0 Lee Chee Hong 5th

AUG 2011

REV DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION PREPARED BY DATE REMARKS

COMMENTS

ON THE

IAEA PEER REVIEW REPORT ON THE

RADIATION SAFETY ASPECTS OF A PROPOSED

RARE EARTHS PROCESSING FACILITY (THE

LYNAS PROJECT), REF: NE/NEFW/2011 [1]

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 3

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 5

1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................. 5

1.2 Purpose of the IAEA peer review ............................................................................................ 5

1.3 Purpose of this report ............................................................................................................. 6

2. SUMMARY OF THE IAEA PEER REVIEW ........................................................................................... 7

3. GENERAL COMMENTS ..................................................................................................................... 8

3.1 Scope of Review ...................................................................................................................... 8

3.2 No reference / citation for public review ............................................................................... 8

3.3 Gamma ray .............................................................................................................................. 8

3.4 Internal Emitters and Decay radionuclides ............................................................................. 9

3.5 TENORM vs. NORM ................................................................................................................. 9

4. COMMENTS ON THE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 10

5. SPECIFIC COMMENTS .................................................................................................................... 12

5.1 Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework ........................................................... 12

5.2 Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including

monitoring systems ........................................................................................................................... 12

5.3 Chapter 3 : Waste management ........................................................................................... 12

5.4 Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation ........................................... 13

5.5 Chapter 5 : Transport ............................................................................................................ 13

5.6 Chapter 6 : Safety assessment .............................................................................................. 13

5.7 Chapter 7 : Public communications ...................................................................................... 14

6. RADIOACTIVE WASTE CLASSIFICATION. IAEA. NO. GSG – 1 [12]. ................................................. 15

6.1 Lynas’ intended WLP disposal and storage measures .......................................................... 17

7. THE IAEA STANDARDS AND MALAYSIAN REGULATIONS .............................................................. 18

8. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 19

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 20

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (known as “LAMP” herein) will commence its operation to

process the enriched rare earth ore (known as concentrates herein) from Australia to yield the high

purity rare earth oxides.

The introduction of the LAMP to Kuantan has sparked overwhelmed row and disagreement amidst

the public and various environment-concerned groups. Hence, on the 3rd

of May 2011, the Malaysian

Government approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a request to organise

an independent expert review (known here as peer review) for LAMP. The findings of the

observations and the peer review were finalised and published on the 28th

June 2011.

The purpose of this report is to summarise the outcomes from the scrutiny efforts of the IAEA peer

review report, the associated IAEA standards, safety guides, the Malaysian Act, its subsidiary

regulations and guides concurrently.

It was speculated the scope of the peer review could have outlined by the Malaysian

Government/AELB, this is demonstrated by the selected lineup of the panel comprises only nuclear-

related specialist. Knowing that this review panel would act upon their areas of expertise by

reviewing only the radiation safety aspects, hence one would expect the peer review solely valid to

determine the safety aspect in relation to radiation. Other critical aspects such process/occupational

health and safety, the plant design, construction, operation, incidents, decommissioning, shutdowns,

and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure, socio-economic were

not in the scope of the review. Unquestionably the IAEA peer review is not an all-inclusive study but

has been wrongly regarded as an ultimate assessment that approves the LAMP.

Several critical documents and claims made by the peer review were not appended and cited in the

report; this made retrieval of the citation/reference difficult. The unsourced claims in the report

demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and could be doubted and challenged.

The study on the radiation exposure protection emphasized only gamma emitter or gamma

radiation; this radiation is only trivial in the thorium and uranium decay chains, in terms of its energy

level and concentration. Whilst the major radiation emanated in both decay chains, i.e. alpha and

beta radiation, were not mentioned anywhere in the report.

There was also no emphasis on the risks of internal emitters/radiation; this can pose substantial

damage to internal organs upon inhalation/ingestion of the air borne thorium/uranium-containing

particles.

Numerous radionuclides (decay products) of the thorium and uranium decay chains are poisonous

and carcinogen in nature, e.g. thorium, uranium, radon, radium, bismuth and the final decay

product, lead. The report has not discussed the hazards posed by these radionuclides, the possible

leakage to the atmosphere and the inhalation/ingestion pathways. Instead the peer review this

analysis was expected this to be provided in the next licensing phase.

The peer review suggested the inhalation of radon gas and ingestion of radioactive dust is not

expected to be significant, yet no scientific and analytic ground was provided to back this claim. It is

apparent both vital aspects of the radiation safety assessment, i.e. internal emitters and

radionuclides, have been guilelessly ignored. This again demonstrates the review does not fit to

conclude the LAMP is safe to operate, even from the radiation safety perspective alone.

