Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1947

8/7/2019 Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1947

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FOUNDED IN 1892 AS THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY

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NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

MARCH-APRIL, 1947

PUBLICATION DATE: April I, 1947

giment a~.

O A S TA R T IL L E R YJO U R N A L

bimonthly by the United States Coast Artillery Al'!'-ociation. Editorial and executive offices, 631 Penns)"h-ania Avenue, X.'V ..n 4, D. C. Terms: $3.00 per )'ear. Foreil!n subscriptions. $4.00 per year. Single copies, 75c. Entered as second-class matternon, D. C.; additional entry at Richmond. Ya., under the Act of ~Iarch 3, 18.9. Copyright, 194., by tbe Cnited States

ry Association.

VOLUME LXXXX

OVER: Cburcb in Albuquerque, New ,\Iexico, Pbotograpb by New i\le;l:ico State Tourist Bureau.

HE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE 200TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA). By Colonel Stepben M. Mellnik .

HE BEGINNING OF GUIDED MISSILE WIARF ARE. By Dr. Ernst H. Krause .

EATH TAKES A SLEEPING CITY. By Lieutemlllt Colonel Dal,id B. Parker .

HE LAUNCHING OF GUIDED MISSILES. By Dr. R. E. Gibson and Dr. A. KossiakofJ .

STRONG AMERICA IS A PEACEFUL AMERICA. By General Jacob L. Del'ers .

RAINING OF RADAR OPERATORS. By Lieutena lit Colollel Leonard M. Ormall .

ABY TAKES ITS FIRST STEP. B)' Major RalPh M. Rogers .

WHO'S WlHO IN THE ATOMIC RACE. B)' Stefan T. POSSOIl)' .

UIDED MISSILE INSTRUCTION AT FORT BLISS. By Colonel '01m H. Madison .

WARHEADS FOR GERMAN ANTIAIRCRAFT G UlDED MISSILES. B)' n ; ralter H. W' allace .HE ARMY IN THE ARCTIC. B)' Major Hal D. Steward .

MERICA CAN BE MADE BOMB RESISTANT. B)' Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintner .

\X'AR DEPARTMENT SCHOOLS CHART .

RMY SEEKS BILL TO REVISE PROMOTIONS .

N INCIDENT ON SAIPAN. B)' Lieutenant Lawrence Sanders .

BOUT OUR AUTHORS .

LAK." B)' Brigadier G. L. Appleton

HE SOLDIER'S SOLDIER .

NSTRUMENTA TION FOR GUIDED .MISSILES. B)' Colonel Leslie E. Si1110n .

EACOAST SERVICE TEST SECTION NOTES .

EWS AND COMMENT .

OAST ARTILLERY NE\X'SLETTERS .

OAST ARTILLERY ORDERS , , .

OOKS AND MA1'lUALS .


4/84

HISTORICAL BRIEF

On 7 April 1942 the two regiments were combined into a brigade,designated as the Philippine Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade IAAL

The remnants of the Brigade surrendered to the Japanese with theLuzon Force on 9 April 1942 .

In the spring of 1940, the 111 th Cavalry of the New Mexico NationalGuard was converted into the 200th CA IAA) Regiment.

As such, the Regiment entered federal service on 6 January 1941 andtrained at Fort Bliss, Texas until August of that year .

It arrived at Fort Stotsenburg, P. I. on 26 September 1941 and saw itsfirst action on 8 December 1941 when it engaged Japanese bombersand fighters which attacked Clark Field.

On the night of 8-9 December, a cadre of ~OO officers and men fromthe 200th moved to Manila. This detachment was designated the 51 5thCA IAAI on 19 December.

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5/84

GSCM. MELLNIK ,

Clark Fie]d ]Th ' t 1e onlv he'at such an ins~' I] a.v)' bomber base on La allon reg' I lIzonmrce at least fi' '.1\ C tllncs . "~ (.l~

Brigadier GM. Peck eneral Charle Gto r ' Commandin s . Sage (left)g aphed just b f g Officer of th ~ - and Colonel HP,i,on C,';.,;';o ~ming th": ~::~~ CA (AA), ;~;;:egm the long . on the MukdJourney home. en

COLONEL STEPHENBY

ervth of the 200

th

1 '" IIS IS t 1C sto ' ft ., 1) 0 an aI ..allstlcal rec d 1tIalrcraft rc ."y,h in" f,:.: SIbut,which fough~'~~e':I'wbich m,deJapanes~ Infa1 s lootIng down lapa' e and died do-

C

' ntr)' I nesc pioast A ']1 assau ts. TI" anes to sto -," e,y d ' us " th P

md"n,lIy PO,'; "'gn"ed (AA) b e $to')' of ther this regl' I' ' ut actually Inf ment t ' .,

asm which acco lere \:as none of the .e was onl ' mpamed units' .fanfare and C11-

) sweat I In Vlct .oped no ' lunger and ']1 onous dri' .new tech . I ness Th \ cs.r or the uns . mques for the .. e regiment

mem we!, 'h~~~>ch ""d themselv';,;eof tbe ~19 Di-the !\ 14 D' gh Its siege th ].' At the time tlIrecto ' e lIst . le

m"eriel, ' w" the I""t in on'n will ,ee,1IiI, 'p'" tim I 'nt"tln,f, ",e eon-

ration was l~' t.le regiment learne Iay. For" m1t:d to onc-ha]f etod forage for foo I, , 'ee,,,,,,,on" I poun of ' ' .ItJons, huntino d' t 1e regiment w nee per manellent s b own Japan . ent on scout",II ou"e nf "ilo,- "'" smpe" wI, mgstoned when h m,de "g"eue plm'edna] Guard d t e 200th CA (A \s).

. ' un t 1'OS c,lIed' e; comm,nd of C I . New ~lcxicoregiment tra~~:d e~ral Service 0 :~nJel Charles G., Ihe p"" of e' " .oct Bli" un,iI 3 ,n u"y 1941.rcraft un' . \ ents In the F E I August 1941ItS In the ar ast a d I '

'0 pmceed ,,"" "suited' n I te lock of Ihe west, m seetc, o,de" f

rrush to get' h . or the

or t . In S ape f . raming and h or action II'ttl .w h ' t e' ,e tImeIt out having h d regIment sailed f h

was

avai]-ns A .. a a tar or t e Ph']"i bemvmg in the PhT ge~pmctice with , f l I P - mo the 0 ] I IppInes it h d nv 0 ItS

pin" (~"i'h th y 'n'i'i"mft u~i' t ,he doubtful, Still in the e exception of th: ~ny type in Ihee1mi"gt"k, ,~~"~'''mft tmdi'ion o:neg~do, g'"

. eglment assumed th unaertakinge defense of


6/84

These prisoners of war cheer at their liberation from prison camp at Cabanatuan.

THE COAST ARTILLERY JOUR:-\AL4

much antiaircraft for its' proper protection. fazed Yen'fe\\' people. least of all the 200th. Placed under operatiomilcontrol of the Far East Air Force at Clark Field, the 200thwas yirtuallv on its own from that time on.

During the ten weeks of bedding down at Clark Fieldbefore the bombs began to drop. the 200th was able to un-pack its equipment. get set in position, and had e\'enplanned for some target practice. Headquarters USAFFE.

established in July 1941. was frantically trying to mobilize.equip and train an Army with which to stop the inevitableinvasion. Of necessity. it could furnish the 200th with littledirection and e\'en I~ss guidance. From the USAFFE pointof view. any organization which had its quota of officers,men and equipment. was so far ahead of the Army beingorganized, that it could well shift for itself until more im-portant problems were solved.

At about 0500 hours on 8 Dccember.l\lanila time (about1000 on 7 December, Hawaii time). the Regiment wasalcrted. Previously preparcd gun positions were manned.and a period of waiting cnsucd. t\fter several hours of wait-ing. with reports that cnemy planes were o\'er thc Island of Luzon. the all clear was givcn about 1130 hours. About1230 hours. Japanese bombers and strafing planes madctheir appcarancc, and the war for the 200th was on.

The 200th was no match for the 300 Japanese planeswhich Hcw in from Formosa. Thc high altitude bombing

attack was well synchronized with the low flying stThe men dished out whate\'er thev could but they took more, \ \'hen the smoke blew aw;,' from the m~zzlesconfirmed planes had been shot do~\'n but quite a bit ~rantiaircraft equipment had been punctured by bullet h

That was just the beginning. That night. it was reathat the City of ~ lanila had no antiaircraft protectionantiaircraft machine-gun platoon had been sent from

regidor to ~lanila to protect the dock area). The regisent 500 officers and men to 1 \lanila to uncrate someaircraft equipment which had just arrivcd. and to estaan antiaircraft defense of the 1\lanila area. Colonel H1 \1. Peck, Executive Officer of the 200th. was in comof this group.

Getting into 1\lanila at 2100 on 8 December, the demem began to uncrate and assemble the antiaircraft eqment found in the dock area. The strange blacked outwith nen'ous sentries shooting at cvcry \'chicle that mat night, added to thc difficulties. Filipinos were hastilcruited, guns were dug in and in twenty-four hours \ ready to shoot. On the morning of 10 December \\'hentwo-motored Japanese bombers flew over 1\lanila, theymet with a pattern of antiaircraft puffs that was more stacular than effectivc, as it was not immediately appathat the plancs were flying ABOVE the cciling of Ipowder train fuzes.


