Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 1

Colombian armed conflict (1964–present)The Colombian Civil War is an ongoing asymmetric low-intensity armed conflict in Colombia that has existedsince approximately 1964 or 1966, between the Colombian government and peasant guerrillas such as theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN).It is historically rooted in the conflict known as La Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948 assassination ofpopulist political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán,[1] and in the aftermath of United States-backed military attacks onpeasant communities in rural Colombia in the 1960s that led Liberal and Communist militants to re-organize intoFARC.[2]

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements claim to be fightingfor the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from government violence and to provide social justicethrough socialism.[3] The Colombian government claims to be fighting for order and stability, and seeking to protectthe rights and interests of its citizens. The paramilitary groups, such as the AUC, claim to be reacting to perceivedthreats by guerrilla movements.[4] Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been accused of engaging in drugtrafficking and terrorism. All of the parties engaged in the conflict have been criticized for numerous human rightsviolations.The fighting has killed 250,000 individuals[5] and displaced millions.

BackgroundThe origin of the armed conflict in Colombia goes back to 1920 at agrarian disputes over the Sumapaz andTequendama regions.[6] Peasants at the time fighted over ownership of coffee lands which caused the liberals andconservative parties to take sides in the conflict, worsening it.In 1948 events would occur that radically stirred up the armed conflict. The assassination of populist Jorge EliécerGaitán in 1948 lead to the Bogotazo, an urban riot killing more than 4,000 people, and subsequently to ten years ofsustained rural warfare between members of Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Conservative Party, aperiod known as La Violencia ("The Violence"), which took the lives of more than 200,000 people throughout thecountryside.[1]

As La Violencia wound down, most self-defense and guerrilla units made up of Liberal Party supportersdemobilized, but at the same time some former Liberals and active Communist groups continued operating in severalrural enclaves. One of the Liberal bands was a group known as the "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia"(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, formed by Dumar Aljure in the early 1950s, one of thelargest Liberal guerrillas in 1958.[7] This group eventually ceased to exist, but its name remained as a historicalreference.Also in 1958, an exclusively bipartisan political alternation system, known as the National Front, resulted from anagreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The agreement had come as a result of the two partiesattempting to find a final political solution to the decade of mutual violence and unrest, remaining in effect until1974.[1]

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 2

Timeline

1960sIn the early 1960s Colombian Army units loyal to the National Front began to attack peasant communities, at thebehest of the United States government. This happened throughout Colombia with the colombian army consideringthat these peasant communities were enclaves for bandits and Communists. It was the 1964 attack on the communityof Marquetalia that motivated the later creation of FARC.[8]

Unlike the rural FARC, which had roots in the previous Liberal peasant struggles, the ELN was mostly an outgrowthof university unrest and would subsequently tend to follow a small group of charismatic leaders, including CamiloTorres Restrepo.[9]

Both guerrilla groups remained mostly operational in remote areas of the country during the rest of the 1960s.The Colombian government organized several short-lived counter-guerrilla campaigns in the late 1950s and early1960s. These efforts were aided by the U.S. government and the CIA, which employed hunter-killer teams andinvolved U.S. personnel from the previous Philippine campaign against the Huks, and which would later participatein the subsequent Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War.[4][10]

1970sBy 1974, another challenge to the state's authority and legitimacy had come from the 19th of April Movement(M-19), leading to a new phase in the conflict. The M-19 was a mostly urban guerrilla group, founded in response toan electoral fraud during the final National Front election of Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) and the defeat offormer dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.

1980sBy 1982, the perceived passivity of the FARC, together with the relative success of the government's efforts againstthe M-19 and ELN, enabled the administration of the Liberal Party's Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) to lift astate-of-siege decree that had been in effect, on and off, for most of the previous 30 years. Under the latest suchdecree, president Turbay had implemented security policies that, though of some military value against the M-19 inparticular, were considered highly questionable both inside and outside Colombian circles due to numerousaccusations of military human rights abuses against suspects and captured guerrillas.Citizen exhaustion due to the conflict's newfound intensity led to the election of president Belisario Betancur(1982–1986), a Conservative who won 47% of the popular vote, directed peace feelers at all the insurgents, andnegotiated a 1984 cease-fire with the FARC at La Uribe, Meta, after a 1982 release of many guerrillas imprisonedduring the previous effort to overpower them. A truce was also arranged with the M-19. The ELN rejected enteringany negotiation and continued to recover itself through the use of extortions and threats, in particular against foreignoil companies of European and U.S. origin.As these events were developing, the growing illegal drug trade and its consequences were also increasinglybecoming a matter of widespread importance to all participants in the Colombian conflict. Guerrillas and newlywealthy drug lords had mutually uneven relations and thus numerous incidents occurred between them. Eventuallythe kidnapping of drug cartel family members by guerrillas led to the creation of the 1981 Muerte a Secuestradores(MAS) death squad ("Death to Kidnappers"). Pressure from the U.S. government and critical sectors of Colombiansociety was met with further violence, as the Medellín Cartel and its hitmen, bribed or murdered numerous publicofficials, politicians and others who stood in its way by supporting the implementation of extradition of Colombiannationals to the U.S. Victims of cartel violence included Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, assassinated in 1984,an event which made the Betancur administration begin to directly oppose the drug lords.

