Command Control Theory - GlobalSecurity.org

Chapter 2

Command and ControlTheory

“Confronted with a task, and having less information avail-able than is needed to perform that task, an organization mayreact in either of two ways. One is to increase its information-processing capacity, the other to design the organization, andindeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operateon the basis of less information. These approaches are ex-haustive; no others are conceivable. A failure to adopt one orthe other will automatically result in a drop in the level ofperformance.”

—Martin van Creveld, Command in War

aving reached a common understanding of the nature ofcommand and control, we turn to developing a theory

about the command and control process that will in turn serveas the basis for creating an effective command and controlsystem.

POINT OF DEPARTURE: THE OODA LOOP

Our study of command and control theory starts with a simplemodel of the command and control process known as theOODA loop.1 The OODA loop applies to any two-sided con-flict, whether the antagonists are individuals in hand-to-handcombat or large military formations. OODA is an acronym forobservation-orientation-decision-action, which describes thebasic sequence of the command and control process. (See fig-ure 2.) When engaged in conflict, we first observe the situa-tion—that is, we take in information about our own status, oursurroundings, and our enemy. Sometimes we actively seek theinformation; sometimes it is thrust upon us. Having observedthe situation, we next orient to it—we make certain estimates,assumptions, analyses, and judgments about the situation in or-der to create a cohesive mental image. In other words, we try tofigure out what the situation means to us. Based on our orien-tation, we decide what to do—whether that decision takes theform of an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan. Then weput the decision into action. This in-

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Figure 2. The command and control process:The OODA loop.

cludes disseminating the decision, supervising to ensure properexecution, and monitoring results through feedback, whichtakes us full circle to the observation phase. Having acted, wehave changed the situation, and so the cycle begins again. It isworth noting that, in any organization with multiple decisionmakers, multiple OODA loops spin simultaneously, althoughnot necessarily at the same speed, as commanders exercisecommand and control at their own level and locale.

Importantly, the OODA loop reflects how command andcontrol is a continuous, cyclical process. In any conflict, theantagonist who can consistently and effectively cycle throughthe OODA loop faster—who can maintain a higher tempo ofactions—gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle.With each reaction, the slower antagonist falls farther and far-ther behind and becomes increasingly unable to cope with thedeteriorating situation. With each cycle, the slower antagonist’sactions become less relevant to the true situation. Commandand control itself deteriorates.

The lesson of the OODA loop is the importance of generat-ing tempo in command and control. In other words, speed is anessential element of effective command and control. Speed incommand and control means shortening the time needed tomake decisions, plan, coordinate, and communicate. Since waris competitive, it is not absolute speed that matters, but speedrelative to the enemy: the aim is to be faster than our enemy,which means interfering with the enemy’s command and con-trol as well as streamlining our own. The speed differentialdoes not necessarily have to be a large one: a small advantageexploited repeatedly can quickly lead to decisive results. Weshould recognize that the ability and desire to generate a higheroperational tempo does not negate the willingness to bide timewhen the situation calls for patience. The aim is not merelyrapid action, but also meaningful action.


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THE INFORMATION HIERARCHY

We use the term information generically to refer to all mannerof descriptions or representations from raw signals on the onehand to knowledge and understanding on the other. But it is im-portant to recognize that there are actually four differentclasses of information. We must understand the differences be-tween these classes because they are of different value in sup-porting command and control. (See figure 3.) We must alsounderstand what happens to information as it moves betweenlevels on the hierarchy.2

Raw data comprise the lowest class of information and in-clude raw signals picked up by a sensor of any kind (a radioantenna, an eyeball, a radar, a satellite) or communicated be-tween any kind of nodes in a system. Data are bits and bytestransferred between computers, individual transmissions sentby telephone or radio or facsimile, or a piece of unprocessedfilm. In other words, raw data are signals which have not beenprocessed, correlated, integrated, evaluated, or interpreted inany way. This class of information is rarely of much use untiltransformed in some way to give it some sort of meaning.

The next class is data that have been processed into or havebeen displayed in a form that is understandable to the people

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Figure 3. The information hierarchy.


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who must use them.* Processed data include film that has beendeveloped into a photograph, radio transmissions copied into astandard report format, a computer file displayed as text or agraphic on a screen, grid coordinates plotted on a map, or anintercepted enemy message deciphered. The act of processingin itself gives the data a limited amount of value. Clearly, proc-essed data are more useful to people than raw data—and somemay have immediate, obvious and signifi-cant value—but theyhave not yet been evaluated or analyzed.

The next rung on the information hierarchy is knowl-edge—data that have been analyzed to provide meaning andvalue. Knowledge is data which have been evaluated as to reli-ability, relevance, and importance. Knowledge is various piecesof processed data which have been integrated and interpretedto begin to build a picture of the situation. For example, mili-tary intelligence is a form of knowledge as compared to combatinformation which has not yet undergone analysis and evalua-tion. Likewise, situation reports pieced together to create an es-timate of the situation represent knowledge. At this level, weare starting to get a product which can be useful fordecisionmaking.

