INTERNATIONAL PEACE STUDIES

Thesis

Memory Bariyo

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST: INTERVENTION AS A METHOD OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

15 June 2007

ABSTRACT

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts, International Peace Studies.

University for PeaceUniversidad para la Paz

This study which is exploratory and explanatory in nature examines the origins of the Ivory Coast conflict, analyzes the current conflict trends and the significance of intervention as a method of conflict resolution. The failure of the 2002 military coup in Ivory Coast resulted into a civil war which divided the country into north controlled by the rebels and south controlled by the government. Fighting between the disgruntled soldiers who later formed a rebel group called “Forces Nouvelles” and the government forces known as “Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire” halted as early as 2003 after the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States and France. The African Union and the United Nations also later intervened in the conflict. Different actors have mediated between the warring parties in order to resolve the conflict peacefully however, this conflict still persists. The warring parties have made several peace agreements monitored by the peacekeeping mission and facilitated by mediators but their implementation has been difficult. Efforts by the United Nations mission in the country and the French troops mandated by the United Nations to restore peace have at times been hampered by local politicians who incite the local groups such as the “Young Patriots” and the government supported militia groups through the media to attack the peacekeepers. Forces Nouvelles and Government forces Chiefs of Staffs have tried on several occasions to resolve the conflict through dialogue just like their political leaders have been doing without much success. This case study addresses what motivated states to intervene

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all who love a peaceful African continent.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Uganda

Peoples Defense Forces administration that gave me the opportunity

to serve as a peacekeeper in Ivory Coast which is the backbone of my

writing this thesis.

I would also like to thank General Aronda Nyakairima, and

General Ivan Koreta of Uganda Peoples Defense Forces, Dr. Kirumira

and Dr. Simba Kayunga of Makerere University who recommended

me to pursue a Master of Arts degree in International Peace Studies

at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

I must thank the University for Peace administration too, for

admitting me and Dr. Mahmoud El Zain for professionally advising me

during my thesis writing.

I further extend my exceptional gratitude to my wife Gloria

Kyampaire, children; Arnold, Anita and Peruth for enduring my

absence while in Ivory Coast and in Costa Rica.

More thanks go to my friends and relatives who supported me in

different ways during my mature formal studies and supporting my

family during my long absence from home.

Finally, I must thank God who has always been on my side to

give me courage and direction of fulfilling my undertakings.

Mucho gracias!

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Table of contents

Abstract i

Dedication ii

Acknowledgementiii

Table of contents iv

List of acronyms v

Map of Ivory Coastvii

Map of Tribal Clusters in Ivory Coastviii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1:1 Background Statement

11:2 Research Problem

4 1:3 Research Questions

41:4 Objectives/Purpose of the study

41:5 Methodology 51:5.1 Data Collection and Analysis

51:6 Limitation to the study

5 1:7 Organization of the study

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CHAPTER 2: INTERVENTION IN A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE2:1 Introduction 62:2 Intervention for Conflict Resolution in a Realist perspective

62:3 Intervention for Conflict Resolution in a Liberal perspective

92:4 The Concept of Intervention

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2:5. The Concept of Mediation11

2:6. The Concept of Peacekeeping Operations11

2:7 The Concept of Peace-building12

2:8 Conflict in a theoretical perspective14

2:9 Causes of Conflict in a theoretical perspective15

2:9.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict15

2:9.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict16

2:9.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict17

2:9.4 External factors as a source of Conflict17

2:10 Effects of Conflict 182:11 Conclusion 18

CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST3:1 Introduction 203:2 The trend of Conflict in Ivory Coast

203:3 Causes of Conflict in Ivory Coast

223:3.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

223:3.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

233:3.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

243:3.4 External factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

243:4 Media Effects on the Conflict in Ivory Coast

273:5 Challenges encountered by Peacekeepers

303:6 Effects of Conflict in Ivory Coast

323:7 Conclusion

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CHAPTER 4: MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION4:1 Introduction 344:2 Mediation process in Ivory Coast

344:3 Peace agreements in Ivory Coast

394:4 International Intervention

444:5 Conclusion

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CHAPTER 5: PEACE-BUILDING IN IVORY COAST CONFLICT5:1 Introduction 475:2 Peace-building in Ivory Coast

475:2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of ex-combatants

485:2.2 Reconciliation

505:2.3 Restoration of judicial system and rule of law

525:2.4 Protection of Human rights

525:2.5 Governance, state institutions and security sector reform

545:3 The role of civil society in peace-building

555:4 Conclusion

57 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS6:1 Conclusion

586:2 Recommendations

59Bibliography

61Appendix A 71Appendix B 72Appendix C 73Appendix D 81

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU African Union

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration

ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission to Côte d’Ivoire

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FAFN Forces Armées Force Nouvelles

FN Force Nouvelles

FANCI Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire

FPI Ivorian Popular Front

IWG International Working Group

MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire

MFA Movement of the Forces of the Future

MPCI Popular Movement of Ivory Coast

MPIGO Greater West Patriotic Movement of

Côte d’Ivoire

MJP Movement for Justice and Peace

NGO Non Governmental Organization

ONUCI United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast

PDCI-RDA Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire - African

Democratic Rally

PIT Ivorian Worker's Party

RDR Rally of the Republicans

RUF Revolutionary United Front

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

UDPCI Union for Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast

UDCY Democratic and Citizenship Union

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

ZOC Zone of Confidence

viii

MAP OF IVORY COAST

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection (2004)

ix

TRIBES OF IVORY COAST

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection (1972).

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CHAPTER ONE

1:0 INTRODUCTION

1:1 Background Statement

Ivory Coast attained its political independence from French

colonial administrators on 7 August 19601. According to Retired

General Sakhawat Hussain, “Though direct colonial rule ended, the

French never left the country. President Houphouet Boigny favored

French military presence to provide security from external

aggression. A small national army was raised with ethnical

representation but gradually became factionalized as the political

bickering widened the ethnical divide within armed forces”.2

Houphouet Boigny maintained a single political party rule, an

authoritarian characteristic of governance for 30 years3 with the

central government dominated by southerners whose policies

neglected the northern regions. Boigny consolidated a north-south

division with the northern region being marginalized in terms of

economic development.4

President Boigny’s authoritarian rule coupled with economic

set-backs in the country resulting from the drop in prices of cocoa and

coffee5, culminated into political and social tensions and

demonstrations on the streets by student activists and politicians with

their supporters became a common activity. The national and

international pressure eventually forced Boigny’s regime to open up

the political arena in 19896 and presidential elections were organized

for the first time based on the multi-party politics in 1990 with

Laurent Gbagbo of Ivorian Popular Front party (FPI) challenging him.

1 Breuilly, John.Nationalism and the State, 435.2 Sakhawat Hussain. Ivory Coast: History of a failed State, 2. 3 Anckar, Carsten. Determinants of Death Penalty,117.4 Forrest, Joshua. Sub-nationalism in Africa, 62.5 Victor T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 211.6 Soludo, C., et al. The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa, 326.

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However, Houphouet Boigny’s political party, Democratic Party of

Ivory Coast (PDCI) managed to win the elections with 85% of votes.7

The multi-party regime in Ivory Coast started in a desperate

situation. The economy was suffering greatly, students and public

servants were on strike for better conditions and religious leaders

were criticizing the regime for human rights violations.8 President

Houphouet Boigny however, tried to control the situation through

dialogue until he passed away in December 1993.9

Henry Konan Bedie the then PDCI National Assembly Speaker

succeeded late Houphouet Boigny using the lever of the 1990

constitutional amendment that permitted the National Assembly

Speaker to become president in the event of vacancy.10

Unlike his predecessor, Bedie was against the foreign

immigrants who were favored by Boigny and he had given them voting

rights. Bedie advanced the notion of "Ivorité" or "Ivorian-ness" as an

identification means of a true citizen from a non-citizen of Ivory

Coast.11 He is further accused of having fuelled the divisions in

religions and rampant corruption with bad governance which led to

the European Union, World Bank and IMF suspension of economic aid

to his country in 1998.12

According to Victor T. Le Vine, “in 1994, Bedie amended the

constitution allegedly to block the candidature for presidency of his

main political rival Alassane Ouattara. Outtara was disqualified on

grounds that his mother was Ivorian and the father was Burkinabe

therefore he did not qualify to stand in accordance with the new

7 Jessup, John. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 351.8 Manning, Patrick. Francophone Sub-Saharan 1880-1995, 195.9 Guy, Martin. Africa in World Politics, 84.10 Victor T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 210.11 Gerd, Baumann, and Andre Gingrich. Grammars of Identity/Alterity, 124.12 Ibid, 125.

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law.”13 This gave Bedie an opportunity to win elections and he took

over the office of the president for the second term.

Bedie’s second term of office was also characterized by

discontentment of the population.14 According to John Allan, during

the second half of 1999, the political atmosphere in Ivory Coast

deteriorated rapidly and that violent clashes between the security

forces and opposition Rally of Republicans (RDR) supporters led to the

arrest and detention of RDR leaders. Konan Bedie was overthrown on

24 December 1999 in a military coup led by his former Army Chief of

Staff, General Robert Guei.15 General Guei said he removed Konan

Bedie from power to restore the dignity of the military and because of

political problems in the country such as imprisonment of politicians

at the Abidjan central prison.16

General Guei later on formed a broad-based government

including members of Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and Rally of

Republicans (RDR.)17 He organized a constitutional referendum which

was held in July 2000 and presidential election in the same year.

Presidential elections were held on 22 October 2000; however

General Guei attempted to rig by declaring himself winner which

resulted into massive public protests and subsequently he was driven

out of power by the people unfortunately, many of them were killed in

this turmoil.18

When General Robert Guei was forced out of office, he fled the

country and Laurent Gbagbo took over as the president. However,

having spent merely two month in office, in January 2001, there was a

coup attempt on Gbagbo’s government which was repulsed.19

13 Victor.T. Le Vine. Politics in Francophone Africa, 210.14 Ibid, 211.15 Conteh-Morgan, Earl. Collective Political Violence,171.16 Klay,George, and Ogaba Agbese. The Military and Politics in Africa, 62.17 Gerd, Baumann, and Andre Gingrich. Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach, 125.18 Gabriel, Williams.The Heart of Darkness, 27.19Victor T. Le Vine Politics in Francophone Africa, 213.

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Gbagbo led the country under political tensions until 19

September 2002 when soldiers unhappy of being demobilized

mutinied. The disturbance grew into a full scale rebellion during

which the former military ruler General Robert Guei and his wife were

murdered20 This mutiny whose aim was to oust Gbagbo flopped

however mutineers ignited a rebellion that split the country into two

regions; the northern region controlled by the rebels and the south

region controlled by Gbagbo’s government up to today.

The rebel group, calling itself the "Patriotic Movement of Cote

d'Ivoire" (MPCI) which was behind the initial attacks and capture of

some towns in the northern region claimed to be protecting the

interests of northerners who are majority Moslems and accused

Gbagbo of discriminating against them.21 In November 2002, two new

rebel groups namely the Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great

West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

emerged in the west with the aim of avenging the death of General

Guei and defending the rights of Yacouba ethnic group22. MPIGO and

MJP later allied with the MPCI, and the three groups subsequently

called themselves the New Forces or Forces Nouvelles (FN).

Although regional organizations and international organizations

intervened in the conflict swiftly at its outbreak, efforts to resolve the

conflict peacefully are still frustrated by different factors such as the

failure to fully implement peace agreements and the sabotage of the

peace process by local activists however, the intervention helped in

securing a ceasefire agreement that halted armed attacks between

the warring parties as negotiations to reach a final settlement

continues up to today.

1:2 Research Problem

20 Ibid.21 Francis, David. Civil Militia, 124.22 Ibid.

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Despite concerted efforts, by the international community,

African union, regional organization, individual states and local actors

in Ivory Coast to terminate the conflict peacefully through

negotiations after the intervention, the conflict has persisted.

1.3 Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the main question of why the conflict

persists in Ivory Coast despite the effective involvement of regional

and international community. A number of sub-questions follow from

this main question, which include questions such as what were the

causes of the conflict in Ivory Coast? What is the significance of

intervention? What is the role of mediation? Does the impact of

mediation vary in accordance with the mediation style? What is the

significance of peace-building in conflicts?

1:4 Objectives/Purpose of the Study

The main objective of this study is to explore and explain the

origins of the conflict in Ivory Coast and to identify the contributory

factors that continue to sustain this conflict and the different actors

involved in the conflict and their immediate interests and how this

affected the peace process in this country. The study aims to figure

out the reasons that contributed to causing the conflict in Ivory Coast

to culminate into a civil war and explain the efforts so far undertaken

by all parties to the conflict to bring it to a peaceful end.

It is anticipated that this study will provide useful information

regarding the origins of the conflict to the United Nations

peacekeeping mission in Ivory Coast and other actors to the conflict

who are pursuing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It is also hoped

that Ivory Coast people will understand why the conflict, that has

divided them into two hostile regions, is not ending and maybe they

will try to establish other contributory means of resolving it such as

traditional methods of conflict resolution so that they can co-exist

harmoniously. The study is also expected to provide useful

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information to academicians especially about intervention methods in

conflict and finally, the study may also act as a source for conducting

further research.

1:5 Methodology

This case study aims to explore as well as to explain the origins

of the conflict in Ivory Coast and to identify the contributory factors

that continue to sustain this conflict and the different actors involved

in the conflict and their immediate interests. It primarily seeks to

figure out why the conflict in Ivory Coast culminated into a civil war in

the country which attracted the regional and international

intervention and the subsequent involvement of third parties or

mediators to pursue a peaceful resolution. The study seek to explain

the efforts so far undertaken by all parties to the conflict such as the

warring parties, the civil society, the United Nation mission deployed

in the country along with French contingents, ECOWAS, African

Union and the mediators, to resolve the conflict peacefully.

1.5.1 Data Collection and Analysis

This case study is based on documentary survey whereby I will

study the available data in the university library and internet sources

which I will analyze by trying to explore and to get explanations that

led to the outbreak and trends of the conflict in Ivory Coast. To

supplement the secondary data, my experience as a military observer

in the Ivory Coast conflict will be utilized.

1:6 Limitation of the Study

The main limitation to this study is limited literature about Ivory

Coast conflict in the University library and beyond. The period allotted

for the submission of the thesis is also limited. My physical contact

with the Ivory Coast conflict, which is far from Costa Rica where iam

conducting the study from, could have enriched the information

however, it is still deemed that the study will meet its objectives in

spite of these limitations.

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1:7 Organization of the Study

This thesis is organized in six chapters namely; Chapter One

which is the Introduction discusses the background statement about

the Ivory Coast conflict, research problem, methodology, data

collection and analysis, limitation of the study, objective of the study

and organization of the study. Chapter Two discusses the intervention

in conflict in a theoretical perspective. Chapter Three discusses the

nature of conflict in Ivory Coast. Chapter Four discusses the role of

mediation tool in conflict resolution. Chapter Five is about peace-

building in the post-conflict period. Chapter Six is the conclusion and

recommendations. After the six chapters, there is a bibliography and

four appendices two of which are crucial peace agreements reached

by the parties to the Ivory Coast conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

2:0 INTERVENTION IN A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2:1 Introduction

The idea of intervention discussed in this chapter denotes

interference in domestic affairs of an autonomous state by another

state or organization. Since the end of the Cold War, the world that

was expected to become peaceful instead came to be characterized by

new forms of intra-state conflicts instead of inter-state conflicts. These

internal conflicts have been principle sources of human suffering

through gross violation of human rights and destruction of property.

Because some sovereign states have at times failed to halt

such human suffering, foreign governments, organizations and

individual actors have found themselves compelled to intervene in

these internal conflicts to protect the population of troubled states

from human catastrophes and to provide the necessary assistance.

Among the methods of intervention into conflict there is

deployment of a peacekeeping mission in a country involved in a

conflict which can be conducted by the United Nations, African Union,

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regional organizations, independent states and coalition forces with

the objective of facilitating a peaceful resolution to a conflict.

Intervention implies the existence of a third party or mediator who

may intervene primarily to help warring parties negotiate a deal,

which should ultimately lead to peace-building process. Peace-

building activities are finally introduced to sustain peace and prevent

relapse to conflict.

This chapter will discuss the definitions of concepts associated

with intervention, namely “mediation”, “peacekeeping” and “peace-

building” and the concept of conflict and its causes and how as

processes they are perceived from within two broad theoretical

perspectives, namely realism and liberalism. These two perspectives

will be discussed here as the main frameworks from within which the

answer to why states intervene in foreign conflicts, could be

developed so that understanding the case study of this research would

be attainable.

2:2 Intervention for conflict resolution in a realist

perspective

Realist theory was developed by Hans J Morgenthau in the

twentieth century. The theory holds that relations between states are

dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest combined with the

preservation and extension of power of the state to facilitate such

pursuits by its members.23 The theory emphasizes that political

leaders think and act in terms of interest defined as “power” and

accordingly, international politics is a process in which national

interests are accommodated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or

war24 Hans J Morgenthau advances six principles of political realism

used as follows;

23 Keren, Michael, and Donald Sylvan. International Intervention, 14.24 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 75.

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(1) Politics like society in general is governed by objective laws

that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging,

therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects

these objectives; (2) The main signpost of political realism is

the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses

rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus

makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.

Political realism stresses the rational, objective and

unemotional; (3) Realism assumes that interest defined as

power is an objective category which is universally valid but not

with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the

control of man over man; (4) Political realism is aware of the

moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the

tension between the moral command and the requirement of a

successful political action; (5) Political realism refuses to

identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the

moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of

interest defined in terms of power that saves us from the moral

excess and political folly; (6) The political realist maintains the

autonomy of the political sphere – he asks – how does this

policy affect the power of the nation? Political realism is based

on pluralistic conception of human nature.25

Hans Morgenthau holds that in power struggles, nations follow

policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic

expansion, or to gain prestige. Hans Morgenthau further noted that,

“states pursue the policy of prestige with the aim of impressing other

nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses or with

the power it believes or wants other nations to believe it possesses, a

policy that can be pursued through diplomacy or display of forces.”26

Hans Morgenthau, however, was not only concerned with the quest

for power but also international peace which he says is affected by

25 Linklater, Andrew, International Relations, 1681.26Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 78.

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pursuit of national interests that are not essential to national

survival.27 Hans Morgenthau also asserted that the world is the result

of forces inherent in human nature and that moral principle can never

be fully realized but must at best be approximated through the ever

temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement

of conflicts.28

However, a strong attachment to “power” by a state can

cause a security problem or a conflicting situation between states

especially neighboring states. Building up power involves building up

or increasing military capabilities and as a specific state embarks on

increasing military activities and build-up, a neighboring state may

feel threatened and eventually competition in military build-up may

ensue for the purpose of national security and defense. Such

competition is likely to end up in arms-race which does not only

impact the economic position of a country through procurement of

military hardware but also increases the availability of weapons which

are means of conflict.

