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Concepts of Security in theEuropean Union After theCold WarHenrik LarsenPublished online: 09 Jun 2010.

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Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000

Concepts of Security in the European Union After the ColdWar

HENRIK LARSEN

(University of Copenhagen)

During the Cold War, the European Community (the EC) as it then was, was not consideredan actor in international security either by its members or by outsiders. Although somemember states wanted it to play a role in the � eld of security, the EC was considered aninternational economic and political actor, but not a security actor. After the Cold War, thenew international situation placed the European Union (EU as it became from 1993 with theentry into force of the Maastricht Treaty) in the de facto position of a security actor in thechanging European security architecture. This was due to its strong organisation and the pullit exerted on potential members. The gauntlet of the EU’s increasing security role was takenup at the two intergovernmental conferences which revised the Union’s basic treaties in the1990s. The Treaty on the European Union, � nalised in Maastricht in 1991, entered into forcein 1993 while the second revision was � nalised in Amsterdam in 1997 and entered into forcein 1999. The Maastricht Treaty stated that the EU could deal with all aspects of security, andthe EU’s formal access to military means was a subject that was on the agenda at bothintergovernmental conferences. The post-Cold War situation thus made the EU’s securityconsiderations more relevant, both from an EU perspective and from the perspective of theEU as an international actor.

Against this background, the paper analyses how the EU made sense of ‘security’ in the1990s. The EU is an important focus of study in international relations since, through thegradual development of foreign policy cooperation and cooperation in foreign economicaffairs, it appears increasingly as an actor or at least a presence (Allen and Smith 1991) inworld politics.

Measured by the content of joint actions, common positions and, in particular, politicaldeclarations, the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is becomingincreasingly global. The EU Member States’ foreign policy, in a long-term perspective, isincreasingly subject to coordination within the CFSP. A ‘coordination re� ex’ exists withinthe CFSP in spite of signi� cant instances of deviation from the consensus and areas that arenot covered by the CFSP (Nuttall 1992). Therefore, in order to comprehend the post-ColdWar world, the EU understanding of security is central. The works published so far dealingwith the inter-subjective aspects of the EU external action have mainly been concerned withthe procedural aspects: mutual understandings about the rules for cooperation and consul-tation (see, for example, Tonra 1997; Jørgensen 1997). Some studies have commented enpassant on the presence of broad, shared understandings in EU external action. Mostcommon, however, have been analyses of agreements and disagreements on policies. Fewhave systematically examined the presence of shared understandings of broad concepts. Theaim of this paper is to study an important substantial inter-subjective aspect of EU action:security. The paper partly draws on the � ndings of Wæver and Buzan, Wæver and de Wildein relation to the EU discourse on security (Wæver 1995, 1996; Buzan et al. 1997), but, inaddition, it identi� es and analyses a wider range of threats and explores the EU understandingof global security.

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/00/030337-19 Ó 2000 Australian Institute of Internationa l Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/000499100 20012615

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The study � nds that � ve dangers are constructed in EU Council documents as threats tothe EU or ‘European security’: the ceasing of EU integration; instability in Central andEastern Europe due to failure of enlargement; instability in Russia; instability in theMediterranean; and � nally non-geographical threats. The goals for countering these dangersare democracy and integration. The means to achieve them are political and economic.Successful EU integration and enlargement are a precondition for a full role for the EU ininternational security. The EU discourse, drawing on liberal values, advocates the same goalsand means for Europe and the world. In spite of the new formulations in the Treaty on theEuropean Union (TEU) and Amsterdam relating to defence, the discourse in relation tosecurity problems is still the discourse of a civilian power.

This paper looks at the meaning dimension in terms of discourse. This is based on theassumption that language constitutes meaning. It is shown that an EU discourse on securitycan be identi� ed which cannot, in any straightforward way, be reduced to the discourses ofthe actors in the EU. It is more than the sum of the parts. The paper does not try to evaluatethe role of the EU/CFSP in world politics, neither does it attempt to offer an analysis ofcompeting explanations of the CFSP or to analyse a particular policy. It attempts to identifythe EU discourse on security. As meaning is integral to social action (Wendt 1992, 1994),so that the distinction between policies and discourse is analytical rather than empirical(Hansen 1998:87), discourse is an indispensable part of understanding European foreignpolicy. Although the link between discourse and policy is not simple (Hansen 1998:87–97),understanding the background for policies requires an understanding of the inter-subjectivemeaning dimension of the actors involved. Studying the discourse on security is thereforenecessary in order to understand the directions of, and limits to, policies.

The theoretical and methodological assumptions behind the use of discourse analysis andthe securitisation approach to security in this paper will � rst be outlined. The main partanalyses the dominant post-Cold War EU discourse on security. In the last section theimplications of this EU understanding of security for the post-Cold War world are brie� ydiscussed.

EU discourse and security

When analysing EU understandings of security, the basic assumption here is that meaningcan be studied by studying language in the form of discourse. Along the lines of Foucault(1989 [1972]), a discourse is understood as a limited range of possible statements promotinga limited range of meanings. Discourses constrain what it is possible to say (Larsen 1997;Wæver et al. forthcoming).

The focus of the analysis is the common language in the Council context. Thereforerelevant texts are documents which express the agreement of the Council. The focus is onthe role of the Council due to its central role in the decision-making of the EU. No distinctionis made between texts from the different pillars of the EU. Because the states and theCommission in the EU have to agree on formulations in Council documents, agreementcannot be expected to be easy. If a dominant discourse on security can be identi� ed here, thisis an indication of common understandings. That there is a dominant discourse refers to thepresence of a discourse which predominantly determines the use of language and hencepromotes certain meanings within the Council context. When the term ‘the EU discourse’ isused, it refers to the dominant discourse unless otherwise stated.1

1 In Laclau and Mouffe (1995:chapter3) terms, this is a hegemonic political discourse. Although the paperfocuses on texts from the Council context, it also, in some cases, draws on material from other contextswhere the dominant discourse can be identi� ed.