* This class is often referred to as “information,” in a more specific usageof that term. To avoid confusion, we will continue to refer to this class as“processed data” and will use “information” to refer to the full range ofinformation classes.


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The highest class of information is understanding—knowl-edge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situa-tion to gain a deeper level of awareness of that situation. Wemay know what is going on; we understand why. Understand-ing results when we synthesize bodies of knowledge, use judg-ment and intuition to fill in the gaps, and arrive at a completemental image of the situation. Understanding means we havegained situational awareness. Understanding reveals the criticalfactors in any situation. It reveals the enemy’s critical vulner-abilities. It reveals the patterns and logic of a situation. Under-standing thus allows us to anticipate events—to recognize inadvance the consequences of new or impending developmentsor the effects of our actions on the enemy. We try to make un-derstanding the basis for our decisions—although recognizingthat we will rarely be able to gain full understanding.

The gradations between the different classes of informationare not always very clear. It is not always easy to tell the exactdifference between raw and processed data, for example. But itis important to realize that there are differences and thatknowledge is usually more valuable than data, for instance.Moreover, it is also important to recognize that information istransformed as it moves up the hierarchy and to understand theforces that cause that transformation.

Raw data are turned into processed data, as we might ex-pect, through processing, an activity involving essentially the


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rote application of procedure. Processing includes formatting,translating, collating, plotting, and so on. Much processing oc-curs automatically (whether by humans or by machines) with-out our even being aware that it is taking place—such as whena facsimile machine converts bits of data into understandabletext or graphics. In many cases, machines can process datamuch more quickly and efficiently than people.

We turn processed data into knowledge through the activityof cognition—the act of learning what something means, atleast in general terms. To a degree, cognition may be based onrules of logic or deduction (“If A happens, it means B”). Expertsystems and artificial intelligence can assist with cognition to acertain extent—by helping to integrate pieces of processeddata, for example. But cognition is primarily a human mentalactivity—not primarily a procedural act like processing, but anact of learning.

We transform the complex components of knowledge intounderstanding through judgment, a purely human skill basedon experience and intuition, beyond the capability of any cur-rent artificial intelligence or expert system. Judgment simplycannot be reduced to procedures or rules (no matter how com-plex).

We should note that as information moves up the hierarchyfrom data toward understanding, an integration occurs. Multi-


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ple bits of raw data are pieced together to make processeddata. Numerous pieces of processed data coalesce into knowl-edge. Various bodies of knowledge distill into understanding.This integration is essential to eventually reaching understand-ing because it involves reducing the total number of “pieces”that must be considered at any one time. The vast number ofbits of raw data that describe any situation would overwhelmany commander if they had to be considered singly. It takes acertain amount of time and effort to make these integrations,but without this effort the commander would be overloaded bya staggering number of things to consider.

By nature, data are significantly easier to generate, identify,quantify, reproduce, and transmit than are knowledge and un-derstanding. But commanders need knowledge and understand-ing in order to make effective decisions. Likewise, subordinatesneed not merely data but knowledge and understanding of thecommander’s concept and intent. The goal in command andcontrol should not be collecting, processing, and communicat-ing vast amounts of data—and increasing the danger of infor-mation overload in the process—but approachingunderstanding as closely as possible. However, we cannot sim-ply provide commanders with ready-made understanding. Theywill have to make the final judgments themselves. But we canstrive to provide information that is as easily assimilable and asclose to final form as possible. This means providing informa-tion in the form of images.


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IMAGE THEORY

Human beings do not normally think in terms of data or evenknowledge. People generally think in terms of ideas or imag-es—mental pictures of a given situation. Not only do peoplegenerally think in images, they understand things best as im-ages and are inspired most by images.3

We can say that an image is the embodiment of our under-standing of a given situation or condition. (The term coupd’oeil, which refers to the ability of gifted commanders to in-tuitively grasp what is happening on the battlefield, means lit-erally “stroke of the eye.”) Images apply not only to themilitary problems we face but also to the solutions. For exam-ple, a well-conceived concept of operations and commander’sintent should convey a clear and powerful image of the actionand the desired outcome.

People assimilate information more quickly and effectivelyas visual images than in text. The implications of this are wide-spread and significant, ranging from technical matters of pre-sentation—the use of maps, overlays, symbols, pictures, andother graphics to display and convey information visually—toconceptual matters of sharing situational awareness and intent.

Our image of a situation is based not just on the facts of thesituation, but also on our interpretation of those facts. In otherwords, it is based on our intuition, appreciation, judgment, and


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so on, which in turn are the products of our preconceptions,training, and past experiences. New information that does notagree with our existing image requires us to revalidate the im-age or revise it—not easily done in the turbulence and stress ofcombat. The images we create and communicate to others mustapproximate reality. Conversely, if we want to deceive our ene-mies, we try to present them with an image of the situation thatdoes not match reality and so lead them to make poordecisions.

