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Combat Rescue Operational Review-Final

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An operational review of Combat Search and Rescue from Vietnam to Kosovo

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Page 1: Combat Rescue Operational Review-Final

COMBAT RESCUE OPERATIONAL REVIEW A Summary of Combat Rescue Operations

from Vietnam to Kosovo

May 2001

Revised June 2002

Prepared by: Marc DiPaolo

301st Rescue Squadron Patrick AFB, FL

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS An effort as lengthy and detailed as the Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) cannot be completed without the input and assistance of many people. First and foremost, the entire Future Combat Rescue Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) team must be acknowledged. Although the AoA was truly a team effort, the input and expertise of the following people was particularly helpful to the completion of the CROR:

Lt Col Travis Chevallier, Air Combat Command

Major Tony Arrington, Air Force Materiel Command

Major Alvin Drew, Air Combat Command

Major Dave Fulk, PhD, Air Combat Command

Major Dave Morgan, Air Combat Command

Mr. Mike Agin, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Mr. Steve Alston, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Mr. Charles Cunningham, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Mr. Jeff Eggers, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Mr. Steve Lupenski, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Mr. Bob Mohan, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

Lt Col (ret.) Al Wood, Pioneer Technologies Corporation

The time spent and thoughtful review by Combat Rescue operators must also be acknowledged. Their first-hand accounts of operations and frank feedback improved the quality of the CROR immeasurably. Although there were too many to list individually, participation of the following individuals was particularly helpful:

Lt Col Joe Callahan, Air Combat Command

Lt Col Tom Trask, Air Force Special Operations Command

Major John Cherry, Air Combat Command

Major John McGonagill, Air Combat Command

Major Mike Trumpfheller, Air Combat Command

The CROR relied heavily on the voluminous work done by others over the decades since the war in Southeast Asia. That fine work, by analysts, operators, and researchers both known and unknown, is acknowledged here. It is hoped that the CROR can match their standard of quality and may be viewed as a helpful addition to existing papers. Access to much of that information was possible only with the assistance of archivists at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency library in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and with the generous assistance of Mr. Steven Maxner of the Vietnam Center at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas. Lastly, the significant assistance of Ms. Donna Egner of the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio must be recognized. Her generous, timely, and expert support went well beyond expectations, and benefited the CROR in a way that is beyond measure.

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Executive Summary

“Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is an integral part of US combat operations and must be considered across the range of military operations. CSAR consists of those air operations conducted to recover distressed personnel during wartime or Military Operations Other Than War…Although all US Air Force weapon systems have the inherent capability to support CSAR operations, certain forces are specifically dedicated for search, rescue, and recovery operations.” (AF Doctrine Document 1, Sep 97)

OVERVIEW Per tasking to the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (CR AoA) team by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Milestone 0 Decision, a historical review of operational factors relating to Combat Rescue missions was conducted. Comprehensive reviews of Combat Rescue missions from Southeast Asia, Operations Desert Storm, Operation Deny Flight, Operation Allied Force, and Cold War losses provide the basis of research data for the study. The scope of this study focused on scenarios of downed aircrews in combat, excluding missions such as conventional troop support, medical evacuation, and non-combatant evacuation operations. The objectives of the study were:

o Describe historic Combat Rescue operations

o Identify trends pertaining to factors associated with combat aircraft losses

o Identify Combat Rescue capabilities and the threat facing recovery forces

o Identify factors that will affect recovery operations in future scenarios (2010-2030)

o Enhance the fidelity and accuracy of Combat Rescue modeling and simulation by providing a single historical data source

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Although force composition, duration of the conflict, topography and climatologic factors, Information Technology advances and enhancements, and Combat Rescue tactics, techniques, and procedures varied from conflict to conflict, a remarkable anthology of lessons learned and factors affecting successful recovery operations is derived. Foremost, a direct correlation exists between exposure times in the target/terminal area of operations and rescue mission success rates. Data analysis validates “slow moving” Combat Rescue assets and “fast moving” fighter aircraft experience higher loss rates in the target/terminal area, while ingress and egress loss rates were relatively low. Small arms, optically guided AAA, and IR MANPADS continue to incur the greatest loss rate to rescue forces within the terminal area of operations. Additional factors affecting successful Combat Rescue operations include (but are not limited to):

o Aircraft distance traveled from initial battle damage to aircrew ejection (data reveals that survivor/evader recovery rates improved as the distance traveled after shootdown increased)

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o Injuries to aircrews suffered during shootdown (i.e. ejection parameters)

o Command and control relationships

o Available Combat Rescue assets (dedicated versus non-dedicated Combat Rescue elements)

o Threat environment to both the Survivor/Evader and recovery forces (population density of evasion environment, location of the S/E, terrain, weather, etc.)

The probability of rescuing downed Survivors/Evaders (S/E) is a function of accurate S/E location identification and time available to rescue forces. From Desert Storm to current contingency operations, this study reinforces the need for improved S/E communication capabilities, to include passage of geo-location information, secure communications, and increased transmission range of S/E communications equipment. The consistent ability of the enemy to “spoof” and jam S/E communications complicated rescue efforts and increased the risk to rescue forces. Adversaries, as witnessed in past conflicts, place high emphasis on capturing downed aircrew and targeting rescue assets. In SEA, adversaries developed tactics known as Search and Rescue Traps (SARTRAPS) designed not only to deceive rescue forces but to position threat forces in advantageous locations for the purpose of destroying rescue forces.

TREND ANALYSIS Growing political and military trends will have a dramatic effect on future Combat Rescue operations. Perhaps the most significant factor will be the level of commitment to maintain a trained Combat Rescue force organized under an Air Component Commander. Although current USAF and Joint doctrine define tactics, techniques, and procedures for Combat Rescue, specific command and control relationships continue to affect the safe and expeditious tasking and execution of Combat Rescue missions. Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, specifically makes each service responsible for providing forces capable of performing Combat Rescue in support of its own operations, consistent with its assigned functions. Each service then organizes, trains, and equips its own Combat Rescue forces based on inherent missions. An area of emphasis requiring attention is the use of another Component’s forces to support an Air Component Commander’s Combat Rescue requirements. While other Component assets continue to be a valuable resource in Combat Rescue operations, loss of Unity of Command has been observed as a significant problem. There also exist doctrine, tactics, and training gaps that affect the planning and coordination of effective recovery operations. Differences between Services or Component communications systems, as well as Standard Operating Procedures for sister-service units can, and has, led to significant mission delays. In some cases, the breakdown of communications due to command relationships greatly impacted the timely execution of rescue operations. Technological advances and system enhancements are expected to reduce problems in the dissemination of data information between Combat Rescue assets supporting forces, and Command and Control nodes, but specific command and control relationships must be stated and adhered to by all players. The introduction of a Time-Critical Targeting model to Combat Rescue operations significantly benefits recovery operations. With improved Command and Control concepts (including full integration of Combat Rescue functions into the Air Operations Center, mission risk will be reduced and Combat Rescue success rates should increase.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Study Objectives and Overview............................................................................................ 1-1 2. Operational Summaries......................................................................................................... 2-1 2.1 Southeast Asia (1961-1975)............................................................................................... 2-2

2.1.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ............................................. 2-2 2.1.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents..................................................................... 2-10 2.1.3 Distribution of Losses ............................................................................................ 2-23 2.1.4 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents .................................................................. 2-26 2.1.5 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ................................................................. 2-26 2.1.6 Types of Recovery Forces ..................................................................................... 2-31 2.1.7 Terminal Area Characteristics ............................................................................... 2-40 2.1.8 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation ................................................................ 2-45 2.1.9 Recovery Force Losses .......................................................................................... 2-55

2.2 Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1991) ................................................................................ 2-61 2.2.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ........................................... 2-61 2.2.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents..................................................................... 2-63 2.2.3 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents .................................................................. 2-72 2.2.4 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ................................................................. 2-72 2.2.5 Types of Recovery Forces ..................................................................................... 2-73 2.2.6 Terminal Area Characteristics ............................................................................... 2-75 2.2.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operations .............................................................. 2-76 2.2.8 Recovery Force Losses .......................................................................................... 2-78

2.3 Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia 1993-1995) .................................................................... 2-80 2.3.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ........................................... 2-81 2.3.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-83 2.3.3 Frequency of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-90 2.3.4 Distribution of Losses ............................................................................................ 2-91 2.3.5 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns....................................................................... 2-92 2.3.6 Use of Ground Forces for Aircrew Rescue............................................................ 2-96 2.3.7 Recovery Force Losses .......................................................................................... 2-96

2.4 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999) ........................................................................... 2-97 2.4.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ........................................... 2-97 2.4.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-99 2.4.3 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns..................................................................... 2-101 2.4.4 Frequency of Isolating Incidents.......................................................................... 2-101 2.4.5 Distribution of Losses .......................................................................................... 2-101 2.4.6 Types of Recovery Forces ................................................................................... 2-103 2.4.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation .............................................................. 2-105 2.4.8 Recovery Force Losses ........................................................................................ 2-105

2.5 Cold War Losses (1946-1991)....................................................................................... 2-106 2.5.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ......................................... 2-106 2.5.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents................................................................... 2-107 2.5.3 Distribution of Losses .......................................................................................... 2-108 2.5.4 Survivor/Evader Landing and Evasion Environments......................................... 2-109

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2.6 Combat Rescue Test and Experiment Results ............................................................... 2-111 2.6.1 Summary of Major Exercise, Test, and Modeling Events ................................... 2-111 2.6.2 Summarized Findings .......................................................................................... 2-116 2.6.3 Warfighter Perspective on Combat Rescue Test Results..................................... 2-132

3. Lessons Learned and Trends in Combat Rescue Operations............................................ 3-1 3.1 Summary of Major Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation ............................................ 3-2 3.2 Summary of Ideal RV Characteristics ............................................................................... 3-3 3.3 Environmental Trends and Planning Factors..................................................................... 3-4

3.3.1 Global Trends........................................................................................................... 3-4 3.3.2 Physical Environment .............................................................................................. 3-4 3.3.3 Military Trends ........................................................................................................ 3-5

3.4 Characteristics of Future Isolating Incidents ..................................................................... 3-9 3.4.1 Reduced Combat Aircraft Loss Rates...................................................................... 3-9 3.4.2 Number of Rescue Candidates per Incident Will Not Increase ............................. 3-10 3.4.3 Losses to Remain Concentrated In/Around the Target Area ................................. 3-11

3.5 Trends in Enemy Reaction to Shootdowns...................................................................... 3-16 3.6 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ........................................................................... 3-16

3.6.1 Trends in Modern Rescue Response...................................................................... 3-16 3.6.2 C2ISR Improvements Will Reduce CSAR Reaction Time ................................... 3-21

3.7 Types of Recovery Forces ............................................................................................... 3-23 3.7.1 Opportune Forces................................................................................................... 3-23 3.7.2 Special Operations Ground Teams ........................................................................ 3-23

4. References............................................................................................................................... 4-1 5. Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 5-1 6. Index........................................................................................................................................ 6-1

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1. Study Objectives and Overview In May 1999, the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Study Team was directed by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[A&T]) to conduct a study of historical data relating to operational aspects of the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission. Emphasis was to be placed on an evaluation of the factors found to be most important to the success or failure of actual CSAR missions.

The scope of the study is generally limited to scenarios in which aircrew were downed in combat (referred to here as a survivor/evader, or S/E). Missions such as conventional troop transport, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) were excluded. This report further restricts itself to assessment of operational factors, while questions of accounting for aircrew declared Missing in Action (MIA) and assessment of the financial and opportunity costs of performing the Combat Rescue mission will be addressed by the Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/MIA Office. Within those constraints, the objectives of this study were:

• Describe historic Combat Rescue operations in their contemporary context. • Identify important trends in the evolution of combat aircraft losses, Combat Rescue

capabilities, and the threat facing recovery forces. • Attempt to identify those factors that will be most important in the 2010-2030 time

frame. • Provide a convenient data source for developers of Combat Rescue models so that their

fidelity and accuracy may be enhanced. To meet those objectives, the Research Team performed a comprehensive review of existing Combat Rescue research, interviewed actual participants in Combat Rescue operations from Vietnam to Kosovo, reviewed operational test data, and hosted round-table discussions to provide context and perspective for the research findings.

A note on data—despite the voluminous reporting on the air wars covered in this report, there are many gaps and conflicting information. The numerous reporting systems underwent many revisions, and non-standard terminology created problems in analyzing/verifying data from different sources. When data sources conflicted, the authors either cited both sources or, using their judgment, used the data they perceived was most accurate.

Section 2 of the report, Operational Summaries, contains the bulk of the research findings, and is organized by the conflicts that were studied. The purpose of each summary is to lay out the facts at face value, using a common outline to provide an evidentiary point of departure for the analysis in Section 3 as well as future studies of the Combat Rescue operations. Some analysis and inferences are made in Section 2, however, and readers should consider the totality of the report when drawing their own conclusions.

Section 3, Assessment of Empirical Combat Rescue Operations, contains the bulk of the report’s analysis. The primary objective of this section is to put the findings of the discrete operational summaries into historic context for comparison, and to identify trends that may help Combat Rescue planners prepare for some future conflict. Equally important is the identification of factors that are not trends—operational “dead-ends,” that (in context of our total Combat Rescue experience) are probably not significant factors for future operations. Some of this report’s most remarkable conclusions fall into this category.

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2. Operational Summaries

Southeast Asia (1961-1975)

Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1991)

Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia 1993-1995)

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999)

Cold War (1946-1992)

Combat Rescue Test and Experiment Results (1996-2001)

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2.1 Southeast Asia (1961-1975)

2.1.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

The United States military buildup in Southeast Asia (SEA) began in earnest in 1962, and by 1965 a significant force had begun air operations in that Theater. The tempo of the war increased and decreased until it peaked in response to the North Vietnamese 1972 Spring Offensive and during Linebacker II in December of that year. US involvement in SEA began to wind down during that period, leading to eventual "Vietnamization" of the conflict, and total withdrawal of US forces by early 1973. Although commonly called the Vietnam War, the fighting in Southeast Asia actually involved several wars of varying degrees of intensity. In Laos, there was a three-way civil war between rightists, Neutralists, and the Pathet Lao. There was an insurgency in South Vietnam (SVN) guided and eventually dominated by North Vietnam (NVN). The United States conducted an air war against NVN, another against the infiltration system along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, provided air support to the forces in SVN, and after 1970 carried out an air war against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.1 Accordingly, the environment faced by rescue forces in the region varied significantly in terms of its physical characteristics and the political and operational factors that shaped their missions.

2.1.1.1 The Physical Environment

Indochina presents a remarkable diversity in topography, climate, and flora and fauna. The area could present a survivor with environments ranging from dense tropical jungle where a survivor might take 30 minutes to travel 10 feet; to rice paddy areas where he could be seen from a mile away; to mountainous karst regions with cold, wet nights; to mangrove swamps; to desert-like stretches of sandy beach; to (best of all in terms of rescue success) open sea. Adding to that description, the character of the environment changed twice a year depending upon the monsoon 1 Tilford, p. 31.

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and the overabundance (or lack) of rain. A survivor landing in a rice paddy at one time of year "might sink in mud above his knees. He might land in the same paddy 6 months later and break an ankle on the parched earth."2

VIETNAM Vietnam is located in the extreme southeastern part of the Indochinese peninsula and occupies about 128,000 square miles (slightly larger than the state of California), and has a long, narrow geography that made egress to the sea a matter of minutes if a damaged aircraft could hold together that long. Before the communist takeover of SVN, a demilitarized zone divided the country at approximately 17 degrees north latitude.

Vietnam is a country of tropical lowlands, hills and densely forested highlands, with level land covering no more than 15-20 percent of the area.3 The country is divided into the highlands and Red River Delta in the north; and the Central Mountains (sometimes called the Annamite Mountains), the coastal lowlands, and the Mekong River Delta in the south.

The Red River Delta consists of a flat triangular region of 1,800 square miles, but is smaller and more intensely developed than the Mekong River Delta. The Red River Delta is a highly populated region, accounting for almost 70 percent of the agriculture and 80 percent of the industry of NVN before 1975.4 The entire Delta region is no more than 3 meters above sea level (much of it is 1 meter or less) and the area is subject to frequent flooding. The Cau Mau Peninsula consists of thick jungles and mangrove swamps, which covers the southernmost tip.

The highlands and mountain plateaus in the north and northwest form Vietnam's border with Laos and Cambodia, which terminates in the Mekong River Delta north of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). In stark opposition to the flat Delta region, these jungled, irregularly formed mountains and limestone karst outcroppings, sometimes rising to 8,500 feet, presented a hazardous obstacle to low flying aircraft and a technical challenge to rescue crews. Following bailout, some pilots were killed when they landed on the jagged karst and others suffered broken bones as they came down through the branches of the multi-layered jungle canopy.

Vietnam's climate was as debilitating as its geography was rugged and hostile. The 2 Porter, p. 9. 3 Smith , p. 12. 4 Cima, p. 85.

Figure 2-1: Population Density in NVN (Source: 7602 AIG, p. 18)

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temperature rarely dipped below 80°F, while the humidity was always high (averaging 84 percent throughout the year). Annual rainfall is substantial in all regions and torrential in some, ranging from 50 to 120 inches. Nearly 90 percent of the precipitation occurs during the summer. During this period, most of SVN experiences heavy precipitation, low cloud ceilings, chronic fog, and poor visibility. When the rains came, equipment often became inoperable, roads impassible, and flying nearly impossible.

NVN experienced the same uneven distribution of population that was typical of Indochina, which averaged 288 persons per square mile overall (see Figure 2-1). The extremes were greater in NVN, however, with very sparse population of the inhospitable uplands, and with densities in the Red River Delta being described as "among the highest in the world.”5 As the war progressed, populations migrated from urban to rural areas in response to US bombing and encouragement of the North Vietnamese government.

Considering its size, SVN as a whole was not densely populated. Although the average density was about 243 persons per square mile, the distribution was uneven, ranging from more than 750-2,000 per square mile in the Mekong Delta to only 13 per square mile on some of the plateaus of the Central Highlands.6 Contrary to what was observed in the North, the population migrated towards urban areas as the war progressed.

LAOS Laos, a landlocked nation covering 91,400 square miles (approximately the size of Great Britain), is surrounded by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam in the center of the Southeast Asian peninsula. Sixty percent of Laos, particularly the north, is covered with dense tropical rain forest and humped-back mountains with elevations above 1,500 feet characterized by steep terrain that has been described as "torturous." Laos has a tropical monsoon climate, with a pronounced rainy season from May to October (as much as 145 inches of rainfall in some areas). The cool dry season begins in November and continues through January. March begins the warmer humid weather, and the temperature reaches a high of 95°F in April—the hottest month of the year. Dust and haze dominate the dry season, when the Lao farmers practice their slash and burn agriculture7.

Although not a physical characteristic per se, the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail deserves specific mention here based on its operational significance during the war. The trail (actually a series of footpaths) ran north-to-south along the Annamite Mountains on Vietnam’s western border, and fanned out into the jungles of SVN. This terrain favored unconventional warfare, allowing guerrillas to hide in the monsoon forest and jungle that covered 60 percent of the nation. The forest canopy rose as high as 200-250 feet above the jungle floor—a factor that complicated the efforts of rescue forces whenever an aircraft was shot down in tree-covered areas of Vietnam or Laos.

The average density of the population was under 40 persons per square mile in 1959 and was very unevenly distributed. The population density was greatest in the Mekong lowlands along the Thailand border where it averaged 180 persons per square mile. Next highest was the 5 Smith [Area Handbook for North Vietnam], p. 15. 6 Smith [Area Handbook for South Vietnam], p. 61. 7 Roberts, p. 40

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Ventiane plain which, excluding the city of Ventiane itself, was estimated at 77 persons per square mile. Density was lowest in the far northwest, at less than 7 per square mile.8

2.1.1.2 The Operational Environment

Many factors shaped US rescue operations in SEA. One important factor was the politics associated with military operations in the area (particularly in Laos). Often, military necessity could not prevail against the political sensitivities present at the time. Detailed analysis of how international (and domestic) politics may have interfered with the effectiveness of Combat Rescue forces is well beyond the scope of this report, although it is undeniable that our ability to recover Survivors/Evaders (S/E) in that Theater surely suffered as a result. Just how many airmen were lost that could otherwise have been recovered will never be known.

A second significant factor that helped shape the operational environment in SEA is the level to which American Combat Rescue capability had been allowed to decay after World War II and Korea. Not just a by-product of poor planning, the lack of a wartime Combat Rescue capability was the centerpiece of the plan itself. In 1958, HQ USAF withdrew its wartime mission clause from the National Search and Rescue Plan by declaring:

"[The Air Rescue Service] will be organized, manned, equipped, trained, and deployed to support peacetime air operations. No special units or specially designed aircraft will be provided for the sole purpose of wartime search and rescue. Wartime rescue operations will be dictated by the capabilities of equipment used for peacetime SAR…"9

As a consequence, the first few years of rescue operations in SEA were made up of a hodgepodge of assets and informal agreements between services, government agencies, and politicians. Once American involvement shifted from limited and clandestine operations to a more conventional air war, the build-up of a rescue capability was rapid. By 1966, forces were finally in place, the concept of a Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF or CSARTF) was well developed, and Combat Rescue operations had become a key component of the air campaign in SEA.

Sentiment of the local population in the vicinity of a shootdown was another important variable in the operational environment. Over the course of the conflict, approximately 20 percent of the population in SVN was characterized as being under control of the Viet Cong, 25 percent was characterized as “contested,” and the remainder (about 55 percent of the SVN countryside) was described as “relatively secure.”11. In such an environment, 17.4 percent of Americans lost that

8 Roberts , p. 40. 9 HQ USAF letter to MATS, Sep 26, 1958, in Tilford, p. 16. 10 Commanders Digest, p. 6. 11 Westmoreland, p. 199.

Table 2-1: Fate of Aircrew That Were Not Rescued10

MIA POW Total

NVN 51.5% (412)

48.5% (388)

800

SVN 82.6% (456)

17.4% (96)

552

Laos 98.2% (278)

1.8% (5)

283

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were neither rescued nor killed in action (KIA) in SVN became POW, and the remainder (82.6 percent) were categorized as missing in action (MIA). As dismal as that statistic is, it is markedly better than the situation in Laos where less than 2 percent of personnel that were not recovered became POWs. The remainder, slightly more than 98 percent, were declared MIA, prompting reasonable suspicion about the treatment of those men while in the hands of the local population. In NVN, where one could assume the population was most hostile towards downed Americans, about 48.5 percent of aircrew that were not rescued were categorized as POWs and 51.5 percent were declared MIA. Those numbers seem to contradict the trend noted in SVN and Laos, suggesting that, in addition to the degree to which the population was “contested,” the local government’s ability to control the behavior of the population is a key variable in the survival of downed airmen. Such a measurement of the “sympathies” of the local population may be useful when assessing the likelihood of evasion success in other areas of the world where similar assessments can be made.

RESCUE FORCE ASSETS AND DEPLOYMENT Rescue force strength generally paralleled the pace of USAF fixed-wing activity in SEA (see Figure 2-10). The responsibility for providing assets to rescue personnel around SEA operating bases and in hostile territory was delegated to the 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (3d ARRG) by the Commander, Seventh Air Force. The Navy Control Center subordinate to this group was responsible for sea/littoral rescues, and was located in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the number and basing locations varied over the course of the war, as of 1969 more than 15 rescue units contributed to that mission from operating locations across SEA (see Figure 2-2). These widespread units, located in two nations, were responsible for search and rescue activities in an area covering more than 1.1 million square miles. The 3d ARRG was also responsible for operating a Joint Search and Rescue Center (then called a JSARC) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and several subordinate Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC) assigned by region. A detailed description of the aircraft used for rescue is in Section 2.1.6.2

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Figure 2-2: 3rd ARRG Units in SEA (Source: Overton, Figure 2)

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SOUTHEAST ASIA RESCUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS When rescue assets and infrastructure were finally in place, employment followed a Concept of Operations that had developed over time in that Theater. Any individual having knowledge of an emergency could initiate a rescue mission by notifying the JSARC, an RCC, or some other agency. At that point, the Mission Commander (typically aboard an HC-130) would determine the composition of the SARTF to include task primary and secondary forces, if required. It was even possible to receive support from civilian agencies such as Air America and Continental Air Services.12 For missions entering NVN, Rescue Coordinators had the added requirement of obtaining "border clearance" from the 7AF Commander.

Prepositioning: To reduce the time and distance for potential missions, rescue helicopters were put at forward operating locations (FOL) in SVN and northern Laos. The aircraft would arrive at the FOL at first light, staging two HH-53s (once they had arrived in theater) for northern missions in NVN and HH-3s for missions in SVN and north of the demilitarized zone.

Orbit Concept: Another tool for decreasing response time was the "orbit concept." It was conceived in March 1969 when the arrival of four additional HH-53s provided a sufficient number of airframes to support such a plan. Execution of the orbit concept put rescue aircraft (both helicopters and rescue escort [RESCORT]) in the air during periods of heavy air activity over NVN in anticipation of a shootdown. Called “airborne alert” in today’s terminology, the airborne forces augmented the rescue forces on ground alert (see Figure 2-3). CSARTF: When a rescue mission began, it tended to take priority over other ongoing missions, and aircraft were often diverted from their assigned targets to support the recovery effort.13 Although much of the fighter-bomber support marshaled was generic, some roles were highly specialized. In particular, On-Scene Commander (OSC) and RESCORT tasks were unique to rescue missions, and are described in Section 2.1.6.3. Once the CSARTF was assembled, the helicopters were escorted to the terminal area (usually by A-1E or A-7 12 Overton, p. 12. 13 Information suggesting that rescue missions received priority over other missions is anecdotal. Research has not uncovered official policy that subordinated offensive air operations to Combat Rescue missions, and it is unlikely that such a policy existed. Regardless, it is an often-mentioned observation (as in Overton, p. 96 and among aircrew assigned to SEA). See Section 2.1.6.3 for more detail.

Figure 2-3: Ground Alert and Orbit Locations (Source: Overton, Figure 10)

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“Sandy” aircraft) where one helicopter was assigned as the “low bird.” When the “low bird” aircraft commander had determined the survivor's location and his best course of action, he would start the approach to the area, jettisoning external fuel tanks if necessary. "Normally, the best approach was a high-speed descending pass over the survivor’s position, and then a tear- drop turn to arrive back at the survivor's position headed into the wind.”14 The second helicopter was assigned as the "high bird,” and would typically orbit over the pickup area at 5,000-6,000 feet, generally safe from the threat of small arms. If weather or hostile activity prevented orbiting directly over the area he would orbit at a position from which the recovery could be observed. The “high bird” would advise the SARTF of enemy activity and could act as a forward air controller, if required. If the low helicopter were disabled, the high helicopter would attempt the recovery unless denied by enemy activity.

Major Gerald A. Jones flew a typical recovery from an orbit position in November 1968. The mission is best described in his own words:

“We were orbiting near Lima Site 36 [an FOL in northern Laos] when the mission broke. The pilot was down in a relatively open area with much enemy gunfire from surrounding hills. The [on-scene commander] mentioned that it was an extremely hot area so I was required to hold out for one and one-half hours during which time extensive sanitization was carried out by fast-movers. Finally I was brought in through intermittent cloud coverage. I couldn’t spot the survivor at all and was taken back out as we began receiving ground fire. The survivor also came on the air and told us to leave the area. I then tried to come in from the west real low with the sun behind me. The Sandys had laid down a smoke screen for me, and flew ‘daisy chains’ over the area while continually firing. I still couldn’t see him, but bored on in anyway. All of my guns were firing at this time. The survivor came on the air saying, ‘I can see you.’ We looked everywhere but couldn’t see him. We were taking fire and I told the Sandys, but failed to give them exact positions. As I was casting about, the survivor came on again, ‘You’re right over me.’ I did a quick 180 [degree turn] and there he was! The hoist operator sent down the penetrator while the rest of the crew fired from the other guns. In about 30 seconds we had him aboard and we egressed climbing and turning all the way…One of the problems in a high threat area such as this was that when the hoist was in operation, we lost the service of the #2 mini-gun.”15

The CHECO report from which that account was taken describes the terminal area operation in greater detail as follows:

“The description of the rescue by Major Jones…did not detail the intense hostile fire during ingress, egress and throughout the area. Six flights of fast-movers were put on numerous hostile gun positions in the area for suppression. Additionally, there were many troops within 200 yards of the survivor. As a matter of fact, the pickup was made on the last possible attempt. The survivor was in the open, being fired on from surrounding gun positions, and being

14 Overton, p. 25. 15 Jones, Maj. Gerald A. in Overton, p. 26.

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approached quickly by enemy troops. A heavy smoke screen was used for ingress and egress. It was a brilliant recovery, daringly conceived to bring out a fellow flyer under extremely dangerous conditions.”16

Mission Closure/Suspension/Withdrawal: If operations were unsuccessful, and when it appeared that all reasonable action had been taken, the JSARC would recommend to the 7AF Commander that the mission be suspended. The Airborne Mission Commander (AMC, usually the HC-130 Crown aircraft) or the On-Scene Commander could also direct the temporary withdrawal of rescue forces in the situation dictated. The JSARC could close the mission completely when:

The recovery was completed The location of the survivor was positively identified but there could be no further

value in the continued use of the SARTF There was no indication of need for Search and Rescue effort Recovery was extremely doubtful due to hostile activity, probable capture, or time

lapse The mission proved to be false

2.1.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents

2.1.2.1 Causes of Isolating Incidents

The type and severity of the threat faced by American and allied flyers in SEA varied significantly by the location of the operation and the timeline of the conflict. In the end, however, ground fire caused about 83 percent of total combat losses between 1962 and 1972. During that same period, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) accounted for 6.3 percent of combat losses, and base attack and Migs accounted for 5.5 percent and 3.8 percent respectively.17

Although enemy weapons typically used for air defense (SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery [AAA], Mig fighters) caused most combat losses, it is noteworthy that (as of 1971) at least 80 fixed-wing USAF aircraft had been lost in SEA due to small arms fire. The actual total for small arms may be much larger due to many kills attributed to "unknown ground fire."18 Also noteworthy is the introduction of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) late in the conflict. In 1972, as US involvement waned, SA-7 MANPADS were introduced in SEA, killing 20 aircraft and damaging six more.19 Had the war continued, MANPADS would have played a very significant role in the air war over North and South Vietnam.

Figures 2-4 and 2-5 illustrate the proportions of aircraft losses that are attributable to each threat category for operations in all of SEA. Of great significance is that simple, widely proliferated weapons (AAA, large caliber automatic weapons, and small arms) account for more than 80 percent of SEA losses.

16 Overton, p. 27. 17 Granville, p. 24. Although not exactly identical, that general distribution of causes matches that described by Hewett. 18 Hewett, p. 5. 19 Crosthwaite, p. 12.

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Figure 2-5: Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Country (Source: Hewett, Tables IV, V, and VI)

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

NVN SVN Laos

MANPAD Air-Air

Small Arms SAM

AAA Automatic Weapons

Figure 2-4: Causes of Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Type of Weapon (Source: Hewett, Tables IV, V, and VI)

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

AAA Automatic Weapons Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD

Laos SVN NVN

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NORTH VIETNAM On the eve of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964, air defenses in NVN were of low effectiveness. There were no fielded missile defenses and conventional anti-aircraft weapons used for air defense had very limited radar tracking capability.20 By June of 1968, Russia had equipped NVN with about 35 SAM battalions and had supplied a sophisticated communications and radar network, numerous aircraft (including the Mig-15, Mig-17, and Mig-21), and large quantities of anti-aircraft weapons. All of those weapons contributed to establishing "the most sophisticated air defense system ever faced by any force in combat."21 In NVN, AAA accounts for nearly half of all losses, and nearly all aircraft lost to SAMs were in NVN.

Figure 2-6: Losses by Threat System in North Vietnam (Source: Hewett, Table IV)

20 Sharp, p. 13. 21 Sharp, p. 4.

NVN

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

AAA Automatic Weapons

Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD

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LAOS In Laos, automatic weapons and AAA were predominant. Pathet Lao air defenses were less sophisticated than were found in NVN but Laotian experience indicates that the threat was nearly as lethal. Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in Viet Cong controlled areas of SVN, the enemy's principle antiaircraft weapons were the 12.7 mm Soviet or Chinese built heavy machine gun and small arms.

Figure 2-7: Losses by Threat System in Laos (Source: Hewett, Table VI)

Laos

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

AAA AutomaticWeapons

Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD

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SOUTH VIETNAM

In SVN, air defenses were similar to those found in Laos where small arms and automatic weapons account for the majority of losses. South Vietnam differs from Laos in that, as the war progressed, the North Vietnam regular army occupied more and more territory in SVN, bringing with them a more conventional and more lethal air defense capability.

Figure 2-8: Losses by Threat System in SVN (Source: Hewett, Table V)

CAMBODIA In Cambodia, the communist Khmer Rouge remained a force without sophisticated weapons up to the day they took power in April 1975. Throughout the war, they rarely, if ever, employed the larger caliber anti-aircraft guns used by the North Vietnamese and, to a lesser extent, by the enemy forces in SVN. As of 1971, only five aircraft were officially reported as lost over Cambodia. Consequently, rescue activity there never assumed the scope that it did elsewhere in SEA.22

22 Hewett, p. 8.

SVN

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

AAA Automatic Weapons

Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD

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2.1.2.2 Type of Asset Lost

Table 2-3 summarizes USAF in-flight combat losses between 1962 and 1973, and suggests that the average number of aircrew available for rescue per loss incident was 0.93. That number includes only those aircrew known to be available for rescue (i.e., rescued or captured). The figure was calculated by: (Rescued + POW)/Aircraft Lost.

US Navy (USN) combat loss experience is similar to that of the USAF. The average number of aircrew available for rescue per loss incident is 1.0 (Table 2-2, based on data from Office of Naval Aviation History and aircrew status distributions described in Every [2], pp. 27-30).

Table 2-2: Summary of USN Losses in SEA

Typical Crew Size Distribution of USN Losses by Aircraft Type23

Personnel Losses per 100 Aircraft Losses

Available for Rescue per 100

Losses A-4 1 37% 37 26.3

R/F-4 2 21% 42 29.8

R/F-8 1 13% 13 9.2

E/A-6 2 10% 20 14.2

A-7 1 8% 8 5.7

E/A-1 1 7% 7 5.0

RA-5 2 3% 6 4.3

OV-10 2 2% 4 5.6

K/EA-3 9 1% 9 2.5

Average USN Crew Size per Aircraft Lost: 1.46

Available for Rescue per Loss (Rescued + POW): 1.0

23 Office of Naval Aviation History (no page number).

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Table 2-3: Summary of USAF Combat Losses in SEA (1962-1972) 24 Fate of Aircrew

Aircraft Aircraft

Lost Total Crew Members Rescued MIA KIA POW

Typical Crew Size

Available for Rescue per

Loss25 A-1 147 158 81 21 54 2 1 0.56 A-7 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 0.00 A-26 10 21 3 9 9 0 2 0.30 A-37 14 14 3 2 9 0 1 0.21 AC-47 15 109 24 28 57 0 7 1.60 A-119 2 10 7 0 3 0 5 3.50 AC-130 6 82 30 50 2 0 14 5.00 B/RB-26 9 21 1 0 20 0 2 0.11 B-52 16 98 32 44 4 18 6 3.13 B-57 32 65 26 16 21 2 2 0.88 C-7 7 22 4 0 18 0 3 0.57 C-47 6 47 11 8 28 0 8 1.83 C-123 17 77 15 16 46 0 5 0.88 C-130 22 134 35 34 65 0 6 1.59 CH-3 13 55 40 3 9 3 4 3.31 CH-53 2 8 6 0 2 0 4 3.00 EB-66 4 25 3 9 1 12 6 3.75 F-4 369 734 322 222 70 120 2 1.20 F-5 7 8 2 0 6 0 1 0.29 F-100 193 218 141 17 55 5 1 0.76 F/TF-102 3 3 2 1 0 0 1 0.67 F-104 8 8 2 3 2 1 1 0.38 F-105 334 353 127 105 25 96 1 0.67 F-111 8 15 0 15 0 0 2 0.00 HH-3 10 40 26 3 11 0 4 2.60 H-43 8 31 24 0 4 3 4 3.38 HH-53 8 44 18 1 25 0 6 2.25 HU-16 2 13 4 7 2 0 7 2.00 O-1 94 110 51 15 44 0 1 0.54 O-2 72 59 25 10 23 1 1 0.36 OV-10 44 59 25 10 23 1 1 0.59 RB-57 2 4 4 0 0 0 2 2.00 RB-66 2 9 5 0 4 0 5 2.50 RF-4 72 144 58 51 14 21 2 1.10 RF-101 32 31 9 10 1 11 1 0.63 T-28 17 20 6 5 9 0 1 0.35 UH-1 13 51 40 0 11 0 4 3.08 TOTAL 1622 2902 1212 717 677 296 1.79 0.93

24 Granville, Table 15. Data from Table 15 was adjusted, based on data in Table 6 of the same document, to remove numbers of aircraft lost on the ground due to enemy attacks on airfields. 25 Although the summaries of aircrew status (rescued, MIA, KIA, POW) in Table 2-3 are useful for estimating rescue demand for each aircraft type, the totals in this table appear to understate the POW and MIA totals when compared with other accounts.

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2.1.2.3 Type of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

Figure 2-9 shows the distribution of S/Es in SEA by mission type, as well as the distribution of S/Es that were captured and became POWs. It shows that two missions, “Strike” and Reconnaissance (“Recce”), combine as the sources for more than half of all S/Es in SEA. A look at the distribution of captured aircrew, also in Figure 2-9, paints a slightly different picture. It shows that losses during strike missions resulted in aircrew capture at about twice the rate of S/E production. Recce losses produced POWs in approximate proportion to the S/Es from that mission, while losses during combat air patrol, while producing only 2.5 percent of total USAF S/Es in SEA, produced 14.1 percent of the total POW population.26

2.1.2.4 Phase of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

Operations in the target area were, by far, the most lethal mission phase for combat aircrew anywhere in SEA. For fixed-wing aircraft, the target area’s combination of threat exposure and predictable aircraft flight profile account for 83 percent of all combat damage incidents leading to aircraft loss.27 The remainder (17 percent) received combat damage and were lost during ingress, egress, or during crash landing. 26 Granville, Table 14. 27 Hewett , 1971, p. xii.

Figure 2-9: Distribution of SEA Losses and POWs by Mission Type (Source: Granville, Table 14)

Strike

Recce

Close Air Support

Fwd Air C

tl/Spt

Search &

Rescue

Cbt C

argo Carry

Com

bat Support

Escort

CAP

Air Interdiction

Training

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

Perc

ent o

f Tot

al

Mission

% of POWs % of S/Es

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2.1.2.5 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

NUMBERS OF SURVIVORS/EVADERS Although references to numbers of rescues attempted in SEA abound, it is difficult to assess which are most accurate. Some reports are very detailed but cover only portions of the conflict’s duration. Other reports contain summary information, but the figures vary widely and are difficult to assess since various methods are used to categorize the losses. In his now classic book, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, Earl Tilford credits the Air Rescue and Recovery Service forces with saving 3,883 lives in SEA.28 That number includes not only the combat rescues of aircrew that are the centerpiece of this report, but also rescues resulting from non-combat losses of aircraft, evacuation of conventional US Army (USA) troops, and mass evacuations of civilians from one area to another. Table 2-4 lists the number and status of aircrew lost to combat action and their yearly distribution using the best data available. It conflicts with tallies of POW and MIA aircrew in Tables 2-3 and 2-5 which are assessed as being more accurate.

Table 2-4: Number and Status of Airmen Surviving Shootdown in SEA 1964-1972 29 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total Combat ACR

26 (est)

122 (est) 179 192 263 214 132 122

(est) 75

(est) 1325

POW 3 74 97 179 95 13 12 11 5 48930

MIA 4 54 204 226 294 176 85 79 23 1145

Rec Rate (available)31 89.7% 62.2% 64.9% 51.8% 73.5% 94.3% 91.7% 91.7% 93.8% 73.0%

Rec Rate (inc. MIA) 78.8% 48.8% 37.3% 32.2% 40.3% 53.1% 57.6% 57.5% 72.8% 44.8%

Table 2-5: Summary of Airmen Downed in SEA (including KIA)

Rescued POW MIA/KIA

USAF Only (Granville)32 USAF Only (Hewett)33

41.8% 44.3%

10.2% 14.8%

48.0% (24.7%/23.3%) 40.9% (19.9%/21.0%)

USN Only (primarily NVN losses)34 39.1% 32% 28.9%

28 Tilford, p. 155. 29 Combat ACR (1965), Tilford p. 74; Combat ACR (1966-1972), Tilford p. 98; MIA/POW (1964-1972), Commanders Digest, p. 6. 30 In 1973, 587 American POWs were released from Vietnam. The figures in the table are dated 1973 (prior to release of POWs) and may have categorized as MIA some personnel that were POW. In any case, figures of the type shown in the table vary based on the source, and the MIA total is apparently not limited to downed aircrew. 31 “Available” refers to those S/E available for rescue (i.e. excludes KIA and MIA). 32 Granville, p. 57. 33 Hewett, pp. 43-44. 34 Every (2), pp. 27 and 30.

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PEAK RESCUE DEMAND To answer the question of how many rescue helicopters might be needed in a given strike area to handle multiple aircraft losses in a short period of time, Every analyzed SEA data and found that of over 500 Navy aircraft lost during the conflict, the numbers in Column A of Table 2-6 represent “the only cases of multiple aircraft ejection in a short period of time.”35 Making a gross extrapolation based on approximately 1622 USAF combat losses,36 one might estimate the following cases of multiple, simultaneous rescue operations in SEA (Column B):

Table 2-6: Estimated Simultaneous Rescue Events (1962-1973)

A B Time (in minutes) USN Cases (of 525

losses)37 Est. USAF Cases (of

1,622 losses)

Total Estimated Simultaneous Rescue Events (1962-1973)

0-15 3 9 12 15-30 5 15 20 30-60 1 3 4 60-240 2 6 8

While one could reasonably assert that the final estimate (43 simultaneous rescue events in a 12-year period) understates the rescue demand, it may be equally likely that the total demand is overstated. The preponderance of USN air combat experience was in NVN, where loss rates were SEA’s highest, and the simple estimate in Table 2-6 casts those loss rates over operations in all areas of SEA.

Ultimately, rescue force structure appears to have been sufficient to handle the expected load. Although 1.2 percent of POW cases were attributed to “SAR vehicle not immediately available,” analysis of the “very limited number of instances (4) wherein the non-availability of vehicles was reported as the primary cause of SAR mission failure disclosed that they were cases in which the crewmembers were advised before the mission that SAR would not be available because of the nature of the mission and its location.”38 Apart from that reference, there is no documented instance in which rescue forces failed to react due to a lack of rescue helicopters.

35 Every (2), p. 44. 36 In addition to combat induced ejections, that figure also includes combat losses of fixed-wing transport aircraft and rescue helicopters. 37 Two cases involved rescue aircraft themselves. 38 7602 AIG, p. 4.