Hamdi Hassan pointed out that, “realists view state as the unit of

analysis in the world politics and international politics is understood

basing on actions and interests of the state. States are the dominant

and primary units of analysis in the international system and thus

exclude domestic politics from the analysis of world politics.”29

According to Torbjom Knutsen, “Realists see international

relations in terms of a hierarchy of issues with national security

concerns at the top and tend to examine the achievement and

maintenance of international stability or how stability breaks down”.30

“Realists anticipate conflict and war”;31 they warn that a world with

many powerful states, roughly equal in economic and military power 27 Ibid.28Sheehan, Michael. The Balance of Power, 529 Hassan, Hamdi. The Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, 16.30 Knutsen,Torbjorn. A History of International Relations Theory, 253.31 Clemens, Walter. Dynamics of International Relations, 25.

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would be a particularly dangerous place.32 Realists use anarchy as

their primary metaphor for the international system. They stress that

there exists no central authority capable of creating and imposing

order on the interactions of states. Viewing countries as competitors,

they argue that the only order is that which emerges from competition

under anarchy.33

“Realists assume that sovereignty makes states

functionally similar”34. Buzan and Little further posit that state is

constituted by both internal and external sovereignty. The internal

sovereignty is defined by the hierarchical structures formed within

the state; state autonomy and equal status with respect to other states

constitute external sovereignty in the system.35

2:3 Interventions for conflict resolution in a liberal

perspective

As A-M Slaughter noted, “realists have no arguments for

humanitarian intervention per se. they can not include humanitarian

concerns in their security equation, however heart-wrenching they

may be. Stopping massive human rights violations or feeding the

hungry does not enhance national power.”36 Humanitarian

intervention is conceptualized more clearly by the liberals.

Liberalist underlying assumption is that human nature is

basically good. “While realists look at sovereignty as a basis for

international anarchy”37 in contrast liberalists say that, “sovereignty

serves a valuable human ends.”38 Although realists emphasizes that

power is the driving force behind intervention, there are situations

where humanitarian emergencies are the primary reason behind

32 Kaplan, Laura, and Laurence Bove. Philosophical Perspectives on Power and Domination, 139.33 Stein, Arthur. Why Nations Cooperate, 5.34 Thakur,Ramesh, and Edward Newman. New Millennium, New Perspectives, 165.35 Ferguson, Yale, et al. What is Polity? 17.36 Slaughter, A.M. Recueil Des Cours, 82.37 Lowenheim, O and Paltiel, J.T. Defining Sovereignty38 Holzgrefe, Jeff, and Robert Keohane. Humanitarian Intervention, 93

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intervention and this challenges the realists’ assertion that power is

the driving force to intervention. As Fernando Teson argues,

“humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases.

His argument is based on liberal theory that the major purpose of

states is to protect and secure human rights”39

To liberalists, this is a contradicting situation as they emphasize

cooperation among states. The realist view of a state was originally in

contrast with the liberalist views however, “the neo-liberalism accepts

realist arguments that states are the major actors in the world affairs

and are unitary rational agents”40.

The liberals on humanitarian intervention argue that the

exercise of government tyranny and the behavior that typically takes

place in extreme anarchy situations are serious forms of injustice

towards persons and that, subject to important constraints, external

intervention is morally permissible to end that injustice.41

From the above discussion it is clear to me that the liberal

perspective provides more clear understanding of the current conflict

in Ivory Coast that this study is about. In the following section, I will

discuss the concept of conflict in relation to its causes and how the

liberal perspective would allow for viewing them differently as

compared to a realist perspective. This will be followed by a

discussion on the concepts of “mediation”, “peacekeeping” and

“peace-building”, necessary for understanding the current dynamics

of the peace process in Ivory Coast.

2:4 The concept of Intervention

Intervention means various forms of nonconsensual action

that are often thought to directly challenge the principle of state

sovereignty42and sovereignty denotes the competence, independence 39 Ibid.40 Grieco, Joseph. Cooperation Among Nations, 29.41 Ibid, 94.42 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect, 15.

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and legal equality of states43. Intervention in a broader sense refers to

interference in the domestic affairs of a country through diplomatic,

economic, military or other means by another country, regional

organization or an international organization. To Holzgrefe, et al,

intervention refers to, “the threat or use of force across state borders

by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending

widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of

individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the

state within whose territory force is applied”.44

Sovereignty ought to encompass responsibility of states. In

situations where a state can not protect or provide for its nationals

then it losses its legitimacy and therefore the international community

or regional bodies have to intervene in order to rescue the

population without giving attention to the sovereignty tradition of

such a state. Countries in conflict can not be ignored as their issues

can impact regional or international peace and security and this

makes intervention a necessity. Deng, et al noted that, “The sovereign

states responsibility and accountability to both domestic and external

constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of the

national and international order”45.

General John Galvin who served as a peacekeeper with US

Army noted that, “Within law it is possible for nations to intervene

where another nation is incapable of handling specific problems

however, there is a provision within the UN Security Council that

provides legal and legitimized basis for action”.46 Antonio Tanca also

noted that, “Armed interventions maybe justified as a means for

43 Ibid.6.44 Holzgrefe, Jeff, and Robert Keohane.eds. Humanitarian Intervention,145 Deng, F., et al. Sovereignty as Responsibility, xvii.46 Manwaring, Max, and Fishel John. eds. Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder, 3

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promoting self-determination, for guaranteeing basic human rights or

for the protection of nationals abroad.”47

Jeong Ho-Won further pointed out that, “External intervention

aims at stopping the killing of the people where as humanitarian

intervention and international assistance are needed to relieve their

sufferings. International intervention aims at curbing aggression in

internal conflict whereby foreign forces are used to prevent

massacres, raping, looting and driving people away from their

homes.”48

2:5 The concept of Mediation

Mediation is one of the methods or tools of conflict resolution

undertaken by a third party or mediator to peacefully terminate

conflict which complies with the liberalists’ culture of supporting non-

violent methods of handling conflicts. Mediating in conflict is not a

new undertaking but has been going on for a long time both in

modern societies such as the use of arbitration and adjudication, and

in traditional societies where groups of people utilize a third party in

search for a solution to disputes or conflicts.

According to Allan Stitt, “Mediation is simply facilitated

negotiation. A mediator attempts to help people negotiate more

effectively and efficiently than they could on their own. The mediator

helps the disputants to find solutions to their conflict that make more

sense to them than continuing with their disputes”.49 Allan further

noted that, “Mediation can not guarantee a settlement though it takes

time and it’s costly. The best mediators are experts in the process of

negotiation and help disputants overcome obstacles in negotiations”.50

According to Jacob Bercovitch;

47 Tanca, Antonio. Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9948Jeong, Ho-Won. Peace and Conflict Studies, 136. 49 Stitt, Allan. Mediation, 1.50 Ibid, 7.

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Mediation involves (1) a relationship between two protagonists

and a mediator,

(2) behavior of some sort within a context, and (3) the outcomes

consequent to that behavior. The outcomes may have been

caused by the direct mediator behavior or they may have been

facilitated indirectly by mediators removing barriers to their

occurrence, permitting them to occur or not preventing them

from occurring.51

2:6 The concept of Peacekeeping operations

The concept of peacekeeping is in line with liberal ideals that

emphasize peace; however, it’s among those concepts that have failed

to get a single definition. Fetherston noted that, “The real difficulty in

providing a comprehensive functional definition of peacekeeping is

that, as peacekeeping takes on more and more functions the

definitions get longer, more general and less useful”52

Peacekeeping is a method of facilitating for countries torn by

conflict to restore peace and security. Peacekeepers monitor and

observe peace processes taking place in countries in conflict and

assist the conflicting parties to reach and implement peace

agreements.

Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and

termination of hostilities between states or within states through the

peaceful intervention of a third party neutral and employing an

international force composed of soldiers, policemen and civilians, in

order to restore and maintain peace.53

The term Peacekeeping is used to denote a military or a police

force deployed at the request of a government or a representative

group of political and military actor that enjoys wide international

51 Bercovitch, Jacob. Resolving International Conflict, 3.52 Fetherston A.B., Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping, 128.53 Child, Jack. Regional Cooperation for Development and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflict in Latin America, 136.

15

recognition.54 Peacekeeping does not propose or enforce a particular

political solution but facilitates in confidence building or bridging the

gap between the conflicting parties and usually is based on the

principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force which

distinguishes it from peace-enforcement that involves intervention of

external forces into a situation of conflict with the aim of imposing

peace in the absence of these three principles.

Jeong also noted that, “Peacekeeping operations are temporary

measures and are intended to be provisional. Rather than determining

the outcome of conflict, their task is oriented towards creating

conditions in which conflict can be resolved by peaceful means.”55

Indeed one of the functions of peacekeeping operations is to create an

environment that allows conflicting parties to come to dialogue so that

they can settle their incompatibilities peacefully.

2:7 The concept of Peace-building

The concept of peace-building can be interpreted as the

conduct of activities that will restore significant social order and

social justice in a society that has been engaged in a conflict with the

ultimate aim of preventing the recurrence of the conflict in order to

attain a durable peace. Kofi Annan defined peace-building as actions

undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a

recurrence of armed confrontation.56

According to Tom Keating, the idea of peace-building was raised

by the former United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-

Ghali in his document “An Agenda for Peace” released in 1992. He

identified peace-building as “action to identify and solidify peace in

order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”57

54 Barman, Eric, and Sams, Katie. Peacekeeping in Africa, 25.55 Jeong, Ho-Won. Peace and Conflict Studies,124.56 Kumar, Chetan. Building Peace in Haiti,29.57 Trudy Govier and Carol Prager. Dilemmas of Reconciliation,171.

16

Peace-building is used in its broadest sense to refer to those

initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and

processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence

and decrease the likelihood of outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation

of violent conflict.58 Genuine development is the best guarantee for

sustainable peace therefore, peace-building and development are

complementary and mutually inclusive processes that seek to promote

social justice, economic equity and political inclusion.59

Keating, et al, pointed out that, “Peace-building isn’t about

imposition of solutions but creation of opportunities. The challenge of

post-conflict peace-building is to identify and nurture the political,

economic and social space within which indigenous actors can identify

development and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful,

prosperous and just society.”60 According to Junne and Verkoren,

challenges of post-conflict development vary with the causes of the

conflict and they identified four root causes of conflict in four strata;

(1) external/international, whereby the root causes maybe

found outside the country in question, (2) characteristics of the

state which may be too strong or too weak, (3) characteristics

of the society which can make it more probable such as

inequalities and ethnicity, (4) individual orientations basically in

ideologies61.

Although there are divergent opinions about the concept of peace-

building at least they all emphasize avoidance of conflict reemergence

and viable peace. The significance of peace-building process in

conflict situations is therefore the creation of structures and

opportunities for durable peace in a country that has been suffering

from violent conflict and ensuring that the conflict does not reoccur.

58 Keating, Tom and Andy Knight. Building Sustainable Peace, 25.59 Murithi, Timothy. The African Union, 40.60Keating, Tom and Andy Knight. Building Sustainable Peace, 25. 61Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren. eds. Post-Conflict Development,7.

17

2:8 Conflict in a theoretical perspective

Conflict refers to any incompatible situation of individuals or

groups that may lead to antagonism. In situations where individuals or

groups fail to meet their goals in order to satisfy their material

interests, needs or values, conflict arises. Michael Lund noted that,

“Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive their interests

are incompatible, express hostile attitudes or pursue their interests

through actions that damage the other parties”.62

Conflicts have diverse characteristics or features normally

dictated by where they are taking place, their type and the reasons for

their eruption. With the end of the cold war which was characterized

by non-direct engagement in armed conflict by the super powers apart

from directly supporting their allies, the nature of conflict has mostly

changed from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict. Conflicts

undergo changes in progression and as they change, their impact on

humanity or society in general also tends to change. One scholar

Adam Curle suggested that conflict moves along a continuum from

non-peaceful to peaceful relationship. Curle employs a matrix that

compares the level of power between the parties in conflict and the

level of awareness of conflicting interests and needs along a

continuum through four major stages or quadrants.63According to

Curle;

In the first quadrant, conflict is latent or hidden because people

are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that

affect them and this requires raising their awareness about the

unequal relationships and address the inequity. The second

quadrant which is the pursuit of change involves some form of

confrontation which brings the violent or nonviolent conflict to

surface. In the third quadrant, confrontation moves towards

negotiations if those involved recognize increase the level of

62 Lund, Michael. Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict, 2.63 Lederach, John P..Building Peace, 64.

18

awareness of their interdependence through mutual

recognition. [That] negotiation means that the parties involved

recognize that they can neither simply impose their will nor

eliminate the other side but rather must work with one another

to achieve their goals. In quadrant four, successful negotiations

and mediation lead to a restructuring of the relationship that

deals with the fundamental substantive and procedural

concerns of those involved. This is what Curle refers to as

“increased justice” or “more peaceful relations” [that] conflicts

can jump or cycle between several of the quadrants for

extensive periods of time and negotiations do not always lead to

restructured relationships and confrontation does not

automatically end in negotiation.64

2:9 Causes of Conflict in a theoretical perspective

Conflicts originate from different sources for different reasons

in different geographical areas and this section will discuss some

sources of conflict. Roderic Alley pointed out that, “root causes can

arise from poverty, political repression and marginalization,

prolonged failure of state functions and unequal distribution of

resource benefits which in combination provide the seedbeds to

internal conflicts.”65 Realists argue that conflict has always existed,

conflict is present today and that there will be conflict tomorrow. They

consider conflict to be the norm and view human nature as essentially

egotistical, aggressive and greedy. To liberalists, on the other hand,

human nature is good and they assumes that the development of

humane and a peaceful society can only occur when antagonist’s

ideals are reformed.66

2:9.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict

Paul Collier pointed out that, “Economic agendas appear to be

central to understanding why civil wars emerge following his

64 Ibid, 6665 Alley, Roderic. Internal Conflicts and the International Community, 17.66 Amstutz, Mark. The Healing of Nations, 173.

19

investigations. Collier emphasizes that if economic agendas are

driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from

conflict and they therefore have some interests in initiating and

sustaining conflict”.67

Tshitereke Clarence noted that “the possession of natural

resources within a particular country has often been a source of grief

and unhappiness to its citizens,”68 However, Clarence noted that in

countries such as Botswana where the possession of these natural

resources is properly managed, the state has brought affluence and

much more needed foreign exchange earnings. He attributes this

positive trend to the resource rents wide-distribution within the

Botswana population which has also prevented conflict from emerging

in the country.

Ted Gurr in his theory of ‘Relative deprivation’ argued that;

“The potential for collective violence depends on the level of

frustrated expectations, or discontent of members of a society as a

result of the perceived gap between what people have and what they

think they should have. This gap provides the motive for action

(rebellion) through the psychological ‘frustration-aggression’

mechanism.”69 In Ted Gurr’s theory, individuals or groups will

perceive themselves as unfairly disadvantaged over a reference group

perceived as having similar attributes and receiving better rewards.

Frances Stewart addresses economic factors that cause conflict

by looking at group motivation, private motivation, failure of the social

contract and environmental degradation. Stewart emphasizes that,

“Group motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation to

fight over the distribution and exercise of economic power. In this

situation relatively deprived groups will seek or be persuaded by their

67 Collier, Paul. Doing Well out of War. 1.68 Tshitereke, Clarence. African Security Review, 86. 69 Brush, Stephen. Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences, 527.

20

leaders to seek redress. Resentments inspired by group differences,

termed horizontal inequalities, are a major cause of war.”70

Addressing economic factors by looking at private motivation,

Stewart says that; “individual benefits can motivate people to fight.

Young uneducated men gain employment as soldiers, war also

generates opportunities to loot; profiteer from shortages and from aid,

trade arms, and carry out illicit production and trade in drugs,

diamonds, timber, and other commodities.”71 On failure of the social

contract, Stewart holds that “social stability is based on a hypothetical

social contract between the people and the government. People

accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and

provide reasonable economic conditions. With economic decline and

worsening state services social contract breaks down and violence

results”.72

Finally on environmental degradation as a source of poverty and

cause of conflict, Stewart says that “rising population pressure and

falling agricultural productivity may lead to land disputes and that

growing scarcity of water may provoke conflict”.73

2:9.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict

Some of the Social factors that are connected to the emergence

of conflict include ethnicity, religious dichotomies and inequality.

Where ethnic clashes have emerged, groups involved are found

to be pursuing the maintenance of their heritage and cultural values.

Some ethnic groups tend to dominate others and when such groups

attain political and economic power they may sideline or neglect the

minority groups. The inequalities caused by such regimes results into

grievances among the groups that feel disadvantaged or relatively

deprived of what they ought to be or get, thus creating a breeding

70 Frances Stewart. Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries.71 Ibid.72 Ibid.73Frances, Stewart. Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries.

21

ground for conflict which may escalate into a rebellion. Gudrun Ostby

noted that “horizontal inequalities often have their origin in historical

circumstances, such as colonial policies, which privileged some

groups over others and he provides Uganda as one of the examples

where horizontal inequality provoked civil war”.74 Ostby wrote that;

“In Uganda during the colonial period, the southern region was

favored than the northern and eastern regions. Southerners

comprised the majority of the civil service and of the educational elite

while northerners were recruited into military and police forces. This

resulted into ‘warrior’ and ‘educated’ perception of each other”.75

Religion can also cause or can stir other causes of conflict. In

situations where religious differences are stressed and can not be

accommodated by different religious groups, there is a likelihood of

hatred development based on religious affiliations and eventually

conflict may arise.

2:9.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict

Political factors that may lead to emergence of conflict include

weak state institutions, crises of state legitimacy, political repression

and bad governance. Michael E. Brown emphasized that

“discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies,

inter-group politics, and elite politics are underlying political factors

that cause conflict”.76 Brown continues to say that;

One of the fundamental roles of governments is to manage

conflict and resolve grievances in a peaceful and consensual

manner. The onset of violent conflict often involves conflict

management failures linked with shortfalls in state legitimacy

and weak state capacity. In addition, where states lack the

capacity to enforce the rule of law or control the use of

74 Ostby, Gudrun. Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict, 7.75 Ibid, 9.76 Brown, Michael. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 573.