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The EU discourse on security can be seen as an expression of the struggle over meaningbetween the different national and institutional (the Commission and the European Parlia-ment) discourses involved in European policy-making. The question is, of course, whetherthere is any conceptual common ground apart from positions on very concrete points ofpolicy; whether there is a negotiation of identities which leads to a broader inter-subjectivebase or no rapprochement at the level of meaning, in Neufeld’s terms consensus rather thaninter-subjectivity (Neufeld 1993:55). In the case of consensus the point would be that therewas only a common discourse in relation to the procedural framework of European foreignpolicy action.2 The study presented here, however, � nds that there is a shared discourse onsecurity, which can be identi� ed in relation to the discursive practices of the EU. It may bethat none of the national or institutional actors use this discourse outside the EU Councilcontext, but it is the discourse that has to be used if arguments are to be made in the Councilcontext at the European level covering all the actors. What are studied here are the discursivepatterns that can be identi� ed at the European level. It is a snapshot. The EU discourse isperpetually undergoing change as a result of the interaction between this European level andother actors’ discourses. At the same time, the assumption is that it is not completely volatile,that there are patterns that are reproduced, but meanings in relation to security are notsomething given once and for all. Discourses—national or European—are never fully closedonto themselves but open to change (Laclau and Mouffe 1995:chapter 3).

State understandings are not worked out independently of the European level (Jørgensen1996:102– 4). State understandings of security are developed in interaction with the under-standings at the European level. They both shape and are shaped by the European level, notexogenously given (Wendt 1992, 1994). At the same time, it is important not to assume‘over-socialised’ versions of this approach, which ignore the individual ‘raw material’ out ofwhich actors are formed (Jørgensen 1997:2). The state actors have strong national politicalidentities which coexist with the European political identity. Linked to this is the issue of thedominance of certain discourses at the European level. In the struggle over meaning takingplace, it is possible that the understandings of certain states—most likely the majorpowers—dominate at the European level. The different understandings of the actors inde� ning the European foreign policy identity lead to discursive struggles over the de� nitionof the European project (Wæver 1990; Larsen 1997; Wæver et al. forthcoming). The differentdiscourses may be re� ected at the European level as different meanings promoted in texts.Because there is a perpetual interaction between the European discourse and the national/in-stitutional actors’ discourses, it cannot be assumed that the EU discourse has strong internaldynamics which will lead to a particular result.

The paper studies the discourse on ‘security’ in the EU based on a ‘thick signi� erapproach’. Within the thick signi� er approach the focus is on the inter-subjective meaningof security used by social actors rather than objectivist de� nitions of security or conceptualanalysis to � nd the ‘essence’ of security (Huysmans 1998). The meaning of security is in itsusage in discourse. The paper studies security in terms of ‘securitisation’. Security discourseis characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presentedas an existential threat which allows the actors to break the normal political rules of thegame. The language used in relation to these kinds of threats will be a language of drama,urgency and threat. The referent is the object which is constructed in the discourse asexistentially threatened. In principle everything can be made the referent of security, sincesecurity is self-referential. The actors are the ones that speak on behalf of the referent(Wæver 1996; Buzan et al. 1997). The analysis also looks at which components are

2 In general terms the question is whether there is a European demos, see Hix (1998:48). If not the politicalagenda is primarily national.

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constructed in the discourse as relevant instruments for furthering security or for counteringthe existential threat (military means, political means, economic means etc). Theidenti� cation of a concept of security in the EU discourse not only contributes to understand-ing the basis of EU policies with respect to security; it is also interesting because theidenti� cation of threats, an ‘Other’, is a crucial part of the establishment of a foreign policyidentity (Campbell 1992). Moreover, the articulation of threats is also an important part ofcreating the inside–outside distinction which is arguably necessary for the construction offoreign policy identity (Walker 1990; Hansen 1995:118–9). As will be argued below,however, there is not a clear-cut binary ‘othering’ in the case of the EU discourse.

EC/EPC understandings of security during the Cold War3

During the Cold War, the EC/EPC (European Political Cooperation—predecessor of theCFSP) presented itself as � rmly in the Western camp. The main threat to internationalsecurity came from the Eastern Bloc, but it was less likely to consider con� icts all over theworld from the perspective of superpower competition, and more likely to consider thecon� icts on their own merits. There was a fundamental acceptance of global economicinterdependence as the basic framework of modern international relations (Hill 1990:125).Emphasis was placed on the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention which went beyondthe political considerations about the East–West context, i.e. spheres of in� uence. The viewwas that peace and security were most likely to be ensured by not seeing regional con� ictsas expressions of the superpower contest.

There was an emphasis on liberal values, human rights in particular, and strong supportfor organisations which furthered these. This led to a stress on civil aspects of foreign policy.The Community underlined moral persuasion as opposed to force in the broad sense of theword as a means of furthering its aims and of contributing to international con� ict resolution.In spite of considerable economic weight, the general approach was not one of linkagebetween economics and politics. Although there was a political element in the Union’sexternal economic diplomacy, there were important pressures which worked against constantlinkages (Hill 1990:128). Moreover, the Union made a virtue out of its lack of militarypower. This was linked to a commitment to mediation in international con� icts and totreating the long-term causes of con� icts rather than the symptoms.4

Until the 1980s the European Political Cooperation did not deal with security questions,but in the 1980s security questions entered the EPC agenda. In the 1981 London declaration,it was made clear that the EPC could discuss political aspects of security and the SingleEuropean Act in 1986 led to the inclusion of economic aspects of security. This was not,however, presented as a break with the civil power pro� le. With the TEU, all aspects ofsecurity were understood as being within the remit of the Union, although defence was onlyunderstood as a potential future part of it (see below).

The post-Cold War world and its dangers

In the EU discourse the post-Cold War situation is seen to have ‘radically altered the scenarioof international relations hitherto operating in the world’, although the system is, as in the

3 This section draws heavily on Hill (1990:125–8, 136–7).4 Hill (1990) discusses three possible roles for the EC as an external actor: power bloc, civilian model

and � op. Hill concludes that the foreign policy actions of the EC/EPC actually has elements of all threecategories. His article, however, is aimed at evaluating the policy actions of the EC rather than the EC’sself-understanding.

