Compulsory Arbitration: The Case of British Columbia Teachers

Compulsory Arbitration: The Case of British Columbia TeachersAuthor(s): Mark Thompson and James CairnieSource: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Oct., 1973), pp. 3-17Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2522202 .

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COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE CASE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA TEACHERS

MARK THOMPSON and JAMES CAIRNIE

TRADITIONALLY, students and practi- tioners of industrial relations in

North America have been hostile to the use of compulsory arbitration to resolve intertest disputes. On the basis of Ameri- can use of wartime adjustment machinery, national arbitration systems in Australia and New Zealand, plus limited North American experience on the state or provincial levels,' compulsory arbitration has been criticized on the grounds that it does not prevent strikes, and collective bargaining atrophies when the parties know that compulsory arbitration is automatically available or very likely to be invoked.

More recently, the growth of unionism and collective bargaining in the public sector has revived interest in compulsory arbitration. Since it is normal for there

The increasing use of compulsory arbitration in the public sector makes particularly timely this study of an arbitration system that has been in effect since 1937 and has resulted in over 500 awards in teacher salary disputes. The authors analyze trends in the proportion of negotiations ending in arbitration under this system, and they compare the record of teacher strikes and salaries in British Columbia with the record in other provinces. They conclude that this case demonstrates that compulsory arbitration can prevent strikes without demol- ishing collective bargaining and without produc- ing wage awards that are far above or below the level of negotiated settlements.

Mark Thompson is an Associate Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administra- tion, University of British Columbia. James Cairnie is an Administrative Officer on the staff of the British Columbia Teachers' Federation. Responsibility for -the opinions expressed in this article rests solely with the authors.-EDITOR

to be limitations on public employees' right to strike, the most common use of compulsory arbitration in North America is now in the public sector, despite its unpopularity in industrial relations circles and the lack of experience with this technique. This article will examine a system of compulsory arbitration that has regulated labor relations for all pub-

1 U.S. and foreign experience is summarized in Herbert R. Northrup, Compulsory Arbitra- tion and Government Intervention in Labor Disputes (Washington: Labor Policy Association, 1966), pp. 15-24; more recent materials include John M. Howells, "Causes and Frequency of Strikes in New Zealand," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1972), pp. 524-532; Robert J. Hines, "Mandatory Con- tract Arbitration-Is It a Viable Process?" In- dustrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1972), pp. 533-544; Donald J. Brown, Interest Arbitration, Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations, Study No. 18 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968); and Peter Z. W. Tsong, "Compulsory Arbitration in British Columbia: Bill 33," Relations Industrielles, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1971), pp. 744-763.

2 See Carl M Stevens, "Is Compulsory Arbi- tration Compatible With Bargaining?" Indus- trial Relations: A Journal of Economy ir So- ciety, Vol. 5, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 38-52; Walter J. Gershenfeld, "Compulsory Arbitration is Ready When You Are," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March 1972), pp. 140-152; J. Joseph Loewenberg, "Compulsory Arbitration for Police and Fire Fighters in Pennsylvania in 1968," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 367-379; Ben- jamin Aaron, "How Other Nations Deal with Emergency Disputes," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 95, No. 5 (May 1972), pp. 37-43; and John E. Drotning and David B. Lipsky, "The Out- come of Impasse Proceedings in New York Schools Under the Taylor Law," The Arbitra- tion Journal, Vol. 26, No 2 (April 1971) pp. 87-102.

3



4 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS

lic school teachers in British Columbia for thirty-six years. An analysis of this lengthy experience with the British Columbia system should contribute to an understanding of the theory and practice of both interest arbitration and collective bargaining.

The Environment of Labor Relations

Industrial relations in the major provinces of Canada tend to display distinct characteristics. Geographical and cultural factors, plus the power of the provinces to legislate on industrial relations for over 90 percent of the labor force, seem to account for these differences. British Columbia occupies an area greater than California, Oregon, and Washington combined and is eco- nomically dependent on primary industries, particularly forest products and mining. The relative importance of these traditionally unionized industries and the province's pattern of development have combined to make British Colum- bia the most heavily unionized province in Canada. Over 43 percent of the province's paid nonagricultural workers are organized, compared with the national average of approximately 33 percent.8 The labor movement is dominated by large international unions, with tradi- tions of local autonomy, militance, and left-wing political action. Although employer circles are dominated by a hand- ful of large forest products and mining concerns, most bargaining is carried out through employer associations. Wage levels in this province are substantially higher than the national average.

