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Climate science and the way weought to think about dangerRaino Malnesa
a Department of Political Science, University of Oslo,NorwayPublished online: 08 Aug 2008.
To cite this article: Raino Malnes (2008) Climate science and the way we ought to thinkabout danger, Environmental Politics, 17:4, 660-672, DOI: 10.1080/09644010802193757
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644010802193757
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Climate science and the way we ought to think about danger
Raino Malnes*
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway
Those who warn that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases mayprecipitate climate change have good cause. But there is both epistemic andstrategic reason to be frank about uncertainties surrounding climatescience. First, a conjectural assessment of danger is all that existingevidence permits and, secondly, sound scepticism may drive out nihilisticscepticism, that is, the notion that nothing ought to be done as long as wecannot be sure about the impact of emissions. Scientists associated with theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change tend to ignore reasonabledoubt. This is apt to do their otherwise worthy cause disservice.
Introduction
Human activity creates grave danger of climate change, or so I shall argue.Such an argument may seem redundant by now, but it is a necessary backdropfor what comes, namely a series of misgivings about ways and means of gettingacross the message that dangerous climate change really exists. In the secondsection, on the problem of uncertainty, I shall target the assertion thatunabated anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols arevirtually certain to produce significant adverse effects. This argument has longbeen heard from scientists associated with the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC). As it transpires, the contributors exaggerate the levelof confidence that can be placed in theoretical simulations of the climatesystem. Are they right to do so?
Exaggerating with a view to alerting people to danger need not be wrong.In the present case, however, it is most likely a strategic blunder, hinderingrather than furthering an appropriate response to climate change. Anotherquestionable way of shoring up the call for radical action is to claim thatdanger exists because most scientists who do climate research say so. In the
*Email: [email protected]
Environmental PoliticsVol. 17, No. 4, August 2008, 660–672
ISSN 0964-4016 print/ISSN 1743-8934 online
� 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09644010802193757
http://www.informaworld.com
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third section, I first cast doubt on the validity of this argument and thenimpugn it on strategic grounds. Finally, in the last section, I shall ask whetherinsistence on the fallibility of climate science will hinder effective politicalaction because people will not take it to heart that danger exists.
What follows is certainly no comprehensive assessment of how people canbest be alerted to the danger of climate change. It rather gives vent to anapprehension that (as far as I know) has yet to go on record: those who warnabout danger often rely on argumentation that may do the good causedisservice.
Danger
We are in danger of disrupting the climate by altering the chemicalcomposition of the atmosphere, and we ought to mend our ways. To justifythis contention, I shall set out a general formula for detecting and dealing withdanger. It is a parsimonious model, but I think no worse for that. The basicidea is that danger is a combination of high stakes and unfavourable odds. Itexists whenever a certain course of events is liable to bring about a very adverseoutcome. People often alert each other to perils, but most live as if real dangeris rather rare, and this inclination towards complacency is reasonable.Consider a concrete case, evoked in these lines by W.B. Yeats (from AmongSchool Children):
What youthful mother, a shape upon her lap . . .Would think her son, did she but see that shapeWith sixty or more winters on its head,A compensation for the pangs of his birth,Or the uncertainty of his setting forth?
Forget birth pangs and concentrate on children’s uncertain prospects. Somegrow up to become wretched adolescents who make their parents miserable.The stakes are accordingly high, but the odds are largely favourable. Youshould not think twice about having a child unless there are grounds toanticipate that this particular child is going to get off on a bad start. In general,neither the mere possibility of an adverse outcome nor unsubstantiatedwarnings are of great concern. The same goes for substantiated, but lowlikelihood, projections that the worst will come to the worst. This is to draw akind of epistemological dividing-line between pseudo-danger and real danger.Below a certain threshold, barring evidence that something is sufficiently likelyto go quite wrong, it behoves us to feel safe.
Alternatively, one may attune one’s concern to the expected (negative)value of an ominous course of events. On this view, the existence of dangerdepends on the product of stakes and odds: the badness of what will at worsteventuate, multiplied by the chance of misfortune. The greater this product, themore reason for concern, and if stakes are sufficiently high, danger prevailseven with fairly favourable odds. This implies, for example, that having a child
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is always dangerous, which is preposterous. Still, there is some merit in makingthe threshold-conception of danger sensitive to particularly high stakes. Ifmany lives, not just my life, may be ruined by a certain course of events, it takesless unfavourable odds for these events to cross the line between pseudo-dangerand the real thing.