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The first negotiated cease-fire with the M-19 ended when the guerrillas resumed fighting in 1985, claiming that thecease-fire had not been fully respected by official security forces, saying that several of its members had sufferedthreats and assaults, and also questioning the government's real willingness to implement any accords. The Betancuradministration in turn questioned the M-19's actions and its commitment to the peace process, as it continued toadvance high profile negotiations with the FARC, which led to the creation of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica)-UP-, a legal and non-clandestine political organization.On November 6, 1985, the M-19 stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice and held the Supreme Court magistrateshostage, intending to put president Betancur on trial. In the ensuing crossfire that followed the military's reaction,some 120 people lost their lives, as did most of the guerrillas, including several high-ranking operatives and 12Supreme Court Judges.InsideColombia Both sides blamed each other for the outcome. This marked the end ofBetancur's peace process.InsideColombia

Meanwhile, individual FARC members initially joined the UP leadership in representation of the guerrilla command,though most of the guerrilla's chiefs and militiamen did not demobilize nor disarm, as that was not a requirement ofthe process at that point in time. Tension soon significantly increased, as both sides began to accuse each other of notrespecting the cease-fire..According to historian Daniel Pecáut, the creation of the Patriotic Union took the guerrillas' political message to awider public outside of the traditional communist spheres of influence and led to local electoral victories in regionssuch as Urabá and Antioquia, with their mayoral candidates winning twenty-three municipalities and theircongressional ones gaining fourteen seats (five in the Senate, nine in the lower Chamber) in 1988.[11] According tojournalist Steven Dudley, who interviewed ex-FARC as well as former members of the UP and the CommunistParty,[12] FARC leader Jacobo Arenas insisted to his subordinates that the UP's creation did not mean that the groupwould lay down its arms nor a rejection of the Seventh Conference's military strategy.[13] Pecáut states that newrecruits entered the guerrilla army and its urban militia units during the period, also claiming that FARC did not stopkidnapping and continued to target regional politicians for assassination.[14]

In October 1987, the UP's 1986 presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal was assassinated amid a wave of violencethat would lead to the deaths of thousands of its party members at the hands of death squads.[15][16] According toPecáut, the killers included members of the military and the political class who had opposed Belisario Betancur'speace process and considered the UP to be little more than a "facade" for FARC, as well as drug traffickers andlandowners who were also involved in the establishment of paramilitary groups.[17]

1990s

Early 1990s

The Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) administration, in addition to continuing to handle the difficulties of thecomplex negotiations with the guerrillas, also inherited a particularly chaotic confrontation against the drug lords,who were engaged in a campaign of terrorism and murder in response to government moves in favor of theirextradition overseas..In June 1987, the ceasefire between FARC and the Colombian government formally collapsed after the guerrillasattacked a military unit in the jungles of Caquetá.[18][19] According to journalist Steven Dudley, FARC founderJacobo Arenas considered the incident to be a "natural" part of the truce and reiterated the group's intention tocontinue the dialogue, but President Barco sent an ultimatum to the guerrillas and demanded that they immediatelydisarm or face military retaliation.[19] Regional guerrilla and Army skirmishes created a situation where eachviolation of the ceasefire rendered it null in each location, until it was rendered practically nonexistent.By 1990, at least 2,500 members of the FARC-founded Patriotic Union had been murdered, according to historian Daniel Pecáut, leading up to that year's assassination of presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. The Colombian government initially blamed drug lord Pablo Escobar for the murder but journalist Steven Dudley argues

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 4

that many in the UP pointed at then-Interior Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds for publicly calling out the UP as the"political wing of FARC" shortly before the murder, while others claimed it was the result of an alliance betweenFidel Castaño, members of the Colombian military and the DAS.[20] Pecáut and Dudley argue that significanttensions had emerged between Jaramillo, FARC and the Communist Party due to the candidate's recent criticism ofthe armed struggle and their debates over the rebels' use of kidnapping, almost leading to a formal break.[21][22]

Jaramillo's death led to a large exodus of UP militants; in addition, by then many FARC cadres who joined the partyhad already returned to clandestinity, using the UP experience as an argument in favor of revolutionarywar.[16][18][23]

The M-19 and several smaller guerrilla groups were successfully incorporated into a peace process as the 1980sended and the 90s began, which culminated in the elections for a Constituent Assembly of Colombia that wouldwrite a new constitution, which took effect in 1991.Contacts with the FARC, which had irregularly continued despite the end of the ceasefire and the official 1987 breakfrom negotiations, were temporarily cut off in 1990 under the presidency of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994). TheColombian Army's assault on the FARC's Casa Verde sanctuary at La Uribe, Meta, followed by a FARC offensivethat sought to undermine the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly, began to highlight a significant break inthe uneven negotiations carried over from the previous decade.Both parties nevertheless never completely broke off some amount of political contacts for long, as some peacefeelers continued to exist, leading to short rounds of conversations in both Caracas, Venezuela (1991) and Tlaxcala,Mexico (1992). Despite the signing of several documents, no concrete results were achieved when the talks ended.

Mid-1990s

FARC military activity increased throughout the bulk of the 1990s as the group continued to grow in wealth fromboth kidnapping and drug-related activities, while drug crops rapidly spread throughout the countryside. Theguerrillas protected many of the coca growers from eradication campaigns and allowed them to grow andcommercialize coca in exchange for a "tax" either in money or in crops.In this context, FARC had managed to recruit and train more fighters, beginning to use them in concentrated attacksin a novel and mostly unexpected way. This led to a series of high profile raids and attacks against Colombian statebases and patrols, mostly in the southeast of Colombia but also affecting other areas.In mid-1996 a civic protest movement made up of an estimated 200,000 coca growers from Putumayo and part ofCauca began marching against the Colombian government to reject its drug war policies, including fumigations andthe declaration of special security zones in some departments. Different analysts have stressed that the movementitself fundamentally originated on its own, but at the same time, FARC heavily encouraged the marchers and activelypromoted their demands both peacefully and through the threat of force.[24][25]

Additionally, in 1997 and 1998, town councilmen in dozens of municipalities of the south of the country werethreatened, killed, kidnapped, forced to resign or to exile themselves to department capitals by the FARC and theELN.[26][27]