The IAEA peer review report has misleadingly quoted the term NORM instead of TENORM

throughout. This gives a false perception to the readers that the feedstock, the processed mineral

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ore and the wastes generated by LAMP alongside with its radioactivity are regarded as “natural”.

This is only true for the rare earth ore mined at Mt. Weld, but once the ore is processed,

concentrated and enriched at the Concentration Plant, it is known as TENORM.

It was found that one of the IAEA general safety guides (GSG) was not incorporated and reported in

the peer review, i.e. Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1. The objective of this Safety

Guide is to set out a general scheme for classifying radioactive wastes that is based primarily on

considerations of long term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste.

According to the RSA 93. UK Radioactive Substances Act 1993 Chapter 12, the LAMP’s WLP waste is

classified as Low Level Waste (LLW). Based on this GSG, this waste in this class requires robust

isolation and containment for periods of up to 300 years and is suitable for disposal in engineered

near surface facilities. The typical safe storage depth is from the surface down to 30 meter.

If the Classification of Radioactive Wastes Safety Guide was to be enforced for the WLP residue, then

the RSF disposal method proposed by Lynas would be violating the IAEA standards. Regrettably, this

standard and the possibly violation were not mentioned in the peer review report.

The Malaysia Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) does not accurately define several vital

terms; and the Act 304 is general in nature, no specific and details made on construction, handling

and operation of rare earth plants; no regulation specific for NORM / TENORM activities; more

significantly, the Act 304 gives exceptional power to the “appropriate authority” and the Minister.

5

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (known as “LAMP” herein) will commence its operation to

process the enriched rare earth ore (known as concentrates herein) and yield high purity rare earth

oxides. The rare earth mineral will be mined at Mount Weld, Western Australia, in which stage; the

crude ore contains c.a. 9% of rare earth oxides and with approximate 44ppm thorium oxide/1% REO

[2], equivalent to 396 ppm thorium oxide (known as thorium herein) and trace amount of uranium

oxide (known as uranium herein). The mineral will be trucked to the Mt. Weld Concentration Plant,

located 1.5 km away from the mine. At this plant, the mineral undergoes crushing, grinding,

flotation, filtration and enriched to an intermediate products called concentrates. Concentrates are

the processed ore contain c.a. 40% of REO with 1600 ppm and 29 ppm of thorium and uranium

respectively [3]. The concentrates will be trucked to Port of Fremantle; 1000 km away prior to a

4000 km sea voyage to Kuantan Port (via Singapore); the intended load to LAMP is of approximate

65,000 tonnes/yr.

Within LAMP, the concentrates will be stored as raw material stockpile up to 5000 tonnes at any

time, and will be fed to the LAMP to undergo the following processes:

- Cracking

- Leaching

- Upstream Extraction

- Downstream Extraction

- Product Finishing

The refinery processes require copious amount of chemicals and reagents, such as sulphuric acid,

magnesium oxide, hydrochloric acid and utilities such as raw water, natural gas are required to

extract the rare earth oxides and to generate three types of gypsum (i.e. FGD, WLP and NUF), flue

gas and waste water.

The introduction of the LAMP to Kuantan has sparked overwhelmed row and disagreement from the

public and various environmental-concerned groups. Hence, on the 3rd

of May 2011, the Malaysian

Government approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a request to organise

an independent expert review (known here as peer review) of the LAMP.

The month-long review commenced with a review mission to Malaysia from the 29th

of May to 3rd

of

June 2011, which included discussion with the relevant local authorities, Lynas staffs and other

stakeholders; and a visit to the LAMP and the nearby harbor to which the feedstock will be shipped

from Australia. Prior to the mission, IAEA experts have been fed with relevant documentation by the

Malaysian counterpart, i.e. Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB). The evaluation of the

observations and reporting of the finding were finalised and published on the 30th

June 2011.

1.2 Purpose of the IAEA peer review

The purpose of the IAEA peer review is to perform an independent and technical expert review for

the radiation safety aspect of the rare earth processing facility which was under construction at the

time of writing. This review was regarded as the decisive assessment which approves the

controversial project [4]; as pointed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia that the government of

Malaysia make a final decision based upon this peer review report [5]. The details of the reports are

summarised in the next Chapter.

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1.3 Purpose of this report

The purpose of this report is to summarise the outcomes from the scrutiny efforts of the IAEA peer

review report, the associated IAEA standards, safety guides, the Malaysian Act, its subsidiary

regulations and guides.