What should be done about danger? Some people relish it, but thesedaredevils notwithstanding, it calls for precaution. Yet whether or notprecaution ought to be taken in any given case also depends on the price ofprecautionary measures. Sometimes safety can be procured without muchsacrifice, and then it would be foolish to trust one’s luck. Often, however, theaim of safety has to be balanced against concern about costs, and occasionallyliving with danger will be preferable to doing something about it.
What, then, about anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions? Are theydangerous, and if so, should we cut emissions or rather sit events out, hopingfor the best? The stakes are high. Suffice it to say that climate change may leadto rising sea levels that in turn render large areas of land inhabitable in manyparts of the world. Determining the odds of such events is more of aconundrum. While it is known that global mean temperature has risensignificantly over the past century, there is disagreement about the cause of thissurge.
The greenhouse theory says that a large contribution comes from by-products of human usage of fossil fuels. This theory is supported by computermodels that simulate interactions between various components of the atmo-sphere. The reliability of the models is attested by the fit between post hocpredictions and observed temperature developments over the last 100 years. Bycontrast, the theory of natural variability says that global mean temperatureshifts owing to many factors, notably variations in solar radiation. Humanactivity makes little difference to these cycles. We just happen to find ourselveson an ascending slope of a curve that alternately rises and falls (see e.g.Svenskmark 1998).
Is the greenhouse theory credible? The underlying models depict extremelycomplex physical processes, and every simulacrum of these processes hasshortcomings. However, all existing models agree that, as the meteorologistKerry Emanuel (2007, p. 12) says, ‘one cannot simulate the evolution of theclimate over the last 30 years without including in the simulations mankind’sinfluence on sulfate aerosols and greenhouse gases’. The convergence ofprojections on this point lends the greenhouse theory credibility. This, in turn,indicates bad odds. It suggests that unmitigated anthropogenic emissions arelikely to cause alterations of the climate system, with a continuing rise in globalmean temperature. Thus, there is reason to place the prospect of anthropogenicclimate change above the dividing line between pseudo-danger and real danger.
Any serious effort to curb emissions of greenhouse gases has to put the lidon energy consumption in affluent countries. Those who live in developingsocieties may for their part be obliged to forgo some comforts previouslyassociated with economic development. The cure is liable to be painful, and
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even so something ought to be done. I shall not, however, delve into the manyethical questions this contention brings in its wake. I will put to one side, forexample, the important question of how the burdens of reducing greenhousegas emissions should be distributed, which is investigated elsewhere in thisvolume by the contributions of both Page, and Jagers and Otterstrom). Whatfollows relates to normative and epistemological questions about opinion-making. What should be done to convince people about the need for a climatepolicy that may serve to avert danger?
Uncertainty
Scientists associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changestand at the forefront of those who influence the way climate issues are viewedand debated. Journalists, politicians and assorted celebrities may be shapingpublic perceptions more directly, but opinion-makers outside the ranks ofscientists take their cue from scientific communication. In the first report of theIPCC, published in 1990, it was claimed with assurance that human activitycauses climate change. Three working groups contributed to the report, andWorking Group 1 says in the summary of its findings:
We are certain of the following: . . . emissions resulting from human activities aresubstantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases . . .These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in anadditional warming of the Earth’s surface. (IPCC 1990, p. xi)
A little later in the text, however, the assessment is more guarded:
Global-mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.38C to 0.68C over the last100 years . . . The size of the warming is broadly consistent with the predictions ofclimate models, but it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability.Thus the observed increase could be largely due to this natural variability . . .(IPCC 1990, p. xii)
Confidence is fainter still in the main body of the report.