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050

100150200250300350400450

CY

65

CY

66

CY

67

CY

68C

Y69

CY

70

CY

71

CY

72

Fixe

d-W

ing

Loss

es

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Res

cue

Airc

raft

Inve

ntor

yUSAF Acft LossRescue Acft Inventory

Figure 2-10: Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Rescue Inventory (1965-1972)(Source: Fixed-wing loss data-USAF Management Summary, SEA, 10 Nov 69; Rescue aircraft inventory-ARRS CORONA HARVEST Report 1954 to 31 Mar 68, Vol I. Data for years after

1969 compiled from multiple sources including Tilford, Streets, Hewett, and the Office of Naval Aviation History)

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AIRCRAFT LOSS RATES

Table 2-7 lists aircraft that comprise more than 90 percent of total USAF combat losses in SEA. The combat sortie data in the table was used to calculate the loss rate per 1000 sorties for each aircraft type:

Table 2-7: Fixed-Wing Loss Rates in SEA39

Total Combat Sorties Losses Losses per 1000

Sorties F-4 496,670 382 0.769 F-105 159,795 334 2.090 F-100 360,665 198 0.549 A-1 91,855 150 1.633 O-1 485,452 122 0.251 O-2 281,000 82 0.292 RF-4C 100,050 76 0.760 OV-10A 123,572 46 0.372 B-57 43,772 40 0.914 C-130 227,807 36 0.158 RF-101 39,296 33 0.840 B-52 124,53240 16 0.190

TOTAL 2,493,934 1,515 0.607

2.1.2.6 Injuries to Survivors/Evaders

Approximately 24 percent of aircrew losses were classified as KIA.41 Of those not KIA, pre-ejection injuries (typically lacerations, fractures, and burns from exploding ordnance) accounted for about 20 percent of all injuries received during combat losses. Those pre-ejection injuries were highly susceptible to further complications during ejection, evasion, and periods of captivity42 (see Table 2-8).

Table 2-8: Time of Occurrence of Combat Aircrew Injuries43

Pre-Ejection Ejection Descent and Landing

Escape and Evasion

During Capture

20% 60% 15% 3% 2%

The major single source of non-fatal injuries is the ejection process itself, and the bulk of those injuries are minor. Windblast induced flailing of the extremities produced the greatest number of injuries during the entire escape sequence. Windblast, also referred to as ram pressure or Q force varies with the air density (ρ) and the square of the relative wind velocity (V) such that Q=½ρV2. Because Q force is a function of the square of the velocity, there is a strong association between 39 Streets, p. 5. Minor discrepancies exist between this data and loss data from Granville listed in Table 2-3 of this report. 40 Sortie data from http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/. 41 Granville, Table 15. 42 Every (2), p. 10. 43 Every (4), p. 14.

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ejection at higher airspeeds and a higher proportion of major injuries (Figure 2-11). For a discussion about how aircrew injuries affected rescue and capture rates, see Section 2.1.8.4

Figure 2-11: Severity of Aircrew Injuries by Ejection Speed (Source: US Navy data from Every [1], p. 9; AF data from Shannon, Table III)

Lower Extremities

29%

Upper Extremities

22%

Spine 16%

Torso 13%

Head/Face 11%

Neck 7%

General 2%

Figure 2-12: Location of Major and Minor Injuries Among USN Aviators Downed in Combat (Source: Every [1], p. 10)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

0 - 99

100 - 199

200 - 299

300 - 399

400 - 499

> 500

Ejection Speed (KIAS)

Perc

ent No Injury

Minor Major

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2.1.2.7 Number of Survivors/Evaders per Incident

Figure 2-13 shows the distribution of losses in SEA by aircrew size. Tables 2-2 and 2-3 in Section 2.1.2.2 suggest the average number of S/E per incident were 1.46 (USN) to 1.79 (USAF) aircrew per aircraft lost. When looking only at the part of that population known to be available for rescue (i.e. excluding MIA and KIA), the average numbers of aircrew per incident were 1.0 and 0.93 respectively.

2.1.3 Distribution of Losses

2.1.3.1 Distribution by Threat Level

Table 2-9 describes the distribution of combat losses by service and location. The losses reflect the taskings of the different services, with the US Marine Corps (USMC) supporting its ground operations in SVN, the USN focusing almost exclusively on NVN, and the USAF supporting operations all across the peninsula. By classic definition, perhaps only areas in NVN qualified as “high threat,” however the nature of the operations in SVN and Laos forced aircraft into the low-altitude environment making them vulnerable to AAA and other assorted ground fire (which, as a shown in Figure 2-14, were the most lethal threat categories in SEA).

Figure 2-13: Distribution of SEA Combat Losses by Aircrew Size (Source: Granville, Table 15)

62%

32%

6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

More Than 2 Crew members2 Crew members 1 Crew member P

erce

nt

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Table 2-9: Distribution of Losses by Country and Service

USAF44 USN45 USMC46 NVN 40% 91% 17% SVN 33% 3% 71% Laos 25% 6% 10%

Other/Unknown 2% 1% 2%

2.1.3.2 Distribution by Range

Until helicopter air refueling became available in SEA, rescue crews had no alternative but to use the FOL at Quang Tri in northern SVN and Lima Sites in northern Laos. At that time, approximately 18.9 percent of cases in which aircrew became POWs were attributed to insufficient range of the helicopter. After July 1966, with the arrival of air-refuelable HH-3s, no

44 Hewett, p. xii. 45 Office of Naval Aviation History in www.bluejackets.com. 46 Office of Naval Aviation History in www.bluejackets.com.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 - 999

2000 - 2999

4000 - 4999

6000 - 6999

8000 - 8999

10000 - 10999

12000 - 12999

14000 - 14999

16000 - 16999

18000 - 18999

20000 - 20999

22000 - 22999

24000 - 24999

Altitude

# of

Kill

s

Air-AirSAMAAAAutomatic & Small Arms

Figure 2-14: Distribution of Combat Losses by Threat System and Altitude (Source: Hewett, pp. 23-25)

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rescue mission failure was again attributed to insufficient range of the recovery vehicles (RVs).47 Even so, the HH-3s and HH-53s continued to use Lima Sites at Long Tieng and Na Khang.48 The combination of geography and basing options resulted in a maximum rescue radius of about 200 miles. Although aircraft improvements made covering those distances easier, it was aircrew creativity that often made the difference. Consider the description, by an HH-43 Flight Engineer, of how the range limitations of his helicopter were overcome:

“As you know, the HH-43 ‘Pedro’ and the HH-34 ‘Choctaw’ did not have in-flight refueling capability. However, we did put 55-gallon drums of fuel on board and [brought] a wobble pump. As we went along, we stuck the hose from the drum to the outside fuel filler receptacle just outside the door (and reachable by the FE). When the drum was empty, we kicked it overboard. The number of 55-gallon drums we carried was set based on the distance to the pick-up location and weight restrictions. The 43 was designed for [local base rescue] and was assigned that in ‘Nam, but as the war changed, so did we. Over time, the radius of required coverage became larger and larger so, like all good Pedro's, we improvised. That’s how the first “North of the DMZ” rescues early in the war were performed by the HH-43's. The HH-34s were likely operated in the same way...”49

Although not a measurement of mission range per se, sortie duration is a helpful indicator of the range (and the pace) of mission execution. The choice of staging locations and alert options (airborne and ground) resulted in average CH-3/HH-3 combat sortie durations of 85.9 minutes. At the extremes, the longest average sortie duration in any given year was 310 minutes by the HH-3 in 1970 and the shortest was 32.1 minutes by the CH-3 in 1965.50

47 7602 AIG, p. 4. 48 Tilford, p. 82. 49 DaSilva, interview 50 JTCG/ME, Table B-1.

Figure 2-15: Average CH-3 and HH-3 Combat Sortie Duration by Year (Source: JTCG/ME, Table B-1)

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1965-1970

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Minutes CH-3

HH-3

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No explanation is given in the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) reference as to the reason for the significant increase in average sortie durations from 1966 to 1970. One could infer, however, that the increase reflects more frequent use of the orbit concept over time in order to keep response times to an absolute minimum. That supposition is supported, at least anecdotally, by the upward trend of recovery rates during that same time period.

2.1.4 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong placed significant value on the capture of downed American aircrew. When the war began, their intention was to capture the aircrew for the goodwill that might be generated by the prisoners’ release at a later date. Once they realized the political leverage gained by long-term possession of American POWs, the strategy shifted accordingly. Regardless of their intention, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong wanted to capture downed aircrew before they could be rescued, and were willing to assign battlefield resources to that end. Once an S/E was captured, the enemy frequently used his survival radio to further confuse rescue efforts.

Very early in the war, North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao allies became adept at setting up flak traps (sometimes called SAR Traps). The flak traps, ambushes of SAR forces using S/E as bait, were the defining characteristic of enemy reaction to shootdowns in SEA. An excellent example is the case of Wolf 06, an F-4D flying out of Udorn Royal Thai Air Base. In the late afternoon of March 19, 1970, Wolf 06 was brought down by a direct hit from 57-mm AAA during a visual reconnaissance mission over Laos. Separated from his backseater, the pilot hunkered down in a concealed area to await rescue. From that vantage point, he witnessed savvy and methodical enemy construction of a SAR trap that was typical in SEA:

“Enemy activity was astonishing. The minute we were down the enemy started bringing in guns all around our position. They had 37mm, 23mm, ZPU, and small arms. It was obvious what they were doing and it made me furious. They had set their pattern in a crossfire, knowing that the SAR effort would begin in the morning. They fired about 1,200 rounds throughout the evening to make sure their crossfire pattern would cover the area where the Jolly Greens or Sandies would be coming in.”51

2.1.5 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

Most Combat Rescue attempts, particularly long-distance missions, were a never-ending race with time. In many cases, too much time was required to build an armada to penetrate enemy air defenses and give rescue forces a reasonable chance for success.52 Key factors influencing the time S/E were available for rescue included distance from friendly rescue forces, enemy population density and sentiment, type of terrain, and amount of ground cover.

Figure 2-16 describes the cumulative status of S/E over time in proportion to the total population that was available for rescue (i.e. excluding MIA/KIA). The data suggest that after the first 60

51 Porter, pp. 45-46. 52 Francis, p. 51.

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minutes, enemy effectiveness in capturing S/E was almost completely diminished, while our own ability to successfully recover personnel persisted (albeit at a reduced rate). In general, if an S/E’s status changed after the first hour, it was more likely to reflect his rescue than his capture. That trend is not evident when operations in NVN are looked at in isolation. In NVN, the enemy was consistently more effective at capturing our S/E than we were at their rescue, and their performance advantage persisted over time.

The spikes in the “Captured” category at the far right of Figures 2-17 and 2-18 actually represent a disproportionately high number of S/E captured after 48 hours. 4.06% of the IPs were still evading after 48 hours—of these, 78.8% were captured while 21.2% were rescued. We attribute that phenomenon to instances where friendly forces were unable to locate the S/E, leaving them exposed to “accidental” or opportune discovery by the enemy.

Figure 2-16: Cumulative Status of S/E Over Time (SEA)

(Source: Total distribution from Granville, p. 57; ‘Rescued’ data from Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D; ‘Captured’ data from 7602 AIG, p. 10)

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Figure 2-17: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (SEA) (Source: Total distribution from Granville, p. 57; ‘Rescued’ data from Directorate of Aerospace

Safety, Section D; ‘Captured’ data from 7602 AIG, p. 10)

Figure 2-18: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (NVN Only) (Source: Every [2], pp. 28-9)

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Figure 2-19: Time to Rescue in Various Environments/Threat Levels

(Source: ‘Water’ from Every (1), p. 30; ‘Land’ (NVN) from Every (2), p. 29; ‘Land (SEA)’ from Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)

2.1.5.1 Elapsed Time to Rescue

Most aircrew downed in SEA were recovered in short order. Many factors had a bearing on this, but “probably the most important were friendly control of the air, an efficient dedicated rescue force, and aircrews who knew how to aid in their own rescues.”53 The use of FOLs and the “orbit concept” described in Section 2.1.1.2 significantly improved rescue response times and helped reduce the period of S/E exposure.

Actual experience of survivors/evaders on the ground varied significantly. While some S/Es were forced to evade capture for weeks before being rescued, others were rescued within mere minutes of his feet touching the ground. Causal factors for prolonged exposure were difficulty locating the S/E, and the delay required to assemble a SARTF when the loss was in an area of elevated threat.

Of S/E that were successfully recovered, 35 percent were recovered in the first 30 minutes. At the end of the first hour of exposure, 56 percent of rescues had been accomplished. Only 16 percent had to spend more than six hours on the ground, and that was usually because darkness terminated the rescue effort. Most of these were picked up at first light the next day.54 After 48 hours, 99 percent of S/Es that were going to be rescued had been picked up.

The influence of threat level on time-to-rescue can be seen in a comparison of land rescues performed in NVN (a traditional high-threat environment) with the overall land experience for combat recoveries in SEA, and with water rescues in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea (Figure 2-19). Although the threat increased as one approached the shoreline, the vast majority of water recoveries were not contested, and might represent a theoretical minimum response time given the equipment and procedures available in SEA

53 Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, p. 5. 54 Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, p. 5.

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Hours

Years

Hours

Figure 2-20: Percent of Land Rescues Accomplished Over Time

With Data for Years 1963 to 197155 (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)

.

55 Data for each individual year were included in the figure to highlight the constancy of the rescue rates over time in SEA. It is remarkable considering the evolving nature of the decade-long war, and the changing capabilities of the recovery vehicles and escort aircraft themselves.

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2.1.5.2 Elapsed Time to Capture

Once the staging locations and orbit concepts were established, elapsed time to capture was a function of four major variables—S/E injury, intensity of the threat surrounding the S/E, population density of the evasion environment, and distance traveled before ejection after being hit (see Section 2.1.8.3). The cumulative effect of those variables on the speed of capture can be seen in the USN results in Figure 2-21. The USN experience in NVN is characterized by more severe injuries, higher threat, higher population density, and shorter distance traveled between being hit and the point of ejection.

2.1.6 Types of Recovery Forces

Multiple, disparate efforts were made in SEA to recover downed aircrew. They ranged from conventional Combat Rescue forces to political pressure to offers of reward for the safe return of our aircrews. Planners had also hoped to establish an underground network of friendly natives in NVN and Laos that would assist pilots (as had the French Maquis in World War II), but such an underground never materialized.56

Friendly guerrilla units operating in southern Laos and CIA Roadwatch teams were also given a secondary mission of searching for missing and captured airmen. Although the Roadwatch teams operated until the end of the war, recovery of downed aircrew members was only a secondary mission for these teams, and they rescued only a small number of people. In 1968, for example, there were only seven instances in which Roadwatch teams were alerted for possible recovery activity, and in only two cases were teams actually used.57

Regarding the many methods available at the time, Col William M. Harris, IV, commander of

56 Tilford, p. 68. 57 Tilford, p. 68.

Figure 2-21: Elapsed Time Until Capture (by Service) (Source: AF data from 7602 AIG, p. 10; Navy data from Every (1), Figure 13)

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the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron in 1971 and 1972, noted, “During my tour rescue efforts have called on every conceivable military resource as well as…Air America, special ground teams, clandestine operations, frogmen, aircraft carriers, tanks, and so on. There is no limitation to tactics or concepts to be employed to effect a rescue.” But despite all of the options available, and Col Harris’ aggressive efforts to use every means imaginable to recover our airmen, the reality was that the helicopter emerged as the single, best tool to do the job. Helicopters performed 98.6 percent of successful rescues, with ground parties performing the remaining 1.4 percent (see Figure 2-22). Further, the vast majority of recoveries via ground party were not pre-planned recovery missions, but the result of opportune arrival of friendly ground forces in the vicinity of the evader. For rescues performed over water, the helicopter remained the primary means of recovery, performing 86.2 percent of water recoveries. Surface vessels (including ships and amphibious aircraft) accounted for the remaining 13.8 percent of successful water recoveries.58

2.1.6.1 Dedicated vs. Opportune Recovery Forces

In all, about 20 percent of successful SEA rescues were accomplished by opportune forces (Figure 2-23). Early in the conflict, doctrinal considerations made it difficult to send rescue forces into Indochina to support Farm Gate air operations there. Farm Gate was a politically sensitive operation, and the presence of rescue forces would have highlighted the fact that they were doing more than "training" missions. At that time, what Tilford calls the "dark ages of SAR," there was a misconception on the part of some US Army helicopter crewmen, shared by their Marine and Vietnamese counterparts, that rescue “entailed nothing more than flying over a

58 Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, “Recovery Means” table.

Figure 2-23: Dedicated vs. Opportune Rescue in SEA (Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)

0%

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Dedicated Rescue Opportune Rescue

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Recovery Mode

Figure 2-22: Recovery Modes for Land Recoveries(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section I)

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downed crewman and picking him up.”59

Even with the development of a robust, specialized rescue force in SEA, “opportune” rescue forces had a significant impact on recovery rates. As of 1968, the US Army had more than 3,200 helicopters operating in SEA and because of that saturation, “an aircrew member downed in South Vietnam who declares an emergency [could] usually expect to have an Army helicopter overhead within minutes after giving his position.”60 In all, US Army helicopters were credited with rescuing 238 people from SVN and 2 from Laos (most of these saves occurred when one helicopter moved in to save the crew of a nearby downed chopper).61 In fact, opportune rescue forces were responsible for the shortest evasion period reported by USAF evaders (20 seconds) when an Army helicopter that followed a pilot during his parachute descent, landed beside him, and made the recovery. An account of one of the more sensational opportune recoveries makes the point that, in a pinch, an evader will be happy to take the first ride home, no matter what it is. Shortly after landing, the pilot was advised by his flight lead that a pair of Army AH-1 Cobra helicopters was heading for the area.

“One set down about 20 yards in front of me but couldn’t spot me and started to lift off. For the first time I exposed myself. I jumped up and waved my arms and started through the mud and slime toward that beautiful chopper. All the time I was expecting to get a bullet in the back. They couldn’t take me inside, since it was a two-seated tandem cockpit, so they dropped a gun-bay door cover and motioned to me to lie down on that and hang on to the skid. It was rather windy riding out there, but I was really relieved to see that Vietnamese countryside going away from me.”62

2.1.6.2 Recovery Vehicles Used

Helicopter recoveries in SEA began with 16 Sikorsky H-34 "Choctaw" helicopters sent to Air America in 1961. The rescue vehicles in the 1961 inventory (primarily the H-34 Choctaw and the HH-43 Husky [also called the “Pedro”]) were ill suited for search and rescue in jungles and mountains. Their most appropriate use was supporting rescue in close proximity to the air base and for fire fighting.

By 1967, the primary aircrew recovery helicopters were the HH-43F and the HH-3E “Jolly Green Giant,” off-the-shelf vehicles modified to satisfy the immediate rescue requirements. Each aircraft had its peculiar deficiencies and neither had the speed or range to rapidly reach airmen downed deep inside NVN or Northern Laos and the HH-43F was unable to hover over the higher mountains and karst formations.

When the HH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giant” was introduced in late 1967, it became the mainstay of Combat Rescue operations in NVN, leaving coverage of SVN and Laos largely to the HH-3 while the numerous HH-43s in Theater retained their traditional taskings of local base rescue. As early as 1966, the H-3’s deficiencies in combat had been categorized by the aircrew flying them. Stated deficiencies included:63

59 Tilford, p. 42. 60 Tuckey, p. 3. 61 Tilford, p. 76. 62 Tuckey, p. 31. 63 Tilford, p. 89.

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• Lack of sufficient armor • Limited firepower • Marginal hover capabilities • Only one 7.62 mm machine gun

The deficiencies were addressed with newer models of the H-3 that included a 650-gallon fuel tank, and two jettisonable 200-gallon external tanks like those used on the F-100 jet fighter. With those improvements, the H-3 could attain a combat range of 500 miles (depending on loiter time and other operational considerations).64 It also had a 240-foot hoist with forest penetrator.

In the HH-53, the rescue service had an aircraft that, with in-flight refueling, had excellent range, improved defensive systems, and represented the best in rescue technology. Yet there were some limitations in the system. Described in Tilford as “too large to be an ideal rescue helicopter,” its size kept it from maneuvering in tight areas like karst valleys and made it an easy target for enemy gunners.”65 Despite the expansion in capabilities offered by the HH-53, “the 3d ARRGp had two primary objections to [the HH-53]: the helicopter was too large and too slow.”66 Pilots complained about the HH-53’s limited field of view and that the position of the rotor mast forced the pilot to maintain a 5-degree nose up attitude during the hover, thus further restricting vision. “[HH-53] crew commanders were also concerned that during a hover the starboard side was not covered by the minigun because if one parajumper was on the jungle penetrator or helping the survivor aboard, and the other was working the winch, there was no one available to fire the minigun.”67

64 Tilford, p. 70. 65 Tilford, p. 93. 66 Francis, p. 51. 67 Tilford, p. 93. 68 Overton, p. 3.

Table 2-10: 3 ARRG Aircraft Strength-as of May 196968

Aircraft Type Authorized Assigned

HH-3E 18 20

HH-43B 25 25

HH-43F 7 6

HH-53B 6 6

HH-53C 4 4

HC-130P 11 11

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Table 2-11: SEA Recovery Vehicle Data

Type HH-43 CH-3 HH-3 HH-53

Crew 4 4 4 5

Speed 75 knots 110 knots 120 knots 140 knots

Radius of Action 91 miles 220 miles (unrefueled) 310 miles (external tanks) 290 miles (unrefueled)

Endurance 2+20 3+00 Unlimited with air refueling Unlimited with air refueling

Armament None 1 x M-60 (7.62) 2 x M-60 (.7.62mm) 3 x GAU-2 (7.62mm)

Armor HH-43B: No, HH-43F: Yes No Yes Yes

Hoist Capability 210 feet 240 feet 240 feet 240 feet

Normal Operating Weight 9150 lbs 18000 lbs 18000 lbs 36000 lbs

Length 25 feet 73 feet 73 feet 88 feet

Combat History Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate

NVN Unk 1 n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 246 1 .0041 SVN Unk 9 n/a 9878 1 .0001 7557 2 .0003 1719 3 .0017

Laos 157 0 0 9761 9 .0009 5398 5 .0009 0 0 n/a

The HH-43 flew 7 sorties in Cambodia with no losses

1 combat loss reported during operations in

Thailand

The HH-53 flew 177 sorties in Cambodia with 1

loss (.0056 loss rate)

(Discrepancies exist between these combat history data [from Granville Tables 8-11] and that from Table 15 of the same document.)

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Sikorsky HH-34 Choctaw Kaman HH-43B “Huskie”

Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green Giant Sikorsky HH-53D Super Jolly Green Giant

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2.1.6.3 Recovery Support Forces Marshaled

Rescue concepts of operations and tactics evolved quickly in SEA. By 1965, with experienced helicopter and A-1E RESCORT crews, and with the amphibious, fixed-wing HU-16s operating out of Da Nang to cover the water rescue mission, a full SARTF was available in SEA. Over the years, equipment improved and aircraft changed, but the SARTF of 1965 closely resembled that of 1973 in doctrine, tactics, and procedures.

Rescue efforts generally took precedence over normal strike missions (particularly in the war’s later years) and aircraft were often diverted from their assigned targets to support the S/E and rescue helicopters. Battle managers’ willingness to task assets to support Combat Rescue operations was, at times, astounding. On one mission in December 1969, 336 sorties were flown over a three-day period to help rescue forces recover a navigator evading capture near Ban Phanop, Laos, just outside Tchepone. In addition to the A-1 and Jolly Green sorties, the USAF used 50 F-105, 43 F-4, 4 F-100, plus assorted O-1 and O-2 sorties. The Navy also contributed a number of A-6 and A-7 sorties.69

Another mission, the rescue of Lt Col Iceal Hambleton, an Electronics Warfare Officer on Bat 21, is perhaps the most famous example of massive airpower used to support Combat Rescue operations, and served as an indication that sometimes the blunt instrument of massive firepower simply is not effective. In March, 1972, Hambleton ejected safely from his damaged EB-66, but landed directly in the middle of a major North Vietnamese army unit sweeping south. A rescue operation was launched that took precedence over virtually all other air missions being flown in South Vietnam, and included eight hundred sorties flown by bombers, fighters, forward air controllers, and helicopters. In the process, six more aircraft were shot down, several others were severely damaged, ten more airmen were killed, and air operations against the massive Easter Offensive were disrupted. Bat 21 would evade capture for twelve days before being rescued by a Navy SEAL, Lieutenant Tom Norris, who received the Medal of Honor for leading a daring and unorthodox boat-borne recovery. Col Jack Allison, a helicopter pilot since 1951 and a veteran of numerous Combat Rescue missions, said “against opposition like that encountered in the Bat 21 mission the traditional SARTF was useless.”70

RESCUE ESCORT During the course of the war, fixed-wing aircraft used most extensively for RESCORT included the T-28 Trojan, A-1 Skyraider and, toward the end of the conflict, the A-7 jet fighter. By 1967 the A-1E had the highest overall loss rate of any airplane in SEA. Skyraider loss rates per 1,000 sorties ranged from 1.1 in SVN to 1.5 over Laos and up to 6.6 for missions over NVN. The high loss rate over NVN was directly attributable to the A-1s rescue escort role. For context, NVN loss rates for the F-105, F-4 and HH-53 were 3.3, 1.6, and 4.1, respectively.71

The A-1 was almost ideally suited for the RESCORT mission because of its ability to fly an efficient cover pattern in the helicopter’s airspeed regime. They were durable against anti-aircraft fire; and could also carry and effectively deliver a wide range of suppressive ordnance.

69 Tilford, p. 96. 70 Tilford, p. 118. 71 Granville, Tables 8, 9, and 10.

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The enemy had an excellent understanding of the capabilities of different support aircraft, and showed little regard for those that were typically equipped with conventional bombs. On the other hand, they had great fear of the A-1, not only for its special munitions, but also because of the surgical precision of its machine guns and their effectiveness against individually targeted soldiers.

Normally, four A-1s in two flights of two were used for RESCORT. The elements, referred to as “Sandy High” and “Sandy Low,” either flew with the helicopters, or split, sending one element to the terminal area to provide an OSC and immediate protection to the S/E, and holding one element back to support the helicopters as they made their way towards the terminal area. When Sandy Low determined that it was safe for the helicopters, he briefed Sandy High on the situation in the terminal area who then escorted the helicopter designated as “low bird” into the zone. The “high bird” typically remained in a safe orbit, ready to advance if the need arose.

Late in the war, the A-1s were retired from this role and were replaced by the A-7. At the time, rescue helicopter crews expressed their concern:

“The SAR community generally feels the A-7, being a jet aircraft, is not the optimal aircraft to support this mission. The A-7’s sustained turn radius is quite small for a jet fighter, but even this radius of turn will occasionally place the escort pilot in a position where visual contact with the helicopter is difficult to maintain. Tests plus combat experience have shown that less than two or three miles of visibility will negate the ability of the A-7 to effectively perform the escort mission.”72

The bomb load of the A-7 was theoretically twice that of the Skyraider. However, this was less relevant for the rescue escort mission because the ordnance load typically included special munitions rather than a large load of 500-pound bombs. In the rescue configuration the first three rescue escort aircraft, Sandys 1, 2, and 3, usually carried two CBU-38 cluster bombs, two LAU-3 launcher pods packed with high explosive rockets, and two additional LAU-3 pods filled with white phosphorus rockets. The fourth plane in the rescue escort flight, Sandy 4, carried two CBU-38s and a pair of CBU-12 cluster smoke bombs.

ON-SCENE COMMANDER The term “On-Scene Commander” describes a specific role filled by a player in the terminal area of an ongoing rescue mission. Although any aircraft in the area could assume the role, it typically fell to the Sandy aircraft when they were available. In those cases, one of the pilots in the Sandy Low element acted as OSC. In the terminal area, the OSC determined the location and condition of the S/E, assessed enemy defenses, and marshaled/controlled forces to suppress the threat until it was safe for the helicopters to attempt the pick-up. If Sandy Low required additional support, he coordinated with HC-130 Crown aircraft to redirect airborne fighters to launch fueled/armed aircraft that (depending on availability) were on standby to support the mission. Ultimately, the OSC determined exactly when, and under what conditions, the pickup attempt would be made.

72 Every (2), p. 31.

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It was not an accident that OSC duties, arguably the most difficult to be found in anywhere SEA, were assigned to Sandy aircraft when they were available. The intense demands of the mission required aircrew that were specifically trained to meet those demands. Inevitably, as described in a Pararescueman’s End of Tour report, when the training was insufficient, mission success suffered:

“Another area I feel deserves attention is the coordination and tactics between the A-1 Sandy aircraft and the rescue helicopters….The SAR aircrews felt that it took a number of SAR missions to produce a good Sandy pilot and even more missions to qualify a Sandy lead, which is one of the most important elements involved in a combat recovery. By flying actual SAR missions on a day-to-day basis, these pilots received training that could never be obtained by [previous] pilots that were required to fly four different types of A-1 missions. The lack of mission experience by the A-1s caused errors in timing or mission sequencing. This often manifested itself as indecision on when to bring the Jolly in to attempt the pick-up….A-1’s flying solely for SAR support were in the best position to get the type of SAR experience needed. Further lack of A-1 experience led to the development of an over-cautious attitude among the SAR forces.”73

The importance of dedicated training of rescue forces in Combat Rescue doctrine and tactics, and the value in a primary focus on that mission, was consistently emphasized among those that operated in SEA. It is also a theme that emerged as universal across all conflicts studied for this report.

OTHER SUPPORTING FORCES Beginning in 1970, twin-engine OV-10 "Broncos" began working with the SARTF as forward air controllers (FAC). Because of their speed, armament that included four 7.62mm machine guns as well as a rocket or gun pod, and great visibility, the Jolly Green pilots preferred the OV-10 to the slower, unarmed O-ls and O-2s. The FAC was often the first aircraft in the area and assumed the OSC role until the arrival of Sandy Low. Once Sandy Low arrived, OSC duties were handed off and the FAC assisted by directing fighter-bombers if they were needed. As the number of A-1s was reduced, the role of the OV-10 in the SARTF expanded.

During our involvement in SEA, just about every imaginable combat capability was assessed for its ability to support the rescue mission. The idea of using AC-130 Spectre gunships in rescue work can be traced to an incident in late 1972. In December 1972, an AC-130 was diverted from its patrol along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to help an HH-53 search for the crew of another Specter gunship shot down over Laos, pinpointing the survivors with the AC-130’s night vision devices. The AC-130’s effectiveness in support of the rescue mission, deriving primarily from its loiter time, remarkable firepower and ability to do command and control (C2), led to establishment of a Special Operations search and rescue integration training program.74 The AC-130 would not again be seen in such a support role until August, 1995, when the Spectre assisted in the (fruitless) search for Ebro 33, shot down during Operation Deny Flight (see Section 2.3). 73 Farrior, p. 2 74 Tilford, pp. 135 and 136.

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2.1.7 Terminal Area Characteristics

2.1.7.1 Physical Environment

In SEA, 80 percent of USAF parachute landings were made on land while about 20 percent ended up in the water. Almost the reverse was true for the Navy, with 73 percent of parachute landings putting the aircrew in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the remaining 27 percent onto land (frequently near the North Vietnamese coastline, the worst possible location for evasion). Figure 2-24 describes the distribution of landing environments and outcomes among downed USAF aircrew.

Of the land environments encountered, Figure 2-24 also shows that slightly more than half of the S/Es that ejected landed in a wooded area. In almost half of those cases the survivor became hung-up in the trees, some as much as 200 feet off the ground. Figure 2-25 shows the results of tree landings in SEA:

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0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%

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as not hung-up in trees

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arst/Stum

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Villiage

Figure 2-24: Survivor/Evader Evasion Environment (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section C)

Figure 2-25: Results of Parachute Landings into Trees in SEA (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section C)

Of survivors hung-up in trees:

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2.1.7.2 Locating the Survivor/Evader in the Terminal Area

Although data describing how each isolating event was detected does not exist in summary form, anecdotal accounts and sensor technology available at the time suggest that radio calls from the distressed aircraft and wingman were the primary method of notifying command and control centers of a loss. Once on the ground, evaders had a myriad of options for signaling their location. In thick jungle areas, however, most were ineffective. By every account, the survival radio was the most important piece of equipment available to S/E in SEA. Figure 2-26 summarizes the types of signal devices used in the terminal area by aircrew that were successfully rescued.

Figure 2-26: Types of Signalling Devices Used in Successful SEA Rescues (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section H)

0%

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adio

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isually Located

Mod 0 M

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arachute

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eacon

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ircraft Wreckage

Signal M

irror

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reserver/Raft

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arker

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anelPe

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as U

sed

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2.1.7.3 Recovery Modes

Among AF aircrews rescued in SEA, the rescue hoist was the primary means for their extraction from the terminal area (see Figure 2-27). Depending on the time of year and rainfall, even flat areas like rice paddies could require a hoist recovery. Some of the difficulties involved with hoist recoveries in rugged terrain are described in this debriefing of a rescued pilot:

“…I saw that I was going to land in the trees, so I discontinued steering, put my feet together, shielded my face, and prepared for a parachute landing fall or tree penetration. I went through the tops of the trees and my chute hit the trees and hung up, causing a very gentle tree landing. I was six feet from the side of a karst face, and although I could not see the valley floor due to the dense foliage, I estimated it was 100 to 200 feet below me. There was also a ledge of karst about 25 feet below me.”75

After an H-34 tried unsuccessfully to get a horse collar to the pilot through the trees, an HH-3 equipped with a forest penetrator arrived in the valley. At that point, the recovery continued:

“…the Jolly Green moved in with a PJ on the hoist. The PJ was unable to get to me due to the trees and because the refueling probe of the helicopter forced it to remain too far from the karst face. I used my helmet and oxygen line as a lasso; the PJ grabbed it and reeled himself over to me. The PJ was sitting on two legs of the penetrator and was strapped in, with another strap ready to put around me. He lowered the third seat but I was unsuccessful in getting on it. I felt secure enough from the strap under my arms and did not attempt to use the seat any more. The PJ was on the radio and called to have us raised a foot or two so that he could cut the shroud lines and back pack which were still connected to me. It took ten minutes to cut all 28 lines. He then swung us away from the tree and we banged into another tree before being hoisted up to the chopper.”76

The problem the H-34 had using a horse collar in a foliated area highlights why the forest penetrator was the extraction device of choice, used in more than 90 percent of the successful hoist recoveries (see Figure 2-28).

Bringing S/Es aboard the helicopter via a landing or while in a low hover were the next most frequent means of recovery (used in 34 percent of cases). Unfortunately, the data do not describe how that 34 percent was divided between landings and low hovers.

75 Seig, p. 48. 76 Seig, p. 49.

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0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

TOTAL 60.7% 34.0% 1.8% 3.4%63-65 63.2% 36.8% 0.0% 0.0%66 70.6% 27.5% 2.0% 0.0%67 66.7% 31.7% 1.6% 0.0%68 68.1% 25.7% 0.0% 6.2%69 55.4% 36.6% 3.6% 4.5%70 59.7% 35.1% 2.6% 2.6%71 42.4% 50.8% 1.7% 5.1%

Hoist Landed/Hovered Rope/Other* Unknown

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

Forest Penetrator Sling (horse collar) Stokes Litter/Basket Unspecified

Figure 2-28: Hoist Insertion/Extraction Devices Used in SEA Combat (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section C)

Figure 2-27: Land Recovery Means Used in SEA Combat (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section C)

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2.1.8 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation

2.1.8.1 Physical Environment

POPULATION DENSITY OF THE EVASION ENVIRONMENT

A study of returned American prisoners of war compared time on the ground for downed aircrew and the average population densities of their aircraft incident locale.77 The results showed a dramatic difference in evasion potential between the highest and lowest areas of population density. Table 2-12 and Figure 2-29 show comparative evasion times for each population density area and the percentage in each area captured within 30 minutes.

USN experience is consistent with that conclusion. Because most USN aircrew downed over land were in heavily populated areas near the coast of NVN (areas with population densities that frequently exceeded 520 persons per square mile) it should be expected that evasion times or Navy aircrew that were captured would be substantially less than the POW population as a whole. That proved to be the case. Within 20 minutes of landing, 80 percent of USN POWs had been captured,78 versus 62 percent of USAF POWs (shot down across the entire SEA area).

Table 2-12: Impact of Population Density on Aircrew Capture79

< 130 Persons per Square Mile

130 Persons per Square Mile

520 Persons per Square Mile

Percent Distribution of Captures by Population Density

23% (62 of 274 RPWs)

38% (104 of 274 RPWs)

39% (108 of 274 RPWs)

Percent of Evaders in Each Area Captured Within 30 Minutes 52% 61% 76%

77 7602 AIG, p. 19. 78 Every (1), Figure 13. 79 7602 AIG, Section C, Tables 1 through 3.

Figure 2-29: Air Force Evasion Times by

Population Density (first 6 hours)

(Source: 7602 AIG, Section C, Figure 2)

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

1 Min

10 min

20 min

30 min

40 min

50 min

60 min

6 hrs

Evasion Time

Cum

ulative Percent Captured

520 per sq mile130 per sq mile<130 per sq mileAF Average

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TERRAIN

The characteristics of the parachute landing area were directly related to time-to-capture and survival. Although high trees, rocky terrain, and thick jungle vegetation were responsible for some parachute landing injuries, the thick vegetation served to give a survivor much better cover to avoid enemy detection. Conversely, if the survivor was severely injured and unable to communicate, it could also be responsible for his not being found by either friendly or enemy forces. The open, populated coastal areas generally resulted in a survivor’s immediate capture, whereas the heavy thick jungle areas and open ocean favored recovery.80 Open water landings, while resulting in a high rescue rate, also resulted in some severe parachute entanglement problems.

In any source that is referenced, the correlation between parachute landings in open terrain and high rates of capture appears to be very strong. An interesting exception is from the perspective of those that were actually captured. When interviewed after their release, only 5.4 percent of returned POWs cited “inadequate cover” as the primary reason for their evasion failure. Figure 2-30 shows aircrew status by parachute landing terrain.

Table 2-13 describes the impact of topography and foliage on rescue of USN aircrew in SEA. The statistics include only those aircrew known to be available for rescue following combat loss (i.e. instances of KIA and MIA are excluded).

Table 2-13: USN Aircrew Status by Terrain Type (excluding MIA and KIA) 81

Terrain Type % Recovered

% POW

Open Ocean 96% 4%

In Shore, Open Areas, Lakes, Marshes, Rice Paddies, Populated Areas 15% 85%

Thick Jungle, Trees, Heavy Vegetation 91% 9%

Often, the jungle canopy was so thick in SEA that the survivor could not see the rescue aircraft even when it was in the immediate vicinity, and injuries often prevented the survivor from moving to an open area that would facilitate location and rescue. If a rescue was attempted in an area of rugged karst terrain with steep, sheer rock walls of high trees, it was often difficult to get the helicopter into a safe hover location. During retrieval, re-entanglement with the vegetation was a problem.82

Interaction between terrain and the recovery vehicle itself was often the origin of problems. During the actual recovery, radios were practically useless due to the helicopter noise; requiring helicopter crews to rely almost completely on hand signals.83 Helicopter downwash was also a problem both over land and over water (see Section 2.1.2.6 for an explanation of windblast, or

80 Every (2), p. 18. 81 Every (2), p. 18. 82 Every (2), p. 23. 83 Every (2), p. 24.

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Q-force). In the cases recoveries from the water, helicopter downwash “was often severe and hampered the recovery effort.”84 Sometimes, as in the 1964 case of an attempted recovery by a relatively lightweight UH-1, the downwash doomed the recovery by actually drowning the rescuee.85 The interference of helicopter downwash during land rescues was no less severe. The force of the downwash would blow down trees and branches, knock survivors out of trees, and create a harsh environment beneath the helicopter during hoist recoveries.

DARKNESS AND WEATHER In 1964 the HH-43F flew its first night mission picking up a Vietnamese A-1 pilot.86 Despite that early success, a viable night Combat Rescue capability never developed. In the early 1970s, an experimental night imaging system was installed on several HH-53s operating in SEA, but it was rarely used (although it was credited with enabling one night rescue in a remote area of Laos in December 1972). All in all, night efforts were rarely attempted and virtually always unsuccessful.87 Because so few night rescues were attempted, darkness is only rarely listed as a cause for mission failure. When darkness was listed as a reason for mission failure, it was generally because a rescue attempt begun in the late afternoon had to be abandoned because of darkness before the aircrew was recovered.

Weather is cited as a causal factor in only 6 percent of cases where a rescue mission was launched and the S/E was subsequently captured. Poor visibility and low ceilings in the terminal

84 Every (2), p. 24. 85 Tilford, p. 43. 86 Tilford, p. 61. 87 Tilford, p. 72.

Figure 2-30: Aircrew Status by Parachute Landing Terrain (Source: KIA/MIA/POW data from Every [5], p. 24; ‘Recovered’ data from Directorate

of Aerospace Safety, Section C)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Recovered POW KIA/MIA

Village

Rocks/Karst/Hills

Swamp/Marsh/RicePaddyOpen Ground

Trees-Wooded

Percent of Total

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area were typical of the weather that was described as contributing to rescue failure.88 While this data may be of interest, it must be remembered that the “causes of failure,” and other information from the 7602 Air Intelligence Group (AIG) source, are based on the opinion of the individual that was captured and not the crews attempting the recovery.

Figures 2-31 and 2-32 show the problems complicating successful rescues in SEA for both the USAF and USN.

88 7602 AIG, p. 7.

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Figure 2-31: Problems Complicating Successful Rescues in SEA- AF Experience(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section L)

Figure 2-32: Problems Complicating Successful Rescues in SEA- Navy Experience (Source: Every [4], p. 26)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Survivo

r Req

uired

Ass

istan

ce

Inade

quate

Surv

ivor T

rainin

g

Hostilit

ies in

Area

No Res

cue D

evice

on R

ecov

ery A

ircraf

t*

Comm di

fficult

ies (e

quipm

ent)

Lack

of C

omm D

evice

on P

enetr

ator

Rotor W

ash

Poor S

AR Force P

roced

ures

Penetr

ator E

ntang

led in

Trees

Dense

Jung

le Grow

th

Hoist F

ailure

Entang

led in

Para

chute

Darkne

ss/B

ad W

eathe

r

Heavy

Sea

s

Tangle

d Pen

etrato

r Cab

le

Smoke O

bscu

red S

urvivo

r

Penetr

ator Z

ipper

Malfun

ction

Perc

ent o

f Cas

es

0%

5%

10%

15%

Topog

raphy

Commun

icatio

ns

Problem

Boa

rding

RV

Physic

al Lim

itatio

n-Surv

ivor

Rescu

e Equ

ipmen

t Fail

ure

Darkne

ss

Helico

pter D

ownw

ash

Inade

quac

y/Lac

k of R

V

Parach

ute E

ntang

lemen

t

Wea

ther

RV/Crew

man A

ssist

Hes

itanc

y

Survivo

r Acti

ons/P

anic

Weig

ht/Drag

(not

due t

o chu

te)

Inade

quac

y of R

escu

e Pers

onne

l

RV Factor

(poo

r proc

edure

)

Hampe

red by

Pers

onal

Surv E

quipm

ent

RV Failure

Fire/E

xplos

ion

Inade

quate

Res

cue E

quipm

ent

Physic

al Lim

itatio

n-Res

cue P

erson

nel

Perc

ent o

f Cas

es

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2.1.8.2 Threat

A study of US aircrew taken prisoner in SEA concluded that “the principal cause for failure to be rescued or evade was the immediacy of capture or the proximity of enemy forces.”89 In 30.3 percent of USAF POW cases, a rescue effort was not even attempted because the shootdown occurred in a high threat area that prohibited any realistic chance of successful recovery.90 In those cases, it is doubtful that any improvement in rescue reaction time could have changed the outcome. Figure 2-33 shows that for cases where rescues were unsuccessfully attempted, enemy proximity was considered as the primary cause of mission failure in about 80 percent of those cases.91

2.1.8.3 Time From Emergency to Ejection

Ejections initiated immediately after being hit decreased that aircrew's chances of successful rescue in several ways. First, it caused ejection in an area of known enemy activity; second, the immediacy of the event often led to a poor posture in the ejection seat, causing injuries that hampered evasion; third, it resulted in ejection at higher airspeeds, causing more severe (often debilitating) flail injuries; and fourth, it often prevented communication with wingmen or rescue forces before ejection (of those aircrew that became POWs, 47 percent were unable to transmit prior to ejection).