7/84

.IE LIFE A~D DEATH OF THE 200TH COAST .\RTILLEHY

Left behind when retreating Japs left Manila, another grou p of men captured on Baman is liberated by U. S. Troops.

he trials and tribulations involved in trying to trainpinos as searchlight crew members will be appreciatednyone who has ever had a similar task. The Filipino'sime disregard for a machine's limited servicing needs

d many a gray hair. However, to the Manila group of

200th, this was merely preliminary training for the realto come.Or the Clark Ficld element, there was another person-Cut in the offing. About 50 self-propelled three-inch guns

been unloaded in 1 \lanila about one week before thestarted. (The personnel to man the guns eventuallye e l in Australia.) On 9 December, the 200th wasred to send] 00 trucks and 200 men to man the self-pro-. e e lguns. The original 200th was now down to ]] 00, \\'ith its mission to protect Clark Field still unchanged.

Orthe next two weeks, the 200th and the Manila "Pro-

nal Regiment of the 200th" were very much harassed.organic regimental transportation had been reduced100 trucks, and tlle balance had to serve two regiments

d of one. The personnel for one antiaircraft regimentbeen reduced by 200, and now had to man the equip-t of two regiments.t Clark Field, the Japs were making doubly sure thatFar East Air Force remain ineffective. Daily bombingstrafing met with only antiaircraft resistance. \\Thile

~\as satisfaction in shooting down Japanese planes, itdisheartening to watch the planes concentrating onpositions and to know that no friendly planes wereable to challenge the Japs. In addition, it seemed point-o Continue the defense of a field which had no operat-stallation. However. there was alwavs the chance that

e reinforcements would arrive, and Clark Field was anlent air base.

e confusion in the ;\ lanila area was further con-

)

founded by a desire On the part of every Filipino to becomea member of the antiaircraft unit. At the approach of enemyplanes, every resident of i\ lanila who had a weapon prompt- .Iy began to shoot. That the planes were flying at altitudes inexcess of 20,000 feet did not, apparently, discourage the

volunteer enthusiasts. This type of firing forced antiaircraftgun crews into foxholes more often than did Jap bomps.

Two weeks after the war began. the Japs started to makelandings on Luzon, and their air efFort over Clark Field andthe i\ lanila area was intensified. Soon the main Jap landingwas made at Linga)'en Gulf, and the decision was made towithdraw our forces into Bataan.

The parent 200th assumed the mission of covering theretreat of the Northern Luzon Force into Bataan, while thePro\'isional Manila Group, newly christened on ]9 Decem-ber ]94] as the 5] 5th Coast Artillerv (1\A), assumed a

similar mission for the South Luzon Force.The successive withdrawals and deployments, to keep

pace with the retreating forces, was a nightmare. Theskeletonized 200th, covering the retreat of three InfantryDivisions, stretched Napoleon's maxim on "Economy of Force" to its elastic limit. No greater Economy of Forcecould have been made. By judicious use of the 24 hours ineach day, and by dispensing with eating and sleeping, the200th safelv convoved its three divisions into Bataan. "TIleimpossible 'was ac~omplished yesterday!"

The 5] 5th had a similar problem, though a bit morecritical. The kev to the successful withdrawal of the SouthLuzon Force la~' in the cluster of bridges at Calumpit. Ifthose bridges remained intact, the Force would get throughsafely, as the Japs in the south and east were still some dis-tance away. \ Vithout the bridges howe\'cr, a long detour of about 100 miles was in prospect: the alternate choice beingto cross a 20-mile swamp.


8/84

THE CO:\ST ARTILLERY JOllR0:AL6

The 51 5th arriyed at the Calumpit bridge alJ'a to findthat the .laps. too. realized the importance of the bridges inthe strategy of the withdrawal. For about fiye days there wasa bitter contest between .lap planes and the 5 I 5th. Due toits accurate shooting and the confused situation facing .lappilots in the large cluster of bridge targets available forbombing. t\\,o key bridges were left unharmed. and ourtroops came through.

\\lith the Infantry Divisions bedded down in Bataan. the

200th and 515th t~rned to the defense of the Cabcabenand Bataan airfields. \ Vhile our available air force of sixP-40s was inconsequential by present standards, it was most

\'ersatile. It performed bombing. photo, transport and pur-suit missions. depending on the task to be done. As such,it needed and got all the protection it deserved. To the e\'er-lasting credit of the alert air force personnel (with help fromthe 200th and 515th), not one of the six P-40s was evendamaged by the numerous Jap raids on the two fields!

As the war progressed on the Bataan front, a "friendly".lap reconnaissance plane named "Photo Joe," began paying

\'isits over the Front lines. Photo Joe rarely dropped visitingcards but always aFter his visit, Jap artillery shells wouldblanket the areas which he had visited. To discouragePhoto Joe's visits, two batteries from each of the regimentswere ordered to the Forward areas 'to greet the plane on its!lights.

It would be gratiFying, but not accurate. to say that uponthe arrival of these batteries, Photo Joe's visits became lessfrequent. Napoleon's maxim of Economy of Force to thecontrary notwithstanding, 37,000 yards of front was toomuch for four antiaircraft artillery batteries to cover with100% effectiveness. However, the fire did force Photo Joeto be more cautious in his approach, and kept him at muchhigher altitudes than he cared to be. As for the Infantryunits, the morale effect of an antiaircraFt battery takingpositive action to discourage enemy planes from coming tooclose was tremendous. In the war on Bataan, virtually allplanes were enemy, and an antiaircraFt unit was worth itsweight in gold.

The next three months saw the situation deterioratefrom bad to worse. \Vhile the Japanese air actions were spo-radic in nature, the menace of malaria and dysentery wasalways present. The limited amount of quinine was soon

consumed, and the malaria rate continued to climb. Casesin some units averaged 70% and there was no hope of re-placements. Finally, malarial patients stopped going to thehospital, as they preferred to stay with their units, sincethe hospital had no medicine with which to work. The oc-casional shipment of quinine which came in via a privatecivilian plane Which could fly to Cebu, was never enoughFor distribution to a regiment.

Food likewise became a serious problem. By February.the ration was limited to one-halF a pound of rice per manper day, with a can of sardines split t\\'o ways for dessert.Soon, even the sardines ran out. Huntinu for monkevs,o .iguanas and carabao became a necessity rather than a sport.In a short time, these edible animals became scarce. andsnake hunting next became popular. Rice fields, abandonedbv the natives at the outbreak of war, were taken over bvthe units and han'ested. The areas were combed For edibl~fruits and vegetables.

The combination of hunger and malaria reducedunits to a state of apathy. There was little enthusiasmthe expeditions into the jungle which marked the unitri\'al into Bataan. The complete lack of mail fromwas a strong factor in lowering morale. There \Vel'movies. magazines or post exchanges: boredom, illnesshunger made this period a trying one. The front-linewere in eyen worse shape. They had no time for hunforaging or han'esting rice fields. In addition they hade\'er-present hazard of an aggressive enemy constantlying our lines. The sole source of commercial cigarettesthe infrequent .lap casualty caught behind our lines.

About 3 April 1942. the . lap had apparently rec'suflicient reinforcements with which to begin his ddown the peninsula. An intense concentration of Japand artillery fire was placed on our front line and theareas were under constant strafing and bombing attacks.complicate the problem, we were at the end of the dryson, and Jap incendiary bombs literally burned out whunits. AFter t\\'o days of preparatory fire, the Japs c

menced their infantry and tank attacks. On 7 Aprilcombined Infantry and tank effort broke through our IiI-Iuman beings could just stand so much and no more.

On the same day, the administrative machineryUSFIP finally formalized a situation which had existedmonths-it organized the 200th and 515th into an antiacraFt brigade. Colonel Sage was given the command of tBrigade, while Colonel 1 \lemory H. Cain, the ExecutiOfficer of the 200th, assumed command of the 200th.life of the Brigade as an antiaircraft unit was short-Ii, \Vithin 24 hours, it was Forced to destroy its antiaircequipment and to organize as an infantry unit with tmission of defending the line south of Cabcaben airfield!

The 24-hour life span of the converted Brigadechaos. Japanese Infantry units, paced by their tanks, wpushing through the break in the line like water throua hole in a dam. Disorganized Filipino units were c1ogg'the single road leading to 1 \larivales, while Japanese planadded to the confusion by spraying the road with machingun fire. Human beings. weakened by hunger and diseahad but one thought-to get away from the slaughter.

The Brigade stayed anchored to its infantry positisouth of Cabcaben airfield while the Jap tanks plough

through the line, interested only in exploiting the break through. As the Japanese Infantry arrived, the Brigafirmed up Forcing the Jap attackers to deploy. Over tnoise of the planes and artillery came the sound of 0ammunition dumps being blown up. It was the end! \Vitn,.in a Few hours, orders were received from the Force CaUlmander to surrender to the nearest Japanese unit.

After the surrender, the inFamous "Death !\ larch" w :followed bv three and one half veal'S of incarceration iJapanese p'risoner of \Var Camps~

It is difficult to assess the contribution of such a unit asthe original 200th without becoming sentimental. In terms

0 1 '86 .lap planes shot down or so many Japs killed. there is l}small degree of cold statistical comFort.