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2. SUMMARY OF THE IAEA PEER REVIEW

The scope of the IAEA peer review was restricted to ONLY the Radiation safety aspect [1; p 1, para 3]

of the LAMP. The peer review team has highlighted the source of the reviewing materials, e.g.

project and official documents, upon which the peer review based, was limited to those made

available in the Construction licensing [6, Class A (b)] phase only [1; p 1, para 5]. Other licensing

phases, i.e. siting [Class A (a)], pre-operational [Class A (c) – Temporary], operational [Class A (c) –

Full], and decommissioning [Class G] are not covered [1; p 1, para 5].

The key task of the IAEA review panel is to provide recommendations, to ensure compliance of

LAMP to the (International and national) standards and regulations [1; p 1]. Areas of the study

including transportation, radiation protection (occupational, public and environmental), safety

assessment, waste management and decommissioning and environmental remediation.

The Peer Review Team Members

The expert team selected by the IAEA to undertake the review consists of nine persons. The team

will be led by Dr Tero Varjoranta from Finland, the Director of the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and

Waste Technology at the IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy. Internal (IAEA) experts comprise Dr

Magnus Vesterlind (Sweden), Dr Horst Monken Fernandes (Brazil) and Hanna Kajander (Finland),

while Hiroko Raticliffe will be the administrative assistant. External experts are Jan van der Steen

(Netherlands), Dr Leo M. Lowe (Canada), Dr P. M. Balagopala Pillai (India), Dr Dennis Wymer (UK),

Ulric Schwela (Finland). The areas of expertise of the review team members can be summarised as

followed:

IAEA internal staffs 3 x nuclear physicists, 1 x PR officer, 1 x admin officer

External experts 2 x nuclear safety experts, 1 x nuclear physicist, 1 x radioactive materials

transportation expert, 1 x rare earth safety expert

The Report

The 55-page IAEA report (appended in this report) comprises 7 pages of introductory chapter, 17

pages of Appendixes whilst the remainder reports the following chapters:

Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework

Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including monitoring

systems

Chapter 3 : Waste management

Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation

Chapter 5 : Transport

Chapter 6 : Safety assessment

Chapter 7 : Public communications

The report concluded that the review team was not able to identify non-compliances with the

International radiation safety standards nonetheless 10 issues have been identified -- to be dealt

with 11 recommendations, which has been detailed in the respective chapters of the report.

8

3. GENERAL COMMENTS

3.1 Scope of Review The scope of the peer review could have outlined by the Malaysian Government/AELB in the first

place, this is demonstrated by the selected lineup of the panel comprises only nuclear-related

specialist from IAEA. Knowing that the IAEA review panel would act upon their areas of expertise by

reviewing only the radiation safety aspects, hence one would expect the peer review only valid to

determine the safety aspect in relation to radiation, If at all.

Other critical aspects such process and safety, the entire plant design, construction, operation,

incidents, shutdowns, and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure,

socio-economic were not in the scope of the review. Unquestionably this IAEA peer review is not an

all-inclusive study but has been wrongly regarded as an ultimate assessment that approves the

LAMP. This peer review report is incapable of concluding the compliance of LAMP process to safety

standards and of approving the plant by assessing only part of the LAMP.

In the radiation safety aspect study, there has been several oversights and inaccuracies as identified

(and summarised) in this report. Further, the results of this review are seemingly shallow; apart from

the 11 recommendations and the conclusions drawn, one can hardly find any constructive

numbers/figures/control limits/process specification that specified by the review panel to the LAMP

and AELB to conform to.

3.2 No reference / citation for public review Several critical documents and claims made by the peer review were not appended and cited in the

report, which is essential in official reporting in order to allow readers to easily retrieve the

citation/reference. The unsourced claims in the report demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and they

may be doubted and challenged. Not only does bad writing negatively impact the outcome of the

review, it can jeopordise the reputation and credibility of the entire review panel.

The following outlines some of the unproven claims made by the review panel:

- “Many similar plants producing RE compounds are operating in various parts of the world.” [1,

p1 pt(a)]

- “Many other RE processing plants that are more radioactive operated in compliance with the

international safety standards” [1; p2 pt(c)]

- Critical documents that are not appended in the report:

• Radiation protection program (RPP)

• Residue storage facility (RSF) – detailed design report

• Lynas Waste Management Plan

• Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) plan

• Emergency planning & preparedness of radiation protection

3.3 Gamma ray The study on the radiation exposure protection performed in the peer review only emphasised on

gamma emitter or gamma radiation, this radiation is only trivial in the thorium and uranium decay

chains in terms of its energy and radioactivity concentration. The major radiation emitters emitted

from both chains, i.e. alpha and beta radiation were not mentioned anywhere in the report [1; p15

pt(ii)].