22

violence, there are opportunities for rebel groups and

international criminal networks to operate.77

2:9.4 External factors as a source of conflict

Conflicts are hardly ever exclusively local incidents; they often

have various inter-connected dimensions ranging from national to

global linkages.78 Internal conflicts often spread across the national

borders. Among the greatest effects of internal conflicts across the

border are refugee problem and the proliferation of small arms and

light weapons through illicit trafficking or as personal weapons

carried by mercenaries which is common in the West African sub-

region.

While small arms and light weapons do not cause conflict, they

soon become part of the conflict equation by exacerbating underlying

tensions, generating more insecurity, deepening the sense of crisis

and increasing casualties. These weapons contribute to human rights

violations; hamper peace-building efforts and sustainable

development.79 Tackling the problem of small arms requires multi-

level governance from the global to the local level. The most

important measures that can be developed are often national in

nature but these must be embedded in robust regional and global

regimes to regulate the cross-border or external consequences of

national policies.80

2:10 Effects of Conflict

The effects of conflict can be positive/constructive or negative/

destructive on society. Conflict can be constructive or positive. They

can foster creative solutions to problems; they can facilitate personal

and social change and can maintain personal and social identities81.

77 Governance and Social Development Resource Center. Conflict Causes and Dynamics.78 International Peace Academy and Economic Community of West African States. “Toward a Pax West Africana”, 6.79 Adekeye Adebajo. West Africa’s Security Challenges, 224.80 Heinbecker, Paul and Patricia Goff. Irrelevant or Indispensable, 6.81 Fisk, Larry, and John Schellenberg. Patterns of Conflict, 26.

23

Conflicts relays information, they expose incompatible situations and

therefore attract attention and enhance ground for solving them.

Once solved or managed effectively, conflicting parties will come to

understand each other properly and changes, reforms or new ideas

will come up. Conflicting situations may play a role of checks and

balance. A party in opposition may lead to the other party to be

accountable to its actions. This is a common tendency with political

parties where a party in opposition keeps monitoring the actions of

the other and through public criticisms and common debates the

party in power will act responsibly which is a positive effect according

to my own experience. Conflict is destructive or negative if it’s violent,

causes death and destruction.

2:11 Conclusion

Nature of conflict changed from inter-state to intra-state with

the end of the cold war. The intra-state conflicts that ensued have

been the worst sources of human suffering and when states fail to

manage these conflicts, foreign entities are compelled to intervene.

Intervention is a big challenge as it basically involves interfering in

domestic affairs of an independent state. Realist theory attempts to

explain why states intervene in domestic affairs of other states by

looking at power or self-interests of states to be the reason behind

intervention however liberal theory challenges it by emphasizing that

intervention maybe based on humanitarian emergency also. Although

realists and liberalists have come up with different views about the

intervention, the neo-liberalists have come to accept the realist

argument that a state is a major actor in world affairs and a unitary

rational agent.

Conflicts arise from different sources for different reasons and

have different effects. Among the methods applied to resolve the

conflict there is mediation, peacekeeping and peace-building.

Mediation involves the intervention of a third party into the conflict

24

with the objective of terminating the conflict peacefully. Peacekeeping

operations are forms of intervention in domestic conflicts which are

normally conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict but

may be conducted without their consent in some situations as a form

of peace-enforcement.

With the current trends in most of African conflicts, the

intervention by deployment of peacekeeping missions have been

basically to prevent human catastrophes and to provide humanitarian

assistance therefore, liberal theorists addresses better the need for

intervention in sovereign states than realists who emphasizes self-

interest or power to be the reason behind intervention. As Donnelly

noted, “realists understand and correctly emphasize the fact that

power has been and will long remain a central part of international

relations.”82 Finally peace-building involves conducting activities in

the post-conflict period that aim at restoring durable peace and

preventing the recurrence of the conflict.

82 Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations, 2.

25

CHAPTER THREE

3:0 THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN IVORY COAST

3:1 Introduction

Little research has been conducted about the conflict in Ivory

Coast. The available limited literature however, associates the Ivorian

conflict with the post colonial administration and others attribute it to

socio-cultural factors. The conflict remained latent since

independence until late 1980s when it became manifest with the

emergence of confrontations between the regime, politicians and

activists.

The authoritarian governance of Houphouet Boigny as pointed

out in Chapter One, had created a lot of grievances among Ivory Coast

people, which was an indicator of an impending political crisis. The

grievances coupled with continued social and economic tensions

culminated into political power struggles characterized by military

coups and eventually a civil war erupted in the country. Another

contributory factor to the origins of the conflict in Ivory Coast is the

overall security situation of West African sub-region where common

intra-state conflicts spread across the national borders thus affecting

neighboring countries’ security as discussed in details in the section

about the causes of conflict in Ivory Coast.

This chapter will discuss the trend of the conflict in Ivory

Coast, the causes of the conflict, how the media affects the conflict,

the challenges encountered by peacekeepers and the effects of the

conflict in Ivory Coast.

3:2 The Trend of Conflict in Ivory Coast

The protracted conflict in Ivory Coast precisely has passed

through Curle’s quadrants of conflict progression discussed in

Chapter Two despite its persistence and failure to reach a peaceful

conclusion. The post colonial authoritarian regime of President Felix

26

Houphouet Boigny was the latent stage whereby not all Ivorians were

aware of the critical social, economic and political problems that

existed. As the national and international communities pressurized

President Houphouet Boigny to open up political space and the

eventual adoption of liberal politics as earlier on discussed in Chapter

One, Ivorians started to know much about the problems that existed

and which affected them at this confrontational stage.

Although there were some dialogues with the government

about the discontentment of the population, the death of Felix

Houphouet Boigny in 1993 escalated the problems and the

subsequent multiparty politics that ensued came to be characterized

by power struggles inclined to religion and ethnic notions.

Negotiations to have a broad-based government that followed

could not restore calmness as Curle’s fourth quadrant holds, until civil

war erupted in the country. With the eruption of a civil war in 2002,

the Curle’s concept was adapted again. The confrontation between

the government of Laurent Gbagbo and Force Nouvelles (FN) rebels

was followed by several negotiations under the international and

regional organizations direction which culminated into ceasefire

agreements and the establishment of the Government of

Reconciliation (GOR). Currently, mediation with the objective of

concluding the conflict peacefully is going on as discussed in Chapter

Four ahead.

The trends of similar conflicts for instance in Africa where they

are common are two fold. Firstly, some conflicts have become

protracted thus within the world conceptualized by the liberals

theorists, are becoming the biggest challenge to the international

peace and order and eventually calling for the international

community intervention. Examples of such conflicts include the Sudan

(SPLA) conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, and the

conflict in Uganda, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, and Central

27

African Republic. The second trend of conflict is in regard to ethnic

clashes which characterizes the conflict in Ivory Coast. Discussing the

ethnical problem in Ivory Coast would require a thesis of its own

because it’s a critical matter in the country therefore it is not

addressed in this study and it calls for future research.

Although some conflicts have been resolved peacefully in Africa

such as in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Liberia,

new conflicts have emerged for instance in Darfur in Sudan and Ivory

Coast. This trend is in compliance with Christopher Moore’s views

that conflict seems to be present in all human relationships and in all

societies.83 These intra-state conflicts do not only retard development

in a country but are the biggest root causes of human suffering in

Africa. Although some scholars emphasize that conflict is an intrinsic

and inevitable part of life84, there is a vital need for managing it by the

concerned parties through negotiations and grievance resolution so

that it does not become violent and destructive if it is inevitable in life.

3:3 Causes of Conflict in Ivory Coast

Conflicts originate from different sources and for different

reasons in a specific place or region. Ivory Coast is not a unique

country and it experiences conflict which exists somewhere else in the

world for diverse reasons. Studying literature on Ivory Coast conflict

leads me to categorize its causes into four. Three of the causes can be

figured at the internal level namely economic, social and political

causes and the fourth cause which is an external factor manifests in

the sub-regional security situation.

3:3.1 Economic factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast.

The outbreak of the crisis in Ivory Coast is associated with the

unevenly distribution of economic development. The northern region

is aggrieved of the un-balanced economic development whereby the

83 Moore, Christopher.The Mediation Process, 3.84 Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 20.

28

southern region has been given much attention by successive

governments as earlier on discussed in Chapter One. Economic

inequalities therefore motivated the northerners to take up arms

against the government.

Though the northern region of Ivory Coast perceives the

southern region to be better-off with two cities of Abidjan and

Yamoussoukro, and oil refineries, the difference has roots not only in

the post-colonial administration that developed them but also in

association to nature of resources for instance, the availability of oil

deposits in the south and in the colonial days whereby the south

being on the Coast, benefited from early foreign traders and Christian

missionaries who settled along the coast where they would dock their

ships and as a result, the area started developing because of

commercial activities according to the local people I interacted with.

Therefore such are unavoidable circumstances that led to the

development of the southern region than the northern region of the

country.

However, the northern region also has mineral deposits, cotton

is grown in abundance and the region has forests that provide timber

which are essential for the development of the region. Forces

Nouvelles (FN) rebels who control the region from the government

ought to positively exploit these economic resources to enable them

raise funds that can develop the region but not to sustain the conflict

since they feel they were earlier economically marginalized by the

southerners who are in control of the political and economic power of

the country.

29

3:3.2 Social factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

Some of the social factors that contribute to the conflict in Ivory

Coast include ethnic problems and religious problems. On the ethnic

problem in Ivory Coast which has multiple tribes and significant

immigrants from neighboring countries, there is a general feeling that

some tribes are privileged than others. Through my interactions with

the local people in both regions, I noticed that the northern tribes look

at the southern tribes of Baoule and Bete who have been ruling the

country to be advantaged and this causes grievances coupled with

hatred developed. The situation is aggravated by sectarian tendency

of the regimes. For instance northerners complain of being treated as

foreigners in their own country by southerners, marginalized and

discriminated against, denied passports and even national identity

papers despite being citizens.85 The country also has immigrants who

migrated to work on the coffee and cocoa plantations during late

Houphouet Boigny’s regime. These immigrants have been competing

with the local people over the resources such as land. Through my

observations , it is these tribal inequality perceptions of the Ivorian

communities and the competition between the local people and

immigrants over resources that have been causing tribal clashes that

have left hundreds of people dead especially in the western region of

Douakoue.

Religious problems in Ivory Coast are based on differences

between Moslems and Christians which are stressed by individuals

and by the authorities, a tendency that breaks down the social

cohesion within the Ivorians. Religion can cause and can also stir the

already existing causes such as inequalities. Inequalities in Ivory

Coast between the northern region and southern region were not

caused by religion but derive from socio-economic and political

settings however, since the north is mostly inhabited by the Moslems

85 Todd, Pitman. Cocoa Industry is Booming in Ivory Coast.

30

and the south mostly by the Christians, there is a tendency of

connecting the existing inequality problems with religion.

It’s common in Ivory Coast to hear that Christians are “better

off” than Moslems however, this is an unavoidable situation in which

religions that are not imposed on anybody, happen to be practiced

most in accordance with the geographical area. Inequality, whether

socio-economic or political in a society, breeds grievances and any

society which is organized in a way that some people are treated

differently and unjustly is doomed to explode into conflict more

especially if its leaders do not have the capacity to address such

inequalities and to equally represent all members of the society. Ivory

Coast plagued by the notion of "Ivorité" or "Ivorianness." as a means

of identifying a true citizen from a non-citizen of Ivory Coast,

Northerner or Southerner, Christian or Moslem was definitely a

breeding ground for the conflict that ensued on the basis of

inequalities.

3:3.3 Political factors as a source of Conflict in Ivory Coast

Political competition and politics of exclusion dominate Ivory

Coast political arena. Since the liberalization of politics in 1990,

political power competition grew as it was evident between the

leaders of political parties and with the prevention of Alassane

Ouattara from standing for a political office as discussed in Chapter

One. Repression of the political opposition party members coupled

with arrests and detentions by the regime as earlier discussed in

Chapter One also characterized the countries politics. Discontentment

and grievances that normally arises from such political bickering and

the failure to control the behaviors of armed forces could have

contributed to the urge of military coups and the eventual eruption of

the civil war in the country.

The periodical mutinies by government soldiers in Ivory Coast

such as in December 1999 when soldiers were demanding payment

31

for peacekeeping duties in Central African Republic; March 2000 in

Daloa town, when soldiers were demanding salary increment; in July

2000 when soldiers were demanding a payment of 9000$ each for

having participated in 1999 coup86 and continued political tensions

coupled with rampant killings of the people as reported by the US

State department on human practices,87 were some of the indicators

of the government’s failure to address grievances, weakness of the

regime and lack of the capacity to enforce the rule of law in the

country.

3:3.4 External factors as causes of conflict in Ivory Coast

The conflict in Ivory Coast is also attributable to the general

security situation in West African region. Not all West African States

are experiencing conflicts but some of them have been in conflict and

others are having some conflict. The conflicts in West Africa are not

unique; issues concerned are common in some other African regions

such as the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa, Central African

region and world wide such as; in the Balkans and Middle East and

Asia.

Jessica Wyndham writes that, “West Africa has been heavily

affected by displacement. Internal conflicts based on ethnic tensions

and rivalries, political instability, disputes over the control of natural

resources, natural disasters, poverty, food insecurity and the

imperatives of development have all resulted in significant population

displacement”88

Some of West African countries have experienced the spill-over

conflicts from their neighbors such as the one in Liberia. The Liberian

violent conflict, which can be traced back to the 12 April 1980

assassination of President William Tolbert by Master Sergeant Samuel

86 Kamara, Tom. Piracy and Anarchy in West Africa.87 US State Department. Ivory Coast: Country Report on Human Rights Practices.88 Wyndham, Jessica. “The Challenges of Internal Displacement in West Africa”. 69.

32

Doe89 who became the President and the subsequent launching of a

rebellion on Samuel Doe’s government in 1989 by Charles Taylor and

his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), soon proved to be a

West African regional problem as evident in the trans-border

dynamics of the conflict spilling into Ivory Coast among others.90

West Africa was described by Professor Adebayo Adedeji to be,

“moving backwards due to lack of essential ingredients necessary for

building peace i.e. good governance, integration, economic progress

and stability. Adebayo Adedeji attributes it to numerous reasons but

focuses on greed, grievance and governance as crucial to

understanding the security dilemma”.91 In the case of Ivory Coast,

greed can be associated with the struggle over natural resources for

economic benefits. This is a similar dilemma in Liberia, Nigeria, and

Sierra Leone just to mention a few countries where the fight over

natural resources has been common. Grievances as earlier on seen

are basically associated with political and economic exclusions in a

country. Weak governance contributes significantly to the failure of

addressing grievances and inequalities and thus leads to conflict

eruption.

When conflict erupts, it spreads to the neighborhoods. Matthew

Kirwin noted that, “the security dilemma in Ivory Coast is connected

to the destabilization of the sub-region, particularly in countries such

as Liberia and Sierra Leone. That there are still large numbers of

rebels who have not been reintegrated into society and are joining the

conflict in Ivory Coast.”92 Human Rights Watch also reported that,

“armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire

have reverberated across each country’s porous borders. Gliding back

and forth across these borders are young fighters, who view war as an

89 Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 254.90 Ibid, 255.91 Adedeji, Adebayo. “West Africa is moving backwards faster”. 92 Kirwin, Mathew. “The Security Dilemma and Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire” 50.

33

economic opportunity and identified poverty and hopelessness as

motivating factors to risk dying in armed conflicts”.93

There exist significant reports from the local population about

the border crossing of former fighters from Liberia into Ivory Coast

with the intention of joining the conflict as a way of their survival. Aid

organizations and United Nations officials working in Liberia say that

hundreds of demobilized combatants, including children, have since

2004 been re-recruited to fight in Côte d’Ivoire.94 The majority of

these regional turned warriors began their fighting careers after

being forcibly recruited by either the Liberian rebels or the Sierra

Leonean rebels, when they were still children. After fighting in their

first war, some of them went to fight in other wars. As these armed

warmongers cross into neighboring countries, the proliferation of

light weapons is elevated and this has lethal impact in the region.

International Alert reported that; “There are an estimated 7 million

small arms and light weapons (SALW) in West Africa, with 77,000 of

them in the hands of insurgents. West African states and civil society

groups have participated actively in arms control initiatives,

particularly at the regional level, but they still face major

challenges.”95

Worth noting here is that in December 1999, the ECOWAS

authority of heads of states adopted a decision establishing national

commissions for the control of the proliferation and illicit circulation

of light weapons. According to the decision, each national commission

shall be composed of representatives of the ministries of defense,

internal affairs and security, justice, and foreign affairs and shall

assist the relevant government authorities in the design, elaboration

and implementation of national policies on the control of the

93 Human Rights Watch, Youth, Blood and Poverty.94 Ibid.95International Alert Publications. Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa.

34

proliferation and illicit circulation of light weapons,96 however the

decision has less or no effect on the warriors who have infested the

region with all sorts of small arms and light weapons.

The rise of regional warriors is linked to the levels of economic

hardships, lack of education and lack of employment especially within

the youth. Long term strategies aimed at improving the severe socio-

economic conditions and efforts to manage political conflicts in the

region before they escalate into armed civil wars could be a remedy of

avoiding the endless troubles in the sub-region. However this calls for

concerted efforts of the states in the region, NGOs and the

international community in order to realize peace and tranquility in

the sub-region.

3:4 Media effects on the conflict in Ivory Coast

According to Absalom Mutere, the media has for long been

recognized as a catalyst in the many intra and inter-state conflicts

that have afflicted the African continent.97 In Ivory Coast, media have

been utilized for a long time for xenophobia hate messages not only

against the peacekeepers and the French forces in the country but

even against individual foreigners and the political opposition, a

tendency that the local population and the international community

feared that it could bring about a similar catastrophe that befell

Rwanda during the 1994 genocide when the media especially the

television and radio stations were used to breed hatred, suspicion and

accelerated the genocide which resulted into the death of many local

and foreign individuals.

Shedrack Gaya Best pointed out that, “The media and all the

channels for the dissemination of information are the aggregate of

public opinion and the voice of the people. The media can promote

peace if it selects to but the media can also promote conflict if it

96 Ayissi, Anatole. Cooperating for Peace in West Africa, 14.97 Mutere, Absolom. Media Graduation from Potential to Actual Power in Africa’s Conflict Resolution, 3.