The immediacy of aircraft kill is directly related to the country of hit and, by extension, threat level. For example, in NVN 63 percent of all aircraft lost flew more than 5 miles after hit; the corresponding percentages for SVN and Laos are only 32 percent and 46 percent, respectively. It appears that the pilot's willingness to remain with his severely damaged aircraft is strongly dependent on the geographical area in which he is hit.92 Because of the threat in NVN, pilots tended to stay with their aircraft as long as possible to increase their chance of recovery. Rescue experience confirms the pilots' suspicions—pilot recovery rates were also directly related to country of hit, as well as distance flown after sustaining a lethal hit. For example, the recovery

89 7602 AIG, p. vi. 90 7602 AIG, p. 4. 91 7602 AIG, Table 1. 92 Hewett, p. xii.

Figure 2-33: Reasons for Failure of Viable Rescue Missions in SEA

(Source: 7602 AIG, p. 5)

Darkness4%

Weather 6%

No Contact

8%

Injuries2%

Enemy Proximity

80%

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rate for pilots of aircraft hit in NVN who fly more than 5 miles after hit is triple the recovery rate for those who fly less than 5 miles.93 Of all USN aircrew forced to eject due to combat damage, only 47.5 percent were able to delay ejection more than 60 seconds after being hit (Table 2-14). Significantly, when only the subgroup of USN aircrew that were successfully rescued is examined, 87 percent of those aircrew had been able to delay their ejection beyond 60 seconds after being hit.94

Table 2-14: Distribution of Ejection Delays After Hit (USN)95 1-10 sec 11-20 sec 21-60 sec 1-10 min 10-30 min 30-60 min

% of Total 24.7% 5.6% 22.2% 35.8% 9.9% 1.7%

Figure 2-34 vividly illustrates the association between delayed ejection and improved recovery rates. Of the USN aircrew losses represented in the figure, the mean time from emergency to ejection among those that were captured was 1 minute.96 In SEA, even if a Navy aircraft had time to get away from an inland target, the aircrew generally headed for the coast to reach the “feet wet” safe area. If they were unable to reach the safety of the open ocean, they were forced to eject over the more heavily populated coastal areas of NVN. Conversely, USAF aircraft would generally head back to bases in Thailand; and if forced to eject, the aircrew would eject over more densely vegetated portions of NVN or Laos.97 In those cases, although the range and response time was increased for rescue forces, recovery rates were higher. In NVN, a pilot who was able to travel at least 50 miles after being hit was more than seven times more likely to be recovered. Figure 2-35 shows the loss outcome by country and distance traveled after hit.

93 Hewett, p. xv. 94 Every (4), p. 7. 95 Every (2), p. 9. 96 Every (2), p. 9. 97 Every (2), p.16.

Figure 2-34: Mean Ejection Time for Navy Aircrew in NVN (Source: Every [1], p. 7)

10.3

13.8

2.4

18.6

10.6

2.11 0.5 1 1.6

0.5 0.202468

101214161820

A-4 A-6 A-7 F-4 F-8 RA-5C

Aircraft Type

Min

utes Recovered Aircrew

POW

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Figure 2-35: Loss Outcome by Country and Distance Traveled After Hit (Source: Hewett, Tables XXIX-XXXI)

Rescue Status vs Distance-NVN

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nmDistance Traveled from Location of Hit

POW-Returned KIAMIAPOW Recovered

Rescue Status vs Distance-SVN

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nmDistance Traveled From Location of Hit

POW-Returned KIAMIAPOW Recovered

Rescue Status vs Distance-Laos

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nm

Distance Traveled fom Location of Hit

POW-Returned KIAMIAPOW Recovered

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2.1.8.4 Survivor/Evader Injuries

Injuries were cited as the primary cause of evasion failure in 12.4 percent of USAF POW cases.98 More than 75 percent of all injured S/E that were captured were able to evade for only 60 minutes or less. In contrast, the population of uninjured evaders did not cross the 75 percent threshold until after twelve hours of evasion (Figure 2-37). Certainly, the absence of injuries plays a very significant role in an evader’s ability to remain available for rescue.

Beyond being a factor in evasion success, S/E injuries also affected the rescue operation itself. A 1980 study of USN evaders confirmed what might seem intuitive—that “the time necessary to extract a survivor was almost directly related proportionate to the extent of the injuries to the survivor.”99 Inevitably, what that meant was longer orbit and hover times required in the terminal area. Compounding the exposure of the helicopter during recovery of injured S/Es, when Pararescue specialists were deplaned to assist, it frequently meant that one or more of the helicopters guns were unmanned.

Those aircrew that were captured were more likely than those that were successfully rescued to have experienced a more severe aircraft emergency during the incident leading to the aircraft’s loss. As described in Section 2.1.2.6, the POW group were forced to eject sooner, resulting in an overall mean ejection speed (for the POW group studied in Every [1] of 407 knots. This compares with an overall speed of 302 knots for aircrew that were successfully recovered in combat, and a speed of approximately 213 knots for non-combat ejections occurring during the same approximate time period.100

The severity of aircraft emergency facing those who eventually became POWs is also suggested by their inability to control their aircraft. Among USN pilots studied, the recovered group was 4.5 times more likely to have a nose-up or straight-and-level attitude at the time of ejection than the POW group.101 Such catastrophic emergencies, and the consequent ejections, tended to produce more (and more severe) aircrew injuries.

98 7602 AIG, p. 9. 99 Every (2), p. 22. 100 Every (1), p. 7. 101 Every (1), Table 4, p. 7.

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Figure 2-37: Influence on Injuries on Cumulative Capture Rates (Source: 7602 AIG, Figure 1)

Figure 2-36: Distribution of Injuries Among POW and Rescued Aircrew Groups (Source: Navy data and AF POW data in Every [1] p. 12; AF

Recovered data in Hewett p. 43)

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0%

100.0%

0 to 1 min 2 to 30 min 31 to 60min

1:01 to 12hrs

12:01 to 48hrs

48:01+hrs

Injured Not InjuredAverage

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

Navy P

OW

PO

W

Navy

Recovered

Air Force

Recovered

Percent

None Minor Injury Major Injury

Air Force

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2.1.9 Recovery Force Losses Rescue force planners assumed from the beginning that rescue force attrition would be high. Brigadier General Adriel Williams, Commander of the Air Rescue Service, in a letter to CSAF, Gen Curtis Lemay, cited Air Rescue Service Programming Plan 563, which estimated that the HH-43B/F force would suffer a 40 percent attrition rate in the first year of combat operation. Attrition rates matched the estimates, but not in the way that General Williams had probably anticipated—three HH-43Bs and two HH-43Fs were indeed damaged or destroyed, but they were lost on the ground during the Viet Cong attack at Bien Hoa.

In the end, more than 190 helicopters from all services were lost performing rescue in SEA, including 47 assigned to ARRS.102 Of the 178 USAF rescue crewmembers aboard helicopters lost in combat, 29 percent were killed outright (see Table 2-15).

A review of H-3 damage incidents in SEA from 1965 to 1970 suggests that, in cases where the enemy inflicted combat damage, it resulted in mission termination (by destruction, forced landing, or mission abort) in about 40 percent of cases. In the remaining 60 percent of cases where H-3 combat damage was received, neither aircraft loss nor mission abort was reported.104

102 AF data from Granville, Table 15; Other service data from Air Combat Command, “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet. The 47 ARRS losses include two HU-16 airplanes. The USAF also lost 13 UH-1 helicopters in combat (although not necessarily while performing rescue missions). In the HU-16 incidents, 4 men were rescued, 7 MIA, 2 KIA, and none captured; the totals for the UH-1 incidents is 40 rescued, 0 MIA, 11 KIA, and none captured. 103 Granville, Table 15. 104 JTCG/ME, p. xii.

Table 2-15: AF Helicopter Losses (Aircraft and Crew)103

Aircraft Aircraft Losses Rescued Missing Killed Captured

CH-3 14 40 3 9 3 CH-53 2 6 0 2 0 HH-3 10 26 3 11 0

HH-43 10 24 0 4 3 HH-53 9 18 1 25 0 TOTAL 45 114 7 51 6

64.6% 3.9% 28.7% 3.4%

Figure 2-38: Results of ARRS Rescue Helicopter Crew Losses in SEA

(Source: Granville, Table 15)

Rescued64%Missing

4%

Killed29%

Captured3%

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2.1.9.1 Recovery Force Losses by Mission Phase

Fixed-wing combat loss experience described in Section 2.1.2.4 is not dissimilar to the combat loss experience of "Rescue and Recovery" helicopters in SEA105. Side-by-side comparison of the two categories is interesting—it shows that helicopters were no more likely to be lost than other combat aircraft (in terms of loss rate per 1000 sorties), and that the losses generally did not occur during the enroute phase, but were concentrated in the terminal area. For losses where the mission phase was reported, those data count 91 percent of "Rescue and Recovery" losses as occurring in the target (or terminal) area, compared with 83 percent of fixed-wing losses (see Figure 2-39). That comparison suggests that neither low altitude operations nor slow enroute airspeed alone are significant determinants of aircraft loss (even in the face of SEA's ubiquitous and lethal AAA/automatic weapons threat environment). Rather it is the combination of forced exposure to the threat and the terminal/target area’s restricted or predictable flight profile that is likely the source such a significant increase in risk (the significance of this important concept is discussed in detail in Section 3.4.3).

Those data are consistent with 190 CH/HH-3 combat damage incidents examined by JTCG/ME. In that study, only 10.8 percent of incidents occurred during the “enroute” phase. The remaining 89.2 percent of incidents were attributed to mission phases associated with the terminal area (“hovering,” “orbiting,” “on ground,” “landing,” “taking off,” “on water”).106

2.1.9.2 Recovery Force Losses by Threat System Type

Of the helicopters that served the French (prior to US involvement in Vietnam), virtually all combat damage was caused by small arms fire.107 As a result, the French took certain precautions including institution of a 3,000-foot minimum cruise altitude to keep helicopters well out of range of most rifle and machine gun fire. Use of “high-bird/low-bird” tactics in the terminal area (see Section 2.1.1.2) suggests that that tactic remained effective for the duration of the conflict. On the other hand, with the arrival of MANPADS in SEA, those tactics would have surely evolved had the war continued.

Improvements in rescue aircraft helped somewhat (for example, the use of titanium armor in vital engine and hydraulic areas improved the aircraft’s chances when it encountered small arms or light anti-aircraft fire) during the enroute portions of the mission. However, in a hover over a

105 XP/SAS, “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet. 106 JTCG/ME, p. 102. 107 There is one documented case of helicopter loss during air refueling by a surprise attack by a North Vietnamese Mig fighter. That loss is not reflected in Figure 2-40.

Enroute Terminal

Figure 2-39: Rescue Helicopter Losses by Mission Phase

(Source: ACC XP/SAS Worksheet)

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survivor “it was still quite assailable.”108 That susceptibility is vividly illustrated by the fact that more than 90 percent of rescue helicopter losses took place during terminal area operations that represented only a fraction of the total mission time.

2.1.9.3 Battle Damage to Recovery Vehicles

In terms of system vulnerability, the XP-SAS data shows that, among all rescue aircraft types, the aircrew themselves were the most vulnerable system, cited in 66 percent of incidents leading to loss of the rescue aircraft (see Figure 2-41). Engines and fuel systems were the next most vulnerable systems, receiving damage in 24 percent and 18 percent of cases, respectively.

A JTCG/ME review of H-3 systems damaged by enemy fire from 1965 to 1970 showed that for H-3 variants in SEA, the overall probability of kill per hit (Pk/h) was 0.021. When forced landings kills are included in the total, Pk/h = 0.036.109 One noteworthy finding of the study was that the average number of hits per incident was 3.8—nearly twice the number of hits per incident reported in previous studies on transport and armed escort helicopters.110 More than 90 percent of those hits took place when the helicopter was moving at less than 75 knots, and the most frequent listed phase of flight when hit was “hovering.” While hovering, the average number of hits per incident was 5.5. The main rotor system was involved in the greatest number of damage incidents, and suffered the second highest number of actual hits, although damage to the main rotor system resulted in “relatively few” adverse reactions.111 The JTCG/ME data also gives an indication the impact of battle damage on mission performance (Figure 2-42).

108 Tilford, p. 92. 109 JTCG/ME, p. xii. 110 JTCG/ME, p. ix. The average for HH-53s (operating mostly in NVN) was 7.5 hits per incident. 111 JTCG/ME, p. 22

Figure 2-40: Causes of SEA Rescue Helicopter Combat Loss Incidents (Source: Air Combat Command, “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet)

0%

10%

20%30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Sm

all Arm

s &A

utomatic

Weapons

RP

G/exploding

weapon

Unidentified

Ground Fire

Rocket

Mortar

AA

A

Percent

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0%

10%20%

30%40%

50%60%

70%

Person

nel

Engine

Fuel S

ystem

Flight

Contro

ls

Hydrau

lics

Trans

mission

Rotor S

ystem

Structu

re

Unkno

wn

Oil Sys

tem

Power

Train/

Other

Perc

ent o

f Los

ses

Figure 2-41: Systems Damaged in Rescue Helicopter Combat Loss Incidents(Source: Air Combat Command, XP-SAS “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet)

Figure 2-42: Impact of Combat Damage on CH/HH-3 Missions (Source: JTCG/ME, p. xii)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100% 1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

TOTA

L (65-70)

No Mission Impact

Mission Aborts

Crashes & ForcedLandings

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2.1.9.4 Combat Experience at Koh Tang

On May 12, 1975, the American-registered cargo ship Mayaguez was taken at sea by Cambodian naval forces, and the ship’s crew was brought ashore and held on Koh Tang Island. US reaction included a plan to land up to 600 US Marines on Koh Tang to recover the crew, setting into motion a remarkable series of events that is as sensational as it is instructive. Although it was not a Combat Rescue mission of the type described elsewhere in this report, a review of certain operational aspects is germane to understanding helicopter risk and the effectiveness of certain risk-reduction measures.

A detailed description of the entire battle on Koh Tang Island is beyond the scope of this report, but one must know that the insertion of the Marines into various landing zones (LZ), and their subsequent extraction was in the face of significant enemy opposition. In that environment, experience at Koh Tang Island is particularly useful due to the simultaneous employment of Combat Rescue and Special Operations helicopters with different combinations of armor, armament, training, fixed-wing support, and vulnerability reduction systems. In an excellent analysis of the battle, Jeffrey Eggers’ “Analysis of Helicopter Operations in the Battle of Koh Tang” looked at each of those variables to assess their impact on helicopter mission success and survivability.

For helicopter operations in contested areas, Eggers identified significant operational value in the use of dedicated ground attack assets to reduce enemy “anti-helicopter” defenses before commencing terminal area operations. Consistent with helicopter loss-rate trends in the terminal area, Eggers also found significant tactical value in coordinated defense suppression during the terminal area operation, and for RVs equipped with armor and vulnerability reduction features.112

ARMORED VS. UNARMORED HELICOPTERS Twenty-seven helicopter runs were made on the island of Koh Tang during the one-day battle. Of those runs, eighteen were by armored HH-53s (from the 40th ARRS), and nine were by unarmored CH-53s (from the 21st SOS). It should also be noted that the armored aircraft were also equipped with an additional machine gun employed from the HH-53’s aft ramp. Of the eighteen armored passes, there were no helicopter losses. Fourteen of the eighteen passes (78 percent) left the helicopter in a mission capable status, and four resulted in successful recovery of the helicopter but in an “unusable” status. Of the nine unarmored passes, three aircraft were lost, three remained mission capable, and three were recovered but unusable. Using those criteria, experience on Koh Tang Island suggests a strong advantage to the armor and armament available on the HH-53s.

DEFENSE SUPPRESSION IN THE LANDING ZONE Although the data were insufficient to separately assess the effectiveness of defense suppression activity before and during the terminal area operations, Eggers suggests that the data “strongly support” the conclusion that the combination of LZ preparation and suppression during the

112 In the case of the Battle for Koh Tang, the vulnerability reduction feature assessed was fire suppressant foam in external fuel tanks. While the example is specific, the concepts certainly apply to vulnerability reduction measures in general.

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terminal area operation greatly helped the helicopters in terms of both survivability and mission success.113 It should be noted that the effectiveness of defense-suppression activity was influenced by the helicopter crew’s ability to anticipate, understand, and (at times) direct that activity. Of the forces at Koh Tang, the 40th ARRSq crews were experienced in those operations while the Special Operators, because of their different employment concept, were not.

Of the twenty-seven helicopter attempts to reach an LZ on Koh Tang, fourteen were performed with fixed-wing defense suppression support. Of those fourteen attempts, twelve (86 percent) resulted in aircraft that remained mission capable, two aircraft (14 percent) were recovered unusable, and none were lost. The results of the thirteen runs that did not have coordinated defense suppression available, five (38 percent) yielded mission capable aircraft, five resulted in a helicopter that was recovered unusable, and three helicopters (23%) were lost.

In the end, experience at Koh Tang, while not the typical Combat Rescue mission, seems a microcosm for the general Combat Rescue experience in SEA. It shows that integration and training with fixed-wing support assets matters, and that armoring aircrew stations and critical flight components significantly impacts both mission success and helicopter survivability.

113 For the purpose of his analysis, Eggers defines Mission Success as whether or not a run on an LZ resulted in successful insertion/extraction of Marines in the LZ.

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2.2 Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1991)

2.2.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

On August 2 1990, Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein invaded the sovereign nation of Kuwait and claimed it as an Iraqi state as it had been in past history. Believing Iraq's aggression would not be satiated by its conquest of Kuwait, US President Bush initiated Operation Desert Shield. At the end of this build-up there were over 2,400 fixed-wing Coalition aircraft in Theater, along with their support entourages, in place ready for war. After sanctions and political negotiations failed to persuade the Iraqis to leave Kuwait, the United Nations passed a resolution approving the use of force to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.

Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991 with an USAF-led air campaign and ended on February 28, 1991 after a four-day combined ground and air assault. Coalition forces expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroyed much of Baghdad's military machine. From the outset, U.S. air power was central to the success of the campaign; it enabled the Coalition to deploy its forces and cripple Iraqi military capabilities, paving the way for Baghdad's unambiguous defeat on the battlefield.

2.2.1.1 The Physical Environment

The Southwest Asia environment presented a series of problems for waging a modern war. The first was blowing dust and sand, lowering visibility on the ground and forcing aircraft maintainers to find new ways to keep grit and fine sand particles out of the aircraft parked out in the elements. Maintenance difficulties for sophisticated aircraft, munitions, and armored vehicles were abundant. The harsh arid desert was suited for neither aircrew survival nor evasion--the land provided no food, and little water; the temperatures reached extreme highs during the day, and extreme lows at night; the terrain was flat and featureless, providing no terrain or vegetation for concealment; and few landmarks existed for help in navigation.

The weather over Iraq during Desert Storm was the worst in fourteen years, twice as bad as the climatological history of the region would have suggested. The conditions, in fact, approximated

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a rainy European summer, not the kind of blue-skies conditions one normally associates with desert warfare. Cloud cover exceeded 25% percent at 10,000 feet over central Iraq on 31 days of the 43-day war; it exceeded 50 percent on 21 of those days, and 75 percent on 9 days. Accompanying this cover were occasionally violent winds and heavy downpours that played havoc with targeting and bomb damage assessment. Eventually, about half of all sorties to Iraq were affected by weather, resulting in cancellations or diversions. The weather problem proved very serious, particularly because the Coalition's rules of engagement (ROE) demanded stringent identification of targets before weapons release.114

KUWAIT Kuwait is one of the world’s smallest countries, occupying only 6,880 square miles (about two-thirds the size of New Hampshire) at the point where Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran converge. Its greatest distance from north to south is 120 miles, and is no more than 110 miles from east to west. The terrain consists of flat desert with some small rolling hills, and is covered in sand of a very fine consistency. Kuwait also includes several offshore islands, the largest of which is Bubiyan, a muddy, uninhabited island near the Iraqi border. Faylakah Island, several miles south, is smaller, but populated with fishermen and light industry. Kuwait has no lakes and rivers and few sources of fresh water. Drinking water is available only from underground aquifers and through desalination of seawater. Although the climate is extremely hot in the summer, the average temperature during the war was 56°F. Annual rainfall is typically less than 5 inches per year, and almost all of it falls in the cooler winter.

Kuwait has an estimated population of 1.8 million. The average population density at the time was 264 per square mile, with most of the population concentrated in cities along the Persian Gulf coast. Slightly fewer than 40 percent of the people are native Kuwaitis, with the remainder of the population composed largely of foreign workers.

IRAQ Iraq is bounded on the north by Turkey; on the east by Iran; on the south by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf; and on the west by Jordan and Syria. Iraq has an area of 168,000 square miles (about the size of Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin combined), and a population of about 21.4 million. The estimated overall population density is about 126 per square mile, although the density varies markedly, with the largest concentrations in the area of the river systems. In Western Iraq, population density over vast stretches averages less than one person per square mile. The population is about 70 percent urban and Baghdad is the country’s capital and largest city.

The northern portion of Iraq, known as Al Jazìra, is mountainous. Elevations of nearly 7,000 feet above sea level are found near the Turkish border, and in the northeastern part of the country peaks range to 11,811 feet atop Jabal Ibrahìm, the highest point in Iraq. Farther south the country slopes downward to form a broad, central alluvial plain, which encompasses the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The extreme southeastern portion of Iraq is a low-lying,

114 HQ USAF, Section 2, “The Weather Factor.”

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marshy area adjacent to the Persian Gulf, on which Iraq fronts for a distance of about 25 miles. West of the Euphrates, the land rises gradually to meet the Syrian Desert.

Most of Iraq has a continental climate with extremes of heat and cold. The mountainous northern portion of the country has cool summers and cold winters, often accompanied by snow. In central Iraq the summers are long and hot and the winters short and cool. During the war, S/Es were exposed to wind, rain, and cool daytime temperatures below 50°F.

2.2.1.2 Operational Environment

This war was fought over sparsely populated desert and mountain environments as well as densely populated and heavily defended urban areas. The Iraqis had just completed a long and bloody war with Iran in 1988 and had grown in stature to the world's fourth largest Army. Most of their weaponry was Soviet-built and, although it was not state-of-the-art, Coalition war planners believed Iraqi soldiers and equipment to be very capable in a wartime environment. The following points excerpted from the Gulf War Air Power Survey provide a succinct summation of key operational factors:

• The military forces that seized Kuwait in August 1990 were traditional mechanized forces backed by a relatively modern industrial infrastructure in Iraq. Hence, Iraq and its military presented the kinds of targets that have traditionally been vulnerable to air attack, and in marked contrast to the Korean and Vietnam wars, Iraq was largely isolated from external sources of armaments for its war effort.

• The Gulf War took place in open, desert terrain well suited to the effective employment of air power.

• Once Desert Storm began, Iraqi air and air-defense forces proved unable to mount any serious opposition to Coalition control of the air.

• Coalition air forces had significant equipment and technological advantages over the opposition − advantages that were further magnified by the far-superior aircrew training, operational concepts, and doctrine of Coalition forces.

• The air campaign neither incurred significant losses of Coalition aircraft and crews nor inflicted widespread collateral damage or civilian casualties on Iraq.115

The United States sent more than 400,000 troops of its own, and more than 200,000 additional troops came from Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Senegal, Niger, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Other countries contributed ships, air forces, and medical units. Survival training and equipment varied greatly among US forces and the addition of Coalition forces into the equation further complicated the situation for rescuers.

2.2.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents

By the time the war was over, the USAF Central Command (USCENTAF) JRCC had tracked 56 combat incidents, launched 13 rescue missions in efforts to rescue 77 personnel, and ultimately

115 In terms of friendly losses, the contrast between Desert Storm and the strategic bombing of Germany, which cost the American and British air forces more than 150,000 personnel and 38,000 aircraft lost in action, is stark [D'Olier, et al. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all Report (European War), p x]. Nor did Desert Storm witness anything remotely comparable to the incineration of enemy cities like Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo that occurred during World War II.

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recovered three individuals. Combined with a recovery by US Army ground forces of a two-person AH-64 crew, the total aircrew recovered under combat conditions during Desert Storm is five.116 In the end, the Iraqis had captured 21 Americans and 10 Allied airmen.

2.2.2.1 Causes of Isolating Incidents

Loss rates for Coalition aircraft were very low relative to historic averages, consistent with a declining trend observed since World War II. The Coalition’s aggressive Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) defeated most Iraqi radar systems. This enabled Coalition aircraft to conduct operations in the middle altitudes (about 15,000 feet) in relative safety because they were less vulnerable to infrared (IR)-guided SAMs or unguided AAA. One of the greater dangers Coalition pilots faced was from IR- or electro-optically (EO) guided SAMs while they were flying at relatively low altitudes supporting Coalition ground forces.117

116 GWAPS, Vol V, Section II, Day C+206. 117 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 178.

Figure 2-43: Causes of Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in Desert Storm (Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641)

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IR SAM RadarSAM

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As evidenced by pilots’ accounts and low-level losses that continued throughout the war, Coalition aircraft were not able to defeat the AAA or portable IR SAM threats because of the very large number of these systems and the difficulty in finding such small, mobile, non-emitting systems. This meant that while Coalition aircraft had a high-altitude sanctuary, medium- and especially low-altitude deliveries remained hazardous throughout the war.118

The primary threat to aircrews was from IR SAMs, accounting for 46 percent of US losses, and 38 percent of losses overall in cases where the cause was known.119 Of US fixed-wing losses known to have been caused by IR SAMs, 14 percent are attributed to SA-9/13 and 71 percent were known or probable MANPADS kills.120 Figure 2-44 depicts the altitudes and airspeeds of US fixed-wing aircraft hit by IR SAMs (for encounters where altitude and airspeed are known).

There were two reported instances of helicopter incidents involving IR SAMs. Both were AH-64 encounters with MANPADS, resulting in one lost and one damaged helicopter.121

118 GAO, Appendix III 9.2.1. 119 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641. 120 Crosthwaite, Slides 4-6. Crosthwaite documents 14 US losses to IR SAMs, which differs from official Gulf War Airpower Survey results by inclusion of one additional A-6 and one additional AV-8B loss attributed to IR SAMs (MANPAD category). 121 Crosthwaite, Slide 4.

0

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35000

40000

0 200 400 600Airspeed (KIAS)

Altit

ude

(fee

t) Damaged (SA-9/13)Loss (SA-9/13)Damaged (MANPAD)Loss (MANPAD)

Figure 2-44: Outcome of US Fixed-Wing Encounters With IR Missiles During Desert Storm

(Source: Crosthwaite, Slides 4-6)

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2.2.2.2 Types of Assets Lost Fighter-type aircraft represented 97 percent of fixed-wing combat losses (37 out of 38). The single exception was an AC-130 that lingered past dawn in an area with a known SAM threat.

2.2.2.3 Type of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

The following figure shows the distribution of Desert Storm combat losses by mission type.

Figure 2-45: Fixed-Wing Combat Losses During Desert Storm (Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641)

Figure 2-46: Fixed-Wing Losses by Mission Type (Source: JSSA, “Gulf War Combat Losses”)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

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-1A

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2.2.2.4 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

LOSS RATES

From 17 January 1991 through 28 February 1991 US and Coalition forces lost 38 fixed-wing aircraft to the enemy in combat, and 48 others were damaged.122 Optimists predicted losing one-half of one percent of all sorties, (150 aircraft over a 30,000 sortie campaign, a .005 loss rate) with roughly a quarter of all shot-down aircrews killed, a quarter captured, and half rescued or able to return to friendly territory. Thoughtful pessimists estimated losses at 2% (which the Israelis had suffered in their spectacularly successful campaign of 1967), or possibly 3%. Dire pessimists--and there were some--forecast losses as high as 10%, equivalent to the casualties experienced by RAF Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force during the worst days of 1943. General Buster Glosson, an architect of the Desert Storm air war, had greater confidence than this; in October, during a briefing to President Bush, he predicted that the coalition would certainly lose no more than 80, and probably less than 50, aircraft in the entire campaign. In actuality, the Air Force loss rate in Desert Storm was .00047--one twentieth of one percent--per combat sortie. That rate reflected a strategic commitment to avoiding aircraft losses and associated casualties. For the first three weeks of the war, for example, Glosson restricted attack aircraft from descending below 8,000 feet to avoid dense antiaircraft fire that had proven so murderous in previous wars.123

Table 2-16 describes combat loss rates by aircraft type (aircraft types that experienced no losses are not included). Due to the low loss numbers, relative differences in the loss rates should not be overvalued.

122 Cohen, Summary Report, p. 61. 123 USAF, Strategic Air Campaign Section

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Table 2-16: Desert Storm Aircraft Combat Attrition Rates (Source: GWAPS, Vol. V. p. 651)

Aircraft Type Combat Sorties Flown Losses Losses per

1000 Sorties

A-10 7983 4 0.5

A-4 651 1 1.5

A-6E 5593 3 0.5

AC-130 101 1 9.9

AV-8B 3349 5 1.5

EF-111F 1105 1 0.9

F/A-18 9250 2 0.2

F-14 3916 1 0.3

F-15E 2142 2 0.9

F-16 13066 3 0.2

F-4G 2678 1 0.4

F-5 1129 1 0.9

GR-1 2482 9 3.6

OA-10 657 2 3.0

OV-10 482 2 4.1

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DISTRIBUTION OVER TIME

Figure 2-47 shows the distribution of fixed-wing combat losses over time during Desert Storm. Although sortie rates were relatively constant, approximately half of its fixed-wing combat losses occurred during either the first week of Operation Desert Storm (17 aircraft), before enemy defenses had been suppressed, or during the last week (eight aircraft), when aircraft were operating at lower altitudes in the IR SAM threat region.124

Figure 2-47 also demonstrates that the peak demand on any given day was four losses. Regarding simultaneous incidents, there were four cases in which two loss incidents occurred within 60 minutes of each other, including one case of near simultaneous shootdown of a flight lead and his wingman. Although some calendar days showed instances of multiple loss events, there was no case in which rescue forces had to respond to more than two incidents in any four-hour period. Table 2-17 lists the intervals between shootdowns and the total instances of near simultaneous shootdowns.

Table 2-17: Estimated Simultaneous Isolating Incidents125

Interval Between Shootdowns (in minutes)

Total Instances of Near Simultaneous Shootdowns

0-15 1 15-30 1 30-60 2 60-240 4

124 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6, p. 178. 125 JSSA, Calculated from shootdown times listed in “Gulf War Combat Losses.”

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Figure 2-47: Combat Losses per Day During Desert Storm (Source: Arnold, p. C-9)

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2.2.2.5 Injuries to Survivors/Evaders

During Desert Storm, 60 percent of downed airmen were known to have been killed during the shootdown phase of the isolating incident.126 That figure represents a sharp increase in shootdown fatalities when compared with a 24 percent rate in Vietnam.127 The immediate fate of an additional 31 percent is not known, although all were subsequently proven or pronounced KIA.128 It should also be noted that, of the 68 airmen killed in combat losses, one incident alone (Spirit 03) accounted for 14 of the fatalities.

2.2.2.6 Number of Survivors/Evaders per Incident Although several loss incidents involved aircraft with large crews (AC-130, UH-60), in each of those cases, the entire crew perished in the crash. The largest fixed-wing crew available for recovery following combat loss (i.e. not KIA) was two people. Including helicopter losses, the largest crew available for recovery included the three surviving members of an original UH-60 crew of eight. In the end, more than 90 percent of incidents produced only one or two candidates for rescue (see Figure 2-48).

2.2.2.7 Distribution by Range

Figure 2-49 shows the geographic distribution of POWs and combat recoveries in Desert Storm.

126 GWAPS, Tables 205 and 209; If Spirit 03 is not included (14 KIA), the total KIA would be 50 percent. Keep in mind that the small size of the population has a low confidence level and is very sensitive to perturbations. 127 Granville, Table 15. 128 Arnold , p. C-10.

0%

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3 Crewmembers2 Crewmembers1 Crewmember

Figure 2-48: Size of Crew Available for Rescue in Desert Storm [n=15] (Source: JSSA, “Gulf War Combat Losses”)

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Figure 2-49: Geographic Distribution of POWs and Combat Recoveries in Desert Storm (Source: Compiled from data in JSSA “Gulf War Combat Losses” summary, Tyner, Arnold, and

GWAPS references)

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2.2.3 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents

Although Iraq placed emphasis on capturing downed aircrew quickly, there was apparently no effort to use the S/E as “bait” for a SAR trap. There were basic jamming and spoofing efforts throughout Iraq using VHF Guard (121.5 MHz) and UHF Guard (243.0 MHz), and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting the Iraqis attempted, sometimes successfully, radio direction-finding of S/E using survival radios.

2.2.4 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

The Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA) debriefed S/E from Desert Storm and collected data on isolating event times, duration of evasion, locations, and evader physical conditions for all twenty three fixed-wing aircrew that evaded over land until capture or recovery. JSSA noted that experiences were similar to those recorded by evaders in North Africa during World War II. Although the general pattern is not dissimilar to that seen in Vietnam (Figure 2-50), the small number of isolating incidents during Desert Storm permits few statistical conclusions to be drawn from the operation. One notable exception may be the effect of darkness on the evasion process. No evader who was isolated during daylight hours was able to evade capture for more than ten minutes, while every evader who was isolated at night was able to evade for at least two hours prior to his capture or recovery. Of eighteen losses over land resulting in S/E that were available for rescue, only four of those airmen were rescued (two by opportune ground forces), and the remainder became POWs.

0%

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VietnamDesert Storm

Figure 2-50: Cumulative Percent of Survivors/Evaders Captured Over Time (Source: Vietnam Data: 7602 AIG, p. 10; Desert Storm Data: Mohan, p. 4)

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Table 2-18: Summary of Successful Rescues Under Combat Conditions

Aircraft Time to Rescue Rescued by: Notes

F-16

WOLF 01 30 minutes USN helicopter

(SH-60)

(Maj Ball)

Controlled bailout over the Persian Gulf. Ejection was tracked by AWACS

Recovery was unopposed

AH-64 4.5 hours US Army ground forces

(CW2 Rogers and CW2 Kurinj)

Two-man crew

Rescue was completed about four hours after initial radio contact had been established

F-16

BENJI 53 2 hours

160 SOAR helicopter (CH-47)

(Capt Thomas)

C2 failure delayed launch of recovery forces

PRC-90 malfunctioned. Was able to signal forces with strobe-light only

F-14

SLATE 46 7 hours

AFSOC helicopter (MH-53)

(Lt Jones and Lt Slade)

Jones and Slade were separated by about 15 miles after ejection. Jones was rescued, Slade was captured.

While it is unlikely that any Combat Rescue CONOPS or readiness posture could have changed the outcome for those that were captured during the day, our failure to locate and recover those S/E that had evaded capture for two hours or more is troubling. The now famous case of Corvette 03 is a particularly egregious example in which the two crewmembers were caught and imprisoned after successfully evading capture for more than 48 hours. Even the cases of the two successful helicopter recoveries over land do not offer much opportunity for satisfaction—a full two hours had elapsed before the first recovery had been accomplished, and seven hours had elapsed for the other.

2.2.5 Types of Recovery Forces

During Desert Storm, Air Force Special Operations Command Central Command (AFSOCCENT) was tasked to be the single manager for all CSAR aviation. In that capacity, AFSOCCENT provided mission guidance to Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) and to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). All assets responded to the Joint Recovery Coordination Cell (JRCC) at Riyadh. By the time Desert Storm began, aircraft supporting Combat Rescue were located at five forward operating locations in Saudi Arabia and two in Turkey.129 Background on the use of Special Operations aviation forces for conventional CSAR is described in the Gulf War Air Power Survey:

129 GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 301. Operating locations in Saudi Arabia included King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Rafha, Al Jouf, Ar’Ar, and Ras al Mishab. Operating locations in Turkey included Diyarbakir and forward

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“None of the Services possessed forces trained and equipped solely to conduct classic combat rescue missions. In Desert Storm, SOF aviation assets were the only forces with the requisite capabilities to penetrate enemy territory, recover a downed pilot, and egress safely. Special Operations Forces, however, are equipped and trained for night missions. A 24-hour on-call search and rescue mission could put Special Operations Forces in enemy territory during daylight hours—a circumstance they were taught to avoid.”130

2.2.5.1 Dedicated vs. Opportune Recovery Forces

AFSOCCENT aircraft were responsible for on-call CSAR in Kuwait and Iraq, south of 33 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude, and Air Force Special Operations Command, European Command (SOCEUR) aircraft in Turkey covered the area north of the 33 degree 30 minute latitude line. Dedicated Combat Rescue forces during Desert Storm were made up of eight AFSOCCENT MH-60G Pavehawks operating out of Saudi Arabia. They were reinforced by eight MH-53 Pave Lows available in support of Combat Rescue and other special operations taskings.131 Providing a secondary capability were several MH-60Ks and CH47s from the US Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).132 Also available were five HH-3s from the Air Force Reserve’s 71st Special Operations Squadron. Arriving immediately prior to the start of the war, the HH-3s sat alert at Ras al Mishab, focused primarily on the over-water Combat Rescue mission. They also participated in several Special Operations missions and at least one medical evacuation.133 The US Navy also committed to have two HH-60Hs on alert around the clock for rescue operations beyond 12 miles from shore in the Gulf and in the Red Sea,134 and four dedicated Navy Strike Rescue HH-60Hs on the ground at Al Jouf that were assigned to the Combat Rescue mission under SOCCENT.135 Five additional MH-53s operating out of Turkey (and assigned to SOCEUR) were available for recoveries in the northern region, if the MH-60Gs could not be used.

Dedicated rescue forces performed two of the four successful combat recoveries during Desert Storm. Although two opportune attempts were successful, opportune recovery was not without risk. One opportune mission to recover an F-16 pilot was attempted by Bengal-15, a US Army Blackhawk. It resulted in the shootdown of the rescue helicopter, yielding five fatalities and three POWs. Aircrew on that mission explained that they attempted it because Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) forces were not in the area. In fact, the area was “too hot and Special Operations Forces (SOF) described it as a ‘RED’ zone that made rescue unlikely and probably impossible in daylight operations.”136 See Section 2.2.8, “Recovery Force Losses,” for more information.

operating location Batman. 130 GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 300. 131 According to Lt Col Trask (MH-53 flight lead for the recovery for Slate 46), MH-53s supporting the Combat Rescue mission were exclusively assigned to that mission, and did not provide their services as a “secondary capability,” as suggested by some sources. 132 Tyner, p. 38. 133 Bergeron, p. 48 and p. 105 134 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6, pp. 533 and 728. 135 Trask, no page number 136 Tyner, p. 46.

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2.2.6 Terminal Area Characteristics

2.2.6.1 Physical Environment

Three of the four successful land recoveries took place in the deserts of Southern Iraq. The terrain is mostly flat, has little or no vegetation, and provides little or no cover for evaders on the ground. Because of the arid climate and lack of vegetation, brownout conditions during helicopter landing could be severe, with dust clouds blowing as high as 75 feet and visibility inside the cloud of less than 5 feet. Although the environment was not suited for evasion or survival, it was very well suited for search and recovery where the flat terrain, and dry climate enhanced both visual and electronic search methods. Unfortunately, survival radio malfunctions were epidemic and, when the radios worked, the conditions benefited the enemy as well as friendly forces.

2.2.6.2 Terminal Area Operations

SLATE 46 (January 21, 1991) The first successful Combat Rescue was a daylight recovery of a Lt Jones, a USN F-14 pilot, on the ground 130 miles inside Iraq. The mission had been impacted by delays in locating and authenticating the survivor that were attributed to limitations of the survival radio issued to the S/E. Before his eventual recovery, at least one failed mission had been launched to find the crew, and both fixed and rotary-wing assets were forced to conduct visual searches in enemy territory during daylight hours in a desperate effort to locate him.137 Once Lt Jones was finally located, the support package for his recovery became much larger than was expected because bad weather had prevented many aircraft from expending their ordnance on their assigned targets. At one point there were twelve F-16s, four A-10s, and two F-15s standing by to assist the AFSOCCENT helicopters.138

Finally, under cover provided by two A-10s, an MH-53 Pave Low arrived in the terminal area, landed, and recovered the airman.139 The potential for armed opposition during the recovery was presented in the form of an Iraqi truck driving straight for the S/E as the MH-53 approached. An A-10 on station quickly engaged with its cannon and immediately destroyed the truck. By the time they recovered to Al Jouf, the MH-53s that rescued Slate 46 had flown six and a half hours inside Iraq.

BENJI 53 (February 17, 1991) The only other land recovery by helicopter (a CH-47) occurred on February 17, 1991, in which a downed F-16 pilot (Capt Thomas) was recovered 2 hours after being shot down. There were no significant complicating factors during the mission, although when the helicopter arrived in the terminal area the S/E was unable to establish communications using his PRC-90 survival radio. He resorted to using his strobe light to highlight his position to the helicopter. His wingman and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) accomplished the initial location and

137 Initial coordinates passed to the recovery forces were about 50 miles away from the location of the actual recovery performed several hours later [Trask, no page number]. 138 Bergeron, p. 93. 139 GWAPS, Volume IV, pp. 302 and 3.

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identification tasks. It was reported later that the helicopter’s radar warning receiver was used to detect and avoid a threat on their return and two IR missiles had been fired (and missed).140

AH-64 (February 20, 1991) The last land rescue under combat conditions was that of CW2 Rogers and Kurinj, both an AH-64 Apache crew. Originally part of an 8-ship package, the weather was so severe that seven of the Apaches aborted the mission. While attempting to continue the mission the others had aborted, the eighth Apache flew into the ground under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Using PRC-90 survival radios, the crew established radio contact with airborne C2 aircraft but, because of the weather and proximity to friendly lines, ground forces were dispatched to recover the aircrew.

2.2.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operations

COALITION ISSUES

In the beginning of Desert Storm, Pave Lows and other Special Operations Forces assets deployed in Southeastern Turkey were not permitted to fly in Turkish airspace until a political agreement was reached with the US. This action essentially “froze” these assets for three days at the start of the war.141 This delay had a certain impact on the recovery of the Corvette 03 by delaying their availability until January 20, 12 hours after the shootdown. Although they never materialized, Coalition language differences and equipment interoperability issues (particularly with respect to survival radios and signaling devices) represented other potential problems of significance during Desert Storm.

ABSENCE OF SPECIALLY TRAINED COMBAT RESCUE FORCES After Vietnam, the USAF allowed its Combat Rescue force to wither away, and most Combat Rescue aircraft were assigned special operations roles. Although, by the early 1990s, Air Rescue Service had just begun to establish deployable MH/HH-60G Combat Rescue squadrons, none were yet available when the war broke out.142 Consequently, SOF aviation assets were the only forces with the requisite capabilities to recover a downed pilot under combat conditions, and they were tasked with the Combat Rescue mission. Although they did the best they could, conventional Combat Rescue was not a mission for which the SOF community trained, nor did their doctrine and tactics at the time anticipate those operations.