9

3.4 Internal Emitters and Decay radionuclides There was no emphasis in the peer review on internal emitters/radiation of alpha particles and beta

ray [1; p10, para2; p33-34]. Both can pose substantial damage to internal organs upon

inhalation/ingestion of the air borne thorium/uranium-containing particles. Yet this aspect was been

discussed.

Numerous radionuclides (decay products) in the thorium and uranium decay chains are poisonous

and carcinogenic in nature, e.g. thorium, uranium, radon, radium, bismuth and final decay product,

lead. The potential disastrous facts such as the hazards posed by these radionuclides, the possible

leakage of radionuclides to the atmosphere, the inhalation/ingestion pathway were not discussed.

Instead the review team has stipulated the investigation of radionuclide effects would only be

performed by Lynas/AELB in the next licensing phase [1; p33 para2].

The peer review did suggest the inhalation of radon gas and ingestion of radioactive dust is not

expected to be significant [1; p33 para4], which has no scientific and analytic ground to back this

claim at all. It is apparent both vital aspects of the radiation safety assessment, i.e. internal emitters

and radionuclides, have been guilelessly ignored, and this again demonstrates the review does not

fit to conclude the LAMP is safe to operate, even from only the radiation safety perspective.

3.5 TENORM vs. NORM Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) are ubiquitous throughout the earth's crust.

However, Human manipulation of NORM for economic ends, such as mining, ore processing, fossil

fuel extraction, and commercial aviation, may lead to what is known as "technologically enhanced

naturally occurring radioactive materials," often called TENORM. [7].

The IAEA peer review report has misleadingly quoted the term NORM instead of TENORM

throughout. This gives a false perception to the readers that the feedstock, the processed mineral

ore and the wastes generated in LAMP alongside with its radioactivity are regarded as “natural”. This

may be true for the rare earth ore mined at Mt. Weld, but once the ore is processed, concentrated

and enriched, it is known as TENORM.

The safety requirement aspects for the NORM and TENORM have not been distinguished by the IAEA

standards and guides. In America, TENORM is not regulated by the Atomic Energy Act and only

indirectly by other Federal regulations. Control and regulation of TENORM is not consistent from

industry to industry nor from State to State or Country to Country. About a dozen States have some

form of regulations addressing TENORM. [8]. Likewise, TENORM (and NORM) is not regulated by the

Malaysian Law, i.e. Act 304: Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 [9]. Nonetheless, the AELB

“Guidelines for the Preparation of a Radiation Protection Program for TENORM Activities” has

highlighted the safety measures and guidelines for the protection from the radiation initiated from

TENORM activities [10], from which the NORM may be exempted.

10

4. COMMENTS ON THE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. The AELB should require Lynas to submit, before the start of operations, a plan

setting out its intended approach to the long term waste management, in particular management of

the water leach purification (WLP) solids after closure of the plant, together with a safety case in

support of such a plan.

• The recommendation vaguely proposed Lynas to prepare a long term waste management plan,

particularly for WLP solids waste, and failed to highlight the relevant regulations, safety

standards, disposal procedures, specification and limits that Lynas shall adhere to.

Recommendation 2. The AELB should require Lynas to submit, before the start of operations, a plan

for managing the waste from the decommissioning and dismantling of the plant at the end of its life.

The RIA and decommissioning plan should be updated accordingly.

• Ditto.

Recommendation 3. The AELB should require that the results of exposure monitoring and

environmental monitoring once the plant is in operation be used to obtain more reliable assessments

of doses to workers and members of the public, and the RIA updated accordingly. The AELB should

also require that dose reduction measures be implemented where appropriate in accordance with the

international principle of optimisation of radiation protection.

• This recommendation failed to specify the critical monitoring sites, details of the exposure

monitor system, the control limits and the mitigation measures when these limits are exceeded.

This also implies the monitoring is constrained to external radiation exposure only.

Recommendation 4. The AELB should develop criteria that will allow the flue gas desulphurisation

(FGD) and neutralisation underflow (NUF) residues to be declared non-radioactive for the purposes of

regulation, so that they can be removed from the site and, if necessary in terms of environmental

regulation, controlled as scheduled waste.

• FGD and NUF, alongside with the waste water and flue gas cannot be declared and should not be

assumed as non-radioactive on the ground of process simulation or simply hypothetical, by

which the radioactivity readings were generated.

• A rigorous monitoring and control system need to be in place and should be regulated in

accordance to international standards; rather than to revise the present regulations just to allow

these wastes to be exempted.

Recommendation 5. The AELB should implement a mechanism for establishing a fund for covering

the cost of the long term management of waste including decommissioning and remediation. The

AELB should require Lynas to make the necessary financial provision. The financial provision should

be regularly monitored and managed in a transparent manner.