For most of the twentieth century, British Columbia has had relatively con-

3 Province of British Columbia, Department of Labour, Annual Report for the Year Ended December 31, 1971 (Victoria: Authority of the Legislative Assembly, 1972), p. U83.

servative governments. During the past two decades, the Social Credit party dominated political life in the province. After coming to power in 1952, the party maintained a majority through seven elections and held uninterrupted power until August 1972, drawing most of its support from rural areas and business interests. The labor movement consti- tuted the principal source of support for the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) and, as a result, relations between government and trade unions were usually strained. After the August 1972 election, the NDP took over the government in British Columbia for the first time, after de-emphasizing its labor ties. The province has comprehensive labor relations statutes that, like most Canadian labor laws, resemble the U.S. Labor-Management Relations Act. Legis- lation in British Columbia, however, provides fewer protections to organized labor than comparable laws elsewhere in Canada.

This combination of economic and political factors has produced turbulent labor relations in British Columbia. Considering the high degree of union- ization, the number of strikes has not been disproportionately large, but industrial disputes in the province have tended to be long and bitter, as the data in Table 1 demonstrate.4

Bargaining in the Public Schools

Formal labor-management negotiations in British Columbia school districts began in an atmosphere of conflict. During World War I, declining real in- come and growing union membership in

4 Cf. Stuart Jamieson, "Regional Factors in Industrial Conflict: The Case of British Colum- bia," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (August 1962), pp. 405-416.



COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 5

Table 1. Comparison of Work Stoppages in Canada as a Whole and in

British Columbia. (by average for the period)

Number Union of

Members Strikes in B.C. in B.C.

Period as Per- as Per- Man Days Lost centage centage per Striker

of Those of Total in in

Canada Canada Canada B.C.

1951-55 12.6 14.3 21.4 25.7 1956-60 13.3 11.8 16.1 35.2 1961-65 12.9 7.9 14.6 20.2 1966-70 12.6 11.4 20.2 25.9 1971-72 12.6 16.8 11.9 15.1

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Eco- nomics and Research Branch, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1970, p. 11; Labour Gazette, various issues; and Canada Department of Labour.

the private sector created a mood of militance among Canadian teachers. Most provincial teachers' associations, incltud- ing the British Columbia Teachers' Fed- eration (BCTF), were formed at that time.5 In Victoria, newly organized teachers went on strike for two days in a salary dispute. This strike, the first teachers' walkout in the British Empire, caused the government to introduce legislation permitting school boards to negotiate with teacher associations and allowing submission of unresolved disputes to voluntary arbitrations When a local school board in New Westminster refused to take a salary dispute to arbi-

5 Ronald Manzer, "Selective Inducemenets and the Development of Pressure Groups: The Case of the Canadian Teachers' Associations," Ca- nadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1969), p 106.

6 Henry F. Johnson, A History of Public Ediu- cation in British Columbia (Vancouver: Univer- sity of British Columbia Press, 1964), pp. 237- 241; Public Schools Act, Revised Statute of Brit- ish Columbia, 1919, c.75, s.115.

tration in 1921, the teachers called a strike and ultimately won their demands.

Lack of protection under the law and their own internal weaknesses forced the teachers' associations to rely on lobbying before school boards and the provincial government during the 1920s. The climate of union militance and a series of salary cuts during the 1930s, however, strengthened the teachers' organization, especially in urban areas. Pressure from the BCTF was a factor in the passage of amendments to the Public Schools Act in 1937, which established the basis for labor relations in the provincial school system.

A key section of the Public Schools Act permitted either party to demand binding arbitration of unresolved salary disputes, thereby inserting compulsory arbitration into: the school labor relations system. This arrangement, with only minor modification, has remained in force since 1937. The law also provided for single salary schedules, which further strengthened collective bargaining by eliminating the common school board practice of negotiating only minimum salaries with an association and then bargaining on an individual basis for salaries above the minima. Although the law eventually stimulated bargaining, its immediate impact was dimin- ished by the limited revenue available to school boards and the surplus of teachers during the 1930s. Not until after World War II did bargaining, with occasional resort to arbitration, become the normal practice in most school districts.7

In 1958, significant procedural changes were incorporated in the legislation. Conciliation became compulsory, and the conciliator was obliged to submit

7 Johnson, A History of Public Education in British Columbia, pp. 242-243; Public Schools Act, RSBC, 1937, c. 68, s. 3.




unresolved disputes to arbitration. The revised legislation specified a mandatory timetable for negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration that requires these proc- esses to begin by September and end by December of each year.