This arrangement was problematic in several ways. First, C2 relationships were established that deviated from the concept of Unity of Command. Specifically, final mission approval authority did not rest with the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), but with AFSOCCENT in the South143 and SOCEUR in the North.144 Such complex information paths can be expected to fail, as in the case of the pilot of Benji 53 (Capt. Thomas). Although he contacted AWACS before bailing out, and talked to his wingman on his PRC-90 after hitting the ground, recovery assets were not launched until after his wingman returned to base and started asking about what

140 Tyner, p. 45. 141 Tyner, p. 38. 142 Tyner, p. 40. 143 GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 301. 144 Tyner, p. 38.

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was happening to rescue Thomas.145 Fortunately, the Iraqis were also slow in reacting and Capt Thomas was safely recovered.

Second, SOF planners were uncomfortable with immediate, daytime missions, and generally unfamiliar with CAF tactics, terminology, and conventional fixed-wing support capabilities. Detection avoidance and secrecy were primary planning factors, and general integration with CAF airpower was, by definition, not a typical component of their concepts of operations. While suitable for special operations missions, that employment concept was at odds with the rest of the air campaign in which the significant majority of missions (and majority of shootdowns) happened during daylight.146 It should be noted that some AFSOC crews that were in Southwest Asia during the conflict do not agree with that characterization. Lt Col Tom Trask, MH-53 flight-lead for the rescue of Slate 46, commented, “Though we…believed that flying at night was certainly safer than flying during the day, we also knew, and had re-learned only months before in Panama, that we must be prepared to fight in the daytime.”147 Notwithstanding that observation, aircrew awareness of tactical-level requirements was not supported by their doctrine or formal training. Emphasis on “detection avoidance,” for example, during the planning process after Corvette 03 was lost (described below), may have had a decisive negative outcome.

Finally, although they are the best in the world for the Special Operations mission, AFSOC helicopter crews had little corporate expertise in supporting conventional Combat Rescue or in integration with conventional Combat Air Force (CAF) operations. Their task was made more difficult by the loss of institutionalized rescue knowledge as the Air Rescue and Recovery service was dismantled after Vietnam. After decades of neglect, conventional Combat Rescue experience was limited to the few aircrew that had flown rescue missions in Vietnam, relying on concepts that had not benefited from reassessment when technology and air power theory evolved. For example, because AFSOC crews were generally unfamiliar with CSARTF tactics, that capability was neither developed nor exercised during Desert Shield.148 Lt Col Weaver, Chief of Operations Plans for the 1st Special Operations Wing (deployed to Al Jouf during the air war), illustrated the extent of the training deficiency in a remarkable statement when he said, “We started working with the A-10s as Sandys with much more enthusiasm after we deployed to Al Jouf and realized what a great CSAR asset they were.”149 Although some individual aircrew members had familiarity with the CSARTF concept (having been previously assigned to HH-53, HH-3, or HH-1 CSAR squadrons), their numbers were too few, and the training too perfunctory, to sway the CONOPS towards more robust integration.150 Because the “corporate memory” had been dismantled, even forces that had been “trained” in conventional Combat Rescue were victims of wildly varied tactics, procedures, and quality of instruction. Some units and

145 Boucher, p. 2. 146 GWAPS, Summary Report, p. 201 (Figure 33). 147 Trask, no page number 148 Tyner, p. 41. Once Desert Storm began, several large scale exercises were conducted that involved CSARTF operations and involved crews from around the theater [Trask, no page number] 149 Tyner, p. 45. 150 As late as 1995, the formal training syllabus at the MH/HH-60G Replacement Training Unit, the 512th Special Operations Squadron, continued to emphasize special operations modes (close formation, pre-planned missions to meet a precise time-over-target, totally comm-out radio procedures, and general absence of CSARTF training), even when conventional Combat Rescue pilots were being trained there. The MH-53 syllabus had even less exposure to conventional rescue concepts.

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individuals excelled. Others did not. There was no uniformity across the community, and no baseline CONOPS.

SOF unfamiliarity with the breadth of support available to them from CAF assets may have been a direct contributor to the capture of the crew of Corvette 03, an F-15E crew shot down on the night of January 19, 1991. In that incident, the first scheduled recovery mission was originally planned for execution during darkness, but was cancelled before takeoff when diplomatic airspace coordination delays prevented a night recovery. SOCEUR’s rationale for canceling the mission was that the threat was too high and would only permit a night recovery. There was additional concern that they had almost no possibility of getting to the western part of Iraq “without detection.”151 In the end, despite having successfully evaded capture for more than 48 hours, both members of Corvette 03’s crew were seized by the Iraqis, and spent the rest of the war as POWs. By the time recovery forces arrived on scene (the night of January 22), the Iraqis were waiting for them and greeted them with a barrage of AAA.

The failure to recover Corvette 03 after they had spent so long on the ground did not go unnoticed by the warfighters in Southwest Asia. Lt Col Trumbull, 550th Tactical Fighter Squadron, had the following comments when interviewed by Gulf War Air Power Survey researchers in June 1991:

“The other thing I think was missing was SAR (Search and Rescue). Our DO and his backseater were on the ground for three and one half days in western Iraq. Nobody’d go in and pick them up, and eventually they became prisoners of war. The advertised special operations guys that came down to talk to us before the war said, ‘no sweat, we’ll come get you wherever you are.’ That from my perspective was a big lie. When I’ve got guys on the ground for three and one-half days and they don’t go pick them up, we basically decided at that point that if anybody went down, you were on your own. Nobody was going to come get you.”152

At this point, one can only speculate about the outcome if recovery forces had employed sooner, using Combat Rescue tactics that exploited CAF firepower. It is possible that a properly assembled CSARTF could have sufficiently suppressed the threat, and made moot the requirement for “detection avoidance.” Regardless, the delay was costly. Colonel Ben Josey, Batman’s FOL commander, stated, “…I think we would have picked Corvette 03 up had we been able to get out the night before.”153

2.2.8 Recovery Force Losses

Rescue force losses were limited to one US Army UH-60L lost due to enemy fire while on an opportune Combat Rescue mission. There were a number of significant factors in the chain of events leading to this incident. The Army planners planned the mission to go to the last known position of the downed aircraft. No one had established radio contact with the downed pilot after ejection, and he was never located, identified, or authenticated during the planning and execution of the attempted recovery. In fact, the pilot had been captured a few minutes after reaching the ground.

151 Tyner, p. 42. 152 GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 302 (Footnote 154). 153 Tyner, p. 42.

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Intelligence personnel briefed mission planners on the threat on the ground, and they sensibly planned the mission around a major concentration of ground forces. As was standard Army practice at the time, the mission plan was passed from the Battalion planning staff down to a MEDEVAC aviation company for execution which meant that the crews that flew the mission were not involved in its planning. The mission included one MEDEVAC UH-60L, carrying an Army Flight Surgeon and a four-man Pathfinder Team, and two AH-1 gunships for escort. There was no fixed-wing component to the CSARTF that was assembled. Once airborne, the formation contacted Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) for flight following and C2. The ABCCC, lacking situational awareness (SA) of the ground order of battle, cleared the package to fly direct to the objective, rather than the circuitous planned route. The UH-60 crew, unfamiliar with ABCCC’s limitations, and unfamiliar with the command relationship, deviated from their planned route in accordance with ABCCC clearance. The new route took the package directly over an Iraqi infantry division. Upon coming under heavy enemy fire, the two Cobras immediately turned and egressed the area. Before the Blackhawk could escape, it was shot down. Five of the eight crew aboard were killed in the crash. The other three were seriously injured and trapped in the wreckage of the crushed and inverted helicopter. All three were extracted from the wreckage by their Iraqi captors, and became POWs along with the pilot they were attempting to rescue.

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2.3 Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia 1993-1995)

In general terms, the primary cause of the Bosnian conflict was the economic and political decline of the Yugoslav Federation during the 1980s. The net effect of this prolonged crisis on Yugoslavian national and provincial politics was the breakup of the country. The republics of Slovenia and Croatia left in the summer of 1991, while Bosnia and Macedonia pulled out in the winter of 1991–92. Left behind in a rump state referred to as “the former Yugoslavia” were Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo—all under the domination of Serbia and its president, Slobodan Milosevic. The breakup was not peaceful. The Yugoslavian People’s Army (JNA) fought a 10-day war in June and July 1991 to keep Slovenia in the federation, and it fought a much longer and more bitter war to quash the Croatian secession, between August 1991 and January 1992. In cooperation with the JNA, Serbian minority groups in Croatia and Bosnia fought to hold those provinces in the federation and under the pale of Milosevic or, failing that, to carve out their own ethnic enclaves (krajinas) for ultimate unification with “greater Serbia.”154 This war ended in January 1992, with the establishment of a tense truce in the krajina and creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise it. All of these conflicts were characterized by an appalling viciousness on all sides, including massacres of civilians and captured soldiers, mass robbery and rape, and scorched-earth conquests—all encapsulated in a new international term: ethnic cleansing. Dismay and disgust at that violence and its implications for regional stability prompted outside states and international organizations to intervene in the Balkans crisis in general and in Bosnia in particular.155

Heavy fighting began immediately after Bosnia formally withdrew from Yugoslavia in March 1992. Forces of the Serb Republic, with overt assistance from the JNA, advanced to expand its borders, while the relatively weak Bosnian army fought to preserve the territorial integrity and authority of its newly independent state. Within a few weeks, Serbs controlled almost two-thirds of the territory of Bosnia. By that time, the direct international intervention that eventually would have a crescendo in Deliberate Force was under way.

154 In 1991 the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia were the Muslim Serbs, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Catholic Croats, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 18 percent of the population, respectively 155 Owen [1], Political and Institutional Context Section

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2.3.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated Operation Deny Flight at the request of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in April 1993, in response to the ongoing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two and one-half years later, in December 1995, Deny Flight officially ended after an almost continuous 970-day aerial presence constituting over 100,000 aircraft sorties. In that time, NATO aircraft dropped more than 3,000 bombs while participating in combat operations for the first time in alliance history.156

Deny Flight’s initial mission was to enforce a UN Security Council mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia. In the ensuing months, NATO and the UN added other missions to Deny Flight, including close air support (CAS) to protect UN personnel under attack, offensive air support to in response to aggression against six UN-designated safe areas, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to protect NATO aircraft. At the start of Deny Flight, NATO also activated a joint target coordination board (JTCB), composed of senior NATO and UN tactical commanders concerned with the use of airpower in the region and its consequences. These developments, and the planning that went into them, constituted an incremental, evolutionary process that laid the foundation for Operation Deliberate Force (29 August through 14 September 1995) which, technically, was but the final phase of Deny Flight.

In Deliberate Force, NATO took a stronger stance designed to break the so-called siege of Sarajevo and get peace negotiations back on track. Although Deny Flight was generally ineffective, Deliberate Force was, in the words of US Secretary of Defense William Perry, “the absolutely crucial step in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton, leading to the peace agreement.”157 By the late summer of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs, who early on controlled 70 percent of Bosnia, were in retreat. Serbia cut off its economic and political support to the Bosnian Serbs and a Bosnian/Croat Confederation Army had been gaining ground against the beleaguered Serbs throughout the spring and summer. Facing defeat and domination, the Bosnian Serb Army was a ripe target for a bombing operation. That bombing (Deliberate Force) proved to be the coercive catalyst that led to the Dayton peace agreement and the ensuing cessation of hostilities.

NATO’s organizational structure during the conflict was quite elaborate. The Bosnian region fell under the purview of NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), with headquarters at the Italian Air Force’s Dal Molino Air Base (AB), Vicenza, Italy. The Italian general commanding 5 ATAF, who at the time of Deliberate Force was Maj Gen Andrea Fornasiero, reported to the commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Command (AIRSOUTH). From December 1992, the AIRSOUTH commander was Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, until his replacement by Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan in September 1994. These two United States Air Force officers, in turn, reported to United States Navy admirals commanding Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), also headquartered in Naples, Italy. The commander in chief of AFSOUTH (CINCSOUTH) at the beginning of Deny Flight was Admiral Jeremy Boorda, until his

156 Beale, p. v. When four warplanes violating the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone were shot down by NATO aircraft on 28 February 1994, that act was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the NATO Alliance 157 Lowe, p. 1. Gen. Michael Ryan, then-commander of NATO southern air forces described Deny Flight as “piecemealed airpower.” Without "a sustained effort [as in Deliberate Force]," Ryan said, airpower was not "taken seriously by the warring factions." (Tirpak, no page number)

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replacement by Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr.158 To complete the chain of command, AFSOUTH reported to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), also an American four-star general. SACEUR took his general guidance from the ambassadors sitting on NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Deny Flight was a joint NATO/UN undertaking. Although AIRSOUTH received UN and NAC approval for initial rules of engagement (ROE) by February 1993, real tension came from what proved to be the UN’s reluctance to actually act on the ROE. “NATO would always view the use of force in terms of compelling the Bosnian Serbs . . . [while] the UN . . . viewed force in a much more limited context of self-defense.”159 That hesitance was also reflected in the theater’s OPLAN that admonished NATO airmen to ensure that their strikes, when authorized at all, were “proportional” (i.e., that they avoided unnecessary casualties and collateral damage). General Ryan and Admiral Smith were in full agreement that the diplomatic sensitivities of the campaign made collateral damage an issue of pivotal strategic importance. Once the high-tempo operations of Deliberate Force had begun, General Ryan believed that a stray bomb that caused civilian casualties would take the interventionists off the moral high ground, marshal world opinion against the air campaign, and probably bring it to a halt before it had its intended effects.160 Operations were not only defensive with respect to collateral damage, but also regarding losses of NATO aircraft. After NATO lost its first aircraft to Serb MANPADS (presumed to be an SA-16), NATO's reaction was to limit the minimum altitude for interdiction and CAS operations to 10,000 feet, outside the effective envelope of the SA-16 and weapons like it. In so doing, however, the effectiveness of the 'shooters' decreased significantly.161

The physical and temporal dimensions of the Deliberate Force air campaign were fairly compact, particularly when compared to the scale and scope of a major air campaign like Operation Desert Storm. Compared to the vast reaches of Southwest Asia, NATO air attacks in Deliberate Force occurred in a triangular area only about 150 nautical miles wide on its northern base and stretching about 150 miles again to the south. The weight of the NATO attack also was relatively limited. Desert Storm lasted 43 days compared with the 22 calendar days of Deliberate Force. Of those 22 days, NATO actually released weapons against the Serbs on just 12 days. Two days into the campaign, NATO commanders halted offensive air operations against the Serbs for four days to encourage negotiations. When useful negotiations failed to materialize, they resumed bombing on the morning of 5 September and continued through the 13th. When notified that the President of the Serb Republic had accepted the UN’s terms, CINCSOUTH and the UNPROFOR commander jointly suspended offensive operations at 2200. NATO's Deny Flight operation was ended on December 20, 1995, when implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for airspace over Bosnia.

The total air forces involved included about 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support aircraft from three US services, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and France—all directly assigned to AIRSOUTH and based mainly in Italy—and a steady stream of airlift aircraft bringing forward units and supplies. On days when strikes were flown, the AIRSOUTH-assigned forces launched an average of four or five air-to-ground “packages,” involving perhaps 60 or 70 bomb-dropping sorties and another 100 to 150 additional sorties to provide combat air 158 AFSOUTH [2], p. 1 159 Owen [1], Planning Section 160 Owen [2], Execution Section 161 Cook [2], p. 63

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patrol, defense suppression, tanker, reconnaissance, and surveillance support to the “shooters.” In total, Deliberate Force included 3,515 aircraft sorties, of which 2,470 went “feet dry” over the Balkans region to deliver 1,026 weapons against 48 targets and 338 individual desired main points of impact (DMPI).162 These figures equated to just about a busy day’s sortie count for coalition air forces during the Gulf War—and only a tiny fraction of the 227,340 weapons those air forces released against the Iraqis in the 43 days of Desert Storm.

2.3.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents

Three combat aircraft were lost to enemy action in the Bosnian Theater of Operations during Deny Flight. One of those losses was an American F-16C, and two were Coalition losses (a British GR-7 Sea Harrier and a French Mirage 2000). Those incidents resulted in a total of four S/E, of whom two were recovered and two were captured.163 Those incidents are described below in chronological order.

2.3.2.1 GR-7 (April 16, 1994)

A British GR-7 Sea Harrier (from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, call sign unknown), piloted by Lt Nick Richardson, was shot down on April 16, 1994. On that day, two Sea Harriers on station over the Bosnian town of Gorazde were directed to provide close air support for UNPROFOR troops threatened by Serbian tank fire. On their first pass, the two Sea Harriers were engaged by a single MANPADS, which they were both able to evade. Unable to positively identify the target because of cloud cover, they overflew the area again but were again unable to confirm the target. On their third run, under direction from a Special Air Service (SAS) forward air controller, the lead aircraft was hit by what was thought to be an SA-7 or SA-16 MANPADS, forcing the pilot to eject at about 2,500 feet above the ground.164 He landed safely in an urban area near the town of Gorazde that was under control of the (sympathetic) Bosnian Government Army, and was later rescued by UN forces and returned to the carrier.165

An unconfirmed (even dubious) source describes the incident in the following way: "Two Sea Harriers were guided onto Bosnian-Serb armour on the outskirts of Gorazde by SAS forward air controllers...stationed on top of the Hotel Gardina. The Sea Harriers, under the rules of engagement, were to make a low pass over the area to try and stop the armour advancing on the city. It was on this pass that [the aircraft] was hit and the pilot ejected and landed in the Muslim held lines of the city. The pilot was later handed over to the SAS team in the city. They and the pilot subsequently escaped and evaded and were picked up by a French forces Puma."166

162 Owen [2], Execution Section 163 The two French Mirage crewmembers were freed and handed over to French authorities on December 12, 1995, ending 104 days of captivity. Operation Deny Flight was formally ended on December 20, 1995. 164 Furdson, p. 18, Cook [1], p. 4 and Cook [2], p. 63 165 AFSOUTH [2], Chronology and SHAPE, p. 32 166 The description is from an uncited source at http://www.aeronautics.ru/, a site known for its attention to detail in Russian aviation affairs, and also known for its pro-Yugoslavia position on NATO involvement there. Some information on the site is clearly untrue (for example, it promotes Serbian propaganda about the number of NATO aircraft shot down in the Balkans during Deny Flight and Allied Force). The reference is included only because it appears consistent with NATO and other Western accounts of the incident, and provides the most specific

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2.3.2.2 BASHER 52 (June 2, 1995)

Basher 52, an F-16C piloted by USAF Capt. Scott O’Grady, was shot down during cruise flight on June 2, 1995, by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 battery 25 miles south of Banja Luka.167 The location of the missile was the result of a shift in defenses recently undertaken by the Bosnian Serbs that had generally escaped the notice of NATO intelligence. The Serbs had never before positioned their SA-6s in that area, and they used its radar sparingly, setting up a trap. The Serbs launched two missiles—the first missile exploded between the two aircraft, and the second one emerged from the undercast cloud deck and hit Basher 52 in the belly, destroying the aircraft at an altitude of 26,000 feet. At the time, an Air Force official said, “We think this was the first time the Serbs fired an SA-6…They waited until just the right moment, and they ambushed us.”168 The event certainly represented a clever use of air defense systems in an environment of total NATO air superiority.

EJECTION

Basher 52’s encounter with the missile was observed by his wingman but, because the aircraft descended into the clouds as it was breaking apart, he did not witness the actual ejection. It would be another five and a half days until Basher 52 would make radio contact with NATO forces with his PRC-112, confirming for the first time that he had survived the encounter.

Once hit, Basher 52 ejected immediately, and manually opened his parachute instead of waiting for its automatic activation at 14,000 feet. Such a high altitude ejection resulted in wind drift of the parachute and more than five miles of geographic separation of the parachute landing from the aircraft wreckage. He descended into a grassy clearing in an area that has been described as very hilly and “relatively uninhabited.”169 The area was densely forested and pocketed by caves that had been used for evasion before—by partisans evading Nazi troops during World War II.170 The area was described as having Karst formations that were similar to those seen in SEA.

According to an Operation Deny Flight chronology released six months after Basher 52 was lost, “[the same day O’Grady was shot down], NATO received unconfirmed reports that the Bosnian Serb Army had recovered the pilot. NATO was not able to independently confirm this information.”171 That statement in the chronology is particularly interesting in light of the fact that, only hours after the incident, CINCSOUTH (Admiral Leighton Smith) confirmed to the press that “that the pilot survived and was taken captive by the Serbians.”172 It didn’t take long before the Serbs (and NATO) changed their story, the next day declaring, “We have no information about the pilot.”173 Two days later, in an odd disclosure of sensitive information, Gen. Ronald Fogelman, the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, mentioned to reporters at a Pentagon reception that intermittent signals had been received from what could be Basher 52’s PRC-112A emergency locator beacon. The reason for conflicting and curious accounts is not known. description of the actual recovery of the pilot. In any case, even NATO accounts have been, at times, misleading. In its first public statements about the loss of the GR-7, NATO claimed the aircraft was on a “reconnaissance mission.” 167 Owens, p. 1; Beale, p. 33 168 Fedarko et a., p. 20 169 Owens 170 Fedarko, p. 20 171 AFSOUTH [2], Chronology 172 AFNS, p. 1 173 Davies, no page number

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US REACTION TO THE SHOOTDOWN Perhaps because NATO had air superiority (and could control the pace of the offensive), or perhaps because military support for the way air power was being used was lukewarm, American commanders showed a great willingness to make Combat Rescue the overwhelming tactical priority when the need arose. Regardless of the motivation, the NATO position was clear—after the loss of Basher 52, Admiral Smith (CINCSOUTH) sent a message to the UNPROFOR commander requesting that he contact the Serbs with the following pointed message: "You have shot down one of my aircraft, I am coming after the pilot and I will kill anyone who attempts to impede us in our mission."174 Admiral Smith explained that position in a 1998 speech to the Armed Forces Staff College:

“After going into Bosnia as the IFOR commander, I had several high ranking Serbian officials ask why we made such a big deal out of the O’Grady affair. Why, they asked, did we expend so much effort to rescue just one pilot? And why, they asked, was his safe return so important? I told them that we place a very high premium on the welfare and safety of our forces. That, I said, is why we will use the force necessary to carry out our mission and protect the lives of those we are asking to do the job.”175

In the five days following the loss of Basher 52, more than 500 missions were flown in an exhaustive search to locate the downed pilot. CINCSOUTH also ordered the USS Kearsarge and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)] to take up a position off the Croatian coast as near to the scene of the search effort as could be safely executed.

Acknowledging the risk posed by the search, Admiral Smith said, “I knew we would be expending a lot of effort in searching for the downed pilot, and that there was a constant danger of losing another aircraft. I wanted to provide those conducting the search with the best possible chance of a recovery should one of them be forced to eject over enemy territory.” 176

COMPOSITION OF RESCUE FORCES

Like Operation Desert Storm before it, and Operation Allied Force to follow, conventional USAF Combat Rescue forces (flying HH-60Gs) were not immediately available due to their support of other operations in the northern and southern Theaters of Southwest Asia. As a result, the seven Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) MH-53J helicopters were primarily responsible for performing Combat Rescue during Deny Flight in addition to their traditional taskings in support of special operations missions. The MH-53s were stationed at Brindisi Air Base, Italy. Those forces were augmented by HH-60H Sea Hawks from the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and the considerable fixed-wing attack assets at various locations in the theater (principally from the aircraft carrier USS T. Roosevelt and Aviano Air Base, Italy).

174 Smith [2], Aircraft Down section 175 Smith [2], Aircraft Down section 176 Smith [2]

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Super Puma helicopters from the French Air Force were also on-call from their staging area at Split, Croatia (see Figure 2-51).

After Basher 52 was lost, CINCSOUTH moved the USS Kearsarge into the area and put the 24th MEU(SOC) on-call for the recovery (in case Basher 52 could be located).177 The MEU(SOC)’s planned method of recovery was to use Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) procedures, and the following aircraft: CH-53, AH-1W, AV-8B, F/A-18, and EA-6B.178 Depending on the time of day, the duty for recovering downed pilots alternated between JSOTF (1500-0300) and the MEU(SOC) (0300-1500). When Basher 52 made radio contact early in the morning on June 8, CINCSOUTH bypassed the alert schedule somewhat, calling BG (sel) Marty Brandt at about 0230 (local), already having decided that the USMC would prosecute the mission if possible.179

The Marines and the JSOTF both established concepts of operations that that anticipated executing combat operations only at night. Although rescue forces were on-call around the clock, very rapid response times were anticipated only in “permissive” environments. “Non-permissive” environments were restricted to periods of darkness and required several hours’ notice prior to takeoff.180 While true that Basher 52’s rescue was accomplished during daylight, that was not the original plan. After more than five days of evasion, Basher 52 finally made contact with NATO aircraft at 0208(L) on June 8. When he did, he was disappointed (to say the least) when the plan passed back to him was to prepare for pickup “mañana” (tomorrow), when it was dark again. He immediately vetoed that plan and, in response, CINCSOUTH gave the MEU(SOC) two options—launch the mission in darkness immediately but without additional air support, or delay for additional air support and accept a daylight mission. BG (sel) Berndt, commanding the MEU(SOC) chose the latter.181 Once the Basher 52 mission was underway, the multinational effort to recover him also included support from about forty aircraft including F-16C, F-15E, EF-111, A-10, KC-135R, HC-130, and MH-53J.182

THE RECOVERY The helicopters departed the USS Kearsarge at 0505 (L) on June 8. Although airborne, they were forced to delay their ingress for 45 minutes as the fixed-wing support forces were launched and assembled from Brindisi Air Base, Italy, and from the USS Teddy Roosevelt. Once the TRAP force had been assembled, the helicopters went “feet dry” over Bosnia, and quickly covered the approximately 90 mile distance to Basher 52. As they approached the last ridge line before reaching O'Grady, the two CH-53s that were the primary recovery vehicles stopped short and held while the two AH-1W Cobra gunships, providing escort, continued forward. The Cobras made voice contact with Basher 52 at about 0640(L) on the morning of the rescue. Once communications were established, Basher 52 used his survival radio to vector the helicopters closer using the sound of the helicopters since they were obscured by fog. When the helicopters 177 Ships supporting the recovery operation included the USS Kearsarge (an LHD-class amphibious assault ship), the USS Nashville, USS Pensacola, and the aircraft carrier T. Roosevelt. 178 Gunther, p. 20 179 Smith [4], Opening Statement. BG (sel) Berndt was the commander of the Marine force (24th MEU(SOC) that would perform the mission. 180 Simmons, p. 11-27 181 Smith [4], Opening Statement 182 Pomeroy, p. 1

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were close, Basher 52 activated a smoke grenade from his survival vest to mark his position. Once spotted, the crew of one of the Cobras opened its canopy and dropped a yellow smoke grenade to mark the position for the CH-53s. The other Cobra circled the area to ensure it was safe and then guided the CH-53s into the landing zone.

The LZ was on the side of a hill in what appeared to be a pasture, strewn with large rocks and smaller pine scrub. A line of tall pine trees surrounded the LZ and a primitive fence divided it in two. Heavy fog hung just below the treetops over the LZ as the CH-53Es landed as close to the mark as possible. As soon as the first CH-53 landed about 20 Marines scrambled down the aft ramp to establish perimeter security and prepare for a search. The second CH-53 initially landed on the fence, making it impossible to lower the tail ramp. The helicopter adjusted its position a few meters forward in the LZ, let down the ramp and began to let out more Marines.

Simultaneously and unexpectedly, Captain O'Grady came running from the tree line. Caked with mud, wearing an orange watch cap and carrying his 9-mm Beretta pistol, he ran to the helicopter and was assisted aboard through the starboard gunner's hatch. With Basher 52 safely aboard, the security element from the lead CH-53 reboarded and a head count was conducted. After seven minutes on the ground in the LZ (most of which was spent ensuring accountability of the Marine security force), the two CH-53s lifted off heading due west toward the coastline. About 0650, word was passed over the loudspeaker on the Kearsarge that the TRAP force had recovered the pilot and was on the way back. 183

On egress, USAF jets detected a Serb search radar (Giraffe) along the Croatian coast, searching for targets. Airborne forces recommended destroying the Serb radar, but the request was denied, partly out of concern that a strike could spark wider conflict. Before arriving back at the ship, the helicopters were confronted with fire from small arms, AAA and MANPADS, experiencing minor damage to the helicopters and no casualties.

Although the mission was successful, certain deficiencies are apparent. Beyond the questions of the very lengthy search phase, and the vulnerability of the helicopters parked in the LZ for several minutes, the most significant issue over which there was some degree of control was the amount of delay introduced in the Command and Control process. The following timeline (Table 2-19) for the Basher 52 recovery reflects significant delay during surface-based command and control decision-making—delays that are noteworthy when one considers that forces had been anticipating (and planning for) that particular mission for the preceding five days. The timeline shows that two full hours were consumed between the positive identification of Basher 52 and the issuance of an execute order.

183 Berndt, pp 45-47.

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Table 2-19: Basher 52 Recovery Timeline (Local Times) (Sources: Various, including: Auster, Smith [4], Fedarko)

0208 Basher 52 contacts Deny Flight aircraft flying overhead

0220 Basher 52 positively identified as Captain O'Grady

0230 CINCSOUTH notifies the Kearsarge of a possible mission. Allied air forces operating out of bases in Italy, the UK, and Germany, are put into an increased readiness posture

0440 CINCSOUTH calls Colonel Berndt aboard the Kearsarge again with orders to "execute."

0505 Helicopters from the Kearsarge are airborne, awaiting rejoin of fixed-wing support assets before pushing into Bosnia.

0550 Forces begin ingress

0635 Helicopters approach the terminal area

0644 Basher 52 recovered

0730 Basher 52 delivered to the Kearsarge

A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF THE RECOVERY

A detailed account of the recovery found its way onto the Internet and caused quite a sensation. It was written by Air Force Capt. Scott Zobrist, an F-16 pilot based with O'Grady at Aviano AB, Italy, just hours after O'Grady's rescue. Although Zobrist was flying an F-16 on the periphery of the operation, he provides a first-hand account of the recovery operation. Despite some initial embarrassment, Defense officials alternately declared that no classified information was revealed in the e-mail, and that the report has been so widely disseminated that further distribution would not cause more damage. Accordingly, that e-mail is included here:

Date: 95-06-08 19:32:48 EDT

(8 Jun 95)

To all my Viper buds and other Shit Hot Fighter Gods on the net -

It was a good day at Aviano! As you guys have no doubt heard, we rescued Scott "Zulu" O'Grady today after 6 days of E&Eing in the Bosnian countryside. We had an idea that he was still out there but hadn't had positive radio contact until about 0000Z this morning when Capt T.O. Hanford had some extra gas so he stayed in his CAP a little longer and tried to reach Zulu on the SAR A (PRC-112) freq from the day of the shoot down.

After about 40 minutes of calls in the blind, T.O. started getting some suspect clicks on the mike. Finally, Zulu came up voice. T.O. didn't have all the info from Zulu's ISOPREP so he came up with a quick way to verify it was indeed Zulu, although it sounded like Zulu recognized T.O.'s voice and called him by name (although the comm was weak since T.O. (Basher 11) was about 70 miles away). The comm went something like this.

"Basher 52 this is Basher 11"

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--- click ---

"Basher 52, this is Basher 11, are you up on this freq"

"This is Basher 52"

"Say again, understand this is Basher 52"

"This is Basher 52...I'm alive"

"Say again, Basher 52, you are weak and unreadable, this is Basher 11"

"This is Basher 52!"

--- pause ---

"Basher 52, what squadron were you in at Kunsan?"

"Juvats! Juvats! I'm alive!"

"Copy that, you're alive! Basher 52, sit tight and come back up at 15 past the hour"

T.O. then started coordinating with Magic to pass words to the Deny Flight CAOC (command center) that he had positive radio contact with Basher 52. They replied that T.O. should pass the word “mañana” to Basher 52. When he did, Zulu replied “I want to get picked up tonight!” (imagine that). So T.O. passed that to the CAOC and the decision was made to press with a rescue. We were 2 hours before sunrise so it would be daylight but there was concern (rightly so) that word would get out to the press and every SA-6 in the AOR would be mobile and spiking us and the rest of the rescue package. So they went ASAP.

T.O. stayed airborne (now at about the 4 hour point in his sortie - one note here: T.O. got high marks for wingman consideration for advising his wingman that it was a good time to take a piss on the way to the tanker! That video clip probably won't make CNN ) and the 510 FS Buzzards scrambled our alert guys (I was #2). Unfortunately, Vaughn "Slot" Littlejohn and I had just gone from 60 minute alert to 180 minute alert and I had headed home to get some sleep. The phone rang at about 0255L (after about 10 minutes of sleep) telling me to get in there ASAP. I was back at the SQ in 15 minutes. Before I was even in the door, our ADO, Phil "Psycho" Sever told me we had positive radio contact, get dressed, step, crank, and taxi ASAP - I would meet SLOT in EOR whenever he made it in. We were in the air at about 0400L (1+05 from a dead sleep at home) loaded with 2xGBU-12s, 2 slammers, 2 9Ms, a 131 pod, and 2 tanks (Standard DF SCL). We swapped out with T.O. manning the cap and staying in touch with Zulu every 15 minutes. A SEAD package was getting airborne as T.O. started his RTB. We had a plan with the F-18Ds (Harm shooters (kind of), with NVGs and a WSO), EFs, and EA-6Bs to try to establish contact. But since we already had contact, the F-18s just did a recce run to get a good fix on him and to check the weather.

Meanwhile, Zobe the hero, callsign Rock 42, was hanging on Slot's wing 70 miles away listening to the whole thing, ensuring my tape was on. I can't wait to tell my grandkids about the day I put all my Weapons School training to use - "No shit, kids, there I was - tape on, tape off, tape on, tape off. The pressure was incredible!" Seriously, although I didn't do shit, it was shit hot to listen to the entire mission unfolding. The helos were inbound, authenicating Zulu (they asked him what he was called in high school when he got drunk!) With a good ID they moved in, had Zulu pop some smoke, and picked him up. The whole thing from the authentication to the pick-up was about 10 minutes (seemed like an eternity). To hear comm like, "Basher 52, got you in sight", was pretty moving, especially after thinking for most of the week that Zulu was a mort ("Wilbur" Wright didn't see a chute, no radio contact, etc.) I've never been choked up in the jet before, but I was this morning.

Unfortunately, they weren't out of danger yet. We hit the tanker and when we came back up to Magic freq the helos were about 13 miles from feet wet. Then I heard the escort chopper, c/s Bull, say, "Bud, impacts underneath you. SAMS IN THE AIR! SAMS IN THE AIR!" FUCK!! Luckily, they missed, although they took some small arms fire and apparently the gunner from Bull silenced that. About 10 minutes later, we heard the call that they were feet

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wet, then shortly after that that they had "mother in sight" (the ship), two more bits of comm that I will never forget.

So we got one of our own back. What a day. I wish we could have done more in the rescue but it was almost entirely a Navy and Marine show (we and the mud-eagles were in the cap) and they kicked ass. So don't bad mouth the squids and jarheads too loudly - they put on a good act today and we've got a Viper driver back because of it.

I thought you might enjoy hearing the story straight from the CSAR Commander of VTR Ops! Hope it wasn't too mushy, but after all, I did cry when I watched Old Yeller. That's just the emotional type of guy I am! Hope all is well with you guys at your various bases. Drop me a line and let me know what's up. Fly safe, check six, and pray for the UN leadership to get a clue and let us blow these bastards back into the stone age!

Zobe

2.3.2.3 EBRO 33 (August 30, 1995)

A Mirage 2000K, operated by French Air Force Captain Frederic Chiffot and Lieutenant Jose Souvignet (callsign, Ebro 33), was shot down in the target area by a heat-seeking MANPADS, on August 30, 1995 (the first day of Operation Deliberate Force). The loss occurred during daylight operations, 20 miles southeast of the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale.184 After being hit, both Mirage crewmembers were filmed ejecting from their aircraft.

Although ambiguous radio signals were received and conspicuous ground-to-air symbols were observed, no positively identified signal was ever received from Ebro 33. Serb claims that they had immediately captured the men turned out to be true (one of the two crewmembers had a serious leg injury, making successful evasion even more unlikely). The status of the aircrew could not be confirmed and, because of a successful Serbian deception campaign (see Section 2.3.5), NATO launched helicopter “reconnaissance” missions on three successive days to locate the French airmen. In the many days that followed, NATO continued the search for Ebro 33, tasking dozens of aircraft to fly hundreds of missions with the hope that they could be found.

2.3.3 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

During the 983 days of Operation Deny Flight, 23,021 "No-Fly Zone” fighter sorties were flown over Bosnia-Herzegovina and an additional 27,077 Close Air Support and strike sorties were flown. Given the three aircraft lost in combat, the frequency of isolating incidents is roughly 0.06 per 1000 combat sorties. That number does not include 29,158 support sorties flown by SEAD, electronic warfare, tanker, reconnaissance, and support aircraft.185

Although Deliberate Force was but a phase of Deny Flight, its more aggressive posture and higher tempo merit a concentrated look at the subset of sorties flown during the operation. Deliberate Force included 2,470 “feet dry” combat sorties over the Balkans region, during which the French Mirage was the only combat loss, yielding a loss rate of 0.4 per 1000 combat sorties. Because of the very small number of losses during Deny Flight and Deliberate Force, statistical conclusions should be drawn with caution.

184 AFSOUTH [2], Chronology and Smith [1], no page number 185 AFSOUTH [2], Statistics

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2.3.4 Distribution of Losses

The following sections characterize the isolating incidents during Deny Flight by categories of threat, range, and time.

2.3.4.1 Distribution By Threat Level and Time of Day

Although the coalition enjoyed air superiority, the small arms, AAA, SAM, and MANPADS threat was persistent. The Serbs had fewer surface-to-air missiles than were faced during Operation Desert Storm, but showed a higher proficiency with the weapons than did the Iraqis.186 From the perspective of the rescuers, the considerable number of scattered Serbian ground troops, and a hostile population in Bosnian Serb controlled areas significantly elevated the risk level of any mission. In the end, one of the losses (Basher 52) can be attributed to a mobile SAM (SA-6), and the remaining two were lost to MANPADS.

A couple of conclusions might be drawn regarding the surface-to-air threat. First, that efforts to suppress Serb radar SAM systems were effective. While true that Basher 52 was lost to a radar guided SAM, the Serbs were forced to be clever in its use (and to deviate from traditional doctrine) to have any chance of success. The second conclusion regards the intractable nature of the threat posed by dismounted infantry. The Serbs, by remaining scattered in the countryside, were able to avoid making themselves targets for traditional bombing campaigns while exploiting their broad area coverage to take shots at targets of opportunity. That battlefield characteristic impacted not only the two fighters lost to MANPADS, but was a significant factor facing their would be rescuers.

Both Basher 52 and Ebro 33 were lost in areas solidly under control of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), making successful evasion difficult and dangerous. Consistent with that description, two of those three crewmembers were captured, and the other suffered an abnormally long period of silent evasion before he could contact friendly forces to initiate his rescue. The rescued pilot of the downed GR-7 may have benefited from a pocket of localized control that the Bosnian Government Army (BIH) maintained around the city of Gorazde. Once outside the vicinity of Gorazde, movement and popular sentiment were under control of the BSA

2.3.4.2 Distribution By Range

The locations of the downed aircrew and the basing locations of rescue forces are depicted in Figure 2-51. At the extreme, forces from Brindisi responding to the Ebro 33 or GR-7 incidents would have operated at a range of just under 200 miles. That range was reduced by operational measures such as the establishment of an FOL at Split, Croatia and the use of HH-60H helicopters from the USS Teddy Roosevelt during initial searches for the crew from Ebro 33.

The rescue of Basher 52 was staged from the USS Kearsarge and other ships that had repositioned off the Croatian coast during the lengthy search phase. When the mission was initiated, forces on the Kearsarge were at a point 87 miles from their objective. Because CINCSOUTH was able to position the ships much closer to the area of interest than the special operations forces stationed at Brindisi, the 24th MEU(SOC) aboard the Kearsarge was tasked as the primary rescue response package.

186 Col. Charles Wald, commander of the 31st Fighter Wing as quoted in Borg, p. 1

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Figure 2-51: Locations of Combat Rescue Incidents in OAF

2.3.5 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns

The Serbs appear to have placed significant strategic value on the capture of downed Coalition pilots, and exploited the hostility of the local population to search for aircrew on the ground after aircraft had been shot down. Search activity was coupled with deception efforts that can generally be characterized as effective. Deception included possible use of false emergency beeper transmissions, and propagation of misinformation in the press.

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One of the most remarkable (and successful) efforts to deceive was observed during the search for Ebro 33. Although the crew had been seen bailing out, voice contact had never been established. Hopes were raised when, on September 5 (six days after the shootdown), a German reconnaissance aircraft returned with what CINCSOUTH considered “convincing evidence” of the status of the crew of Ebro 33. That photograph included “what appeared to be a 3 with the outline of a Mirage aircraft, another 3, followed by the letters E, B, and something beyond that which I was not personally able to make out…There was an individual photographed standing on the road adjacent to this sign, pointing to it.”187

Based on that photograph, CINCSOUTH received approval to launch three helicopter “reconnaissance” missions to search for the crew of Ebro 33. In a press conference after the missions had been completed, CINCSOUTH made the following distinction between a reconnaissance mission and a rescue mission:

“Let me first point out the difference between a reconnaissance mission and a rescue mission. A pickup or rescue mission is similar to that which was conducted for Capt. Scott O'Grady. You will recall that we had voice communications with Capt. O'Grady, he had authenticated his call sign, we knew his precise location, and we knew that he was physically well enough to get to a helicopter if we got into the area…Now the reason we were able to do [the three reconnaissance missions] is, earlier, we had been briefed by some young men from the combat search and rescue organization on board the Theodore Roosevelt as well as our special operations forces out of Brindisi, and I was convinced that they had done some very good planning to navigate to this objective area, to conduct reconnaissance in the area, and to egress out of the area. So we knew that there had been considerable work done and that's why Gen. Ryan and I elected to go up our chain of command and recommend that we conduct the mission.” 188

The reconnaissance missions were conducted on September 6, 7, and 8, and included a large contingent of support aircraft, including those for CAS, SEAD, combat air patrol, airborne command and control, and NATO AWACs. On those missions, helicopters (carrying up to 11 ground troops each) searched the terminal area for 30 minutes or more, encountering enemy fire described as “fulsome” and “fairly heavy.” Each of the three missions took fire, resulting in the wounding of two of the would-be rescuers.189 It should be emphasized that performing a “combat search” using helicopters in denied areas is a departure from Joint (and Air Force) doctrine and, considering the vulnerability of the helicopters and the number of personnel they carried, was performed at considerable risk. Doctrine does contemplate the use of reconnaissance missions but the intended vehicle is not a helicopter, but an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or a higher-flying fixed-wing aircraft.190 The successful hoax upped the ante for 187 Smith [3], Opening Statement 188 Smith [3], Opening Statement 189 Smith [3], in Opening Statement and responses to reporters questions 190 Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, suggests, “Visual searches using manned aircraft conducting search patterns are not recommended in other than low-threat environments (p. III-6).” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue, is consistent in that regard. It says, “The concept of “combat search” associated with Air Force CSAR should be considered extremely limited in scope…The vulnerability of rescue resources in a threat environment precludes extended aerial search operations in all but a permissive environment. (p. 20)”

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NATO commanders, prompting a response that put many additional NATO personnel at very high risk of loss. This is not necessarily a critique of the decisions leading to the reconnaissance missions, but is intended to highlight how a successful deception campaign can significantly benefit an outnumbered, outmatched enemy force.