• No comment

Recommendation 6. For regulating the Lynas project, the Malaysian Government should ensure that

the AELB has sufficient human, financial and technical resources, competence and independence.

• No comment

Recommendation 7. The AELB and the relevant Ministries should establish a programme for regularly

and timely updating the Regulations in accordance with the most recent international standards. In

particular, regulations pertinent to NORM activities relevant to the proposed rare earths processing

facility should be considered to be updated.

11

• It has been identified that the Malaysian regulations are lagged behind from the latest

international standards. It is also apparent the current regulations are not impeccable in

regulating various safety aspects of the rare earth process in the country, including the

radioactive waste disposal and storage, clearance threshold, radiation leakage, health and

safety damages caused by radionuclides and internal emitters. See Chapter 7 for more

details

Recommendation 8. The AELB should enhance the understanding, transparency and visibility of its

regulatory actions in the eyes of the public, particularly those actions related to inspection and

enforcement of the proposed rare earths processing facility.

• No comment

Recommendation 9. The AELB should intensify its activities regarding public information and public

involvement.

• No comment

Recommendation 10. Lynas, as the party responsible for the safety of the proposed rare earths

processing facility, should be urged to intensify its communication with interested and affected

parties in order to demonstrate how it will ensure the radiological safety of the public and the

environment.

• No comment

Recommendation 11. Based on recommendations 1–10 above, the Government of Malaysia should

prepare an action plan that:

(a) Indicates how the above-mentioned recommendations are to be addressed;

(b) Sets out the corresponding time schedule for the actions;

(c) Is geared to the possibility of an IAEA-organised follow-up mission, which will review the

fulfillment of recommendations 1–10 above in, say, one to two years' time, in line with other IAEA

review missions.

• The intangible nature of the 10 recommendations would create a challenging task for the

Government of Malaysia to monitor, review, assess and ultimately to approve the

compliances by AELB and Lynas.

• Further, it would be contradictory to the interest of this peer review, if AELB was demanded

by the Government to act on its behalf to monitor, review, assess and approve the

fulfillment of these recommendations.

12

5. SPECIFIC COMMENTS

5.1 Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework Pages 8 and 9 – List of relevant legal, regulations, standards and supporting documents.

There was no rare earth process-specific regulations, standards, nor industry best practice given. The

Malaysian regulations have been lagged behind from the latest versions of the International

Standards

Page 10, paragraph 3, points (a) and (b) – “Malaysian regulations are even stricter than the IAEA

standards.”

Both statements of the control of radiation doses regulated by the Malaysian Law is ONLY intended

for External Radiation. This is irrelevant as the External radioactivity concentration of the TENORM of

LAMP is low naturally; drawing attention to the control measures of the External Radiation gives

false impression of the Malaysian regulations. The Malaysian law has been loosely regulating the

internal radiation and radionuclides.

5.2 Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including

monitoring systems Pages 13, para 4, line 1 – Facilities for the processing of mineral containing NORM may give rise to

elevated levels of radiation exposure of workers and, to a much lesser extent, member of the public

residing nearby.

This statement was made for EXTERNAL radiation protection only; and has disregarded the life-

threatening internal emitters and radionuclides. The affecting zone threaten by both can be

extended far from the LAMP premises.

Pages 13, para 4, line 5 – … the process materials (mainly thorium-232 and its decay products) are at

relatively low concentrations.

Unverified claim. Low concentration of thorium relatively to what? For reference, the process

materials contain 1600 ppm thorium, significantly higher than that exist in nature at between 8 to 12

ppm. Peer review made a false statement by quoting low concentration of thorium in the process

materials.

Pages 13, last para, line 3 – The activity concentrations in all other process material are essentially at

natural background levels.

Unproven claim.

Pages 14, para 2 & 3

It was apparent that the radiation protection program (RPP) document submitted by Lynas for

review incorporated several important elements of radiation protection and it was claim that the

RPP is in accordance with the relevant AELB guidance and the Act 304, 1984. Such an important

document should have been released for public review and agreement.

Pages 15, para 3, pt (i) –With regard to monitoring system, …

The details of the radiation monitoring system, including its location, control limits, should have

done during design/detailed design phase. However, this is not available at the time of writing.

5.3 Chapter 3 : Waste management Peer review failed to specify discharge limit of radioactive materials into various waste streams of

LAMP, in accordance to the International standards and guides

13

Page 17, para 2, line 1 – The radionuclide concentrations in the FGD and NUF residues are expected

to be very low – similar to the average values in normal rocks and soils.