I met man v men of the unit, durinu the war and in Jap. 0

nese prison camps. Few men on Bataan will ever forget thunfailing good humor of the boys from ,'\fe\\' 7 \lexico, tl\e'willingness to help out. and their cheerful acceptance


9/84


10/84

T h e B eg in n in gO f G u ide

M issile W arfa re B yD r. E rn st H .K ra u seIt was August, I~.B. i\ British convoy was steaming

hrough the Bay of Biscay on the alert for enemy submarinesnd planes. And then it happened! The observers of the

hip sa\\" what appearcd to be a small dive bomber comeut of a turn and head directly for the ship at an apparentlyncredible speed. The specd of the "plane" as well as themall targct which it presented proved to be too big an orderor what antiaircraft guns could be brought to bear on it inimc. The ship was hit.

This incident marked the beginning of the long awaitednd much dreaded guided missile warfare. Although de-

vices which might be classed as guided missiles had beenused previously, they were primarily makeshift wcaponsused in isolated instances. Here for the first time in the his-ory of warfarc were uscd, as we shall see later, several

guided missiles which were designed for the job and werebeing produced in large enough quantity to be potentiallycthal to the extent of having a serious eITect on the course

of the war. But for an intensive electronic countermeasureampaign by the Allies and certain design errors (from aountermeasure point of view) by the Germans, this might

well have been the case. The actions which followed theirst German attack are, I believe, representative of what

will take place in one type of future guided missile warfare.Although the discussion which follows shows that theguided missile counteoneasure job is a difficult one, it also

shows that it is not always an impossible one.The news of the attack in the Bay of Biscay, as well asscveral more which followed, soon spread among the shipswhich plied the Southern and Southwestern Europeanwaters. It bred terror in the hearts of seamen who enteredhe Bav of Biscav or the Southern i\lediterranean. The

averag~ seaman \;'as willing to take his chances with a sub-marine or airplane attack, for against these there were wellproven defenses which gave him at least a fair chance of survival. But what defense was there against such a mon-strous thing as a radio-controlled bomb?

It was obvious that fast action on the part of the AlliedNavies was imperative. For, not only did this weapon havegreat potentialities against our ships but it was also the sortof thing which undermined the morale of the men whofight the ships.

Such an incident had been anticipated about six monthsbefore by a group working on guided missiles at the NavalHesearch Laboratorv. \ Ve had been \mrking on various

typcs of radio control systems for our own use with a viewto developing systems which could not be easily jammed IXinterfered with. A natural consequence of this work \ the de\'elopment of methods for testing the vulnerabiliof radio control equipment to jamming of various typl.'S.This led to speculation on what we might do to counteractthe use of radio controlled dcvices bv the Germans. Thtithey were working on such devices w;s almost certain. Buhow could we build jamming equipment to counteract.completely unknown radio control system?

There was first of all the question of the frequency of t~radio signals likely to be used to transmit the controllingsignals to the bomb. Anyone of thousands of channehmight conceivably be used. The region of frequencies usedfor commercial broadcasting represented but a minute por-

tion of the possible range of frcquencies. In fact, it wa~more probable that the limitless expanse of the shorter wa\clengths oITered better possibilities for this use.

To find such a needle "in this ethereal haystack" \\3'made even more difficult by the fact that most of the time itwouldn't even be there for thc signals were transmitted onlywhenever the bomb was in Hight and possibly only during(

'part of the Right time. It was impossible to expect that'while we turned the dial on an extended range receiver w ewould happen to be tuned to the transmission just at themoment it was on. Undoubtedly we would be listening tosome other portion of the spectrum. ,

But even if we found such a signal which was controllinga bomb, we had to be able to tune a high powered jammin!!'"transmitter to exactly the same frecluency. It was a difficultenough problem to build a high power radio transmitterwhich covers a frequency of I to 10 mcgacycles but theproblem of building one to cover thc range of a hundredtimes greater or more was absolutely staggering. ~

The idea was hit upon that perhaps the best way to attack this problem was to use the psychology of the old Indiantracker who apparently could track a man over solid stoneoround. The secret of his success lav in the fact that when'o -

e\'er he had no tracks to follow he would ask himself thequestion, "Now what would I do in a similar circumstanceif I were being pursued?" Using this method of attack. weasked ourselves what we mioht have done if a vear or tW

o -ago we had ;)Cen asked to freeze the design on a simple rad~control svstem. The vear or two mentioned here was.course. tile amount o(time that would have been necessa


11/84

THE BEGl:'\~L'\G OF GUIDED ;\llSSILE \\'ARF,\HE

The German HS 293, a radio-controlled gliding missile with Jet Propulsion Booster Unit suspended below.

put the equipment into volume production and train thecessary groups to use it after a practical design had beenided upon. On this basis and also on the basis of what

ttlewe knew about the Germans' activity in various por-ns of the radio spectrum, we decided that their first equip-nt would likely utilize a frequency somewhere betweenand 50 megacycles. This narrowed the problem downenough that a practical solution was possible.

The next question to be answered was how the enemyuld be likely to use the radio signal to control the bomb.

e felt it most probable that they would use a simple formamplitude or frequency modulation of tones which couldinterpreted in electrical apparatus in the missile as com-nds to turn, climb or dive, the simplest maneuvers re-ired of a flying guided missile.In line with these basic decisions, we proceeded to build

mm"ing transmitters for preliminary tests under laboratoryditions which were capable of emitting high power

nals over this relatively broad range of frequencies. Butest' transmitters differed from the usual broadcast trans-tters in that thev sacrificed the abilitv to stav at the samece on the dial' (same frequency) for the' ability to bequickly to the frequency at which they were needed to

Bect the faHino bomb. For there would be much to accom-"h in those 3 0seconds or so that sudden death was

ding toward you. First, you had to find and identify thelJa]out of the thousands likeh' to be on the air; then YOU

to find how he was using 'his radio signal to control;

9

then set your jamming transmitter to exattly the same fre-cluency as his to interfere with his control. If you still hadtime, you could fool the bomb by transmitting false controlinformation to it to throw it off its course. Unless the firstthree parts of this could be accomplished in 30 seconds orless, the jamming would likely be too late!-

"\lith such a restriction in time as this, it was, of course,impossible to use any standard type of receiver for sweepingthrough the band by twisting the dial. To accomplish thisdetection process rapidly, we had to develop a series of

broad band receivers in which a motor would tunc the dialrapidly over and over. The signals thus received on any fre-quency would appear as pips (or vertical marks) on a hori-zontalline on a cathode ray tube. The position on the linewould indicate the place ~n the dial \~.here the "station"could be received. t\ combination of broad band and con-

\'entional receivers pro\'ed an effective and rapiel means of finding a frequency to a high degree of accuracy. Othermodifications allowed the same recei\'ers to be used to adjustthe frequency of the jamming transmitter accurately to thatof the enemy control signal.

As far as the transmitters were concerned. it was impos-sible to get high speed tuning in any of the existing high,powered transmitters because most of them utilized at leastthree or four different adjustments for tunin2 because of certain requirements such as, stability, long life, etc. \Vedecided that only a single dial tuning arrangement couldbe tolerated. To attain this, we reached the conclusion that


12/84

The German FX 1400, a radio-concrolled bomb.

Marcl1-A

PR06A.BL! LOCAtIO. Of' SELf-DJt!TROTuaC H A R GE I I C O I iT k O L C C Il PA. Jn ' II D 'T

the German equipment. 1hey reSisted their natural aiety to jam in order to obtain data on the commands usedsteer the missile. As a matter of fact. they \\'ere success~in making phonograph records of the (adio signal 1 ' 1 'several of the bombs. After these records had been mathey turned on their jamming transmitters, and there Wl'tf!indications in this first attack that the jammino transmitt~functioned successfully. Since previous ex~rience wi

the bombs had shown that quite a few of them went out I control for unknown reasons. it was difficult to establishaO\' given one was forced out of control bva J'ammino siQI]

, ~ . 0 b

One of the ships in the convoy was hit, but fortunately theDE's escaped any damage. On returning to port, tilerecordings were flown back to the Naval Research L 1 borutory to be analyzed. 1\lean while we had been building, Onvery high priority, two new transmitters with an output r1one kilowatt each. These were flown to the i\ lediterraneanand installed in the DE's.

The analysis of the recording brought out the essentialpoints of the German system of controlling the bomb. Itwas, as we had suspected, an amplitude modulated systembut it involvcd a method of operation which wc had nO(anticipated. However, we were able to determine that themodulation with which we had equipped the transmitterswas able to upset the operation of the system if the trans.mittel'S were properly tuned. Essentially, the German S)5-tem of control was that the transmitter was modulated witheither of a pair of tones. \Vhcn one of the pair was trans-mitted, the bomb steered to the left and when the otherwas "heard" by the apparatus, it caused it to turn to theright. These tones were sent alternately, about ten times a

second. Thus the apparatus was in a constant dither, firslbeing commanded to go one way and then the other. If both of the commands were on for equal times, the bombwent straight. But if one was Icss insistent and the othermore, it would turn in the direction of the stronger signal,the amount of the turn depending on the difference in in.sistence of the command. Another similar pair of tonescontrollcd the angle at which thc bomb was to glide.whether steeper or to a longer range. This allowed all of the control needed for a bomb of the type they were using.

