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Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives Steven R. Hunt ARC IT Governance Manager Ames Research Center Matt Linton IT Security Specialist Ames Research Center Matt Chew Spence IT Security Compliance Consultant Dell Services Federal Government Ames Research Center August 17, 2010

Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

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Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives. Steven R. Hunt ARC IT Governance Manager Ames Research Center Matt Linton IT Security Specialist Ames Research Center Matt Chew Spence IT Security Compliance Consultant Dell Services Federal Government - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Cloud ComputingArchitecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Steven R. HuntARC IT Governance Manager

Ames Research Center

Matt LintonIT Security Specialist

Ames Research Center

Matt Chew SpenceIT Security Compliance Consultant

Dell Services Federal Government

Ames Research Center

August 17, 2010

Page 2: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Agenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 3: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Overview of cloud computing and share vocabularyOBJECTIVE: Overview of cloud

computing and share vocabularyAgenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 4: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Cloud Computing – NIST Definition:

“A model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction”

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 5: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Conventional Manually Provisioned Dedicated Hardware Fixed Capacity Pay for Capacity Capital & Operational

Expenses Managed via Sysadmins

Cloud Self-provisioned Shared Hardware Elastic Capacity Pay for Use Operational Expenses Managed via APIs

Conventional Computingvs.

Cloud Computing

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 6: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Five Key Cloud Attributes:

1. Shared / pooled resources

2. Broad network access

3. On-demand self-service

4. Scalable and elastic

5. Metered by use

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 7: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Shared / Pooled Resources:

Resources are drawn from a common pool Common resources build economies of scale Common infrastructure runs at high efficiency

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 8: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Broad Network Access:

Open standards and APIs Almost always IP, HTTP, and REST Available from anywhere with an internet

connection

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 9: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

On-Demand Self-Service:

Completely automated Users abstracted from the implementation Near real-time delivery (seconds or minutes) Services accessed through a self-serve

web interface

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 10: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Scalable and Elastic:

Resources dynamically-allocated between users

Additional resources dynamically-released when needed

Fully automated

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 11: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Metered by Use:

Services are metered, like a utility Users pay only for services used Services can be cancelled at any time

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 12: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Three Service Delivery Models

IaaS: Infrastructure as a ServiceConsumer can provision computing resources within provider's infrastructure upon which they can deploy and run arbitrary software, including OS and applications

PaaS: Platform as ServiceConsumer can create custom applications using

programming tools supported by the provider and deploy them onto the provider's cloud infrastructure

SaaS: Software as ServiceConsumer uses provider’s applications running on provider's cloud infrastructure

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 13: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

What is Cloud Computing?

SaaS

PaaS

IaaS

Amazon Google Microsoft Salesforce

Service Delivery Model Examples

Products and companies shown for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement

Page 14: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Cost efficiencies Time efficiencies Power efficiencies Improved process

control Improved security “Unlimited” capacity

Cloud efficiencies and improvements

• Burst capacity (over-provisioning)

• Short-duration projects• Cancelled or failed missions

• Burst capacity (over-provisioning)

• Short-duration projects• Cancelled or failed missions

$

• Procurement• Network connectivity

• Procurement• Network connectivity

• Standardized, updated base images• Centrally auditable log servers

• Centralized authentication systems• Improved forensics (w/ drive image)

• Standardized, updated base images• Centrally auditable log servers

• Centralized authentication systems• Improved forensics (w/ drive image)

What is Cloud Computing?

Page 15: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Discuss requirements, use cases, and ROI

OBJECTIVE: Discuss requirements, use cases, and ROI

Agenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 16: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Current IT options for Scientists

Current Options*Requirements*

* Requirements and Options documented in over 30+ interviews with Ames scientists as part 2009 NASA Workstation project.