The inherent variability of the climate system appears to be sufficient to obscureany enhanced greenhouse signal to date. Poor quantitative understanding of lowfrequency climate variability (particularly on the 10–100 year time scale) leavesopen the possibility that the observed warming is largely unrelated to theenhanced greenhouse effect. (IPCC 1990: 254)
This is to say that what we observe with respect to temperature and weatherdevelopments are either an enhanced greenhouse effect or an instance ofnatural variability. It appears that both hypotheses are serious candidates fortruth.
The next report of the IPCC, which was completed in 1995, points out thatthe ‘ability to quantify the human influence on global climate is currentlylimited because the expected signal is still emerging from the noise of natural
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variability, and because there are uncertainties in key factors’ (Houghton et al.1996, p. 6). Granted ‘uncertainties in key factors’, it is presumably prematureto say that natural variability is ‘noise’ that obscures the ‘expected signal’ ofhuman influence. But this is what scientists customarily assume.
In the latest IPCC report, published in 2007, the summary of the contri-bution from Working Group 1 is sprinkled with protestations of confidence inthe greenhouse theory. We are told that ‘[m]ost of the observed increase inglobal average temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to theobserved increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’, whereas it‘is very unlikely that climate changes of at least the seven centuries prior to 1950were due to variability generated within the climate system alone’ (IPCC 2007,pp. 10, 12). As the italicised terms are defined, this implies a chance of 9 in 10that human activity is the culprit. Still, the authors of the report averuncertainty about several aspects of the models that produce this preciseestimate of how dangerous the situation is. In particular, inadequacy issuspected in simulations of how clouds and oceans respond to climate change,and these processes play no small role in the causal nexus (ibid., pp. 592–593).
It might seem unfair to say that scientists who stand behind the successivereports of the IPCC feign assurance; yet there is some truth in it. Theirpredictions are hedged with reservations, but in such a way as to makeuncertainty seem insignificant. This is, on the face of it, objectionable on ethicalgrounds, but I shall not espouse that kind of criticism. My objection will ratherbe strategic: ignoring uncertainty may very well be counterproductive when itcomes to the need to generate support for a sensible climate policy.
Take ethics first. The IPCC is guilty of duplicitous communication. Thescientists who sign the conclusions of the panel’s research voice moreconfidence in the greenhouse theory than evidence permits. But this chargecan be overturned by a certain species of paternalistic reasoning. As a matter offact, people sometimes make mistakes when they weigh present costs againstfuture benefits. Some, for example, underestimate the value of savings. Theyfail to anticipate problems that swiftly follow if they spend too much oncurrent consumption. This speaks in favour of compulsory savings schemes orat least enrolling people in such schemes unless they expressly opt out.Generalising from the example, Cass Sunstein (2005, p. 177) advocates aparticular brand of paternalism:
In some cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare –decisions that they would change if they had complete information, unlimitedcognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control. Hence libertarian paternalismpromises to be responsive to both excessive and insufficient fear.
The argument seems sound. When someone does something she will surelyand sorely regret, and admonition will not stop her, manipulation is not,ethically speaking, off limits. This carries over to the issue of feigned assurance.Suppose many people are prone to take uncertainty about danger as an excusefor living dangerously. Suppose, moreover, that lecturing people on the folly of
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this attitude is futile. Neither assumption is far-fetched when (as in the case ofclimate change) dealing effectively with danger has high costs. It follows thatpoliticians are sometimes justified in overstating the case for concern, and thatscientists may have an ethical licence to cover up uncertainty, with a view todiscouraging people from living dangerously.
But permissibility is not advisability, and what I just said does not answerthe question whether it is wise, all things considered, to play down uncertaintyin the way the IPCC does. Let us assume that the more someone trusts thegreenhouse theory, the more ready she is (every thing else being equal) to dowhat ought to be done about climate change. Add the assumption thatsuccessful efforts to cover up uncertainties surrounding a certain theory willcontribute to raising trust in it. At the very least, that is, such efforts do nothave the opposite effect. On these assumptions, the IPCC has reason toexaggerate scientific confidence in the greenhouse theory provided their effort islikely to succeed. The caveat alludes to an obvious, but so far unstated, premiseof liberal paternalism. Ineffective or counterproductive manipulation lacksmerit: leading people astray is justified only if it actually caters to their long-term interests. In deciding between frank and duplicitous communication, theethical preference for frankness is not reverted unless duplicity can be expectedto meet with success in the relevant respect. Call this the success criterion.