Serb deception was not limited to the one photograph. In the cases of Ebro 33 and Basher 52, multiple conflicting public statements were made by the Serbs, alternatively claiming to have captured the airmen and claiming no knowledge of their status. The following tables outline the chronology of often conflicting public statements made regarding the status of the aircrew:

Table 2-21: Chronology of Public Statements - Basher 52

June 2 Basher 52 shot down by SA-6. It is not known whether O’Grady survived the incident.

Serb military leaders tell Western officials they are holding the pilot.

Adm. Leighton Smith (CINCSOUTH) confirms to the press that the pilot survived and was taken captive by the Serbians.

June 3 Wreckage of the F-16 is shown on Bosnian Serb television.

The same day, A spokesman for Serb leader Radovan Karadzic then declares, "we have no information about the pilot."

June 4 Gen. Ronald Fogelman (USAF Chief of Staff) mentions to reporters at a Pentagon reception that intermittent signals have been received from what could be the airman's emergency locator beacon.

June 7 NATO reports that aircraft flying over the region confirm they were getting transmissions from what was thought to be O'Grady's radio beacon

June 8 A pilot from Capt. O'Grady's own squadron, (555th Fighter Squadron) from Aviano Air Base, hears and recognizes O’Grady’s voice while flying over Bosnia. O’Grady is recovered.

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Table 2-22: Chronology of Public Statements – Ebro 33

Aug 30 Ebro 33 shot down by MANPADS. Film of the aircrew bailing out confirms their survival.

Sept 4 Serb military sources say a Serb farmer armed with a pistol captured the officers and handed them to Bosnian Serb soldiers.

Sept 5 A German reconnaissance aircraft returns with a photograph of what is presumed to be a ground-to-air signal constructed by the crew of Ebro 33.

Sept 6 Recon Mission #1: Two US Navy HH-60H helicopters from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, each carrying an eight-man SEAL team, attempt to locate Ebro 33. Sporadic ground fire was encountered and the mission was eventually turned back due to heavy thunderstorms without arriving in the terminal area.

CNN broadcasts Peter Arnett's interview of Bosnian-Serb President, Radovan Karadzic. When asked about the fate of the aircrew, Karadzic said the truth was "secret."

Sept 7 Recon Mission #2: Four MH-53J helicopters from the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) at Brindisi, Italy attempt to locate Ebro 33. Each helicopter carried “15 or 16” personnel (including aircrew). “Rather fulsome” ground fire was encountered and the mission was eventually turned back due to very dense ground fog after searching the terminal area for a “considerable mount of time.”

Sept 8 Recon Mission #3: Four JSOTF MH-53J helicopters attempt to locate Ebro 33. They spent “almost 30 minutes” searching and received small arms fire described as “fairly heavy.”

Sept 7 French Defense Minister Charles Millon hints he knows the pilots are still free, saying they “are out there in the Bosnian countryside in a place known only to those whose mission today is to go and bring them back.''

Sept 18 France asks the Red Cross to help find the two airmen, abandoning its suggestions they are still at large.

Sept 22 The Yugoslavian Foreign Minister said he understood that one of the pilots had been in hospital in Bosnian Serb territory where he had treatment for a broken leg.

Later on the same day he said he has no knowledge of the pilots' whereabouts.

Sept 27 Millon says France has proof that the servicemen are alive and being held by Bosnian Serbs.

Sept 28 French magazine Paris Match publishes the first photographs of the two, held by Bosnian Serbs.

Search efforts are discontinued.

Oct 18 Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic confirms the two airmen were captured but says they were later kidnapped by an unknown group.

Dec 8 Without specifying the actions that will be taken, France sets December 10 as deadline for the Bosnian Serbs return the two flyers.

Dec 11 France backs away from its ultimatum after the deadline passes with no word on pilots' fate.

The Yugoslav Defense Minister later tells a NATO delegation in Belgrade that the Bosnian Serb authorities are about to issue a statement on the pilots' fate and hints it would be positive.

Dec 12 The Serbs release the crew from Ebro 33 to French authorities.

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2.3.6 Use of Ground Forces for Aircrew Rescue

Although airpower was a primary focus during Deny Flight for both the enforcement of the NFZ and during attempted rescue missions, NATO had a noteworthy presence on the ground in Bosnia, totaling about 15,000 troops serving under UNPROFOR. Their concentrations, however, were not in likely areas of aircraft loss, reducing their potential to conduct opportune recoveries. Nevertheless, the rapid recovery of the GR-7 crew benefited from the proximity of UNPROFOR ground troops.

Other ground forces were available to support recovery of S/E (i.e. SOF and SEALS), but their use as clandestine ground recovery teams, while advocated by some during the search for Ebro 33, was deemed impractical. In retrospect, that assessment appears to have been a wise one. Even if the crew had not already been captured, an Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) mission to recover Ebro 33 would have presented a nearly insurmountable tactical challenge to a team on the ground in light of the scant information that was available and the large search area in the vicinity of a Serb stronghold (for aircrew with whom NATO had no contact). In the end, such a mission would have exposed the team to significant risk to recover an aircrew that was already in enemy hands.

2.3.7 Recovery Force Losses

Although every rescue reconnaissance and recovery mission experienced took fire from various small arms, AAA, and SAMS, there were no recovery force losses during Deny Flight. Several of the helicopters received minor battle damage, and two cabin crewmembers received (non-critical) shrapnel wounds. All forces involved in the rescue missions returned safely to their respective bases.

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2.4 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999)

For 78 days, from March to June 1999, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies engaged in a major military operation (Operation Allied Force [OAF]) to bring an end to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo.191 The operation resulted 14,000 combat sorties and two combat losses of aircraft.

2.4.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

Nineteen NATO nations worked together to support Operation Allied Force. In all, 14 Air Forces contributed combat and combat support sorties for the air campaign in rough proportion to the size of each member’s Air Force, and European nations, both NATO and non-NATO, deployed substantial ground forces in neighboring Albania and Macedonia.

Despite those factors, NATO successfully integrated air, land, and sea operations throughout the conflict. Some activities—notably, targeting, strike operations, and humanitarian assistance were conducted from locations around the globe. Within the Kosovo area of operations, NATO carried out combat strikes over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the province of Kosovo using aircraft from 14 of its member states, including the United States. In addition, NATO forces provided defense and logistics support for the alliance forces deployed in Italy, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and carried out naval operations in the Adriatic Sea. The latter included, at one time, aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships from four nations, all operating within the same confined sea space.192 Ultimately, NATO’s military effort prevailed, incurring very few losses in the process.193

191 Cohen, p. 1 of “Message from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton” in Kosovo/OAF After Action Report. 192 Cohen, p. xiv. 193 Cohen, p. 2.

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Despite the significant NATO presence, the campaign over Kosovo was not a traditional military conflict. Instead of pursuing decisive airpower objectives, NATO chose a coercive strategy that was similar to that used during Operation Deny Flight. Further, there was no direct clash of massed military forces in Operation Allied Force. Because the Serbs were generally ineffective in directly countering NATO’s military operations (although the continuous threat to allied pilots posed by large numbers of SAMs and AAA was formidable), they chose to fight chiefly through indirect means: use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians; attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage; creation of enormous refugee flows to trigger a humanitarian crisis; and the conduct of disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Serb forces dispersed themselves among civilian populations and exploited the small signature of scattered light infantry and police forces. The Serbs also hid many of their better military weapons and kept their SAM defenses largely intact through hit-and-run-tactics. Although overwhelmed militarily, the Serbs proved to be remarkably agile and resilient, constantly adjusting their tactics based on what they observed. An A-10 pilot who operated in the region describes that flexibility:

“I flew the first day that we went, and flew 25 missions, 19 as mission commander. So I saw the evolution. It really was an evolutionary period. The Serbs reacted to everything we did. When we initially went into country we found the military vehicles on the roads, we attacked them with precision-guided missions, bombs, bullets, and within three days we drove them off the roads. They were smart…. We had to change our tactics. The first week or so we were very effective, and then we found that they were driven into hiding. Then we had to develop techniques for finding them in the mountains, in revetments. We found them there, again began to engage them. Before long they left the revetments and started going into the tree lines. For the tree lines we used other assets along with that to find them. So there are peaks and valleys, along with the poor weather, where our actual tactics evolved over the period. At the very end, with Mount Pec, we saw some of the Serbs coming out to engage and we were able to find them out in the open and engage them. So there were peaks and there were valleys. The Serbs were very smart on the ground.”194

Weather was also a factor, complicating efforts to acquire and identify targets and making it more difficult to prevent collateral damage.195 Only 50 percent of the strike days during the conflict were described as “good weather days.”196

The OAF Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC), located within the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, was responsible for establishing, maintaining, and operating the personnel recovery (PR) architecture for OAF and other ongoing operations within the Theater. Consistent with doctrine, the PRCC established a “PR umbrella” over the entire Theater, consisting of PR forces and assets provided by all Services of the U.S., the United Nations (UN), and several Allied Nations within NATO.

194 Unnamed A-10 pilot, quoted in Gen Clark’s press conference (see Boyle reference). 195 Cohen, p. xiv. 196 Boyle (no page number).

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2.4.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents

There were a total of three isolating incidents involving Coalition assets in the Balkan Theater of Operations in 1999. Two of these incidents involved combat loss of Coalition aircraft. The third incident, which is not a subject of this report, was the ambush and capture of three US Army soldiers conducting a border patrol. Both aircraft incidents resulted in the use of helicopters to perform the recoveries.

2.4.2.1 VEGA 31 (March 27, 1999)

Vega 31, a USAF F-117A, was hit by a radar guided SAM while egressing the target area on a night mission over Kosovo. It immediately became uncontrollable, and the pilot ejected without delay in the vicinity of the missile system that led to aircraft loss. He landed in an area of plowed fields and irrigation ditches, about 50 yards from a road and rail track intersection. Once on the ground, he concealed himself in a culvert about 200 yards from his landing site.197

Initial notification originated with a radio call from Vega 31 (using his PRC-112A survival radio) to AWACS during his parachute descent.198 Additional contact from the survivor would not be received until about 3-1/2 hours later, when he informed support forces that he was okay and that there was a fair amount of ground activity in the area. The location effort was made more difficult due to enemy spoofing and jamming.199

The recovery of Vega 31 was the first Combat Rescue mission of OAF. The nighttime mission had an inauspicious beginning when, at the direction of the JSOTF, the three-ship formation of helicopters launched without the knowledge of the CAOC. The JSOTF’s unilateral launch order to the helicopters had a high potential for fratricide. The flight’s location was unknown to the CAOC, and NATO forces were shooting down helicopters when they were detected. Although the helicopter crews felt confident that their identity and status were known (based on the presence of a mission tasking in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and their transponder codes),200 there was actually great ambiguity within the command and control network and among fighters flying combat air patrol that night. In fact, the helicopters were targeted by a formation of American F-15Cs after an interrogation of the lead MH-53’s transponder failed to return to proper identifying codes. Because the F-15s were engaging the helicopters beyond visual range (BVR), theater procedures required the CAOC to authorize engagement of the target. It was during the pause created by that final safeguard, based on nothing more than an uneasy suspicion in the CAOC, that the fighters were directed to break off the engagement.201

Because the CAOC received late notice that the helicopters were airborne, CSARTF assembly was delayed. As a result, when the helicopters arrived at the Serbian border, the fighters, C2 aircraft, and other assets needed for the rescue were not yet ready for the push into Serbian airspace. The helicopters hovered for a while at the edge of Serbian territory, then landed with engines running to conserve fuel. Now in contact with the OSC (a Sandy qualified A-10), it was decided that, since their remaining fuel only permitted about 10 minutes of loiter time, they 197 Borg, p. 1. 198 Borg, p. 1. 199 Laushine, p.1. 200 Trask, in correspondence 201 Trumpfheller (from his personal interviews with the F-15C flight lead that flew the intercept that night and Maj McGonagill, the PRCC director during Allied Force).

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would need more fuel before attempting the recovery. Accordingly, the helicopters rejoined with an MC-130P tanker (which itself was running low on fuel) for air refueling. The refueling took place within 3 miles of the Serbian border at an altitude of just 700 feet. Because of the early launch, the helicopter refueling occurred when the rest of the CSARTF was ready to push, further upsetting the synchronization of the mission.

By the time the fixed-wing support package crossed into Serbia, the downed pilot's location had been determined within a mile. The pilot was 25 miles outside of Belgrade and within 10 miles of three Serb Army Brigades. As the helicopters got close to the pilot's reported position, a cloud deck made it impossible for the A-10s to visually locate him (see Section 2.4.6for a more detailed discussion about the placement of the A-10s above the cloud deck). All the rescuers could determine was that the pilot was near a major intersection, where Serb vehicles stopped regularly to unload soldiers and search dogs.

The final push into the terminal area had been delayed three times. First, so that the helicopters could refuel; second, when the CSARTF received false reports that Vega 31 had been captured; and third, following the bogus capture reports, when Sandy 1 had difficulty re-contacting Vega 31 on his survival radio. After spending an additional eight minutes trying to make contact, the helicopters were finally cleared in for the recovery.

Once in the terminal area, Vega 31 was directed to ignite the smoke generator available in his survival vest. When he did, helicopters (about a half-mile away) spotted him immediately. Six hours after the shootdown, the third helicopter in the formation, an MH-60G quickly touched down, and within 60 seconds was airborne again with Vega 31 on board.202 On egress, they experienced Serb searchlights, small arms fire, and AAA.203

2.4.2.2 HAMMER 34 (May 2, 1999)

On the night of May 2, 1999, the Serbs launched three SA-3 missiles, from two separate sites, against a four-ship of F-16CJs on a Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (DEAD) mission near Novi Sad, in northern Serbia. One of the missiles hit Hammer 34, damaging his engine. The aircraft remained controllable, but engine performance was immediately degraded. Within about 5 minutes, the engine failed entirely, and the pilot was forced to glide away from the threat. Initial notification of the loss was by a radio call from the Hammer 34 to his wingman immediately after being hit. Hammer 34 was in constant contact with his wingman, right up until ejection, as he assessed the severity of his problem.204

The ejection was a controlled bailout within a safe ejection envelope, approximately 20 miles from the area where the SAM was encountered.205 The pilot landed in plowed fields and concealed himself in an adjacent tree line until recovery three hours later.206 Once on the ground, Hammer 34 was in immediate contact with his flight-lead (Hammer 33), now acting as the OSC. Hammer 33 organized a flow plan for tanker aircraft to keep a constant stream of fighters over the crash site and coordinated the fighter orbits so that aircraft would be available to

202 Borg, p. 1. 203 Information in the account that is not specifically cited is a composite from Newman and interviews of Laushine, McGonagill, Cherrey, and Trumpfheller. 204 Hammer 34 interview. 205 Hammer 34 interview. 206 Williams, p. 1.

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knock out any SAMs that popped up. The Serbs still managed to fire a few shots, at one point forcing his new wingman to jettison his weapons to outmaneuver a missile.

Meanwhile, NATO had launched rescue helicopters (two MH-53Js and one MH-60G) from Bosnia, hoping to arrive before sunrise less than two hours later. Because the crews felt that there was no time to wait for their A-10 RESCORT, the helicopters flew without them. As the helicopters searched in the vicinity of the initial coordinates for about 7 minutes, and as they navigated to the multiple incorrect locations that were reported to them over the course of the next hour, the three helicopters faced sporadic barrages of SAMs, AAA, and small arms fire, and used their on-board guns to suppress what they could.207 At one point, the MH-60G was targeted by an SA-9 missile, which missed by about 100 feet. Later on, the same helicopter took rounds in the fuselage and left engine cowling from small arms fire. Finally, vectors from the OSC pointed the helicopters towards Hammer 34’s actual location about 17 miles away. It is a small (and illustrative) irony that the A-10s, for which there was not enough time to wait, actually saved the mission in its role as OSC by handing-off the correct S/E location to the helicopter.

Once in the terminal area, Hammer 34 vectored the helicopters toward him based on their rotor noise. As they were just passing his location, Hammer 34 turned on his strobe light, and the MH-60G made a quick turn and landed in the clearing. Although the time in the LZ was measured in seconds, it was enough time for Serbs with small arms to approach the area and fire. On egress, as was the case during the recovery of Vega 31, Serb heavy AAA and small-arms fire followed the helicopters until they were once again in Bosnia.208

2.4.3 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns

The Serbs appear to have placed significant strategic value on the capture of downed Coalition pilots. Special effort was taken to increase the likelihood of their success, and forces were assigned to that role. Further, Serbs attempted (successfully) to disrupt rescue activity with spoofing and jamming of rescue frequencies.209

2.4.4 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

Over 38,000 sorties were flown in support of OAF and related operations in the Balkan Theater for the period of March to June 1999. Approximately 16,500 of those were strike, air defense, or air defense suppression sorties.210 Given the two aircraft lost in combat, the frequency of isolating incidents is roughly 0.121 per 1000 combat sorties.

2.4.5 Distribution of Losses

The following sections characterize the isolating incidents of OAF by categories of threat, range, and time. It should be recognized that the limited number of incidents might present a misleading picture.

207 Newman (no page number). 208 The account is a composite of information from Williams and interviews of Laushine, McGonagill, and Trumpfheller. 209 Laushine, p. 1. 210 Clark, pp. 16-18.

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2.4.5.1 Distribution By Threat Level

Both combat losses during OAF occurred under conditions described as “non-permissive.” Although the coalition enjoyed air superiority (and eventually air supremacy), the small arms, AAA, and SAM threat was persistent. From the perspective of the rescuers, the considerable number of ground troops distributed throughout Serbia, and a hostile Serbian population significantly elevated the risk level of any mission.

2.4.5.2 Distribution By Range

Figure 2-52 shows where the F-117 incident (Vega 31) occurred, approximately 20 miles west of Belgrade.211 That location was about fifty miles from recovery forces at Tuzla. The F-16 incident (Hammer 34) occurred about 40 miles from recovery forces, just after his strike on SAM sites near Novi Sad.212 All of the incidents (including the non-combat events) happened within 50 miles of recovery forces, and can be considered short-range missions.

Figure 2-52: Locations of Combat Rescue Incidents in OAF

211 Vega 31 interview. 212 Williams, p. 1.

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2.4.5.3 Distribution by Time of Day

Both combat losses occurred at night. This is primarily a function of the doctrine and tactics employed throughout the operation. From the standpoint of successful evasion, it is noteworthy to point out that most movement of Serbian ground combat forces occurred during the night.213 In both cases of combat loss, the downed pilots reported a significant amount of nighttime activity in their immediate area.

2.4.6 Types of Recovery Forces

AIRBORNE FORCES For both the Vega 31 and Hammer 34 recoveries, a fixed-wing force of about 50 aircraft supported the operation.214 In each case, it was a mixed-aircraft formation of MH-53Js and MH-60Gs operating from ground-alert at Tuzla Air Base in Bosnia that made the recovery. At the insistence of the JSOTF Commander, the MH-53s carried a platoon-sized “ground security” element that was supposed to deploy in the LZ if the MH-53s landed. Although the AFSOC crews operating the helicopters disagreed with the use of that tactic, they were given no choice but to bring the ground forces along. Fortunately (perhaps conveniently) the MH-60G made the pick-up in both cases. Had the security element been deployed, it is inevitable that the helicopters would have been forced to spend more time on the ground in the LZ (as during the recovery of Basher 52 during Operation Deny Flight).

With regard to CSAR support for the combat operation, OAF had many similarities to Desert Storm and Deny Flight. First, AFSOF were assigned as primary CSAR assets. Conventional CSAR forces (flying HH-60Gs) were not immediately available due to their support of other operations in the northern and southern theaters of Southwest Asia. Although HH-60Gs eventually arrived, they did not meet the theater’s requirements for operations in the robust IR threat environment. By the time the aircraft were fitted with the appropriate countermeasures, the war was essentially over, and both rescues had already been successfully prosecuted.

Second, assignment of AFSOF to the conventional Combat Rescue mission manifested force integration problems resulting, primarily, from the now familiar dual chain of command for the helicopters.215 Under that organization, operational control was maintained by the JSOTF who, when a rescue mission was assigned, gave tactical control of the assets to the JFACC once the helicopters became airborne. As in Desert Storm, complex information pathways and reporting relationships caused critical communications failures resulting, for example, in the launch of rescue forces without the direction (or knowledge) of the CAOC.216 In the end, the integration failures ranged from the esoteric (violation of the principle of Unity of Command) to the

213 Cohen, p. 62. 214 McGonagill, interview. 215 The dual JSOTF/JFACC command chain was observed in Desert Storm, Deny Flight, and Allied Force. Perhaps because its persistence over time has conferred it some credibility, it remains (as of this writing) the preferred mode of operation when JSOTF assets are tasked to perform Combat Rescue in support of a JFACC. It was briefed as standard operating procedure by General Bailey (Commander of USSOCOM) during the January 2001 Department of Defense Personnel Recovery Conference. At the same briefing, the Director of Operations for Air Combat Command, MGen Lamontagne, remarked, “we’re familiar with that, and can expect to see that organization again in the future.” 216 Trumpfheller, interview.

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mundane (the JFACC and the JSOTF used different communications security codes, making secure communications between players from each organization essentially impossible).

Training shortcomings were also evident during OAF, and the lack of procedural familiarity among task force members created significant coordination problems during both CSAR efforts.217 For example, as during Desert Storm, AFSOF were uncomfortable with traditional RESCORT tactics, fearing that the fighters overhead would “give away” their position. During training in the weeks before to the loss of Vega 31, AFSOF helicopter crews had insisted that A-10s performing RESCORT remain detached so that they did not “highlight the helicopters.” According to Sandy 1 during the Vega 31 mission, the weather, while adverse, would have allowed the A-10s operate below the cloud deck, but would have required attached escort due to the limited visibility.218 The contract established during training, however, caused the A-10s to remain above the cloud deck, and unable to provide protection to the low-level helicopters as they ingressed, or to visually locate Vega 31 in the terminal area. During the rescue of Hammer 34, AFSOF helicopters pushed into Serbia without waiting for RESCORT, causing massive confusion and lengthy exposure to (and engagement by) threats on the ground.219

Many of the integration problems may have been discovered had the in-theater training been more robust. Because the CAOC resisted running large-package Combat Rescue exercises (SAREX) for training, rescue remained on the periphery of theater exercises, often taking place after the main exercise activity had concluded, and without the benefit of the entire command and control architecture.220 According to Major John Cherrey, “we never got a real command and control workout during a SAREX.”221 In the end, training was generally limited to sorties flown between the A-10s and either the AFSOF or French helicopters. Over time, AFSOF helicopter crews changed and, for both the Vega and Hammer missions, the participating helicopter crews were not those that had received the pre-conflict training.222

GROUND FORCES Because of the nature of the ground threat during OAF, and general resistance to the use of US (or other) ground forces in Bosnia or Kosovo, the use of ground teams as recovery forces was generally discounted. Further, it was assessed that ground forces could not meet established “time to recovery” criteria.223

217 Cohen, p. 72. 218 Cherrey, interview. 219 Trumpfheller, interview. During in-theater training, AFSOF helicopter units and A-10s providing RESCORT had established “a contract” that said (a) the helicopters would not push across the border without RESCORT and (b) that RESCORT would fly detached from the helicopters to accommodate AFSOF concerns about highlighting the helicopters [Cherrey, interview]. Sudden departure from the expected concept of operations was a primary contributor to the confusion among the players that night. 220 Trumpfheller, interview. 221 Cherrey, interview. Maj Cherrey, a Sandy-qualified A-10 pilot, was the OSC for the recovery of Vega 31. 222 Cherrey and Trumpfheller interviews. 223 McGonagill, interview.

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2.4.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation

The following factors complicated one or both Combat Rescue missions in OAF: 224

• Both missions were hampered by delays in determining and disseminating the survivor’s location.

• SOF elements were uncomfortable and unprepared to work as an element of a conventional CSARTF.225

• SOF units were not given the opportunity to exercise with a large-scale CSARTF package supported by command and control. This created numerous problems that manifested themselves during both rescue missions.

• Conventional Combat Rescue forces, when they arrived in theater, were not equipped to operate in the theater’s IR threat environment.

• US-only information. The US-only Air Tasking Orders (ATO) slowed reaction times and lowered the overall situational awareness of the (NATO) CAOC. Further, the simultaneous use of US-only and NATO communications security codes (COMSEC) made secure communications between JSOTF and JFACC forces essentially impossible until it was discovered.

• Dual Chain of Command – Joint Task Force (U.S.) and ALLIED FORCE (NATO).

• Dual Chain of Command of CSAR helicopters – CFACC and JSOTF.

• The JSOTF’s unilateral launch order to the helicopter flight had a high potential for fratricide. The flight’s location was unknown to the CAOC, and helicopters were being shot down by NATO forces when detected. Because of the early launch, the flight required refueling when the rest of the CSARTF was ready to push, upsetting the synchronization of the mission.

• Combat Rescue planning did not adequately consider the adversary’s communications capability; including the effectiveness of jamming, spoofing, and the ability to identify the CSAR channels being used.

2.4.8 Recovery Force Losses

Although both combat recovery missions experienced resistance and fire from various small arms, AAA, and SAMS, there were no recovery force losses during OAF. One MH-60G received battle damage to a main rotor blade and engine cowling from small arms fire during the recovery of Hammer 34.

224 Cherrey, McGonagill, Laushine, and Trumpfheller interviews. 225 From the helicopter perspective, the approach to Combat Rescue execution during OAF was essentially as it was eight years earlier during Desert Storm. One by one, the operational and tactical missteps observed in SWA were repeated in the Balkans.

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2.5 Cold War Losses (1946-1991)

This section summarizes publicly reported incidents in which US military or other Government aircraft were attacked by Soviet or other Communist forces, resulting in US casualties. Not included are those losses occurring during military operations incident to and during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Also not included are those incidents in which US aircraft were forced or shot down, but in which all aircrew were returned to the US unharmed. The references on which the section is based emphasize that they are not an exhaustive account.

2.5.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

From the moment Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended across Europe, the Cold War became the defining feature of the remainder of the century. When the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became the centers of two contending blocs, representing fundamentally opposed political ideologies, American military strategy changed radically. The end of the war with Japan also witnessed the dawn of the nuclear age with its subsequent stockpiles of weapons and delivery systems. The American monopoly on nuclear power was broken with the Soviet acquisition of an atomic weapon in 1949 and by the late 1960s, a deliberately contrived nuclear weapons parity existed between the two superpowers. Each was generally deterred from direct hostile acts against the other by the knowledge that in a general war, victory could only be Pyrrhic. Amid conditions of nuclear stalemate, the American defense establishment sought to contain an opponent perceived as implacably hostile and bent on constant aggrandizement.

In this international setting, underdeveloped areas and emerging nations in the so-called Third World sought to broker their own independent futures, often with the superpower aid and assistance. Several limited conflicts raged on the periphery of superpower influence in countries seen as client states of the respective superpowers. Yielding anywhere threatened to tumble local commitments and alliances like so many dominoes.

After nearly a half-century punctuated by two major and protracted conflicts, several simmering ones, and constant tension over client state loyalties, the Cold War drew to a close with the collapse and dissolution of one of the principal contenders. The Soviet Union succumbed to the increasing internal contradictions of its economic system and a political structure resistant to change and sustained in power by an elaborate police and propaganda network.

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Throughout the Cold War, American forces maintained the ability to project American power abroad in support of national foreign policy. Naval forces in particular were engaged in continuous patrol in the Mediterranean after a U.S. presence was established there as early as 1946. The Truman Doctrine, announced in 1947, pledged American help to legitimate governments battling insurgent forces. The doctrine was itself considered the first application of the evolving containment policy. The US Navy also sailed in contested waters separating the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan and its Communist counterpart on the mainland of China.

Containment came to be played out in a series of smaller, localized conflicts rather than in a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. The call-up of military and air reserve forces helped resolve the Berlin Crisis of 1961. Washington was also inclined to use force in the sensitive Caribbean basin, site of the strategic Panama Canal. The protection of American interests in this region and along the southern border of the United States included the quarantine of Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962, the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Grenada intervention of October 1983, and the Panama operation of 1989.

The Soviet Union's successes in consolidating and controlling a bloc in Eastern Europe in the early years of the Cold War and the victory of Chinese Communism in the same period contributed to a pervasive sense of danger and threat in the United States. The closing of the Cold War, defined in terms of the end of the bipolar strategic equation, finds the United States redefining its global commitments, reassessing its force structure, and restructuring Department of Defense to adapt to a new and uncertain role in world affairs.

2.5.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents

Over the course of nearly 50 years of “cold war,” U.S. government aircraft were shot down with regularity by the USSR, Eastern European countries, China, and North Korea. Some of these aircraft were performing intelligence missions near or actually inside Soviet airspace; others were definitely in international airspace and/or were not involved in intelligence operations. While virtually all such aircraft losses were acknowledged at the time, often with considerable publicity, their intelligence functions were not.226

The American intelligence community would come to rely on the intelligence gathered during those missions to assess Soviet technological advances. However, the Soviet Union was not the sole objective of the operation. For instance, in September 1956, Francis Gary Powers flew over the eastern Mediterranean to determine the position of British and French warships poised to assist Israel's invasion of Egypt after Egyptian forces seized the Suez Canal. Other flights followed to gather data on military activity during crises involving Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Between 1946 and 1992, there are 19 publicly reported incidents in which US Government aircraft were destroyed and one involving a ship (the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, by the North Koreans in early 1968). Of the 194 crewmembers involved in publicly reported aircraft incidents, 38 were rescued, 12 were eventually repatriated to the United States, 29 were known

226 Goldrich (2) (no page number).

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to have been killed, and 115 remain unaccounted for.227 If there were loss incidents that were not publicly reported, those numbers would inevitably rise.

2.5.2.1 Causes of Isolating Incidents In 17 publicly reported Cold War incidents where the cause of loss or damage is known, 14 were caused by enemy fighters (Soviet, Chinese, or North Korean). The remainder is split between AAA (two) and SAMs (one).

2.5.2.2 Frequency of Isolating Incidents Without knowing the total number of missions flown in Cold War scenarios, it is impossible to calculate loss rates per sortie. Even so, the losses were distributed rather evenly over time, averaging about one loss per year between the first reported loss in 1950 and the last in 1969.

2.5.2.3 Number of Survivors/Evaders per Incident Unlike the more traditional conflicts included in this report, Cold War incidents tended to involve aircraft with larger crews (averaging 10 crewmembers per incident). Figure 2-53 shows the distribution among the 19 reported incidents.

2.5.3 Distribution of Losses

Figure 2-54 shows the physical distribution of reported aircraft losses during the Cold War (not shown is an additional U-2 loss over Cuba). With the exception of a U-2 lost deep in the USSR near Sverdlovsk (the “Gary Powers U-2 Incident”), aircraft losses were at the geographic periphery of the Soviet Union. Because those aircraft did not have the U-2s ability to fly at remarkably high altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses, it is assumed that they were not routinely

227 Compiled from Goldrich (1) and DPMO.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30+

Crew Size (personnel)

Inci

dent

s

Figure 2-53: Distribution of Crew Sizes Among Reported Cold War Losses(Source: DPMO PM-Cold Database and Goldrich [1] Summary)

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tasked for flights into the USSR’s interior. If that is the case, the loss distribution probably represents the concentration of mission profiles in those areas, as opposed to a weaker air defense inside the USSR’s. One can only speculate about the missions that were accomplished without incident, or that went unreported.

Figure 2-54: Distribution of Known Cold War Incidents

(Source: DPMO PM-Cold Database and Goldrich [1] Summary)

2.5.4 Survivor/Evader Landing and Evasion Environments

Because of the incredible vastness of the Soviet Union, any aircrew that was shot down could have been exposed to just about any imaginable physical environment, including desert, tundra, glacier, and urban areas. Despite those potentialities, 13 of 18 incidents (72 percent) for which the S/E’s physical environment was known resulted in aircraft losses over water. Except for a US Navy P2V that crash landed on St. Lawrence Island in Alaska after being damaged by Soviet fighters, there was no instance of a successful rescue over land (among the small group of incidents covered in this section). Table 2-22 summarizes the outcomes for the 18 incidents where the physical environment was known.

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Table 2-27: Incident Outcomes Over Land and Water

Incidents Over Land

Incidents Over Water

Geography Unknown Total

All aircrew killed or missing 2 8 1 11

At least one crew member successfully rescued 1 4 - 5

At least one crewmember repatriated after capture 2 1 - 3

Total 5 13 1 19

When a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down in May of 1960, nearby civilians captured him almost immediately after his parachute landing. Among his possessions were a “blood chit” for requesting assistance in several languages, several ounces of gold, and cash in denominations from several European countries. Those items, along with contemporaneous interest in the feasibility of evasion by foot over extremely long distances, and the limited range and capabilities of that era’s helicopters, suggest that rescue from deep inside the Soviet Union may not have been seen as realistic. By contrast, recovery forces (usually the US Navy) were frequently available to respond to incidents at sea and near coastlines.

Soviet reaction to Cold War incidents was secretive and confounding. Few details were volunteered by the Soviets and what information was available was often demonstrably false. It is surmised that some of the aircrew listed as an MIA had actually been captured by the Soviets—a fact that they denied then, and continue to deny now.

Because of the scarcity of information about the isolating incidents during the Cold War, the uniqueness of the missions, and the significant evolution of Combat Rescue and Special Operations capabilities since most of those events occurred, no significant conclusions could be drawn from that part of our history. At best, the Cold War incidents serve as a reminder that the World is very large and that rescue may sometimes be needed at the most improbable locations. Figure 2-55: Washington Daily News,

May 7, 1960

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2.6 Combat Rescue Test and Experiment Results

One of the outcomes of the numerous problems experienced during Combat Rescue missions since the war in SEA, particularly after Desert Storm, was a heightened DOD interest in “fixing Rescue.” As the HH-60G was introduced to the Combat Rescue role, Air Rescue Service (ARS) was reactivated in 1989 and organized under USAF Military Airlift Command.228 By 1993, ARS was again deactivated and its aircraft and resources were subsequently transferred to Air Combat Command as part of an Air Force Chief of Staff plan to integrate the Combat Rescue function with the combat air forces (CAF). With the realignment came a significant increase in funding for conventional Combat Rescue equipment and personnel. In addition to the increased resources dedicated to Combat Rescue, more emphasis was placed on development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Consequently a variety of Combat Rescue oriented experiments and testing events have occurred since the early 1990s. Significant among them were the Joint Combat Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation (JCSAR JT&E), Expeditionary Force Experiments (EFX 1999 and Joint EFX 2000), and numerous CSAR tactics development and evaluations (TD&E), operational tests (OT&E), and computer modeling and simulation (M&S) conducted by the Air Warfare Center (AWFC).

The data derived from the combination of all those events provide a sample size that rivals the SEA conflict, and offer results that are germane to the purpose of this report. Note, however, that this section provides only an overview of these events—for a detailed presentation of data, and for in depth analysis, the published reports must be referenced.

2.6.1 Summary of Major Exercise, Test, and Modeling Events

The scope of the “wars” that made up the exercise and test events were such that every imaginable type of tactical, ISR, and C4I asset was represented. The events had varied levels of real and notional players, and took place at a wide variety of stateside and overseas locations.

228 At the time, the aircraft was designated the MH-60G. Identical to the MH-60G used for Special Operations, the designations of aircraft assigned to Combat Rescue squadrons were later changed to HH-60G.

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2.6.1.1 Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation

The Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) was a three-year, Office of Secretary of Defense-chartered program to assess the effectiveness of the Services' current (at the time) JCSAR capabilities and identify problems and potential enhancements. The JCSAR JT&E examined the entire JCSAR process from the initial report of a downed aircraft to the recovery of isolated personnel. It tested the effectiveness of individual JCSAR functions (i.e., S/E location and identification; surface-based command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (SBC4I), and mission execution), as well as comprehensive, end-to-end JCSAR environments. To make their overall assessment the JT&E test schedule included 10 major field tests, 3 command post exercises, and 2 virtual simulation tests. Stateside events were conducted in desert environments (on the Nellis, Ft Irwin, and Fallon ranges) and forested environments (in Washington, Alaska, Florida, and Mississippi). Exercise and test players came from all services and included the range of air vehicles and satellites employed by DOD. The JCSAR JT&E Final Report contains a complete summary of all test events and a CD ROM containing all Test Plans and Reports. The following table summarizes the major JT&E events:

Table 2-28: Summary of JCSAR JT&E Events

Event Focus Recovery Vehicles RESCORT Other Forces Location

Blue Flag 96-3 SBC4I Various (Simulated)

Various (Simulated) SBC4I USCENTCOM

scenario (Simulated)

ASCIET 96 S/E Location

& Identification

N/A N/A

RC-135

EC-130 E

EP-3

NSS

Camp Shelby, Mississippi

Eglin AFB, Florida

FTX-1A and 1C (1996 and

1997))

Mission Execution HH-60G A-10 E-3

Nellis AFB, Nevada (Weapons School CSARTF & ME)

FTX-1B (1996 and 1997)

Mission Execution

HH-60G

HH-60H

A-10

AH-64 E-2C

Nellis AFB, Nevada (Weapons School CSARTF & ME)

Loc/ID Mini-Test S/E Location

& Identification

HH-60G N/A

HC-130

OA-10

EC-130E

Cook Inlet and Yukon/Susitna Ranges, Alaska

Aviano Range, Italy

Tuzla, BanjaLuka, Sarajevo, Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina

FTX-2 (1997) Mission Execution

HH-60G

HH-60H

A-10

F-16

AH-64

E-2C

E-8

Camp Shelby, Mississippi

Eglin AFB, Florida

Blue Flag 97-1 SBC4I Various (Simulated)

Various (Simulated) SBC4I USCENTCOM

scenario (Virtual)

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Event Focus Recovery Vehicles RESCORT Other Forces Location

Woodland Cougar 97 End-to-End

HH-60G

HH-60H

UART

A-10

AV-8B

CH-47

ES-3

HC-130

MC-130

MH-60K

Realistic S/E229

Spokane, Washington

Blue Flag 98-2 SBC4I Various (Simulated)

Various (Simulated) SBC4I USCENTCOM

scenario

Virtual Simulation

(VS-1)

Mission Execution

and Airborne C4I

HH-60G

HH-60H

UH-60L

A-10

F/A-18

AH-1W

AH-64

E-3

F-15C Notional DIA “medium threat” environment

Virtual Simulation

(VS-2)

Mission Execution

and Airborne C4I

HH-60G

HH-60H

UH-60L

A-10

F/A-18

AH-1W

AH-64

E-2C

E-3

E-8

F-15C

Notional DIA “medium threat” environment

JREX 98 End-to-End

HH-60G

HH-60H

UART

A-10 NSS

Realistic S/E

Spokane, Washington

Tacoma, Washington

2.6.1.2 Expeditionary Force Experiments

The general operational focus of EFX 98, JEFX 99, and JEFX 2000 was to find and kill time critical targets such as ballistic missile transporter erector/launchers (TELS), mobile SAMS, or even fixed targets that are critical in the time dimension. By JEFX 2000 a Time Critical Targeting (TCT) Cell had evolved to include a “Hunter” section with direct links to multiple ISR assets and a “Killer” section consisting of operators (including a Search and Rescue Duty Officer, or SARDO) and weaponeers with direct links to on-call airborne shooters.

For participants working Combat Rescue issues during the experiment, the hypothesis for JEFX was that Combat Rescue is basically a Time Critical Targeting problem. Keep in mind that there are certain steps that must be accomplished in order to prosecute any target, whether or not it is “time critical” (those steps are find, fix, identify, target, task, engage, and assess—also called the “Kill Chain”). TCT is a complex, evolving process that seeks to speed the flow of a target through that chain. To do that, TCT managers in the AOC are given processes, assets (strike, ISR, and communications), and JFACC authority to act within certain parameters. Further, 229 All of the JCSAR JT&E events included S/E play in one way or another. Sometimes, that play was scripted, and sometimes it was simulated, depending in the requirements of the test event. During Woodland Cougar 97 and JREX 98, S/E play was robust and particularly realistic. S/E were in the field for days, evading live OPFOR and attempting to facilitate their own rescues.

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assets with particular capabilities are specifically apportioned to support TCT operations. Wide use of datalinks (primarily Link-16 and Situational Awareness Datalink, or SADL) in JEFX passed critical information among all players, and was used to create (and share) a common operating picture (COP). In that TCT environment, a target could be found, fixed, identified, targeted, and tasked in single-digit minutes.

If the Kill Chain is examined from a CSAR perspective, and the survivor visualized as a “target,” the process looks very familiar. Because of their similarity, Combat Rescue planners during JEFX supposed that if CSAR events were handled using generic TCT processes, and supported by appropriate enabling technologies, they could reduce CSAR response time from several hours down to several minutes. In the end, their supposition was proven correct.

2.6.1.3 Air Warfare Center Tests

AWFC testing was smaller in scope than JCSAR JT&E and EFX activity, instead focusing on tactics and systems-level issues. Test events included both enroute and terminal area operations, depending on the specific test objectives. The scenarios ranged from major theater war down to small-scale contingencies with restrictive ROE. Due to resource constraints, some of the “big war” was notional so that the testers could concentrate on the specific issues. Threats included live and notional players, real and simulated enemy fighters, SAMs, AAA, MANPADs, and small arms. The opposition forces (OPFOR) employed realistic electronic, air, and ground orders of battle although no single event had the full array. In some test events, OPFOR response to friendly action was scripted, while in others they were given free play.

RV enroute operations were examined during the HH-60G Defensive Systems and Foreign Material Exploitation (FME) tests in which scenarios were used to examine adversary engagement of enroute helicopters with RF/IR SAMs and fighters. These were ambush scenarios with the enemy employing its early warning, ground control intercept (GCI), and C4I capability to track the helicopter until it was in the heart of the envelope and then engaging the helicopters. The threat operators exercised counter-SEAD tactics in these scenarios so the CSARTF players usually got little or no warning. Despite this, the HH-60G escaped from the majority of these engagements using a combination of expendables and maneuver.

In recognition of the particular danger during terminal area operations, AWFC conducted extensive testing and tactics development in that regime from 1996 until 1999 in three separate efforts—HH-60G Cabin Configuration Test, Terminal Area Tactics (TAT) Test, and Extended Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) Test. Detailed results for all of the AWFC testing have been published as test reports and in AFTTP 3-1.

2.6.1.4 Modeling and Simulation

The JCSAR JT&E conducted extensive research into Modeling and Simulation tools available to support the JCSAR JT&E and the Combat Rescue community at large. The JT&E grouped Modeling and Simulation needs into four types of tools:

Support Analysis of Proposed Equipment

Support Tactics and Processes Development and Evaluation

Support Operational Plans Development and Evaluation

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Support Mission Planning, Rehearsal, and Virtual Training

The JCSAR JT&E research also determined that other than the Air Force Rescue Model no tool or tools had been developed to address these stated needs.

To support JCSAR JT&E objectives the Test Team adapted a number of virtual simulation tools to evaluate CSARTF operations as part of major force employment operations. In two separate Virtual Simulation Tests, the JCSAR JT&E integrated up to 5 virtual simulation facilities to allow the interaction of Recovery Vehicles (HH-60G, HH-60H), RESCORT/OSC (A-10, AH-64, AH-1, F/A-18), RESCAP (F-15C), and Command and Control Platforms (E-3, E-2, and JSTARS). The forces flew CSARTF operations against virtual and constructive ground and air threats.