Page 17: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Mission ObjectivesExplore, Understand, and Share

Exploration Space OpsScienceAeronautics

High Compute Vast StorageHigh Speed Networking

Process Large Data Sets

Scale-out for one-time

events

Require infrastructure on-demand

Store mission & science

data

Share information

with the public

Run Compute Intensive

Workloads

Shared Resource

Mission Support

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Scientists direct access to Nebula cloud computing

Page 18: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

High-end Compute

Vast StorageHigh Speed Networking

TARGET COMPUTE PLATFORM

Excellent example of how OCIO-sponsored innovation can be rapidly transformed into services that address Agency mission needs

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Offer scientists services to address the gap

Page 19: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

*15% utilization based on two reports from Gartner Group, Cost of Traditional Data Centers (2009), and Data Center Efficiency (2010).

ROI and ARC Case Study

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

POWER: Computers typically require 70% of their total power requirements to run at just 15% utilization.

Page 20: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Operational Enhancements:» Strict standardization of hardware and infrastructure

software components» Small numbers of system administrators due to the

cookie-cutter design of cloud components and support processes

» Failure of any single component within the Nebula cloud will not become reason for alarm

» Application operations will realize similar efficiencies once application developers learn how to properly deploy applications so that they are not reliant on any particular cloud component.

ROI and ARC Case Study

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

Page 21: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Overview of how NASA is implementing cloud computing

OBJECTIVE: Overview of how NASA is implementing cloud computingAgenda

Introductions » Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 22: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 23: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 24: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 25: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Nebula Principles

Open and Public APIs, everywhere Open-source platform, apps, and data Full transparency»Open source code and documentation

releases Reference platform»Cloud model for Federal Government

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 26: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Nebula User Experience

Nebula IaaS user will have an experience similar to Amazon EC2: Dedicated private VLAN for instances Dedicated VPN for access to private VLAN Public IPs to assign to instances Launch VM instances Dashboard for instance control and API accessAble to import/export bundled instances to AWS and other clouds

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Products and companies named for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement

Page 27: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Architecture Drivers

Reliability Availability Cost IT Security

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 28: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Shared Nothing Messaging Queue State Discovery Standard Protocols

AutomatedAutomated• IPMI• PXEBoot• Puppet

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 29: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Nebula Infrastructure Components

Cloud Node Network Node Compute Node Volume Node Object Node Monitoring / Metering / Logging / Scanning

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 30: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Cloud Node

LDAP Data Store

LDAP Data Store

Ubuntu OSUbuntu OS

PuppetPuppet

NovaCloudNode

NovaCloudNode

PXEPXE

RabbitMQ

Redis KVS

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 31: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Ubuntu OSUbuntu OS

PuppetPuppetKVMKVM

LibVirtLibVirt

NovaCompute

Node

NovaCompute

Node

802.1(q)802.1(q)

BrctlBrctl

PXEPXE

Project VLANProject VLAN

Running InstanceRunning Instance

Compute Node

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 32: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Ubuntu OSUbuntu OS

PuppetPuppetLVMLVM

AoEAoE

NovaVolumeNode

NovaVolumeNode

PXEPXE

Exported VolumeExported Volume

Volume Node

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 33: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Object Node

Ubuntu OSUbuntu OS

PuppetPuppet

NovaObjectNode

NovaObjectNode

PXEPXE

NginxNginx

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 34: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Network Node

Ubuntu OSUbuntu OS

PuppetPuppet

NovaNetwork

Node

NovaNetwork

Node

802.1(q)802.1(q)

BrctlBrctl

PXEPXE

Project VLANProject VLAN

IPTablesIPTables

Public InternetPublic

Internet

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 35: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Pilot Lessons Learned - Automate Everything

No SysAdmin is perfect 99% is not good enough NEVER make direct system changes When in doubt - PXEBoot

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 36: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Pilot Lessons Learned - Test Everything

KVM + Jumbo Frames Grinder Unit Tests / Cyclometric Complexity TransactionID Insertion (Universal Proxy)

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 37: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Pilot Lessons Learned - Monitor Everything

Ganglia Munin Syslog-NG + PHPSyslog-NG Nagios Custom Log Parsing (Instance-centric)

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

Page 38: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into Nebula

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into NebulaAgenda

Introductions » Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 39: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Technical Security Overview• Issues with Commercial Cloud Providers