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Cold War period, still seen as characterised by interdependence.5 The changes have madepossible new roles for the actors on the international scene: ‘The threat posed by rival blocksfacing each other has receded and has given way to new roles of the main actors on theinternational political scene and to an overall more secure, but also more unstable situation’.6

According to the dominant EU discourse the EU must assume increased responsibilitiesin the new context, and face the new challenges confronting it. There is a clear stress on theneed for the Union to become a political actor that could use its economic means to furtherits political goals and act on challenges.7 Thus, the re� ection group proclaimed that the keytask was ‘to provide the Union with a genuine external identity’ (Re� ection Group’s Report1995:4). A clear link was made between politics and economics. The aim was ‘to createconsistency in the EU’s external actions, so that the EU’s political weight matched itseconomic strength’.8 In the discourse, ‘consistency’ is not just linked to the appropriateinstitutional means; political will is also a crucial part of the EU assuming greaterresponsibilities and a ‘genuine external identity’: ‘The political will to act is a determiningfactor in the proper use of the instruments of the Treaty’.9 In the post-Cold War discourse,the Union is presented as a political actor that is increasingly obliged to act, and which canand should use power to further its goals by drawing on its political and economic resources.Although persuasion still remains a central means for the Union, the EU constructs itself inits post-Cold War discourse as a civilian political power.

The dangers identi� ed in EU discourse

In this section the dangers that are identi� ed in the EU discourse are analysed. Within thisdiscourse, the EU is constructed as the primary referent for security, although the referent issometimes widened to Europe as a whole. In the EU discourse, it is possible to identify � ve‘dangers’ to which the EU has to respond.10 These dangers are securitised. The � rst four ofthe dangers relate speci� cally to Europe. If these dangers are not countered they mayconstitute existential threats to the referent, the ‘EU’ or ‘European security’ (the two arelinked so that a threat to EU security is presented as a threat to European security moregenerally).

Cessation of EU integration

First is the cessation of EU integration, including a stop to the implementation of treaties andthe EMU. This is what Wæver (1995, 1996) and Buzan et al. (1997) identify as theexistential threat to the referent ‘European security’. Continued EU integration is securitisedas the following examples from the of� cial text indicate:

5 Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:39); Statement by the EU presidency at the UN General Assembly(23 September 1997:1).

6 Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:39); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council (29 October1993:5).

7 See Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:39); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Turin (29March 1996:5).

8 Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:40); Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Turin (29 March1996:5).

9 Report from the Council on the Workings of the TEU (1995:Article 56).10 A very similar listing of the � ve dangers can be found in the Durieux Report (1994:Part II). The group

was set up by the Commission and the discourse in the report is in many ways close to the discourseof the Commission, but we � nd the same discursive patterns in the dominant discourse in the Council.

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A prime objective to be achieved …: maintenance of strong European integration and cooperation … as,together with the organisations responsible for European security and national policies, they are both aguarantee of peace and prosperity for the citizens of the Union … this guarantee is not perpetual and … itwould be a grave error to underestimate the Community’s main contribution … namely a shared view oflife that has ruled out war as a means of settling differences (Re� ection Group’s Report 1995:5).

In this citation integration is equalled with peace (and other things) and is linked to theruling out of war. This constitutes an example of a dramatisation of the issue of integrationin security terms which is what securitisation is about. In the two quotations below, thecrucial link between EU integration and security is even more direct:

The EU is attached to the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security … The EUcontributes to this process, by actively pursuing the objectives of European integration and enlargement.11

[T]he fundamental aim of Union is to further peace, security and stability amongst the Europeansthemselves … It is dif� cult to put � gures on peace, stability and the economic aspects, but they are ofcrucial importance for both the CEECs and the Union’s present members.12

Instability in Central and Eastern Europe, no enlargement of the EU

Instability in Central and Eastern Europe is seen as a danger to European security. Theprimary solution to this potential instability is the enlargement process of the Union,13 partof which is the need for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) to adapt to EUstandards. The enlargement process is securitised in the discourse: ‘the Union is determinedto work towards stability and peace on the continent of Europe, by preparing for theaccession of the associated European countries’.14

The securitisation of enlargement is linked to the securitisation of EU integration. Thediscursive connection between the securitisation of enlargement and of EU integration is therisk that the � rst might endanger the latter through a weakening of the momentum ofEuropean integration.15 The understanding that developed within the Union in relation to the1996 Intergovernmental Conference was that this conference and the ensuing treaty wereprimarily addressing this problem. Within the discourse, then, the two � rst dangers were,therefore, closely linked (Re� ection Group’s Report 1995:4).

Instability in Russia

In Council documents, Russia is not presented as a military threat.16 It is, rather, presentedas a power whose instability might constitute a danger to European security. Stability, peace

11 EU Presidency intervention at the UN General Assembly (26 September 1995).12 Commission Report about Enlargement, 1995:6 (author’s translation).13 The Durieux Report (1994) also suggests that the con� ict in the former Yugoslavia is linked to the failure

to convince the countries in the region about the bene� ts of the integration/enlargement process: ‘… InCEE and, and particularly the Balkans, the old spectres of nationalism and ethnic rivalry haverevived … Impotent to solve the Yugoslav con� ict, the EU has still not managed to … “sell” the bene� tsof economic and political integration to these countries …’(1994:5–7).

14 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Cannes (26– 27 June 1995:1); cf. Presidency Conclusions,European Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993:12); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council(9–10 December 1994:3); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council (15–16 December 1995:22).

15 Presidency Conclusions, European Council (21– 22 June 1993:12).16 The Durieux Report (1994:Part II) does, however, frame its analysis of the possible risks to European

security from Russia in terms of a possible resurgence of Russian political—military ambitions versusa new peaceful role.