By the time the Normandy invasion was in preparation.most of the aspects of the German system were known. Thefinal details were obtained when several of the so-calledHS293 glider-type bombs were captured after hitting a shipand failing to explode. These were pieced together first in

THE COAST AHTILLERY )OllR:'\AL

could Forego some of the requirements such as st5bility.Because of the pressure of so many war born problems.s countermeasure \\'ork had proceeded rather slowly on a

w priority. However. at the time of the German attack the Bay of Biscav we had a\'ailable one broad band searchei\'er. ~ne moch;lation analyzer. and one 50-watt jammingnsmitter. all of lahoratory experimental construction,ides the other necessary recei\'ers.\ Vithin 30 days after d;e first attack. the Chief of Naval

erations and the Bureau of Ships arranged to put at theboratory's disposal two destroyer escorts (DE) to be fittedh equipment to detect and record the signals of the so--unknown German radio-controlled bomb. 1 \leanwhile,er attacks had taken place and an enterprising radiorator on one of the ships attacked had intercepted whatthought was the control frequency at 20 megacycles.

later analysis proved that he had indeed intercepted thenal, but because of the peculiar behavior of his receiver

d obtained a frequency which was about one-half the truequency. Fortunately, we stuck to our original guess of

frequency and equipped the ships with jamming equip-nt covering the wider range between 15 and 50 mega-les. The ships were brought into the \Vashington Navy

rd and after a period of about two weeks of night-and-y activity they were ready to sail with the best equipment

had available at the time. The most difficult problem atlast minute proved to be furnishing antennas which

uld cover such a broad band of frequencies efficiently.Simultaneous with the fitting of the ships was the task training Navy personnel to understand and operate the

uipment. These men had the tremendous task of using

ipment (which had been designed to be coddled inoratory experiments) under full battle conditions. Thered been none of the refinements that go into fini~heduipment for the fleet to make operation easier, For thisparatus was truly in the earliest stages of development.On September 30, 1943, these ships set sail For the r.ledi-ranean. The job of these crews certainly was not 3asant one, in view 0 1 'all 0 1 'the reports that kept comingabout hits on more and more of our ships and the high

rcentaoe of hits with these bombs, but it was certainlyo ,interesting one in that the problem reduced itself to onematching wits with the enemy on the subject of elec-

nics. Both the crews and we were a bit dubious aboutw successful a process this would be, but we were cer-nly ooino to make everv effort to beat the enemy at his

...0 0 ~ ,I

n game.By the time the ships arrived in the r.lediterranean, the

proximate location of the air base from which the r.lothernes took off was fairly well known. It was also knownt the Germans were reserving the use of these newmbs for especially valuable targets. Therefore, theyuld not necessarily attack a convoy unless it was a large

d important one. These known facts aided in the assign-

nt of the two DE's to coO\'o\'S on which they were sure tofer an attack. On one or'the first trips, 'the Germansned out in force. They seemed to pick for their targets

specially equipped intercept ships, although they prob-y did not know their mission. The interception equip-nt functioned verv nicelv. Durino this attack the crew

, . 0

oard the DE's had no difficulty locating the frequency of


13/84

A Strong America

Is a Peaceful America

THE BEGI:'\:'\L\'G OF GUIDED ~lISSILE \\'r\RFl\RE

and .md then here. The HS293 was a winged glidingIe c.mying a payload of about 1000 pounds. below

\\ as suspended a jet propulsion booster unit. TheIe \\ as launched from a 1 \Iother plane at a range of t 2.000 yards. A short period after launching. theer unit was used to increase the speed of the missileout 3:;0 miles per hour. Control was effected by means

op:rator in a ~ lother plane who used his radio control>ep the bomb. the target and himself always in a

oht line. The general method of attack was for theer plane to come up on the target ship parallel to itsse. launch the missile and have the radio controlledpment make the necessary corrections.nother of the Gem1an missiles used during this samei was of a considerably different type. but it utilizedlIme radio control mechanism. This so-called FX 1400imply a specially designed bomb tail and a set of fourizino fins which fitted to a standard German bomb

I:'>

the whole affair was used for high altitude bombing.bomb would be dropped from the lVlother plane from

t 20.000 feet almost vertically on the target as in aal high altitude bombing run with a bomb sight. Radio1 swere used to make corrections in the aim. From aermeasure point of view this was a far more potenton because the whole time of Right was on the order seconds. and hence there was onlv half the time tohis one as there was for the glider t)'Pe. Furthermore.the bomb was falling almost vertically and had been

ily aimed by standard bombing methods, it was likelyevery close to being on course. There was a possibilitythe jamming, if not expertly done, might result inIv freezing the controls of the bomb so that it con-d to fall onto its target.IVasanticipated that the Germans would make free useese radio-controlled bombs during the channel inn- To forestall their effectiveness. a total of 14 installa-of guided missile countermeasure equipment were

on American Ships cv the Naval Research Lacora-Thev were installed ~n a crash basis under most

11

unfm'Orable conditions while the ships rode at anchor inEnglish Harbor between exercises. By this time. the designof the necessarv receivers, transmitters. analYzers and an-tennas had beei1 completed. but none of the equipmenthad been put into production. It was necessary that mostof the equipment be Fabricated on a unit by unit basis inthe Laboratorv and at se\'eral radio manufacturing con-cerns. Additi~nal installations of a similar t~'Pe of ~quip-

ment were made in time for the landings in SouthernFrance. later in the summer of 19.H.It is difficult to assess the success of the guided missile

countermeasure campaign, but the over-all results weregratifying in so far as can be ascertained. Not a single shipin either of these invasions was hit bv a radio controlledbomb although a considerable numbe~ of both t)'Pes wereused bv the enemv.

The' whole problem of radio countermeasures is primarilyone of preparcdness in generaL The countermeasure engi-neer has to anticipate as many eventualities as he can andhe prepared to act against the most likely group. \ Vhateverthe enemv can do e1ectronicallv. can be undone bv means of countenn'easure electronics. The real deciding' factors inthis battle of wits arc two: I) Has the enemv had too muchof a head start so that insufficient time is .~vailable to getcountermeasure equipment into action? and 2) Is it eco-nomicallv feasible: that is. does the countermeasure re-quire m;ny times the expenditure in manpower and moneythat the countermeasure sa\'es? If the enemy can developa weapon so that either or both of these apply, thenhe has a very effective weapon.

In general, the Germans were very much countermeas-

ure-minded during the war and made extensive preparationsfor counter-countermeasures. Their feeling that they werelikely to be jammed led to a feeling of insecurity concerningall electronically operated equipment. This was reflected inthe development of mechanical systems for controlling mis-siles which were pre-set before takeoff. Such controlswere used almost exclusivel" in their later missiles, such asthe V-I and V-2. '


14/84

B y L ieu ten a n t C olon el D a u id B .P a rk er ,C.f.

Excerpts from SOme{lItllre historiaJl 's Jlotebook:

1\t 3: 30 on the morning of February 25th, 1952, RogerJones, a textile importer living in lower New York, wokeup with a violent, inexplicable attack of nausea, whichlasted a quarter of an hour. \Vhen he went back to bed henoticed a thick mist blowing in at his window. This vaguelysurprised him, for the night had begun clear, with a strongsteady wind.

At 3:40 Ellis C. Manchester, Port Commissioner of New York, arrived at the waterfront with one shoelace un-tied. He had been routed out of bed by frantic, almostincoherent subordinates. who now met him at Pier 10. Theend of the pier had been battered by a huge wave. and twomotorboats lay crushed on top of the piling. In spite of darkness and a wet, drifting mist, he could see more damagefarther up the Hudson. The excited men about him spokeof a great tidal wave caused by an earthquake far out at

sea. As the Commissioner walked back to his car, he wasovercome by a sudden attack of nausea.At about the same time Dr. Hiram Strandbero. a Co-o

lumbia Uni\'ersity radiologist who often worked all night inhis laboratory, noticed that the pointers of three of hisradioactivit,. meters had moved clear off the calibrated dials.After a hur~ied check with instruments able to record higher


15/84

values. he telephoned his wife to wake their little boy andget out of the city at once. Then he called the police, the~ layor and Army Headquarters on Governor's Island. Someof those who ans\\"ered were politely incredulous, otherssleepily annoyed. Strandberg finally threw the telephone tothe floor and rushed out. As he ran toward the subwav henoticed the mist riding on a stiff southwest wind-a ~om-bination he had never obsen'ed before.

At four o'clock Dixie Turner, cook on the earlv shift atO'Gradv's Cafeteria, turned off her alarm clock, siid out of bed, t~k a big red apple from the plate on the fire escapeand munched it while she dressed. As she walked to work,she began to feel queer: on arriving she collapsed in a chairand was violently sick. Half an hour later she felt wellenough to start u'p the coffee urn.

By five o'clock the 1 \layor's big room in City Hall wasfull of oflicials, newspaper and radio executives. Pale andunshaven, they listened to a group of scientists, amongwhom was the famous physicist and Nobel prizewinnerDr. Felix Novak, trying to outline a catastrophe that noreliable \'vitness had actuallv seen.

Not until months later w'as the whole storv of the disasterpieced together. An atomic bomb had been'detonated deepin the waters of New York harbor, not far from theStatue of Liberty. \Vhether the bomb had been plantedbv a submarine, or lowered from some surface craft, wasn~'verdetermined. It exploded at exactly three o'clock, witha mumed roar noticed by few of the city's sleeping millions.The explosion sent skyward, a mile or more into the air,several million tons of water-not solid water, but a rainymist of particles, each one of which was laden with radio-active fragments that shot forth deadly gamma and betarays. The enemy had picked a night ideally suited to hispurpose: a 30-mile wind was blowing from the bomb'sbursting point straight up the long splinter of ManhattanIsland. In less than an hour the lethal rain had fallen o\'erthe whole island. Although the intensity of the radioactivedeposit varied greatly from block to block, death threatenedevervone.