• Overview of Current Security Mechanisms

• Innovations

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into Nebula

OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical security mechanisms built into Nebula

Page 40: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Commercial Cloud Provider Security Concerns

» IT Security not brought into decision of how & when NASA orgs use clouds

» IT Security may not know NASA orgs are using clouds until an incident has occurred

»Without insight into monitoring/IDS/logs, NASA may not find out that an incident has occurred

»No assurances of sufficient cloud infrastructure access to perform proper forensics/investigations

» These issues are less likely with a private cloud like Nebula  

Page 41: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

IT Security is built into Nebula User Isolation from Nebula Infrastructure

Users only have access to APIs and Dashboards»No user direct access to Nebula infrastructure

Project-based separation» A project is a set of compute resources

accessible by one or more users

» Each project has separate: • VLAN for project instances• VPN for project users to launch, terminate,

and access instances• Image library of instances

Page 42: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Networking

RFC1918 address space internal to Nebula»NAT is used for those hosts within Nebula

needing visibility outside a cluster

Three core types of networks within Nebula:» Customer

• Customer VLANs are isolated from each other

» DMZ• Services available to all Nebula such as

NTP, DNS, etc

»Administrative

Page 43: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Security Groups

Combination of VLANs and Subnetting Can be extended to use physical

network/node separation as well (future)

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Page 44: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

CLOUD

APIS

SMR

Project A

(10.1.1/24)

Project B

(10.1.2/24)

Operations Console(custom)

Security Scanners(Nessus, Hydra, etc)

Log Aggregation, SOC Tap

RFC1918 Space

(LAN_X)

BRIDGE

Public IP Space

INTERNET

ExternalScanner

DMZServices

Event CorrelationEngine

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Page 45: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Firewalls

Multiple levels of firewalling»Hardware firewall at site border»Firewall on cluster network head-ends»Host-based firewalls on key hosts»Project based rule sets based on Amazon

security groups

Page 46: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Remote User Access

Remote access is only through VPN (openVPN) Separate administrative VPN and user VPNs Each project has own VPN server

Page 47: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Intrusion Detection

OSSEC on key infrastructure hosts»Open source Host-based Intrusion Detection

Mirror port to NASA SOC tap

Building 10Gb/sec IDS/IPS/Forensics device with vendor partners

Page 48: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Configuration Management

Puppet used to automatically push out configuration changes to infrastructure

Automatic reversion of unauthorized changes to system

Page 49: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vulnerability Scanning

Nebula uses both internal and external vulnerability scanners

Correlate findings between internal and external scans

Page 50: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Incident Response

Procedures for isolating individual VMs, compute nodes, and clusters, including:

»Taking snapshot of suspect VMs, including memory dump

»Quarantining a VM within a compute node»Disabling VM images so new instances

can’t be launched»Quarantining a compute node within a

cluster»Quarantining a cluster

Page 51: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Role Based Access Control

Multiple defined roles within a project Role determines which API calls can be invoked»Only network admin can request non-1918

addresses»Only system admin can bundle new images»etc

Page 52: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Innovation - Security Gates

API calls can be intercepted and security gates can be imposed on function being called

When an instance is launched, it can be scanned automatically for vulnerabilities

Long term vision is to have a pass/fail launch gate based on scan/monitoring results

Page 53: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vision - Security as a Service

Goal - Automate compliance through security services provided by cloud provider

Security APIs/tools mapped to specific controls»Customers could subscribe to tools/services to

meet compliance requirements

When setting up new project in cloud»Customers assert nature of data they will use»Cloud responds with list of APIs/tools for

customers to use

Currently gathering requirements but funding needed to realize vision

Page 54: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Vision - Security Service Bus Goal - FISMA compliance through continuous real-time monitoring and situational awareness

» Security service bus with event driven messaging engine

»Correlate events across provider and multiple customers

»Dashboard view for security providers and customers

» Allows customers to make risk-based security decisions based on events experienced by other customers

Funding Needed to Realize Vision

Page 55: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Nebula Open Source Progress

Significant progress in embracing the value of open source software release

» Agreements with SourceForge and Github» Open source identified as an essential component of

NASA’s open government plan

Elements of Nebula in open source release pipeline

» Started Feb 2010. Hope for release in June.» Working toward continual incremental releases.» Exploring avenues to contribute code to external

projects and to accept external contributions to the Nebula code base.