The Public Schools Act has never ex- plicitly prohibited strikes by teachers, and there is no general legislation ban- ning strikes by public employees that applies to teachers. School boards have maintained that a de facto prohibition of strikes exists, since the use of arbitration is a quid pro quo for loss of the right to strike. Although it officially re- fuses to accept the trustees' position, the BCTF has requested amendment of the act to confirm the legality of teachers' strikes only in nonsalary disputes.8

Like other jurisdictions in the North America, British Columbia finances its school system through a combination of local property tax revenues and equali- zation grants from general provincial revenues. Currently, provincial grants account for an average of 45.6 percent of school district revenues. Budgetary procedures for B.C. schools are complex and embody a high degree of control of the levels of expenditure by the provincial Minister of Education. Prior to 1968, the province operated on a shared- cost formula. This committed the provincial government to meeting specified portions of approved classes of expendi- tures, such as teachers' salaries. Concern

8 Roy A. North, "The British Columbia Teachers' Federation and the Compulsory Arbi- tration Process," (Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1964), p. 80; Vancouver Province, April 25, 1973. A similar ambiguity exists concerning the legality of strikes by those employed in the Ontario provincial civil service: H. W. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining by Public Em- ployees in Canada: Five Models (Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan-Wayne State University, 1971), p. 121.

for the rising costs of education led to the adoption of the present, more re- strictive system.

The Minister of Education, by law, has two responsibilities for local school financing. He sets a uniform school property tax rate for the entire province, and he determines a "basic education program" for each school district-a dollar figure computed by a complex (and little understood) formula incor- porating the number of pupils in a district, approved costs of the previous year, and several specific objects of expenditure contained in the law. Equali- zation grants are calculated by subtract- ing the revenue generated by property taxes from the basic education program. Districts that wish to spend more than that provided by the basic education program must raise additional funds by increasing local property taxes.9

School boards may spend their revenues without any further supervision from the provincial government. The rigid formula for determining the basic education program, however, precludes any lobbying by local interests to increase provincial grants to local boards, a relatively common practice in U.S. school systems.10 On the other hand, the law makes local boards responsible only for "salary and bonus schedules" and limits arbitration to those subjects. Al- though arbitrators and the courts have interpreted the meaning of "bonus" liberally to include such items as allow- ances for summer school attendance, transportation to isolated areas, and

9 British Columbia Teachers' Federation, Edu- cational Finance in British Columbia-1971 (Vancouver, 1971), p. 1; Public Schools Act, RSBC, 1970, c. 41, ss. 180-181.

10 Cf. Michael H. Moskow, Teachers and Unions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl- vania, Wharton School of Finance and Com- merce, Industrial Research Unit, 1966), p. 248.




jointly financed insurance plans, a number of economic items of employment are not included under "salary and bonus schedules" and therefore cannot be determined locally. The most important item not under trustees' jurisdiction is the pension system, which is con- trolled by the provincial legislature and funded by contributions from the provincial government and participating teachers. Other matters outside the boards' authority include tenure, paid holidays, and sick leave. In the past, many of these nonsalary items were first negotiated locally in more affluent districts, and school trustees from these districts then joined the BCTF in peti- tioning the legislature to assume direct responsibility for such subjects. The act also provides for the review of dismissals of teachers by tripartite boards.

The Bargaining Parties

The public primary and secondary schools in British Columbia employ approximately 23,000 teachers, defined under the Public Schools Act to include both practicing teachers and supervisors through the rank of principal. Qualifi- cations of Canadian teachers vary greatly, but until 1971, British Colum- bia maintained the highest proportion of teachers with full university training of any province in Canada.1"

Rapid population growth and decreasing pupil-teacher ratios combined to produce a high demand for teachers in the years after World War II, and between 1950 and 1971 the number of teachers in the province rose by more than 340 percent. This demand was met

11 J. Douglas Muir, Collective Bargaining by Canadian Public School Teachers, Prime Min- ister's Task Force on Labour Relations, Study No. 21 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), pp. 70-74.

through increased university enrollment and the hiring of teachers from other provinces and abroad, principally from Great Britain. Despite these measures, a general scarcity of teachers prevailed until the end of 1971.

Over 99 percent of all teachers (as defined in the act) belong to the British Columbia Teachers' Federation.12 The federation is composed of seventy-eight local associations, each corresponding to a provincially established school district, except for several larger districts in the Vancouver metropolitan area that have multiple associations. Local associations range in size from sixteen members to more than 1,500, and each has its own constitution, elects its own officers, and generally operates autonomously.