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and security in Europe are linked to Russia’s political, economic and social development. Anunstable, undemocratic development in Russia is seen as endangering European security:

The successful completion of these elections and the consolidation of democracy in Russia will contributeto strengthening peace, stability and security in Europe.17

… Russia must be brought into the European security structures, and the development of democraticstructures in the country is central to that. EU’s (good) relationship with Russia is seen as ‘essential’ for astable European development . Instability in Russia or a break-down of EU-relations with Russia mightthreaten European security.18

Instability in the Mediterranean

An unstable Mediterranean region also constitutes a danger to Europe. Peace, stability andprosperity in the region are central to European security:

[T]he Mediterranean basin constitutes an area of strategic importance for the Community. Peace, stabilityand prosperity in the region are amongst the highest priorities of Europe … The Council supports theestablishment of an Euro-Mediterranean area of political stability and security. The reinforcement of thepolitical dialogue must be based on the respect of democracy, good governance and human rights.19

A crucial element in creating a stable region is the furthering of the internal stability ofstates. Central means are respect for fundamental freedoms and the rule of law within eachstate.20

There is a certain similarity in the way the dangers are constructed with respect to CEEC,Russia and the Mediterranean. It is instability that is endangering Europe, not direct militarythreats, but there are also important differences. The Mediterranean is described in terms thatsignal more uncertainty and unpredictability than in the case of Russia and CEEC. TheDurieux Report (1994), for example, uses the term ‘time bomb’ to describe demographic,economic and ecological problems in the Mediterranean region which might, if not defused,‘fuel the sort of repressive regime, anti-Western religious fundamentalism seen in Algeria’(part II). The European Council in Essen expressed its ‘concern at the emergence of extremistand fundamentalist forces in a number of North African states’ and stated that ‘EU policymust take account of these developments’.21 Also, where the dangers from Russia and Centraland Eastern Europe are seen as dangers from within Europe the challenge is to engage Russiain the European security system—the dangers from the Mediterranean are seen as moreremoved from Europe. The South and its dangers are dealt with more in terms of traditionalstate-to-state relations (cooperation), as inside–outside. The East is described in terms ofaccommodation (‘openness’).22 At the same time, however, the use in the dominant discourseof ‘the Mediterranean’ (rather than, for example, North Africa or Middle East23) indicates

17 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Florence (21– 22 June 1996:4, annex);cf. Conclusions ofthe European Council (15–16 December 1995:38, Annex).

18 See for example Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27 June 1995:11); PresidencyConclusions, European Council (15–16 December 1995:37). Conclusions of the Presidency from theEuropean Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993: 6, Russia).

19 European Council, Essen (9–10 December 1994).20 See for example Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27 June 1995:16–17, annex); cf.

ibid:17.21 European Council (9–10 December 1994:15).22 Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27 June 1995:16, annex Barcelona Conference).23 The Durieux Report (1994) locates the dangers more clearly in North Africa and does not restrict itself

to the ‘Mediterranean’.

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less of a clear-cut inside–outside construction.24 Although Russia is constructed as withinEurope, the language of warmth spoken in relation to the CEEC countries is absent. In theDurieux Report (1994:5–7) the CEEC is labelled as ‘closer to home’ and the CEEC countriesare frequently referred to as applicant countries, associated countries or candidate countries.25

A discursive distinction is made between the dangers arising from instability in CEEC andin Russia. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe enlargement enhances security. In thecase of Russia it does not.

Diffuse, non-geographica l dangers

The � nal category of dangers identi� ed in EU discourse has little or no geographical base.It consists of elements like terrorism, international crime, drug traf� cking, nuclear prolifera-tion, ecological risks and strong migratory pressures:

Paramount importance of the common struggle against international organized crime, terrorism and thethreat posed by drugs.26

Even though the dangers are diffuse and non-geographical, they are described in termswhich locate them outside the EU itself: the action against some of these dangers (terrorism,organised crime and drug traf� cking) is linked up with a strengthening of the EU’s internalcohesion and external border.27

Values and means in European security

The Amsterdam Treaty outlines the general values on which the Union is built: ‘The Unionis founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamentalfreedoms, and the rule of law’.28

These values are elements in a discourse of universalist, liberal values: liberty, democ-racy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law are presentedas values to be safeguarded and promoted. To a lesser extent, this is also the case with‘market forces’. An important question is whether the strong presence of these liberal valuesin the European (foreign policy) identity in Campbell’s sense can be seen as linked to whatis constituted as threats to European security. Above, we have attempted to show thediscursive construction of dangers in the EU language relating to a cessation of EUintegration, CEEC (the enlargement), Russia, the Mediterranean and non-geographica lthreats. As for the � rst two dangers, which are linked, the ‘othering’ is not to be found inspace but rather in time, i.e. Europe’s historical past (Wæver 1996:104). This ‘other’ couldarguably have an effect on present European identity. The emphasis on the liberal values can

24 See Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27 June 1995:16–17, annex, Barcelona). In the caseof NATO it has been noted that a change has taken place in language from the ‘Middle East’ to the‘Mediterranean’ which expresses ambivalence as to whether it is inside or outside (Hansen 1995).

25 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993:12); Presidency Conclu-sions, European Council (9–10 December 1994:3); Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27June 1995:1).

26 European Council (9–10 December 1994:19). About terrorism speci� cally cf. Conclusions of thePresidency, European Council (15–16 December 1995:20) and Presidency Conclusions, EuropeanCouncil (12–13 December 1997); cf. Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:3).

27 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Florence (21– 22 June 1996).28 Amsterdam Treaty, Article F.

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be seen as a negation of Europe’s past (dictatorships and genocide). Dangers identi� ed inthe language in relation to Russia and the Mediterranean, unstable democracy and Islamicfundamentalism, could also be seen as having a constitutive effect as far as the liberalvalues in the discourse are concerned. For the non-geographica l dangers, the importance forEuropean foreign policy identity is less clear, but these dangers can be said to play a rolefor the constitution of the European foreign policy identity: a Europe which protects theenvironment, against crime etc. It is argued, in other words, that both internal and externaltypes of dangers contribute to the constitution of the Union’s identity. The complexmultitude of dangers and risks does not lead to a clear-cut binary othering in relation toEuropean security (Wæver 1996:122), but it does arguably reinforce the liberal values atthe core of the EU’s political identity, since it is threats to these values which are part ofthe construction of the dangers.