How does NASA secure cloud computing?

Page 56: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Agenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 57: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Q & A

Page 58: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Extended Presentation

Page 59: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Overview of Nebula C&A with Lessons Learned

OBJECTIVE: Overview of Nebula C&A with Lessons Learned

Agenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 60: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

FISMA Overview

Federal Information Security Management Act– Requires all Gov’t computers to be under a security plan–Mandates following NIST security guidance–Required controls depend on FIPS-199 sensitivity level–Requires periodic assessments of security controls–Extremely documentation heavy–Assumes one organization has responsibility for majority of identified security controls

FISMA is burdensome to cloud customers–Customers want to outsource IT Security to cloud provider

Page 61: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

FISMA Responsibilities in Clouds

Clouds are a “Highly Dynamic Shared Management Environment”

» Customers retain FISMA responsibilities for aspects of a cloud under their control

» Responsibilities vary depending on level of control maintained by customer

» Customer control varies relative to service delivery model (SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS)

Need to define & document responsibilities» We parsed 800-53 Rev3 controls per service delivery model

Nebula currently only offers IaaS» We parsed all three service models for future planning

Page 62: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Identifying data typesEnsuring data appropriate to system

User/Account ManagementPersonnel Controls

Identifying data typesEnsuring data appropriate to system

User/Account ManagementPersonnel Controls

Software LicensesDeveloper Testing

App Configuration ManagementSoftware Development Lifecycle

Software LicensesDeveloper Testing

App Configuration ManagementSoftware Development Lifecycle

OS Config MgmtAnti-Malware

SW Install ControlsOS specific Controls

etc

OS Config MgmtAnti-Malware

SW Install ControlsOS specific Controls

etc

SaaS

IaaS

PaaS

Cloud CustomerSecurityResponsibility

Customer FISMA Responsibilities for Cloud

Customer FISMA responsibilities Increase as Customers have more control over security measures

62

FISMA & Clouds

Page 63: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

IaaS Customer Security Plan Coverage Options

At inception little guidance existed on cloud computing control responsibilities & security plan coverage

FedRAMP primarily addresses cloud provider responsibilities» Other than control parsing definitions Customers are given little

guidance on implementing and managing FISMA requirements in a highly dynamic shared management environment

We have developed the following options:

Option Description IssuesCustomer Owned Customer responsible for

own security plan with no assistance from provider

• None to Providers• Burdensome to customers

Facilitated Customer responsible for own security plan using NASA template

• May still be burdensome to customers.• Not scalable unless automated.

Agency Owned Agency or Center level “Group” security plans associated with Cloud providers serve as aggregation point for customer.

• May be burdensome to Agency or Center.• Requires technology to automate input and aggregation of customer data.

Page 64: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

Current NASA Requirements/Tools may Impede Cloud Implementation

Default security categorization of Scientific and Space Science data as “Moderate”

» Independent assessment required for every major change• Currently requires 3rd party document-centric audit• Not scalable to cloud environments

e-Authentication/AD integration required for all NASA Apps» NASA implementations don’t currently support LDAP/SAML-

based federated identity management

Function-specific stove-piped compliance tools» STRAW/PIA tool/A&A Repository/NASA electronic forms» Can’t easily automate compliance process for new apps

64

Page 65: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

Emerging Developments in FISMA & Clouds

Interagency Cloud Computing Security Working Group is developing additional baseline security requirements for cloud computing providers

NIST Cloud Computing guidance forthcoming?