We generate images from others’ observations as well asour own. In general, the higher the level of command, the morewe depend on information from others and the less on our ownobservations. All but the smallest-unit commanders receivemost of their information from others. This can cause severalproblems. First, when we observe a situation firsthand, wehave an intuitive appreciation for the level of uncertainty—wehave a sense for how reliable the image is—and we can act ac-cordingly. But when we receive our information secondhand,we usually lose that sense. This is especially dangerous in ahigh-technology age in which impressively displayed informa-tion appears especially reliable. Second, we can sense moreabout a situation from firsthand observation than we can faith-fully communicate to others or, at least, than we have time tocommunicate in a crisis. Third, since each of us interpretsevents differently, the information we communicate is distortedto some degree with each node that it passes through on its wayto its final destination. And fourth, this same information is


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likewise delayed at each node. Since the value of informationexists in time, this delay can be critical.

Commanders need essentially three different pictures. Thefirst is a closeup of the situation, a “feel” for the action gainedbest through personal observation and experience. From thispicture, commanders gain a sense of what subordinates are ex-periencing—their physical and moral state. From this image,commanders get a sense of what they can and cannot demandof their people. In the words of Israeli General YshayahorGavish about his experience in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war:“There is no alternative to looking into a subordinate’s eyes,listening to his tone of voice.” 4

The second picture is an overall view of the situation. Fromthis view, commanders try to make sense of the relative dispo-sitions of forces and the overall patterns of the unfolding situa-tion. From this view, they also gauge the difference betweenthe actual situation and the desired end state. The desired resultof the overall view is a quality we can call “topsight”—a graspof the big picture. If “insight is the illumination to be achievedby penetrating inner depths, topsight is what comes from a far-overhead vantage point, from a bird’s eye view that reveals thewhole—the big picture; how the parts fit together.” 5

The third picture we try to form is the action as seen throughthe eyes of the enemy commander from which we try to deducepossible enemy intentions and anticipate possible enemymoves. Of the three pictures, the first is clearly the most


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detailed but usually offers a very narrow field of vision. Com-manders who focus only on this image risk losing sight of thebig picture. The second picture provides an overall image butlacks critical detail—just as a situation map does not capturemore than a broad impression of the reality of events on thebattlefield. Commanders who focus only on this image risk be-ing out of touch with reality. The third picture is largely a men-tal exercise limited by the fact that we can never be sure ofwhat our enemy is up to.

Squad leaders or fighter pilots may simultaneously be ableto generate all three images largely from their own observa-tions. Higher commanders, however, feel a tension betweensatisfying the need for both the closeup and overall imag-es—the former best satisfied by personal observation at thefront and the latter probably best satisfied from a more distantvantage point, such as a command post or higher headquar-ters.

As we have mentioned, any system which attempts to com-municate information by transmitting images will suffer from acertain degree of distortion and delay. There are several waysto deal with this problem. The first is for commanders to viewcritical events directly to the greatest extent possible (consis-tent with the competing need to stay abreast of the overallsituation). In this way they avoid the distortions and delayswhich occur when information filters through successiveechelons.


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Because as war has evolved, it has become increasinglycomplex and dispersed, commanders have found it increasinglydifficult to observe all, or even most, critical events directly.One historical solution to this problem is a technique known asthe directed telescope, which can be especially useful for gain-ing a closeup image. This technique involves using a dedicatedinformation collector—whether a trusted and like-minded sub-ordinate or a sensor—to observe selected events and report di-rectly to the commander. Commanders may direct the“telescope” at the enemy, at the surroundings, or at their ownforces. In theory, because these observers report directly, theinformation arrives with minimal delay or distortion. Directedtelescopes should not replace regular reporting chains butshould augment them—to avoid burdening lower echelons withadditional information gathering and to check the validity of in-formation flowing through regular channels. Improperly used,directed telescopes can damage the vital trust a commanderseeks to build with subordinates.6

The second way to deal with the problems of delay and dis-tortion of information is to rely on implicit communications tothe greatest extent possible. Implicit communication minimizesthe need for explicit transmission of information. Theoretically,because implicit communication requires individuals whoshare a common perspective, information will suffer minimaldistortion as it passes up or down the chain. We will discussimplicit communication in greater detail later.


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The third way to deal with the problems of delay and dis-tortion of information, also discussed later in more detail, isto decentralize decisionmaking authority so that the individualon the spot, the individual who has direct observation of thesituation at that spot, is the person making the decisions.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SPECTRUM

Historically, there have been two basic responses to the funda-mental problem of uncertainty: to pursue certainty as the basisfor effective command and control or to accept uncertainty as afact and to learn to function in spite of it.

The first response to uncertainty is to try to minimize it bycreating a powerful, highly efficient command and control ap-paratus able to process huge amounts of information and in-tended to reduce nearly all unknowns. The result is detailedcommand and control. Such a system stems from the belief thatif we can impose order and certainty on the disorderly and un-certain battlefield, then successful results are predictable.Such a system tends to be technology-intensive.