To support AFWC defensive simulation testing, the Test Team used Georgia Tech Infrared Simulator (GTSIM) to evaluate expendable countermeasure effectiveness and develop an optimum mix of flares to counter advanced IR missiles. The GTSIM model was consistent with live-fire IR missile test results. The GTSIM model is in use today for the development of improved IR countermeasures.

In the spring of 2000, the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (CR AoA) picked up where the JCSAR JT&E left off, but focused on tools needed to support the CR AoA mission -- analysis of proposed Combat Rescue equipment, tactics, and processes. Where appropriate the CR AoA adapted existing modeling and simulation tools. These tools include:

Campaign and Operations Models (Air Force Rescue Model and SIMPROCESS [named Combat Rescue Operations Simulation]) to model the Combat Rescue process in a 30 day campaign. Inputs to these tools include various threat levels found in two separate DIA validated threat laydowns, performance and availability characteristics of the concept Recovery Vehicles under study (HH-60G, Compound Helicopters, Medium Lift Helicopters, and Tiltrotors), and various air and ground command and control delays. Outputs included Percent Of Isolated Personnel Rescued And Time To Rescue

Combat Rescue Mission Level Models (SUPPRESSOR and Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS)) to evaluate performance characteristics of the concept Recovery Vehicles under study.

o SUPPRESSOR evaluated the ingress and egress survivability of the recovery vehicles. Inputs to SUPPRESSOR include one-on-one threat engagement results from Enhanced Surface to Air Missile Simulation (ESAMS), Radar Guns (RADGUNS), and MOSIAC (IR SAM). SUPRESSOR was also used to investigate the relative benefits of advanced countermeasure capabilities and use of RESCORT.

o Terminal area M&S using the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) began in the fall of 2000. It allows users to model CSARTF players (including RVs) with virtually any flight, operational, or weapons characteristics. It can also model RV and weapons interaction against enemy forces that react to events in accordance with user-defined rule sets. JCATS also permits the use of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) or equipment that are not currently fielded. For example, the utility of battlefield obscurants and agents like CS gas can be examined without the controversy or safety questions that may accompany their use. These enjoyed modest success in SEA, but they have fallen in disuse due to a lack of certified munitions and legal restrictions on their use. JCATS

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provides a means to “test” them, and future non-lethal munitions, providing insight to their possible utility. Although it has the limitations that are typical of computer models, JCATS is the first tool of its type used to examine the terminal area phase of a Combat Rescue mission.

2.6.2 Summarized Findings

This section summarizes the findings of the tests, experiments, and mission modeling that were previously described. Findings are categorized into the areas of rescue force training, location/identification of the S/E, Command and Control, threat encounter and suppression, use of ground teams, and interoperability. For a thorough description of how the events were constructed, conclusions, and the limits of the data, the source reports must be referenced. They are listed in this report’s References section.

2.6.2.1 Rescue Force Training

Anomaly Review Boards and Expert Panels that reviewed all the JCSAR JT&E test results unanimously identified insufficient mission area training as a root cause for many of the observed problems. It follows that, in a larger sense, the quality, focus, and curricula of the individual Service’s training programs are problems themselves. JT&E findings put emphasis on end-to-end training with live OPFOR equipped with MANPADS and small arms.

A general unwillingness to include Combat Rescue operations as part of an exercise’s main body is routinely observed (and was specifically cited by the Expert Panels) during in-CONUS exercises and during theater spin-up training (as was observed in Desert Storm and Allied Force). In a well-intended attempt to make up for the oversight, major exercises (like Red Flag) will often set aside a day as “CSAR day,” during which the sole focus is Combat Rescue. That, also misses the mark—experience during contingency support, JCSAR JT&E, and JEFX, suggests that the most appropriate training for Combat Rescue occurs when the rescue operation is an integral part of the larger air battle plan being executed. “CSAR day” may tend to reinforce the notion that battle managers must “stop the war” when a Combat Rescue event is in progress.

Woodland Cougar 97 and JREX 98 represented rare examples of live-fly events that included rescue forces, realistic survivors, robust enemy ground order of battle, and a complete, end-to-end command and control architecture. Participant feedback and the JT&E Expert Panels that reviewed the results were unanimous in recommending regular end-to-end training exercises integrated with existing major exercises as an enhancement to JCSAR effectiveness. Training events must include all elements that would participate in actual Combat Rescue operations (including surface-based C4I elements) executing a well-understood CONOPS in order to maximize both the training opportunity and the likelihood of success in combat. Woodland Cougar 97 and JREX 98 results illustrate that when CONOPS and interoperability violations occur, delayed and failed missions are the result. That conclusion appears to have certain validity as the predicted results of CONOPS and interoperability violations were directly observed during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force.

Although not a literal part of the rescue force, the ability of the S/E to assist his own rescue was observed as a key predictor of success across almost all of the test events. Significant S/E related factors include the ability to accurately report location and local threats, ability to follow rescue

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force instructions, and ability to evade capture (particularly during the first 60 minutes after S/E isolation).

2.6.2.2 Location, Identification, and Authentication of the Survivor/Evader

Initial notification of the isolating incidents varied from test venue to venue. In some of the limited tests, S/E detection was scripted, but during the major exercises (JEFX 2000, JREX 98, WC 97) an attempt was made to allow the process to unfold in a realistic way. Consistent with what has been observed in history, the primary means of incident notification was a radio call from the isolated person himself on a survival radio or a wingman call. In some cases, the call from the isolated person was undetected by C4I elements. Causes for failed detection included improper use of the radios, incorrect frequencies, monitoring/transmitting schedule confusion, and equipment failures. The S/E suffered from additional problems of antennae misuse, low batteries, terrain masking, vegetation attenuation, and poor radio human factors. In other words, the same failure modes experienced in the real world were observed during testing.

Testing demonstrated the logical result that that delays and errors in locating the survivor result in delays issuing a launch order to recover the survivor. Errors of sufficient magnitude cause mission failure because, when CSAR forces arrive at an expected survivor location, they are not close enough to the survivor to use their locating equipment and line-of-sight radios. Location errors also cause unneeded exposure of forces to threats during an extended search phase that may not result in a rescue, incorrect threat assessments, and selection of improper CSAR forces. JCSAR JT&E also found that these failed rescue attempts attracted the OPFOR and had a adverse impact on the survivability of the rescue force on their second attempt–the bad guys were waiting.

Compounding those problems is the fact that all of the currently fielded survival radios (PRC-90 and PRC-112A, Hook 112) are subject to direction finding (DF) by the enemy. OPFOR exploited that vulnerability during WC 97 and JREX 98 and, as a result, enjoyed some success in capturing survivors or setting up SAR traps. The current radios have no encryption capability, remain vulnerable to spoofing, and are easily jammed due to their low transmitter power. All of those weaknesses were observed in testing and have been exploited by real enemy forces in every conflict covered by this report. Friendly forces also use DF techniques to locate S/E on the ground. Using airborne C4I assets (Rivet Joint, Senior Scout, and an EP-3), JT&E testing measured the average DF location error at 6 to 7 miles for the PRC-90 and PRC-112A. The amount of error is significantly dependant on the physical position of the DF asset relative to the radio on the ground and, even when all systems are working correctly, could measure in the dozens of miles.

To assess solutions to limitations of the standard radios, some test scenarios equipped S/E with advanced radios capable of over the horizon (OTH) geolocation and messaging capabilities. These technologies included the partially fielded PRC-112B (“Hook-112”), the prototype PRQ-7 Combat Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL) radio, and the experimental Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS). System architectures and detection success of these advanced signaling devices varied. The very nature of OTH communications drives an increased level of complexity that includes multiple satellites, landlines, downlinks, uplinks, etc. Additionally the CSEL and GPRS devices were immature designs, so it was unsurprising during testing when one of the links in the chain broke. Thus the advent of the advanced technology radios mitigated

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some of the deficiencies of the older radios while introducing more possible failures modes with their greater complexity.

JT&E and JEFX results reflect a vastly improved capability when everything in an advanced radio’s architecture worked as advertised. The detection of the isolating incident was in near real-time, and can be made simultaneously available to multiple players in a CSARTF, C4I elements, and even in the Pentagon. The specific content and quality of the messages varied by device, but each delivered some capability for precise, self-reported geolocation and low-probability of exploitation (LPE) two-way messaging for communication of S/E physical condition, threat activity, weather, or whatever else he chose to send. The advanced radios employ combinations of databurst and LPE waveforms to make them both difficult to detect and to jam. OPFOR attempts to DF, spoof, and jam the radios were made with only limited success.

The enhanced capability demonstrated that the mean survivor location error could be reduced from at least 6 nautical miles to 0.5 nautical miles. With those enhancements alone, the median SBC4I processing time was reduced from 7.3 to 3.8 hours. The overall impact on mission success is inconclusive—JT&E testing measured mission success rates between 46 and 49 percent when either the standard or advanced radios were used (although their use during JEFX was one of several decisive factors for successful real-time reaction to shootdowns).

The S/E himself is not the only source of error in his reported location. JT&E testing quantified how frequently the C4I system itself introduced S/E location error as the information was being collected, recorded, or distributed. Remarkably, after the S/E location was reported to the JSRC, additional errors were introduced and reported in more than 60% of cases. Typical sources of error included incorrectly plotting survivor locations on maps, distance unit conversion, coordinate system conversion, and true/magnetic heading conversion, transcription error, or simply mis-hearing the information.

Utility of National Security Systems (NSS) in locating and identifying S/E was also examined during JT&E and JEFX testing. While those systems offer capabilities that are helpful to those tasks, using them effectively is difficult. Unfamiliarity with NSS CONOPS within each of the CSAR elements (SBC4I, rescue forces, isolated personnel, or SOF) is extremely high, and they are therefore rarely used. Opportunities for forces to train or test with National Assets in an operational Theater were described by the JT&E as “nearly non-existent.” While that may have been true during the JT&E, accessibility had improved over time such that (after significant pre-coordination) JEFX 2000 received support from several NSS and every imaginable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset. Looking ahead, one of the most valuable results of major exercises and experiments will be aircrew and battle manager familiarity with NSS request and coordination procedures.

2.6.2.3 Command and Control

Given current SBC4I processes, the test team found that the median and average SBC4I process times, from shootdown to issuance of a launch order, were 7.3 hours and 5 hours respectively. Even using enhanced processes and systems developed by the JT&E, the test team found that the median SBC4I process time was 3.8 hours and, in any case, could not be completed in less than 30 minutes. Because of the significant process redesign, JEFX results significantly departed from those of the JT&E and showed that by exploiting the breadth of experience and assets

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available in a TCT-capable AOC, SBC4I can accomplish the same tasks, with higher quality, in less than 10 minutes.

Even several hours of process time do not prevent fundamental errors from having a significant, sometimes decisive, effect on rescue operations. Some errors observed by the JT&E include:

o JSRC confused aircraft callsigns (Ambush 41 versus Ambush 42). JSRC logged in mission folder that 1 chute was seen for Ambush 42 but posted on JSRC status board that no chutes were seen for Ambush.

o JSRC located, identified, and authenticated isolated personnel. Based on operational factors, JSRC passed mission to SOC RCC. SOC RCC selected forces, developed CONOPS, and approved mission. SOC RCC sent mission approval message to JSRC. JSRC filed message in mission folder but did not transmit an execute order.

o JSRC assessed threat at isolated personnel's last known position as medium but did not examine the threat along route from rescue forces to isolated personnel, which was high.

o Initial notification of lost aircraft came as an overdue aircraft report from Wing Operations Center (no time, cause, or location of loss). JSRC stopped efforts to locate, identify, and communicate with the isolated personnel after first failed attempt, JSRC made no follow-up efforts.

o JSRC located, identified, and authenticated isolated personnel. JSRC passed mission to SOC RCC and instructed isolated personnel to evade to a low-threat area. Survivor evaded to a low threat area. Army and Navy RCCs provided forces/CONOPS to conduct rescue mission. SOC RCC declined mission after threat degraded to low. JSRC did not assign mission to another agency.

o JSRC located and identified isolated personnel. JSRC did not communicate with or authenticate isolated personnel. JSRC misconverted isolated personnel's location from lat./long. to range/bearing from SARDOT by using statute miles instead of nautical miles, placing isolated personnel in adjacent country . JSRC passed wrong isolated personnel location down-channel to CSAR Forces.

The JT&E found that, despite improved processes, most of the problems identified over the course of the multiple test events were persistent. The test team found that those problems are symptomatic of the following root causes:

o CONOPS. The various CSAR CONOPS in use by the Services and Theaters are based, in part, on assumptions that may be obsolete. They do not address the factors that the test team has shown are linked to success or failure.

o TTP. The current Joint TTP are insufficient for the needs of the C4I element. Joint TTP have not kept pace with the CSAR C4I process. Service TTP for CSAR C4I are not standardized, resulting in interoperability issues.

o Training. There is a lack of joint, integrated training opportunities for CSAR C4I personnel. Negative learning occurs when JSRCs and CSAR forces train separately. CSAR C4I personnel have few opportunities to experience and deal with interoperability problems.

o Technology. No automated information technology has been effectively fielded in any JSRC or RCC to support the CSAR C4I process. The CSAR C4I tasks of collecting, filtering, organizing, and distributing information are currently being performed manually and human errors will persist.

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o Manpower. Manpower and experience within the CSAR C4I element are eroding. Service and Component RCCs continue to decline in size and capability. The skill and experience prerequisites assigned to personnel manning a JSRC or RCC have been reduced or eliminated.

To address the larger command and control issues, the JT&E recommended a Survivor-Sensor-Save concept that obliges the planners to look at the Joint CSAR mission area as an overall system or process, not individual elements. They proposed a Joint CSAR system made up of three basic elements (isolated personnel, recovery forces, and C4I) between which the interfaces are well defined. For the system to work effectively, the interfaces (indicated by the arrows) must work together seamlessly and within the existing warfighting environment.

As a long-term vision, the system the JT&E described would interact in the following manner:

o The advanced survival radio should be capable of near real-time, two-way, OTH, databurst communication and geo-location

o The RV should be capable of receiving battlespace awareness information, trading digital information, and maintaining constant track of each other

o Using the PRQ-X, the isolated person alerts the CSAR C4I element and distributes critical information electronically to an automated information system

o The C4I element uses an automated information system to filter and organize isolated personnel and battlespace information, plan a mission to recover the isolated person, and produce a decision aid to present to the launch authority

o Through the battlespace awareness system, the isolated personnel information and mission plan can be distributed to the selected recovery force (HH-X, RESCORT, and support aircraft, as needed) while on ground or airborne alert for prosecution and recovery of the isolated person.

Figure 2-56: Survivor-Sensor-Save Process Model

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In practical terms, what the JT&E described was the JEFX time-critical targeting data architecture (in which Combat Rescue was only one of many participating mission areas). Considering the remarkable effect such a system had on SBC4I process time, the JT&E recommendation was prescient.

2.6.2.4 Time Critical Targeting for Combat Rescue

Exploitation of TCT processes for CSAR during JEFX improved rescue response in two basic ways:

1. Considerably less Surface-based C4I (SBC4I) time was consumed following “shootdowns.”

2. Asset packaging decisions and coordination quality were significantly improved

During JEFX, the TCT Cell performed real-time mission execution management duties normally accomplished by an air component’s RCC. By reassigning those tasks to a TCT organization, the S/E was located and identified, “targeted” by battle managers, and tasked for prosecution by a CSARTF in real-time using assets that were already airborne at the time of the “shootdown.” SBC4I time required during JEFX Combat Rescue missions showed marked improvement over current processes—what used to take, on average, more than five hours, was being done (better) in about 10 minutes.230 Compared against current capability, such a response is revolutionary. In context of JEFX Time Critical Targeting operations, however, such performance was routine and expected, regardless of whether the target was a mobile SAM or a Survivor/Evader. The use of common, integrated processes meant that all of the Combat Rescue activity took place simultaneously with continuous prosecution of other nominated TCTs. The leverage produced by putting wide variety of expertise in a common environment to execute a clearly defined, collaborative battle management process cannot be overstated.

The following extract from the JEFX 2000 Experiment Report provides a synopsis of the typical TCT Cell mission flow (in a Combat Rescue scenario):

• Receive, correlate, and then “plot” location best determined by the SARDO onto the Common Operational Picture (COP). [30 sec – 5 min, depending on signal device accuracy progression].

• Identify an initial On-Scene Commander with suitable area suppression munitions from the airborne TCT asset pool. Task the OSC to move into the vicinity of the S/E. Simultaneously, improve the position of the rescue forces as close to the S/E as possible (in accordance with JFACC guidance) from their airborne alert anchor via a cleared holding point [30 sec – 1 min]231.

230 Using traditional processes, the average SBC4I process time to make a go/no-go decision is 3.95 hours (JCSAR JT&E data). Using the same SBC4I processes, the average time required to simply disseminate a mission execution decision that has already been made is 1.15 hours. The data also show that the higher the threat, the more SBC4I process time is consumed. In other words, our ability to respond quickly is at its worst when the need for a fast response is greatest. 231 All CSAR forces were staged in an airborne alert posture. Although airborne alert reduced reaction time and helped the helicopters meet JEFX range time restrictions, airborne alert is not necessarily a prerequisite for Combat Rescue operations in a TCT environment.

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• Hunter Section establishes a 20 NM ring around the S/E location, and informs the Killer Section/SARDO of all SIGINT/COMINT and ground activity until mission complete. Ingress/egress routings are evaluated as well [30 sec to initiate, 1 - 5 min’s for substantial ISR analysis, area dependent].

• Attempt to receive real-time video from a UAV or similar source to validate S/E location and status, locate dismounted enemy infantry, and (in the event of S/E capture) document the S/E status as Prisoner of War.

• Evaluate SEAD and CAP requirements (to include EA-6B jamming) and confirm adequate coverage. Put in direct contact with OSC [1 min].

• TCT assets, including appropriate strike aircraft and surface-to-surface weapons, begin sterilization process around S/E and RV routing.

• Once the complete plan is assembled, gain execution approval from JFACC prior to RV threat penetration [15 mins to two hours].232

o Obtain ISOPREP from RCC, then pass it to RV’s, and OSC (1 min)

o CAOC-F orchestrates additional TCT support (as required) and maintains battle-space awareness until egress complete.

A summary of major elements that were considered as a recovery plan was assembled included:

• Requirements for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense assets

• Requirements for Combat Air Patrol assets

• Real-time intelligence from coordinated ISR assets

• Weapons effects

• Support from classified programs

• Enroute and terminal area weather

• Support available from other Components (Land, Maritime, and Special Operations)

• Air Refueling requirements

To the extent that a targeting process is intended to produce a desired effect, S/Es in the field were indeed “targeted” during JEFX but, unlike more traditional targets, the desired effect on S/Es was their protection. Once the survivor was formally declared a target, the first priority was immediate assignment of airborne assets that could refine the location of the S/E (if required) and provide protection until the arrival of recovery forces (if required). The SARDO’s position in the TCT Cell section allowed his real-time collaboration with experts from many disciplines in 232 A requirement for the JSRC Director to provide the CFACC a structured Combat Rescue mission briefing made this a very time-consuming process relative to the speed of other rescue activity and decision-making. The CFACC’s confidence in the rescue process improved as a track-record of mission success was developed during live-fly. At its fastest (on the last day of live-fly), the briefing/approval process took as little as 15 minutes. Approval for missions executed during Spirals 2 and 3 took substantially longer (in one case as long as two hours). Stringent requirements for centralized control/centralized execution of Combat Rescue missions can be expected to diminish as CFACC comfort level increases.

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order to assemble a properly armed, high-SA protective force capable of operating in any threat environment in which TCT operations were expected. One must keep in mind that there were no “Combat Rescue TCT procedures,” per se. Attack missions and Combat Rescue missions were prosecuted using identical TCT procedures.

There was one significant difference between “traditional” targets and S/Es that were classified as targets—unlike more traditional TCTs, once CSAR missions arrived at the “task” step in the Kill Chain, the TCT Cell was obligated pause and wait for specific JFACC approval to execute the mission. That additional “go wake the General” step delayed mission execution by, at times, up to two hours. Separate interviews with the JFACC during JEFX, the JFACC “mentor” from the Aerospace C2ISR Center, and with the Air Combat Command Commander identified the reason for their insistence on that extra step—they unanimously perceived excessive variation in Combat Rescue C2 processes across the CAF, among the warfighting commands, and in actual Combat Operations. As a result, each felt it was important to ensure their significant involvement in what they perceived to be a very important mission that carries with it considerable risk.233

Regardless of those additional delays, the significance of the improvements can be clearly seen. The curve in Figure 2-57 shows survivor viability as a function of exposure time. For a rescue mission about 80 miles from recovery forces (as was used in JEFX scenarios), the three labeled points show the impact of SBC4I process time.

• Point A shows that after 4:40 hours of exposure time (representing 3.95 hours of SBC4I delay plus 40 minutes of RV enroute time), only about 5% of S/Es remain viable.

• Point B shows the improvements observed when Combat Rescue was prosecuted via TCT processes during JEFX (representing 15 minutes of TCT processing time, 30 minutes of JFACC approval time, and 40 minutes of enroute time). TCT processes reduced S/E exposure time from 4:40 minutes to 1:25 hours, and increased S/E viability by a factor of five.

• Point C shows what would have been possible if Combat Rescue operations had been prosecuted like other TCTs during JEFX, without the additional requirement for specific JFACC mission approval. After 55 minutes of exposure (15 minutes TCT processing time plus 40 minutes enroute time), S/E viability is more than 10 times higher than the status quo (Point A), and about two times better than what was observed during JEFX (Point B).

233 Jumper, Keck, and Corder interviews.

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(Source: USAF Air Warfare Center; “Combat Rescue Time Critical Targeting and Tactical Datalinks—JEFX 2000 Final Report,” p. 10)

It must be emphasized that activity in support of Combat Rescue missions took place simultaneously with the prosecution of other TCTs in the TCT Cell. In short, inclusion of downed aircrew on a theater’s list of approved TCTs did not adversely affect prosecution of other targets and, by virtue of the planning process that precedes TCT operations, actually reduced total resource demand for Combat Rescue missions.

2.6.2.5 Threat Encounter and Suppression

Although most of the defensive systems and terminal area test results are classified, certain broad conclusions may be stated here. Foremost among them is the survivability advantage derived from high Situational Awareness (SA) among combat aircrews and battle mangers. As adversaries improve their capabilities, testing suggests that the best countermeasure is to maintain high, real-time SA of the threat (via radar warning, real-time intelligence to the cockpit (RTIC), and datalink systems), status of friendly forces, and the intentions of both.

OPPOSITION FORCES USED IN THE TESTING The capabilities and effectiveness of OPFOR participating in each test event varied. Some JCSAR JT&E events employed adversaries equipped with small arms, MANPAD simulators with Night Vision Devices, unarmored vehicles, and tactical radios (VHF-FM) for communications. They were deployed in platoon strength throughout the exercise area, and their vehicles and the existing road net permitted rapid reaction to extended CSAR efforts. The tactics employed by OPFOR in these scenarios was a meld of those seen by the North Vietnamese Army, the Viet Cong, the Iraqis, and the Serbs, coupled with their rather detailed knowledge of US tactics and equipment. Enemy objectives were to inflict as much damage on US forces as

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possible. The enemy sought to use the survivors as bait for SAR traps or, failing that, to capture the survivor. Due to the short duration of some of the events, some enemy behaviors, strengths, and initial locations were scripted to ensure a “fight” would actually occur. Beyond that, enemy forces were generally allowed to free play and employ whatever they could get their hands on to win.

The enemy forces conducted limited SIGINT collection during WC 97 and JREX 98 in addition to their DF activities. This information was exploited to obtain general operational patterns. Call signs and aircraft types were obtained from the context of conversations with air traffic control. The adversaries also exploited captured personnel and their equipment. No interrogations were conducted but the adversaries made full use of survivors’ radios and GPS devices to obtain frequencies and coordinates. Using this information and equipment, the enemy was able to conduct radio intrusion and jamming sufficient to result in several aborted rescue attempts. It should be reiterated that no currently fielded survival radio has secure or anti-jam modes so, in the terminal area, the CSARTF is talking in the clear by necessity. This problem was compounded by frequent Blue Force abandonment of security procedures designed for passing sensitive information over unclassified communications nets.

A specially trained team of Security Forces and Tactical Air Control Personnel from the AWFC were tasked as OPFOR during most of the AWFC-directed testing. They were deployed as a single platoon (9 to 11 personnel) in close proximity to the survivor’s location such that they could react to the pickup attempt. They were equipped with small arms, a single, unarmored all-terrain vehicle, and tactical radios (VHF-FM) for communications. The same AWFC team also deployed to JREX 98 as adversaries. Additional adversaries at JREX 98 included a USMC Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (140 personnel) and an Army Special Operations Team- Alpha with DF equipment.

Adversary ground teams employed small-arms and automatic weapons with blanks, and Smoky SAMs to provide visual feedback to the aircrews. Flares were also employed at night to simulate missile firings. For safety reasons, RVs employed blanks in the door guns, but CSARTF aircraft used no other munitions. JREX 98 also saw the use of threat emitters capable of emulating the ZSU-23-4, and the SA-8, Giraffe acquisitions radars, and generic EW radar.

THREAT EFFECT ON MISSION PROGRESS The average speed of advance of the CSARTF helicopters to the terminal area in these tests/experiments was largely threat dependent. RESCORT directed the helicopters to orbit at the “safest” available intermediate points while enroute, pushing the RVs closer as each segment was cleared for them. It was recognized that extended orbiting in enemy territory, itself, would soon draw an enemy response, thus “safety” was relative. Enroute delays ranged from as short as a single orbit to as long as 30 minutes. When proceeding, the helicopters flew as fast as conditions (weather and illumination) allowed. The resulting “hurry up and wait” meant that 140-knot helicopters had an average speed of advance as low as 30 knots over a distance of 80 miles enroute. That experience is not dissimilar to what was observed in recent conflicts, including an instance in which an MH-53 was airborne for more than five hours and required air refueling to reach an S/E less than 50 miles away.

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It should also be noted that defensive systems testing has debunked some conventional wisdom about low-level helicopter invulnerability to certain tactical SAM systems. Adversaries continuously adapt and improve their anti-aircraft systems, and our assessment of their effectiveness is often dated or based on faulty assumptions. Only a robust, on-going test process will identify areas of weakness (or strength), so that tacticians and systems may adapt.

TERMINAL AREA OPERATIONS Terminal Area Tactics testing began with the RVs orbiting at an initial point a few miles way from the survivor. The test S/E concealed himself the best he could be in the available cover, sometimes with simulated injuries or a parachute entanglement that would tend to increase the amount of time an RV had to spend in the Terminal Area. OPFOR were given a general vicinity for the S/E (two to ten square miles) and sufficient time to deploy within the play area in accordance with their tactics. Generally they chose to place radio-equipped observers on any high ground and deploy the remainder of their forces in small groups scattered throughout the Terminal Area.

The small number of adversaries and their relatively light armament were deliberately chosen to emulate the dismounted, squad size remnants that could elude detection and destruction by RESCORT. If the S/E’s position is well known, US forces generally have the capability to create a protective ring around him, outside of which dismounted troops are subject to a lethal mix of ordnance: bombs, air-to-ground missiles, rockets, strafing, mines, combined effects munitions, and (historically) napalm and tear gas. Enemy vehicles are quickly targeted and destroyed in open terrain and only stationary vehicles survive in forested terrain. Radar and radio emitters are also targeted. Once adversaries advance inside that ring, RESCORT ability to do additional suppression becomes limited. Consequently, unless the enemy is already very close to an S/E by the time the RV arrives in the Terminal Area, a likely worst case for the recovery helicopters to deal with are dismounted, squad size remnants of larger forces.

Even with highly precise S/E coordinates or a high-quality hand-off from RESCORT/OSC, getting “eyes on” the S/E from the RV is both difficult and important. If the S/E can be spotted quickly, the RV is less likely to find itself in a “trolling” mode—in testing, every RV that began a slow troll in the Terminal Area was hit at least once. The RV’s wingman was a partial cure for suppressing close-in OPFOR because it had far better likelihood of detecting dismounted infantry, and has weapons that are more precise than a fighter’s, reducing risk of fratricide. However, the RV wingman’s effectiveness was inversely proportional to its speed and its distance from what it was protecting (i.e. the hovering helicopter, deployed PJs, or S/E). As TAT progressed, OPFOR learned to simply ignore the wingman when it was out of position, pressing inward towards the S/E whenever possible. Compounding matters, as the wingman got lower and slower, his increase in effectiveness was matched by an increase in his vulnerability. The best tactic for the wingman was a compromise in speed and proximity. An optimum trade-off of effectiveness and vulnerability is classified, and is described in detail in the test report and AFTTP 3-1 Volume 24 (S).

JCATS modeling has generally confirmed that the best use for the RV’s wingman (or the flight lead, once PJs are on the ground) is to provide mutual support to the ground element with proactive gun patterns and suppressive fire. The modeling also suggests that against close, soft targets, the rate of fire and field of fire of the RV’s weapon is a primary determinant of

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suppression effectiveness. A direct communications link between the deployed PJ team and RESCORT was also assessed to be an important (and often overlooked) aspect of a successful Terminal Area operation.

TAT results were far more extensive then can be addressed here, but the major lessons learned were unsurprising in the context of what history has already made clear. First and foremost was that a helicopter hovering for more than a few minute over a deployed PJ team or S/E is a recipe for failure, even in the relatively low threat scenarios used during TAT. The helicopter is a beacon to enemy forces, the noise of the helicopter deafens the deployed PJs and S/E, and the downwash partially blinds them in sand and snow. When the helicopter remained in a hover in these extended scenarios, every single attempt in multiple trials resulted in mission failure. The adversary forces quickly learned that they could approach from the recovery vehicle from its six o’clock with near impunity from its scanners and guns.234 This result was quantified in JCATS modeling. The implication is that a simple change in tactics may result in significant improvement in RV survivability.

Another primary finding of all of the Terminal Area testing was that dismounted troops are very, very difficult to detect, and their destruction is largely a matter of chance. RESCORT fighters were unable to see dismounted OPFOR, even in low desert scrub. Further, when responding to PJ Emergency CAS (ECAS) requests, the fighters were frequently unable to engage the enemy close to the hovering helicopter, deployed PJs, or S/E due to fratricide concerns. RESCORT fighters were still key to the operation for numerous reasons, but real limitations in the capability of fixed wing air power to suppress dismounted adversaries, particularly in rough or foliated terrain, were demonstrated repeatedly. This was true when the RESCORT duties were performed by A-10s, and even more so when F-16s or F-15Es were used. The JCSAR JT&E observed that the use of mixed helicopter/fixed-wing RESCORT packages might be an appropriate mitigating tactic.

MANPADS were the most effective threat against CSARTF aircraft during all the tests, particularly since a hit by MANPADS tends to result in the destruction of a helicopter, and the likely destruction of a RESCORT fighter. NVG-equipped MANPADS operating at night proved to be only one-third as effective against CSARTF aircraft as their daytime counterparts. It is a significant factor that most suppression of MANPADS was performed only after at least one missile had been launched.

Also a factor, although less so than OPFOR use of MANPADS and small arms/automatic weapons, were “leaking” enemy fighters that were occasionally able to execute unobserved, radar-silent, GCI assisted attacks and achieve kills with simulated IR missiles and guns. In contrast, no enemy fighter was able to achieve a gun track or achieve IR missile tone if the RV aircrews were alert to the enemy presence and maneuvered. Regardless of the weapon used, visual lookout from the RV and by the rest of the CSARTF was the best preventative measure.

Tactical deception improved Terminal Area success rates dramatically. False insertions and extractions compounded the OPFOR targeting problem, forcing them to split their already small forces, or to guess which insertion point was real. Having the pickup helicopter insert the PJs and move away during S/E packaging eliminated both the beacon effect and the 234 The recovery vehicles used for TAT testing were HH-60Gs. The HH-60G has side windows for visual look out of the cabin crew (i.e. scanning), and machine guns mounted in the windows that have a near 180-degree field of fire. The HH-60G does not have an aft ramp or rear-facing gun.

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deafening/blinding of the deployed team. The inserting helicopter was then able to join the wingman in a gun cover pattern, doubling the eyes on lookout and number of guns. The insert-leave-return-extract tactic does have shortfalls as described in the report, but worked better than the “parked overhead” tactic every time it was tested.

The PJ team’s situational awareness was another key factor in the TA success rate. PJ familiarity with the Terminal Area plan prior to insertion, awareness of the location/status of other friendlies, and the ability to detect and avoid/engage the enemy are determinants of success or failure. When a deployed PJ could communicate with his teammates, the helicopters, RESCORT, and the S/E, they were able to find the survivor, package him, react to changing situations, and prepare for extraction successfully. Their best weapons were pointing devices and radios that were used to direct employment of helicopter and RESCORT weapons. Unfortunately there remain numerous shortfalls in PJ equipment that reduce their SA and, ultimately, their effectiveness.

Results of JCATS modeling are consistent with the Terminal Area findings of the JT&E and AWFC events. Within the limits of the model, the results of AWFC TAT and WEZ testing have also been confirmed.

RECOVERY VEHICLE WEAPONRY Even with the best tactics, the helicopter weapons tested lacked sufficient lethality. That conclusion was affirmed in both the Cabin Configuration and Extended WEZ tests. This lethality shortfall was a combination of inadequate coverage in the tail and nose quadrants (limited by both crew field of view and weapon field of fire), poor design of the weapon mounts themselves that inhibit the fields of fire, low rates of fire in the simple 7.62mm guns (M-60D and M-240), low reliability of the 7.62mm GAU-2 system, and the absence of manned gun on the right side of the helicopter when the flight engineer was performing work in the cabin or operating the hoist (a problem critically observed by rescue helicopter aircrew since the War in SEA).235 None of the fielded 7.62mm weapons have sufficient tactical range for use in open terrain, or sufficient energy for penetration of masonry, thick foliage, or the lightest of armor. Other weapons (like the 50cal machine gun) provide significantly more energy, but lack other important characteristics such as a sufficiently high rate of fire or area effects. Appropriate weapons selection, like every other factor, depends on finding the optimum balance of system capabilities and limitations.

JCSAR JT&E observations regarding RV self-protection and weaponry were consistent with those in the TAT and WEZ tests. Accordingly, the test team recommended the Services investigate munitions tailored/suited for Combat Rescue. They concluded that rescue forces need:

o Obscurants (both visual and IR) to protect the RV during critical portions of ingress, pickup, and egress. They also noted that obscurants like the old White Phosphorous (WP) bombs are are more effective in masking the RVs during terminal pickup phase

235 Testing indicated that if the right gun will be unmanned then it should be fixed forward for firing by the pilots. Although fixing the gun forward is better than nothing, the ability of the pilots to employ the gun ffectively is extremely limited, particularly during AIEs. Even when the pilots were free to maneuver the aircraft, fixed-forward guns were of limited utility. Other categories of weapons (such as rockets) may not be similarly restricted.

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than WP 2.75” rockets currently in the inventory—they are too small, and their effects are very fleeting.

o Non-lethal weapons which can minimize collateral damage while also providing the isolated personnel and RV vital protection from hard to locate, dismounted adversaries. Non-lethal weapons, like BLU-52, that provide CS riot control agent, are no longer authorized for use, but are needed to enhance survivability during the end-game pickup phase. If CS is no longer authorized, then a suitable alternative is needed. Research into newer non-lethal technologies being developed for other mission areas is suggested.

o Longer Reach Weapons like rockets to provide improved standoff and potent anti-personnel capability.

o Sensor Technologies to enhance detection and engagement of threats to match the longer reach weapons.

The JT&E’s VS 2 event included five trials in which HH-60Hs were equipped with Hellfire missiles (which are currently being installed on those Navy helicopters). During that test event, RVs armed with those missiles produced no measurable impact on mission effectiveness. However, none of the aircrews had any experience using the Hellfire and, either no training and no TTP to guide them, they were less effective in exploiting new weapon than the JT&E expects trained crews would be.

INFLUENCE OF RECOVERY VEHICLE SIZE ON OPERATIONS

A composite of findings of several tests (chiefly TAT, Defensive Systems, Self Protection System, Bulldog, and Cabin Configuration tests) also highlights the significant influence of the physical size of the recovery vehicle on operations. In context of threat encounter, several conclusions are supported. First, the larger the RV, the greater its susceptibility (generally). Size effects include greater presented area for ballistic shots, greater radar signature, and (due to power requirements to keep larger aircraft airborne) potentially greater IR signatures. Maneuverability and flexibility (particularly in the terminal area) are also significant operational factors relating to aircraft size. Anecdotal information supports those test results, with aircraft like the HH-53 (used in SEA) described as “too large” by rescue crews at the time. Those factors would tend to support movement towards ever-smaller RVs.

A second conclusion, however, sets a lower bound on RV size. Testing assessed that the cabin space available in an HH-60G is insufficient to meet mission requirements. Simultaneous treatment of two non-ambulatory S/E is not feasible in such a limited area, and the size of the Pararescue team that can be carried is also limited by cabin space. Although TAT confirmed that a three-man PJ team is both sufficient for terminal area operations and can fit into a single HH-60G, any requirement for additional PJs in the terminal area forces participation of a second helicopter. Adding the second helicopter to the terminal area’s tactical scenario not only increases risk to that aircraft (during insertion/extraction of its PJs), but significantly increases the complexity of the operation itself. Synchronization, span of control, mutual support, fratricide risk, and bump plans are all adversely affected as a result. Optimally, an RV would provide more cabin space than is available in an aircraft the size of an HH-60G.

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2.6.2.6 Ground Teams

As in the rest of this document, the term “ground team” refers not to a Pararescue element deployed in the terminal area to assist the S/E (or even a helicopter-borne, platoon-sized element like that used during the recovery of Basher 52), but to a Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team (UART) operating independently of helicopter or other air support. The tendency towards lengthy overland movement and the unique training of the Special Operations Forces performing them characterize UART missions.

In summary, the JCSAR JT&E found that ground teams performing aircrew recoveries suffer from:

o Mission planning delay/errors

o Ineffective command and control

o Ineffective ground linkup procedures

The JT&E also found that the elapsed time between launch of rescue forces and recovery of isolated personnel showed a significant difference between CSARTF and SOF team trials. The SOF mission execution delays were assessed to be a result of a number of factors: delay in locating the isolated personnel due to lack of a contact plan, slow travel on the ground, and delay in obtaining exfiltration transportation. The JT&E also assessed that a SOF team’s difficulties in locating the S/E also degrade mission effectiveness. Those difficulties increased the teams’ threat exposure because teams had to conduct various compromising search techniques or use the radio to locate the isolated personnel.

Linkup with S/E was also found to be a problem. After the Woodland Cougar trials highlighted it, future test events included enhanced ground linkup procedures in aircrew special instructions (SPINS) for use in an evasion situation. JREX 98 test results showed no improvement in SOF force effectiveness as a result of the enhanced linkup procedures. Even with remedial training, S/E were still unable to develop ground linkup plans that were viable for the SOF teams to execute. JT&E research of a sample of SOF units found that different teams use different linkup procedures. The procedural variation is enough that it would be difficult to prescribe a single rule for high-risk-of-capture personnel to follow that meets the expectations of all SOF. JT&E research also showed that S/E do not understand when to come out of their hide site and show themselves to the team. This is particularly true when SOF forces are not readily distinguishable from OPFOR personnel. Advanced survival radios with two-way messaging capabilities may reduce some of the linkup problems that were observed in testing.

The operational utility of tasking ground teams to support aircrew recoveries is not a settled issue. While they offer unique capabilities, thorough assessment of their effectiveness has been hampered by scant data and evolving methods of mission risk assessment. For example, during the JCSAR JT&E, the primary criterion for deciding whether a mission should be assigned to conventional Combat Rescue forces or to SOF was the mission’s assessed “threat level.” When an S/E was assessed to be in a “high threat” area, conventional Combat Rescue forces were ruled out as an option and missions were exclusively assigned to SOF teams. The teams would be inserted some distance from the Terminal Area and move overland for linkup with the S/E. At the time of the JT&E, Combat Rescue doctrine defined threat levels in terms primarily related to

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the sophistication of an enemy’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).236 The resulting classifications of low, medium, and high threat levels were misleading for Combat Rescue operations, and their use during JCSAR JT&E testing probably mischaracterized the actual risk to forces selected to perform each mission.237 Although threat categorizations in use at the time of the JCSAR JT&E have been abandoned (for the reasons described here), the old paradigm remains—that ground forces will succeed in high threat areas where Combat Rescue forces would be expected to fail.

That paradigm is problematic. Decades of experience indicate that IADS type weapons systems, and aircraft with look-down/shoot-down radar (i.e. a “high threat” environment), are not what cause Combat Rescue helicopter losses. Instead it is dismounted infantry, using portable weapons like small arms, automatic weapons, RPGs, and MANPADS that will cause the overwhelming majority of Combat Rescue losses. That class of threat—individual enemy ground troops—is precisely the threat that may tend to put the SOF teams’ ground operation at significant risk, particularly if a search is required. Except, perhaps, for urban terrain, it may be an unlikely scenario that a UART could operate effectively in an area where a helicopter could not when each is attempting to recover downed aircrew.

2.6.2.7 Interoperability

Lack of joint training and joint leadership were assessed by the JCSAR JT&E as significant factors that degraded mission effectiveness or caused mission failure. Based on the problem counts, the analysis indicates mission planning, mission execution, and staffing and resource shortfalls are the primary contributing factors to interoperability problems. Test participants identified the need for added mission planning when operating jointly because of unfamiliarity with the operating procedures of other Services.

Secure communications was another interoperability problem area observed by the JT&E. Testing showed that most CSARTFs were not able to operate in secure mode because at least one element in the force did not have the capability to go secure in a given band. RESCORT aircraft were usually the limiting factor in communications for the CSARTF. The AH-64s could only go secure on FM, while the A-10s could only go secure on UHF. The anti-jam frequency hopping systems are also different between Services and platforms. The USAF uses Have Quick II, while

236 The low/medium/high threat definitions used during the JT&E have recently been abandoned because of their inability to accurately describe RV risk. The March 1998 version of Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint TTP for Combat Search and Rescue, offered the following (now obsolete) definition of High Threat: “The operating environment presents hostile forces over a wide area of coverage, densely concentrated, and capable of rapid reconstitution and mobility. Enemy weaponry includes advanced or late generation SAMs, modern ground-based radars, early warning systems, electronic counter-countermeasures, integrated AAA, and aircraft with look-down and/or shoot-down capabilities. High threat environments are characterized by fully-integrated air defense systems and C2 networks, as well as EW capabilities.” 237 This limitation was understood by the JT&E test team. In the Enhanced Capability Test Report, they noted, “The current CSAR threat categories do not effectively support the CSAR mission. Intelligence assessments of a ‘low threat,’ using current doctrinal guidance regarding air and ground threat levels, potentially result in an inaccurate assessment… Threat categories are subjective. Many undocumented variables influence the threat assessment process that are not accounted for in the current threat level categories. The threat levels described in JP 3-50.21 account for only the types of threat systems and the density of systems deployed. The threat levels do not account for terrain, weather, threat system operator qualifications, time of day, or capabilities of specific assets within the CSAR forces.”

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the USA uses SINCGARS. While the USN also uses Have Quick, the USN HH-60Hs relinquish this capability during non-deployment training.

A positive JT&E finding was that mixed helicopter and fixed-wing RESCORT packages suppressed a greater percentage of the threats encountered and had a lower overall loss rate than missions protected by pure helicopter or fixed-wing packages. Mixed RESCORT also had the best results with respect to the overall measures of success. Accordingly, the JT&E concluded that a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing RESCORT can be more effective than either all fixed- or all rotary-wing support.