A~ 5: 15 the Mayor put into effect '''Schedule 99"-a de-tailed plan for the evacuation of New York which had beenprepared some years before. Immediately orders and warn-ings flooded the air from all radio stations-until they weresilenced by power failure caused by the flight of a few key

powerhouse employees in improvised rafts across the EastRiver. There were some other deserters, but all over thecity firemen, policemen, national guardsmen and scientistsremained at their posts risking the accumulation of analmost certain "graveyard dose" of gamma rays. The calmestpeople in the city were the scientists who had musteredNew York's entire collection of Geiger counters-a pitiful100 machines, where 10,000 would have been too few-andwent about mapping the contours of infection and search-ing out spots that might be comparatively safe-for others.

Ten minutes after the news of the explosion reachedhim, Dr. Felix Novak had estimated the amount of radio-activity released. "Over the citv's most heavily contami-nated ~reas," he told the 1 \layor, "~he average dos~ of gammaradiation is enough to be fatal to anyone who remains theremore than three hours. In these cases, death will not occurfor at least nine days-possibly not for six weeks, and there


16/84

M arc h-

exposure as deadlY as a sinole concentrated dose., "All through the spring and summer. efforts to d

taminate portions of the city were continued. A goodof radioactivity was washed from the streets with sea \\ but once the 'first layer had been removed. repeatedment had little effect on the residue. It was panicudifficult to decontaminate the outside of buildings.hosing them down collected deadly washings at their b a tThere were no chemicals that could be used to neutra

the poison of radioactiVity. as would have been Pss!had the attack been made by poison gas. 1\lachinery \\~countless millions was a total loss. Even when it could h tremm'cd. its contamination stayed with it. Packs of carne.fed dogs. once household pets, roamed the deserted streets,until they also died from the effects of radiation.

Altho~gh he had managed to get out of the cit~,qui0~-by walking through the Holland Tunnel just before 6closed it-Roger Jones developed, on the fifth day. midiarrhea followed by persistent attacks of nausea. \ \litha week, his temperature went up to 104 and his mou

and throat became severely inAamed. In spite of the devoll'liand skillful care given him in a Philadelphia hospital. h edied on the ninth day.

Dr. Hiram Strandberg. the first man to see the disaslarecorded on his telltale instruments, was at once put incharge of the Geiger counter survey squads, and workednight and day until ordered out of the city by Dr. FelixNovak. Two weeks after the explosion his hair began IIIdrop out. After 18 days he began to lose weight and run afever. After four weeks he was deathly pale, suffered fromnosebleeds, and had lost 25 pounds. Only many tram-fusions and administration of hormones and vitamins saved

his life-plus the lucky fact that he had spent the deadliesthalf-hour of the radioactive mist in the subway on his \\'3\ to police headquarters. The \Vall Street nigl~t watchma~in the hospital bed next to his developed exactly the samesymptoms, but died on the 32nd day.

The body of Dixie Turner was one of the 141 corpses.eventually taken from the 77th Street subway station. Shewould almost certainly have died anyhow. 1

Not for a whole year was New York City officially de-clared fit for repopulation by its survivors.

The points to remember about this hypothetical attack are as follows;

First-No detail in the account you have just read isdependent on the future progress of atomic science. Thebomb as it is t~, the bomb as dropped on Japan andtested at Bikini, can do the damage I have described to thepeople and the city of New York.

Second-!'vlost of the military men who have worked withthe bomb doubt whether any e'ffective defense can be devel-oped against a bomb used in this imaginary, but quilepractical way.

Third-Until international control becomes a reality. ouronly safeguard is ceaseless vigilance, and the protection of

our leadership in atomic research and development.Fourth, and most important-\Ve must do everything in

our power, to effect international control o f atomic energy.The men who have worked with the bomb feel that theUnited States plan, as presented to the United Nations byBernard AI. Baruch, is the best answer to the problem.

TI iE COAST ARTILLERY JOllR~t\L14

will be no symptoms for two or three days. In a few places.people will get such a concentrated dose that,they will benauseated almost at once. These people will die withinfour days. The people who were able to get out of the cityfast ma\' lose some of their hair next week. or run a slioht

, "fever. but they will recO\'er completely. Only the futurecan tell what the gamma rays will do to their descendants."

Dr. Felix No\'ak died on the ninth dav after the disaster.But while his estimate of the radioactivit~, proved uncannily

accurate. there were manv who died in less than the mini-mum time he predicted 'for death from gamma rays. Forneither he. nor the 1\layor, nor the police, nor the youngsoldiers who wept as they fired into mobs. foresaw the chainreaction of hysteria which seized the inhabitants of NewYork as they tried to get off their narrow island. It was theworst panic in all human history. Thousands were crushedo death in subway stations, on bridges. in the tunnels underhe rivers. After the first hour of the panic the city's exits

were so clogged with wrecked cars and corpses that only arickle of people-some of them swimmers-were able toscape. The trains that were in the city early that morning

got out, with capacity loads. l\ lany train crews heroicallyvolunteered to return, and continued the evacuation untilhe city was nearly emptied and the panic had subsided.

But these return trips often exposed the volunteers to theew additional minutes of radiation needed to tip the bal-nce. and caused their deaths some four weeks later.

At the time of the explosion, there were over 2,000,000eople on 1\lanhanan. According to figures, admittedly in-ccurate, given out later at the Metropolitan Life Insurance

Company's temporary headquarters in Boston, within sixweeks 389,101 New Yorkers were dead or missing. Most of

he survivors suffered from some form of radiation sickness.n addition, many thousands outside of 1\'\anhattan weretricken, particularly in \Vestchester County and the Bronx,nd great numbers of them died. The casualties most dis-ant from the explosion were in the upstate town of \Vat-ins Glen, about 180 miles away, where the vagaries of their currents unexpec!edly dropped the last large concen-ation of fission products.

It took nearly a week to get all the living out of NewYork, No one will ever know how manv died from causesther than radiation, how manv drowned in the rivers, how

many were killed in subways' by contact with third rails,ow many were shot as looters. Some shut themselves upafe from radiation in a steel bank vault, only to perish forack of water and air. Others who stuck it out as long ashey could in sub-basements picked up fatal doses whenunger forced them above the ground.

On March 6 a small party of bold scientists, Geigerpunters in hand, threaded its way back through the in-sible maze of death to retrieve precious documents. Gradu-lv, as radioactivitv on the citv's walks and pavements andairways and tabI'e tops dec~yed, more such raids wereganized, some of them in lead-lined army tanks. A few

tempts were made to drain off water in plumbing systems.ut the task was given up as hopeless, and when the weatherrned cold again a million pipelines froze and burst.It was not easy to find volunteers for such expeditions,

en when under the protection of Geiger counters. Themma ray effects were cumulative, and made repeated


17/84

e Launching OfGuided Missiles

B yDr. R . E .Gibson and Dr. 7\. Kossiakoff

INTRODUCTION

m the artilleryman's point of view, the guided missileieapon for use at ranges where conventional gunfire issible or ineffective. Even if the ranges of ordinary~ere increased many fold, the necessity for the guidede would be reduced only slightly, particularly for the

ement of moving targets, because the long times of im'olved would strain heyond their limit the capaci-

f present or future fire control systems. Up to a fewago the whole future history of a shell in time andwas determined irrevocablv at the instant it left thee of the gun, no correction 'based on subsequent moreate knowledge of the relative positions of the shellhe target being possible thereafter. The development proximity fuze introduced the possibility of such a

ctjon by permitting the shell it,.' to determine fromr study of the target, the ProF ' time to explode. This

n important advance, particularly in antiaircraft war-but it soon became apparent that at long ranges evenmity fuzes were not able to assist the gunner ma-ly, because of the limitations imposed upon him byability to use later information to change the course shell to allow for the movements of the target. Theidea underlying the guided missile is the developmentmechanism whereby information about the relativeons and courses of the missile and the target may beed during the time of flight and utilized to affect thet possible coincidence of the two at the time the war-functions.

lthis article we are concerned with problems arising inunching of these missiles and in the paragraphs that

we shall discuss some of the general underlying prin-in\'olved. \Ve shall review the present status of thed present some quantitative considerations intended

ve a foundation for a balanced viewpoint from whicheader may judge future operations in this field.

ral Descriptioll of cllided Missiles.

us first consider the tvpe of missile that will fulfill theal purposes we have 'j~st outlined. It can be seen at

that it must possess the following characteristics:It must carrv a warhead and fuze of suitable size.It must hav~ a bodv to house the mechanism for re-cei\'ing, interpreting, and using intelligence about its

ition and motion relative to the target.must be equipped with control surfaces or someer means enabling it to make use of the intelligence

to alter its course in space as dictated by the data.4. It must be able to travel at high speeds in order to out-

Figure I-Launcher for \X' AC Corporal.


18/84

THE COr\ST r\RT1LlERY JOUR~AL

Defl ll itio l/ of Tenl /il lo!ogy Used to Describe Lalll/ch'1'1ec1wl/isllls.