The BCTF has concentrated on the improvement of its members' economic welfare, although it also conducts extensive professional activities.13 After the strike in 1921, the federation concentrated on lobbying in favor of provincial minimum salaries, locally established salary schedules, and pensions. The federation is active in political discussions of educational issues and worked to defeat the Social Credit government after a ceiling on educational expendi- tures was imposed. In local salary disputes, the federation has often resorted to boycotts or work-to-rule campaigns to

12 Membership of principals and other supervisors has been a frequent subject of debate within the BCTF. Despite pressure from local boards and a militant faction in the union, the federation has refused to classify these officials as management and exclude them. Between 1947 and 1971, membership was compulsory by law for all teachers. Statutory membership was enacted to encourage enforcement of a code of professional ethics but was withdrawn after a series of disputes between the BCTF and the provincial government.

13 Muir, Collective Bargaining by Canadian Public School Teachers, pp. 287-289.




bring pressure on school boards. Two brief strikes over working conditions occurred in the late 1960s, and in 1971 virtually every teacher in the province struck for one day in a pension dispute with the provincial government. Other province-wide strikes have been nar- rowly averted on at least two occasions.

After compulsory binding arbitration was first introduced in 1937, the BCTF discouraged its frequent use by local associations. Following World War II, however, arbitration gained greater acceptance, and its use was often actively promoted by the federation. 4 At present, the federation's official position re- jects "the idea that arbitration is a desirable procedure" and favors the sub- stitution of full collective bargaining, with the explicit right to strike. The current statement was adopted in 1966, after vigorous debate for a number of years.'5 The BCTF, however, has taken no concrete action to implement this policy.

Affiliation with the labor movement has been a long-standing issue in the BCTF. The question was discussed ex- tensively in the 1930s, culminating in affiliation with the craft-oriented Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) in 1943. Ten years later, when the TLC was about to merge with a confederation of industrial unions, the BCTF voted by a nar- row margin to disaffiliate. Although association with the TLC had exposed teachers to trade union tactics, BCTF members were reluctant to become involved with militant industrial unions, primarily because they believed few

14 Johnson, A History of Public Education in British Columbia, pp. 242 248; and North, "The British Columbia Teachers' Federation and the Compulsory Arbitration Process," pp. 78, 92-173.

15 B.C. Teachers Federation, Policies and Pro- cedures 1971-72 (Vancouver, 1971), p. 16.

tangible benefits had been gained by formal association with the TLC.16

There are seventy-four school districts in the province, each supervised by a board composed of three to nine trustees elected by local rate-payers for two-year terms. School boards are legally em- powered to set salary schedules for their districts unilaterally (in the absence of an agreement) or through negotiations with any association of teachers.

Trustees are represented at the provincial level by the British Columbia School Trustees Association (BCSTA), a voluntary body to which seventy-two school boards belong. In the 1950s the BCSTA tried to assume a leading role in local negotiations by promoting an aggressive bargaining posture among its members. This tactic was one factor leading to a breakdown of negotiations in 1957, a teachers' boycott, the personal intervention of the Minister of Educa- tion to force binding arbitration, and the 1958 amendments to the Public Schools Act. Since then, the BCSTA has been less prominent in negotiations. The association meets annualy to set provincial policies and strategies for negotiations with teachers but lacks the power to bind its members to these policies. The BCSTA is clearly a weaker organization than the BCTF.17

Bargaining and Arbitration

Collective negotiations between teachers and trustees are characterized by a high degree of local autonomy in bargaining and by rigid time limits for arbitration. Each district bargains locally, and decisions reached at that level by

16 Johnson, A History of Public Education in British Columbia, pp. 248-249.

17 Cf. Muir, Collective Bargaining by Canadian Public School Teachers, pp. 52-54.




either party are not subject to ratifica- tion by any higher authority. Although the BCTF adopts overall bargaining policies at its annual general meeting, local teachers' associations elect negotiating committees and rely on the federation only for advice and technical support. A provincial agreements committee, composed of twelve regional representa- tives plus members of the BCTF staff, assists and coordinates the work of local negotiation committees. At the request of local associations, staff specialists con- duct training sessions, hold regional strategy meetings, and supply the basic arguments and economic data to support the teachers' position.

School boards receive comparable support from the BCSTA, although its services are less extensive than those provided by the BCTF. In an effort to equalize the expertise of the parties in bargaining, a growing proportion of local boards (currently about one half) engage professional counsel to represent them.

Revision of salary and bonus schedules is the major concern of negotiators. In some larger school districts, there are negotiations on several other topics, including class size, maternity leave, un- paid leave, the status of substitute teachers, school libraries, supervisory positions, and discipline. In those school districts, formal Learning and Working Conditions Agreements cover subjects other than salaries.