2.6.3 Warfighter Perspective on Combat Rescue Test Results

The last event that combined total fidelity with a very large “sample” size was the war in SEA more than a quarter century ago. The conflicts since the war in SEA have seen newer technologies (night vision systems, datalinks, stealth technology, etc.) and different physical and operational environments, but the sample size for CSAR was very small. This was fortunate in that it speaks well of advances in susceptibility and vulnerability reduction, but the small number of CSAR missions results in a paucity of data on the effectiveness of the equipment and TTP that were used. Were we good or just lucky? Would the same methods have resulted in disaster or success if used repeatedly? Testing is the only way to address the question and it is an imperfect tool. Only results that have been rigorously checked for proper experiment technique and plain common sense should be accepted.

With that caveat clearly in mind, we asked a team of Combat Rescue operators (many of whom designed, managed, or participated in the test events) to perform a Warfighter review of all of the detailed test reports and to summarize their conclusions. They found the following:

o The very best people, with the very best tools, must man the SARDO positions in the AOCs because the senior guy in the AOC will have limited CSAR experience, and little understanding of helicopter operations.

o It would be impossible for a SARDO/JSRC to have the breadth of expertise to respond optimally to all aspects of a CSAR mission within the given time constraints. If they try to do it all, they will fail. Integrate with the AOC.

o Bad C4I will always waste more time the slowest airplane

o Datalinks, Near Real-Time Intelligence in the Cockpit systems, and over-the-horizon communications are all two edged swords with potential for information overload and micromanagement from REMFs

o Although CSAR is, by definition, a reactive mission, good planning can mitigate many of the variables

o Don’t plan for too long—most captures happen within 30 minutes

o Shaping the battlefield with the best available force is generally a better alternative than delaying a recovery until battlefield conditions are ideal (waiting for darkness, etc)

o Situational Awareness of the Terminal Area will always be imperfect. Further delay to improve it rapidly reaches the point of diminishing returns

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o Any survivor position other than from an eyeball by an RV aircrew is suspect. Any reported position with a CEP greater than 20 meters will result in a search.

o Trained OSCs are worth a dozen untrained strikers

o An untrained OSC now is better than a trained OSC 30 minutes from now

o The highest likelihood of enemy encounter will always be in the LZ

o CSAR aircrews will overcome limitations in creative, unpredictable ways

o The single greatest threat to the survivor and to the recovery vehicle is dismounted infantry

o Simultaneous 4-quadrant gun coverage in the hover is a must

o Unreliable guns are worse then no guns

o A gun being fired by a pilot badly is better than the gun being unmanned

o The unobserved adversary gets the kill so heads up/out must be primary

o Jets can't see dismounted gomers and can't kill them close to the helicopter even if they could

o The helicopter wingman isn't a great gunship, but he is the only one who will see dismounted gomers and have the precision weapons to engage them pointblank

o Using Unconventional Assisted Recovery Teams to respond to an air component's isolating incidents does not work—too slow, too complex, and is generally based on old “threat level” paradigms

o An appropriately sized PJ ground team reflects a balance between capabilities required and minimizing complexity of the operation (span of control, time in the LZ, risk of loss/frat, etc.)

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3. Lessons Learned and Trends in Combat Rescue Operations

It is axiomatic that judgments based on trends can be relatively precise for the near term, but become less so as the focus extends into the future. Most analysts, for example, did not foresee the end of the Cold War five years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and reunification of Germany. Yet, in a relatively short period, these events profoundly affected geopolitics in general and US military force-structure planning specifically.

Given that qualification, this section offers some general observations about the likely characteristics of the world environment that will influence Combat Rescue operations and capabilities over the next two decades. This section also identifies Combat Rescue mission trends observed since Vietnam, and suggests how those trends might be manifested in future operations. Those observations derive from the research supporting Section 2 and from subject matter experts from many disciplines.

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3.1 Summary of Major Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation The following have been observed as the factors most significant to Combat Rescue operations:

• Accuracy in Location/Identification of the Survivor/Evader

• Survivor viability

- Distance of ejection from location of hit

- Intensity of threat around Survivor/Evader

- Population density around Survivor/Evader

- Severity of Survivor/Evader injury

- Enemy government’s interest in capturing Survivors/Evaders and its ability to control the behavior of its population

• Friendly response to the isolating incident

- Unity of Command and interoperability among recovery forces and the supported Component

- Command and Control processes/delays

- Presence/absence of trained conventional Combat Rescue forces exploiting appropriate doctrine and tactics

- Time required to assemble an effective CSARTF

- Readiness posture of Recovery Forces

- Recovery Vehicle protection in the Terminal Area

- Availability of Opportune Forces

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3.2 Summary of Ideal RV Characteristics The following “ideal” characteristics were gleaned from a thorough review of Combat Rescue operations and from aircrew comments about RVs from Vietnam to present:

• Self-Protection:

- Ability to locate/suppress dismounted infantry

- Simultaneous four-quadrant coverage in the terminal area

- Ability to carry a variety of ordnance for mutual support and survivor protection

- Ballistic protection for aircrew and systems

- Low susceptibility to infrared missiles

• Ideal size:

- More cabin space than an HH-60G

- Smaller total size than an HH-53

• Hover/Hoist capability to recover S/E in the following conditions:

- Areas tightly confined by terrain and vertical obstructions

- Through dense foliage

- Over water

- Over surfaces covered with fine particulates (i.e., sand and snow)

- “Single skid” conditions

• Other Capabilities

- Out of ground effect (OGE) hover power available in the Terminal Area

- Improved enroute cruise speed without increasing enroute loss-rates

- Perform takeoff/low-level cruise/approach/hover in IMC

- Rapid offload/recovery of Pararescuemen and Survivors/Evaders by landing or by alternate means

- Rotor downwash that does not exceed that generated by and MH-53J

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3.3 Environmental Trends and Planning Factors

3.3.1 Global Trends

Some of the global trends that will affect our future National Military Strategy include:238

• Changing Demographics: Demographic trends indicate a tremendous increase in the numbers of people moving to and living in urban areas. By 2010, nearly two-thirds of the world’s population will be urbanized, with much of the growth in littoral areas of the world.

• Economic Development: While developing nations will experience economic growth, the poorest nations will face declining standards of living. Mass communications will convey these differences, leading to political instability in some places. Global economic growth and resulting tax revenues will provide many states with considerable means to invest in weapons and military forces.

• More Players on the International Scene: The number of international groups seeking to influence global security issues will increase. The number of developing countries that face serious instability and potential state failure due to political unrest will increase.

• Technological Developments: The diffusion of technology and information will accelerate. In support of economic and political agendas, developed countries will export advanced technological systems, including weapons. Nations and others will be able to purchase access to space-based capabilities and modern computer and communications equipment, which can be used to support military operations.

From a strategic perspective, patterns of conflict that we have experienced since about 1989 will likely continue into the 21st century. We should expect to be involved—probably as part of a multinational force—in large-scale combat contingencies akin to Operation Desert Storm, foreign humanitarian assistance efforts such as Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh, noncombatant evacuation requirements such as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia, peace operations such as those in Bosnia and Haiti; and various other types of operations requiring US military capability. Although the threat of particularly large-scale conflict is less likely than during the Cold War, such conflict remains possible in a world made increasingly smaller by the 24-hour news cycle.239

3.3.2 Physical Environment

True to the pattern of history, military operations in the next few decades are likely to be conducted across the widest imaginable range of physical environments. In addition to physical variation, darkness and poor weather will increasingly fall within the bounds of acceptable environments for future air wars as improved sensors and weapons remove operational limitations.

With regard to the impact of the physical environment on Combat Rescue operations, the past should guide our plans for the future. Because they have been encountered with regularity,

238JCS, p. 8-9. 239 JCS, p. 7

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rescue operations in every extreme of temperature, darkness, topography, pressure altitude, and foliage should be expected. In Joint Vision 2020, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Hugh Shelton, defined the tomorrow’s battlefield environment as follows:

“The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.”240

A significant trend towards (or, some might say, the return to) urban warfare is an important environmental development that will gain prominence over the decades to follow. As global urbanization continues, and as adversaries perceive an asymmetric advantage in that environment, the trend toward military operations in urban terrain is likely to accelerate.241 Further, aircrew losses in urban environments inject Combat Rescue operations into an exceedingly difficult tactical scenario. Although tactics and technology will inevitably adapt, the threat posed by widely proliferated, man-portable weapons (small arms, automatic weapons, IR MANPADS, Rocket Propelled Grenades, etc.) is sure to persist and will be both more concentrated and more difficult to suppress in an urban environment.

3.3.3 Military Trends

ADVERSARIES Greater global interaction will strongly influence the nature of future threats. While unlikely that any single nation could globally challenge US interests in 2010, it is probable that more than one will have both the will and the ability to concurrently issue such a challenge. Potentially, the US could face parallel military challenges in different regions at roughly the same time. Global interaction, for example, provides a regional power the potential to accelerate its development as a peer competitor without the buildup signals and warning time expected in the past. A regional competitor taking advantage of advanced technological capabilities may be able to gain local superiority long enough to achieve limited aims, resulting in a range of combat and noncombat requirements.242

Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can provide asymmetrical counters to US military strengths. Adversaries will closely observe US capabilities and tactics in an effort to exploit weaknesses by asymmetric approaches that may include attempts to inflict heavy casualties at home or abroad, to exploit the media, to conduct acts of terrorism, and to defeat our national will.243 General Shelton assesses the potential for such asymmetric approaches as “perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future. The asymmetric methods and objectives of an adversary are often far more important than the relative technological imbalance, and the psychological impact of an attack might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted.”244 Most importantly, these asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to change. Combat Rescue operations are particularly influenced by such asymmetric

240 Shelton, p. 4 241 JCS, p. 77 242 JCS, p. 13-14. 243 JCS, p. 15. 244 Shelton, p. 5.

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threats since successful capture of US aircrews is doubtlessly the centerpiece of many of such strategies.

Weaponry will become more portable and lethal. Military forces will increase their mobility, complicating US and allied targeting. Against paramilitary forces, distinguishing combatant from noncombatant will become increasingly difficult.245 Man-portable weapons will continue to be widely proliferated, and are likely to remain one of the most intractable hazards on the battlefield. Man-portable weapons will be enhanced by the use of inexpensive night vision systems, computer integration, and improved communications among fielded forces.246 Despite the inevitable improvements in our adversaries’ capabilities, however, simple, low-technology weapons like AAA and automatic weapons will be present in abundance, and will remain the most resilient threats the US will encounter over the next two decades.

It is also worthwhile to note that there is an increasing trend for non-state groups to threaten US interests. Multinational corporations, legal and illegal cartels, alliances, and special interest groups will compete with the US in specific arenas. Criminal organizations will oppose US interests in areas such as drug and arms trafficking, immigration, and antidemocratic political intimidation. Technology may provide criminal organizations with weapons capabilities, intelligence, and communications comparable—and in some cases superior—to those of law enforcement agencies. Also, the distinction will blur between terrorist groups, warring factions in ethnic conflicts, insurgent movements, international criminals, and drug cartels.247

In sum, the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity.248

US EXPLOITATION OF TECHNOLOGY By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets, applied in a sequential manner. With precision targeting and longer-range systems, commanders can achieve the necessary destruction or suppression of enemy forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing the need for time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Improved C2, based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations days and hours in advance of attacks.

In the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) four key technological areas highlighted in Joint Vision 2010—Low Observable/Masking Technologies, smarter weapons, long-range precision weapons, and information technologies—are destined to shape the conduct of U.S.-led

245 JCS, p. 9-10. 246 In SEA, about 9 percent of MANPADS incidents occurred at night, compared with 4 percent of MANPADS incidents during Desert Storm (Crosthwaite [2], p. 13). While nighttime MANPADS capabilities are expected to improve, it would probably be an overstatement to suggest that the distinction between day and night will be eliminated. 247 JCS, p. 13. 248 Shalikashvili, p. 10-11.

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air campaigns over the next few decades.249 The net result is that combat units will pack more combat capability into smaller, more survivable packages.

FASTER, MORE INTENSE AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Multispectral sensing, automated target recognition, and other advances will enhance the detectability of targets across the battlespace, improving detection ranges, turning night into day for some classes of operations, reducing the risk of fratricide and further accelerating operational tempo. Improvements in information and systems integration technologies will also significantly impact future military operations by providing decision makers with accurate information in a timely manner. Information technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster. Advances in computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations.250

CONTINUED PRESENCE OVERSEAS The demand for US overseas presence is not likely to diminish. The US will continue to maintain forces and other military capabilities in foreign regions. Carefully tailored to regional requirements, overseas presence facilitates power projection and sends a clear signal of US commitment and resolve. Effective overseas presence demands a balance between permanently stationed forces, rotational forces, and temporarily deployed forces. Each contributes uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that support US interests.251

Deploying US forces over long distances to unfamiliar surroundings will be a continuing challenge. Combat operations could closely follow deployment, particularly if forcible entry operations are required. In other cases, combat operations to achieve limited objectives might be conducted without establishing preliminary lodgments in the operations area, or perhaps before the joint force is fully formed. A combination of forces could conduct such operations, such as forward-deployed naval forces and land-based air and land forces deploying from Continental United States, other Theaters, or forward bases elsewhere in the Theater.252

MORE JOINT/COALITION OPS In Joint Vision 2010, Gen Shalikashvili, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised that “our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations.”253 He emphasized the point again by suggesting the following:

249 JCS, p. 24-26. 250 Shalikashvili, p. 13. 251 JCS, p. 10-11. 252 JCS, p. 14. 253 Shalikashvili, p. 4.

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“It is not enough just to be joint, when conducting future operations. We must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners. Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality.”254

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION Mindful of public concern and expectation to minimize the unnecessary risk of casualties, the National Command Authorities will seek quick, focused, effective, and decisive application of combat power when and where it is required.255 The American people will continue to expect us to win in any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing the mission successfully. Commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects of military operations, from environmental disruption in training to collateral damage in combat. Risks and expenditures will be even more closely scrutinized than they are at present.256

254 Shalikashvili, p. 9. 255 JCS, p. 11. 256 Shalikashvili, p.8

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3.4 Characteristics of Future Isolating Incidents

3.4.1 Reduced Combat Aircraft Loss Rates

US combat aircraft loss rates have been in near constant decline since the dawn of air power (see Figure 3-1). Although loss rates during the most recent conflicts are already particularly low, several factors, described below, suggest that combat aircraft losses will continue to decline.

Figure 3-1: Combat Loss Rates (per 1000 sorties) During US Air Campaigns Sources: Granville, p. 17 (World War II, Korea, SEA); GWAPS, Statistical Compendium

(Desert Storm); AFSOUTH Fact Sheet (Deny Flight), Cohen, pp. 68-70 (Allied Force)

MORE FIREPOWER, FEWER COMBATANTS

Although improvements in combat aircraft loss rates can be observed over the decades since World War II, threat systems seem to be evolving as quickly as aircraft countermeasures, and component-level improvements (on their own) do not appear likely to significantly reduce combat aircraft loss rates.257 On the other hand, the sum total of the product of the current RMA is likely to deliver a distinct advantage to US combat aircraft. The systemic, integrated improvements in precision, stealth, C2, sensors, information processing, etc., suggest fewer aircraft losses across the spectrum of conflict. Loss rate reductions will derive, primarily, from our ability to accomplish the effects of mass—the necessary concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place—with less need to mass forces physically than in the past.258 For example, without stealth, “a typical strike mission requires 32 planes with bombs, 16 fighter

257 For example, analysis done by SURVIAC shows that the Pk/h has remained relatively constant during the last 60 years (when averaging overall tactical aircraft types, all threats, and all missions for various conflicts). Mr. Crosthwaite attributed the stability in aircraft vulnerability to the efforts of the vulnerability reduction community keeping pace with an ever evolving and more lethal threat. (Crosthwaite [1], p. 9). 258 Shalikashvili, p. 17

9.71

2.06

0.43

2.04

0.54 0.13 0.53 0.06 0.120

2

4

6

8

10

12

WW II Korea SEA(Total)

SEA(NVN)

SEA(Laos)

SEA(SVN)

DesertStorm

DenyFlight

AlliedForce

Loss

es p

er 1

000

Sor

ties

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escorts, eight Wild Weasel aircraft to suppress enemy radar, four aircraft to electronically jam enemy radar, and 15 tankers to refuel the group. With stealth technology the same mission can be accomplished with only eight F-117s and two tankers to refuel them. Stealth technology combined with precision guided munitions puts far fewer aircraft at risk and saves lives -- both of aircrew and innocent civilians.”259

MORE STANDOFF WEAPONS As the accuracy and confidence in standoff weapons continue to improve, they will play a larger role on future battlefields. Systems like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, Army Tactical Missile System, Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and Standoff Land Attack Missile are just a few of the family of options that can apply force with great precision without risking the loss of aircrews. Standoff weapons are not only increasingly effective, but are appealing to political leadership that may be averse to US casualties. As the proportional use of standoff weapons increases, combat aircraft loss rates will be reduced.

LESS PUBLIC TOLERANCE FOR LOSSES OR COLLATERAL DAMAGE For better or for worse, the precedent for “loss-less” warfare has been set. Skilled practitioners of war using good technology have made such warfare look easy, and it may be now more or less expected by civilian authorities by the public. Although public tolerance for casualties will certainly vary based on the nature of the conflict, it seems inevitable that casualty minimization will be at the core of likely future battle plans, and fewer combat aircraft losses will result. That pressure will be perpetuated by the omnipresence of the media on the battlefield and the continuous reporting requirements of the 24-hour news cycle.

On the other hand, the public’s intolerance of collateral damage during air wars may tend, initially, to increase the risk of loss to US aircrews (particularly when operating over urban terrain). The pressure to minimize collateral damage drives robust requirements for highly precise weapons delivery, carefully controlled effects, and minimization of total damage. All of those requirements tend to increase the risk level to aircrews performing their missions in urban environments. Despite those competing requirements (minimal US aircrew losses vs. minimal collateral damage on the ground), the public seems likely to abandon its resistance to collateral damage, if US losses begin to mount.

3.4.2 Number of Rescue Candidates per Incident Will Not Increase

CREW SIZES WILL NOT INCREASE

The pool of combat aircraft, from which losses will be expected, will evolve but remain largely as it is today. Current trends in aircraft acquisition time and cost, combined with increased congressional oversight, legal battles, and smaller budgets, suggest that most of the airframes flying today will still be flying in the next two decades. For context, note that the A-6, B-52, C-130, C-141, KC-135, and U-2 flew during Vietnam and are still flying today. Thirty years will elapse from the time the F-15 became operational until its replacement by the F-22—assuming no further delays. The next 20 years may yet see an F-16 block 80, F-15F, or a B-2 block 40 259 USAF Fact Sheet 91-03

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aircraft. Forecasts show the venerable B-52 remaining in service until 2040. Budgetary constraints may find the United States purchasing only manned aircraft that are currently past the demonstration and validation phase (e.g., the F-22, V-22, and possibly the Joint Strike Fighter). From a Combat Rescue perspective, such a scenario would tend to hold constant the number of personnel isolated in each combat loss incident.

A likely exception to the slow evolution of new weapon systems is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The military services are just beginning to understand what capabilities UAVs might offer, and are likely to pursue more rapid acquisition of UAV systems. The next two decades will see the UAV evolving from airborne sensor to forward air controller to weapons delivery platform. If that should prove to be the case, it would be another downward pressure on the number of personnel required to create sufficient mass on the battlefield.

SHOOTDOWN INCIDENTS WILL BE MORE LETHAL THAN IN THE PAST

In forecasting the number of Survivors/Evaders that may be available for rescue following each loss incident, one must also consider the severity of injury during aircrew ejection. Losses during Operation Desert Storm showed a marked increase in the number of airmen known to have been killed during the shootdown phase than was observed in SEA (50 percent vs. 24 percent respectively).260 One explanation may be that, due to improvements in aircraft vulnerability reduction or more effective enemy weapon systems (or both), events causing aircraft loss tend to be more catastrophic.261 Regardless, the probability of a higher proportion of aircrew killed during ejection, and a reasonably predictable combat aircraft inventory, together suggest the number of S/Es per incident will tend to remain static or decline. The result will be a downward influence on the total rescue demand.

3.4.3 Losses to Remain Concentrated In/Around the Target Area

One constant in this study has been the concentration of combat aircraft losses in the target area. It was true for every type of mission, every conflict, and every type of combat aircraft studied (including Combat Rescue helicopters). Although exploitation of Dominant Maneuver will result in operations conducted from multiple, dispersed locations, it is not anticipated that those disparate basing locations will influence the very strong trend of concentrated losses in the target area.262 That trend is important to this study’s line of inquiry (1) for its impact on the likely distribution of S/Es on the battlefield; (2) for gaining insight into effective risk-reduction tactics for Combat Rescue helicopter crews; and (3) for detecting deficiencies in RV self defenses. Those three issues are described below.

3.4.3.1 Impact on Survivor/Evader Distribution on the Battlefield

Because rescue success is significantly influenced by the S/E’s proximity to the enemy (see Section 2.1.8.3, for example), the constancy of losses in the target area levies a significant and

260 The 50 percent KIA rate during Desert Storm does not include 14 KIA during the shootdown of Spirit 03, an AC-130. If they were to be included, the Desert Storm KIA rate would be 60 percent. 261 Bennett, interview. 262 Shalikashvili, p. 20.

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unchanging time pressure on rescue forces. The only factors that might abate that pressure would be design improvements would cause the aircraft to “hold together” so that aircrew could delay ejection until some distance from the target has been achieved, or the development of ejection systems that offer some “fly away” capability to the aircrew. Significant advances in those areas are not expected in the look-ahead time frame covered by this report.

3.4.3.2 Assessment of Recovery Vehicle Risk

Beyond the question of forecasting where S/Es may be concentrated on the battlefield, the fact that both fixed-wing and Combat Rescue helicopter losses were similarly concentrated in the target/terminal area reveals an important point about the effectiveness of Combat Rescue helicopter tactics. Both the loss data and interviews with combat aircrew support the conclusion that (for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft) the proportion of losses in the target area derives from essentially two considerations—threat avoidance during a mission’s enroute phases (ingress and egress), and a tendency towards a predictable flight profile in the target area. Although it reads at first like simple common sense, that conclusion is noteworthy for its implications:

• Aircraft speed does not appear to be a singularly effective preventive countermeasure to threats in the target area.263

• Helicopters operating enroute at very low altitudes are not necessarily more susceptible/vulnerable to loss than higher-altitude fighters/bombers. In fact, the contrary may be true.

For its sheer volume of sortie data, US experience in SEA is instructive. A comparison of absolute fixed-wing and Combat Rescue helicopter loss rates shows that CSAR helicopter operations were decidedly more risky, particularly as the density of the threat increased (see Table 3-1, Column C). However, when losses are broken out by mission phase, a clearer picture emerges. In SEA, about 83 percent of all fixed-wing combat losses occurred in the target/terminal area, compared with about 91 percent of helicopter losses during Combat Rescue missions. Casting those proportions over SEA loss data suggests that Combat Rescue helicopter loss rates during ingress/egress were roughly equal to (or modestly less than) those of fixed-wing fighter/attack/bomber aircraft. That trend held true for operations all over SEA.264

It is only in the target and terminal area that the helicopter experienced relative inferiority with respect to loss rates. That interpretation of the data suggests that, despite its relatively slow speed, the helicopter’s low altitude ingress and egress tactics are as effective for risk reduction as is the fighter’s combination of high-altitude, speed, and maneuverability. It must be noted that the environment in Vietnam was essentially free of MANPADS.

The presence of MANPADS on a future battlefield could change the equation, depending on MANPADS proliferation, effectiveness of a low-altitude aircraft’s tactics and IR countermeasures, and the difference in Pk/h between MANPADS and other optically aimed weapons. Although it is impossible to predict how the technology will evolve, it is expected that improvements in RV susceptibility to IR threats and improvements in IR missile effectiveness

263 Although the statement is true in the absolute, fixed-wing encounters with IR missiles during Desert Storm may highlight an exception. They resulted in a Pk/h of about 0.7 at airspeeds below 300 KIAS (5 kills out of 7 hits), and a Pk/h of 0.0 above 300 KIAS (zero kills out of 8 damage incidents). See Figure 2-44 in Section 2 of this report. 264 Granville, Tables 8-10.

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will maintain a rough parity, and that the probability of hit (Ph) will return to relatively “normal” levels. Pk/h, however, is expected to remain high relative to other battlefield threats to RVs. Although US experience with MANPAD/helicopter engagement is limited in that regard, Russian experience is not. After reviewing helicopter losses in Afghanistan, Russian survivability analysts summed up those encounters by saying (with almost comic understatement), “a hit by a portable anti-aircraft missile system on helicopters is accompanied primarily by a catastrophic outcome.”265

265 Crosthwaite[2], p. 488

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Table 3-1: SEA Combat Aircraft Loss Rates per 1000 Sorties by Mission Phase and Location (Source: Granville, Tables 8-10) 266

A B C

ENROUTE TERMINAL AREA TOTAL LOSS RATES

NVN Helos:

Fighters:

0.37

0.39

Helos:

Fighters:

3.70

1.89

Helos:

Fighters:

4.07

2.28

LAOS Helos:

Fighters:

0.09

0.10

Helos:

Fighters:

0.91

0.49

Helos:

Fighters:

0.90

0.59

SVN Helos:

Fighters:

0.03

0.05

Helos:

Fighters:

0.29

0.24

Helos:

Fighters:

0.31

0.29

266The term “Helos” refers to USAF Combat Rescue helicopters. To paint a more accurate picture of combat operations, H-43 sorties were not included in the loss rate calculations. Had they been included, there would have been no change in NVN and Laos loss rates. In SVN, the composite enroute and terminal area loss rates would have been 0.017 and 0.170 respectively, with a total SVN Helo loss rate of 0.187 per 1000 sorties.

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

SA/AAA RF SAM IR SAM

Pk/h

Figure 3-2: General Probability of Fixed-Wing Kill Given a Hit, by Threat Type (Source: Rainis, p. 6)

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3.4.3.3 Recovery Vehicle Vulnerabilities in the Terminal Area

High Combat Rescue helicopter loss rates in the terminal area (relative to loss rates for fighter/bomber/attack aircraft) suggest a significant deficiency in the ability of RESCORT to suppress key threats (primarily dismounted infantry), and the inability of the RVs to perform that function for themselves. For RVs to have (and use) a robust self-defense capability has been an obvious need in each conflict studied as part of this report. That is not meant to suggest that combat support from RESCORT has not been a key factor in the success of many, many operations. Rather, it recognizes the real limitations in the capability of fixed wing air power to suppress small concentrations of dismounted infantry, particularly in rough or foliated terrain.

As the role of RESCORT has been handed from the slower, propeller-driven A-1E (and its predecessor, the T-28), to faster flying jets like the A-7, F-16, F-18, and F-15E, the ability to deliver ordnance in very close proximity to the S/E on the ground has been reduced while response time following call for fire has increased. While the A-1E could pursue and attack individual soldiers on the ground during the war in SEA, current RESCORT aircraft, with the possible exception of the A-10, do not have that capability. In SEA, attempts to fill the void by using battlefield obscurants and agents like CS gas enjoyed modest success, but their use has been abandoned and is not likely to be resurrected.

The inability of the RV (or wingman) to engage in a “knife fight” in the terminal area has emerged as one of the most commonly observed operational deficiencies for the Combat Rescue mission. A review of hundreds of individual Combat Rescue mission narratives, and numerous interviews with Combat Rescue aircrew with experience from Vietnam to Kosovo indicate that the need is real and persistent. Over the years, and still today, aircrew have been particularly concerned about ensuring simultaneous weapons coverage in all four quadrants. The aircrews’ concern seems to be well placed since it is typical of Combat Rescue mission narratives to describe that when one of the helicopter’s guns was firing, all of the others on board were soon firing as well.

Recent testing indicates that even with four-quadrant coverage, RV self-defense capability is still insufficient due to the limited capability of the machine guns that have been traditional Combat Rescue helicopter weaponry. History suggests that weapons not traditionally seen on USAF helicopters (rockets, air-to-ground missiles, larger caliber guns, and combined effects munitions) are appropriate candidates for future Combat Rescue aircraft. Weapons versatility and employment will be key determinants of success during recoveries in contested areas (particularly in urban terrain).

Beyond the question of improved RV weapons, only a significant reduction in RV vulnerability is likely to reduce terminal area loss rates to those experienced by fixed-wing combat aircraft.

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3.5 Trends in Enemy Reaction to Shootdowns Even the least sophisticated adversaries will perceive and exploit asymmetric advantages during conflict with the United States and, as part of that effort, will assign resources to the capture of downed U.S., or Coalition, aircrew. Their efforts will be facilitated by the trend towards Coalition warfare, which exposes US plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to forces beyond the US span of control. In an environment of such broad distribution to organizations or individuals that may have their own agendas, information will make its way to our adversaries. As happened in Somalia (Operation Continue Hope), Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight), and Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), that information will be used effectively by our adversaries to put US forces into scenarios of asymmetric vulnerability. Types of information that should be expected to arrive in enemy hands include target lists, ATO, codewords, communications plans, and ROE. While it would be an overstatement to say that such information in the hands of an adversary could lead to disproportionate aircraft losses, it may tend to enable occasional aircraft kills that would otherwise not have been possible. On a battlefield pervaded by 24-hour news networks, such limited, solitary victories could change the outcome of an entire campaign.

With respect to Combat Rescue, it is probable that in a Coalition warfare environment, adversaries will have awareness of SAR codewords, survival radio frequencies, and pick-up procedures. Spoofing should be expected on UHF and VHF SAR frequencies and, depending on the mobility of the enemy’s forces, SAR Traps in the terminal area are likely. The enemy will use the Internet to gather remarkably detailed information about the units, aircraft, and individuals involved in loss incidents for exploitation before and after an S/E’s capture.

3.6 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

3.6.1 Trends in Modern Rescue Response

Since 1991, 27 American combat aircrew have been shot down in combat and survived the event.267 Of the 27, eight (30 percent) were successfully rescued before capture. Although the sample size is small, there is sufficient information to begin drawing some broad conclusions:

3.6.1.1 The “Golden Hour” Belongs to the Enemy

In rescue circles, the first 60 minutes an S/E is on the ground is sometimes called the “Golden Hour,” ostensibly representing the period of time when the chance for successful recovery is greatest. Although that first hour certainly has operational significance enough to warrant its name, the verbal lore is misleading—the data do not illustrate a particular advantage for rescuers during that first hour. Instead, the Golden Hour is really a description of the contest between the S/E and those that would capture him. The hour is golden, indeed, for if the S/E can avoid capture in that time period, his proportionate chance of being rescued is significantly improved (because his chances of being captured are so much less).

To be precise, the Golden Hour is really only 30 minutes. Table 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show the cases of recent shootdowns (from Desert Storm for present), during which the enemy enjoyed a

267 This figure includes 24 during Desert Storm, Vega 31, and Hammer 34 during Operation Allied Force, and Basher 52 during Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia.

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14 to 1 advantage in aircrew capture in the first 30 minutes. After the first 30 minutes, the enemy had lost all of his relative advantage, and his ability to capture aircrew before they were rescued lagged at a 0.7 to 1 ratio. Our voluminous experience in SEA shows remarkable, almost mathematical, similarity with the Golden Hour trends observed in recent history (see Figures 2-17, 2-18, and 3-3).

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Table 3-2: Rescue and Capture Rates During the "Golden Hour" Operation Rescue Rate Capture Rate

0-30 mins > 30 mins 0-30 mins > 30 mins

Post 1990268 4% 58% 52% 42%

SEA (NVN Only)269 3% 53% 69% 46%

SEA (All)270 27% 83% 17% 17%

Notes:

• This table only considers those S/E that were available for rescue (i.e. MIA and KIA are excluded).

• The rescues/captures happening before 30 minutes had expired, and those happening after the first 30 minutes, are examined here as separate populations. Consequently, the percentage total for those rescued or captured in less than 30 minutes will not add up to 100% (i.e. not all of the S/E available for rescue were rescued or captured in “0-30 mins”), while the “>30 mins will add-up to 100% (i.e. 100% of those still available after 30 minutes were either rescued or captured)

268 GWAPS, Vol IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol. V, p. 660. 269 Every (2), pp. 28-9. 270 Granville, p. 57; 7602 AIG, p. 10.

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Figure 3-3: Distribution and Status of S/Es Over Time Since 1991 (Source: GWAPS, Vol. IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol V, p. 660;

Borg, p. 1; Williams, p.1; AFNS, p. 1

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3.6.1.2 Current Time To Rescue is Measured in Hours, Not Minutes

Faster, more capable RVs with better countermeasures and communications suites have not resulted in improved Combat Rescue performance over time. Even when compared against experience in NVN, SEA’s most difficult rescue environment, modern efforts do not show an obvious improvement. To the contrary, the average time to recover an evader has more than doubled, climbing from 1.7 hours in NVN to 4.1 hours in operations since 1990 (i.e. from Desert Storm to present).

Table 3-3: Comparison of Response Times between SEA and Recent Operations

Operation Mean Time to Capture

Mean Time to Rescue

Post 1990271 5.8 hrs 21.4 hrs

Post 1990 (adjusted)272 0.6 hrs 4.1 hrs

SEA (NVN Only)273 < 0.2 hrs 1.7 hrs

SEA (All)274 < 0.2 hrs 0.8 hrs

For perspective, consider the fact that during OAF it took recovery forces 6 hours and 3 hours, respectively (and required mid-mission air refueling), to cover less than 50 miles during the rescues of Vega 31 and Hammer 34. Also, recall the case of Basher 52, shot down over Bosnia during Operation Deny Flight. After evading capture for almost 6 days, he was finally able to establish radio contact with US forces overhead. From that point, it took almost five hours before the RV arrived to bring him safely out of Bosnia. Keep in mind that from the moment Basher 52 was reported lost, there were two rescue teams (one AFSOC and one USMC) on alert around the clock, waiting to perform that very mission.

Current deficiencies in reaction time have two primary origins—(1) the absence of specially trained Combat Rescue forces in recent conflicts, and (2) C2 practices that impede Combat Rescue mission success.

ABSENCE OF SPECIALLY TRAINED COMBAT RESCUE FORCES

There is remarkable similarity in the Section 2 descriptions of CSAR operations in Desert Storm and in Allied Force. In each case, specifically trained Combat Rescue expertise was not available, and in each case our CSAR capability suffered (sometimes with heartbreaking results, as with the case of Corvette 03). Nearly all of the mistakes made during Desert Storm that came from an absence of forces trained for conventional CSAR, or failure to exploit appropriate 271 GWAPS, Vol. IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol. V, p. 660. 272 The adjusted figures are somewhat arbitrarily manipulated to present what is probably a more accurate picture of rescue and capture capabilities. Mean Time to Capture was adjusted by removing the case of Corvette 03 (F-15E lost during Desert Storm). Instead of being captured by a search party, the crew evaded towards the Syrian border for almost 50 hours, and (having run out of food and water) approached what turned out to be an Iraqi border post. Mean Time to Rescue was adjusted to change Captain Scott O’Grady’s evasion time from 144 hours down to the 5 hours that elapsed between his establishing radio contact and his eventual rescue. 273 Every (2), pp. 28-9. 274 Granville, p. 57; 7602 AIG, p. 10.

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doctrine and tactics, were repeated less than 10 years later in Kosovo (i.e., lack of Unity of Command, unfamiliarity with proven Combat Rescue tactics, poor integration with conventional players, etc.). Given the expected acceleration of the pace of future air wars, an absence of conventional Combat Rescue forces is likely to be the limiting factor in future rescue attempts.

Because of their remarkable capabilities, SOF have been routinely tasked to fill the CSAR void. However, although the tools used for Special Operations and for Combat Rescue are similar (or, sometimes, identical), the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that support the two missions are very different, and each requires maintenance of very specialized capabilities. It is unlikely that SOF performing Combat Rescue as a collateral mission) will ever perform the mission as effectively as a dedicated conventional Combat Rescue squadron.275 Whether the relative rarity of isolating incidents warrants investment in such single-role capability is another question entirely, and is well beyond the scope of this report.

COMMAND AND CONTROL PRACTICES The framework for current Combat Rescue C2 processes originated in Vietnam. During that conflict, the requirement to manage a broad array of Combat Rescue forces and to ensure reliable dissemination of mission information led, inevitably, to the development of a very centralized, hierarchical C2 organization. Such a centralized approach to C2 and mission execution inevitably caused delays and confusion, but represented the optimum solution given the technology at the time.

Little has changed since Vietnam. Although the advent of the HH-60G Pavehawk ushered in a new, modern era for the operational aspects of Combat Rescue employment, Combat Rescue C2 processes are largely as they were when the venerable HH-3H sat alert at Lima Site 36 in Na Khang. Although some improvements have been adopted, the inadequacy of current Combat Rescue C2 processes is obvious on the modern battlefield, and is reflected in rescue reaction times and S/E capture rates. Recent testing of surface-based elements of Combat Rescue C2 highlighted mission critical delays, failure to complete significant tasks (such as transmission of a launch order to Combat Rescue forces or reassessment of mission viability after a change in threat level), and failure to relay information to recovery forces. The most egregious C2 delays occur when Survivors/Evaders are in areas where the threat level is elevated. In other words, C2 is least effective when the need for speed is most acute.276 Of course, the real sense of urgency present during combat operations is not felt during testing, and may explain some of the poor results. On the other hand, even the most egregious failures observed during Joint CSAR testing have precedent in actual Combat Rescue operations from Desert Storm to today, many of which have been cited in this report.

275 Ten years after Desert Storm, and following several conflicts in which SOF had primary responsibility for supporting the air component’s Combat Rescue requirements, the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement says, “SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF perform CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions.” Consistent with its Congressional mandate, USSOCOM lists CSAR as a collateral mission, subordinate to nine assigned “Principal Missions.” (Sheridan, p. 44). 276 DiPaolo, p. 5.

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3.6.1.3 Most Shootdowns May Be Hopeless Cases for Rescuers

It is important to note that almost 70 percent of US aircrew captured since 1991 were in enemy hands, not just within the first 30 minutes, but within the first 7 minutes.277 That trend is likely to continue. On a battlefield where aircraft combat damage leading to loss is expected to be more catastrophic than in the past, target area losses are more likely to place the downed aircrew in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. In those cases, it may be unrealistic to expect that even a perfect Combat Rescue capability could identify the loss, locate the S/E, assess and suppress the threat, and deliver a RV to the S/E in less than 10 minutes. While there are sure to be exceptions (recall the SEA case of opportune recovery [Section 2.1.6], in which a downed pilot was recovered after 20 seconds on the ground), sustained performance within such narrow time constraints should not be expected.

Two factors may tend to mitigate this trend:

• Nighttime operations: All of the immediate captures during Desert Storm occurred during daylight hours. In contrast, every S/E isolated at night was able to evade for at least 2 hours. However, keep in mind that the deserts in Southwest Asia were a “worst case scenario” for evaders during daylight hours—there was no foliage, footprints could be tracked in the sand, and the terrain was described as “pancake flat.”

• Limitation of fixed-wing combat sorties to medium or high altitudes: Operations that made minimization of aircrew losses a top priority (OAF and Operation Deny Flight) appear to have more successful outcomes following combat loss. While it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions given the extremely small sample size (n=3), it seems reasonable to consider that the separation between the downed aircrew and the threats that hit them aided the successful evasions. Because the aircraft were hit at relatively high altitudes, the longer parachute descent into hilly terrain created physical and temporal separation from the aircraft crash site that may have complicated the enemy’s search efforts, and ensured successful evasion during the critical Golden Hour.

Improvements in C2 processes described in Section 3.6.2 are also likely to produce some benefit. In the look-ahead time frame covered by this report, it is anticipated that an S/E could be located/identified, and protection assets will be tasked, within single-digit minutes following a combat loss. Time of arrival of the RV will depend on its readiness posture, location, and speed. Also key will be Air Forces Component Commander’s willingness to decentralize execution of a mission with such high political interest and visibility.

3.6.2 C2ISR Improvements Will Reduce CSAR Reaction Time

3.6.2.1 Survivors/Evaders Will Be Immediately Located and Identified

Recent testing highlighted problems with our ability to accurately locate and identify S/Es on the battlefield. In 71 trials, testing measured an average location error of 38.1 nautical miles, with a median of 9 NM. Those errors were introduced by human error and poor system accuracy.278 Over the next 5 years or so, current survival radios will be replaced by an advanced radio that will improve location/identification capability, and will have the following characteristics: 277 Thirteen out of 19 POWs. 278 Stanley, p. 4-6.

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• High reliability • Two-way voice on UHF or VHF • Two-way text messaging via databurst • Integrated geolocation capability with good precision • Use of Low-Probability of Exploitation wave forms for databurst

When fielded, these radios will (in most cases) eliminate the requirement to perform additional location/identification of the Survivors/Evaders, and will feed required information to the CSARTF, RV, and the Pararescue team on the ground. Additional electronic tagging technologies, and the rapid exploitation of electronic, electro-optic, and hyperspectral sensors will also support the location/identification task. In turn, those capabilities will reduce reaction time and increase the chances for successful recovery.

3.6.2.2 Real-Time CSARTF Reaction to Shootdowns Will Be Possible

Future conflicts will exploit some version of Time Critical Targeting (TCT) capability to accelerate the C2 decision-making process. Combat Rescue will be handled as a TCT process, enabling the construction of a high-SA, appropriately armed CSARTF in real-time from assets that are already airborne. CSAR C2 processes will be more integrated with the rest of the campaign’s C2 architecture, and readiness postures will also include better integration of Combat Rescue operations into air battle plans, putting the RVs as close as possible to areas of expected losses. On-board intelligence systems and data-links will enable “just-in-time” flight planning. The net result will be to provide immediate protection to the S/E, and more rapid arrival of the RV in the terminal area.

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3.7 Types of Recovery Forces While the comparison between CSAR and SOF has already been made, it should be emphasized that history doesn’t suggest the conclusion that SOF (particularly AFSOF) “can’t do rescue,” but that they “don’t do rescue” as a matter of assigned roles and missions (see Footnote 275). It also suggests that when SOF find themselves performing the mission anyway, they don’t use CAF Combat Rescue doctrine or tactics. Unfortunately, this report’s multiple references to AFSOC-led rescue missions may imply a false conclusion that a decision to use AFSOC forces was a bad one—the fact is that it, in each case, it was the best option available at the time to provide needed rescue capability. The issue is that when it reached the point that AFSOC was assigned the rescue mission, the stage had already been set. From there, our warfighters relied on the creativity and perseverance of the AFSOC crews who were operating without the benefit of Combat Rescue doctrine or tactics, and were organized in a way that was at odds with basic tenets of airpower. From that perspective, their performance was remarkable.

Two other categories of recovery forces merit attention—opportune forces and Special Operations ground teams.

3.7.1 Opportune Forces

This category of rescuer refers, primarily, to US Army and USMC helicopters or ground forces operating in the vicinity of downed aircrew. In SEA, due to the saturation of the Vietnamese countryside with US Army UH-1s, the recovery rate for opportune forces during that conflict was nothing short of surprising—they recovered about 20 percent of the more than 2,900 combat aircrew that were shot down. However, recent uses of airpower suggest that robust air combat operations are likely to precede any large scale fielding of ground forces, thereby reducing the likelihood of opportune recovery in future conflict.