Move towards automated risk models and security management tools over documentation

On the bleeding edge - changing guidance & requirements are a key risk factor (and opportunity)

65

Page 66: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FISMA & Clouds

Nebula is Contributing to Cloud StandardsNebula is Contributing to Cloud Standards

Federal Cloud Standards Working Group Fed Cloud Computing Security Working Group»Federal Risk & Authorization Management

Program (FedRAMP) Cloud Audit project»Automated Audit Assertion Assessment &

Assurance API Providing Feedback to NIST and GAO GSA Cloud PMO

66

Page 67: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

OBJECTIVE: Overview of how Nebula concepts may integrate with FedRAMPOBJECTIVE: Overview of how Nebula

concepts may integrate with FedRAMPAgenda Introductions

» Steve Hunt

What is cloud computing?» Matt Chew Spence

How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? » Matt Chew Spence

How is NASA implementing cloud computing?» Matt Linton

How does NASA secure cloud computing?» Matt Linton

Q&A» Presentation Team

Extended Presentation FISMA & Clouds

» Matt Chew Spence» Steve Hunt

Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP» Steve Hunt

Page 68: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

A Federal Government-Wide program to provide “Joint Authorizations” and Continuous Monitoring»Unified Government-Wide risk management»Authorizations can be leveraged throughout

Federal Government

This is to be an optional service provided to Agencies that does not supplant existing Agency authority

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

FedRAMP

Page 69: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Independent Agency Risk Management of Cloud Services

Federal Agencies

Cloud Service Providers (CSP)

: Duplicative risk management efforts

: Incompatible agency policies

: Potential for inconsistent application of Federal security requirements

: Acquisition slowed bylengthy complianceprocesses

FedRAMP

Page 70: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Federated Risk Management of Cloud Systems

: Risk management cost savings and increased effectiveness

: Interagency vetted approach

: Consistent application of Federal security requirements

Federal Agencies

: Rapid acquisition through consolidated risk management

Cloud Service Providers (CSP)

FedRAMPFedRAMP

Risk Management• Authorization• Continuous Monitoring• Federal Security Requirements

FedRAMP

Page 71: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FedRAMP Authorization process

Agency X has a need for a new cloud based

IT system

Agency X gets security requirements for the new IT system from FedRAMP and

adds requirements if necessary

Agency X releases RFP for new IT

system and awards contract to cloud service provider

(CSP)

Agency X submits request to FedRAMP office for CSP To be FedRAMP authorized

to operate

CSP is put into FedRAMP priority queue

(prioritization occurs based on factors such as

multi-agency use, number of expected

users, etc.)

FedRAMP

Page 72: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

FedRAMP Authorization process (cont)FedRAMP

CSP and agency sponsor begin authorization process with

FedRAMP office

CSP, agency sponsor and

FedRAMP office review security

requirements and any alternative

implementations

FedRAMP office coordinates with

CSP for creation of system security

plan (SSP)

CSP has independent

assessment of security controls

and develops appropriate reports for

submission to FedRAMP office

FedRAMP office reviews and

assembles the final authorization

package for the JAB

JAB reviews final certification package and

authorizes CSP to operate

FedRAMP office adds CSP to

authorized system inventory to be reviewed and

leveraged by all Federal agencies

FedRAMP provides

continuous monitoring of CSP

Page 73: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Issues & Concerns

FedRAMP doesn’t provide much guidance for customer side … e.g. Agency users of cloud services

Current NIST guidance oriented primarily towards “Static Single System Owner” environments

Lack of NIST guidance for “Highly Dynamic Shared Owner” environments … e.g. Virtualized Data Centers & Clouds» SSP generation & maintenance» Application of SP 800-53 (security controls)» Application of SP 800-37 (assessment & ATO)» Continuous Monitoring

Guidance may be forthcoming but NIST is resource constrained

FedRAMP

Page 74: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Potential Solution

Agency/Center level Aggregated SSPs:

»Plan per CSP … e.g. Nebula, Amazon, Google, Microsoft … etc.

»Plan covers all customers of a specific CSP»Technology integration may be needed with

SSP repository to dynamically update SSP content via Web Registration site.

»Or … SSP may be able to point to dynamic content entered and housed on Web Registration site ... maintained in Wiki type doc.

Presentation Title—74—March 5, 2010

FedRAMP

Page 75: Cloud Computing Architecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

Q & A