One may object that no such criterion is needed to find out whether or notthe IPCC does right in ignoring uncertainty. It makes no difference in this casewhether the prospect of success is good or bad, as long as it exists at all. If fewpeople take scientists at their word, little comes out of the effort of stirringpublic concern, but it will still be worthwhile, granted the worthy objective ofovercoming reluctance to do what they ought to do. But things are not thissimple. When someone portrays their favourite hypothesis as certain knowl-edge, the hyperbole will scarcely go unchallenged by proponents of competingtheories. The risk is that it kindles rather than dampens down scientific debate.As the heat turns up on a contested issue, many people may come to believethat disagreement and uncertainty run deeper than they actually do. Thus, thesuccess criterion is unlikely to be met, and not only that. Protestations ofconfidence can have the perverse effect of making uncertainty more of aproblem than it really is. It makes a pivotal issue out of the question whether ornot something is known to be the case. Normally, however, the most one canask from a scientific hypothesis is that it has enough credibility to be seen as astrong candidate for truth. When scientists nurture excessive expectationsabout what science can accomplish, a shadow is cast over far-fetched andbelievable theories alike. Then well-grounded hypotheses will be more exposedto vilification than they would have been if exponents had been frank about theuncertainty surrounding them.
The upshot is that efforts to boost the credibility of the greenhouse theoryare liable to backfire. Scientific dissenters are likely to speak up loudly, andthose with political or economic interest in dismissing the danger of climatechange will benefit from this turn of the debate. They need not take on the
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arduous task of arguing that adverse effects of human activity are too unlikelyto be worth worrying about. All they have to do is disprove that adversity is aforegone conclusion. A memo from a Republican politician in the UnitedStates illustrates the last point. Articulated as a defence of President Bush’sresistance to greenhouse gas reductions, it says: ‘Should the public come tobelieve that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global warmingwill change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack ofscientific certainty a primary issue in the debate’ (quoted from Lanchester 2007,p. 5)
It is in many ways unfortunate that scientists who try to pass thegreenhouse theory for certified truth open the door to this kind ofargumentation. They play into the hands of those who are out to disparagethe theory by allowing them to trade on its margin of error. But lack ofcertainty is, as we have seen, no embarrassment to the theory and no reasonnot to act on its dire predictions.
Generally speaking, the line between pseudo-danger and real danger iscrossed long before we know for sure that calamity awaits. But many peopleneed accommodation to the idea that danger may reside in unfavourable oddsas well as the assurance that things are bound to go badly. Scientists, inparticular, ought to explain the point to the public in the way they convey theresults of their research. They should make us aware that uncertainty isresilient in even the best parts of science.
Counting heads
It appears that a majority of scientists who conduct climate research endorsethe greenhouse theory. Among them is the sizeable contingent that takes partin the work of the IPCC. Does the fact that the greenhouse theory has the bulkof qualified opinion on its side attest to its trustworthiness? The Condorcet jurytheorem provides a neat answer. It says, in pointed terms, that
if each member of a jury is more likely to be right than wrong, then the majorityof the jury, too, is more likely to be right than wrong; and the probability that theright outcome is supported by a majority of the jury is a (swiftly) increasingfunction of the size of the jury, converging to 1 as the jury tends to infinity. (Listand Goodin 2001, p. 283)
There is, in a sense, safety in numbers, and the credibility of an opiniondepends straightforwardly on the number of people who vouch for it. Thisargument, whose statistical validity is impeccable, grounds a presumption tothe effect that scientific disputes can be resolved by counting heads. Providedthe basic premise of the argument applies to the community of climatescientists – if, that is, each scientist is more likely to be right than wrong aboutthe best explanation of climate change – then the greenhouse theory, owing toits overwhelming popularity, has far more credibility than the theory of naturalvariability.