Although both provincial associations discourage arbitration, the BCTF is more strongly in favor of bargaining. In addition to a philosophicial commitment to collective bargaining, the federation be- lieves that negotiation is superior to arbitration for tactical reasons. Politi- cally, teachers prefer a bilateral settlement rapidly concluded and supported

by both parties to a more protracted dispute leading to arbitration that focuses community attention on teacher demands. Trustees may wish to avoid antagonizing teachers, a potentially vocal element of the electorate, by provoking arbitration. Arbitration is also relatively expensive, especially in remote areas where travel costs for arbitrators and staff are substantial. The parties are especially conscious of these negative aspects of arbitration when negotiation has narrowed salary differences to less than 2 percent.

The Public Schools Act closely regu- lates the time schedule for salary negotiations.is By law, salary agreements must take effect on January 1 of each year, and either party seeking modification of existing salary schedules must do so on or before September 20. Although negotiations may legally begin at any time between July 1 and September 20, talks usually start in late September. If the parties have not reached agreement by October 15, the Minister of Educa- tion appoints a conciliator to assist with the bargaining. Negotiations may continue with conciliation until November 14. If no agreement is achieved by that date, the conciliator must refer matters in dispute to a salary arbitration board. Under the act, a board will be tripartite (this is normal practice for both interest and rights arbitration in Canada), with each party nominating its member not later than November 20. Partisan nomi- nees must name a chairman by Novem- ber 30. If the parties fail to nominate board members or to agree on a chairman, the courts appoints the necessary members. Appointment of a neutral chairman by the Supreme Court must occur on or before December 5, and

18 Public Schools Act, RSBC, 1970, Chi. 319. ss. 135A-141.




arbitration proceedings must be concluded and an award announced before the end of the calendar year.19 In practice, most arbitration hearings are held between December 1 and December 20. All awards are final and binding, and few have been challenged successfully in the courts.

The two provincial associations assist local bodies with conciliation and arbitration in a variety of ways. Both advise local negotiators in the selection of conciliators and arbitrators. Conciliators are usually chosen from the communities in which bargaining occurs. Lacking formal training or experience in industrial relations, they seldom succeed in bringing about an agreement. Arbitra- tors generally are lawyers or academics residing in Vancouver or Victoria with extensive backgrounds in labor relations. The parties deliberately avoid naming persons connected with the provincial government. Although costs of both conciliation and arbitration are shared equally by the parties, the BCTF reim- burses local associations for expenses in excess of ten dollar per member. School boards receive no subsidies from the BCSTA.

Arbitration proceedings are formal but short. Each hearing is held in the district affected and rarely lasts more than one day. The parties, usually represented or assisted by staff from the provincial associations, present written and oral arguments. Basic written ex- hibits prepared by the associations tend to be standardized for all hearings but are supported by local data.20 Presenta-

19 A similar system of legislated deadlines is contained in the Pennsylvania statute governing police and fire fighters. Loewenberg, "Compul- sory Arbitration for Police and Firefighters in Pennsylvania in 1968," p. 368.

20 Muir, Collective Bargaining by Canadian Public School Teachers, pp. 161-163.

tions rely on four sets of criteria: trends established in settlements in the private sector of the province; community wage rates, especially recent collective bargaining agreements; negotiated agreements signed previously in nearby school districts; and any teacher arbitration awards issued prior to the hearing.

Arbitration awards are extremely brief and are submitted only to the parties directly concerned, i.e., the local teachers' association and the district school board. Typically, an award con- sists of a salary schedule for each classi- fication of teacher in the district, including increments based on years of experience. There may also be provisions for compensation based on service in remote areas, responsibility for special classes, and administrative duties, plus the "bonus" items mentioned earlier. The law does not specify any criteria to be used by arbitration boards, and no justification for an award is presented. Indeed, no one connected with the process is absolutely certain of the criteria employed by arbitrators. When awards are compared on the basis of average increases granted, variation is slight; these averages conceal wide de- viations from the mean, however, for specific classifications of teachers. Sim- ilarly, overall increases contained in awards normally equal or exceed the average in the employer's last offer in bargaining, but the salary scale in an award may differ at many points from that proposed by a school board.

In any single year, awards follow regional patterns. Arbitrators in a region tend to follow a settlement or award that was negotiated in a leading district, often the largest, in the area. Regional boundaries, however, are not fixed, and leading districts are not constant. Arbi- trators frequently choose one of two or




three previous settlements or awards in making their determinations, so patterns become apparent only after several awards are issued. The parties may at- tempt to exploit this system to their advantage by stalling in posthearing deliberations over awards. Thus, if the teachers' nominee on a board learns that the chairman is favoring a modest award, he attempts to delay completion of the award to prevent its use as precedent elsewhere. Consequently, most arbitration decisions are issued in the last few days of December.21

Further analysis of the outcome of negotiations in the past thirteen years reveals that it is the larger school districts that tend to use arbitration, as Table 2 indicates. The same results

Table 2. Mean Number of Teachers in School Districts, by Manner of Contract Resolution and Year.