Detailed command and control can be described as coercive,a term which effectively describes the manner by which thecommander achieves unity of effort.7 In such a system, thecommander holds a tight rein, commanding by personal di-


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rection or detailed directive.8 Command and control tends to becentralized and formal. Orders and plans are detailed and ex-plicit, and their successful execution requires strict obedienceand minimizes subordinate decisionmaking and initiative. De-tailed command and control emphasizes vertical, linear infor-mation flow: in general, information flows up the chain ofcommand and orders flow down. Discipline and coordinationare imposed from above to ensure compliance with the plan.

In a system based on detailed command and control, thecommand and control process tends to move slowly: informa-tion must be fed up to the top of the chain where sole decision-making authority resides, and orders must filter to the bottomto be executed. Understandably, such a system does not gener-ally react well to rapidly changing situations. Nor does it func-tion well when the vertical flow of information is disrupted.While distrust is not an inherent feature of detailed commandand control, organizations characterized by distrust tend to-ward detailed command and control.

This approach represents an attempt to overcome the funda-mental nature of war. Since we have already concluded thatprecise direction is generally impossible in war, detailed com-mand and control risks falling short of its desired result. Thequestion is whether it nears the desired result enough to achieveoverall success.


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By contrast, mission command and control accepts the tur-bulence and uncertainty of war. Rather than increase the levelof certainty that we seek, by mission command and control wereduce the degree of certainty that we need. Mission commandand control can be described as spontaneous: unity of effort isnot the product of conformity imposed from above but of thespontaneous cooperation of all the elements of the force.9 Sub-ordinates are guided not by detailed instructions and controlmeasures but by their knowledge of the requirements of theoverall mission. In such a system, the commander holds aloose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of actionand requiring them to act with initiative. Discipline imposedfrom above is reinforced with self-discipline throughout the or-ganization. Because it decentralizes decisionmaking authorityand grants subordinates significant freedom of action, missioncommand and control demands more of leaders at all levels andrequires rigorous training and education.

Mission command and control tends to be decentralized, in-formal, and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief and simpleas possible, relying on subordinates to effect the necessary co-ordination and on the human capacity for implicit communica-tion—mutual understanding with minimal informationexchange. By decentralizing decisionmaking authority, missioncommand and control seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.


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Moreover, with its reliance on implicit communications, mis-sion command and control is less vulnerable to disruption ofthe information flow than is detailed command and control.

The two approaches to the problem mark the theoretical ex-tremes of a spectrum of command and control. (See figure 4.)In practice, no commander will rely entirely on either purelydetailed or purely mission methods. Exactly what type of com-mand and control we use in a particular situation will dependon a variety of factors, such as the nature of the action or task,the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps most ofall, the qualities of our people. This is not to suggest that thetwo types of command and control are of equal value andmerely a matter of personal preference. While detailed com-mand and control may be appropriate in the performance ofspecific tasks of a procedural or technical nature, it is less thaneffective in the overall conduct of military operations in an en-vironment of uncertainty, friction, disorder, and fleeting oppor-tunities, in which judgment, creativity, and initiative arerequired. Militaries have frequently favored detailed commandand control, but our understanding of the true nature of warand the lessons of history points to the advantages of missioncommand and control.


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Figure 4. The Command and control spectrum.


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LEADERSHIP THEORY

Leadership is the influencing of people to work toward the ac-complishment of a common objective. Because war is funda-mentally a human endeavor, leadership is essential to effectivecommand and control. There are two basic theories of leader-ship that generally correspond to the theories of command andcontrol.

The authoritarian theory of leadership is based on the as-sumption that people naturally dislike work and will try toavoid it where possible, and that they must therefore be forcedby coercion and threat of punishment to work toward the com-mon goal. This theory further argues that people actually pre-fer to be directed and try to avoid responsibility. The result isan autocratic style of leadership aimed at achieving immediateand unquestioning obedience. Leaders announce their decisionsand expect subordinates to execute them. The authoritarianleader is sometimes also known as a telling or directing leader.While authoritarian leadership may result in rapid obedience, italso can often result in subordinates who are highly dependenton the leader, require continuous supervision, and lack initia-tive. Military discipline is widely seen as an example of thismodel since quick and unquestioning response to orders may berequired in the heat of an emergency. This is, however, onlyone version of leadership that military leaders have usedsuccessfully.


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The opposite theory of leadership, known as persuasive ordelegating leadership, assumes that work is as natural as restor play, that people do not inherently dislike work, and thatwork can be either a source of satisfaction (in which case peo-ple will perform it willingly) or a source of punishment (inwhich case they will avoid it). This theory rejects the idea thatexternal supervision and the threat of punishment are the mosteffective ways to get people to work toward the common objec-tive. The persuasive theory argues that people will exercise ini-tiative and self-control to the degree they are committed to theorganizational objective. Under proper conditions, people learnnot only to accept responsibility but to actively seek it. Accord-ing to this theory, the potential for exercising imagination, in-genuity, and creativity in the solution of unit problems iswidespread throughout any unit. Leadership thus becomes aquestion of inspiring, guiding, and supporting committed sub-ordinates and encouraging them to perform freely within setlimits. Over time, delegating or persuasive leadership tends toproduce subordinates who exhibit a high degree of independ-ence, self-discipline, and initiative.10

The leadership style we adopt in a given situation dependson a variety of factors. Key among them is the maturity of sub-ordinates—that is, how motivated, experienced, and willing toaccept responsibility they are. Here maturity is not necessarilylinked to age or seniority. The more mature the subordinate, themore we can delegate; the less mature, the more we will haveto direct. All other things being equal, we prefer the persuasiveapproach because it seeks to gain the committed performanceof subordinates and encourages subordinate initiative.