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Two objections can be raised. First, the applicability of the basic premise isnot beyond doubt in the present case. In particular, we should not assume tooreadily that each scientist is more likely to be right than wrong about thetrustworthiness of model-based simulations of the atmosphere. Consider, byway of contrast, another type of scientific controversy: disagreement over theattribution of works of art. If neither historical records nor tangible evidence(like the shaping of a hand or an eye in a painting) leave any clear clue, theclaim that one should trust overall impressions of the kind that come naturallyto an educated eye has an irreducible intuitiveness to it. For example,Giorgione and Titian are both credited the Concert Champetre, which hangs inthe Louvre, and the debate turns partly on how far the picture has marks ofGiorgione’s style or elements familiar from Titian’s work. In this case, Isuppose, Titian is (currently) the best candidate for truth because thisjudgement finds favour with the largest number of experts on VenetianRenaissance art. The more a certain attribution is endorsed in this group, thegreater its credibility.
The dispute over descriptions of the climate system differs in crucialrespects. Recall Emanuel’s reason to believe that global warming is caused byhuman activity. His averred doubt about the realism of scientific models isoffset by the convergence of model based predictions. Yet, his conclusion ishesitant. First, he points out that the models ‘are not entirely independent ofone another, often sharing common pieces of computer code and commonancestors’ (Emanuel 2007, p. 10). Secondly, important processes in theatmosphere do not allow of modelling and therefore have to be represented byparameters. ‘Changing the values of the parameters or the way the variousprocesses are parameterized’, he argues, ‘can change not only the climatesimulated by the model, but the sensitivity of the model’s climate to, say,greenhouse gas increases’ (ibid., p. 11). In effect, trusting the greenhouse theoryis tantamount to ‘operat[ing] under the faith that the real climate will fallamong the projections made with the various models’ (ibid.).
In the attribution of works of art, we may learn from the judgement of anexpert who mines a picture for epistemic considerations in a reliable, albeitindecipherable way. There is no analogy to this when it comes topronouncements on the trustworthiness of climate models. In the latter case,every relevant epistemological consideration is out in the open and equallyavailable to all climate scientists. Some of them take the problem ofparameterisation to be offset by the convergence of predictions from severalmodels, while others do not. Thus, in the midst of a complex scientific debate,there comes a pure question of where to place one’s faith. As regards thisquestion, each scientist is no more likely to get things right than wrong. Thus,the foundation of faith in one assessment or the other is not reinforced by thenumber of faithful.
One more reason to doubt the applicability of the basic premise of the jurytheorem to climate science has to do with the role played by the IPCC (Malnes2006). William R. Cline (1992, p. 3) says that the first IPCC report ‘provided an
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important occasion to reveal a wide consensus among a substantial majority ofscientists’. It seems, however, that working on the report was as much aninducement to concur on a particular point of view as an occasion to revealscientific consensus. These scientists were assigned to prepare the basis forpolitical decisions. They entered into a role that is extraneous to the onescientists primarily fill. What defines the role of scientists is a dual requirement:to seek out epistemic considerations before one forms an opinion, and to makeup one’s mind on the basis of such considerations only (where something, e , isan epistemic consideration with respect to some subject of inquiry providedthere is a fact of the matter, and e may be germane in sorting it out.) TheIPCC process mixes this requirement with another: to develop an analysis ofclimate change suitable for use in political decision-making. Research in itselfmay not be affected by conflict between the role of scientist and advisor,respectively. But the conflict shows up in scientists’ presentation of results.This, at any rate, is the conclusion that suggests itself from the kind ofincongruence in IPPC reports that was documented earlier (see the section onuncertainty above). This conclusion is buttressed by what John Houghton,who was chairman of Working Group 1 at the time of the first IPCC report,says about the task at hand:
[O]ur work was rather like the making of a weather forecast. It is of little help fora forecaster to say that the weather will change tomorrow but that he is unwillingto say in what way. The forecaster also needs to give his best estimate of the detailof that change. (Houghton 1990, p. 6)
The analogy of saying that the weather will change, but not in what way,would have been to expound competing climate theories without vesting moretrust in one than in the other. Houghton suggests, to be sure, that thegreenhouse theory is the ‘best estimate’ of where the truth lies. But, as we sawabove, scientific uncertainty surrounds the validity of computer models when itcomes to identifying all the major causes of climate change. Thus, Houghtonand his colleagues must be basing their estimate on more than epistemicconsiderations. From what he says, they seem swayed by the assumption thattheir work would serve to facilitate political decision-making only if it came toa determinate conclusion.