Let us now return to the issue of dangers. In the Union’s discourse, the goals throughthe achievement of which the Union attempts to counter the � ve dangers are twofold. The� rst is the promotion of liberal values. The internal conditions of the states, understood interms of whether liberal principles characterise society—primarily whether there is democ-racy—are seen as crucial for regional security.29 The Union, in other words, takes forgranted the truth of the democratic peace thesis (Rummel 1997:106–7).30 This is in linewith the general EU approach to problems of stability also found in relation to otherregions or globally (see below). The second goal is to strengthen European integration andthe CEEC’s role herein. Regional integration is presented as of value in the areas borderingthe Union (Rummel 1997:107):

It [the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership] involves a reaf� rmation of the importance, within each state, ofrespect for fundamental freedoms and the establishment of the rule of law, which constitute elements ofstability for the whole Mediterranean region … The aim is to build a zone of shared prosperity … Particularimportance is attached to regional integration.31

The means to further these aims, and hence security, are mainly understood as econ-omic (Rummel 1997:107) and political. The formulations about creating a common defenceare mostly linked to the need to strengthen ‘European identity’, which will then promotepeace, stability etc. Defence is not linked directly to strengthening peace and stability.When it comes to solving concrete problems, the discourse does not stress the importanceof military means or defence. No direct link is made between ‘consistent action’ anddefence or military means. In the discourse, the development of the ‘genuine externalidentity’ is primarily linked to the problems that Europe must be able to contribute tosolving. The development of a military or defence capacity is linked rather to developingthe ‘European identity’ or increasing the EU’s political weight, but rarely directly linked tothe practical or more general problems that Europe has to confront. In concrete policyarticulations, the defence elements are, therefore, not integrated in the argumentsabout con� ict resolution. The references to defence are, rather, linked to attempts tocreate a capable European identity. They do not primarily refer to defence as away of enhancing the Union’s possibility to engage in concrete endeavours to solveproblems (Re� ection Group’s Report 1995:45). When it comes to furthering itsconcrete policy aims in the world, the EU is, thus, still very much a civilian power in its

29 Note also the formulation in the re� ection group’s report: ‘Europe and democracy are inseparableconcepts. This is also how we should construct the future’ (Re� ection Group’s Report, 1995:x).

30 This is worth noting because the issues of why democracies should have these peaceful properties orhow a democracy should be de� ned are subject to academic debate (Rummel 1997:117).

31 European Council (26–27 June 1995:16–7, Annex, Barcelona).

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Table 1. Central points in the EU discourse on security. European security as a referent

Referent Dangers Goals to counter dangers Means

EU/European Cessation of EU Integration Primarily political andsecurity economic integration

Instability in CEEC due Furthering of liberal values Integrationto failure of enlargement (particularly democracy)Instability in Russia Furthering of liberal values

(particularly democracy)Instability in the Furthering of liberal valuesMediterranean (particularly democracy)Diffuse, nongeographica l Integrationdangers

self-understanding.32 Civilian means are articulated as the main means to solve problems inthe world (Rummel 1997:107).

However, the Council texts often have a very composite character in relation to defence.The reference to use of military means sometimes seems like the articulation of anotherdiscourse than the dominant one: military means are necessary for EU external action to becredible (Agenda 2000 1998:36). This is, of course, a result of the negotiation of meaningbetween actors in the EU, including states, with a different understanding of the scope ofdefence within the Union. If we look at the discourses of the EP, the Commission, Germanyor France, we � nd a relatively unambiguous commitment to a defence capacity within the EUas part of the European identity and with the weight that this gives in concrete problemsolving. On the other side of the spectrum we � nd the UK, Denmark and Ireland, who adhereto different discourses on the role of the Union in the � eld of defence, converging on onepoint: development of an EU defence is not a natural part of an EU foreign policy identity.The Council texts in this respect can, therefore, be seen as in� uenced by the differentdiscourses at play in the negotiation of meaning at the Union level: one that stresses theunambiguous link between a genuine identity and a defence capacity within the Union andone that does not.33

Although a dominant discourse can be identi� ed which presents a common defence forthe Union not as inevitable but as a possibility within certain limits, users of this discoursemay place a different stress on the possible defence dimension of the Union.

Although there are variations in the discourse when it comes to whether the strengtheningof the European identity implies the establishment of common defence within the EU, andwhether such a defence capacity is necessary to provide the weight behind the EU diplomacy,

32 It should be added that the dominant EU discourse in the late 1990s does not present Europe as a civilianpower in Hill’s (1990) full sense. It presents itself as a civilian power in the sense of seeking outcooperative or negotiated solutions to disputes and con� icts rather than threatening military force. Hill’scharacterisation, however, also includes another element which is the ‘emphasis on persuasion ratherthan coercion’ (Hill 1990:31–55 ). The EU in the 1990s presents itself much less as a civilian powerin this sense. The emphasis on consistency in the Union’s external actions so that its political weightmatches its economic weight (see above) comes close to saying that the Union should use its power,rather than persuade.

33 For the UK, it is not problematic in the same way that the Union draws on the WEU to implementdecisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. This is the institutional set-up inthe TEU (and in Amsterdam).

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there is a unitary discourse on one point: political and economic means are primaryinstruments for the Union. The Union’s means are very much the ones of a civilian power.Views differ as to whether a military capacity within the EU is desirable to back up EUdiplomacy or a European foreign policy identity. Here competing discourses are at play. Themain points about the EU discourse on security with respect to European security as areferent can be outlined (see Table 1).

The role of the EU in international security

In this section I will turn to the issue of international security. In the post-Cold War discourseof the EU, an important stated aim for the EU is to promote international security; but, inthe EU understanding of the international dangers of the post-Cold War world, the focus isvery much on Europe. Although the EU discourse presents the aims of the Union ascontributing to international peace and stability, the focus, as far as security is concerned, isvery much on strengthening European security. As indicated by the � rst four dangers toEuropean security identi� ed above, and to some extent the � fth, the primary ways thatEurope should respond to these international challenges is by acting on itself or on theregions immediately around itself. The EU presidency said in the United Nations GeneralAssembly on 23 September 1997 (where one would, of all places, expect a global outlook):

Free from the threat of confrontation in a polarised world, we are faced today with a series of globalproblems both old and new … it is essential that we continue to promote justice and solidarity … and aboveall, to strengthen cooperation between states at both regional and world level … The EU, wishing torespond to the challenges of the post-Cold War world, proposes to take up three major challenges over theyears ahead:

The establishment of the EMU;The strengthening of its institutional base through the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty;The preparation for further enlargement towards the East and South of Europe.