35

chooses to.”98 For a long time the media in Ivory Coast opted to

promote conflict instead of promoting peace which is lacking in the

country. The deliberate distortion of news in the Ivorian media for

specific interests continues to exacerbate the tensions between the

belligerents and parties to the conflict remain worried as it may

trigger more violence and affect the peace process. For instance On 8

November 2004, the national radio station announced that French

soldiers were conveying a "political leader" in one of their armoured

vehicles to Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne or Ivorian Radio

Television (RTI) headquarters so that he could publicly proclaim

himself president. This was false information and it triggered violence

in the streets of Abidjan and created more political tensions.99

Similarly on 22 December 2004, Madame Simone Gbagbo who is the

wife of the president through “Le Nouvel Observateur” newspaper

stated that, “in order to restore peace and tranquility in Cote d’Ivoire,

France needs to stop financing the rebels and supporting the

rebellion.”100 Such allegations from a prominent national person does

not only reveal ones attitude towards the country (France) that is part

of the peace process but also incites the public into violence which

can result into human catastrophe such as in Rwanda.

Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in Rwanda,

was deliberately used by authorities to promote hate and violence101

which eventually resulted into genocide. In a similar twist, Ivory Coast

authorities also took over the control of Radiodiffusion Télévision

Ivoirienne (RTI) and embarked on broadcasting hate messages and

inciting local people into violence which created fear of another

genocide outbreak on the continent.

98, Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 113.99 Reporters without borders, Abidjan State Media mix Propaganda.100 Gbagbo, Simone, About France.101Mpambara, Ines, and Monique Alexis. IMS Assessment Mission.

36

According to international journalism watchdog reporters, Sans

Frontiers (RSF), religious rhetoric has also been used to incite the

public into violence in Ivory Coast through the media. For instance

one pastor declared over the radio in December 2004 that “the

country must be delivered from evil”. He said that President Jacques

Chirac of France had been possessed by the spirit of Satan and that

the country was divided into two blocs, the devil’s bloc on one side

and the God’s bloc on the other.102 The pastor was referring to the

Ivory Coast northern region under the FN rebels to be the devil’s bloc

while the southern government controlled region to be God’s bloc.

The pastor like other local politicians was expressing his attitude

towards France however, such statements exacerbates the conflict

and it may take a religious form since the northern bloc which the

pastor referred to as a devil’s bloc is mostly inhabited by Moslems and

the southern bloc of God according to him, is mostly inhabited by

Christians.

As one of the argument in the premise of “political contest

model” that the authorities’ level of control over the political

environment is one of the key variables that determine the role of the

news media in a political conflict, President Gbagbo’s government in

Ivory Coast took the advantage of taking over the control of the media

and used that chance to broadcast xenophobic hate messages against

the opposition, foreigners and peacekeepers. In the aftermath of the

conflict escalation, the government took over state television and

radio broadcaster and used it to broadcast virulent anti-foreign

102 Amnesty International, Clashes between Peacekeeping Forces and Civilians.

37

rhetoric, while pro-government newspapers encouraged patriotic

Ivorians to attack foreigners103. National figures such as Charles Ble

Goude, urged thousands of President Gbabgo supporters called Young

Patriots to rise up against French imperialism, through state-run

Ivorian Radio Television, known as RTI. In such circumstances, the

UN mission media can be used to counter hate speeches from the host

country.

The U.N. Security Council in its resolution no 1572 demanded

among others that the Ivorian authorities should stop all radio and

television broadcasting hatred, intolerance, and violence. The UN

mission in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) further set up a unit within the

section of Public affairs to track the media for hate speeches but all in

vain.

At the beginning of the year 2006, the media was extensively

used to call upon Ivorian to arm them-selves and attack UN staff and

facilities along with the French Licorne forces. What triggered the call

for attacks using the media was a recommendation made by the UN-

backed International Working Group (IWG) in Ivory Coast which

stated that the mandate of Côte d'Ivoire's parliament which had

expired should not be extended. The demonstrators and their political

backers portrayed the IWG's proposal as a provocation.

Several UN facilities and residences of UN staff members in the

government controlled region in the south were attacked, vandalized

and looted by a group called “Young Patriots”, government supported

militia groups and some other security elements. Mostly affected

places were Abidjan City, Daloa town, San Pedro and Giuglo town in

the west which came under simultaneous attacks on the morning of

the 16 January 2006. On the following day of 17 January 2006

demonstrators attempted to overrun a radio station in Daloa but they

103 Human Rights Watch, Country on a Precipice.

38

were not successful though they managed to vandalize and to loot the

premises.

In Abidjan City, hundreds of Young Patriots overran the radio

station Radio-télévision ivoirienne (RTI) building on 18 January 2006

and forced technicians to broadcast calls for people to take to the

streets to liberate the country. They camped outside the RTI building

pledging to stay there until the UN peacekeepers and the French

Licorne forces left the country.

In Daloa , looting and vandalizing of UN staff residences and

setting on fire of official UN vehicles was preceded by besieging the

headquarters by Young Patriots for ten days until non-essential UN

staff members in the situation, were rescued and taken to Abidjan to

join other UN staff who were eventually evacuated to Bangui city in

Gambia safe haven until the end February 2006 when they returned to

Ivory Coast.

Guiglo town in the west of Ivory Coast was the scene of the

worst violence. Bangladesh peacekeepers shot dead four

demonstrators after laying siege to the UN camp and as they

attempted to grab weapons from the soldiers. Demonstrators

ransacked UN and NGOs offices forcing the flight of UN personnel.

UN base in San Pedro town in the south suffered the same plight but

peacekeepers managed to resist the attack.

Although UN personnel were evacuated, negotiations with

leaders of the demonstrators and the call on them by their leaders

such as Ble Goude and President Gbagbo himself led to the end of the

demonstrations and attacks which could have ended into a

catastrophe. What I observed is that media are vital means of

information dissemination and can be used effectively and swiftly to

mobilize the population against a cause whether positive or negative.

39

3:5 Challenges encountered by peacekeepers104

“The challenges encountered by UN peacekeeping operations

are immense. Over the past few years, there is a high demand for

United Nations peace operations. New complex and multidimensional

missions, massive deployments of military and civilian personnel and

charges of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers are

challenging the organization.”105

Kofi Annan said, “Peacekeeping is one of the most important as

well as one of the most difficult responsibilities of the United Nations.

The end of the cold war and the rise in intra-state hostilities brought

many challenges to peacekeeping.”106 Traditional peacekeeping model

of the cold war era that involved deployment of unarmed or lightly

armed troops between disputants107came to be challenged by the post

cold war intra-state violent conflicts that required deployment of

multinational forces mandated to implement peace agreements

reached by the actors in the conflict. Adam Roberts attributes the

expansion of peacekeeping operations to three aspects:

Firstly, the capacity of the Security Council to agree on action

in particular crises has increased with the decline in the use of

veto powers. Secondly, there has been a wide spread mood of

optimism that UN can have a much more central role in

international security and that peacekeeping can tackle a very

wide range of urgent problems. Thirdly, the end of the cold war

led to situations where peacekeeping operations are called for

the conclusion of peace agreements108

104 Some facts in this section were used in the previous paper “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Ivory Cost: Peace process, Intervention and Challenges to Peacekeepers” presented to the Peace Operations Class, April 2007 however, they have been updated and expanded.105United Nations, Meeting United Nations Peacekeeping New Challenges.106 Kofi, Annan. Global Values, 2.107 Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace, 12.108 Katayanagi, Mari. Human Rights Functions of UN Peacekeeping Operations,40.

40

The multiplicity of armed conflicts poses a big challenge not only to

the UN as an organization in terms of funding, logistics, personnel

and political trends but also to individual peacekeepers. This section

of the chapter will discuss the challenges encountered by

peacekeepers besides those encountered by the organization.

Thomas Britt and Amy Adler wrote that, “Individuals have been

called on from across the world to deploy to areas around the globe to

maintain peace among the former warring factions or nations. These

international peacekeepers often do their job in a chaotic and

uncertain environment and some of them have been killed in the

service of keeping the peace.”109 One such example is that of eight

Guatemalan peacekeepers who were killed by the Ugandan Lord

Resistance Army rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

while on routine duties in January 2006 under the United Nations

Operation in Congo (MONUC) 110

Peacekeepers that are not part of military contingents are

seconded to UN missions from different countries world wide

therefore they have different military background since military

organizations and doctrines differ from one country to another.

Having different training background which is a fundamental

requirement to model a soldier or a military officer, creates conflicting

situations in terms of command, control and communication and the

military principle of unity is lost by peacekeepers which affects their

uniform response to the chain of command and military etiquettes,

eventually it affects individual conduct which is a serious challenge.

African peacekeepers are mostly divided between Francophone

and Anglophone whose etiquettes differ even when they are from one

continent. Other countries use military establishments and doctrines

derived from developed countries such as United Kingdom, France,

109 Britt, Thomas, and Adler Amy. The Psychology of the Peacekeeper, 3.110 Lewis, David. “Eight UN Peacekeepers Killed in Congo Fighting.”

41

Russia and United States of America which further sets apart the

peacekeepers in terms of individual conduct. Multi-military cultures

pose a very big challenge to peacekeepers and they encompass

conduct of individuals which is at times unbecoming to other

peacekeepers for instance in the respect to the chain of command

which happens to be different among the peacekeepers since they are

from different military background.

Peacekeepers are trained military personnel who through quick

appreciation of the situation usually react to what’s confronting them.

In peacekeeping operations, they are required to adhere to the

mission mandates and rules of engagement which hampers individual

decision making. This situation poses a big challenge to peacekeepers

and frustrates them more especially when they are attacked and they

are required to refrain from any response except in vaguely defined

self-defense or in accordance with rules of engagement which may

require securing permission in order to react to an urgent problem.

3:6 Effects of Conflict in Ivory Coast

Violence has been common in the country even during President

Houphouet Boigny’s regime. Street demonstrations and election

violence have left many people dead and property destroyed on

several occasions. The outbreak of the rebellion brought the worst

human rights violations among the Ivorian people. Several people

were arbitrarily murdered, tortured, women were raped and sexually

abused, other people were arrested and detained for long without

trial, others disappeared completely and others got displaced from

their homes. This situation does not only lead to loss of people and

property but it traumatizes the population in the conflict area.

The conflict destroyed the infrastructure to some extent,

government institutions broke down, rule of law broke down, and

fundamental human requirements have been deprived of the most

Ivorians in the country thus leading to more political and socio-

42

economic unrest which negatively affects the population. The

population is languishing in abject poverty and most of the social

services have collapsed especially in the northern region. Poverty

situation has not only negatively affected the population but is also

one of the contributory factors that have motivated some people to

join the rebellion especially the youth searching for survival as they

hope to be better like the rebels they see roaming in the northern

region of Ivory Coast. “Conflict is not totally negative but can be

positive too depending on how it is handled”.111 In the case of Ivory

Coast, the conflict was overlooked and neglected at its early stages

instead of managing it properly so that it can be helpful to identify the

problem, thus leading to its escalation and subsequent eruption into a

civil war that bisected the country into two hostile regions.

3:7 Conclusion

Conflict is not static but undergoes changes with the situation.

The conflict in Ivory Coast has been undergoing changes with the

situation at hand. Conflicts originate from different sources for

different reasons in different regions of the world. Ivory Coast conflict

can be attributed to internal and external factors that characterized

the country in the post-colonial period. Media in Ivory Coast have

been utilized to broadcast xenophobia speeches and provision of

wrong information to the audience which stirs the conflict and incites

the local people against the peacekeepers, foreigners and the

opposition. The United Nations peacekeeping operations encounter

some challenges at both organizational level and individual level.

There are differing effects of conflict on the population and the

conflict in Ivory Coast brought about human suffering and destruction

of property than any other constructive effect on the population.

111 Best, Shedrack. Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, 36

43

CHAPTER FOUR

4:0 MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

4:1 Introduction

African traditional societies have for so long been handling

conflicts by applying the mediation tool even today. Conflicts related

to land disputes, domestic violence, disputes between neighbors,

disputes over assets claims and inheritance, damage to property,

personal conduct are some of the examples of conflicts that traditional

society continues to handle through a third party or mediator in most

cases who is the elder or village chief.

In modern world, the intervention in national or international

conflicts in search for a peaceful resolution using the mediation tool is

conducted by different actors and this chapter will discuss about the

mediation process in the Ivory Coast conflict.

4:2 Mediation process in Ivory Coast.

Soon after the civil war erupted in Ivory Coast, different actors

attempted to restore peace in the country through mediation besides

other methods of restoring peace in the country such as the

deployment of a peacekeeping force. Most of the mediators were from

the West African sub-region and they could have been motivated by

self-interests, moral authority or bilateral agreements.

For example, Nigeria being the most powerful country in terms

of its military and economic capabilities in the region, has been

attempting to impose its hegemony in the West African region. The

military intervention in Sierra Leone conflict, Chad conflict and in

Liberia conflict were spearheaded by Nigeria as it happened in Ivory

Coast.

One of the assumptions of realist theory is that power is the

most important concept in explaining and predicting behaviors of

states therefore the actions of Nigeria towards the Ivory Coast conflict

could be explained from its hegemonic position however, there are

44

other reasons that could explain Nigeria’s intervention like other

states.

The population in Ivory Coast was going under worst violations

of human rights by both government agents and the rebels as

discussed in Chapter Three therefore regional states got involved to

save a neighboring country from human catastrophe. Then the sub-

region has bilateral agreements that bind member states to jointly

react to conflict situation as precisely explained in this section ahead

about ECOWAS.

The rest of the mediators fall under the African Union umbrella

and this could have been the reason why they got involved in the

conflict in order to save a member state of the union from calamity or

to advance self-interests.

French involvement in Ivory Coast conflict could be associated

with the long time ties as a former colonial master with bilateral

agreements and self interests in the country. Ever since Ivory Coast

attained independence, it remained a quasi-colony of France which

maintains its physical presence in the country. The country’s economy

is dictated by France and the French power is visible almost in all

institutions. Therefore to protect its interests in Ivory Coast can be an

explanation for the French intervention in the conflict in order to

preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion ambitions

or to gain prestige as realists upholds. Although, “France

demonstrates its hegemonic role in West Africa, Nigeria also

possesses military and economic resources for its potential to

dominate the sub-region”.112

When it became evident that a major humanitarian catastrophe

loomed, “France quickly reinforced its 600-strong permanent military

presence in the country to a 4000 strong force (Licorne), which

112 Adekeye Adebajo. Liberia’s Civil War, 7.

45

deployed to separate the warring parties.”113 Initially, the aim of

Licorne was, “to evacuate French nationals but it changed when

President Gbagbo accepted a cease-fire of 17 October 2002 and

further requested France to assign forces to monitor the ceasefire

pending deployment of ECOWAS troops.”114 The French intervention

was followed by the deployment of army contingents from West

African states acting under the auspices of the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS), known as the ECOWAS Mission in

Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI).115

Concurrent with the ECOWAS and France intervention, the

mediation process was taking place. According to Deverin, between

19 September 2002 when the civil war broke out, and March 2006 the

following actors participated at different points in the mediation

process:

CEDEAO (Economic Community of West African States), the

African Union, France, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal,

President Eyadema Gnasingbe of Togo, President Alpha Oumar

Konare, former President of Mali, President Amani Toumani

Toure of Mali, President John Kuofor of Ghana, President Omar

Bongo of Gabon, President Mamadou Tandja of Niger,

President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Abdou Diouf

former President of Senegal, President Thabo Mbeki of the

South African Republic, King Mohamed VI of Morocco and

President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo.116

Although various actors have participated in the mediation process

without successfully terminating the conflict, the mediation process

has had a significant impact on the trend of the conflict and this leads

113 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire, 7.114 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary General on Cote d’Ivoire, 4.115 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire, 7.116 Yveline, Deverin. “The dynamics of mediation in Ivory Coast.”

46

to address one of the study questions that; what is the role of

mediation as an alternative means of conflict resolution?

Prompt intervention in the conflict by the mediator resulted into

securing a cease-fire truce between the warring parties. Senegalese

Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio who intervened under the

auspices of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

as a third party negotiated a cease-fire agreement which was signed

by the warring parties on 17 October 2002117. The significance of this

initial mediation is that the cease-fire truce which was secured

controlled the relationship and attitude of the warring parties towards

each other, and prevented the deterioration in the violence and served

as a springboard for further peace negotiations and intervention for

instance by ECOWAS troops.

Why did ECOWAS change its economic role to get involved in

the sub-regional security and politics then? The genesis of ECOWAS

formation has roots in the proposals for creating a West African

common market that encompassed all states in West Africa,

envisioned by the then Nigerian Governor-General Nnandi Azikiwe in

1961.118 The ideas of Azikiwe were revived by leaders of Togo and

Nigeria and ECOWAS was formed in 1975. Under the 1975 treaty,

ECOWAS aims were to promote cooperation and development in

industry, telecommunication, energy, agriculture, natural resources,

commerce, monetary and financial issues, and in social and cultural

matters.119 This initially economic oriented organization came to be

involved in regional politics and security matters when regional

leaders met and adapted additional protocols to the treaty.

In 1976, Heads of States and Governments under ECOWAS

umbrella met at a summit in Lome, Togo and signed a protocol on

117 Global Security Organisation.org, Ivory Coast.118 Oteng, Kufuor.The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West Africa States, 21.119 Ibid, 23.

47

non-aggression which was to guarantee regional peace seen as

essential for rapid integration and development and refrained

member states from threat, use of force or aggression.120

Although member states were under obligations to refrain from

threat, use of force and aggression, another protocol relating to

mutual assistance on defense deepened military relations

within the community by establishing the ECOWAS defense

council and the defense commission. In case of armed

intervention, the defense council assisted by the defense

commission is to supervise with the authority of the states or

states concerned, all measures taken by ECOWAS force

commander and ensure that all necessary means for the

intervention are made available to him.121

Article 16 of 1981 ECOWAS protocol about mutual assistance in

defense states that when an external armed threat or aggression is

directed against a member state, the Head of State shall send a

written request for assistance to the chairman of ECOWAS copied to

members.122 ECOWAS was empowered to intervene when there was

an internal conflict in a member state of the community that was

actively maintained and sustained from outside under article 18 of the

treaty however, ECOWAS forces were prevented from intervening if

the conflict remained purely internal.123Chapter VIII, article 40 of

ECOWAS protocol signed on 10 December 1999 states that,

“ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations

and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and

disaster.”124

It was within this new atmosphere that successive mediators

were able to bring the belligerents to negotiating table and this

120 Ibid, 25.121 Ibid.122 Edouard,Benjamin. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense,7123 Ibid.124 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

48

helped to keep them busy in negotiations instead of fighting which

could have left more people dead and property destroyed. The then

Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema also intervened as a

mediator in the conflict before his death and his intervention yielded

an agreement on 31 October 2002. Rebels vowed to disarm if they

receive guarantee that new elections will be held within six months

and further made a series of demands concerning the armed forces

such as uniting all the armed factions and granting of amnesty. The

warring parties agreed in principle on military matters but failed to

strike a political deal125 France also secured a peace agreement

signed by all parties to the conflict in January 2003 at Linas-

Marcoussis. This agreement is available in full at appendix C of the

thesis. My argument therefore is that, the mediation processes that

involved different actors played the role of containing a conflict from

escalation in a peaceful manner and enabled an environment for

pursuing further peace negotiations.