What happens is, generally speaking, that non-epistemic considerationsenter into the formation of someone’s belief about a certain matter of fact andinfluence the opinion she eventually arrives at. This is a well-knownphenomenon that occurs in many mundane contexts (Sunstein 2006, pp. 34–35). As people sometimes rise above such influences, scientists associated withthe IPCC are obviously not destined to be distorted in their work by taking onan extra-scientific task. But there is, as we have seen, indications of distortionwhen the result of research is conveyed to the public. Thus, climate science isnot safely covered by the jury theorem.
One more objection may be made to the idea that scientific disagreementabout climate change can be overcome by counting heads. The objection
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applies whether or not the jury theorem covers climate science. By citing thenumber of adherents to the greenhouse theory in order to verify it, one invitesrejoinders like this:
Scientists . . . who question the global warming disaster narrative [are] not hard tofind. Last year 60 of them sent a letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper ofCanada . . . disputing the contention that ‘a climate catastrophe is looming andhumanity is the cause.’ . . . Among those signing the letter to Harper were . . .(Jacoby 2007, p. 7)
Then comes a list of names, followed by the observation that ‘science of climatechange is still young and unsettled’ (ibid.). This is quite right, but does not bearon the question whether the danger of anthropogenic climate change exists.Those who advocate complacency and inaction will always be able to namesome sceptics among scientists in order to sow the impression that no theory ofclimate change is as yet dependable. The crucial issue, however, is whethermodel-based simulations of the climate give enough reason to reckon with areal danger that ought to be averted. So they do, although they may well bewrong. The contrary assessment can only be made to look sensible because thestage has been set, by advocates of the greenhouse theory, for the wrong kindof debate.
Shallow and deep belief
To sum up the argument so far, there is both epistemic and strategic reason tobe frank about uncertainties that surround climate science. First, a non-dogmatic view of climate change is all existing evidence permits and, secondly,sound scepticism may drive out nihilistic scepticism, i.e. the notion that nothingought to be done as long as we cannot be sure about the impact ofanthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Will those who mix belief with doubt in this manner take it to heart thatgrave danger exists? Or will their belief be shallow in the way of, say, mostpeople’s belief about life and death after they have accepted that Einstein mayvery well be right about the four-dimensional nature of reality? While therelativistic theory of space–time implies that no one and nothing ever ceases toexist, Einstein may be the only one to take true comfort in contemplating that adeceased friend remains ‘in existence back there along the fourth dimension’(Leslie 2007, p. 57).
Jennifer Church (2002, p. 366) says that some beliefs are ‘deep’ in the sensethat they ‘operate unreflectively, automatically generating a wide range ofthought, feelings, and behaviour’. Thus, ‘[a] deep belief in the guilt of adefendant leads automatically to thought about his character, feelings of fearor anger, behaviour that is wary or punitive, and so on’ (ibid.). If, by contrast, Igo along with the verdict that someone committed a heinous crime whileentertaining considerable doubt about it, I will not be equally disposed to reactwith fear, wariness or vindictiveness in the presence of this person. This
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argument carries over to the relationship between thought and action in thecase of climate change. Presumably, the nature of my belief about the dangerassociated with greenhouse gas emissions affects my readiness to supportreductions. Dragging one’s feet is only reasonable when adversity is distant andcan be diverted only by taking on significant short-term costs, and resolve willhardly be stiffened if, on top of this, I am told that the depiction of danger isconjectural.
I still stand by the argument outlined above and there are three reasons notto flinch. In the first place, if deep belief that danger exists is at one withcomplete trust in the greenhouse theory, then the prospect of deepening beliefwill always be slim. I argued above that scientific professions of certainty aboutthe greenhouse effect are apt to provoke protestations that fuel scientificdisagreement and pave the way for scepticism of the worst kind. This is to saythat there is no way of cultivating unquestioned confidence however much (andparticularly if) one tries by deliberately playing down uncertainties. Shallowbelief does not just accompany non-dogmatic climate science; it is more or lessinevitable as long as experts disagree.
