Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment the Difference a ??2015-11-10Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment – the Difference a Year Makes ... Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, ... • Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc

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<ul><li><p>1 </p><p>Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical </p><p>Environment the Difference a Year Makes </p><p>This document does not contain technical data as defined by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR 120.10(a), or technology as defined by the Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations, and is therefore authorized for publication. </p><p>Copyright Raytheon Company. All rights reserved. </p><p>Panel Coordinator / Moderator: Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson 260-429-5457 Email: Noel_E_Johnson@Raytheon.com </p></li><li><p>2 2 </p><p>Panel Topic &amp; Members </p><p>Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, the Difference a Year Makes </p><p> Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon Sr. Principal Systems Engineer, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP, Tactical Communications Solutions, </p><p>multiple program supports as a Cybersecurity Subject Matter Expert, </p><p> Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, </p><p> Principal Research Scientist </p><p> Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University, Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center, </p><p> Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, </p><p> Member of the Technical Staff </p><p> Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG C4I Business Area Technical Lead </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p></li><li><p>3 3 </p><p>Panel Format </p><p>Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment </p><p> Each panel member will have 3-5 minutes to provide an initial position statement, Discussion based on initial position statements &amp; moderator questions, Half hour will be reserved for questions from the audience, Each panel member will be provided 5 minutes final remarks, </p><p> Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson Raytheon </p><p> Provide the context of challenges and opportunities of Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment </p><p> Opening position statements. </p><p> Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, </p><p> Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University, Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p></li><li><p>4 4 </p><p>What is Cloud Computing ? </p><p> NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011 Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network </p><p>access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. </p><p> Essential Characteristics, Rapid Elasticity Resource Pooling Measured Service Broad network access On-demand self-service </p><p> Service Models Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) </p><p> Deployment Models Public Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, Private Cloud, Community Cloud, </p></li><li><p>5 5 </p><p>Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environments, </p><p>Not all Tactical Environments are the Same ! </p><p> Types of Cloud Computing Services Software as a Service (SaaS) </p><p> Platform as a Service (PaaS) </p><p> Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), </p><p> Core Advantages Flexibility, </p><p> Highly automated, </p><p> Shared Resources, </p><p> Increased storage, </p><p> Pay for what your use, </p><p> Back up and restoration, </p><p> Easy installation and maintenance, </p><p> Core Disadvantages Cost, </p><p> Limited flexibility, </p><p> Data security and privacy, </p><p> Knowledge and integration, </p><p> Dependence on outside agencies, </p><p> Network connectivity and bandwidth, </p><p> Long term stability of service provider, </p><p> Service unavailability due to a variety of reasons, </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p></li><li><p>6 6 </p><p>USG &amp; DoD Transitioning to the Cloud </p><p>The Transition has begun: Is it secure? Will it meet the goals? </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p> FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Cloud computing for USG DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Version 1, Release 1, 1/13/2015 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) </p><p> Cloud Computing Strategy working paper, April 2011 USG Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap Volume 1 Release 1.0 (Draft) November 2011 </p><p> NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publication (SP) Relevant to Cloud Computing FIPS 199; Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems NIST SP 500-291; NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, Version 2.0, July 2013 NIST SP 500-292; NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, September 2011, NIST SP 800-37; Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems; A Security Life Cycle </p><p>Approach; NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4; Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information systems and Organizations; NIST SP 800-53A Rev.3; Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Build </p><p>Effective Assessment Plans; June 2010; NIST SP 800-92; Guide to Computer Security Log Management; September 2006 NIST SP 800-125; Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies; January 2011 NIST SP 800-137; Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations; </p><p>September 2011; NIST SP 800-144; Guidelines on Security and Privacy Issues in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011 NIST SP 800-145; The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing; September 2011 NIST SP 800-146; Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations; May 2012 </p></li><li><p>7 7 </p><p>The Solution must address </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>Timely Keep Bad Guys &amp; Malware Out </p><p>Cloud </p><p>Computing, </p><p>COTS &amp; </p><p>GOTS Device(s) </p><p>&amp; Types </p></li><li><p>8 </p><p>Cloud Security at the Edge Jeff Boleng, PhD </p><p>Principal Research Scientist </p><p> Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, </p><p>Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering </p><p>Institute, </p><p>Introduction &amp; Opening Statement of Panel Member </p></li><li><p>9 9 </p><p>Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University and IEEE This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN AS-IS BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu. DM-0002951 </p></li><li><p>10 10 </p><p> Dr. Jeff Boleng, PhD, Principal Research Scientist, Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellow University </p><p> Since 2012, Advanced Mobile Systems Team </p><p> Co-PI of Tactical Computing and Communications and Tactical Analytics research at SEI </p><p> Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Scientific Computing, Parallel and Distributed Systems </p><p> BS in CS from US Air Force Academy 1991, MS and PhD from Colorado School of Mines (1997 and 2002) in Mathematical and Computer Sciences </p><p> 25 years experience as AF Cyber Operation Officer, deployable networks, command post integration, 21st Mission Support Squadron Commander </p><p> 8 years on faculty at USAFA as Associate Professor, 4 years as Deputy Computer Science Department Head </p><p>Jeff Boleng, PhD, CMU/SEI </p></li><li><p>11 11 </p><p>Securing the cloud </p><p> Tail of two layers </p><p> Infrastructure </p><p> Services </p><p> Securing each is different </p><p> Infrastructure </p><p> Largely virtualized </p><p> Depends on security of every VM </p><p> Services </p><p> Secured by numerous external administrators </p><p>Largest risk to the hypervisor is through poorly secured services </p></li><li><p>12 12 </p><p>Securing the Services* </p><p> Simplify! </p><p> Simple, well defined, and enforced interfaces </p><p> Do one thing and do it well -- Doug McIlroy </p><p> Favor composability over monolithic design </p><p> Assume components are compromised </p><p> Use fail-safe/fail-secure design </p><p> Never implicitly trust the results of another service </p><p> Always ask What will my service do when it fails? </p><p>*Note: these ideas arent new or mine. Thanks to Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie, Brian Kernighan, Rob Pike, Doug McIlroy, Eric Raymond and others </p></li><li><p>13 13 </p><p>Piping diagram of a Westinghouse Air Brake System - 1909 </p></li><li><p>14 14 </p><p>Elisha Otiss elevator patent drawing, 15 January 1861 </p></li><li><p>15 15 </p><p>Microservice architectures </p><p> Modular operating system containers </p><p> Docker and LXC </p><p> OSv </p><p> Unikernels and MirageOS </p><p> CoreOS </p><p> Intel Clear Containers </p><p> Small, lightweight, typically single process, multi-</p><p>threaded VMs built with only the OS and library </p><p>components necessary to support the code </p><p>implementing the service </p></li><li><p>16 16 </p><p>Microservice architectures Our experience on an embedded robotics sensor system </p><p> OSv with nanoMsg and protocol buffers on Xen </p><p> 12Mb VM on disk, 60Mb VM when running </p><p> Redis benchmark 30% faster in OSv container </p><p> No other OS service running (i.e. only 1 or 2 ports open at all) </p><p> Pros </p><p> cohesion coupling </p><p> Forces rigorous commitment to interfaces and standardization </p><p> Small size on disk and in RAM </p><p> Faster startup and migration </p><p> Reduced attack surface and complexity </p><p> High availability (redundancy, load balancing, fail over) techniques from data center </p><p>experience directly applicable </p><p> Cons </p><p> Timing, network latency, etc. (all the distributed computing challenges) </p><p> Startup and shutdown orchestration </p><p> Service discovery </p></li><li><p>17 17 </p><p>Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication -Leonardo da Vinci </p></li><li><p>18 </p><p>Sensor-Cloud: </p><p>Opportunities and Research Directions Elisa Bertino </p><p>Purdue University </p><p>Cyber </p><p>Center </p><p> Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University, </p><p> Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber </p><p>Center, </p><p>Introduction &amp; Opening Statement of Panel Member </p></li><li><p>19 19 </p><p>Definitions and Conceptual Architecture </p><p>Military Target Tracking Natural Disaster Relief </p><p>What is a Sensor-Cloud? An Infrastructure supporting pervasive computation based on: sensors as an interface between physical and cyber </p><p>worlds the cloud as the cyber backbone the Internet and wireless technologies as the </p><p>communication medium </p><p> IoT and NoT These recent trends will further accelerate the deployment of sensor networks and sensor-based applications </p><p>Drones and UAV The use of these devices will multiply the opportunities for collecting data from (possibly mobile) sensors on-the-ground and for managing these sensors </p></li><li><p>20 20 </p><p>Research Directions </p><p>Diagram from: A. Alamri et al. A Survey on Sensor-Cloud: Architectures, Applications, and Approaches, 2013. </p><p> Network access management Encryption techniques for small devices Sensor software and firmware security Secure sensor localization techniques Provenance techniques for sensors Tools supporting the deployment and </p><p>monitoring of sensors, and the design of sensor-based data collection applications </p><p> Data fusion techniques to assess and enhance sensor data trustworthiness </p><p> Fault-tolerant and reliable continuous data acquisition </p><p> Efficient sensor streamed data processing techniques </p><p> Event processing and management Privacy for sensor-based applications and data </p></li><li><p>21 </p><p>Introduction &amp; Opening Statement of Panel Member </p><p> Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow, </p><p> Member of the Technical Staff </p></li><li><p>22 22 </p><p>Position Statement </p><p> Cloud Security is difficult to achieve in a tactical </p><p>environment. It is faced with connectivity issues, a </p><p>lack of elasticity and limited Infrastructure as a </p><p>Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) </p><p>providers. </p><p>Outer Router</p><p>On Prem Server Farm</p><p>FirewallProxy</p><p>(Deep Packet Inspection)</p><p>IaaSServer Farm</p><p>SaaSProvider</p><p>PaaSServer Farm</p><p>Host Operating System</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>App A App A App B App C</p><p>Mobile User</p><p>IsolatedServices</p></li><li><p>23 23 </p><p>Cloud Computing </p><p> Essential </p><p>Characteristics: </p><p> Rapid Elasticity </p><p> Resource Pooling </p><p> Measured Service </p><p> Broad network access </p><p> On-demand self-</p><p>service </p><p>PaaS</p><p>Host Operating System</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>App A App A App B App C</p><p> NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011 </p><p> Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand </p><p>network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., </p><p>networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly </p><p>provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider </p><p>interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three </p><p>service models, and four deployment models. </p></li><li><p>24 24 </p><p>Cloud Computing Models </p><p> Service Models </p><p> Software as a Service </p><p>(SaaS) </p><p> Platform as a Service </p><p>(PaaS) </p><p> Infrastructure as a </p><p>Service (IaaS) </p><p> Deployment Models </p><p> Public Cloud </p><p> Hybrid Cloud </p><p> Private Cloud </p><p> Community Cloud </p><p>IaaSServer Farm</p><p>SaaSProvider</p><p>PaaSServer Farm</p><p>Host Operating System</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>App A App A App B App C</p><p>IaaSServer Farm</p><p>SaaSProvider</p><p>PaaSServer Farm</p><p>Host Operating System</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>Clo</p><p>ud</p><p> Ap</p><p>plic</p><p>atio</p><p>n (</p><p>ho</p><p>sted</p><p> VM</p><p>)</p><p>App A App A App B App C</p></li><li><p>25 25 </p><p>The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats </p><p> Data Breaches </p><p> Data Loss </p><p> Account Hijacking </p><p> Insecure APIs </p><p> Denial of Service </p><p> Malicious Insiders </p><p> Abuse of Cloud Services </p><p> Insufficient Due Diligence </p><p> Shared Technology Issue </p></li><li><p>26 26 </p><p> Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud </p><p>TIG </p><p> C4I Business Area Technical Lead </p><p>Introduction &amp; Opening Statement of Panel Member </p></li><li><p>27 27 </p><p>The Power of Cloud Applications </p><p>Instances are added, deleted, and restarted by the application </p><p>itself based on need. </p><p>Security is built in, or not, to the application. </p><p>(Mobile) User Interface </p><p>Service Interfaces </p><p>Service Processing </p><p>Data </p><p>Cloud Application Designs are Scalable and Resilient when connected </p><p>Cloud Native Applications are built differently. </p><p> Stateless services are composed </p><p>of many separate, identical instances. </p></li><li><p>28 28 </p><p>The Solution must address </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>UNCLASSIFIED </p><p>Timely Keep Bad Guys &amp; Malware...</p></li></ul>