President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa designated as a mediator

by the African Union on 7 November 2004 served longer than the rest

of the mediators in the Ivory Coast conflict.126 Through his mediation,

some peace agreements were endorsed by the warring parties as

discussed in the next section, although the implementation has been

problematic presumably because of lack of political will on the part of

local politicians and maybe the warring parties were still capable of

sustaining the conflict in other words, the conflict was not yet ripe for

resolution.

President Thabo Mbeki’s mediation was eventually turned down

by the Force Nouvelles rebels (FN) on accusation of engaging in

commercial transactions with the government. The rebels accused

Thabo Mbeki of being more of a partner to President Gbabgo instead

125 Peace Negotiation Watch, Ivory Coast rebels call for new polls. 126 Yveline, Deverin. “The dynamics of mediation in Ivory Coast.”

49

of a mediator by selling him weapons which violated an imposed arms

embargo on both parties and further accused Thabo Mbeki of his

involvement in the establishment of a telephone company in the

country. Sadiki Konate, FN rebels spokesman blamed Thabo Mbeki

for the collapse of the mediation process by getting involved in Ivory

Coast economy.127 A mediator ought not to take sides but remain

impartial so that he or she does not facilitate the mediation process

with bias.

Thabo Mbeki overlooked the principle of impartiality and

neutrality according to FN rebels, hence loosing integrity as a

mediator and he had to step down from the mediation process. He

was replaced by the President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaore, who

successfully secured an agreement between the incumbent president

Laurent Gbagbo and the rebel leader Guillaume Soro in March 2007,

as discussed in details in the next section.

Rejection of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation leads to address another

study question that; does the impact of mediation vary in accordance

with mediator style? Mediation process varies with the mediator or

third party. Not all mediators in Ivory Coast succeeded, only a few

managed to secure peace agreements though they all contributed in

containing the conflict through negotiations. Mediation involves

persuasion which varies with individuals capabilities therefore the

style applied by a mediator, in other words how the mediator

facilitates the process; determines the outcome of the mediation

process.

4:3 Peace Agreements in Ivory Coast128.

Peace Agreements are joint decisions by parties to the conflict

reached during dialogue or negotiations for the purpose of resolving

the conflict peacefully. Actors in Ivory Coast conflict resorted to

127Colombant, Nico “ Ivory Coast Rebels Reject South African Mediation”128 These peace agreements in Ivory Coast were also mentioned in my previous essay presented in the Peace Operations course on 23 April 2007.

50

negotiations as a tool of securing peace agreements or ceasefires in

order to stop violence that was taking place and to avoid further

negative consequences of the civil war.

When the military coup flopped and Ivory Coast plunged into a

civil war, the conflict in Ivory Coast invited an increased involvement

of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member

states which reflects the wider regional concern with an internal

conflict along liberalists’ characteristics. ECOWAS convened an

emergency summit in Accra which set up a “contact group” composed

of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo supported by

African Union to promote dialogue between rebels and the

government in order to resolve the crisis peacefully through

negotiations.129 This was the first peace agreement code named Accra

I.

Attempts to end the fighting and initiate negotiations were

further made at the end of September 2002 when the “contact group”

met President Gbagbo in Abidjan. Talks were held and rebels were

willing to cooperate although there was no agreement that was

signed.130 Another attempt to restore peace was made in mid October

when Senegalese foreign minister held talks with the rebels that led

to the signing of a cease-fire agreement between Forces Armées

Force Nouvelles (FAFN) rebels and the government on 17 October

2002.131 Further negotiations were held on 30 October 2002 in Lome,

Togo, where the Togolese president Gnassingbe Eyadema was

appointed coordinator of the mediating efforts and both parties

agreed to create a climate favorable for dialogue and reconciliation.132

129 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre with Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatze, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d’Ivoire, 21.130 UPPSALAConflict Database, Negotiations.131 Ibid.132 UPPSALA Conflict Database, Negotiations.

51

In January 2003 rebel groups of the Ivorian Patriotic Movement

of the Far West (MPIGO) and the Ivorian Movement for Justice and

Peace (MJP) active in the west of the country also signed a ceasefire

with the government.133 After the signing of the ceasefire agreements,

actors in the Ivorian conflict met at Linas-Marcoussis in France on the

invitation of the President of France, from 15 to 23 January 2003 and

reached another peace agreement codenamed Linas-Marcoussis

Agreement.134

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement established a Government of

National Reconciliation composed of ministers from the main political

parties and the rebel groups. Gbagbo was to remain President, but a

Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers was to be appointed in

agreement with the other groups.135 The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

also defined the main tasks of the new government of national

reconciliation, which included preparing a timetable for credible and

transparent national elections, restructuring the defense and security

forces, and organizing the regrouping and disarmament of all armed

groups.136

Linas-marcoussis agreement was marred with disputes over

ministerial positions prompting Ghana to initiate another round of

negotiation which was held on 7 March 2003 to search for a solution

to ministerial posts. This Accra II Agreement was a continuation of the

process begun with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.137 In order to

ease the formation of a government of national reconciliation Accra II

agreement provided for the formation of a national security council

(NSC) comprising of representatives from each signatory of the Linas-

Marcoussis Agreement. NSC was tasked to appoint a minister of

133 Ibid.134 United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection.135 Gberie, Lansana. “The Crisis in Ivory Coast.” 136 United Nations Mission in Cote d’ivoire, Background.137 Sengupta, Somini. “As Peace Accord is Fleshed Our, Ivory Coast Fighting Resumes”

52

defense and a minister of national security. The agreement also more

closely specified some aspects of the power-sharing arrangements,

clearly stating that two state ministries (the ministry of territorial

administration and the ministry of communication) were to be

attributed to the MPCI.138 Following Accra II agreement, a total

ceasefire agreement for the whole country between the main rebel

groups and the government was signed on 3 May 2003 to pave the

way for deployment of peacekeepers.139

Negotiations continued and on 30 July 2004, Accra III

agreement which set a timetable for political reform and

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was signed and rebels

and the opposition who had withdrawn from the government of

reconciliation following violent repression of the opposition were

called upon to rejoin the government.140

The implementation of all concluded multiple agreements

initiated by different mediators remained difficult; the obstacle among

others being the unwillingness of President Gbagbo to accommodate

rebels in his administration and mistrust that could not let any of the

group disarm first. The cease-fire agreements which were reached

would be violated occasionally by both sides, for instance in

November 2004, government broke the ceasefire agreement and

launched new air attacks on the rebel territory.141

To break the impasse in the peace process, African Union

appointed the South African President Thambo Mbeki to spearhead

the mediation role.142 Under mediation of President Mbeki, talks

between the government and rebels were convened in November and

again in December 2004 and the disputants promised to implement

the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. On 11 January 2005, Thabo Mbeki 138 UPPSALAConflict Database, Agreements.139 Ibid. 140 Ibid.141 Human Rights Watch, Country on a Precipice142 Banjo, Adewale. “Restoring the jewel of West Africa.”

53

met the warring parties at Yamoussoukro city but the group failed to

reach any agreement.143 President Mbeki further met both sides in the

conflict in Pretoria, between 2 and 6 April 2005 accomplishing what

was known as the Pretoria agreement that was signed by President

Gbagbo, FAFN leader Guillaume Soro, former Prime Ministers Seydou

Diarra and Alassane Outtara declaring an immediate and final

cessation of hostilities.144

Under the Pretoria agreement, the rebel politicians pledged to

rejoin the government of national reconciliation and the disputants

agreed to immediately start disarming and dismantling militia groups.

In line with the Pretoria agreement, government and rebel chiefs

initiated a round of talks aiming at settling the question of

disarmament and uniting the forces. These talks led to an agreement

on the disarmament timetable and the withdrawal of heavy weapons

from the frontline. Heavy weapons were removed from the purported

front-lines however disarmament and unification of forces have never

been implemented to date.

Although efforts were made to hold elections at the end of

October 2005 as provided for in the Pretoria agreement, they couldn’t

be conducted on ground that all requirements were not available and

President Gbagbo also insisted that rebels had not disarmed while

rebels also insisted that pro-Gbagbo militias had to lay down their

weapons first. President Gbagbo was allowed to stay in power till

October 2006 by UN and AU on the recommendation of ECOWAS

leaders to avoid a constitutional crisis in the country.

The search for a peaceful solution to the conflict continued with

the dialogue between Chiefs of Staff Brigadier General Philippe

Mangou of FANCI and Soumaila Bakayoko of FAFN. These chiefs met

on several occasions in Bouake town and Yamoussoukro city with the

143GlobalSecurity.org, Ivory Coast Conflict.144Banjo, Adewale. “Restoring the jewel of West Africa”

54

aim of finding a solution especially about how the disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process can be implemented

and belligerent forces be united. Following continued dialoguing of

the chiefs of staff, soldiers due for DDR started gathering at identified

sites for DDR exercise in both sides of the rebel’s territory and

government’s territory.

To strengthen the peace process, the UN Secretary General, the

Mediator in the conflict President Mbeki and all actors in the conflict

further met at Yamoussoukro city in June 2006. Meanwhile the

identification exercise to support registration of voters in anticipation

of end of year elections was sabotaged by government supporters and

eventually Presidential elections which were scheduled for October

2006 were postponed for another year for the second time and AU

and UN granted President Gbagbo another extension of one year in

office. 145Presidential elections have failed to takeoff on two occasions

and the reasons given have been lack of preparations. In accordance

with the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration is required to be conducted prior to

presidential elections however it had not taken off on those occasions,

thus affecting elections schedules. The then, UN chief Kofi Annan

stated that, “elections for October 2005 could not take place because

political leaders and parties were not cooperating and the electoral

commission had not been constituted.”146

At the beginning of the year 2007, President Blaise Compaore of

Burkina Faso in his capacity as the conflict mediator invited the

warring parties to his country. President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel

leader Guillaume Soro met the mediator President Blaise Compaore in

Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 and after negotiations, they signed an

agreement to form a new unity government and create a new joint

145 Global Policy Forum, Security Council Reiterates Full Support for Ivory Coast’s Prime Minister and Elections by next October.146 Global Policy Forum, October Elections 'Not Possible,' Annan.

55

military command that would include FAFN and FANCI officials. They

also agreed on the implementation of DDR process before the end of

the year and to issue identification papers to those who lack them in

preparation of elections.147

The agreement – reached in Ouagadougou, capital of

neighbouring Burkina Faso, on 4 March – between President Laurent

Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles Secretary-General Guillaume Soro

commits both sides to honoring all Security Council resolutions on the

issue, including the need to abide by free, fair and transparent

elections. It also tackles other key issues such as disarmament, reform

and restructuring of the armed forces and the restoration of State

authority throughout the country. A full version of the Ouagadougou

agreement is available at appendix D of this thesis.

President Gbagbo named rebel leader Guillaume Soro as Prime

Minister on 29 March 2007 in a major step towards implementing

Ouagadougou accord.148 The buffer zone (ZOC) between the

government controlled south and rebel controlled north was lifted on

the 16 April 2007 in accordance with the Ouagadougou accord.

France also announced that it would pull out 500 of its 3,500

peacekeepers from Ivory Coast following the new peace deal.149

Multiple peace agreements have failed to conclude the civil

war in Ivory Coast even with the involvement of international actors

and mediators however, the Ouagadougou accord which brought

about the appointing of the former rebel leader as the Prime minister,

the establishment of a joint command center composed of government

military officers and former rebel commanders and the lifting of the

ZOC is a significant move towards the direction of achieving peace in

the country so long as the accord is fully implemented. The

147 United Nations Security Council, Update Report No. 1 Cote d'Ivoire.148 Tran, Phuong. “Rebel Leader Takes Over as Ivory Coast's New Prime Minister” 149 Aboa, Ange, and Coulibaly Loucoumane. “UN to leave Ivory Coast buffer zone from April 16.”

56

implementation of the several agreements reached under the

facilitation of different mediators has been difficult apart from the

Ouagadougou Agreement and I would argue that the conflict had not

reached a stalemate and the warring parties have realized that the

conflict is retarding the development of the country and it’s the

source of the prevalent human suffering.

4:4 International Intervention

Following the initial intervention of France and ECOWAS, the

international community also got concerned. On 13 May 2003, UN

Security Council adopted resolution 1479 which established the

United Nations mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) for an initial period

of twelve months with the mandate to facilitate the implementation by

the Ivorian parties, of Linas-Marcoussis agreement and

complementing the operations of the French and ECOWAS forces.150

Initially, MINUCI had few liaison officers, who advised the

Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on military

matters, they monitored the military situation, they established liaison

with the French, ECOWAS, FANCI and FN, in order to build

confidence and trust between the armed groups, provided input to

planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-

combatants and reported to the Special Representative of the

Secretary General (SRSG).151

The UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) and ECOWAS forces

were replaced by United Nations operation in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) on

4 April 2004 which was established under UNSC Resolution 1528 of

27 February 2004 for an initial 12 month under chapter VII of the UN

Charter.152 The mandate for ONUCI has been changing with time, for

instance the originally mandate stipulated in resolution 1528 was

developed to resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005 which was also

150 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1479. 151 United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire mandate.152 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1528.

57

developed to resolution 1739 of 10 January 2007 and shall be

implemented in coordination with French forces-Licorne stationed in

Ivory Coast.

Because the UN missions are deployed after the Security

Council has passed the resolution and on temporary basis, whenever

the period for the mission granted in the resolution expires before the

mission achieves its objective or mandate, the mission is extended for

another period in a new resolution. ONUCI has been getting

extensions since its initial deployment of a 12 months period under

new resolutions to enable the mission to achieve its objective.

Secondly, the situation in a mission area may change and therefore

call for developing of the existing resolution by the Security Council to

a new resolution.

Approximately 9,200 uniformed personnel and approximately

1,150 civilian personnel of United Nations are currently involved in

the peace process153 and supported by approximately 4,000 French

troops. According to the latest Security Council resolution 1739, the

mandate of ONUCI shall be the following: 154

(1)Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of

armed groups, (2)Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration,

repatriation and resettlement, (3)Disarmament and dismantling

of militias, (4)Operations of identification of the population and

registration of voters, (5)Reform of the security sector,

(6)Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and

civilians, (7)Monitoring of the arms embargo, (8)Support for

humanitarian assistance, (9)Support for the redeployment of

State administration, (10)Support for the organization of open,

free, fair and transparent elections, (11)Assistance in the field

of human rights, (12)Public information, (13)Law and order.155

153 United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast facts.154 Ibid.155 Ibid.

58

Different mediators through facilitating negotiations between the

warring parties in conjunction with the UN mission have managed to

control the hostilities through confidence building. ONUCI and

Licorne forces have managed to implement almost all their mandates

so far and DDR which had failed to take off, finally started as

scheduled in the Ouagadougou agreement and as I write, some militia

groups have already handed over their weapons.

4:5 Conclusion

Mediation is one of the methods of conflict resolution

through peaceful means conducted by a third party or mediator which

has been in use for a long time and at different levels. The mediator

facilitates the warring parties to reach a decision about the conflict.

The method is applicable in both modern and traditional societies. Not

only politicians and military practitioners are involved in the

mediation process in conflicts but also community leaders play a big

role of mediation at their level. The mediator and the situation, both

dictate the outcomes of the mediation process.

Mediation process in Ivory Coast began concurrently with

peacekeeping operations by the ECOWAS and the French troops.

ECOWAS formerly an economic organization changed its objectives

after adapting new protocols to its treaty to get involved in the sub-

regional politics and security. France got involved because of its long

relationship with Ivory Coast as its former colonial master. Mediation

has been carried out by different actors at different periods and some

have been successful and others have not. Some mediators have been

able to secure peace agreements between warring parties and others

have failed however, both mediators facilitated the containment of the

conflict from escalation by engaging the conflicting parties into

negotiations.

Through mediation processes, some peace agreements were

reached in Ivory Coast and abroad between the warring parties

59

however, the implementation of these peace agreements has been

problematic apart from the latest agreement reached in Ouagadougou

that is currently under implementation.

The international community i.e. the United Nations also

intervened in the conflict by establishing a peacekeeping mission in

Ivory Coast to facilitate the peace process that was being pursued by

the mediators, France and sub-regional organization.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5:0 PEACE-BUILDING IN IVORY COAST CONFLICT

5:1 Introduction

Peace-building encompasses activities carried out either by the

primary parties to the conflict, the civil society, the government,

international organizations, independent states and donor

organizations to ensure a long lasting peaceful situation in the post

conflict period and also prevent the recurrence of conflict.

These activities may include disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation, restoration of

judicial system and the rule of law, protection of human rights, good

governance, state institutions building , security sector reforms; they

will be discussed in detail in the ensuing sections of this chapter.

Peace-building activities may be conducted during the

progression of the conflict or after the conflict has been terminated. In

Ivory Coast despite the fact that the civil war has not yet ended,

reconstruction activities as part of peace-building have been going on.

For instance, Bangladesh peacekeepers under the United Nations

Mission in the country (ONUCI) have been reconstructing roads in

Daloa region and the French military engineering company at

Yamoussoukro has been repairing feeder roads. ONUCI has also been

involved in quick impact projects commonly known as QIPs, which

were coordinated by the military observers and as a result of this,

local schools have been constructed.

This chapter while analyzing the conflict in Ivory Coast will

attempt to address two research questions; what is the significance of

peace-building in Ivory Coast’s conflict? How can the international

community prevent reoccurrence of the conflict in Ivory Coast

conflict?

5:2 Peace-building in Ivory Coast conflict

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Unlike other African destructive conflicts such as in Liberia,

Sierra Leone and Somalia, the conflict in Ivory Coast received prompt

intervention by foreign troops therefore there wasn’t much

destruction especially in the southern region such as the

administrative capital Yamoussoukro and Abidjan capital city.