Implementing the EMU [economic and monetary Union], the Amsterdam Treaty, and asuccessful enlargement, are central European contributions to international security.34 Theyare not just presented as furthering a more secure Europe, but also as providing thebackground for a more united European stance in the world, facing international challenges:

The international repercussions of the enlargement of the EU will far transcend the new frontiers of anenlarged Europe; such enlargement will add to Europe’s weight in the world, will provide the Union withnew neighbour s and make Europe a peaceful, more united and stable area … In taking up these threechallenges [EMU, implementation of Amsterdam, enlargement] the Member States seek to unite further inorder to form a common front against … [soft diffuse threats mentioned above].35

The securitisation of EU integration and enlargement is in the discourse linked to theactor status of the EU in the world. This linkage arguably draws on the traditionalinside–outside discourse of international relations (Walker 1993), whereby the inside is asecure and safe environment and the outside dangerous and unstable. Within this discourse,Europe can only be a state-like international actor if it has relatively � rm borders and a clearinside and outside where there is no doubt about who is inside. A clear inside–outside mustbe established as a result of continued integration and enlargement, or, at least, the processmust not have come to a halt. The challenge is, thus, that the enlargement must not weakenthe Union or internalise con� icts. This might lead to insecurity being found not only outside

34 See also the formulation in the Re� ection Group’s Report (1995:4) where the focus slides towardsEuropean security.

35 EU Presidency in the UN General Assembly (23 September 1997).

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the Union but also inside and would go against the understanding in the EU discourse of theEU as a capable international actor. But while the discourse gives priority to the processesin Europe in relation to international security, and is linked to the EU’s increasing actorcapacity, the EU does in� uence world affairs by promoting certain values in its foreign policyand defending its own interests. The EU is seeking to act: ‘At the same time [as integrationand enlargement], the EU is seeking to increase its in� uence over world affairs, promotevalues such as peace and security, democracy and human rights … [and] defend its concep-tion of the social model and assert its presence on international markets’.36

The discursive links between the Union’s handling of dangers to European security andthe Union’s contribution to international security can be presented in this way:

Dealing with the dangers of EU disintegration and failure of no EU enlargement (dangers to Europeansecurity) by integration and democratisation ® increasing the EU’s actor capacity globally ® increasingthe EU’s ability to deal with international dangers. ® The EU’s main contribution to international securityin the short term is to solve the central issues of European security, integration and enlargement .

Furthering international security through the values of the EU

It has been argued above that the Union’s focus on preserving peace and strengtheninginternational security was linked discursively to furthering European security. SolvingEurope’s security problems would make the Union more capable of engaging in efforts topromote international security. These concerns come � rst, as illustrated for example in theorder of priorities in Article J.1 in Amsterdam. However, the concern is also extended in thediscourse to a concern for regional or general aspects of international security. Regional orinternational security are also referents of security. There is general commitment to preserv-ing peace and international security and to furthering the broader liberal values of the Union:

[The safeguard of the common values, interests, independence and integrity of the Union is mentioned � rst]

· To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principlesof the UN charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki � nal act and the objectives ofthe Paris Charter, including those on external borders

· To promote international cooperation· To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights

and fundamental freedoms.37

The question, then, is how the Union discourse constructs the nature of these internationaland regional security problems. This paper argues that the way they are understood is basedon the liberal values of the Union presented above (and restated as the last tire in Article J.1).In relation to concrete con� icts or threats of con� icts all over the world, including internalcon� icts, the EU discourse is replete with references to the importance of the general liberalvalues: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the ruleof law. These concepts are presented as either the base of a secure order or, if threatened,the roots of instability. It is a discourse of universalist, liberal values which rejects culturalrelativism in relation to societal organisation and con� ict resolution. This discourse is drawnon both in recommendations for con� ict resolution and in diagnosis of con� icts.

In the discourse, the concepts are interconnected and mutually supportive, so that oneconcept may further or threaten the other (for example: violation of human rights threatensthe rule of law which threatens democracy). They can be said to be linked in a chain of

36 EU Presidency at the UN General Assembly (23 September 1997).37 Amsterdam Treaty, Article J.1.

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equivalence whereby the differences between the concepts disappear.38 If one concept isthreatened the others are threatened too. Compared with the discourse in relation to problemsof European security, an extended version of the democratic peace thesis is drawn on. Allconcepts in the chain of equivalence are drawn on. Violation of human rights or the rule oflaw might equally well be presented as the root of the problems. In European security theemphasis is often on the lack of ‘democracy’ as the root cause of problems and which shouldbe safeguarded or ensured (Rummel 1997:107). When engaging in con� ict resolution orreacting to crises, the chain of equivalence of the liberal values, and the links between them,are central to the ‘diagnosis’ of the problem. The chain of equivalence is central in thesuggestions, recommendations or demands in relation to the issues. Violations of them arepresented as root causes of con� icts. To this chain of equivalence is frequently added theimportance of economic and social factors (particularly in relation to the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, SNG) for security. This way of perceiving international con� ict arguablydraws on what can be said to be a liberal understanding of international relations: the waysocieties are organised politically and economically is crucial for international security.

In contrast to the situation in relation to European security, integration is not as frequentlypresented as a means of resolving or preventing regional con� icts. Although it is oftenclaimed that the Union furthers and encourages regional blocs by its diplomacy, regionalintegration is not given a prominent place as a general solution to problems in internationalsecurity in the discourse. In the next section I will give examples of the use of the conceptsin the chain of equivalence in relation to international and regional security.

Con� icts and chains of equivalence

The elements in the chain of equivalence in the liberal discourse are frequently drawn on inthe CFSP when establishing causes in relation to international or regional security problems.Sometimes the whole cluster of fundamental freedoms is drawn on. However, human rightsare the most common single point of departure in establishing international security.39

Suppression of human rights leads to con� ict:

The European Council recalls the contribution of human rights to the establishment of conditions which aremore conducive to peace, security, democracy and social and economic development . It therefore supportsthe approach of integrating human rights into the relevant activities of the UN and other internationalorganisations.40

The discursive emphasis on the role of liberal values in the chain of equivalence can befound in relation to con� icts or security problems all over the world.

Latin America

The European Council noted with satisfaction the progress made in Central America to maintain peace,dialogue and reconciliation as well as the achievements in consolidation of democracy and regionalintegration.41

38 ‘If, through the chain of equivalence, all the differential objective determinations of its terms have beenlost, then identity can only be given either by a positive determination underlying them all, or by theircommon reference to something external’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1995:127, cf. 127–34.).

39 Section II.a in the Re� ection Group’s Report (1995) is called ‘Promoting European Values’. The � rstsubheading is ‘Human Rights and Fundamental Rights’ (p. 11).