Unproven claim. The assumption of low radionuclide concentration in both residues is merely

hypothetical, no analytical data nor simulation results was provided by Lynas that supports this

claim.

Page 17, para 3

Peer review did not specify and finalise the long term management plan for the WLP waste. Their

plan to reuse WLP for developing synthetic concrete is nothing much more than just a hypothesis. It

was expected by IAEA some (if not all) of the radioactive WLP waste will end up having to be

disposed of as waste in Gebeng.

Page 18, para 1 and 2 –Discharges to the environment

Peer review failed to envisage the likelihood and the consequences of contamination/leaking of

radioactive materials into both liquid and gas waste streams. Both waste sources will eventually end

up in the environment, yet they have been shallowly described in just 6 lines of text.

Page 18, para 4

IAEA/AELB/Lynas have not addressed the long term management option for WLP waste, the

institutional waste management time scale, or the possibility of future events that could affect the

integrity of the waste site.

Page 20, para 3, line 3 – The WLP contains relatively low concentration of naturally occurring

radionuclides and thus the hazards are equally low. It can therefore be assumed that the

development of the safety case will be straightforward and that it can rely on established

methodologies and assessment tools.

Unverified claim. The WLP contains radionuclides significantly higher than that exist in nature. Peer

review made a false statement by quoting low concentration of radionuclides and hence low hazards

of the WLP; furthermore they have failed to incorporate the risks caused by internal emitters.

5.4 Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation No comment

5.5 Chapter 5 : Transport

No comment

5.6 Chapter 6 : Safety assessment Page 33, para 2, line 6 – … only the WLP residue is expected to contain elevated level of radioactivity.

The peer review neglected the possibility of radioactivity materials released to the other waste

streams.

Page 33, para 2, line 11 – … Confirmation of these activity concentration values and the basis …in the

next licensing phase.

The peer review has disregarded the study on the key aspects of radionuclides and yet concluded

the LAMP is safe to operate and complied with International safety standards.

Page 33, para 3, line 6 – … Pb-210 and Po-210.

The more volatile radionuclides in both thorium and uranium decay chains is the poisonous radon

gas. The Pb-210 and Po-210 quoted in the peer review report only present in the uranium decay

chain, of which concentration is very much lower as compared to that of the thorium (29 ppm vs

14

1600 ppm). Therefore, emission of the radionuclides in the thorium chain (instead of uranium chain)

should have been studied instead.

Page 33, para 4, line 5 – … The inhalation of thoron and radon, whether by workers or members of

the public, is not expected to be significant.

Unverified claim.

Page 33, para 4, line 8 – … daily ingestion of 100 mg of 6 Bq/g thorium containing material would

give rise to a worker dose of only 0.2 mSv per year.

page 34, para 3, line 6 – it can be shown that the maximum dose receive by a worker from inhalation

of dust will be less than 0.3 mSv per year …

False and negligent statement. The figures of 0.2 and 0.3 mSv/year quoted here referred to External

radiation dose [3]; ingestion and inhalation of thorium containing material or internal emitters

would give Internal emission that is considerably more damaging to the internal organs than

external radiation; let alone the poisonous and carcinogenic radionuclides. It is not acceptable that

the IAEA nuclear experts misperceived the internal radiation with an external radiation dosage.

Page 34, last para; page 35, first and second para – Gamma radiation has been used as a basis of

radiation safety study

In the decay scheme of thorium, one atom of thorium emits six alpha particles, four beta rays and

several low-energy gamma rays [11]. The low exposure dosage of workers illustrated in the peer

review report denoted to the gamma rays only; it is inappropriate that gamma ray was used as a

basis of analysis, as this radiation only present in thorium and uranium decay chains, in minute

amount and with low energy, hence low dose reading naturally. The peer review has failed to assess

the high energy/high intensity alpha and beta radiation, both radiations were not mentioned

anywhere in the report.

Page 34, para 4

It was not detailed by either AELB or Lynas that surface water to be treated for radioactivity

materials.

5.7 Chapter 7 : Public communications

No comment

15

6. RADIOACTIVE WASTE CLASSIFICATION. IAEA. NO. GSG – 1 [12].

It was found that one of the critical IAEA general safety guides (GSG) was not incorporated and

reported in the peer review, i,e, Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1. The objective of

this Safety Guide is to set out a general scheme for classifying radioactive waste that is based

primarily on considerations of long term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste.

Figure 1 shows the illustration of the radioactive waste classification of this general guide, which is

determined by the radioactivity concentration and the half-life. It is noted that different class of

radioactive waste requires various mean of safe disposal and storage. Nonetheless, this guide has

not incorporated the distinctive numbers that define the boundary of each class. Hence, an

international best practice was adopted for the purpose of this reporting.