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Moreover, persuasive leadership reduces the need for continu-ous supervision, an important consideration on a dispersed andfluid battlefield on which continuous, detailed supervision isproblematic.

PLANNING THEORY

Planning is the process of developing practical schemes fortaking future actions. Planning may occur before a decisionand so support decisionmaking—by analyzing the mission, theenemy, or the environment to help develop situational aware-ness or by studying the feasibility of different courses of ac-tion. Planning may also occur after a decision and so supportits execution—by working out necessary coordination meas-ures, allocation of resources, or timing and scheduling.

Planning facilitates future decisions and actions by helpingcommanders provide for those things which are not likely tochange or which are fairly predictable (such as geography andcertain aspects of supply or transport). Planning helps themto examine their assumptions, to come to a common under-standing about the situation and its general direction, to antici-pate possible enemy actions, and thus to consider possiblecounteractions. Planning helps to uncover and clarify poten-tial opportunities and threats and to prepare for opportunities


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and threats in advance. Conversely, planning helps to avoidpreventable mistakes and missed opportunities.

By definition, planning is oriented on the future. It repre-sents an effort to project our thoughts and designs forward intime and space. Because the future is always uncertain, plan-ning should generally not seek to specify future actions withprecision. The farther ahead we plan, the more time we allowourselves to prepare, but the less certain and specific our planscan be. Planning ahead thus becomes less a matter of trying todirect events and more a matter of identifying options andpossibilities.

Depending on the situation and the nature of the prepara-tions, planning may be done rapidly or deliberately. Rapid/time-sensitive planning is conducted in response to existingconditions and is meant for immediate or near-future execution.In contrast, deliberate planning is based on anticipated futureconditions and is intended for possible execution at some moredistant time. We should keep in mind that all planning takestime and must facilitate the generation or maintenance oftempo, while ensuring that time allocated for planning does notadversely impact on tempo.

Planning routines can improve the proficiency of a staff bycreating an effectiveness and efficiency of effort. The goal ofthe Marine Corps is to develop an institutionalized planningframework for use at all echelons of command. However, wemust guard against using an institutionalized planning frame-


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work in a lock-step fashion. We must ensure that the applica-tion of this planning process contributes to flexibility in con-ducting operations.

Planning occurs at different levels and manifests itself dif-ferently at these levels. At the highest level is what we can callconceptual planning which establishes aims, objectives, and in-tents and which involves developing tactical, opera- tional, orstrategic concepts for the overall conduct of military actions.Conceptual planning should provide the foundation for all sub-sequent planning, which we can call functional and detailed.These are the more routine and pragmatic elements of planningwhich are concerned with translating the concept into a com-plete and practicable plan. Functional planning is concernedwith the various functional areas necessary to support theoverall concept, such as subordinate concepts for mo-bilization, deployment, logistics, intelligence, and so on. De-tailed planning encompasses the practical specifics of execu-tion. Detailed planning deals primarily with scheduling, coordi-nation, or technical matters required to move and sustain mili-tary forces, such as calculating the supplies or transport neededfor a given operation.

In general, conceptual planning corresponds to the art ofwar, detailed planning applies to the science of war, and func-tional planning falls somewhere in between. Detailed and, to alesser extent, functional planning may require deliberate anddetailed calculations and may involve the development of de-tailed schedules or plans, such as landing tables, resupply


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schedules, communications plans, or task organizations. How-ever, the staff procedures which may be necessary in de- tailedand functional matters are generally not appropriate forbroader conceptual planning. Rather, such planning should at-tempt to broadly influence rather than precisely direct futureactions. Conceptual planning should impart intent, developoverall operating concepts, and identify contingencies and pos-sible problems but otherwise should leave the subordinatebroad latitude in the manner of functional or detailed execu-tion.

ORGANIZATION THEORY

Organization is an important tool of command and control.How we organize can complicate or simplify the problems ofexecution. By task-organizing our force into capable subor- di-nate elements and assigning each its own task, we also organizethe overall mission into manageable parts. The organization ofour force, then, should reflect the conceptual organization ofthe plan.

Specifically, what should organization accomplish for us?First, organization establishes the chain of command and thecommand and support relationships within the force. The chainof command establishes authority and responsibility in an un-broken succession directly from one commander to another.