In Las Delicias, Caquetá, five FARC fronts (about 400 guerrillas) recognized intelligence pitfalls in a ColombianArmy base and exploited them to overrun it on August 30, 1996, killing 34 soldiers, wounding 17 and taking some60 as prisoners. Another significant attack took place in El Billar, Caquetá on March 2, 1998, where a ColombianArmy counterinsurgency battalion was patrolling, resulting in the death of 62 soldiers and the capture of some 43.Other FARC attacks against Police bases in Miraflores, Guaviare and La Uribe, Meta in August 1998 killed morethan a hundred soldiers, policemen and civilians, and resulted in the capture or kidnapping of a hundred more.These attacks, and the dozens of members of the Colombian security forces taken prisoner by the FARC, contributed to increasingly shaming the government of president Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998) in the eyes of sectors of public and political opinion. He was already the target of numerous critics due to revelations of a drug-money scandal surrounding his presidential campaign. Perceptions of corruption due to similar scandals led to Colombia's

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 5

decertification as a country cooperating with the United States in the war on drugs in 1995 (when the effects of themeasure were temporarily waived), 1996 and 1997.[28][29]

The Samper administration reacted against FARC's attacks by gradually abandoning numerous vulnerable andisolated outposts in more than 100,000 km².² of the rural countryside, instead concentrating Army and Police forcesin the more heavily defended strongholds available, which allowed the guerrillas to more directly mobilize throughand influence events in large areas of rural territory which were left with little or no remaining local garrisons.Samper also contacted the guerrillas in order to negotiate the release of some or all of the hostages in FARC hands,which led to the temporary demilitarization of the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá in July 1997 andthe unilateral liberation of 70 soldiers, a move which was opposed by the command of the Colombian military. Othercontacts between the guerrillas and government, as well as with representatives of religious and economic sectors,continued throughout 1997 and 1998.Altogether, these events were interpreted by some Colombian and foreign analysts as a turning point in the armedconfrontation, giving the FARC the upper hand in the military and political balance, making the Colombiangovernment a target of critics from some observers who concluded that its weakness was being evidenced, perhapseven overshadowing a future guerrilla victory in the middle term. A leaked 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) report went so far as to speculate that this could be possible within 5 years if the guerrilla's rate of operationswas kept up without effective opposition. Some viewed this report as inaccurate and alarmist, claiming that it did notproperly take into account many factors, such as possible actions that the Colombian state and the U.S. might take inresponse to the situation, nor the effects of the existence of paramilitary groups.[30]

Also during this period, paramilitary activities increased, both legally and illegally. The creation of legal CONVIVIRself-defense and intelligence gathering groups was authorized by Congress and the Samper administration in 1994.Members of CONVIVIR groups were accused of committing numerous abuses against the civilian population byseveral human rights organizations. The groups were left without legal support after a 1997 decision by theColombian Constitutional Court which restricted many of their prerrogatives and demanded stricter oversight. After1997, preexisting paramilitary forces and several former CONVIVIR members joined in creating the "AutodefensasUnidas de Colombia" ("United Self-defense Forces of Colombia") or AUC, a now illegal loose federation of regionalparamilitary groups.The AUC, originally present around the central/northwest part of the country, executed a series of raids into areas ofguerrilla influence, targeting those that they considered as either guerrillas in disguise or their suspectedcollaborators. This resulted in a continuing series of massacres, such as a July 1997 operation against the village ofMaripipán, Meta, which left between 30 and 49 civilians dead. After some of these operations, governmentprosecutors and/or human rights organizations repeatedly blamed officers and members of Colombian Army andPolice units for either passively permitting these acts, or directly collaborating in their execution.[31][32]

Late 1990s – Early 2000sOn August 7, 1998, Andrés Pastrana Arango was sworn in as the President of Colombia. A member of theConservative Party, Pastrana defeated Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa in a run-off election marked by highvoter turn-out and little political unrest. The new president's program was based on a commitment to bring about apeaceful resolution of Colombia's longstanding civil conflict and to cooperate fully with the United States to combatthe trafficking of illegal drugs.In July 1999, Colombian military forces attacked the town of Puerto Lleras, Colombia where FARC rebels were stationed. Using U.S. supplied aircraft and equipment, and backed with U.S. logistical support, Colombian government forces strafed and bombed the town for over 72 hours. In the attack, three civilians were killed, and several others were wounded as the military attacked hospitals, churches, ambulances, and residential areas. FARC rebels were forced to flee the area, and many were killed or wounded. The Colombian government claimed that this was a significant victory, while human rights groups claimed this as proof that "anti-narcotics" aid, was actually just

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military aid which was being used to fight a leftist insurgency.[33]

On September 10, 2001, the AUC were added to the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.Critics had long accused the US of hypocrisy for labeling the FARC and ELN terrorists, while ignoring the AUC,which was responsible for far more killings.AUC Due to payments made by Chiquita Brands International to theAUC, requests have been made for the extradition of Chiquita's board members and executive officers.[34]

On January 17, 2002, right-wing paramilitaries entered the village of Chengue, and divided up the villagers into twogroups. They then went from person to person in one of the groups, smashing each person's head withsledgehammers and rocks, killing 24 people, as the Colombian military sat by and watched. Two other bodies werelater discovered dumped in a shallow grave. As the paramilitaries left, they set fire to the village.[35]

Early 2000s – 2006

Army soldiers wearing a new version of digitalized camouflage.

During President Uribe's first term in office(2002–2006), the security situation inside Colombiashowed some measure of improvement and theeconomy, while still fragile, also showed some positivesigns of recovery according to observers. But relativelylittle has been accomplished in structurally solvingmost of the country's other grave problems, such aspoverty and inequality, possibly in part due tolegislative and political conflicts between theadministration and the Colombian Congress (includingthose over a controversial project to eventually giveUribe the possibility of re-election), and a relative lackof freely allocated funds and credits.