The appamtus for launching a missile should prwhatever control and acceleration are needed dl/rino

oinitial part of the flight to enable the missile's guidancepropulsion systems to carry it to the target in the nlostficient manner. Control during launching is affected

means of a mechanical structure which constrains thesile to move in the desired direction of fire, Such a struetis common Iv called the Iml1lc1zer and will be describeddetail in th~ following section. t\cccleration, when nto supplement that provided by the missile's main p o lplant, is accomplished by means of an auxiliary sourcethrust which detaches itself from the missile after thesired velocity has been attained. If the thrust is supplieda fixed structure, the structure is called a catnpllit. If thrust is supplied by a unit which travels with> the miduring the acceleration period, the unit is referred to asbooster. Both types of accelerating devices have been uized and will be discussed below.

LAUNCHERS

In considering the practical problems of launchingbulky, heavy and delicate structure comprising the guidmissile, we see that the launcher must be a stable, ristructure on which the missile may be set up and serviprior to launching, on which it may reside in comparatisecurity until needed, and which will guide it in the desirdirection during at least the first few feet of its journey.is essential that this structure be strong enough to sup

the weight of the missile, and that it be rigid and comenough to withstand the rearward blast expelled by tpropulsion system of the missile or of auxiliary launchirockets. The guiding members must be designed tovent the missile from rolling off or receiving damagecause of movements of the platform, and at the same timust allow unobstructed passage for the fins, wings,other external attachments at the time of the missile'sparture.

Generally speaking, a launcher consists of a set of h~steel rails alono which the missile slides. These rails are" .together by members in such a way as to give maxll1~rigidity and complete freedom of passage of the vehlThe guided length depends very strongly on the size. 3purpose of the missile itself, and may vary from essentJzero to many times the length of the missile. In praclaunchers vary in size .and complexity from the bazlauncher used by infantrymen during the war, to the

equipped with propulsion systems designed 10 sustainin Aioht but not to accelemte them to cruising sn ~such cases auxiliary power plants will be required tothe missile. As was shown in the previous paragraphs,relati,'ek fraoile construction of the missiles places a. "upper limit for the acceleration it can stand during laing. a fact which restricts the choice of an auxiliarvpulsion system. The need for elaborate equipmenthandling and servicing the missiles. and keeping th~readiness prior to launching will have already occu~the reader.

Figure 2-Launcher for "Bumblebee."

manem'er a high speed target or to attain the desiredrange.

). For many applications. it must be able to maintainhigh speeds for a considerable length of time. andhence requires a propulsion system of its own in orderto overcome gravity and the aerodynamic drag set up

by flight and maneuverability.

Present designs indicate that ] 000 Ibs is likely to be theminimum weight of an effective guided missile and thatfive 10 ten feet is the smallest IOtal span of the wings or con-trol surfaces that will suffice to provide the necessary liftcharacteristics. Furthermore. in order that the warhead mavbe of suitable size and effectiveness. the weight of the re;tof the missile must be kept as low as possible. This meansthat the missile cannot be designed to withstand accelera-tion forces that are even of the same order of magnitude asthose set up in a shell during its travel in a gun barrel. Itwill be seen, therefore. that a missile designed to fulfill theabove requirements will be bulky, heavy and fragile com-

pared with ordinary ammunition.

Lallllch i IIg HeqII iremellts.

Up to the present, practical experience in the launchingof guided missiles has been almost entirely limited to thelaunching of long-range rockets like the German V-2 andthe dropping of guided bombs from airplanes; operationswhich require only the nlost rudimentary launching ap-purtenances.

The launching requirements L. "rile military guided mis-sile of the immediate future will, however, be much moreexacting. In some cases the guidance systems used may re-quire more or less elaborate 'fixed installations for project-ing the missile accurately in agiven direction; for example,a launcher with train ancl'elevator mechanisms might be re-quired. Furthermore for most applications, missiles will be

16


19/84

THE LAU;\TCHING OF GUIDED J\l ISSILES

rocket launchers used on landing craft or by fielctartil-and to the 90-foot \'ertical steel tower at \ Vhite Sands"noGround used for launching high altitude rockets.la~ncher is shown in Figure 1. An e;..:perimental struc- _used for launching test missiles at smaller angles of tion is shown in Figure 2.esent launchers for guided missiles may be classifiedtWOtypes: flxed lalllzdzeTs which send the missile off oi\'en direction. not necessarily pointed at the target.;aillable ImmelleTs which dispatch the missile in thetion of the target. The type best suited to a particularan' use depends both on the nature of the guidance

and the range at which the target must be inter-. The fixed launcher. which is usually made vertical,

far the simplest but is limited to use against relativelyrange targets and requires a separate ground guidance

for each missile. The trainable launcher is bestfor short ranges and makes the least demand on the

nnce system of the missile, but it introduces engineer-roblems which are comparable with those encountered

c construction and use of the largest guns.CATAPULTS

catapult combines the function of directing and accel-ng the missile during its take-off from the launchingorm. Thus the catapult must possess the characteristicsaunchcr, described in the preceding section, and in ad-n must include . system for applying a thrust to theileduring its t' .;el on the launcher. It then sen'es thefunction for J missile as a gun tube does for a shell.

17

\\'hile the catapult beha\'es in principle like a gun, aguided missile is so different in construction from an artil-lery shell that there is usually little physical resemblancebetween a catapult and a conventional gun. As a result of its bulk, the construction of a gun barrel to enclose the mis-sile completely and a piston to transmit the thrust presentformidable design problems. In all catapults used at present.this problem has been avoided by having the missile con-nected externally to the accelerating mechanism. Two ex-amples of such catapults are those used on ships to launchfighter planes, and the launching ramp for the GermanV-I (Buzz Bomb). The airplane catapult uses the force ex-erted by a piston in a hydraulic cylinder to move a systemof levers attached to the plane. The levers convert the largeforce of the piston acting over a short distance into a smallerforce acting on the plane over the distance required fortake-off. The German V-I ramp consists of a split tube165 feet long along which a piston is drivcn by prcssure de-veloped by decomposing hydrogen peroxide. The pistoncarries a hook which passes through thc slot in the tube and

engages the underside of the Buzz Bomb. An ingenious de-vice. consisting of a flexible tube which is brought againstthe slot by the piston, seals the tube behind it. The V-I cata-pult accelerates the missile, weighing about 5000 lbs, to avelocity of 240 miles per hour.

\Ve have noted earlier that the relatively fragile missilestructure places a definite upper limit on the acceleration towhich it can be subjected during launching. A reasonablevalue, according to present design practices, would be 50times gravity (50g). It is readily seen that this limitation

Figure 3-A Booster Rocket.


20/84

THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

It will be recalled that~:~::s carry with them the fiand oxidizer needed for propulsion, that they develop f thrust even at zero velocity and indeed that their thrustindependent of velocity. \Vith suitable choices of nonharea and other design variables, rockets can be constructeto give a wide variation of thrusts and operating times. ~

There is now a considerable background of e)o.:periencthe use of rockets for launching experimental miss ilSimple methods of coupling the booster to the missile habeen devised. I t is possible to use a single rocket or.cluster of rockets mounted at the rear end of the miSSil~such a way that the thrust is applied directly alongaxis of the missile, and so that the booster separates eawhen it ceases to burn by virtue of its larger aerodyna

drag. It has also been found practical to use as a boosternumber of rockets arranged around the circumference of circle whose center lies in the axis of the missile, the rackethemselves being on the outside of the missile.

Liqllid and Solid Fuel RocketsRockets fall into two general types-liquid fuel rockets

For these, the use of a booster durino launchino is a.:> .:>

sential operational requirement.

Requiremellts for tile Auxiliary Propulsioll SysteBecause of the high velocities to which it is usually n

sary to launch guided missiles and the limited time duwhich the acceleration must usually be accomplished,horsepower requirements imposed on the auxiliary

plants are quite extraordinary. Consider, for example,requirements on a booster for accelerating a missile w .ing 1000 Ibs to a velocity of 2000 feet per second in 2onds. The lightest possible auxiliary power plantweigh at least 1000 Ibs. Thus, a mass of :W O O Ibs wouldto be given an acceleration of approximately 30 g (960per sec~), which would require a thrust of 60,000(weight). Remembering that the horsepower input isgiby the product of the velocity and the thrust divided550 (with the units used), we see further that whenvelocity is lOaD feet per second about 110,000 horsepois required and when the velocity is 2000 feet per seeabout 220,000 horsepower is required. This performais unattainable in any but rocket or turbojet engines.erally speaking therefore, we cannot consider conventioengines, for example an airplane engine and propeller,providing all the auxiliary power for boosting guided m issiles. On the other hand, the application of conventionengines to supply part of the acceleration needed to bringmissile to cruising velocity appears to be feasible. Forample, the use of large airplanes to launch heavy missilat high altitudes with a velocity of approximately 500 f per second is not only possible but may be profitable.

At present, rockets seem to be the most promising candate for light and efficient power plants capable of givithe required acceleration to guided missiles. The siplicity, versatility, and the fact that their operation is inpendent of velocity and altitude gives them an advantaat present over turbojet engines, their only likely copetitors for such applications.