40 Presidency Conclusions, European Council (12–13 December 1997:7, declaration of human rights); cf.Statements by the EU Presidency at the UN General Assembly (26 September 1995 and 24 September1996).

41 Presidency Conclusions, European Council (22– 23 June 1993). See also Presidency Conclusions,European Council (15–16 December 1995:65, Latin America); Presidency Conclusions, EuropeanCouncil (13–14 December 1996:26–7, Cuba).

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Asia

The EU is concerned at the absence of progress towards democratisation and at the continuing violation ofhuman rights in Burma … It calls on the SLORC to enter into meaningful dialogue with pro-democracygroups with a view to bringing about national reconciliation.42

Africa

The EU will intensify its efforts to restore stability in the Great Lakes Region, in particular by encouragingthe setting up of democratic institutions and respect for human rights. It reaf� rms that the holding of aninternational conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region, under the auspicesof the UN and the OAU, has a decisive role to play in � nding a lasting settlement of the crisis in theregion.43

The Middle East

It remained convinced that the con� dence-building measures suggested by the Communityand its Member States and signi� cant improvements on the ground, including the humanrights situation, would be instrumental in moving the peace process.44

The examples illustrate how the liberal values discourse is an integral part of the Union’sconstruction of international and regional security problems and their resolution. It isarticulated in relation to the diagnosis or resolution of almost all security problems.

Means

The primary means to solve con� icts is seen as preventive diplomacy. Political and economicmeans and moral persuasion are presented as central to solving or preventing crises. In spiteof new possibilities for drawing on military means in TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty, thelanguage used in relation to con� ict resolution is the language of preventive diplomacy.There is a stress on � nding the root causes rather than treating the symptoms:

Recent experience has taught us that we need a more encompassing strategy for con� ict prevention andcrisis management . This strategy has to address both the causes and the consequences of con� ict … tosecure peace the root causes have to be tackled.45

Root causes of con� icts in the EU discourse are, as we have seen, often lack of orsuppression of liberal values. A central aim in the EU’s use of its political and economic

42 Common Position, Burma (28 September 1996, 96/635/CFSP). See also Common Position on EastTimor (25 June 1996, 96/407/CFSP).

43 Joint Action, Great Lakes (22 November 1996 96/669/CFSP). See also Presidency Conclusion,European Council on Congo (16–17 June 1997:23); Common Position on Angola (2 October1995/95/413/CFSP); Declaration on the Comores (28 September 1995); Declaration on Burundi (23June 1995); Declaration on Nigeria (22 March 1995); Declaration on Nigeria (20 October 1995);European Council (26– 27 June 1995:38, Annex on Burundi); Declaration on the situation in Nigeria(22 March 1995); Declaration on Algeria (23 January 1995).

44 Presidency Conclusions, European Council (22– 23 June 1993:41, Middle East). See also Joint Actionon the Middle East (19 April 1994, 94/276/CFSP); Joint Action on the Middle East (29 April.1997,97/289/CFSP); Joint Action on the Middle East (25 November 1995, 96/676/CFSP).

45 Statement by the EU Presidency at the UN General Assembly (24 September 1996). See also PresidencyConclusions, European Council, Dublin (13–14 December 1996:26), Great Lakes.

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Table 2. Regional/international security as a referent

Referent Dangers Goals to counter dangers Means

Regional/ Regional/international Chain of equivalence of liberal Primarily politicalinternational instability and con� ict values (human and economicsecurity rights « democracy

rule of law « fundamentalfreedoms)

EU should and does further international security directly: EU political and economic means (primarilynon-military means, civilian power) Õ furthering the liberal values regionally/internationally (drawing onliberal chain of equivalence , and the democratic peace thesis) Õ furthering international/regional security.

means is the spread of liberal values, often through the use of political conditionality inrelation to aid.

The EU is based on the principle of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamentalfreedoms, and the rule of law, principles … human rights constitute an essential factor in internationalrelations and one of the cornerstones of European cooperation and relations between the EU and thirdcountries.46

As mentioned above, although the use of military means is an option, military means arenot presented as central to solving con� icts. Mostly political and economic means are themain means to promote the liberal values which, in turn, further security: military means, onthe few occasions they are mentioned in relation to speci� c concepts, seem to be an additionor a possibility rather than the primary instruments. Notice how in the quote below from theCommon Position on con� ict resolution in Africa, the basic civilian, preventive aims retaina prominent position, even when the subject is the use of the WEU through TEU ArticleJ.4.2. Liberal values also � nd their way into the text in this context:

Prevention and resolution of con� icts in Africa constitute priorities for the EU … Pursuant to the objectivesof the CFSP … the EU shall actively support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of con� ictsin Africa … The Union shall pursue its policies … within the appropriate political and legalframework … While recognizing the need to respond to existing crises, the Union’s policy shall also focuson preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent con� ict, including at an early stage, and on post-con� ictpeace-building … The Union shall seek … to use the various instruments available coherently to promoteeffective con� ict prevention and resolution … in accordance with the relevant procedures , steps will betaken … in this � eld, including with regard to development cooperation and the support for human rights,democracy, the rule of law and good governance … Where any Union initiative undertaken … has defenceimplications, the Union shall request the WEU to elaborate and implement this initiative as regards thesedefence implications, in particular the use of military means in accordance with article J.4.2 of the Treaty.47

The discourse on international security described in this section can be summarised as inTable 2 below.

An EU or a Western discourse on security?

In many ways, the EU discourse identi� ed in relation to international security seems similarto the dominant discourse in most Western regional organisations, including the North

46 See Presidency Conclusions, European Council (12–13 December 1997:7). See also PresidencyConclusions, European Council (16–17 June 1997:23, Congo); Declaration on Rwanda (25 April 1995).

47 Common Position: Con� ict Resolution in Africa (2 June 1997, 97/356/CFSP). See also PresidencyConclusions, European Council (15–16 December 1995).

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Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Williams 1997), the Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN.48 There is a general emphasis in the post-ColdWar period on peaceful con� ict resolution, political and economic means, and the importanceof the liberal values as central to the solving of con� icts. In a certain sense, this points toa common Western culturally based approach to security. This could be seen as a commonWestern discourse a la Huntington (cf Williams 1997). If the EU discourse on internationalsecurity is similar to a general Western discourse, this would imply that the EU discoursewould not be a particularly important background for understanding the speci� c EU approachto international security. However, the EU security discourse has certain distinctive featureswhich renders it important as part of the speci� c EU policy context.