Districts Districts All With Using

Year Districts Negotiated Arbitration Settlements Boards

1960 140 99 287 1961 146 90 228 1962 154 154 *

1963 164 129 352 1964 172 150 236 1965 182 87 298 1966 193 133 411 1967 207 172 279 1968 226 188 336 1969 240 157 402 1970 262 132 337 1971 283 286 136 1972 287 226 322

*No arbitration board used. Source: BCTF records.

21 Conversation with members of the administrative staffs of the BCSTA and the BCTF. See also, Johnl Arnett, "There Must Be a Better Way," B.C. School Trustee (Winter-Spring 1965), 1.15; and Royal Commission on Education, Report (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1960), pp. 205-206.

were obtained when data for the nine districts in the greater Vancouver area (which contain nearly half of all teachers in the province) were eliminated from provincial totals. In a few smaller districts, the parties have agreed before- hand to accept whatever settlement (or award) is reached in an adjacent district, a practice that, until recently, has been discouraged by the BCTF.

Results of Arbitration

Perhaps the most clear-cut result of this arbitration system is its success in averting strikes. There has not been a strike over salaries in any British Colum- bia public school since compulsory arbitration was instituted in 1937. This fact is especially noteworthy in light of the turbulent industrial relations climate that has long characterized this province and the recent inclination to strike by teachers elsewhere in Canada. As previously noted, only two local associations in the BCTF have called strikes in recent years (over nonsalary issues) and the federation itself has called a province-wide walkout only once-the one- day strike during the pension dispute of 1971. In contrast, between July 1960 and July 1971, there were forty-three teachers' strikes in Canada, thirty in Quecbec and the remainder in the Eng- lish-speaking provinces, including four each in Alberta and Saskatchewan, British Columbia's neighboring provinces.22 There were also two other pro- longed teachers' strikes in Alberta in 1972 and 1973.

A second result of this system is the apparent preservation of bargaining.

22 Muir, Collective Bargaining by Canadian Public School Teachers, p. 223; Canada Depart- ment of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada (Ot- tawa: Queen's Printer, 1968-71 issues.




The data in Tables 3 and 4 indicate clearly that collective bargaining has not atrophied in British Columbia public schools. Although the overall use of arbitration has increased since 1937, there is no pattern of decreasing reliance on negotiated settlements during the period 1960-73, the only years for which complete statistics are available.

Because of the decentralized nature of the bargaining structure in the schools, no statistical series exists on negotiated settlements during the years prior to 1960. Moreover, between 1945 and 1959, the provincial government reduced the number of school districts from over 800 to 83, so the number of

districts engaging in negotiations and the proportion of disputes ending in arbitration prior to 1960 cannot be de- terminecl. Data on the incidence of arbitration, presented in Table 3, show that a total of 576 awards were issued from 1937 through 1973, with. different patterns in each of three distinct periods. It is true that the number of awards issued was significantly higher in 1960- 73 than in the earlier periods, but the more detailed data in Table 4 demonstrate that the parties still rely heavily on bargaining. Also, although Table 2 shows that larger districts are more likely to invoke arbitration, no single district habitually avoids negotiated settlements.

Table 3. Incidence of Arbitration, by Period, 1938-73.

Number of Annual Highest Number Lowest Number Period Awards Average in One Year in One Year

1938-46 50 5.6* 10 3* 1947-59 145 11.1 29 9 1960-73 381 27.2 51 0

*Excludes 1943, when a national wage and salary freeze resulted in no arbitration boards being ap- pointed.

Source: BCTF files. Dates refer to calendar year covered by agreement or award.

Table 4. Outcome of Bargaining, 1960-73.

Number of Number of Arbitration Awards Number of School Districts with Districts as Percentage of

Year Districts Involved Negotiated Using Total Districts in Bargaining Settlements Arbitration Bargaining

1960 82 64 18 22 1961 83 49 34 41 1962 83 83 0 0 1963 83 70 13 16 1964 84 63 21 25 1965 84 46 38 45 1966 84 66 18 21 1967 83 56 27 33 1968 82 61 21 26 1969 82 54 28 34 1970 80 29 51 64 1971 77 75 2 3 1972 76 26 48 64 1973 74 38 36 49

Source: BCTF files. Dates refer to calendar year covered by agreement or award.