Some critical observers considered that Uribe's policies, while reducing crime and guerrilla activity, were too slantedin favor of a military solution to Colombia's internal war while neglecting grave social and human rights concerns.Critics have asked for Uribe's government to change this position and make serious efforts towards improving thehuman rights situation inside the country, protecting civilians and reducing any abuses committed by the armedforces. Political dissenters and labor union members, among others, have suffered from threats and have beenmurdered.In 2004, it was revealed by the National Security Archive that a 1991 document from the U.S. Defense IntelligenceAgency had described then-Senator Uribe as a "close personal friend" and collaborator of Pablo Escobar. The Uribeadministration denied several of the allegations in the 1991 report.[36]

In May 2006, Uribe was re-elected on the first round of the elections, with a historically unprecedented 62% of thetotal vote, with leftist Carlos Gaviria in second place (22%) and Horacio Serpa in third.

2007–2009On June 28, 2007 the FARC suddenly reported the death of 11 of the 12 kidnapped provincial deputies from Valledel Cauca Department. The Colombian government accused the FARC of executing the hostages and stated thatgovernment forces had not made any rescue attempts. FARC claimed that the deaths occurred during a crossfire,after an attack to one of its camps by an "unidentified military group". FARC did not report any other casualties oneither side.[37]

In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Colombian Senator Piedad Córdoba were acting as authorised mediators in the ongoing Humanitarian Exchange between the FARC and the government of Colombia. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe had given Chávez permission to mediate, under the conditions that all meetings with the

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 7

FARC would take place in Venezuela and that Chávez would not contact members of the Colombian militarydirectly, but instead go through proper diplomatic channels.[38][39] However, President Uribe abruptly terminatedChávez's mediation efforts on November 22, 2007, after Chávez personally contacted General Mario Montoya Uribe,the Commander of the Colombian National Army.[40] In response, Chávez said that he was still willing to mediate,but had withdrawn Venezuela's ambassador to Colombia and placed Colombian-Venezuelan relations "in afreezer"[41] President Uribe responded that Colombia needed "mediation against terrorism, not for Chávez tolegitimise terrorism," that Chávez was not interested in peace in Colombia, and that Chávez was building anexpansionist project on the continent.[42]

Several scandals have affected Uribe's administration. The Colombian parapolitics scandal expanded during hissecond term, involving numerous members of the administration's ruling coalition. Many pro-governmentlawmakers, such as the President's cousin Mario Uribe, have been investigated for their possible ties to paramilitaryorganizations.[43]

At the end of 2007, FARC agreed to release former senator Consuelo González, politician Clara Rojas and her sonEmmanuel, born in captivity after a relationship with one of her captors. Operation Emmanuel was proposed and setup by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, with the permission of the Colombian government. The mission wasapproved on December 26. Although, on December 31, FARC claimed that the hostage release had been delayedbecause of Colombian military operations. On the same time, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe indicated thatFARC had not freed the three hostages because Emmanuel may not be in their hands anymore.[44] Two FARCgunmen were taken prisoner.Colombian authorities added that a boy matching Emmanuel's description had been taken to a hospital in San Josédel Guaviare in June 2005. The child was in poor condition; one of his arms was hurt, he had severe malnutrition,and he had diseases that are commonly suffered in the jungle. Having been evidently mistreated, the boy was latersent to a foster home in Bogotá and DNA tests were announced in order to confirm his identity.[44] On January 4,2008, the results of a mitochondrial DNA test, comparing the child's DNA with that of his potential grandmotherClara de Rojas, were revealed by the Colombian government. It was reported that there was a very high probabilitythat the boy was indeed part of the Rojas family.[45] The same day, FARC released a communique in which theyadmitted that Emmanuel had been taken to Bogotá and "left in the care of honest persons" for safety reasons until ahumanitarian exchange took place. The group accused President Uribe of "kidnapping" the child in order to sabotagehis liberation.[46][47] However, on January 10, 2008, FARC released Rojas and Gonzalez through a humanitariancommission headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. On January 13, 2008, Venezuelan PresidentHugo Chávez stated his disapproval with the FARC strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping saying "I don't agreewith kidnapping and I don't agree with armed struggle".[48] He repeated his call for a political solution and an end tothe war on March and June 2008, "The guerrilla war is history...At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrillamovement is out of place".[49]

On February 2008, FARC released four others political hostages "as a gesture of goodwill" toward Chávez, who hadbrokered the deal and sent Venezuelan helicopters with Red Cross logos into the Colombian jungle to pick up thefreed hostages.[50]

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched a military operation 1.8 kilometres into Ecuador on aFARC position, killing 24, including Raúl Reyes, member of the FARC Central High Command. This led to the2008 Andean diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, supported byVenezuelan President Hugo Chávez.On March 3, Iván Ríos, also a member of the FARC Central High Command was killed by his security chief"Rojas".On May 24, 2008, Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed by FARC-commander 'Timochenko' on Venezuelan based television station Telesur on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko'

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 8

announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano'.[51]

In May 2008, a dozen jailed paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United States on drug-related charges. In2009, extradited paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso would claim that the AUC had supported Uribe's 2002election, but said that this was a result of their similar "ideological discourse" and not the result of any direct priorarrangement.[52]

In March 2008 alone, FARC lost 3 members of their Secretariat, including their founder.On July 2, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched Operation Jaque that resulted in the freedom of 15 politicalhostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes,and Keith Stansell, three American military contractors employed by Northrop Grumman[53] and 11 Colombianmilitary and police.[54] Two FARC members were arrested. This trick to the FARC was presented by the Colombiangovernment as a proof that the guerilla organisation and influence is declining.On October 26, 2008, the ex-congressman, Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped after 8 years of captivity with a FARC rebelhe convinced to travel with him. Soon after the liberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President ofColombia Francisco Santos Calderón called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little controlof the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are aminimal threat to Colombian security," and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income andpromoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kindof premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500000 square kilometers (unknownoperator: u'strong' sq mi) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight.[55]

