number Reviewed and updated annually, based on global situation and

intelligence AQ targets focus on small targets with high symbolic value, Sodom & Gomorra sites, symbols of wealth, instant & massive media coverage -vulnerable

What are the AOR most vulnerable operations or sites (or NATO/UN)? Are we nested with whoever does? How can we in the CT core nest CT efforts under the charter “protect the homeland and US interest abroad” with this list? Can we garner PN support – tie theirs with ours?

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“Bad guys, whether they build an ammonium nitrate bomb or shank someone for their wallet, are bad guys.”

Determine the nexus of the terrorist networks, be it criminal or terrorist by definition is irrelevant, in our AOR with OGA and PNs to eliminate the “bad guys” .

CLOSING

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