First, in spite of formulations in TEU and Amsterdam that suggest that the EU is on theway to becoming a military power through the Western European Union (WEU), thedominant discourse on security is still very much a civilian power discourse. Non-militarymeans are central in relation to solving concrete problems and con� icts. This constitutes aconstraint for those member states who work to equip the Union with a stronger defencedimension. Military means, when mentioned in Union documents, are often embedded in adiscourse where military means are necessary to strengthen the Union’s identity and politicalweight rather than to solve concrete problems. At the same time, the dominant discourse inrelation to solving concrete security issues does not stress the importance of military means.This is re� ected in the policies in relation to the CFSP. It can be argued that on the nineoccasions (until December 1999) when the Union has drawn on TEU J.4.2, this has had moreto do with certain member states wanting to show that the prospect of a military dimensionof the Union was still on the agenda (drawing on the identity discourse), than it had to dowith the needs in the concrete situations (this was applied to mine-sweeping, evacuation, theGreat Lakes, con� ict prevention in Africa). An important discursive constraint on the Unionadopting a stronger military capacity is therefore the view that military means are not centralto solving post-Cold War security problems.

Second, European security is given priority over international security. Whether the EUcan contribute to international security depends, in the discourse, very much on whether theEU has solved its own security problems, in particular the continuation of integration andenlargement. This would allow it to contribute more to international security. Although thediscourse on how to participate in international con� ict resolution is very much a Westerndiscourse, the EU discourse does emphasise the priority of European security problems. Theintegration and enlargement aspects of European security point to the EU being primarilyfocused on questions related to its own actorness.

Third, the EU discourse not only promotes Western values, it also constructs the EU asa political unit with a role to play in world politics with its own interests. Europe isconstructed as an international unit or identity, not just as the same as the West, in the sameway as the US also presents itself as a unit and not just the same as the West. This givesrise to the possibility of con� icts within civilisations and not between civilisations as theconcrete application of these values in relation to con� ict resolution are de� ned by the units.

Conclusion

It has been argued that an EU discourse on security in the post-Cold War world can beidenti� ed, which limits the range of possible statements and promotes a limited range of

48 Where the stronger position of the liberal values can, in many institutions and contexts, be linked tothe post-Cold War period, it can be argued that the EU emphasis on human rights goes back to the ColdWar period and thus strictly speaking is an expression of continuity (see also the beginning of the secondsection).

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meanings, and which is more than the sum of the discourses of the participating states andother actors. This discourse can be described in the following terms: ‘EU’ or ‘European’security is the primary referent of the Union’s securitisation. Many new dangers tointernational security are identi� ed which the EU must take part in countering. In the shortterm, the EU’s main contribution to international security is through its contribution toEuropean security. In the EU discourse, the dangers to European security consist in an endingof the integration process and the enlargement process, instability in Russia, the Mediter-ranean and diffuse global threats. A successful European integration process and enlargementprocess would contribute to a stronger political role for Europe in the world and hence theUnion’s capacity to solve problems. The Union is, according to its own understanding, acivilian power in the sense that its contribution to international con� ict resolution is notprimarily based on military means. Con� ict resolution is articulated as having the aim offurthering human rights, democracy and a state of rights—liberal values—through politicaland economic means and moral persuasion. The EU discourse argues in terms of thedemocratic peace thesis in Europe: democracies are less prone to war and, therefore,furthering peace, stability and security is a question of furthering democratic values togetherwith integration. In relation to con� icts outside Europe, or international security in general,the chain of equivalence of liberal values is drawn on to establish causes. This can be saidto draw on the democratic peace thesis in an extended form; but in relation to internationaland regional security, integration is not promoted to the same extent.

Rummel argues that economic and political means are the means used in relation toEuropean security (1997:107). This paper argues that this is also the case in EU discoursevis-a-vis con� icts outside the realm of European security. Although the TEU and theAmsterdam Treaty opens up for the EU dealing with the military aspects of security throughthe WEU, the primary means to further security, by promoting the liberal values, remainpolitical and economic. As has been argued earlier in the article, the Union’s discourse is acentral background shaping the Union’s policies. On the basis of the discourse analysed, theimplications for the Union’s external policies are as follow. First, the EU has ambitions forin� uencing international security and stability, but the implications for the internationalsystem as a whole might, in the short- and medium-term, be limited. In the EU discourse,the continued EU integration and its � t with the enlargement is the primary security concernfor the Union. It is a precondition for the Union being able to play a more important role ininternational security. Moreover, the concrete security concerns for the Union are articulatedaround Europe, they are not primarily global. When it comes to international security, thecontribution of the EU is therefore likely to be focused on the European region. The EU will,for a long period, be concerned with its own security problems, rather than global systemmanagement applying military means.

Second, the dominant EU discourse for most of the 1990s was still one which did notview a defence role for the EU as a natural development, although competing discourses canbe identi� ed within this � eld. Defence or military means were not presented by the EU asprimary means to further security. This meant that in spite of new formulations in TEU andlater in the Amsterdam Treaty to the effect that the EU might contribute to internationalsecurity through military means, the EU conceptual apparatus still relied very much on‘civilian means’ to promote the liberal values.

However, from 1998, the hitherto dominant civilian power discourse described in thisarticle has been challenged by another discourse which has since been gaining dominance inUnion documents. The civilian power discourse element has been articulated with theelement that the Union’s access to military means might be bene� cial in responding tointernational crises and in contributing to international peace and stability, so that the Unionhas access to the full-scale of instruments.

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[The EU] should have the ability to take decisions on the … Petersburg Tasks [humanitarian and rescuetasks, peacekeeping , tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking] . To this end, theUnion must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces … in order torespond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase itsability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UNCharter’ (Declaration by the European Council in Cologne, 3 June 1999, on strengthening the commonEuropean policy on security and defence).49

From a discourse perspective, this might be seen as a change in the nature of the EU asan international actor from the dominant one of the 1990s outlined in this article. The hithertodominant civilian power discourse, which has shaped EU policies, is in the process of beingreplaced by an understanding of military means as a natural part of the Union’s foreignpolicy instruments.

References

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