Reasons for variations in the incidence of arbitration from one year to another are not completely clear, although the causes of extreme fluctuations are understood. For example, the contrast between the negotiation results of 1971 and 1972 arose from experience with a new method of determining salary increases. This new method consisted of a formula based on weighted averages of wage and salary changes in the private sector. Originally proposed by the BCTF, the formula was accepted by school trustees for the 1971 negotiations, resulting in the virtual absence of arbitration. After their initial experience with the formula and the relatively generous settlements it produced, however, the trustees refused to accept it as a basis for a second round of negotiations, and bargaining for 1972 salaries was bitter and generally fruit- less.

The figures in Table 4 overstate somewhat the true incidence of arbitration. Although salary issues that are unresolved by November 14 must be re- ferred by the conciliator to an arbitration board, negotiations often continue after that date. If the parties agree on a new salary schedule, they make a joint submission to the arbitration board. Because the act makes no provision for bilateral agreement after November 14, the arbitration board must still meet (often by telephone conferences) to ratify the terms of the agreement. Although the actual results are reached by negotiation, the settlement is re- corded as having been achieved through arbitration.

Impact of Bargaining and Arbitration on Salaries

Despite the well-known difficulties in measuring the impact of bargaining or

arbitration on salaries, some tentative conclusions are possible concerning the experience in British Columbia.

The data presented in Table 5 indicate that arbitration awards have not deviated significantly from negotiated settlements within the province, a re- lationship probably due to the reliance of arbitration boards on previously bar- gained agreements.2

Table 5. Wage Increases for Teachers in British Columbia, by Manner of

Contract Resolution and Year. (in percentages)

Average Average for for Provincial

Year Negotiated Arbitration Average Settlements Awards

1969 6.2 6.2 6.2 1970 7.6 7.6 7.6 1971 7.8 7.7 7.8 1972 7.7 7.6 7.6 1973 8.8 8.8 8.8

Source: BCTF files.

When interprovincial comparisons are made of teachers' salaries, salaries in British Columbia seem to have kept pace with those in other western provinces, two of which (Saskatchewan and Alberta) have bargaining with the right to strike. At first glance, the data do not appear to support this conclu- sion, for average teacher salaries increased by only 54 percent in British Columbia from 1960-61 to 1969z 70, compared to increases during that period of 65 percent in Alberta, 70 percent in Manitoba, and 75 percent in Saskat- chewan. Direct comparison of average salaries is deceptive, however, for the averages conceal wide variation among provinces in the educational qualifica-

23 The rigid schedule of negotiations precludes the use of arbitration awards as patterns to shape negotiated settlements.




tions of teachers (a major factor in determining salaries paid), as well as differences in experience, educational systems, ability to pay, school size, and urbanization, all of which influence salary levels. Rapid growth in the proportion of university-trained teachers during the 1960s raised average salaries paid more rapidly than salary schedules. The rate of change in average salaries was therefore lower in British Columbia, where the proportion of university- trained teachers was already high, as Table 6 indicates, and university-level teacher training had existed for many years.

It is possible to make approximate comparisons of teachers' salaries accord- ing to broad categories of educational preparation and adjusted for median years of experience, and this is done in Table 7. Each educational level cor- responds, in general, to one year of

postsecondary education (although some teachers outside British Columbia have been able to count one year of their secondary education in attaining a given level). Within these data limitations, Table 7 indicates that, among teachers with comparable training, salaries have increased about as rapidly in British Columbia as in the other three western provinces.

Analysis of Results

These data indicate rather clearly that compulsory arbitration can avert strikes without causing collective bargaining to disappear and without leading to wage awards far above or below negotiated settlements. The special fea- tures of the arbitration system examined here suggest some general conclusions concerning the process of compulsory interest arbitration.

Table 6. Distribution of Teachers with University Degrees in Western Provinces, by Period.

British Columbia Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba

Teachers Teachers Teachers Teachers Percentage with Percentage with Percentage with Percentage with

Period of Teachers University of Teachers University of Teachers University of Teachers University with Degrees as with Degrees as with Degrees as with Degrees as

University Percentage University Percentage University Percentage University Percentage Degrees of B.C. Degrees of B.C. Degrees of B.C. Degrees of B.C.