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The commander at each level responds to orders and directionsreceived from a higher commander and, in turn, issues ordersand gives directions to subordinates. In this way, the chain ofcommand fixes authority and responsibility at each level whileat the same time distributing them broadly throughout theforce; each commander has designated authority and responsi-bility in a given sphere. Command and support relationshipsspecify the type and degree of authority one commander hasover another and the type and degree of support that one com-mander provides another.

Importantly, organization should establish unity of com-mand which means that any given mission falls within theauthority and responsibility of a single commander and that acommander receives orders from only one superior for anygiven mission. Similarly, organization should ensure that acommander has authority over or access to all the resources re-quired to accomplish the assigned mission.

Organization also serves the important socializing functionof providing sources of group identity for members of the or-ganization. For example, Marines may see themselves first asmembers of a squad, next as members of a platoon, and then asmembers of a company. An organization operates most effec-tively when its members think of themselves as belonging toone or more groups characterized by high levels of loyalty, co-operation, morale, and commitment to the group mission.


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Each commander (supported by the staff) and immediatesubordinates constitute an integrated team—a cohesive groupcommitted to the accomplishment of a single mission. For ex-ample, a company commander and platoon commanders con-stitute a team cooperating in the accomplishment of thecompany mission. A platoon commander and squad leadersalso constitute a team cooperating in the accomplishment ofthe platoon mission. The size of a team can vary with the situa-tion, as we will discuss. Whereas the chain of command con-veys authority and responsibility from commander tocommander, the idea of an integrated team is to pull individualstogether into cohesive groups. (See figure 5.) Each team func-tions as a single, self-contained organism—characterized bycooperation, reciprocal influence, lateral and vertical communi-cation, and action-feedback loops operating continuously in alldirections. Each member of the team may perform a differenttask, but always within the context of the team mission. Conti-nuity throughout the organization results from each com-mander’s being a member of two related teams, one as thesenior and one as a subordinate.11

Organization should also provide commanders with staffsappropriate to the level of command. The staff assists the com-mander by providing specialized expertise and allowing a divi-sion of labor and a distribution of information. The staff is notpart of the chain of command and thus has no formal authorityin its own right, although commanders may delegate authorityto a staff officer if they choose.


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Figure 5. Overlapping units and teams.

Organization should ensure a reasonable span of controlwhich refers to the number of subordinates or activities under asingle commander. The span of control should not exceed acommander’s capability to command effectively. The optimalnumber of subordinates is situation-dependent. For example,


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the more fluid and faster-changing a situation is, the fewer sub-ordinate elements a commander can keep track of continuously.Likewise, commanders exercising detailed command and con-trol, which requires them to pay close attention to the opera-tions of each subordinate element, generally have narrowerspans of control than commanders who use mission commandand control and let their subordinates work out the details ofexecution.

Although a reasonable span of control varies with the situa-tion, as a rule of thumb an individual can effectively commandat least three and as many as seven subordinates. Within thissituation-dependent range, a greater number means greaterflexibility—three subordinate units allow for more options andcombinations than two, for example. However, as the numberincreases, at some point we lose the ability to effectively con-sider each unit individually and begin to think of the units to-gether as a single, inflexible mass. At this point, the only wayto reintroduce flexibility is to group elements together into asmaller number of parts, thereby creating the need for anotherintermediate echelon of command. The evolution of the Marinerifle squad during the Second World War is a good example ofthis. Entering the war, the rifle squad consisted of nineMarines—a squad leader and eight squad members with no ad-ditional internal organization. In combat this squad lacked theflexibility needed for small-unit fire and maneuver. Moreover,squad leaders often could not effectively command eight indi-vidual Marines. The answer was the creation of an intermedi-ate organizational level, the fire team of four Marines, which


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also allowed an increase in squad size to thirteen Marines. Thecreation of the fire team decreased the number of immediatesubordinates the squad leader had to deal with, while extendingthe squad leader’s influence over a larger squad.

Narrowing span of control—that is, lessening the number ofimmediate subordinates—means deepening the organization byadding layers of command. But the more layers of command anorganization has, the longer it takes for information to move upor down. Consequently, the organization becomes slower andless responsive. Conversely, an effort to increase tempo byeliminating echelons of command, or flattening an organiza-tion, necessitates widening the span of control. The commanderwill have to resolve the resulting tension that exists between or-ganizational width and depth. (See figure 6.)

Finally, organization does not apply only to people andequipment. It also applies to information. In large part, organi-zation determines how we distribute information throughout theforce and establishes communication channels.

Information may flow vertically within the chain of com-mand, but it should not be restricted by the chain of command.It also flows laterally between adjacent units, or even “diago-nally”—between a platoon and an adjacent company headquar-ters, for example, or between a supported unit and a supporting unit outside the chain of command. Information


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Figure 6. Organization width and depth.

flows informally and unofficially—that is, between individualsaccording to personal relationships—as well as according toformally established channels. These informal channels providean important redundancy and are especially important in teambuilding.