Although the northern region lacks equivalent infrastructure it was

not rampantly destroyed too except that basic social services are

lacking. Therefore, the country has the potential of healing from civil

war in a short time of reconstruction, provided the essential

requirements such as the political will and the funds are available.

With the current positive signal of concluding the conflict,

peace-building projects or activities, besides those which have been

going on amid the civil war, ought to be established to rejuvenate the

society which has suffered for more than four years of crisis.

Although Peter Batchelor, et al. are against the international

organizations and foreign powers involvement in resolving African

intra-state crises,156 the Ivorian conflict requires the involvement of

the international, regional, the civil society and local actors to work

hand in hand if peace is to be restored and be sustained in the

country. Part of the infrastructure was destroyed by the civil war and

peace-building activities requires funding, therefore the international

and regional organizations ought to give financial support towards the

conduct of peace-building activities such disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration of former combatants which has failed to take off

for a long time and the reason among others which are given happens

to be financial constraints. The civil society and local actors have been

instrumental in the post-conflict peace-building activities in other

regions such as in the Liberia post-conflict period and in the Uganda’s

northern region conflict; therefore they can play a big role in the Ivory

Coast post-conflict period. These parties have already been part of the

156 Batchelor, P., et al., Demilitarization and Peace-building in Southern Africa, 53.

62

on-going peace processes therefore it’s important that they continue

to give a hand to the country in its efforts to realize a viable peace.

To address the last research question of how can the

international community prevent the recurrence of conflict in Ivory

Coast, the following peace-building activities ought to be established

in such a country emerging from civil war and normally characterized

by a number of problems that must be dealt with successfully if the

recurrence of conflict is to be prevented.

5:2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of ex-

combatants (DDR).

The objective of disarmament is to take away weapons, which

are means of violence from former combatants and illegal owners.

Disarmament should therefore target recovering all arms from former

combatants and be destroyed or registered for official use.

Demobilization in this section refers to a process of reducing the

number of personnel and equipment normally which are non-essential

in the post-conflict period and when restructuring armed forces, and

reintegration refers to the absorbing of the ex-combatants into the

society or into the national forces for those who are eligible.

The 1998 report by the United Nations Secretary General on the

causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable

development in Africa, lists the reintegration of ex-combatants and

others into productive society as one of the priorities of post-conflict

or peace-building.157 When ex-combatants are neglected and are not

reintegrated to settle within the community, they are likely to get

involved in conflict again. Therefore, there is a need to resettle these

former combatants to where they prefer to live and employ or

reintegrate them into developmental activities to avoid their idleness

which can motivate them back into violence. These demobilized

combatants also deserve to get education and psychological

157 Newman, Edward, and Albrecht Schnabel. Recovering from Civil Conflict, 181.

63

counseling as at times some of them are traumatized by the war

situation. Other ex-combatants come out when they are already

casualties or disabled and some are ill therefore they deserve

additional benefits and care since they are not in position of taking

care of themselves.

African countries such as Uganda, Democratic Republic of

Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Ivory Coast which have abundant illegal

small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation requires DDR

programs so that these weapons can be recovered from ex-

combatants and illegal owners to prevent their further utilization in

conflicts so that viable peace can be achieved. Several conflicts in

Africa are thriving on weapons that are smuggled across national

borders of the countries recovering from conflict therefore

disarmament after conflict settlement or de-escalation is very

important in order to have accountability for these weapons and

control their misuse.

DDR programs have been conducted successfully twice in

Uganda in 1990s; where by soldiers were retrenched after fighting for

so long in internal insurgencies and to give way for the

professionalizing the armed forces and reduce military expenditure.

DDR was also conducted successfully in Sierra Leone after the civil

war in 2001with the support of United Nations Mission in the country

(UNAMSIL). In Liberia, DDR was also successfully conducted after the

conclusion of the armed conflict but as earlier discussed in chapter 2

about the external causes of conflict in Ivory Coast; some soldiers

crossed the national border to fight in the Ivory Coast conflict, a

tendency that is promoting mercenarism in the West African sub-

region. If these ex-combatants had been disarmed and reintegrated

into society they wouldn’t be reinforcing factors to the sub-region’s

conflicts and armed violence.

64

DDR in the Ivory Coast conflict has been a contentious issue

ever since the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement which

clearly stated the need to conduct disarmament and demobilization of

the forces. The DDR process in Ivory Coast is a national program

called; National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization,

Reinsertion/Reintegration, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement (NPDDR/RRR) and it’s supported by the international

and regional communities and local actors.

All combatants recruited after the failed coup of September

2002 in Ivory Coast, are expected to be affected by the process and

gathering places named DDR sites were selected in both rebel and

government controlled regions. By mid 2006, the affected fighters of

Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and Forces

Armées Force Nouvelles (FAFN) had started to assemble in pre-

grouping sites in preparation to proceed to the DDR sites for final

send-off. According to ONUCI daily news of 15 July 2006158, thirty

thousand FAFN combatants had already reported to forty-five pre-

regrouping sites in the rebel territory. The affected government

soldiers had also started to assemble in the pre-regrouping sites in

the southern region although the numbers of those who had arrived at

the sites were not available. DDR programs deserve adequate funding

and monitoring to ensure proper implementation. Although DDR

process in Ivory Coast has not been concluded, when it is successfully

completed, it will lead to the reduction in military expenditure and

funds that are saved could be utilized in other developmental or

peace-building activities. The facilitators of the process ought to

provide alternative way of living to the former combatants,

rehabilitation and employment opportunities so that they do not get

involved in violence after resettlement.

158 ONUCI daily news is dispatched to the intra-net which can only be accessed by staff members.

65

5:2.2 Reconciliation

Reconciliation may involve trials for persons accused of

committing war crimes and other abuses to give justice to the victims,

the conducting of truth commissions such as in South Africa in the

aftermath of apartheid, the issuing of public apologies as the former

FAFN rebel leader Guillieme Soro did when he was appointed the

prime minister in March 2007, the establishment of various public

courts such as gacaca in Rwanda which were established to handle

genocide cases and Mato Oput in northern Uganda which is used by

Acholis. These are some of the examples applied to handle post-

conflict reconciliation.

In Africa, there are other traditional methods of reconciliation

for the purpose of maintaining peace and harmonious relations or

social solidarity. Okusasira (to forgive) has been in use by Bakiga of

southern Uganda for centuries. Okusasira promotes truth and

forgiveness through direct confrontation between victims and

perpetrators after disputes or violent conflicts. It may take place in

private or publicly at an individual or group level whereby the

perpetrator apologizes and the victim forgives on humanitarian basis.

The significance of this mechanism is that it helps the victim to heal

the pain or emotional wounds and redress grievances that caused the

dispute or the conflict and the perpetrator will be accepted back in

the community. Almost similar to okusasira mechanism, there is

another African indigenous mechanism known as ubuntu mostly used

by the Bantu tribe. The term ubuntu generally expresses humanistic

principles that portray social values which are fundamental

requirements of social solidarity. Such social values include dignity,

respect, compassion, conformity, hospitality, unity, and friendship.

The main impression about ubuntu is that people don’t live in isolation

but with and through others. This co-existence promotes peace in

society and these humanistic principles are a basis of controlling ones

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actions. In times of reconciliation, it is upon ones feeling of ubuntu

that he/she forgives or he/she accepts responsibility for the wrong

doings inflicted on others for the purpose of social cohesion.

Ivory Coast ought to emphasize the application of traditional

mechanisms of reconciliation which have been effective in other

African societies. There have been significant disputes and hatred

within the local population which contributed to ethnic clashes that

have left hundreds of local people and foreigners dead and others

displaced besides the national crisis. Since the victims have mostly

been the common local people and who are mostly illiterate, there is a

need of sensitizing them about the essence of co-existence and the

use of traditional means of reconciliation such as reconciliation

dialogues conducted by the local village chiefs, should be emphasized

as an alternative means to the modern methods of reconciliation.

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5:2.3 Restoration of Judicial system and Rule of law.

Rama Mani pointed out that, “Law is a prerequisite for peace,

security and stability. A society without law will inevitably be a society

without peace.”159 Since the objective of peace building is to create

durable peace, it’s important to establish or reestablish the judicial

system in a country and restructure the police in the case of Ivory

Coast during the post-conflict period.

It’s a common phenomenon for the judicial system to collapse

or become corrupt and inefficient during civil wars in Africa and Ivory

Coast is an example of a country where the judicial system collapsed

with the outbreak of the civil war. There is a need of reestablishing

proper functioning courts of law in the country with competent

judges, prosecutors and lawyers to efficiently run the judicial system.

Most crimes in Ivory Coast go unpunished which increases the rate at

which they are committed since the perpetrators know that they may

not be apprehended. On 16 January 2006 for instance my residence in

Daloa town was looted and local people were moving in public putting

on my lost clothes. When I reported the matter to the police in Daloa

town, I was told that they were in a war situation and therefore they

could not arrest the suspects. Laws require a competent police force

to enforce them. The current corrupt and inefficient national police

needs reshuffling in the post-conflict era if law and order are to be

restored in the country and durable peace to be attained in the

country.

5:2.4 Protection of Human rights

This section will try to analyze the general idea of human rights

as provided for by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

and how Ivory Coast ought to respect human rights as a source of

stability and durable peace.

159 Wohlgemuth, L., et al., Common Security and Civil Society in Africa, 146.

68

Human rights are international norms that help to protect all

people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. The

connection between peace and human rights is obvious and the two

are inextricably glued together, where they are separated then

conflict emerges.

Francesca Marotta wrote that, “History has repeatedly

demonstrated the link between peace and human rights. Where

massive violations of human rights occur, conflict prevails. Lasting

peace can not be achieved without respect for human rights and any

effort to restore peace must incorporate efforts to promote and

protect human rights”.160 Human rights have a direct influence on the

stability of a country therefore they should be protected in the post-

conflict period.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out a list of

specific human rights that countries should respect and protect.

These specific rights can be divided into six;

security rights that protect people against crimes such as

murder, massacre, torture, and rape; due process rights that

protect against abuses of the legal system such as

imprisonment without trial, secret trials, and excessive

punishments; liberty rights that protect freedoms in areas such

as belief, expression, association, assembly, and movement;

political rights that protect the liberty to participate in politics

through actions such as communicating, assembling,

protesting, voting, and serving in public office; equality rights

that guarantee equal citizenship, equality before the law, and

nondiscrimination; and social (or "welfare") rights that require

provision of education to all children and protections against

severe poverty and starvation.161

160 Ibid, 69.161 Nickel, James. “Human Rights.”

69

Since the beginning of the conflict in Ivory Coast, both government

security forces and rebels have committed serious human rights

abuses162with very few of the perpetrators being held accountable for

their acts before a national or an international court. Government

forces have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture, and

detention without trial. The rebels have also committed human rights

abuses particularly in the west and in the north of the country where

they have terrorized the population and carried out arbitrary killings.

Indeed in few months after the out break of the war, Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) news reported that government

soldiers had killed at least 120 civilians in Monoko-Zohi village on 8

November 2002163. Amnesty International (AI) also reported that on 6

October 2002, rebels had killed 60 gendarmes with about 50 of their

children in Bouake town.164 Other killings were reported at Daloa

town in October 2002 where the Anti-riot Brigade killed 50 civilians

from the north. In March 2003, Greater West Patriotic Movement of

Côte d’Ivoire rebels (MPIGO) murdered 40 civilians at Dah and in the

same months 60 civilians were killed at Bangalo.165 These were

isolated cases that were reported but people were being killed almost

in every region even in the north especially at Korhogo, a rebel

dominated town.

Establishment of sound legal framework and fostering human

rights awareness in war-torn countries is one way of protecting

human rights.166 Law enforcement officers need to undergo under

human rights training besides the ongoing efforts of United Nations

mission in the country in sensitizing the population and promoting

human rights through advocacy such as distribution of reading

162The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse.163 CBC, “Ivory Coast villagers buried 120 after massacre.” 164 Amnesty International, Cote d’Ivoire: A Succession of Unpunished Crimes from the Massacre of Gendarmes at Bouake to the Mass Graves of Daloa.165 Fiact, “Ivory Coast: No Impunity for War Crime and Crimes against Humanity”.166 Tor Tanke Holm, and Espen Barth Eide, Peace-building and Police Reform, 70.

70

materials about human rights, use of ONUCI FM radio to sensitize the

local people about human rights and conducting workshops.

It is through understanding human rights that they will be

protected. As earlier discussed, there is an urgent need of restoration

of the rule of law to protect human rights violations in Ivory Coast and

the government ought to come up with commissions to protect human

rights. Civil societies have also been active in the protection of human

rights though they can not enforce laws and apprehend the culprits.

They carry out activities such as sensitizing the people on human

rights, promoting human rights through advocacy and advising the

government and belligerents about the human rights. Some of these

organizations include, the Christian Association for the Abolition of

Torture and the Respect of Human Rights, the Ivorian division of

Amnesty International, and the Ivorian League of Human Rights.

These societies are doing a tremendous job in coordination with the

peacekeeping mission in Ivory Coast although they are at times

frustrated by the local authorities who deny them freedom of

movement to both regions in the country. State security forces,

militias and pro-government groups also regularly threaten and

intimidate these human rights activists.167

5:2.5 Governance, State institutions and Security sector

reform.

Governance, state institutions, and security sector reforms are

of significant importance for Ivory Coast to consider in peace-building

processes. In post-conflict period, restoration or reformation of state

institutions occurs following the establishment of a broad-based

regime that ought to prevent the state from slipping back into armed

conflict. The education sector needs reinstallation or reinforcement to

provide formal and civic education, crisis and conflict management

knowledge to eligible persons without any discrimination against. The

167 Human Rights Watch. The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse.

71

military and other security organs are restructured towards the goal

of professionalization so that the security of the state is assured. Ivory

Coast state security forces and elements of Force Nouvelles (FN)

rebels who might be absorbed in national forces in the post-conflict

period ought to go under refresher training in their respective

specializations incorporated with human rights training following

rampant violations of human rights during the conflict. Some of them

have been accused of Killings, sexual violence against women, use of

child soldiers, torture and intimidation; 168the culprit should face the

law instead of staying in the forces which won’t please the population

and for the purpose of justice provision.

Political institution building, decentralization of power and

constitutional reform are also important activities of peace-building

required in Ivory Coast situation. Conducting elections is also an

important step in the process of peace-building. However , in Ivory

Coast badly designed or poorly managed elections have often been

the cause of violence and subsequent violation of human rights, a

tendency that should be avoided in the post-conflict era that looks

forward to attaining durable peace. The establishment of good

governance, restoring state institutions and legitimate political order

based on democratic, transparent and participatory governance is

central to post-conflict peace, security and development in Ivory

Coast.

5:3 The role of civil society in peace-building

Peace-building is not an activity restricted to politicians and

military practitioners involved in peace operations but civil society

organizations too have important roles they carry out in their efforts

towards peace-building world wide.

For Ivory Coast which is on the verge of recovering from a four

year civil war, the roles played by the civil society organizations

168 Human Rights Watch. Country on a precipice.

72

towards peace-building activities should not be neglected. The

activities they carry out are prerequisites for transforming a society

from a conflict situation to a post-conflict situation and they

contribute towards the realization of durable peace and development.

Civil society organizations have been at the forefront of peace

initiatives in most of the African countries that suffered conflict such

as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda where they demonstrated their

potential to transform conflicts; Ivory Coast ought to similarly utilize

them instead of frustrating them by sabotaging their activities as

discussed in the previous section.

Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff argues that among the strategies and

approaches being proposed and adopted in efforts to manage conflicts

in West Africa are a greater recognition and use of civil society in

these efforts. Some positive developments in democratization and

conflict management in West Africa have been attributed to civil

society.169 Beyond West Africa, civil society organizations are doing a

tremendous job in peace-building also.

Civil society organizations in African perspective contribute

significantly towards peace-building activities. For instance in Uganda

whose conflict has some similarities with that in Ivory Coast

particularly in the root causes as previously discussed in Chapter

Two, several civil society organizations are playing big roles towards

restoration of peace in the northern region which for more than two

decades has suffered under the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebels.

These civil society organizations or NGOs monitor and report on

human rights violations e.g. Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), they are

taking care of the refugees from neighboring countries of Sudan and

Democratic Republic of Congo and Ugandan internally displaced

people by the LRA conflict e.g. Oxfam, they are involved in

humanitarian and relief provisions, they are involved in public

169 Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. West Africa’s Security Challenges, 265.

73

sensitization about post-conflict trauma, diseases and other people-

centered developmental issues, they pursue conflict resolution

activities such as reintegrating ex-combatants in the community,

mediating between the government and the rebels e.g. Acholi

Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and The Sant Egidio

Community, they are involved in issues of reconciliation e.g. Mato

Oput in northern Uganda.

ARLPI is a local organization of all religious leaders in northern

Uganda which was formed in 1997 to promote dialogue between the

government and LRA rebels. It has been involved in the on-going

negotiations between the government and LRA rebels in Juba-Sudan

and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Sant Egidio Community

is an Italian religious community based in northern Uganda and

specialized in peace mediation. It helped to secure peace talks

between the LRA and the Ugandan government in 1999 which

resulted into granting amnesty to the LRA leadership. Mato Oput is a

local society specialized in conflict resolution and reconciliation which

is based in Gulu.

Generally, civil society organizations have emerged as crucial

entities that complement efforts of the government towards peace-

building activities and they have proved to be efficient having realized

some positive developments in the region.

5:4 Conclusion

Peace-building in post-conflict situations is significant for the

prevention of conflict recurrence and creating a long lasting peaceful

situation which are the main objectives of peace-building as a phase of

conflict management.

Although there are divergent views about the concept of peace-

building, they all encompass prevention of conflict recurrence and the

quest for viable peace. Peace-building activities may be carried out

during the conflict progression or after the conflict termination

74

depending on the conflict situation and they are carried out by

different actors such as civil society organizations, governments,

regional organizations, donors or the international community.

African methods of carrying out some of the peace-building

activities such as reconciliation have proved to be effective

mechanisms and they ought to be emphasized when handling African

conflicts.

Peace as the cardinal goal of peace-building is associated with

the rule of law and human rights respect therefore Ivory Coast parties

to the conflict ought to emphasize them in the post-conflict era.