Figure Figure Figure Figure

1957-58 33.9 100 25.2 74.3 14.6 43.1 20.7 61.1 1960-61 37.0 100 27.7 74.9 16.7 45.1 25.6 69.2 1965-66 44.2 100 38.4 86.9 22.8 53.9* 29.3 66.3 1970-71 56.9 100 58.3 102.5 39.5 69.4 41.3 72.6

Net Change in Each Province (in percentages)

1970-71 over +67.8 +131.4 +170.5 +99.5

1957-58

*196667 figures. Source: Statistics Canada, Salaries and Qualifications of Teachers in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools,

1957-58 through 1969-70; Statistics Canada, Service Bulletin, Education Division, Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 1972).




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A singular element in this system is its limited scope, as measured on three different dimensions. First, public school teachers are the only group in the province specifically covered by compulsory arbitration. Consequently, the direct impact of any settlement or award is re- stricted and unlikely to be used as a precedent in negotiations outside of education, thus limiting outside pressures on the system. Second, the division of the province into a large number of widely scattered school districts means that, apart from a key settlement in the Vancouver area, no single award assumes great importance for the province as a whole. Since a rigid system of key awards or settlements has never developed, no award has great precedential value. Both locally elected trustees and autonomous local teachers' associations have vested interests in maintaining the locus of authority in salary negotiations at the district level, despite occasional demands for regional or provincial bargaining by leaders of both parties. Both parties also perceive political advantage in avoiding costly and acrimonious disputes culminating in arbitration. This factor appears to be particularly important in smaller communities, where political and personal considerations converge; this may account for the greater propensity of small districts to settle disputes without resorting to arbitration. A third, and possibly crucial, limitation on the scope of arbitration is the exclusion of nonwage issues (a feature strongly op- posed by the BCTF). Since a number of important and expensive items, notably pensions and leave provisions, are ex- cluded from bargaining and arbitration, pressures generated within the industrial relations system by disagreements over these items are dissipated into the broader political process. Also, if either party is

disappointed by the outcome of arbitration, there is an opportunity to com- pensate by taking other issues to the legislature.

A second major factor in the success of this arbitration system is the rigid time schedule contained in the law. In some other jurisdictions, illegal strikes in a system of compulsory arbitration are thought to be protests against delays in decisions caused by cumbersome and complex administrative structures.24 In British Columbia, the Public Schools Act permits almost no delay in collective bargaining or the issuance of arbitration awards, so that complaints caused by delays in the system do not develop. Moreover, experience under this system supports the conventional theories of collective bargaining that emphasize the importance of deadlines as a source of pressure on the parties to settle their differences.25 The cumulative effect of im- posing a series of strict deadlines on the parties appears to encourage bilateral settlement.

Acceptance by the parties of a rigid and compressed schedule of bargaining and arbitration, followed by awards without any stated criteria, is relevant to the role of uncertainty in the theory of collective bargaining. Recent discussions of compulsory arbitration contain two distinct views of uncertainty. One model stresses the need to develop mutually acceptable criteria in interest arbitration, thereby reducing the parties' uncertainty regarding awards. Establishment of criteria, by increasing the predictability of awards, is believed to encourage effective

24 Cf. Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration and Government Intervention in Labor Disputes, p. 40; and Howells, "Causes and Frequency of Strikes in New Zealand," p. 532.

25 Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1963), pp. 100-102.




bargaining. A second model emphasizes the positive values of uncertainty for bargaining, on the grounds that parties may prefer bilateral agreement to the risks of arbitration conducted without a set of known principles to govern awards.7 The experience in British Co- lumbia seems to support the second model of arbitration.

A final factor in the success of this arbitration system is the sense of security that teachers derive from the strength of the provincial labor movement. Teachers have had reasonable assurance that organized workers in the private

26 Robert Hines, "Mandatory Contract Arbi- tration-Is It a Viable Process?" p. 544; and David B. Ross, "The Arbitration of Public Em- ployee Wage Disputes," Industrial and Labor Relations Reviez, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October 1969), pp. 3-14.

27 Stevens, "Is Compulsory Arbitration Com- patible with Bargaining?" pp. 45-46; Brown, Interest Arbitration, p. 47.

sector would secure generous and easily identified wage increases that would justify higher teacher salaries to the public, school trustees, and arbitrators. In addition, teachers have had at least tacit assurance that other unions would effec- tively resist any manipulation of the arbitration process to the disadvantage of the teachers.

The results of this system may demonstrate that compulsory arbitration can be an effective technique for resolving interest disputes under the appropriate conditions. The technique must have at least the tacit support of both parties; a means for avoiding long delays in the resolution of disputes must be employed; and an opportunity for political bargaining complementary to collective bargaining is useful to avoid the con- centration of several contentious issues in bilateral negotiations.



Documents

Compulsory Arbitration: The Case of British Columbia Teachers