18

on acceleration results in a limitation on the velocity whichcan be attained by a catapult of practical length: As anexample, let us consider a catapult 50 feet long which givesthe missile a constant acceleration of 50 g. The velocity pro-duced, v, is gh'en by the elementary equation l'~ = 2as,where a is the acceleration and s the distance through whichit is applied. Substituting s = 50 ft. and a = 50 x 32ft/sec~, gi\'es l' = 400 ft/sec. Doubling both the ac-celeration and the length would give a velocity of 800h/sec,

The abo\'e analysis shows that the catapult must be largeand heavy, elaborately constructed, and that its lengthstrictly limits the velocity to which it can accelerate themissile. It possesses the advantage, however, of being capa-ble of repeated use with little expenditure of fuel and ma-terial, as compared to that necessary to supply the samevelocity by means of a jettisonable booster unit. Accord-ingly, it represents a method of launching which, undercertain conditions, can be more advantageous than anyother means. In addition, even when a high launchingvelocity is required, the use of a combination of catapultand booster may in certain applications be more expedientthan the use of a correspondingly larger booster alone.

BOOSTERS

The booster has' een defined as an auxiliary propulsionsystem which tnr .,s with the missile and separates after itsimpulse has been delivered. In considering the functionsof boosters we may recognize four important cases wherethe entire work of propelling the missile from rest to thetarget cannot be efficiently accomplished by the main power

plant of the missile and can best be done in part by a sepa-rate booster. These are listed below:1. In case the missile must attain full velocity in the

shortest possible time and sustain it for a long time there-after a much larger thrust is needed initially than thatwhich would be developed by a propulsion system designedto maintain the speed. Here a booster which develops ahigh thrust for a short time and then separates from themissile, fulfills this requirement most effectively. This caseis particularly significant when guided missiles are used indefense against attacking aircraft.

2. In case the missile must have minimum weightthroughout sustained Hight to permit maneuvering or to at-tain long range with minimum thrust, the use of a boosterreduces the weight of the missiles by that of the fuel andtanks required to accelerate it to full velocity.

3. In case the propulsion system used in the missile iseffective only above a certain critical velocity, a booster mustbe used to b~ing the missile up to the required speed. Ram-jets, which are perhaps the most efficient long-range high-speed engines, do not develop appreciable thrust below thevelocity of sound in air while pulse- or reso-jets are ineffi-cient at velocities below 100 miles per hour.

4, In case the missile must attain a peak velocity greaterthan that attainable by a single stage propulsion systemthe velocity must be achieved in two or more stages by us-ing one or more boosters to provide the velocity in incre-ments.

Actually, most of the missiles now under considerationare subject to one or more of the conditions listed above.


21/84

THE LAllNCHE'\G OF GUIDED ,\llSSILES

e dby the German \'-2 weapon and solid ruel rocketsified by the aircraft and artillery rockets used during

war. Both ha\'e their own peculiar ad\'antages and dis-mages. In liquid fuel rockets, the fuel and oxidizer are

in separate tanks whence they are pumped to a rela- small combustion chamber where the propelling re-

n takes place. The relatively elaborate equipmentcd to control and supply the fuels and oxidizer makesd fuel rockets inefficient in small sizes and in casese a large thrust is required for a short time. For large

operating for many seconds, the inherent possibili-of liquid rockets as auxiliary power plants are less edthan those of solid rockets.mpared with current liquid fuel rockets, solid fueltS are very simple in design and operation, and thisicity is one of their important advantages. The rocket

orconsists of a cvlindrical chamber fitted with a nozzleCh restricts the ~scape of the gases produced by com-on, thus raising their pressure and escape velocity, andpermits them to expand, thus helping to drive thet. The rate of gas production is controlled by theical composition of the propellant (in particular by

atio of oxidizing agent to fuel), by the operating pres-lnd temperature and by the geometry of the charge.

uring the past year the art of solid fuel rockets has madele progress in the direction of the design and buildingits many times larger than those previously available.e 3 shows a booster rocket used for launching a missile

hing 1000 Ibs to a velocity of 1800 ftjsec. It carriesoximately 800 Ibs of solid propellant, burns for twods and has a thrust of approximately 65,000 Ibs

ght). Smaller versions of this same design have beenas units in a multiple rocket system for acceleratingilar missile.

topmental Problems Connected witll Booster Rockets.

e more important problems connected with the de-ment and use of booster rockets for launching guidedes may be stated as follows;) De~elopment of high-thrust, high-total-impulse

rockets using either liquid or solid fuels. A flexibledesign capable of wide extension in scale is desired.

Development of fuels giving high effective gas ve-locities in rockets.) Development of rocket motors of as low weight as

is compatible with safety and reliability of opera-tion.Development of the means for achieving stabilityand control of the complete assembly (missile andauxiliary power plant) during the accelerationperiod.

oder problem (A) ,the main work now required is aof the mechanical and interior ballistic design of

ts to obtain the engineering data for the building of

required for any missile without the necessity of aghgoing de\'elopment for each specific case.

e effective gas velocity is equal to the thrust inals obtained when propellant gas is discharged from

Ie of the rocket at a rate of one pound per second.ds mainly on the thermodynamic properties of thent gases and to a small extent on the chamber res-

19

sure and the design of the nozzle. The problem of acceler-ating a missile to high velocities with a rocket booster, de-pends on being able to use a propellant with a sufficientlyhigh gas \'elocity. Propellants currently available have ef-fective gas velocities lying between 5000 and 7000 feet persecond.

An important parameter in the design of a booster rocketis the ratio of the mass of the empty rocket to the mass of

powder carried-this is a measure of the dead load carriedby the rocket itself. In the present state of the art it is pos-sible to construct solid fuel rockets in which the weight of the empty rocket is equal to the weight of the powder car-ried. A number of ways in which the metal to propellantweight may be cut down are being explored. Increase indensity of loading, reduction of operating pressures, andthermal insulation of the rocket chamber are among themore promising.

The aerodynamic stability of the missile during launch-ing differs in kind as well as in degree from its stability at

full operating speed after the booster has separated. Dur-ing this period the control surfaces on the missile are noteffective either in maintaining a straight course or in exe-cuting a maneuver for two reasons; (1) the lift producedby the control surfaces is highly dependent on velocity andis inadequate during most of the accelerating period, and(2) the added weight of the booster rocket, which isusually greater than that of the missile, greatly reduces theresponse of the missile to the forces developed by the con-trols. For this reason auxiliary means must be used to guidethe course of the missile during the launching period. Inorder to avoid the use of a separate guidance system, no ef-fort is usually made to fly any but a straight course untilseparation has occurred.

The stabilization of the booster and missile duringlaunching is accomplished by equipping the former withlarge fixed fins so as to bring the center of pressure of theentire assembly well behind the center of gravity. \\'ith thiscondition, rotation of the missile axis from the line of Right(yaw or pitch) will be opposed by an aerodynamic restoringmoment, and as a result the missile will tend to flv with zeroangle of attack. '

Since the location of the center of pressure is somewhat

dependent on velocity, the nns must be designed to producea suitable stability over the entire range. However, it hasbeen found experimentally for the type of design usuallyemployed that, if the assembly is stable at low air speeds, itwill usually likewise be stable in the transonic and super-sonic regions.

In the missile itself, as in conventional aircraft, the degreeof stability is usually adjusted to bring the center of pressurea few per cent behind the center of gravity. A greater degreeof stability is unnecessary because the guidance system cancorrect for deflections in course produced by gusts or minormalalignments. Furthermore, additional stability would beundesirable since it would decrease maneuverability.

In contrast to the stability requirements of a co~trolledmissile, those of an uncontrolled rocket, such as the missile-booster combination during launching, are much more se-vere. This arises from the fact that it is impossible to designthe assembly so as to guarantee exact alignment between theaxis of thrust of the rocket' et and the c n r 0


22/84

THE COAST ARTILLERY JOlIRNAL0

he entire assembly. Thus. the torque produced by a mal-ligned jet causes the missile to turn and no control is avail-ble to correct this condition durino the boost. In order too

minimize the yawing tendency. which would result in themposition of excessive loadino on the missile winos as wello C>s an unpredictable deviation from a linear path, the fins onhe booster are made considerabh. laroer than would be re-

o 0

uired just to achieve stability. In this way the center of

ressure is usually brought about 10 per cent behind theenter of gravity. The restorino moment is thus made suf-~, C>iciently large to prevent the yaw resulting from the un-voidable jet malalignment from exceeding a tolerable limit.

CONCLUSION

The art of the guided missile is still in an early stage of echnical development, and we must again emphasize thatractical experience in the launching and flying of these

missiles has been limited almost entirely to experimentalest vehicles. In this article, therefore, we have confined

ur attention to those technical aspects of the subject onwhich a body of information has been accumulated fromocket and catapult experimentation or from the preliminarytudies and tests of prototype missiles. During the war, ex-erior ballistics of fin stabilized rockets were studied ex-ensively, both in theory and practice, and the results of

Moon

these investigations may be applied directly to guideefforts of the desioner of booster-missile combinations ioproductive channels. The interior ballistics of rockets arocket propellants also advanced notably during theand these investigations, together with later work baupon them, have placed at our disposal a number of dev'for accelerating guided missiles and a background for aproaching intelligently the many problems pertinent

design and use.Many problems in the actual launching of guided

siles under field conditions will doubtless have occurredthe reader during his perusal of this article. Problems sudras the handling of rockets in the field, the concealmentoperations, and the safe disposal of the booster after sepal10tion from the missile raise questions whose practical il1\ portance cannot be minimized. These problems haveyet been crystallized except in the few specific applicatioin which experienced military men have had the opJ>Otunity to work with the missiles under service condition \Ve have, therefore, not attempted any general discussiaaof this aspect of the subject, but would emphasize that. iour opinion, the formulation and solution of problems ar'ing from experience in their use under tactical conditions ISthe next important phase in the development of launchingsystems for military guided missiles. J

R o c k e fBy Constantin Paul lent

A question is often asked: \\That will be the chances fora rocket ship to reach the Moon without being hit bymeteorites? Another question: How a rocket will land uponthe surface of the 1\ 11oon?