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COMMUNICATIONS THEORY

Because military evolutions require cooperative effort, it is im-portant that we be able to communicate effectively with others.Communications are any method or means of conveying infor-mation from one person or place to another to improve under-standing. In general, effective organizations are characterizedby intense, unconstrained communications— that is, the freeand enthusiastic sharing of meaningful information throughoutthe organization.12 Moreover, communication has an impor-tance far beyond the exchange of information; it serves a so-cializing function. Separate from the quality or meaning of theinformation exchanged, the act of communicating strengthensbonds within an organization and so is an important device inbuilding trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutualunderstanding.

The traditional view of communications within military or-ganizations is that the subordinate supplies the commanderwith information about the situation, and the commander inturn supplies the subordinate with decisions and instructions.This linear form of communication may be consistent with theexercise of detailed command and control, but not with a sys-tem based on mission command and control which instead re-quires interactive communications characterized by con-tinuous feedback loops. Feedback provides the means to im-prove and confirm mutual understanding—and this applies tolateral as well as vertical communications.


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We communicate by a wide variety of means: face-to-faceconversation, radio, telephone, data link, written word, visualsignal, picture, or diagram. Human beings communicate notonly in the words they use, but also by tone of voice, inflection, facial expression, body language, and gestures. In fact, evi-dence suggests that in face-to-face conversation, humans actu-ally communicate most by visual means (such as gestures,body language, or facial expressions), second by vocal non-verbal means (such as tone or inflection), and least by the ac-tual words they use.13

Moreover, people can communicate implicitly—that is, theyachieve mutual understanding and cooperation with a minimalamount of information having to be transmitted—if they have afamiliarity formed of shared experiences and a common out-look. A key phrase or a slight gesture can sometimes communi-cate more than a detailed order. Since it reduces the time spentdrafting and relaying messages, implicit communication alsoreduces the problems of delay typically associated with infor-mation flow. Implicit communication helps to maximize infor-mation content while minimizing the actual flow of data,thereby making the organization less vulnerable to the disrup-tion of communications.

While conciseness is a virtue, so is a certain amount of re-dundancy. Used within reason, redundancy of communicationscan improve clarity of meaning and mitigate against disrup-tions to the communications system. Effective communica-tions consequently exhibit a balance between conciseness and


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redundancy. (In general, the greater the implicit understandingwithin the organization, the less the need for redundancy.)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT THEORY

Since effective command and control is concerned with gettingthe right information to the right person at the right time, infor-mation management is crucial.

We initiate communications under two basic principles:supply-push and demand-pull.14 A supply-push system pushesinformation from the source to the user either as the informa-tion becomes available or according to a schedule. (See figure7.) The advantages of supply-push are that the commanderdoes not need to request the information and that the informa-tion generally arrives in a timely fashion. The challenge with asupply-push system is to be able to anticipate the commander’sinformation needs. The danger of information overload arisesprimarily from supply-push.

By contrast, a pure demand-pull system does not rely on theability to anticipate information needs; it is inactive until a de-mand is made on it. In a pure demand-pull system, the usergenerates all information requirements. (See figure 7.) If theinformation is readily available—already resident in some


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Figure 7. Supply-push and demand-pull informationmanagement.

data base, for example—the demand can be filled quickly andefficiently. However, if the information is not readily available,the demand typically triggers a “demand cascade,” as the re-quirement filters through the chain of command until it reachesthe appropriate level for gathering. This takes time and can bea burden to lower echelons, especially in a centralized com-mand and control system in which all information must be fedto the senior echelons. An answer to the demand cascade is forcommanders to keep dedicated gathering assets which answerdirectly to them, such as the directed telescopes alreadymentioned.

Demand-pull can help focus scarce resources on those taskswhich the commander has identified as critical; it can deliverinformation specifically tailored to the commander’s informa-tion needs; and it will produce only that information which the


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commander requests. These characteristics can be bothstrengths and weaknesses. They can be strengths because infor-mation flow is tailored specifically to identified requirements.However, they can also be weaknesses because there will oftenbe information requirements that the commander has not identi-fied, and in a pure demand-pull system those requirements willgo unsatisfied. One definite disadvantage of demand-pull is thecost in time since the search for information may not begin un-til the commander has identified the need for that information.

We can also discuss information management in terms ofhow information is transmitted. First, information may bebroadcast, sent simultaneously to a broad audience—anyonewith access to the information network—to include differentechelons of command. (See figure 8.) The great advantage ofbroadcast is that it gets information to the widest audience inthe shortest amount of time. If the information is of a genericnature, this method may be extremely efficient. However, sincethe information is sent to a wide audience with varying infor-mation requirements, the information cannot be tailored to suitany specific commander’s needs. Perhaps the greatest draw-back of broadcast transmission is that undisciplined use of thismethod can quickly lead to information overload.


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Figure 8. Broadcast transmission.

The alternative to broadcast is point-to-point transmis-sion—or “narrowcast”—in which information is sent to a spe-cific user or users. As appropriate, information is then passedsequentially from one user to the next. (See figure 9.) Point-to-point transmission has two basic advantages. First, informationcan be tailored to meet the specific needs of each recipient.Second, point-to-point transmission has built-in control mecha-nisms which broadcast transmission lacks. Each node in the se-quence can serve as a control mechanism, filtering andintegrating information as appropriate before passing iton—lessening the risk of overload and tailoring information tothe needs of the next recipient. The major disad-


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Figure 9. Point-to-point transmission.

vantages of point-to-point are that information reaches a broadaudience more slowly and that the chances of distortion in-crease with each node that information passes through.