75

CHAPTER SIX

6:0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6:1 Conclusion

The crisis that erupted in Ivory Coast in the new millennium

which made the focus of this study is the outcome of both historical

and current factors that contributed equally to bringing it to surface

and to reshaping its consequences. Despite of Ivory Coast getting its

political autonomy, the former colonial master France, maintained

presence in the country up to today. The post-colonial authoritarian

political leadership of President Houphouet Boigny in Ivory Coast

created a breeding ground for the crisis in the country that escalated

with the liberalization of the politics when multiparty politics were

adopted in the country. Ivorians had been deprived of their rights and

this brought about discontentment with the regime. Discontentment

of some people coupled with socio-economic problems and political

power struggles, culminated into a motivating factor to overthrow by

military means, successive regimes in Ivory Coast. Politics of

exclusion and cultural problems associated with religion, tribal

divisions and ethnical identity problems significantly contributed to

the emerging of different armed rebellions that eventually

transformed into a civil war in the country.

The crisis that erupted in the country brought about the

destruction of the infrastructures, human suffering and demise and

this prompted neighbouring countries to intervene in the conflict. The

intervention of foreign states in the conflict whether it was stimulated

by state-selfish interests or moral responsibility prevented a

humanistic catastrophe though the conflict has not yet been

concluded.

The conflict in ivory Coast has not been stagnant but has been

going through changes with different actors. The peacekeeping force

that was deployed after the eruption of the armed rebellion managed

76

to keep apart the belligerents by establishing a buffer zone and in

conjunction with the sub-regional political leaders who intervened as

third parties, a ceasefire agreement was secured and this has

contained the warring parties from engaging in battles although on

some occasions, the agreement would be violated by both warring

parties. Peacekeepers together with French Licorne forces besides

the challenges they encounter, have so far done a good job by

implementing their mandates which has drastically contributed to the

general efforts of returning peace to the country. This initial

intervention in the conflict by a peacekeeping force also created an

environment for further negotiations with the aim of resolving the

conflict peacefully. Different actors have intervened as mediators

besides the efforts of the United Nations mission which is deployed in

the country.

Mediation is an important tool in settling conflicts. Mediation

may be conducted successfully or unsuccessfully depending on the

mediator and the situation. When a mediator gets derailed from the

principles of mediation the process is doomed to fail and vice versa.

The mediation process in Ivory Coast yielded multiple peace

agreements although the implementation has been difficult mainly

because the conflict had not reached a stalemate and there was lack

of the political will among the local Ivorian politicians. However, the

mediation process demonstrated its greatness when it kept the

belligerents busy in dialogue thus creating a period without

skirmishes and when finally the rebel leader got united into the

government following the mediation of President Blaise Compaore of

Burkina Faso. Currently the implementation of the latest

Ouagadougou peace accord is on the right track and hopefully peace

will be restored in the country soon.

Peace-building activities and certainly the one in Ivory Coast is

prominent among them not only prevent recurrence of conflict after

77

its settlement but create durable social order in a post-conflict period.

Civil society, the government and the international community all play

a vital role in peace-building efforts and at this stage of the conflict

there is a need to double efforts in establishing all the necessary

peace-building activities so that the peace process does not relapse.

The peace-building activities discussed in chapter five ought to

address the root causes of the conflict and their contributory factors

such as poverty and ethnicity which are associated with the causes of

conflict in Ivory Coast. These are crucial factors in the country that

call for extensive research. Finally as one of the objectives of the

study was to provide information about the origins of the conflict in

Ivory Coast to peacekeepers and other actors in the conflict, there

could be some areas of interest that the study did not address

basically because of geographical limitations, time limitation and the

number of words required for this specific study. Incase there are

such areas left in the open they should be a basis for further research.

6:2 Recommendations

All parties to the conflict in Ivory Coast ought to support the

implementation of the Linnas-marcoussis agreement, the March 2007

Ouagadougou peace agreement and the United Nations mission’s

mandate in the country so that the Ivory Coast conflict can be

resolved. The current situation indicates positive measures towards

concluding the conflict following the implementation of disarmament

process, establishment of a joint command center that is composed of

former belligerents and lifting of the buffer zone which was commonly

known as the zone of confidence.

ONUCI and Licorne French forces have done a tremendous job

since their intervention to create an environment suitable for peace

negotiations they should hold to the ground until peace is completely

established in the country.

78

To the challenges the UN peacekeepers encounter, firstly there

should be a similar pre-deployment training so that all the

participants in the prospective mission are equipped with the same

concept of the mission and if possible UN should have its own Army

which has the same military etiquettes in future. The mandates and

rules of engagement should precisely match with the situation on the

ground in a sense that when the situation changes, the rules of

engagement also changes. Peacekeepers in volatile conflict zones are

vulnerable to hostilities therefore they should be armed or

accompanied by armed troops in order to avoid their being attacked

by armed people and hostile populations.

There is also a need to sensitize the local population about the

role of peacekeepers in their country so that they can stop looking at

them as occupational forces and all components in the peacekeeping

mission should endeavor to share available information as the aim of

their involvement in the conflict is the same.

Now that there are signs of settling the conflict at the national

level with some of the peace-building activities taking place, the local

people need to engage in reconciliation processes following the divide

that developed between their relationships during the conflict.

Indigenous ways of reconciliation have demonstrated to be workable

in other regions in Africa during the post-conflict period therefore

they should be employed to mend relationships. The objectives of such

traditional initiatives of resolving conflicts have mostly been to

reconcile the parties in conflict for the purpose of harmonious co-

existence in the society which strengthens social solidarity but not

necessarily to punish individuals. These traditional conflict resolution

mechanisms have been very effective and encompass local support

and are respected. Conflicts resolved at this level, rarely reoccur.

However, in some cases where the perpetrators committed mass

79

atrocities and war crimes they should be brought forward to face law

so that justice is administered.

Number of words = 21415

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Stewart, Frances. “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries”. British Medical Journal v324 -7333 (February 2002): 342-345 http://www.bmj.com

Tran, Phuong. “Rebel Leader Takes Over as Ivory Coast's New Prime Minister” Voice of America News, 29 March 2007. http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-04-05-voa31.cfm (accessed 15 April 2007).

Todd, Pitman. “Cocoa Industry is Booming in Ivory Coast” Associated Press, 6 December 2005. http://ilrf.org/press/ChildLabor/ivorycoastcocoa_associatedpress_12.htm(accessed 12 April 2007).

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Appendix A

Declaration of Academic Honesty

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and that it has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at

any other University.

Signed

Memory Bariyo

Place___________________________________________________________________

Date___________________________________________________________________

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Appendix B

PERMISSION FOR USE OF THESIS OR MASTER’S DEGREE PROJECT

Full name of author……………………………………………………..

Full title of Thesis or Master’s Degree Project

…………………………………………………………………………….

……………………………………………………………………………

Degree:……………………………….. Year of submission:……………

University Department:…………………………………………………..

I do/do not* agree to this Thesis or Master’s Degree Project being consulted, for research or study purposes only, provided that due acknowledgement of its use is made where appropriate.

I do/ do not* consent to single copies of this Thesis or Master’s Degree Project, in part or as whole, being made for research or study purposes at another institution, at the discretion of the University Librarian.

I wish the following limitations to apply, for the period of time specified, to the use of this Thesis or Master’s Degree Project:

Signature of author:……………………………………………………………

Date:………………………………….

delete as appropriate.

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Appendix C

LINAS-MARCOUSSIS AGREEMENT170

1. At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties: FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY and UDPCI. The conference was chaired by Mr. Pierre MAZEAUD, assisted by Judge Keba Mbaye, former Prime Minister Seydou Diarra and facilitators appointed by the UN, the African Union and ECOWAS.

Each delegation gave its analysis of the situation in Cote d'lvoire and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and overcoming the crisis. The vision shown by delegations enabled the Round Table to bring the positions together and arrive at the consensus described below, in which all elements - principles and annexes - have the same status:

2. The Round Table welcomes the cease-fire made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by French forces, and demands strict compliance with it. The Round Table calls on all parties immediately to put a stop to all exactions and consecrate the peace. It calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners.

3. The Round Table reiterates the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Cote d'lvoire and respect for its institutions and to restore the authority of the State. It recalls its commitment to the principle of democratic accession to and exercise of power. To this end it agrees as follows:

a)  A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country. It will implement the appended Round Table program which includes, in particular, provisions in the constitutional, legislative and regulatory spheres.

170United States Institute of Peace. Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Côte d'Ivoire. Washington, DC, 2003.

http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003en.html

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b)  It will prepare an electoral timetable with a view to holding credible and transparent elections and set dates for them.

c)  The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

d)  This government will be made up of representatives appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the Round Table. In assigning Ministries a balance will be struck among the parties throughout the term of office of the government.

e)  To discharge its duties the government will have executive powers in accordance with the delegation of authority provided for in the Constitution. The political parties represented in the National Assembly which took part in the Round Table undertake to guarantee the support of their Members of Parliament for the implementation of the government's programme.

f)  The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers and in particular the assistance offered by France.

g)  In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

h)  The Government of National Reconciliation will seek the help of ECOWAS, France and the United Nations to arrange for their forces to guarantee these operations.

i)  The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure release and amnesty for all military personnel being held on charges of threatening State security and will extend this measure to soldiers living in exile.

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4. The Round Table decides to set up a committee to monitor implementation of the Paris Agreements on Cote d'lvoire in charge of ensuring compliance with commitments made. This committee will report to national, regional and international authorities all cases of obstruction of the Agreements and failure to apply them, to ensure that appropriate remedies are implemented.

The Round Table recommends to the Conference of Heads of State that the monitoring committee be set up in Abidjan and made up of representatives of the countries and organizations called on to guarantee implementation of the Paris Agreements, and in particular:

the representative of the European Union,

the representative of the Commission of the African Union,

the representative of the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS,

the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will co-ordinate UN bodies,

the representative of the International Francophone Organization,

the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank,

a representative of the G8 countries,

the representative of France.

5. The Round Table calls on the French government, ECOWAS and the international community to provide for the security of the persons who took part in it and if need be for that of the members of the Government of National Reconciliation until such time as the latter is in a position to fully perform this task.

6. The Round Table pays tribute to the mediation provided by ECOWAS and to the endeavours of the African Union and the UN, and thanks France for its role in organizing this meeting and achieving this consensus.

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Done at Linas-Marcoussis, 23 January 2003

FOR THE FPIPascal AFFI N'GUESSAN

FOR THE MFAInnocent KOBENA ANAKY

FOR THE MJPGaspard DELI

FOR THE MPCIGuillaume SORO

FOR THE MPIGOFelix DOH

FOR THE PDCI-RDAHenri KONAN BEDIE

FOR THE PITFrancis WODIE

FOR THE RDRAlassane Dramane OUATTARA

FOR THE UDCYTheodore MEL EG

FOR THE UDPCIPaul AKOTO YAO

THE CHAIRMANPierre MAZEAUD

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Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation

I- Citizenship, identity, status of foreign nationals

1. The Round Table considers that Law 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on Ivorian citizenship, as amended by Law 72-852 of 21 December 1972, which is based on complementarity between jus sanguinis and jus soli and makes broad provision for naturalization by certificate issued by the public authorities, is a generous and well-drafted text.

The Round Table considers on the other hand that there are many difficulties in implementing the law, as a result either of lack of awareness among populations or of administration and police and security force practices which disregard the law and human rights.

The Round Table has observed a degree of legal difficulty in applying Articles 6 and 7 of the Citizenship Code. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that in practice the certificate of citizenship is valid for three months only and that the person holding it must prove his citizenship each time it is renewed by producing a number of documents. However, the Code has heretofore been applied.

Therefore the Government of National Reconciliation will:

a. immediately promote increased recourse to existing naturalization procedures, based on better information and possibly co-operation projects implemented with the support of international development partners;

b. submit, on an exceptional basis and within six months, a naturalization bill aimed at settling in a simple and accessible manner the cases of those persons deemed ineligible and considered to be in the country illegally (in particular cases concerning persons formerly covered by Articles 17 to 23 of Law 61-415 as repealed by Law 72-852 and persons residing in Cote d'lvoire prior to 7 August 1960 who did not exercise their option within the prescribed deadline), and supplement the existing text by including in new Article 12 foreign men married to Ivorian women.

2. To cope with the uncertainty and slow pace of the identification process and with the mistakes and abuses to which security

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checks can give rise, the Government of National Reconciliation will take further action with respect to registration and identification of individuals, in particular:

a. Suspension of the current identification process pending decrees implementing the Law and timely establishment of a National Identification Commission, headed by a judge and made up of representatives of the political parties, to be charged with supervising and overseeing the National Identification Office.

b. Ensuring strict consistency of the Law on Identification with the Citizenship Code regarding proof of citizenship.

3. The Round Table finds that the foreign nationals residing in large numbers in Cote d'lvoire have made a major contribution to national wealth and helped confer on Cote d'lvoire its special position and responsibility within the sub-region, which has also benefited the countries of origin of these foreign nationals, and considers that the petty annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and which often affect foreign nationals, can be caused by wilful misapplication of identification provisions.

a. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement under Article 8 paragraph 2 of Law 2002-03 of 3 January 2002 for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not subject to fraudulent misuse.

b. Moreover the Government of National Reconciliation will consider introducing legislative and regulatory provisions to improve the status of foreign nationals and protect their property and persons.

c. The Round Table also calls on all ECOWAS Member States to ratify, in a timely manner, the existing protocols concerning free circulation of persons and goods, to practice strengthened co-operation in controlling migratory flows, to respect the fundamental rights of immigrants and to diversify areas of development. These actions can be implemented with the support of international development partners.

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II- Electoral system

1. The Round Table considers that Law 2000-514 of 1 August 2000 on the Election Code raises no difficulties and reflects efforts to improve the text of the laws and that Law 2001-634 of 9 January 2001 creating the Independent Electoral Commission constitutes significant progress in ensuring the organization of transparent elections.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation:

a. will ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify voters and draw up voter lists;

b. will submit several amendments to Law 2001-634 aimed at achieving better representation of the parties taking part in the Round Table within the central committee of the Independent Electoral Commission, including its Officers;

c. will submit, within 6 months, a bill relating to the status of the opposition and to the public funding of political parties and election campaigns;

d. will submit within one year a bill on illicit personal enrichment and will organize effective inspection of the personal asset disclosures filed by those elected;

e. take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the justice system and the impartiality of the media with respect to both election disputes and election propaganda.

III- Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic

1. The Round Table considers that Article 35 of the Constitution on the Election of the President of the Republic must avoid referring to concepts without legal content or deriving from legislation. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore propose that the conditions governing eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic be laid down as follows:

"The President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage to a five year term of office. He can be re-elected only once. The candidate must be in possession of his civil and political rights

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and be at least thirty-five years of age. He must have only Ivorian citizenship and have a father or a mother born Ivorian."

2. The Citizenship Code will be amended by adding to the conditions under which Ivorian citizenship can be revoked, under Article 53, the following words: "holding elective office abroad or serving as a member of a foreign government".

3. The President of the Republic shall publish a report on his state of health once a year.

IV- Land tenure regime

1. The Round Table considers that Law 98-750 of 23 December 1998 on Rural Land Tenure, adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, constitutes a reference in a field that is legally difficult and economically crucial.

2. Nevertheless the Government of National Reconciliation:

a.  will support the progressive implementation of this regime by carrying out a campaign to explain it to rural populations in such a way as to work toward true security of tenure.

b. will submit an amendment to better protect acquired rights under Article 26 of the law on heirs of landowners holding rights predating the enactment of the law but not fulfilling the conditions of ownership set out in Article 1.

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V- Media

1. The Round Table condemns the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will within one year overhaul the general regime governing the press so as to strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities, guarantee neutrality and impartiality of the State broadcasters and foster the financial independence of the media. These measures may receive the support of international development partners.

3. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately restore free broadcasting of the international radio and television media.

VI- Rights and freedoms of the individual

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Cote d'lvoire. The Commission will be made up of delegates of all Round Table parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will call for the establishment of an international board of enquiry to investigate and establish the facts throughout the national territory in order to identify cases of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law since 19 September 2002.

3. Based on the report by the international board of enquiry, the Government of National Reconciliation will determine which cases should be brought to justice in order to put an end to impunity. The Round Table particularly condemns the actions of the "death squads" and those giving them orders as well as those carrying out summary executions throughout the country, and considers that those guilty of and those aiding and abetting these acts must be brought to justice before an international criminal jurisdiction.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

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VII Regrouping, disarming and demobilizing

1. Immediately after assuming office, the Government of National Reconciliation will undertake the process of concomitant regrouping of the forces on the ground, under the supervision of ECOWAS and French forces.

2. In a second phase it will set out the measures to be taken with respect to disarming and demobilizing these forces, also under ECOWAS and French force supervision.

3. All recruits enlisted after 19 September will be immediately demobilized.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation shall ensure the social reintegration of military personnel of every origin with the help of Disarmament - Demobilization - Repatriation - Resettlement - Reintegration (DDRRR) type programmes which can be implemented with the support of international development partners.

5. The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure the release and amnesty of all military personnel detained on charges of threatening State security and will extend the benefit of these measures to soldiers living in exile. The amnesty law will under no circumstances mean that those having committed serious economic violations and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will go unpunished.

6. The Government of National Reconciliation will carry out an audit of its armed forces and determine, in a difficult economic context, the level of sacrifice which it can accept in order to meet its obligations with respect to national defence. It will on that basis restructure the armed forces and request, for this purpose, outside assistance.

VIII- Economic recovery and the need for social cohesion

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will restore free circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory and facilitate the resumption of educational, administrative, economic and social activity.

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2. It will prepare, in a timely fashion, a plan for infrastructure reconstruction and development, national economic recovery and strengthening of social cohesion.

3. The Round Table recommends to international institutions and international development partners that they provide support for the process of rebuilding Cote d'lvoire.

IX- Implementation

The Government of National Reconciliation will ensure that the constitutional, legislative and regulatory reforms arising from the decisions it is required to make are introduced without delay

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Appendix D

OUAGADOUGOU PEACE AGREEMENT171

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, acting in his capacity as current Chairman of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with an express mandate from this organization, two delegations from the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, one representing the President of the Republic and the other representing Forces nouvelles, met in Ouagadougou from 5 February to 3 March 2007.

The meeting followed the announcement on 19 December 2006 of the peace plan presented by President Laurent Gbagbo, who on 23 January 2007 invited the current Chairman of ECOWAS to facilitate direct talks between the former belligerents in the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.

President Blaise Compaoré, after consulting with the Secretary-General of Forces nouvelles, Mr. Guillaume Soro, with the various political stakeholders in Côte d’Ivoire and with the Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Konan Banny, acceded to the request and recommended that the direct talks should be held within the framework of resolution 1721 (2006), adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 1 November 2006.