16

Figure 2 : Radioactive waste classification system used in the UK [13,14]

Figure 2 demonstrates the radioactive waste classification for different radioactivity level used in the

UK. Most EU Member States, the Baltic and the Central European countries have the similar

categorisation limits (if not more stringent) as per the UK’s [15] back in 1998, and is believed to be

more rigorous to date.

The radioactivity concentration of the water leach purification (WLP) solid waste is reportedly 6.2

Bq/g [3], this puts the LAMP’s WLP waste in the Low Level Waste (LLW) category. It is recommended

by the IAEA GSG [12], this waste requires robust isolation and containment for periods of up to a

few hundred years and is suitable for disposal in engineered near surface facilities. This class covers

a very broad range of waste. LLW may include short lived radionuclides at higher levels of activity

concentration, and also long lived radionuclides, but only at relatively low levels of activity

concentration – the latter reflects the LAMP’s WLP.

The LLW involves near surface disposal facilities at varying depths, typically from the surface down

to 30 meter. The LLW may need for controls over time frames for which institutional control can be

guaranteed and thus human intrusion into the waste can be prevented.

In many States it is assumed that institutional controls can be relied upon for a period of up to

around 300 years. A different situation arises for the WLP waste containing significant amounts of

radionuclides, for which the activity content will not decrease significantly over such timescales.

Since the management of such waste in near surface facilities is in many cases the only practicable

option, longer periods of institutional control have to be postulated, with periodic safety review of

the facility [12]. All these will depend on safety assessments and on national practices, and are

subject to approval by the regulatory body.

LAMP’s WLP

waste = 6.2 Bq/g

17

6.1 Lynas’ intended WLP disposal and storage measures

The RIA and IAEA reports indicated that the WLP solid waste will be stored temporarily in Residue

Storage Facilities (RSF) for several years, if the WLP residue cannot be recycled and reused; it will be

eventually disposed at a permanent disposal facility in the country.

The design of the RSF as revealed by the RIA report [3; p46], will have a dual liner system consisting

of a clay layer and a HDPE (High-density polyethylene) layer to prevent migration and leakage of

radionuclides into the environment. The WLP residue will be covered with “special materials” to

minimise infiltration of rainwater into the residue materials and spread of materials to the

environment. The depositing of WLP residue will be conducted by dispersing the materials into the

RSF site and this will build up height on the 24 000 m2 RSF.

No details of the methodology, design and location of the permanent disposal site was disclosed by

AELB/Lynas.

If the IAEA General Safety Guide. Classification of Radioactive Wastes. No GSG-1 , was to be

employed for the WLP residue, then the mean of RSF disposal proposed above will be violating the

IAEA standards. Regrettably, this standard well as the possibly safety violation were not mentioned

in the peer review report.

As far as the Malaysian Law is concerned, Lynas is allowed to accumulate and dispose the WLP

residue onsite if they obtained a written authorisation from AELB. Given the relaxed nature of the

Act 304, no disposal limits nor the method of safe disposal/storage was outlined in the Act and its

subsidiary regulations. It is therefore, under the Act 304, up to the AELB to decide those exempted

limits and methods for safe disposal and storage.

18

7. THE IAEA STANDARDS AND MALAYSIAN REGULATIONS

Regulating nuclear and radiation safety is a national responsibility, and many Member States have

decided to adopt the IAEA’s safety standards for use in their national regulations. [16]

In Malaysia, the primary legislation for radiation protection is the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984

(Act 304) [9], the subsidiary Regulations and Guides. The regulations are controlled, maintained,

executed and supervised by a regulatory body, i.e. AELB [9; Section 3].

Several inadequacies of the Act 304 were identified by the RIA and IAEA, and summarised as

followed:

Act 304 Description and Implications

"radioactive material" means any nuclear fuel,

radioactive product or radioactive waste. No

follow-on definition for “radioactive product”

Under the law of Malaysia, any material that is

radioactive is regulated under Act 304, this

covers material with background or trivial

radiation, e.g. sand, granite rocks etc.

Radiation protection (Basic Safety Standards)

Regulations 2010, …the value established by the

“appropriate authority” and expressed in terms

of activity concentration and/or total activity, at

or below which the source of radiation may be

released from the control of the “appropriate

authority”…

Appropriate authority in this case means AELB.

The clearance level of radioactive materials to be

determined by AELB, and such level has not been

established for LAMP. It will be up to AELB to set

the exempted limits, below which the materials

can be released from the control of AELB and Act

304, and this allows one to transport, process,

store, handle and dispose radioactive materials.