In practice, the different aspects of information managementare far from incompatible; in fact, combined wisely they caneffectively complement one another within the same commandand control system.


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DECISIONMAKING THEORY

A principal aim of command and control is to enhance thecommander’s ability to make sound and timely decisions. Aswe might expect, the defining features of command and con-trol—uncertainty and time—exert a significant influence ondecisionmaking.15 All decisions must be made in the face of un-certainty. Theoretically, we can reduce uncertainty by gaining more information, but any such decrease in uncertainty oc-curs at the expense of time. And as we have already mentioned,it is not so much the amount of information that matters, butthe right elements of information available at the right time andplace.

There are two basic theories on how we make decisions.16

The traditional view is that decisionmaking is an analyti-cal process based on generating several different options, com-paring all the options according to some set of criteria, andidentifying the best option. The basic idea is that comparingmultiple options concurrently will produce the optimal solu-tion. As a result, analytical decisionmaking tends to be me-thodical and time-consuming. Theoretically, reasoning powermatters more than experience.

The other basic approach, called intuitive decisionmaking,rejects the computational approach of the analytical methodand instead relies on an experienced commander’s (and


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staff’s) intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a par-ticular problem and arrive at the proper decision. Intuitivedecisionmaking thus replaces methodical analysis with an in-tuitive skill for pattern-recognition based on experience andjudgment. The intuitive approach focuses on situation as-sessment instead of on the comparison of multiple options. In-tuitive decisionmaking aims at “satisficing,” finding the firstsolution which will satisfactorily solve the problem, rather thanon optimizing, as the analytical approach attempts to do.17 Theintuitive approach is based on the belief that, war being ulti-mately an art rather than a science, there is no absolutelyright answer to any problem. Intuitive decisionmaking workson the further belief that, due to the judgment gained by experi-ence, training, and reflection, the commander will generate aworkable first solution, and therefore it is not necessary to gen-erate multiple options. Because it does not involve comparingmultiple options, intuitive decisionmaking is generally muchfaster than analytical decisionmaking. If time permits, the com-mander may further evaluate this decision; if it proves defec-tive, the commander moves on to the next reasonable solution.

Each approach has different strengths and weaknesses, anddetermining which approach is better in a given situation de-pends on the nature of the situation, particularly on how muchtime and information are available. The analytical approachmay be appropriate for prehostility decisions about mobiliza-tion or contingency planning when time is not a factor and ex-tensive information can be gathered. It may be useful in


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situations in which it is necessary to document or justify adecision or in decisions requiring complicated computationswhich simply cannot be done intuitively (such as in making de-cisions about supply rates). It may be appropriate when choos-ing from among several existing alternatives, as in equipment acquisition, for example. Finally, an analytical approach mayhave some merit in situations in which commanders are inexpe-rienced or in which they face never-before-experienced prob-lems. However, that said, the intuitive approach is moreappropriate for the vast majority of typical tactical or opera-tional decisions—decisions made in the fluid, rapidly changingconditions of war when time and uncertainty are critical fac-tors, and creativity is a desirable trait.18

We frequently associate intuitive decisionmaking with

rapid/time-sensitive planning and analytical decisionmakingwith deliberate planning. This may often be the case but notnecessarily. For example, a thorough, deliberate planning ef-fort in advance of a crisis can provide the situational aware-ness that allows a commander to exercise effective intuitive de-cisionmaking. Conversely, the analytical approach of develop-ing and selecting from several courses of action may be donerapidly. The point is that the planning model or process wechoose, and the decisionmaking approach that supports it,should be based upon the situation, the time available, theknowledge and situational awareness of the organization, andthe commander’s involvement in the planning and decision-making process. While the two approaches to decisionmakingare conceptually distinct, they are rarely mutually exclusive in


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practice.

CONCLUSION

Our view of the true nature of war leads us to one of two re-sponses to dealing with the fundamental problem of command:either pursuing certainty or coping with uncertainty. These re-sponses lead to two distinctly different theories of commandand control. Each theory in turn imposes its own requirementson the various aspects of command and control—decisionmak-ing, communications, information management, planning, or-ganization, training, education, doctrine, and so on—and soforms the basis for a distinct and comprehensive approach tocommand and control. The question is: Which approach do weadopt? The Marine Corps’ concept of command and control isbased on accepting uncertainty as an undeniable fact and beingable to operate effectively despite it. The Marine Corps’ com-mand and control system is thus built around mission com-mand and control which allows us to create tempo, flexibility,and the ability to exploit opportunities but which also requiresus to decentralize and rely on low-level initiative. In the nextchapter, we will discuss the features of such a command andcontrol system.


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Documents

Command Control Theory - GlobalSecurity.org