According to the Colombian government, in early 2009 FARC launched plan Rebirth to avoid being defeated. Theyplanned to intensify guerrilla warfare by the use of landmines, snipers, and bomb attacks in urban areas. They alsoplan to buy missiles to fight the Colombian airforce which highly contribute to their weakness since few years.[56]

On February 2009, the guerilla released 6 hostages as a humanitarian gesture. In March, they released Swedishhostage Erik Roland Larsson.On April 2009, the Colombian armed forces launched Strategic Leap,[57] an offensive in borders areas where theFARC's forces has still a strong military presence, especially in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border.[58]

On November 2009, Nine Colombian soldiers were killed when their post was attacked by FARC guerrillas in asouthwestern part of the country.[59]

On December 22, 2009, FARC rebels raided the home of Provincial governor Luis Francisco Cuellar, killing onepolice officer and wounding two. Cuellar was found dead the following day.On January 1, 2010, Eighteen FARC rebels were killed when the Colombian Air Force bombed a jungle camp inSouthern Colombia. Colombian troops of the elite Task Force Omega then stormed the camp, capturing fifteenFARC rebels, as well as 25 rifles, war materials, explosives, and information which was given to militaryintelligence. In Southwestern Colombia, FARC rebels ambushed an army patrol, killing a soldier. The troops thenexchanged fire with the rebels. During the fighting, a teenager was killed in the crossfire.[60]

2010–2012When Juan Manuel Santos was elected president in August 2010 he promised to 'continue the armed offensive'against rebel movements. In the month after his inauguration FARC and ELN killed roughly 50 soldiers andpolicemen in attacks all over Colombia.[61] September also saw the killing of FARC's second-in-command MonoJojoy. By the end of 2010 it became increasingly clear that 'neo-paramilitary groups', referred to as 'criminal groups'(BACRIM) by the government, had become an increasing threat to national security, with violent groups such as LosRastrojos and Aguilas Negras taking control of large parts of the Colombian countryside.[62]

In 2010 the FARC killed at least 460 members of the security forces, while wounding more than 2,000.[63]

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 9

By early 2011 Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups havepartly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfare to 'a war of militias', meaning that they are increasingly operating incivilian clothes while hiding amongst sympathizers in the civilian population.[64] In early January 2011 theColombian army said that the FARC has some 18,000 members, with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias.[65]

The army says it has 'identified' at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC-strongholds of Valle del Cauca andCauca in 2011.[66] In June 2011 Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to 'urbanize theiractions',[67] which could partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medellín and particularlyCali.[68][69][70][71][72] Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, estimates that FARC may have some 30,000'part-time fighters' in 2011, consisting of supporters making up the rebel militia network instead of armed uniformedcombatants.[73]

In 2011 the Colombian Congress issued a statement claiming that the FARC has a 'strong presence' in roughly onethird of Colombia, while their attacks against security forces 'have continued to rise' throughout 2010 and 2011.[74]

in 2012 the Colombia Military launched The Espada de Honor War Plan, an aggressive counterinsurgency strategiesthat aims to dismantle FARC´s structure, crippling both militarily and financially. The plan targets FARC leadershipand it is focused on eliminating 15 of the most powerful economic and military fronts.[75]

Role of the United StatesThe United States has been heavily involved in the conflict since its beginnings, when in the early 1960s the U.S.government pushed the Colombian military to attack peasant self-defense communities in rural Colombia. This waspart of the U.S. fight against communism, according to Mario A. Murillo.[76]

As of August, 2004, the US had spent $3 billion in Colombia, more than 75% of it on military aid. Before the Iraqwar, Colombia was the third largest recipient of US aid only after Egypt and Israel, and the U.S. has 400 militarypersonnel and 400 civilian contractors in Colombia.Egeland Legrand

Notes1. "Why did the Colombia Peace Process Fail?" [77] (PDF). The Tabula Rasa Institute. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF

file]2. Livingstone, Grace (2004). Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War [78]. Rutgers University Press. p. 176.

ISBN 0-8135-3443-7.3. Molano, Alfredo (February 18 2004). James Graham (Translator). ed. Loyal Soldiers in the Cocaine Kingdom:

Tales of Drugs, Mules, and Gunmen. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12915-7.4. Peter, Canby (August 16 2004). "Latin America's longest war; "More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and

America's War in Colombia," "Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia," "Inside Colombia:Drugs, Democracy and War," "Loyal Soldiers in the Cocaine Kingdom: Tales of Drugs, Mules and Gunmen,""Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia"; Book Review" [79]. The Nation 279 (5): 31.

5. Stokes, Doug (July 1 2005). "America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia" [80]. Canadian Dimension 39 (4): 26.6.6. Stokes, p. 26, quoting Marc Grossman, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs.7. Dudley, Steven; January (2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge.

ISBN 0-415-93303-X.8. Corbyn, Jeremy (July 2 2003). "Supporting terror; Jeremy Corbyn MP explains the reasons why Britain should be

staying well clear of Colombian President Uribe Velez's regime" [81]. Morning Star: 7.9.9. Livingstone, (Foreword by Pearce, Jenny), p. xvii (f24)10. Livingstone, p. 5;

Pearce, Jenny (May 1 1990). 1st. ed. Colombia:Inside the Labyrinth. London: Latin America Bureau. p. 287.ISBN 0-906156-44-0.

11.11. Pearce's forward in Livingstone, p. xx

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 10

12. LeGrand, Catherine C (June 2003). "The Colombian crisis in historical perspective (Record in progress)" [82].Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies 28 (55/5): 165–209.