But we may, in the second place, try to deepen non-dogmatic belief aboutdanger in order to prevent shallowness from contributing to inaction. Considerthe general nature of belief formation. It is mostly involuntary. We arefrequently not in control of what we think about matters of fact. Looking overmy shoulder and catching sight of a raging bull, I cannot but believe thatdanger looms. Belief has its own oppressive ethics that leaves little opportunityfor asking what to think. As Adler (2000, p. 2) puts it, ‘Our degree of beliefmust match our degree of evidential support’. But suppose I smell gasolinewhile driving and begin to worry whether it comes from a leak in the fuelsupply system. For all I know, the car will soon catch fire, but what do I knowabout cars? Perhaps they reek of gasoline once in a while, and I am mostreluctant to do anything right now to improve my epistemic situation. (I am ina hurry.) Still, I can make an earnest effort not to put the worst-case scenarioout of mind. Granted that the case is open to doubt, I will not be able toimmerse myself in deep belief about looming danger, but I can at least combatcomplacency. Moulding the contents of one’s thought is no small feat (seeStrawson 2003), and one may be hard put to work up concern about distantdanger, but the effort is never futile.
Finally, whether or not deep belief about danger ever comes about underconditions of scientific disagreement, it can turn out to be a mixed blessing,because it tends to foster fear. What is wrong with that? For one thing, fear isan unpleasant state of mind, which detracts from the quality of life. Some,among them Adam Smith (1976, p. 12), see it as a bane of our existence.
The infant . . . feels only the uneasiness of the present instant, which can never begreat. With regard to the future, it is perfectly secure, and in its thoughtlessnessand want of foresight, possesses an antidote against fear and anxiety, the greattormentors of the human breast, from which reason and philosophy will, in vain,attempt to defend it, when it grows up to a man.
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Smith may be right that, after a certain age, everyone will inevitably be inthe grip of many fears, but the fewer, ceteris paribus, the better. There is, inother words, a practical reason to take things calmly. In so far as peoplecontrol what they worry about, they should be wary of worrying too much. Toreach this conclusion, one need not count fear and anxiety among our greatesttormentors. It is enough that such sentiments make people worse off that theywould have been without them.
Much, however, hinges on the ceteris paribus clause. It alludes to the tensionbetween lack of fear and readiness to do that which is called for by real, albeituncertain, danger. Hence, the ceteris paribus clause ties in with the main argumentof this section. Fear, while unpleasant, may galvanise people into action byemotionally augmenting the supposition that adversity lies ahead. But I amsceptical about this means of stiffening resolve. Abating the greenhouse effect isgoing to be not just a costly affair, but an arduous one. It will take time, and largeparts of the world will be in a state of prolonged emergency. Hard problems haveto be sorted out along the way. They pertain to the ways and means of climatepolicy, as well as the distribution of costs between social groups, states andgenerations discussed by others in this volume. Will widespread fear provide afavourable condition, mentally and socially, for rational deliberation about suchproblems? Or will it be conducive to phoney problem-solving? James Lovelockcontends that the response so far ‘is just like that before the Second World War,an attempt to appease’. The Kyoto agreement, he thinks, is ‘uncannily like that ofMunich, with politicians out to show that they do respond but in reality playingfor time’ (quoted from Lanchester 2007, p. 3).
Munich is shorthand for spurious efforts to deal with real danger. Does fearpave the way for this kind of behaviour? On the one hand, it will prevent usfrom putting danger out of mind. On the other hand, fear may spur make-believe solutions to hard problems precisely because it is such a torment thatone naturally looks around for an instant antidote. No positive result can comefrom speculative psychology, but a negative conclusion emerges. Fear cannotbe counted on to galvanise those of us who are loath to take costly precautionagainst climate change. However much it counteracts the reluctance to doanything at all, it may encourage the wrong kind of climate policy. Thus,shallow belief of the kind that sound scepticism brings it its train is notnecessarily a bad thing.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to two anonymous referees as well as Kim Angell, Ludvig Beckman, JakobElster, Eli Feiring, Aanund Hylland, Hilde W. Nagell, Ed Page, Mathew Randell, NilsRoll-Hansen, Anne Julie Semb and Dag Einar Thorsen.
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