To answer question No.1, one must take in considera-tion that in comparison with the size of the earth and thesize of the rocket, the meteors falling on the earth have abetter chance to hit the planet because of its tremendoussize, while the rocket offers such a small hitting surface.The chances that a rocket will be hit bv meteorites is likelv..to be 100,000 to one or even less.

Question No. 2 is much harder to answer.An important factor to be considered is the necessity of

landing the rocket ship in an upright position. The speed

*This extract from Mr. Lent's original article which appeared in hismagazine, Rockel-Jet Flying, is reproduced here because it brings out apoint not covered by G. Edward Pendray's article, "Next Stop the Moon,"published in the January-February JOUR:-;A~

of the rocket at landing can be reduced by firing the rockemotors in reverse and the rocket can be made to land upona pick. The landing pick must be quite large and massivin construction so that when the rocket hits the surface c I the Moon, at reduced speed, it will inbed itself in ~ground and hold the rocket in an upright position.

Once the landing has been effected, the next problemwill be to leave the rocket for the sake of exploration of ~Moon's surface. This is not an easl problem to solve C()ll~'sidering the changes of temperature and other unkno~factors upon the Moon. It has been estimated that facJl1

the sun the temperature might be as high as plus 230 ~~grees Centigrade, and in the shade as much as minus 2 7 1 degrees Absolute. Inasmuch as there is no atmosphere uthe Moon to help absorb excessive ultraviolet radiation,rays will be very dangerous to anyone venturing on1\loon without protective equipment such as space suitsshields.


23/84

A Stron g A m erica IsA P ea cefu l A m erica

Celebration of Army Week during wartime had a special significance, for duringwartime the whole of America was acutely conscious of the Army's importance andindispensability, proud of its accomplishments and secure behind its might.

But this peacetime observance, our second since winning the war, is even more

significant than its wartime celebration. Having won the war, we must win the peace,and the theme of Army Week 1947-"A Strong America is a Peaceful America"-is amost powerful reminder of how we may best win the peace.

~-~~~ . .. ~ ~~$J" r- :, :" ", ,: 7' - ....... _- ...

It would be well if we could be reminded more often than"'once.a'.year that astrong America is a peaceful America, for it seems that, as always after a war, thewarnings in the world news in our daily papers are little heeded.

America was militarily weak in 1917,and Germany thought she could defeat us.America was militarily weak in 1941,and Japan thought we could be defeated:-FOr~

tunately, in both wars, we had some allies capable of withstanding the enemy untilwe could make ready. In any future war, we would not have that advantage, for itis probable that we would be attacked first of all.

America must, therefore, remain strong, to insure the peace we have won so ardu-ously. To remain strong, she need not maintain an unduly large Army. A compara-tively small Regular Army, backed by a National Guard and by an Organized ReserveCorps, is all th~t is needed, all that has been needed.

But all of these components of our Army must be given the means and support

necessaryto achieve the degree of strength which is essential, and to maintain thatstrength. To abandon our Army again, in this age, would be more than shortsighted:it would be foolhardy.

General, USACommanding, Army Ground Forces


24/84


25/84

TRAI~ING OF RADAR OPERATORS

ntrained eye.II operators should be schooled in:

Theorv of radar. Capab'ilities and limitations of radar to include theeffect of weather on the particular set or sets withwhich they are to work.

. IFF.

. Operational techniques.Pipology.Countermeasures, and defense against countermeas-ures.

o attempt should be made to have operators under-ldall of the electrical circuits that exist within a radar.

is the function of the repairman and repairs to a sethis responsibility. Operators should be taught to keeps off if the set needs repairs.he balance of this article will be confined to operational

iques since pipology and defense against counter-sures are considered broad enough to deserve separatement and the other subjects have been covered pre-

slv in this series.l}~en the general instruction has been concluded, themtor should be introduced to the set which he is toate. Correct step-by-step procedure in turning on andcalibrating, tuning and operating each set should beonstrated. The various uses of the set should be ex-ned. \\lays to recognize improper operation and inferiororm:mce should be described, along with suggestionsorrecting these faults. Finally, results to be expectedhis set should be given so that the efficiency of similar

s may be compared, and steps taken to correct per-allce when it is not up to standard.

OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

arious radars differ in physical appearance. Each haspecial knobs, types of presentation, and gadgets, de-ing on the primary function of the individual set.rdless of this physical variance, there'is much that can

aid, in a general sense about good operational tech-es for all radar sets.order to gain the maximum tactical advantage from at all times, the radar operational techniques mustge as the situation changes. Methods of operation must

exible. Common sense and a thorough knowledge of other elements of the battery with which the radarorking must determine which of these techniquesId be used in any given situation.brief outline of the various basic controls and indica-w illform a Foundation for a more detailed discussionese techniques.

Range scale. \Vhat scale should be used under whatitions?Gain control. This corresponds to the volume controlbroadcast receiver. Should it be set high, low, or

um?Antenna rotation. Should the antenna be rotatednuously? How fast should it turn? Should it alwaysh an area of 360? If stopped, for how long.Range. How should ranges be read? Should the

step and associated dials be used when provided?Id estimated ranges be used with the assistance of

23

SIGNAL TO TYPICAL ECHONOISE PATTERN STRENGHRATIO

I to I Intermittent echo

or less~

barely perceptible

2 to I Weak

~ echo

4 t o I

~

Goodecho

8 to I JL Strong16 to I JL Very strong oror greater Saturating echo

T h e a b ov e s ke tc h s ho ws t he v ar i at io n i n p at te rn i n r el at i on t ot he r a t io b et we e n t he s i gn al a n d " n oi se ."

improvised scales?

5. If the radar set is equipped with two or more typesof cathode-ray indicators, which should be used, and underwhat conditions is one preferable to the other?

6. Azimuths and Elevations. Is it possible to match pipsand still be off target?

The answers to these questions, for different types of radar sets operating in various tactical situations, will pro-vide the operator with the foundation of operational tech-niques. From this foundation, each special circumstance

will require variations which can only be determined byradar operating experience and common sense.Each type of radar has been designed for one specific

field of application and there is nothing that the operatorcan do to modify these purposes. An air-search radar is apoor surface-search radar, and vice versa. Each of thesetypes may serve in an emergency as a fire-control radar butthey cannot be expected to furnish ranges and azimuthswith the same degree of accuracy as a fire-control radarspecifically designed for that purpose. In case of failure of either the air- or surface-search radars, the nre-control radarmay act as a search set.

SURFACE-SEARCH RADAR

L o n g - r m l g e s e a r c h f o r l a r g e t a r g e t s .

It is essential that large surface targets be detected atthe maximum possible range of the radar so that an effectivedefense can be employed. The range scale used should be


26/84

B

c

e C.0 aC> '"

o I r.E '"~ I i

.2 0...0- a.e c. . . .

. .

= ::---1JVariation in effective beam width with receiver gain

If a target lies on the lobe axis, and the receiver gain is varied,the size of the received echo will also vary. For high gain, theecho will be proportional to the line AM, for medium gain to'AL, and for low gain the echo will be proportional to ~.Thus, at high gain, the radar can see the target if it is wi .the angle BAC since all echoes received in lobe 3 within tangle are larger thao the minimum that can be detect \X7hen the gain is reduced to normal, angle DAG applies an

for low gain, angle HAJ is the limit.

Auxiliary fire control.

If your battery has no fire-control radar, or if such equip-ment has failed, you may have to depend completely onsurface-search radar for the control of gunfire.

The radar operator must furnish more accurate rangesand azimuths than those provided by obtaining them on theHy. The antenna must be stopped to obtain accurate rangesfrom the A scope and azimuths from the azimuth scale. Ifno A scope is available, the most accurate method of ob-taining this data must be selected, depending upon the

particular radars in use.For radar spotting, the antenna must be fixed on the

target while the shells are in flight so that splashes may b enoted on the radar indicator. In spite of the high degree

A

be the shortest a,'ailable scale, although on some sets itbe found that the mid-range scaie can be used to bead\'antage. The receiver oain should be \'aried durino

" "entire search, its setting depending on the amount of ~return present and other tactical considerations. Look [o rperiscopes close, increase the gain a little, and search nearthe outer limits of the sea-return area for surfaced sulrmarines and small patrol craft. Remember that sea returnis basically the same as an echo from a target. and that itmust be present if a small target echo is to be detected.

Operating experience will determine the correct oainsetting for different amounts of sea return. Antenna ~ota-tion should be as slow as possible; again, make occasionalmanual searches. New targets should appear on either theA scope or the PPI almost simultaneously, provided thegain is set high enough for PPI operation. These indicatorsshould be alternately observed for equal periods of timeto reduce eye strain and monotony. If a contact

Documents

Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1947