13. "Economic Indicators Real Sector, 1999–2004" [83]. Latin Focus. Retrieved 2006-05-31.14. Legrand, p. 165. See Note #15 [84] for more on women in the conflict.15. Legrand, p. 165. See Note #18 [85] for more on peasant support for the guerrillas. (see also Ortiz 2001; Reyes

Posada and A. Bejarano 1988; Archila N. 1996)", Notes [86].16. Legrand, p. 165. Lengrand states: "Some observers noted that this percentage of supposed paramilitary

supporters elected to congress in March 2002 corresponded to the number of representatives elected from Urabaand the Atlantic coast where the paramilitaries are strong. (El Tiempo March 13–14, 2002)", see Notes [86].

17. "Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" [87] (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]

18. "Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" [87] (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]James, Preston Everett (1969). Latin America (4th edition). The Odyssey Press. p. 426.

19. "The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity" [88] (PDF). StrategicStudies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Retrieved 2006-02-26. [PDF file]

20. Livingstone, p. 5; Bergquist, Charles, ed. (February 2001). Violence in Colombia, 1990–2000: Waging War andNegotiating Peace. SR Books. p. 13. ISBN 0-8420-2869-2.

21.21. Livingstone, p. 110.22. Livingstone, p. 7; Quoting: Colombia: Inseguridad, Violencia, y Desempeño Económico en las Areas Rurales,

Consejería para la Paz de la Presidencia de la República, Colombia, 1999, Director de Investigación: JesusAntonio Bejarano Avila.

23.23. Livingstone, p. 524. Livingstone, p. 5; Canby, p 31

"Colombia" [89]. infoplease.com. Retrieved 2006-02-26.25. Livingstone, p. 6; "Amnistía Internacional Colombia Seguridad, ¿a qué precio? La falta de voluntad del

gobierno para hacer frente a la crisis de derechos humanos" [90]. Amnesty Internacional (Amnesty International).December 2002.

26. Livingstone, p. 6; Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists; Arocha, Jaime (1998). Evolución reciente delconflicto armado en Colombia: La Guerrilla in Las violencias: inclusión creciente (1998 ed.). Bogata: CES.pp. 35–65. ISBN 958-96259-5-9.

27. Livingstone, p. 6; Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists; "Country report on Human Rights in Colombia".US State Department: 1 (mimeograph). 2000.

28. Livingstone, p. 7; Source: Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS); Richani, Nazih (April 1 2002).Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. State University of New York Press.ISBN 0-7914-5345-6.

29.29. Livingstone, p. 7; Richani, p. 8730.30. Livingstone, p. 7

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 11

References[1] Garry Leech (2009). Beyond Bogota: Diary of a Drug War Journalist. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. pp. 242–247. ISBN 978-0-8070-6148-0.[2] Mario A. Murillo; Jesús Rey Avirama (2004). Colombia and the United States: war, unrest, and destabilization (http:/ / books. google. com/

?id=EdhCanqQN8kC& pg=PA57& dq="la+ violencia"+ colombia+ united+ states& q="la violencia" colombia united states). Seven StoriesPress. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-58322-606-3. .

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[54] "Betancourt, 14 others freed by Colombian forces" (http:/ / www. monstersandcritics. com/ news/ americas/ news/ article_1414668. php/Betancourt_14_others_freed_by_Colombian_forces__3rd_Lead_). Monsters and Critics. 2008-07-02. . Retrieved 2008-07-02.

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[60] http:/ / www. english. aljazeera. net/ news/ americas/ 2010/ 01/ 20101123513156705. html[61] "Colombian rebel attacks intensify, dozens killed | Energy & Oil | Reuters" (http:/ / af. reuters. com/ article/ energyOilNews/

idAFN1025921520100910). Af.reuters.com. September 10, 2010. . Retrieved October 18, 2011.[62] McDermott, Jeremy (April 25, 2011). "BBC News – Colombia's criminal bands pose new security challenge" (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/

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Further reading

Books

English

• Stokes, Doug; Noam Chomsky (Foreword) (2005). America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. Zed Books.ISBN 1-84277-547-2.

• Cuellar, Francisco Ramírez; Aviva Chomsky (2005). The Profits of Extermination. Monroe, ME: CommonCourage Press.. ISBN 1-56751-322-0.

• Aviva Chomsky (2008). Linked labor histories: New England, Colombia, and the making of a global workingclass (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=pNxSYwP1TdEC& printsec=frontcover& q=). Duke University Press.ISBN 978-0-8223-4190-1.

• Bushnell, David (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia, a Nation in spite of itself. University of CaliforniaPress. ISBN 0-520-08289-3.

• Dudley, Steven (January 2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. Routledge.ISBN 0-415-93303-X.

• Kirk, Robin (January, 2003). More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia.PublicAffairs. ISBN 1-58648-104-5.

• Ruiz, Bert (October 1, 2001). The Colombian Civil War. McFarland & Company. ISBN 0-7864-1084-1.

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 14

• Safford, Frank and Marco Palacios (July 1, 2001). Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. OxfordUniversity Press. ISBN 0-19-504617-X.

• Taussig, Michael (November 1, 2003). Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza. New Press.ISBN 1-56584-863-2.

Other languages

• Murillo, Mario and Jesus Rey Avirama (September 1, 2003). Colombia and the United States: War, Terrorismand Destabilization. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-606-0.

• Palacios, Marco (1995) (in Spanish). Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994. Norma.• Pardo Rueda, Rafael (2004) (in Spanish). La historia de las guerras. Ediciones B-Vergara. ISBN 958-97405-5-3.• Hennecke, Angelika (2006) (in German). Zwischen Faszination und Gewalt : Kolumbien—unser gemeinsamer

Nenner : Reflexionen über das Verhältnis zwischen kultureller Identität, Kommunikation und Medien anhand derdiskursanalytischen Untersuchung einer kolumbianischen Werbekampagne. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.ISBN 3-631-54930-X.

• Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo (1991). Las Farc: de la autodefensa a la combinación de todas las formas de lucha.Universidad Nacional.

• Tirado Mejía, Alvaro, ed. (1989). Nueva historia de Colombia. Planeta.

Journals / Periodicals• Giraldo, Juan Fernando (December 2005). "Colombia in Armed Conflict?: 1946–1985" (http:/ / www. javeriana.

edu. co/ politicas/ publicaciones/ documents/ colombia. pdf) (PDF). Papel Politico (Facultad de Ciencias Políticasy Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Javeriana) (18): 43–78.

• Zahller, Trina (2002). "Prospects for Peace:The Projected Impact of Plan Colombia" (http:/ / www. cjpf. org/drug/ prospectsforpeace. pdf) (PDF). McNair Scholars Project University of Montana 2002.

• Restrepo, Jorge A.; Michael Spagat. "The Colombian Conflict Where is it Heading?" (http:/ / www. cerac. org.co/ pdf/ CSISPresentationwithtext-V10_Low. pdf) (PDF). Javeriana University and CERAC.

• Azcarate, Camilo A. (March 1999). "Psychosocial Dynamics of the Armed Conflict in Colombia" (http:/ / www.trinstitute. org/ ojpcr/ 2_1columbia. htm). Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution.

• James Petras (July 2, 1988)). "Neglected Dimensions of Violence". Economic and Political Weekly 23 (27): 1367.JSTOR 4378701.

• Elizabeth F. Schwartz (Winter, 1995/1996). "Getting Away with Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia and theRole of the United States". The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 27 (2): 381–420.

• John Lindsay-Poland (January/February 2010). "Retreat to Colombia: The Pentagon Adapts Its Latin AmericaStrategy". NACLA Report on the Americas.

Government/NGO reports• "Colombia" (http:/ / hrw. org/ doc?t=americas& c=colomb). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 2006-02-24.• "Information about the combatants" (http:/ / www. ciponline. org/ colombia/ infocombat. htm). Center for

International Policy. Retrieved 2006-02-24.• "Solutions to Escape the Conflict's Impasse" (http:/ / indh. pnud. org. co/ pagina.

plx?pg=ENdescargaInforme2003& mlat=11& lang=EN). National Human Development Report 2003. Retrieved2006-02-23. Extensive ideas on solutions to the Colombia conflict

• "Colombia 2005 Report" (http:/ / www. hchr. org. co/ documentoseinformes/ informes/ altocomisionado/informes. php3?cod=9& cat=11). UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (Spanish andEnglish)

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 15

News• Constanza Vieira (July 16, 2010). "'Let's talk about the disappeared'" (http:/ / ipsnews. net/ news.

asp?idnews=52185). Inter Press Service.• "Indigenous Community in Colombia Fears Start of "Dirty War" (http:/ / www. democracynow. org/ print.

pl?sid=05/ 05/ 20/ 1425246). Democracy Now!. Retrieved 2006-02-24. Guests: Ezequiel Vitonas, former mayorof Toribio, and Manuel Rozental, human rights activist. Interviewers: Juan Gonzalez and Amy Goodman.Segment available in transcript (http:/ / www. democracynow. org/ print. pl?sid=05/ 05/ 20/ 1425246) and viastreaming real audio (http:/ / play. rbn. com/ ?url=demnow/ demnow/ demand/ 2005/ may/ audio/ dn20050520.ra& proto=rtsp& start=46:35), 128k streaming Real Video (http:/ / play. rbn. com/ ?url=demnow/ demnow/demand/ 2005/ may/ video/ dnB20050520a. rm& proto=rtsp& start=46:35) or MP3 download (http:/ / www.archive. org/ download/ dn2005-0520/ dn2005-0520-1_64kb. mp3).

Websites• "Colombia Page on InSight Crime" (http:/ / insightcrime. org/ country-profiles/ colombia). Retrieved 2011-03-29.

(Ongoing reporting on the Colombian conflict and active criminal groups)• "Evolution of the Colombian Civil War" (http:/ / www. icdc. com/ ~paulwolf/ colombia/ colombiawar. htm). Paul

Wolf. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (collection of declassified U.S. documents online)• Michael Evans, ed. (May 3, 2002). "War in Colombia: Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.-Colombia

Policy, 1988–2002" (http:/ / www. gwu. edu/ ~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/ NSAEBB69/ index. html). National SecurityArchive Electronic Briefing Book No. 69. National Security Archive.

• "America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia" (http:/ / www. webcitation. org/ query?url=http:/ / www. geocities.com/ travbailey/ colombia. htm& date=2009-10-25+ 23:15:46). Archived from the original (http:/ / www.geocities. com/ travbailey/ colombia. htm) on 2009-10-26. Retrieved 2006-02-25.

• Plan Colombia by Carmen Guhn-Knight (http:/ / www. mtholyoke. edu/ ~cmguhnkn/ plancolombia/ )• "Rule of Law in Armed Conflict: Colombia" (http:/ / www. adh-geneva. ch/ RULAC/ state. php?id_state=47).

RULAC Project. Retrieved 2009-03-23.• "Q&A: Colombia's civil conflict" (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 1738963. stm). BBC. 2009-12-23.

Retrieved 2006-02-24.• "Colombia Program" (http:/ / www. ciponline. org/ colombia/ ). Center for International Policy. Retrieved

2006-02-24.• "Accord issue on Colombia's peace process" (http:/ / www. c-r. org/ our-work/ accord/ colombia/ contents. php).