Section 26 and 27 stated that no person shall

dispose of or cause to be disposed, accumulate

or cause to be accumulated any radioactive

waste on any premises without the prior

authorisation in writing of the “appropriate

authority”.

No clear definition of “authorisation”. [1; p9,

para3]

AELB has the authority to allow any person to

accumulate (produce) and dispose radioactive

materials in the country, if a prior written

authorisation is provisioned.

Section 69 - The Minister can impose, exempt

any person or class of persons from any or all of

the provisions of this Act.

The minister has the authority to grant any

person to be exempted from the regulations,

guides under the Act 304.

To summarise, several vital terms were not defined accurately by the Act 304; and the Act 304 is

general in nature, no specific and details made on construction, handling and operation of rare earth

plants. [3; p4, para2]; no regulation specific for NORM / TENORM activities [1; p10, pt(c)]; more

significantly, the Act 304 gives exceptional power to the “appropriate authority” and the Minister.

Based on the understanding from reviewing the Malaysian regulations, it can be speculated that the

Malaysian laws are not impeccable regulating various safety aspects of the rare earth process in the

country, including the radioactive waste disposal and storage, clearance threshold, radiation

leakage, health and safety damages caused by radionuclides and internal emitters.

19

8. CONCLUSIONS

The IAEA peer review report can be regarded as poorly written given the fairly large number of

grammar and typographical errors, non-rare earth-specific assessment, poor organisation and

presentation of its contents.

This review study has identified several shortcomings, among others, the peer review did not assess

the potential hazards that initiated by ingestion of radionuclides and the subsequent internal

emission.

Several critical documents referred and claims made by the peer review were appended and cited,

this has made the retrieval the citation/reference difficult. The unsourced claims in the report

demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and they may be doubted and challenged.

It was identified that the IAEA GSG, Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1 was not

incorporated and reported in the peer review. The objective of this Safety Guide is to set out a

general scheme for classifying radioactive waste that is based primarily on considerations of long

term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste.

If the Classification of Radioactive Wastes Safety Guide was to be employed for the WLP residue as

Low Level Waste, then the mean of RSF disposal proposed above will be violating the IAEA safety

standards. Regrettably, this standard as well as the possibly violation were not mentioned in the

peer review report.

Although it was asserted this peer review report only assess the radiation safety and protection

aspect, however, without incorporating other non-radiation-related aspects outlined below. The

peer review report is thus not fit to conclude the LAMP is safe to operate.

Other critical aspects such process safety, the entire plant design, construction, operation, incident,

shutdowns, and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure, socio-

economic were not in the scope of the peer review.

Unquestionably this IAEA peer review is not an all-inclusive study and it would be very wrong to

regard this peer review as an ultimate assessment that approves safe operation of the LAMP.

20

REFERENCES

1. IAEA, “Report of the International peer review mission on the Radiation Safety Aspects of a

Proposed Rare Earths Processing Facility (The Lynas Project)”, NE/NEFW/2011, 2011

2. Lynas Corp, “Investor Presentation”, March 2010

3. Nuklear Malaysia, “Riadiological Impact Assessment of Advanced Materials Plant, Gebeng

Industrial Estate, Kuantan, Pahang”, June 2010

4 The Star Online, “Lynas’ fate depends on IAEA”, 23th May 2011

5. The Star Online, “PM: Govt won’t compromise on projects that jeopardise public safety”, 23th

April 2011

6. AELB, “Radiation Protection (Licensing) Regulations 1986”, P.U. (A) 149, 1986

7. D. Vearrier, et. al. “Technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials”, Clin

Toxicol (Phila). 47(5):393-406. 2009.

8. AEA 1954. 42 USC 2011-2292. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

9. ACT 304. Atomic Energy Licensing Act, 1984.

10. AELB, “Guidelines for the Preparation of a Radiation Protection Program for TENORM Activities”,

LEM/TEK/45 (Part E), 2001

11. P.M.B. PILLAI, “Naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in the extraction and processing

of rare earths”, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM IV), IAEA, Seville (2007), 197 – 221

12. IAEA, “Radioactive Waste Classification”. IAEA No. GSG-1 , Vienna, 2009

13 . DELFRA, “Policy for the Long Term Management of Solid Low Level Radioactive Waste in the

United

Kingdom” London, 2007

14. RSA 93. UK Radioactive Substances Act 1993 Chapter 12.

15. P. Vankerckhoven (Ed.), “Radioactive waste categories - current position (1998) in the EU

Member States and in the Baltic and Central European countries, EUR 18324 EN, 1998

16. IAEA, “Fundamental Safety Principles”, No. SF-1, Vienna, 2006.