During their discussions, the delegation of the Presidency of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, headed by Mr. Désiré Tagro, Special Advisor to President Laurent Gbagbo and spokesman for the Presidency of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, and the delegation of Forces nouvelles, led by Mr. Louis-André Dacoury Tabley, Deputy Secretary-General of Forces nouvelles and Minister of Solidarity and War Victims, both of which are deeply committed to a successful resolution of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, reviewed the situation in the country.

Participants stressed the urgent need to restore peace and stability, to combat the growing insecurity, unemployment and poverty, to re-establish the authority of the State throughout the national territory, and to guarantee freedom of movement of people and goods throughout the national territory.Because of their special responsibility in the peace process, the two Parties to the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire have agreed on the urgent need for them to work together to restore peace, promote genuine national reconciliation and achieve political and institutional

171 Reliefweb. Cote d’Ivoire: Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. 2007. http://reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/4BAC3D0177396479492572C600074702-Full_Report.pdf/$File/Full_Report.pdf

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normalization in the country through permanent dialogue and mutual trust.

After identifying the problems encountered in the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria Agreements and the United Nations resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire and before taking any decisions, the Parties reaffirmed the following:– Their commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côted’Ivoire;– Their respect for the Constitution;– Their commitment to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria Agreements;--Their commitment to all United Nations resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire, particularly resolutions 1633 (2005) and 1721 (2006) of the Security Council; – Their determination to create conditions conducive to free, open, transparent and democratic elections;– Their willingness to combine their efforts and energies with a view to ensuring the normal functioning of Côte d’Ivoire and achieving political, administrative and military normalization in the country.In order to facilitate the implementation of the above-mentioned agreements and resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 1721 (2006), the Parties have agreed as follows:I. General identification of the population

The Parties signatories to this Agreement recognize that the identification of the Ivorian and foreign populations living in Côte d’Ivoire is a major concern. The absence of a clear and standard identity document and of individual administrative documents attesting to the identity and nationality of persons is a source of conflict. They have therefore decided to put an end to this situation by adopting the following measures:1.1. Redeployment of mobile courts (audiences foraines) for the issuance of substitute birth certificates (jugements supplétifs)1.1.1. Mobile courts shall be redeployed throughout the national territory as soon as the new Government is formed pursuant to the present Agreement. In order to expedite the issuance of substitute birth certificates, the judges in charge of the new jurisdictions created specifically for the mobile courts shall be appointed bypresidential decree and provided with the necessary resources for the discharge of their mandate.1.1.2. These exceptional mobile court hearings, which shall take place over a period of three months, shall issue substitute birth certificates only to individuals born in Côte d’Ivoire who have never been registered in a registry office.1.1.3. The redeployment of the mobile courts shall be accompanied by a public awareness, information and mobilization campaign involving political stakeholders, the military high command and civil society,

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during which affected individuals will be invited to go before the mobile courts corresponding to their place of birth so that they could be issued with a substitute birth certificate.1.1.4 The Parties pledge to guarantee the security of the mobile court hearings throughout the national territory.1.2. Reconstruction of lost or destroyed birth registers

In parallel with the mobile court hearings for the issuance of substitute birth certificates, registers that were lost or destroyed in certain registry offices shall be reconstructed in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance of 17 January 2007 and its implementation decree, which must be enacted as soon as possible.1.3. Launching of an operation for the issuance of new identity documents (nationalidentity cards and residence permits)

The Parties undertake to conduct a special operation for the issuance of new identity cards in accordance with the following modalities:1.3.1. Standard identification1.3.1.1. Ivorians who are required to carry a national identity card and who have been issued with a certificate of nationality and a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate shall be entitled to be issued with the new national identity card.1.3.1.2. Non-Ivorians who have been issued with a substitute birth certificate and a document from their consulate stating their nationality shall be entitled to be issued with a new identity card consistent with their legal status in the country.1.3.2. Identification on the basis of the new electoral roll1.3.2.1. In order to expedite the process of identification and given the current situation of the administration in Côte d’Ivoire and the consequent need to end the crisis, the Parties agree to accredit identification based on the electoral roll.1.3.2.2. At the conclusion of the mobile court hearings and based on the 2000 electoral roll, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) shall conduct an electoral census during which biometrical data shall be collected throughout the national territory. Ivorians at least 18 years of age who are holders of a birth certificate or a substitute birth certificate shall be entitled to register on the electoral roll.1.3.2.3. All citizens registered on the electoral roll shall be issued with a receipt bearing their personal identification number. This receipt must be presented when uplifting voter registration cards and the new national identity cards.1.3.2.4. Upon completion of the procedure for validation of the electoral roll by the Independent Electoral Commission, the Council of Ministers shall adopt a decree authorizing the issuance of the new national identity card to all persons whose names appear on the final

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electoral roll, which will serve as a common database for the issuance of the new national identity card and voter registration card.1.3.3. Characteristics of the new identity documents1.3.3.1. The new identity documents shall be forgery-proof and shall contain many security features and a personal identification number for each holder.1.3.3.2. The new identity documents shall be manufactured and issued by the National Identification Office (ONI) under the supervision of the National Commission for the Supervision of Identification (CNSI).1.3.3.3. With the agreement of both Parties, the Government shall engage the services of a technical agency which shall be appointed by a decree of the Council of Ministers to undertake the identification operation.II. Electoral process

The Parties to the direct dialogue, determined to achieve without delay a lasting peace and political and institutional normalization in Côte d’Ivoire, reaffirm their commitment to prepare for open, democratic and transparent presidential elections upon completion of the identification process, in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria Agreements. To this end, they have decided as follows:2.1. Registration on the electoral roll2.1.1. The Parties agree that registration on the electoral roll shall be undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics (INS) and the technical agency designated by the Government for the identification operation. These two agencies shall discharge their mandate under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission.2.1.2. All Ivorian citizens of voting age may be registered on the electoral roll. In order to register, they must be in possession of the following documents: a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate.2.1.3. A decree by the Council of Ministers shall establish the modalities for registration on the electoral roll, in accordance with the provisions of the electoral code.2.2. Publication of the definitive electoral roll2.2.1. The definitive electoral roll, validated by the Independent Electoral Commission, shall be published in accordance with the provisions of article 11, paragraph 2, of the electoral code, or in any other manner agreed upon by the Parties.2.3. Preparation and issuance of voter registration cards2.3.1. Voter registration cards shall be prepared under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission once the definitive electoral roll has been published.2.3.2. Voter registration cards shall be issued by the Independent Electoral Commission through its various branches at least two weeks prior to the date of the elections, in accordance with article 5 of the electoral code.

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2.3.3. Voters who fail to uplift their voter registration cards before the deadline laid down in the above paragraph may nevertheless vote with their new national identity cards if they are duly registered on the electoral roll.2.4. Collaboration between agencies involved in the electoral process2.4.1. In order to ensure transparency and efficiency, the National Institute of Statistics and the technical agency designated by the Government shall work together under the supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission to prepare the voter registration cards.2.4.2. The modalities of such collaboration shall be set out in a decree by the Council of Ministers. III. Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire

The Parties to this Agreement, recognizing that the national army must be the symbol of the unity and cohesion of the nation and the guarantor of the stability of the institutions of the Republic, have undertaken to restructure and reorganize their two armed forces with a view to the creation of new defence and security forces that are committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. A special mechanism for the restructuring and reorganization of the army shall be created by law to establish the general framework for the organization, composition and operation of the new defence and security forces. The two Parties have therefore decided to merge their two forces by creating an integrated operational structure.3.1. Establishment of an Integrated Command Centre (CCI)3.1.1. In keeping with the spirit of joint handling of issues related to defence and security, the two former belligerent Parties agree to create an Integrated Command Centre for the purpose of integrating the two fighting forces and implementing measures for the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) of Côte d’Ivoire.3.1.2. The Integrated Command Centre shall adopt its organizational chart and shall be placed under the joint command of the Chief of Staff of the National Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the Chief of Staff of Forces nouvelles (FAFN). It shall be comprised of equal numbers of officers designated by the two Chiefs of Staff.3.1.3. The core missions of the Integrated Command Centre shall be to:– Contribute to the elaboration of defence and security policy;– Implement the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme under the supervision of the impartial forces;– Operationalize the military and security tasks associated with the peace process;

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– Provide security for the mobile courts, for identification operations and for the electoral process;– Create joint military and paramilitary units; and– Coordinate measures designed to ensure the protection and free movement of people and goods throughout the national territory.3.2. National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme3.2.1. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to disarm their respective forces as soon as possible, in accordance with the recommendations of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the modalities laid down in the following military agreements:– The Joint Plan for DDR Operations (PCO) signed on 9 January 2004 and updated at the seminar on disarmament held from 2 to 6 May 2005 in Yamoussoukro under the auspices of the South African mediation; – The National DDR Programme and its accompanying timetable adopted on 9 July 2005 in Yamassoukro;– The conclusions of the working meeting held in Yamoussoukro on Saturday 14 May 2005 between the Chiefs of Staff of FANCI and FAFN.3.2.2. The Parties agree to accelerate the disbanding and disarmament of militias.3.2.3. The Parties agree to accelerate the process of assembly of the combatants on the 17 previously identified sites and to abide by the updated DDR timetable.3.3. Civic Service3.3.1. The two Parties agree that the Civic Service, which was established for the purpose of providing guidance and job training to all young people in Côte d’Ivoire, shall also accept all young people who have been trained in the use of weapons of war with a view to providing them with guidance and training for future civilian or military jobs.3.3.2. The modalities of the organization and functioning of the Civic Service shall be defined by decree of the Council of Ministers.IV. Restoration of the authority of the State and redeployment of the administration throughout the national territory4.1. Resolutely determined to bring about political and institutional normalization in Côte d’Ivoire, the Parties to this Agreement pledge to restore the authority of the State and to redeploy the administration and all public services throughout the national territory.4.2. The redeployment of the administration and of public services shall be done by all ministries concerned, under the authority of the Prime Minister, as soon as the zone of confidence is dismantled and observation posts established. The redeployment of the administration shall involve all public services, including the basic social services in such sectors as education, health, water and sanitation.

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4.3. Heads of the main administrative services shall be appointed after consultations between the two Parties.4.4. The National Police and Gendarmerie Forces, including the 600 members integrated pursuant to the Pretoria Agreement, shall be responsible for providing security for the entire prefectural corps and technical services deployed.V. Institutional framework for implementation5.1. The two Parties to the direct dialogue, exercising effective administrative and military control on both sides of the zone of confidence, conscious of their heavy responsibilities for the functioning of the State and determined to bring about political and institutional normalization based on the joint exercise of political power and on national reconciliation, have decided to establish a new institutional framework for implementation.5.2. The Government of Transition shall work in a spirit of permanent consultation, complementarity and openness to the other political forces in Côte d’Ivoire to bring about national reunification, disarmament and the organization of open, transparent and democratic elections, as provided for in the various agreements and resolutions for overcoming the crisis.VI. Measures to promote national reconciliation, peace, security and the free movement of people and goods

In order to promote peace, national reconciliation and the free movement of people and goods, the Parties to the direct dialogue agree on the following measures:6.1. Embargo on the importation of arms6.1.1. The two Parties to the direct dialogue agree to request the United Nations Security Council, with the support of the Facilitator and of ECOWAS, to lift the arms embargo imposed on Côte d’Ivoire within three months after the holding of presidential elections.6.1.2. The Parties also agree to request from the United Nations Security Council, with the support of the Facilitator and of ECOWAS, immediate special authorization to import the light arms necessary for the maintenance of law and order, under the supervision of the Integrated Command Centre referred to in paragraph 3.1 above.6.2. Zone of confidence6.2.1. In order to allow the free movement of people and goods, the two Parties to the direct dialogue agree to request the impartial forces of Licorne and UNOCI to dismantle the zone of confidence, in accordance with paragraph A.4 of the document on “Management of the zone of confidence”, referred to as Code 14.6.2.2. On a transitional basis, an imaginary line to be referred to as the green line, going from east to west along the median line of the zone of confidence, shall be established and punctuated by observation posts situated on the main infiltration routes. The observation posts shall be occupied by the impartial forces and their

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number shall be reduced by half every two months until all of them are removed.6.2.3. Joint units comprised of equal numbers of FAFN and FDS members and with responsibility for conducting police and security missions shall be deployed in the zone of confidence. These units shall be abolished when the process of reform and restructuring of the army is complete.6.3. Amnesty law

In order to promote forgiveness and national reconciliation and to restore social cohesion and solidarity among Ivorians, the two Parties to the direct dialogue agree to extend the scope of the amnesty law passed in 2003. To this end, they have decided to adopt, by ordinance, a new amnesty law covering crimes and offences related to national security and arising from the conflict that shook Côte d’Ivoire and which were committed between 17 September 2000 and the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, with the exception of economic crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity.6.4. Sanctions

The Parties to the present Agreement agree to request the African Union, through the intermediary of ECOWAS, to petition the United Nations Security Council for the immediate lifting of the personal sanctions in force against the actors in the Ivorian crisis.6.5. Programme of assistance for the return of persons displaced by the war

With a view to promoting national reconciliation and political and institutional normalization, the Parties to the direct dialogue agree to establish as early as possible a programme to provide assistance for the return of persons displaced by the war. This programme is intended to facilitate the social reintegration of individuals and families who abandoned their homes or their property on account of the war. The two Parties undertake to provide the relevant technical ministry with the resources necessary for the implementation of this programme.6.6. Code of conduct

In view of the urgent need to restore calm and integrity to public life, to create a new political environment in Côte d’Ivoire and to eschew any partisan and demagogic interpretation of the present Agreement, the Parties pledge to observe a code of conduct.6.6.1. The Parties undertake to organize a vast information and public awareness campaign targeted to the population of Côte d’Ivoire to seek their full support for the peace and national reconciliation process.6.6.2. The Parties pledge to refrain from any propaganda, particularly in the media, that is likely to undermine the spirit of national cohesion

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and unity. They appeal to the national and international press for their constructive support in promoting peace and a spirit of tolerance.6.6.3. The Parties pledge to maintain a spirit of permanent dialogue based on trust in each other, to refrain from any belligerent and offensive attitude and to call upon their respective supporters to conduct themselves with respect and decorum.6.6.4. The Parties agree to combine their efforts aimed at promoting Republican ethics and morality within their respective forces, with respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. The Parties pledge to encourage their respective forces to work together with mutual understanding.6.6.5. The Parties pledge to refrain from any use of civil society and trade union organizations that is abusive and contrary to the spirit of the present Agreement.VII. Follow-up and consultation mechanisms

In order to ensure follow-up to this Agreement and continuation of the direct dialogue, the Parties agree to establish a permanent consultation mechanism (CPC) and an evaluation and monitoring committee (CEA).7.1. Permanent consultation mechanism (CPC)

The permanent consultation mechanism is an organ for monitoring and permanent dialogue aimed at strengthening national unity. Its membership is as follows:– Mr. Laurent GBAGBO, President of the Republic– Mr. Guillaume K. SORO, Secretary-General of Forces nouvelles– Mr. Alassane Dramane OUATTARA, leader of RDR– Mr. Henri Konan BEDIE, leader of PDCI– Mr. Blaise COMPAORE, current Chairman of ECOWAS, in his capacity as Facilitator.Except for President Laurent GBAGBO and the current Chairman of ECOWAS, the other members of CPC are all heads of institutions. CPC is competent to consider any issue related to this Agreement.7.2. Evaluation and monitoring committee (CEA)

The evaluation and monitoring committee is responsible for the periodic evaluation of the implementation of the measures provided for in this Agreement. The committee may also make any practical and necessary suggestions for the effective implementation of this Agreement. Its membership is as follows:– Chairman: the Facilitator or his representative– Members: three representatives for each of the two Parties signatories to this Agreement.The two Parties shall jointly agree on the enlargement of the committee to include other members of the Ivorian political class. The Facilitator may also call upon any other observer representing a country or an international or inter-African organization, should he deem it necessary. CEA shall be chaired by the Facilitator or his

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representative. It shall meet at least once a month in ordinary session and, where necessary, in extraordinary session convened by the Chairman. In fulfilment of its mandate, CEA shall report to CPC on the implementation of the Agreement and shall so advise the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.VIII. Miscellaneous and final provisions8.1. The Parties agree to refer to arbitration by the Facilitator any dispute that may arise from the interpretation or implementation of the present Agreement.8.2. The Parties agree to request additional African troops to participate in the peacekeeping mission of the impartial forces in Côte d’Ivoire.8.3. The timetable attached to the present Agreement is an integral part hereof. The Parties agree to carry out the operations agreed upon in accordance with this timetable.8.4. The present Agreement shall enter into force upon its signing by the Parties. The Parties agree to request the Facilitator, in his capacity as current Chairman of ECOWAS, to refer the present Agreement to the United Nations Security Council through the African Union for the purpose of ratification.

Done at Ouagadougou, 4 March 2007

(Signed) Laurent GbagboPresident of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire(Signed) Guillaume Kigbafori SoroSecretary-General of Forces nouvelles of theRepublic of Côte d’Ivoire(Signed) Blaise CompaoréPresident of Burkina FasoCurrent Chairman of ECOWASFacilitator

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Timetable of implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement

1. Signing of the Ouagadougou Political AgreementDay 12. Establishment of the Integrated Command CentreBeginning two weeks after Day l3. Establishment of the institutional framework for implementationFour weeks after the signing of the Agreement4. Formation of the GovernmentFive weeks after the signing of the Agreement5. Dismantling of the zone of confidence and creation of joint unitsBeginning one week after the formation of the Government6. Disbanding of militiasBeginning two weeks after the formation of the Government and lastingtwo weeks7. Assembly (assembly by units of ex-combatants in assembly sites andstockpiling of weapons under the supervision of the impartial forces)– Redeployment of the administration– Beginning of mobile court hearings (audiences foraines)Beginning two weeks after the formation of the Government and lastingthree months8. Registration for the purpose of inclusion in the electoral roll and identificationBeginning one month after the redeployment of the mobile courts9. Unification of the opposing forces and enlistment in the Civic ServiceBeginning two weeks after the commencement of enlistment10. Preparation and issuance of the new national identity cards and voterregistration cards based on the electoral rollBeginning when the definitive electoral roll is officially adopted11. End of the DDR process and holding of electionsAll measures provided for in the above timetable shall be completed within aperiod of 10 (ten) months.

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