Alternatives to war. Retrieved 2006-11-18. (In Spanish and English with chronology and key texts andagreements)

• "CERAC" (http:/ / www. cerac. org. co/ home_english. htm). Conflict Analysis Resources Center.Colombian-based private research center that studies the conflict (In Spanish and English)

• "Colombian Army website" (http:/ / www. ejercito. mil. co/ ?idcategoria=4& cadena_buscar=farc). Retrieved2006-02-24. (In Spanish and English)

• "Colombian President's Office" (http:/ / www. presidencia. gov. co/ ). Retrieved 2006-02-24. (In Spanish andEnglish)

• "Background Note: Colombia" (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ei/ bgn/ 35754. htm). U.S. Department of State.Retrieved 2006-02-11.

• "Different Views of Colombian Territory" (http:/ / www. en-camino. org/ viewsofcolombia. htm). Retrieved2006-02-24. Maps of the conflict.

• "AUC Official Website" (http:/ / www. colombialibre. org). Retrieved 2006-02-24. (in Spanish)• "FARC website" (http:/ / resistencianacional. net). Retrieved 2008-07-12. (in Spanish and English) – No longer

available online (censored by U.S. government)

Colombian armed conflict (1964present) 16

• "Colombia – Insurgency" (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ war/ colombia. htm). GlobalSecurity. Retrieved 2006-02-24.

• "Civil War? The Language of Conflict in Colombia" (http:/ / www. ideaspaz. org/ publicaciones/ download/guerra_civil_english. pdf) (PDF). Ideas for Peace Foundation. Retrieved 2006-02-24. (PDF) Is the Colombiaconflict a civil war?

• "The Peace Village San José Must Live" (http:/ / www. sos-sanjose. org/ ). SOS San Jose. Retrieved 2006-02-24.(in German and English)

• "Washington Office on Latin America" (http:/ / www. wola. org/ ). Retrieved 2006-02-24.• "Who Shot My Brother?" (http:/ / www. onf. ca/ trouverunfilm/ fichefilm. php?id=53566& lg=en& v=h).

National Film Board of Canada. Retrieved 2006.• "Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: the US War of Terror in Colombia" (http:/ / web. archive. org/

web/ 20051001014412/ http:/ / www. aqnt98. dsl. pipex. com/ choms. htm). Bristol University PoliticsDepartment. Archived from the original (http:/ / www. aqnt98. dsl. pipex. com/ choms. htm) on October 1, 2005.Retrieved 2006-02-27. by Doug Stokes

• Red Resistencia (http:/ / www. redresistencia. org/ )• "Insight on Conflict" (http:/ / www. insightonconflict. org/ ). Colombia Peacebuilding database.• Crisis briefing on displacement because of the war (http:/ / www. alertnet. org/ db/ crisisprofiles/ CO_DIS.

htm?v=in_detail) from Reuters AlertNet

Article Sources and Contributors 17

Article Sources and ContributorsColombian armed conflict (1964–present)  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=507230334  Contributors: ATyoyo, Againme, Ahoerstemeier, Amnesico29, Anotherclown,Ardfern, Argyriou, Ariedartin, Arjayay, Arthas01, Asarlaí, Asdfgtre4532, Attonbrass, AxelBoldt, Bestlyriccollection, Bobo192, Bolivian Unicyclist, Boowah59, Briaboru, Bugonthewall,BusterD, Caknuck, CalJW, CanisRufus, Carcharoth, Charles Essie, Ciroa, Cmdrjameson, Colombiano21, ComputerJA, Conti, DJ Silverfish, Dafranca, Dainomite, Dbachmann, Descendall,Dimadick, EME44, Electionworld, Emc2, Emersoni, EoGuy, Eopsid, Epbr123, Epolk, Essuu, Evilpingouin, FieldMarine, Fish and karate, Forich, Freepsbane, Fuzz Norelid, Gaius Cornelius,Garion96, Gob Lofa, Gralo, Grsz11, Gurch, HanzoHattori, HappyInGeneral, Hibernian, IZAK, Ibnzintzo, Ikip, Infovoria, Inkie Struyk, InverseHypercube, JHunterJ, Jdorney, Jed, Jersay, John ofReading, Jonkerz, Jrtayloriv, Juancarlos2004, Kendrick7, Khoikhoi, Kintetsubuffalo, KnowledgeOfSelf, Knowledgebycoop, Kormin, Kungfuadam, Lapsed Pacifist, Latinfriend, Ligulem,LilHelpa, Lucky to be me, Luffy487, Luwilt, Mac canccce, Mandarax, Manxruler, Master of Puppets, Matthew Russinsky, Mikael Häggström, Mild Bill Hiccup, Monegasque, Nakon,Nehrams2020, Nick-D, Nightstallion, Nikofeelan, Nkomone, Noclador, Nymf, Nyttend, Occur Curve, Ohconfucius, PBP, Pascaweb, Phil Boswell, PhnomPencil, PiMaster3, Porchcorpter, Ptah,the El Daoud, R'n'B, RaiderAspect, Ray Chason, Rbraunwa, Reenem, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Rkt2312, Rotsapsky, Saftorangen, Sampi, Sarcelles, Sardanaphalus, ScoutHawk 01, SelfQ,Sentinel R, Several Pending, SilentOne17, Skorpion87, SmartGuy Old, Smsarmad, Snowolf, Soetermans, Somebodympc, Spangineer, Spyder00Boi, Storm05, StuRat, Sylvain2803, TDC,Tabletop, Tassedethe, Tedickey, Tequendamia, The Anome, The Thing That Should Not Be, Timeshifter, Trilliumz, Tryyazz, Vanegas123, Varlaam, Waldir, WereSpielChequers, Wewelsburg,Wiki13, Woohookitty, Yellowdesk, Yotna, Yussef90, Z-d, Zero Gravity, 269 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Ejército4.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Ejército4.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0,2.5,2.0,1.0  Contributors: Agostinhox

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