3.7.2 Special Operations Ground Teams

One of the most surprising findings of this report’s research effort was the extreme rarity of the use of SOF for “Planned Assisted Recoveries,” and the even more rare occasions of mission success. Since the advent of the helicopter, there are only a few (not more than three) documented cases of S/E recovery by Unconventional Assisted Recovery Teams (UART). As was the case for the recovery of Col Iceal Hambleton (Bat 21) in Vietnam, successful recoveries by such unconventional means tend to get a disproportionate amount of attention. The sensational details of those missions tend to perpetuate a general misconception regarding the real effectiveness of such an approach.279

Several factors appear to contribute to the infrequent success of recovery by SOF teams. First, and primarily, is the scarcity of the teams themselves. Second, the limited numbers of teams, because of their unique capabilities, are typically tasked with higher-priority missions, leaving very little excess capacity to support S/E recovery operations. Lastly, the CONOPS itself may

279 The discussion here is limited to the observed utility of Planned Assisted Recoveries of an Air Component’s S/Es by unconventional ground forces. Other SOF activities in support of Theater personnel recovery operations (organization of in-Theater evasion networks, support for SOF emergency exfiltration, psychological and information operations support, etc.) are manifestly important components of comprehensive personnel recovery programs.

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be faulty. The time required for a team to enter isolation for mission planning, and then perform the mission (including overland movement) almost guarantees mission failure based on known “time to capture” curves. Further, US Army SOF guidance for Unconventional Assisted Recovery states that the normal use of SOF teams for recovery operations is to pre-position the team at a Selected Area For Evasion (SAFE) to link-up with the S/E.280 They may be waiting to quite a while, however, since SAFEs are seldom (if ever) used by evaders. In fact, recommending S/E movement to SAFEs may tend to increase S/E risk of exposure for very little potential benefit. The SEA POW Analysis Program came to the following conclusion regarding SAFEs:

“We have not determined that persons who made their way to ‘SAFE’ areas were in a more advantageous position to evade capture. The sole advantage to those areas apparently lay in the fact that they were subject to continuing surveillance. Any low population density area, remote from significant anti-aircraft threat, was relatively ‘safe’ compared to areas near most incident sites.”281

The wartime utility of SAFEs notwithstanding, UARTs are tasked so infrequently as to make the issue moot. All of those factors combined have resulted in land rescues being performed by helicopters in 98.6 percent of cases from Vietnam to present. The bulk of the remaining 1.4 percent of successful recoveries was by opportune arrival of conventional ground forces in the area of the survivor.

280 Bowra, p. 13. A SAFE is defined as “a designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and surviving until they can be evacuated.” (JP 1-02) 281 7602 AIG, p. 41

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4. References SOUTHEAST ASIA SECTION

7602 Air Intelligence Group (AIG); SEA PW Analysis Program Report--Factors Relating to the Search and Rescue (SAR) and Evasion Experiences of US Prisoners of War (PWs) in Southeast Asia; Report Number 700/FO-1; USAF Captivity Analysis Program, Washington DC, September 1976.

Air Combat Command (USAF), XP/SAS; Southeast Asia Helicopter Loss spreadsheet, February 1999.

Boyne, Walter; Boeing B-52 -- A Documentary History, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981 in http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/b052-11.html, prepared by Joe Baugher.

Cima, Ronald J.; Vietnam: A Country Study. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC 1989.

Crosthwaite, Kevin; "MANPADS Combat History" in Aircraft Survivability (pp. 12-13), Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS), Arlington VA, Summer 1999.

Dasilva, Ricardo SMSgt (ret.), SEA HH-43 Flight Engineer, in correspondence with by Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Marc DiPaolo; November 12, 2000.

Department of Defense; Commanders Digest (a periodical); Washington DC, May 11, 1972.

Directorate of Aerospace Safety; South East Asia Escape, Evasion, and Recovery Experience, 1 Jan 63 - 31 Dec 71 [Preliminary Report]; Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, CA, October 1972.

Eggers, Jeffery W.; An Analysis of Helicopter Operations in the Battle of Koh Tang; 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB NV; September 10, 2000.

Every, Martin G. (1); Biomedical Aspects of Escape and Survival Under Combat Conditions, Biological and Medical Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, March 1976

Every, Martin G. (2); Problems and Alternatives in the Combat Rescue of Navy Aircrewmen, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, November 1980.

Every, Martin G. (4); Review of Problems Encountered in the Recovery of Navy Aircrewmen under Combat Conditions, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, June 1973.

Every, Martin G. (5); Summary of Navy Air Combat Escape and Survival, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, February 1977.

Farrior, Tsgt Aaron D., Pararescue NCOIC, Det 1, 40 ARRSq; End of Tour Report sent to CORONA HARVEST; Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai AFB, Thailand; December 11, 1969.

Francis, Capt David G.; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Search and Rescue Operations in SEA 1 April 1972-30 June 1973. HQ PACAF, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division; November 27, 1974.

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Granville, John M.; Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA; HQ Tactical Air Command/XPSY, Langley AFB VA, June 1974.

Hewett, Paul C.; Analysis of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses, Aircrew Casualties and F-105 Damages in SEAsia Conflict, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory [AFFDL-TR-72-15], Wright-Patterson AFB OH, July 1971.

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME); Analysis of Combat Damage on H-3 Helicopters in Southeast Asia From 1965 Through 1970, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; US Government Printing Office 1972-769-010/40, April 1, 1972.

Lee, Col Branford; Briefing: Pararescue Emergency Medical Training, HQ ACC/SG (Aerospace Medicine), 1996.

Office of Naval Aviation History; U.S. Air Operations in Southeast Asia, 1964-73--Southeast Asia Statistical Summary. Washington Navy Yard, Wash DC in www.bluejackets.com.

Overton, Major James B.; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, USAF Search and Rescue November 1967-June 1969. HQ PACAF, CHECO Division; July 30, 1969.

Porter, Mel; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Escape and Evasion SEA 1964-1971. HQ PACAF, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division; February 4 1972.

Roberts, T. D.; Laos: A Country Study [DA Pam No. 550-58]; Foreign Area Studies Series, The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.

Shannon, Robert H. Combat Use of Life Support Systems in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 67-31 Dec 68; Life Sciences Group, Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton AFB, CA, May 5-8, 1969.

Sharp, Admiral U. S. G., Commander in Chief Pacific; Report on the War in Vietnam-Section I; Vietnam, June 30, 1968.

Seig, Major Louis; Project CHECO Report, Impact of Geography on Air Operations in SEA, HQ PACAF, CHECO Division; June 11, 1970.

Smith, Harvey H. (1); Area Handbook for North Vietnam [DA Pam No. 550-57]; Foreign Area Studies Series, The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.

Smith, Harvey H. (2); Area Handbook for South Vietnam [DA Pam No. 550-55]; Foreign Area Studies Series, The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.

Streets, Gary B., Comparative Analysis of USAF Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia Combat [Technical Report AFFDL-TR-77-115]; Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, December 1977.

Tilford, Earl H.; Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975; Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington DC, January 1992.

Tuckey, Major R. F.; Search and Rescue Operations Combat Experiences-Lessons Learned No. 72; Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; November 18, 1968.

Westmoreland, General William C., Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Report on the War in Vietnam-Section II, June 30, 1968.

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OPERATION DESERT STORM SECTION

Arnold, John; Analysis of V-22 and H-60 Effectiveness for the Combat Search and Rescue Mission, ANSER Inc.; Arlington VA, Sep 1997.

Bergeron, TSgt Randy G. ; Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Air Force Special Operations Command in the Gulf War; Headquarters AFSOC, Office of the Command Historian; Hurlburt AFB, FL, June 2000

Boucher, Paul; “Desert Storm Rescue Results Summary Briefing”; Joint Services SERE Agency, Ft Belvoir, Washington DC, 1995.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25); Washington DC, April 1992.

Crosthewaite, Kevin; “MANPADs Combat History” in National MANPADS Workshop Proceedings, Volume 1, SURVIAC-TR-99-006; Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville AL, 15 December 1998.

Department of the Air Force; Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS); Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1993.

Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War-A Report, Washington DC, September 1991.

General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, GAO/NSIAD 97-134, Washington DC, June 1997.

Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA), “Gulf War Combat Losses-Aviation Related,” (typed document summarizing data from JRCC logs and open source information). JSSA Library, Desert Storm Archive, Ft Belvoir VA.

Mohan, Capt Robert; Report on Historical CSAR and Evasion Data and Discussion of Mission Failure Factors, Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Feasibility Study, Nellis AFB, NV, January 1995.

Trask, Lt Col Thomas, MH-53 flight-lead during the rescue of Slate 46, in correspondence with Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Michael Agin; February 12, 2001.

Tyner, Lt Col Joe E.; AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries for Combat Rescue Partnership Tomorrow; US Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.

USAF; Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force In The Gulf War—A Report; September 1991.

OPERATION DENY FLIGHT SECTION Auster, Bruce B.; “One Amazing Kid,” U.S. News & World Report; June 19, 1995

Air Force News Service (AFNS); “F-16 Pilot Shot Down,” Washington DC; June 2, 1995.

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AFSOUTH [1]; Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: Operation Deliberate Force; AFSOUTH Public Information Office, Viale della Liberazione, Naples, Italy; November 16, 1995.

AFSOUTH [2]; Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: Operation Deny Flight; AFSOUTH Public Information Office, Viale della Liberazione, Naples, Italy; November 16, 1995.

Beale, Michael O.; “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina;” School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University; Maxwell AFB AL; June 1996.

Berndt, BG Martin,; “The Recovery of Basher 52,” Proceedings, US Naval Institute, Vol 121/11/113; November 1995. BG (sel) Brandt was the commander of the 24th MEU(SOC) during the recovery of Basher 52.

Borg, Capt. Lindsey; “Serbian Air Defenses a Threat;” air Force News Service; Aviano Air Base, Ital; September 12, 1995.

Bowman, Steven R.; “Bosnia: US Military Operations,” Issue Brief 93056; Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division; December 16, 1996.

Cook, Nick [1]; “Survival of the Smartest,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 033, Issue 009; March 1, 2000.

Cook, Nick [2]; “Serb Air War Changes Gear,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 031, Issue 014; April 7, 1999.

Davies, Karin; Associated Press, “Rescued US Pilot Was One Amazing Kid,” reported in The Standard Times, New Bedford MA, June 9, 1995.

Fedarko, Kevin; “All For One,” Time, Volume 145, No. 25; June 19, 1995.

Furdson, MGen Edward; “Task Group 612.02,” Jane’s Navy International; Volume 100, Issue 001; January 1, 1995.

Gunther, Lt Col Christopher J.; “Fortune Favors the Bold,” in Armed Forces Journal International; Washington DC, December 1995. Lt Col Gunther was the USMC mission commander for the mission to rescue Basher 52.

Lowe, MSgt Merrie Schilter; “America Introduces New Way of War,” Air Force News Service report; Orlando, FL; Feb 23, 1996.

Murray, BG Terry, DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA); June 8, 1995 (in http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1995/t060995_t0608rsc.html).

Owen, Robert C. [1]; “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," Air Power Journal, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer 1997): pp. 4-24.

Owen, Robert C. [2]; “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2," Air Power Journal, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1997): pp. 6-26.

Owens, Admiral William, Joint Chiefs of Staff; DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); June 8, 1995 (in http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1995/t060995_t0608rsc.html).

Pomeroy, MSgt Gary; Air Force News Service (AFNS); “Downed Pilot Rescued by NATO Team,” Washington DC; June 8, 1995

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SHAPE; Information Booklet on NATO, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe; SHAPE Public Information Office; May 2000.

Simmons, L. D.; Lessons and Implications From the US Air Operations in the Former Yugoslavia 1992-1995, Volume I (S); IDA Report # R-3.97; Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA; July 1996. Excerpts cited from this source are unclassified.

Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [1], Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe; Transcript of news conference, “NATO Air Strike Against Bosnian Serbs;” Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy; 1000 hours, August 31, 1995.

Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [2]; “NATO’s IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations,” Strategic Forum, Number 154; National Defense University; Washington DC; January 1999.

Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [3], Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe; Transcript of press conference, Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy; 1700 hours, September 22, 1995.

Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [4], Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe; Transcript of news conference, “Rescue of F-16 Pilot;” London, June 8, 1995.

Tirpak, John A.; “Deliberate Force,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 80, No. 10; October 1997.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE SECTION Borg, 1st Lt Matthew, 31st Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs Officer, “Rescued Pilot Details Evasion, Inspiration;” Aviano Air Base, Italy, April 5, 1999.

Boyle, Col (no first name); quoted in Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment by General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team; NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 16 Sept 99.

Cherrey, Major John, A-10 Sandy pilot and Sandy flight lead during the recovery of Vega 31; Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; February 16, 2001.

Clark, General Wesley K., Supreme Allied Commander Europe; “When Force Is Necessary: NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis,” NATO Review, Summer 1999.

Cohen, William S, et. al.; Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS); Washington DC, 31 January 2000.

Fedkow, CW4 Walter; Operations Warrant Officer, HHC 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Ft. Lewis, WA, 28 February, 2000.

Hammer 34, pilot of downed F-16CJ; Interviewed by ABC News, April 25, 1999. (http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/Popoff/pilot_coversheet_000425.popoffblk.html).

Laushine, Lt Col Steven, Mission Commander for the recoveries of Vega 31 and Hammer 34; Interviewed by ABC News, April 25, 1999. (http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/Nightline/nl000425_F117fighter_pilot_feature.html)

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McGonagill, Major John; Director, Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC), 5 ATAF, Vicenza, Italy, Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Robert Mohan; 21 March 2000.

Newman, Richard J.; “Ten Airmen Were Awarded The Silver Star For Their Heroic Efforts In The Kosovo Campaign,” Air Force Magazine, Volume 83, Number 6 (www.afa.org/magazine) June 2000.

Schmitt, Eric; “Downing a Stealth Jet: Shrewd Tactics or a Lucky Shot?” New York Times (in www.nytimes.com), April 11, 1999.

Trumpfheller, Capt Michael, USAF Weapons School Instructor assigned to the Air Operations Center in Vicenza during Operation Allied Force; Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; June 24, 2000 and February 16, 2001.

Williams, Rudy; “Daring Rescues Snatch Pilots from Jaws of Enemy,” American Forces Press Service; Fort Belvoir, VA, February 17, 2000.

COLD WAR SECTION Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), Personnel Missing-Cold War (PMCOLD) Database; available at http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmcold/index.htm.

Goldrich, Robert L. [1], Un-numbered Memorandum: “Cold War Shoot-Down Incidents Involving US Military Aircraft Resulting in US Casualties;” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Washington DC; July 1992.

Goldrich, Robert L. [2], CRS Issue Brief: 92101: “POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting Issues;” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Washington DC; November 7, 1996.

COMBAT RESCUE TEST,AND EXPERIMENT SECTION Corder, Lt Gen (ret) John A., Aerospace C2ISR Center JAFCC Mentor; Interviewed by CROR researcher Marc DiPaolo; August 12, 2000.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Enhanced Capability Test Report,” TR-01-0399; Nellis AFB, NV; March 1999.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Woodland Cougar End-to-End Test Report,” TR-01-0898; Nellis AFB, NV; August, 1998.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR VS-1 Detailed Test Plan,” JCSAR DTP-VS 1-01-0597; Nellis AFB, NV; May 1997.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Location and Identification of Isolated Personnel, Interim Test Report,” Nellis AFB, NV; February 1997.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “Joint Rescue Exercise 98, Executive Summary;” Nellis AFB, NV; September 1998.

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JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Field Training Exercise 1, Executive Summary;” Nellis AFB, NV; October 1997.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR JT&E Final Report,” Final Report-01-0499; Nellis AFB, NV; April 1999.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Current Capability Test Report,” TR-01-0898; Nellis AFB, NV; August 1998.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Mission Execution Test Report,” TR-01-0498; Nellis AFB, NV; April 1998.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Test At Surface-Based C4I Blue Flag 98-2,” Nellis AFB, NV; July 1998.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Blue Flag 97-1 Surface-Based C4I Interim Test Report,” Nellis AFB, NV; October 1997.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Blue Flag 96-3 Surface-Based C4I Interim Test Report,” Nellis AFB, NV; February 1997.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “Joint Combat Search and Rescue All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team 96 Detailed Test Plan,” Nellis AFB, NV; August 6, 1996.

JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Field Training Exercise 2 at ASCIET 97,” Nellis AFB, NV; October 1997.

Jumper, Gen John, Commander, Air Combat Command; Interviewed by CROR researcher Marc DiPaolo, August 13, 2000.

Keck, Lt Gen Thomas, JFACC during JEFX 2000; Interviewed by Robert Donnelly, JSRC Director for JEFX 2000; August 12, 2000.

USAF Air Warfare Center; “Combat Rescue Time Critical Targeting and Tactical Datalinks—JEFX 2000 Final Report,” ACC Project 00-152AR; Nellis AFB, NV; February, 2001.

USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Cabin Configuration Final Operational Test and Evaluation Test Report,” ACC Project 96-012A, April 1997

USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Defensive Systems Employment Tactics OT&E Test Report,” ACC Project 96-562FTR, August 1996.

USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Terminal Area Tactics Development and Evaluation Test Report,” ACC Project 97-507A, August 1999

REFERENCES FOR SECTION 3

AFSOUTH Operation Deny Flight Public Information Office; “Allied Forces Southern Europe, Fact Sheet,” AFSOUTH Viale della Liberazione, ITALY; December 1995.

Air Force News Service (AFNS); “Air Force F-16 Shot Down;” Washington DC; June 2, 1995.

Bennett, Gerald; Survivability Analyst, Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center; Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; August 28, 2000.

Borg, 1st Lt Matthew, 31st Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs Officer, “Rescued Pilot Details Evasion, Inspiration;” Aviano Air Base, Italy, April 5, 1999.

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Bowra, Maj Gen Kenneth R.; “Unconventional Assisted Recovery,” USAJFKSWC Pub 525-5-14; US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg NC; January 1999.

Crosthwaite, Kevin [1]; “airplanes Vulnerability: A Survey of Combat and Peacetime Experience,” Aircraft Survivability, pp. 8-9; Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS), Arlington, VA; Spring 1998.

Crosthwaite, Kevin [2]; “MANPADS Combat History,” Aircraft Survivability, pp. 8-9; Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS); Summer 1999.

Department of the Air Force; Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS); Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1993.

DiPaolo, Marc C.; Ready, Fire, Aim: A Dynamic Approach to Command and Control for Combat Rescue; Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation, Nellis AFB NV; September 17, 1999.

Every, Martin G. (2); Problems and Alternatives in the Combat Rescue of Navy Aircrewmen, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, November 1980.

Granville, John M.; Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA; HQ Tactical Air Command/XPSY, Langley AFB VA; June 1974.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Concept for Future Joint Operations; Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe VA; 30 January 1998.

Rainis, Dr. Al “airplanes Vulnerability to Man Portable Air Defense Weapons,” Aircraft Survivability, pp. 6-7; Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS), Arlington, VA; Summer 1998.

Shalikashvili, Gen John M.; Joint Vision 2010; Joint Staff, Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C; July 1996.

Shelton, Gen Henry H.; Joint Vision 2020; Joint Staff, Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; June 2000.

Sheridan, Brian E. United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2000; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict), Pentagon, Washington D.C.; 2000.

Stanley, Col Kenneth C.; JCSAR Current Capability Surface-Based C4I Test Report; Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation; Nellis AFB, NV August 1998.

Unterreiner, Cdr Ronald J. “Kill Mechanism Carriage,” 2025, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; Maxwell AFB AL, August 1996.

USAF Fact Sheet 91-03 Special Edition, May 1991.

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5.Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ACR Aircrew Recovery

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOCCENT Air Force Special Operations Command, Central Command

AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces

AIG Air Intelligence Group

AMC Airborne Mission Commander

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

AOC Air Operations Center

ARRG Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group

ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

ARRSq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron

ARS Air Rescue Service

ATO Air Tasking Orders

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

C2 Command and Control

CAF Combat Air Forces

CAOC Combined Air Operations Center

CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Commander

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CR Combat Rescue

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSARTF Combat Search and Rescue Task Force

CW Chief Warrant Officer

DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defense

DMZ De-Militarized Zone

FOL Forward Operating Locations

IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IR Infrared

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JEFX Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander

JRCC Joint Recovery Coordination Cell

JSARC Joint Search and Rescue Center (Vietnam era)

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Center

JSSA Joint Services SERE Agency

JTCG/ME Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness

JT&E Joint Test and Evaluation

KIA Killed in Action

KKMC King Khalid Military City

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

MIA Missing in Action

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

NM Nautical Miles

NVN North Vietnam

OAF Operation Allied Force

OGE Out of Ground Effect

OSC On-Scene Commander

Ph Probability of hit

Pk/h Probability of kill given a hit

POW Prisoner of War

PR Personnel Recovery

PRCC Personnel Recovery Coordination Center

RCC Rescue Coordination Centers

Recce Reconnaissance

RESCORT Rescue Escort

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROE Rules of Engagement

RTIC Real-Time Intelligence/Information to the Cockpit

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RV Recovery Vehicle

S/E Survivors/Evaders

SA Small Arms or Situational Awareness

SAFE Selected Area for Evasion

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SARTF Search and Rescue Task Force

SEA Southeast Asia

SERE Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape

SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment

SOCEUR Air Force Special Operations Command, European Command

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOS Special Operations Squadron

SVN South Vietnam

SWA Southwest Asia

TCT Time Critical Targeting

TFTS Tactical Fighter Squadron

US United States

UART Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USCENTAF USAF Central Command

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UTE Monthly Airframe Utilization Rate

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6.Index 160 SOAR........................................................ 2-73 24 MEU(SOC) ....................... 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 4-4 3d ARRG .......................................... 2-6, 2-34, 5-1 5th Allied Tactical Air Force ....................2-81, 4-6 AFSOC ...... 2-73, 2-74, 2-103, 3-19, 3-23, 4-3, 5-1 AFSOCCENT ...............2-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-76, 5-1 Air Component Commander (Joint/Combined)... 2-

105, 2-113, 2-121, 2-122, 2-123, 4-7, 5-1 Air Force Reserve ............................................ 2-74 air refueling (also see HC-130) 2-24, 2-35, 2-56, 2-

122, 3-19 airborne alert (Also see Orbit Concept) .2-8, 2-120,

2-121 Airborne Mission Commander (AMC).....2-10, 5-1 aircrew size, downed..................... 2-15, 2-16, 2-23 airplanes

A-1............................................ 2-37, 2-38, 2-39 A-10 2-68, 2-75, 2-77, 2-86, 2-98, 2-100, 2-101,

2-112, 2-113, 2-115, 3-15 A-119........................................................... 2-16 A-26............................................................. 2-16 A-37............................................................. 2-16 A-4......................................................2-15, 2-68 A-6 or EA-6..................... 2-15, 2-37, 2-65, 3-10 A-7....2-8, 2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2-

47, 3-15 AC-130...................2-39, 2-66, 2-68, 2-70, 3-11 AC-47.......................................................... 2-16 AH-64................................. 2-112, 2-113, 2-115 AV-8B........................... 2-65, 2-68, 2-86, 2-113 B-52................................... 2-21, 3-10, 3-11, 4-1 B-57............................................................. 2-21 C-130..................................................2-21, 3-10 E-3 ...................................... 2-112, 2-113, 2-115 E-8 ..................................................2-112, 2-113 EA-3 ............................................................ 2-15 EB-66 .................................................2-16, 2-37 EC-130 ...................................................... 2-112 F/A-18 ......................... 2-68, 2-86, 2-113, 2-115 F-100 ............................... 2-16, 2-21, 2-34, 2-37 F-104 ........................................................... 2-16 F-105 ................................. 2-16, 2-21, 2-37, 4-2 F-111 ..................................................2-16, 2-68 F-117 ........................................................... 2-99 F-14 .......................................... 2-68, 2-73, 2-75 F-15 ............................................................. 2-75 F-15C..............................................2-113, 2-115 F-15E......................2-68, 2-78, 2-86, 3-15, 3-19 F-16 2-68, 2-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-83, 2-84, 2-86, 2-

88, 2-94, 2-102, 3-10, 3-15, 4-3, 4-5, 4-7 F-4................................................................2-68 F-4 or RF-4 ......................2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-37 F-5...................................................... 2-16, 2-68 F-8................................................................2-15 GR-1 ............................................................2-68 GR-7 .........................................2-83, 2-91, 2-96 HC-130 .................................2-34, 2-112, 2-113 HU-16 ................................................ 2-16, 2-55 MC-130......................................................2-113 Mirage.......................................2-83, 2-90, 2-93 O-1 ............................................2-16, 2-21, 2-37 O-2 ............................................2-16, 2-21, 2-37 OA-10 .............................................. 2-68, 2-112 OV-10 .................... 2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-39, 2-68 RA-5 ............................................................2-15 RB-57...........................................................2-16 RB-66...........................................................2-16 RC-135.......................................................2-112 RF-4 ................................................... 2-16, 2-21 T-28...........................................2-16, 2-37, 3-15

Al Jouf (Saudi Arabia) ..................2-73, 2-75, 2-77 Albania .............................................................2-97 armor (helicopter).................2-34, 2-56, 2-59, 2-61 Army (US)....2-18, 2-32, 2-33, 2-64, 2-73, 2-74, 2-

78, 2-99, 3-23, 3-24, 4-8 Army, (US)............................................... 2-18, 5-3 Aviano Air Base (Italy) . 2-85, 2-88, 2-94, 4-4, 4-5,

4-7 AWACS ....................... 2-73, 2-75, 2-76, 2-99, 5-1 bailout..................................................See Ejection Basher 52.2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-87, 2-88, 2-89, 2-91,

2-94, 2-103, 2-130, 3-16, 3-19, 4-4 Bat 21 ..................................................... 2-37, 3-23 Batman (Turkey). Also see FOL .....................2-78 Bengal 15..........................................................2-74 Bosnia... 2-1, 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-

90, 2-94, 2-96, 2-97, 2-101, 2-104, 2-112, 3-4, 3-16, 3-19, 4-4

Bosnian Government Army (BIH) ...................2-91 Brindisi Air Base (Italy) . 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-

95 brownout...........................................................2-75 Bush, President George H. ..................... 2-61, 2-67 CHECO ...............................................2-9, 4-1, 4-2 CINCSOUTH2-81, 2-82, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-

91, 2-93, 2-94 close air support..................2-81, 2-82, 2-93, 2-127 coalition operations 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 2-

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67, 2-76, 2-83, 2-92, 2-99, 2-101, 3-7, 3-16 Cold War...2-1, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 2-109, 2-110,

3-1, 3-4, 4-6 command and control.2-39, 2-42, 2-73, 2-76, 2-79,

2-87, 2-93, 2-99, 2-112, 2-113, 2-115, 2-116, 2-118, 2-119, 2-120, 2-121, 2-123, 2-124, 2-130, 2-131, 3-2, 3-6, 3-9, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 3-22, 5-1

CONOPS 2-73, 2-77, 2-86, 2-116, 2-118, 2-119, 3-23, 5-1

Corvette 03........................... 2-73, 2-76, 2-78, 3-19 CSARTF .2-5, 2-8, 2-10, 2-29, 2-37, 2-39, 2-78, 2-

79, 2-100, 2-105, 2-112, 2-114, 2-115, 2-118, 2-121, 2-125, 2-127, 2-130, 2-131, 3-2, 3-22, 5-1, 5-3

data................................................ 2-16, 2-21, 2-55 deception.................................................2-93, 2-98 desert.... 2-2, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-109, 2-112, 2-127 downwash ........................................ See Windblast Ebro 33..... 2-39, 2-90, 2-91, 2-93, 2-94, 2-95, 2-96 ejection2-19, 2-21, 2-31, 2-50, 2-51, 2-53, 2-73, 2-

78, 2-84, 2-100, 3-2, 3-11, 3-12 enemy reaction (to isolating incidents) ..2-26, 2-72,

3-16 environment 2-2, 2-5, 2-23, 2-29, 2-31, 2-47, 2-56,

2-59, 2-61, 2-63, 2-75, 2-84, 2-93, 2-103, 2-109, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 3-12, 3-16, 3-19

evasion ..2-6, 2-21, 2-31, 2-33, 2-40, 2-45, 2-46, 2-50, 2-53, 2-61, 2-72, 2-73, 2-75, 2-78, 2-83, 2-84, 2-86, 2-90, 2-91, 2-103, 2-110, 2-130, 3-19, 3-21, 3-23

Farm Gate ........................................................ 2-32 flak traps ................................... 2-26, 2-117, 2-125 Fogelman, Gen Ronald ...........................2-84, 2-94 forest penetrator .............................. 2-9, 2-34, 2-43 forward air controllers (FAC) .......................... 2-39 forward operating locations (FOL) .. 2-8, 2-9, 2-24,

2-78, 2-91, 5-1 France ..............2-31, 2-56, 2-83, 2-90, 2-95, 2-107 Germany ................................ 2-63, 2-82, 2-88, 3-1 Glosson, Gen Buster ........................................ 2-67 Great Britain ................................... 2-4, 2-63, 2-82 Greece .............................................................. 2-82 ground teams (Also see Unconventional Assisted

Recovery) ........................... 2-116, 2-125, 2-130 Gulf of Tonkin ....................... 2-6, 2-12, 2-29, 2-40 guns (helicopter) .2-9, 2-26, 2-33, 2-34, 2-38, 2-39,

2-53, 2-56, 2-59, 2-101, 2-125, 2-127, 2-128, 2-133, 3-15

Hambleton, Lt Col Iceal......................... See Bat 21 Hammer 34 ..2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, 2-

105, 3-16, 3-19, 4-5 helicopters

AH-1.....................2-33, 2-79, 2-86, 2-87, 2-113

AH-64 ..............................2-64, 2-65, 2-73, 2-76 CH-3 ................................2-16, 2-25, 2-35, 2-55 CH-47 ........................................................2-113 CH-53 ..............................2-16, 2-55, 2-86, 2-87 H-34 ................................................... 2-33, 2-43 HH-3 2-8, 2-16, 2-24, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-

43, 2-55, 2-56, 2-74, 2-77 HH-43 .2-16, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-47, 2-55,

3-14, 4-1, 4-3 HH-53 ...2-8, 2-16, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-37,

2-39, 2-47, 2-55, 2-57, 2-59, 2-77, 3-3 HH-60G ....2-85, 2-103, 2-111, 2-112, 2-113, 2-

114, 2-115, 2-127, 2-129, 4-7 HH-60H ..............................2-112, 2-113, 2-115 MH-532-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-85, 2-86, 2-95, 2-103 MH-60G......... 2-74, 2-100, 2-101, 2-103, 2-105 MH-60K.....................................................2-113 SH-60...........................................................2-73 UH-1 .........................................2-16, 2-47, 2-55 UH-60 ..............................2-70, 2-74, 2-78, 2-79

high bird ................................................... 2-9, 2-38 Ho Chi Minh Trail....................2-2, 2-4, 2-13, 2-39 hoist ............................ 2-9, 2-34, 2-43, 2-47, 2-128 Holland .............................................................2-82 hovering............................2-56, 2-57, 2-127, 2-133 Hussein, Saddam ..............................................2-61 injuries............... 2-21, 2-31, 2-46, 2-50, 2-53, 2-79 integration..2-39, 2-60, 2-77, 2-103, 3-6, 3-7, 3-20,

3-22 interoperability 2-76, 2-116, 2-119, 2-131, 3-2, 3-8 Iraq .. 2-1, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-72, 2-74, 2-75,

2-77, 2-78, 2-79, 2-83, 2-91, 2-107, 3-19 Italy 2-81, 2-82, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-95, 2-97, 2-98,

4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7 jamming and spoofing (radio transmissions)...2-72,

2-99, 2-101, 2-105, 2-117, 2-118, 2-125, 2-131 Jones, Lt Devon...............................2-9, 2-73, 2-75 JRCC (also see JSRC) ..............2-63, 2-73, 4-3, 5-2 JSRC... 2-6, 2-8, 2-10, 2-98, 2-99, 2-105, 2-118, 2-

119, 2-120, 2-122, 2-132, 4-6, 4-7, 5-2 jungle....................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-34, 2-42, 2-46 karst ....................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-33, 2-34, 2-43, 2-46 Khmer Rouge ........................................... 2-2, 2-14 KIA.. 2-6, 2-16, 2-18, 2-21, 2-23, 2-26, 2-46, 2-55,

2-70, 3-11, 3-18, 5-2 Koh Tang Island ..............................2-59, 2-60, 4-1 Korea ............... 2-5, 2-63, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 3-9 Kosovo . 1-1, 2-1, 2-80, 2-97, 2-98, 2-99, 2-104, 3-

15, 3-16, 3-19, 4-5, 4-6 Kuwait ..................................2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-74 Laos .................................................See SEA: Laos Lima sites (also see FOL).......2-9, 2-24, 2-25, 3-20 losses 1-1, 2-10, 2-12, 2-14, 2-15, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19,

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2-21, 2-23, 2-35, 2-51, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-59, 2-63, 2-65, 2-66, 2-67, 2-69, 2-70, 2-72, 2-78, 2-82, 2-83, 2-90, 2-91, 2-96, 2-97, 2-102, 2-103, 2-105, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 2-109, 2-131, 3-5, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 3-16, 3-21, 3-22

low bird.....................................................2-9, 2-38 Macedonia...............................................2-80, 2-97 Mayaguez......................................................... 2-59 MEDEVAC....................................... 1-1, 2-79, 5-2 Mekong River .............................................2-3, 2-4 MIA..1-1, 2-5, 2-6, 2-16, 2-18, 2-23, 2-26, 2-46, 2-

55, 2-110, 3-18, 5-2 Milosevic, Slobodan (Serbian president) ......... 2-80 Missing in Action......................................See MIA mission failure .....2-19, 2-25, 2-47, 2-50, 2-116, 2-

117, 2-119, 2-127, 2-131 Montenegro...................................................... 2-80 NATO .2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-90, 2-

93, 2-94, 2-95, 2-96, 2-97, 2-98, 2-99, 2-101, 2-105, 4-4, 4-5, 5-2

Navy (USN) . 2-15, 2-18, 2-19, 2-23, 2-24, 2-31, 2-45, 2-46, 2-48, 2-51, 2-53, 2-73, 2-75, 2-119, 2-129, 5-3

NEO ............................................................1-1, 5-2 night2-29, 2-39, 2-47, 2-61, 2-72, 2-74, 2-75, 2-77,

2-78, 2-86, 2-89, 2-99, 2-100, 2-103, 2-124, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-21

North Vietnam ............................... See SEA: NVN On Scene Commander (OSC).... 2-8, 2-38, 2-39, 2-

100, 2-101, 2-115, 2-121, 2-122, 2-126, 2-133, 5-2

Operation Allied Force 2-1, 2-83, 2-85, 2-92, 2-97, 2-98, 2-99, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 2-116, 3-9, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 4-5, 5-2

Operation Deliberate Force. 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-90, 4-4, 4-5

Operation Deny Flight .2-1, 2-39, 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-84, 2-85, 2-88, 2-89, 2-90, 2-91, 2-96, 2-98, 2-103, 3-9, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 4-4, 4-7

Operation Desert Shield.................. 2-61, 2-77, 4-3 Operation Desert Storm 2-1, 2-61, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65,

2-66, 2-67, 2-68, 2-69, 2-70, 2-71, 2-72, 2-73, 2-74, 2-76, 2-78, 2-82, 2-83, 2-85, 2-91, 2-103, 2-105, 2-111, 2-116, 3-4, 3-6, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12, 3-16, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 4-3, 4-8

opportune rescue or capture 2-27, 2-32, 2-33, 2-74, 2-78, 2-96, 3-21, 3-23, 3-24

orbit concept .......................... 2-8, 2-26, 2-29, 2-31 parachute descent/landing... 2-33, 2-40, 2-43, 2-46,

2-84, 2-99, 2-110, 3-21 pararescuemen (PJs) ................ 2-43, 2-53, 4-1, 4-2 Perry, William.................................................. 2-81 political aspects of rescue ...2-2, 2-5, 2-26, 2-31, 2-

61, 2-76, 2-81, 2-106, 3-4, 3-6, 3-10, 3-21 population. 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-17, 2-23, 2-26, 2-31, 2-

45, 2-46, 2-51, 2-53, 2-62, 2-63, 2-70, 2-80, 2-91, 2-92, 2-102, 3-2, 3-4, 3-24

POW 1-1, 2-5, 2-6, 2-15, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-24, 2-26, 2-45, 2-46, 2-50, 2-53, 2-70, 2-71, 2-72, 2-74, 2-78, 2-79, 3-21, 3-24, 4-6, 5-2

pre-ejection (also see Ejection) ........................2-21 Q force..............................................See Windblast rain........................................................See weather Ras al Mishab ......................................... 2-73, 2-74 RCC (also see JSRC)...........................2-6, 2-8, 5-2 Red River.................................................... 2-3, 2-4 Red Sea.............................................................2-74 RESCORT 2-8, 2-37, 2-38, 2-101, 2-104, 2-112, 2-

115, 2-120, 2-125, 2-126, 2-127, 2-128, 2-131, 2-132, 3-15, 5-2

roadwatch teams ....... See Unconventional Assisted Recovery

Ryan, Lt Gen Michael ...................2-81, 2-82, 2-93 Sandy......................................2-9, 2-38, 2-39, 2-77 SAR trap..............................................See flak trap SARTF .............................................. See CSARTF Saudi Arabia ............. 2-62, 2-63, 2-73, 2-74, 2-107 SEA .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 2-14,

2-15, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 2-23, 2-24, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-30, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-39, 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-45, 2-46, 2-47, 2-48, 2-50, 2-51, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-60, 2-63, 2-70, 2-72, 2-76, 2-84, 2-106, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 3-23, 3-24, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-8, 5-2, 5-3 Cambodia..................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-14, 2-35 Laos2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-9, 2-13, 2-14,

2-23, 2-24, 2-26, 2-31, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-39, 2-47, 2-50, 2-51, 3-14, 4-2

NVN.. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-12, 2-13, 2-19, 2-23, 2-24, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-31, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-45, 2-50, 2-51, 2-57, 3-14, 3-18, 3-19, 5-2

SVN .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-13, 2-14, 2-23, 2-24, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-50, 3-14, 5-3

Thailand ...............................2-4, 2-35, 2-51, 4-1 SEAL (Also see Unconventional Assisted

Recovery)........................................... 2-37, 2-95 search. 2-5, 2-6, 2-31, 2-33, 2-39, 2-74, 2-75, 2-85,

2-87, 2-90, 2-91, 2-92, 2-93, 2-95, 2-96, 2-100, 2-101, 2-117, 2-130, 2-131, 2-133, 3-19, 3-21

Selected Area For Evasion (SAFE)..................3-24 Serbia................................2-80, 2-81, 2-100, 2-102 signal devices ...................................................2-42

radio2-26, 2-42, 2-72, 2-75, 2-76, 2-84, 2-86, 2-

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88, 2-99, 2-117, 2-120, 2-125, 3-16, 3-21 simultaneous rescue events .. 2-19, 2-59, 2-69, 3-15 Slovenia ........................................................... 2-80 Smith, Admiral Leighton W. (CINCSOUTH) .. 2-3,

2-4, 2-82, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-90, 2-93, 2-94, 4-2, 4-5

South Vietnam ................................ See SEA: SVN Special Operations forces2-39, 2-59, 2-73, 2-74, 2-

76, 2-77, 2-78, 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-95, 2-96, 2-99, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 2-110, 3-20, 3-23, 3-24, 4-3, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3

Spirit 03 ..................................................2-70, 3-11 spoofing ........................See jamming and spoofing Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

(TRAP)...............................................2-86, 2-87 target/terminal area operations 2-8, 2-9, 2-17, 2-38,

2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-48, 2-53, 2-56, 2-57, 2-59, 2-60, 2-75, 2-88, 2-90, 2-93, 2-95, 2-99, 2-100, 2-101, 2-114, 2-116, 2-122, 2-124, 2-125, 2-129, 2-130, 3-3, 3-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-21, 3-22

Thailand ....................................See SEA: Thailand threats

anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 2-23, 2-26, 2-56, 2-64, 2-65, 2-78, 2-87, 2-91, 2-96, 2-98, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-105, 2-108, 2-114, 2-131, 3-6, 5-1

automatic weapons .... 2-13, 2-125, 2-127, 2-131 fighters...................................... 2-10, 2-12, 2-56 infantry .....................2-79, 2-91, 2-98, 3-3, 3-15 infrared missiles (also see MANPADS).2-64, 2-

65, 2-69, 2-76, 2-103, 3-5, 3-12, 5-1 infrared missiles (also see, MANPADS) 2-65, 3-

12 MANPAD ................................................. 2-124 MANPADS ..2-10, 2-56, 2-65, 2-82, 2-83, 2-87,

2-90, 2-91, 2-95, 2-114, 2-116, 2-127, 2-131, 3-5, 3-6, 3-12, 4-1, 4-3, 4-8, 5-2

small arms . 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-14, 2-26, 2-56, 2-87, 2-89, 2-91, 2-95, 2-96, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-105, 2-114, 2-116, 2-124, 2-125, 2-127, 2-131, 3-5

surface to air missiles (SAM).. 2-10, 2-12, 2-64,

2-65, 2-66, 2-69, 2-84, 2-89, 2-91, 2-94, 2-98, 2-99, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-108, 2-114, 2-115, 2-121, 2-125, 2-126, 2-131, 5-3

Tilford, Earl .2-2, 2-5, 2-18, 2-25, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33, 2-34, 2-37, 2-39, 2-47, 2-57, 4-2

training 2-32, 2-39, 2-59, 2-60, 2-63, 2-76, 2-77, 2-89, 2-116, 2-119, 2-129, 2-130, 2-131, 2-132, 3-8, 3-19

trees2-3, 2-4, 2-34, 2-40, 2-43, 2-46, 2-47, 2-84, 2-87, 2-98, 2-100

trends (in Combat Rescue operations).1-1, 2-59, 3-1, 3-4, 3-10, 3-17

Turkey ........................ 2-62, 2-73, 2-74, 2-76, 2-82 Udorn Air Base.................................................2-26 Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) 2-31, 3-

23, 3-24 United Nations..... 2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-90, 2-98, 5-3 unmanned aerial vehicle ..................2-93, 3-11, 5-3 UNPROFOR............... 2-80, 2-82, 2-83, 2-85, 2-96 USS Kearsarge ........... 2-85, 2-86, 2-87, 2-88, 2-91 USS Theodore Roosevelt 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-

95 Vega 31 2-99, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 3-16, 3-

19, 4-5 Vicenza (Italy)..........................2-81, 2-98, 4-5, 4-6 Viet Cong ...............................2-5, 2-13, 2-26, 2-55 Vietnam .....................................................See SEA water ....2-29, 2-32, 2-37, 2-40, 2-46, 2-56, 2-61, 2-

62, 2-74, 2-109, 3-3, 3-19 water recoveries...................................... 2-29, 2-32 weapons (helicopter) .............................. 2-39, 2-59 weather .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-9, 2-47, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63,

2-75, 2-76, 2-89, 2-98, 3-3, 3-4, 5-1 clouds. 2-4, 2-9, 2-47, 2-62, 2-75, 2-83, 2-84, 2-

86, 2-87, 2-95 rain .....................................2-4, 2-43, 2-62, 2-63 temperature ........................................ 2-61, 2-63 wind .............................................................2-62

windblast .....................................2-21, 2-47, 2-127 World War II 2-5, 2-31, 2-63, 2-64, 2-72, 2-84, 3-9 Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA) ..................2-80 Zobrist, Capt Scott............................................2-88

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