CONSTI FINALS NOTES-2.pdf

8/11/2019 CONSTI FINALS NOTES-2.pdf

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B. PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OFBILL.BILLS that must originate EXCLUSIVELYFROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APPROPRIATION BILLSA BILL CREATING A NEW OFFICE ANDAPPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR IS

NOT AN APPROPRITION BILL.A law regulating an industry, thoughincidentally imposing a taz does not make thelaw a revenue billRevenue billsTariff billsBills authorizing the increase of debtBills of local applicationPrivate bills

A. Procedure for enactment

Must be by any member of the HoR orsenate except for some measures that mustoriginate only from the former chamber

FIRST READING:The reading of the title and the number; thebill is passed by the Senate President orSpeaker to the proper committee

SECOND READING

Entire text is read and debates are held andamendments introduced. The bill asapproved in the second reading is printed inits final form and copies are distributedthree days before the third reading

THIRD READINGOnly the title is read, no amendments areallowed. Vote shall be taken immediatelythereafter and the yeas and nays entered inthe journal

SENT TO OTHER CHAMBEROnce the bill passes the third reading. It issent to the other chamber where it will gounder third readings

ENROLLED BILLThe bill is printed as finally approved by theCongress, authenticated with the signaturesof the Senate President or the Speaker and

the Secretary and approved by thePresident.

b. SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENTthe PRESIDENTS VETO POWER

every bill, in order to become law

must be presented to and signed by

the President

if the President does nit approve of

the bill, he shall veto the same and

return his objections to the House

from which it originated. The house

shall enter the objections in the

journal and proceed to reconsider it

the President must communicate his

decision to veto within 30days fro the

date of receipt thereof. If he fails todo so, the bill shall become a law as

if he signed it

to override the beto, at least 2/3 of

ALL the members of each house

must agree to pass the bill. In such

case the vero is overridden and

becomes a law as if he signed it

the President may veto particular

items in appropriation, revenue or

tariff bill

this veto will not affect items to which

he does not object

VETO of a Rider a rider is a provision which does

not relate to a particular

appropriation stated in the bill.

Since it is an invalid provisoon

under Section(25)2 the President

may veto it as an item.

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE(SUPRA)


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PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

1. HOUSE BILL NO. 10900, THE GENERALAPPROPRIATION BILL OF 1994 (GAB OF

1994) ! passed and approved by bothhouses of Congress on December 17,1993.

- Imposed conditions and limitations oncertain items of appropriations in theproposed budget previously submittedby the President.

- Authorized members of Congress topropose and identify projects in the"pork barrels" allotted to them and torealign their respective operating

budgets.2. President signed the bill into law, making it

as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "ANACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THEOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OFTHE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONETO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"(GAA of 1994).

3. SAME DAY: the President delivered his

Presidential Veto Message ! specifyingthe provisions of the bill he vetoed and onwhich he imposed certain conditions.

4. PETITIONERS: ASSAIL THE SPECIALPROVISION ALLOWING A MEMBER OFCONGRESS TO REALIGN HIS

ALLOCATION FOR OPERATIONALEXPENSES TO ANY OTHER EXPENSECATEGORY.

- Violates Section 25, Article 7 of theConstitution.

- To declare unconstitutional and voidTHE PROVISION UNDER ARTICLE16 OF THE COUNTRYWIDEDEVELOPMENT FUND AND THEVETO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THESPECIAL PROVISION OF ART XLVIIIOF THE GAA OF 1994.

ISSUE:


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WON the petitioners have locus standi.YES.WON the veto of the special provision in theappropriation for debt service and theautomatic appropriation of funds isconstitutional. NO, an attempt to repeal PD1177.

RATIO: A member of Congress has the legalstanding to question the validity of apresidential veto or any other act of theExecutive which injures the institution ofCongress.

- It becomes the duty of the Court to drawthe dividing line where the exercise ofexecutive power ends and the bounds oflegislative jurisdiction begin.

- EXECUTIVE FUNCTION UNDER THE

COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND:implementation of the priority projectsspecified in the law while the authoritygiven to members of Congress is only topropose and identify projects to beimplemented.o THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO THE

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IS ONLYTO PROPOSE AND IDENTIFFYPROJECTS TO BE IMPLEMENTEDBY THE PRESIDENT ! MERELY

RECOMMENDATORY.o It is the President who shall implement

them.- THE PROCEDURE OF PROPOSING AND

IDENTIFYING BY MEMBERS OFCONGRESS OF PARTICULARPROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES UNDER

ART. XLI OF THE GAA OF 1994:IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE.o CDF attempts to make equal the

unequal.

oMembers of Congress are likely to beKNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THENEEDS OF THEIR RESPECTIVECONSTITUENTS and the priority to begiven each project.

- The members ONLY DETERMINE THENECESITY OF THE REALIGNMENT OFTHE SAVINGS IN THE ALLOTMENTS fortheir operating expenses BUT IT IS THESENATE PRES. AND THE SPEAKER OF


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THE HOW WHO SHALL APPROVE THEREALIGNMENT.o They are in the best position to do so

because they are the ones who knowwhether there are savings available insome items and whether there aredeficiencies in other items of their

operating expenses that needAUGMENTATION.

o Before SP and SHOR approve:1. The funds to be realigned or

transferred are actually savings inthe items of expenditures fromwhich the same are to be taken.

2. The transfer of realignment is forthe purpose of augmenting theitems of expenditure to whichsaid transfer or realignment is to

be made.- CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

DIRECTS HIGHEST BUDGETARYPRIORITY TO EDUCATION ! MERELYDIRECTORY (Guingona vs. Carague).

- GENERALLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS TOVETO THE ENTIRE BILL, not merelyparts. EXCEPT in regard to generalappropriations bills where he may veto anyparticular item or items, in which case hehas to veto the ENTIRE ITEM.

- DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATEPROVISION: any provision which doesNOT RELATE to ANY PARTICULARITEM, or which EXTENDS IN ITSOPERATION BEYOND AN ITEM OF

APPROPRIATION ! CAN BE VETOEDSEPARATELY FROM AN ITEM.o UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

and PROVISIONS WHICH AREINTENDED TO AMEND OTHERLAWS ! these are maters of general

legislation more appropriately dealtwith in separate enactments.

- Second paragraph of SP No. 2 !divergence in policy of Congress (30% ofthe total appropriation for roadmaintenance should be contracted out)and the President (70% - more efficient,economical and practical) ! VETO ISUNCONSTITUTIONAL.o The SP is NOT AN INAPPROPRIATE


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PROVISION ! NOT ALIEN to theappropriation for road maintenance.

o SPECIFIC: 70% by administrative and30% by contract.

- SP requiring that all purchases ofmedicines by the AFP should strictlycomply with formulary embodied in the

National Drug Policy of the Department ofHealth (RA No. 6675) ! an appropriateprovision ! VETO ISUNCONSTITUTIONAL.o Directly related to and inseparable

from the appropriation item onpurchases of medicines by AFP !SPcannot be vetoed by the Presidentwithout also vetoing the said item.

- Appropriation for the modernization ofAFP: SP No. 2 (Use of Fund) and entire

SP No. 3 (Specific Prohibition) !VETOIS VALID.o SP No. 2 is an exercise of the

congressional or legislative veto !ameans by the legislature can block ormodify admin action taken under astatute; a form of legislative control inthe implementation of particularexecutive actions ! what Congresscannot do directly by law it cannot doindirectly by attaching conditions to the

exercise of that power.o SP No. 3 is violative of the

Constitutional prohibition on thepassage of laws that impair theobligation of contracts ! benefitsshould be covered by directappropriations.

- Condition on the deactivation of theCAFGUs!VETO IS VALID.o PRESIDENT MSG: The deactivation

should be done in accordance to his

timetable, taking into consideration thepeace and order situation in theaffected localities.

o Appropriation law is not the propervehicle for such purpose ! must bemanifested in another law; existinglaws on the CAFGUs need to beamended.

- Conditions on the appropriation for the SC,Ombudsman, COA, and CHR !

Petitioner: Fiscal autonomy? VETOESARE VALID.o The issuance of administrative

guidelines on the use of public fundsauthorized by Congress is simply anexercise by the President of hisconstitutional duty to see that the laws

are faithfully executed.- The Courts interpretation of the law is par

of that law as of the date of its enactment.


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GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: upheld theauthority of the President and other keyofficials to augment any item or anyappropriation from savings in the interestof EXPEDIENCY and EFFICIENCY.

FACTS:

1. Dec. 1988: Congress passed House BillNo. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989)which eliminated or decreased certainitems included in the proposed budgetsubmitted by the President.

2. Dec. 1988: President signed bill into law(RA 6688) but VETOED 7 SPECIALPROVISIONS AND SEC 55, A GENERALPROVISION.

3. Feb. 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 !Senate as an institution decided to contestthe constitutionality of the veto of thepresident of SEC 55 only ! DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL, therefore VOID.

- SEC. 55 disallows the president andheads of several departments to augmentany item in the GAB !violation ART. VISEC 25(5).

4. PETITIONER: (1) the President's line-vetopower as regards appropriation bills is

limited to item/s and does not coverprovision/s; therefore, she exceeded herauthority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY'89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which areprovisions; (2) When the President objectsto a provision of an appropriation bill, shecannot exercise the item-veto power butshould veto the entire bill; (3) The item-veto power does not carry with it the powerto strike out conditions or restrictions forthat would be legislation, in violation of the

doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)The power of augmentation in Article VI,Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, hasto be provided for by law and, therefore,Congress is also vested with theprerogative to impose restrictions on theexercise of that power.

5. SOLICITOR GENERAL: (1) the issue inthe present case is a political questionbeyond the power of this Court to


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determine; (2) Gonzales et al. had apolitical remedy, which was to override theveto; (3) Section 55 is a "rider" because itis extraneous to the Appropriations Actand, therefore, merits the President's veto;(4) The power of the President to augmentitems in the appropriations for the

executive branches had already beenprovided for in the Budget Law, specificallySections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, asamended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988);and(5) The President is empowered by the

Constitution to veto provisions or other

"distinct and severable parts" of an

Appropriations Bill.

ISSUES:

WON Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY'90) are provisions, not items, in theappropriation bill. NO.WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 ofthe 1989 Appropriation Bill, and subsequently,its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990

Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional andwithout effect. NO.

RATIO: THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATEPROVISIONS THAT SHOULD BE TREATED

AS ITEMS: The challenged "provisions" fallshort of this requirement.

1. The vetoed "provisions" do not relate toany particular or distinctive appropriation.They apply generally to all itemsdisapproved or reduced by Congress inthe Appropriations Bill.

2. The disapproved or reduced items are

nowhere to be found on the face of theBill. To discover them, resort will have tobe made to the original recommendationsmade by the President and to the sourceindicated by the "Legislative BudgetResearch and Monitoring Office."

3. The vetoed Sections are more of anexpression of Congressional policy inrespect of augmentation from savings


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rather than a budgetary appropriation.

They are even inappropriate conditions:THEY ARE ACTUALLY GENERAL LAWMEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE FORSUBSTANTIVE AND, THEREFORE,

SEPARATE LEGISLATION.

- SECTIONS 55 (FY '89) AND 16 (FY '90)PARTAKE MORE OF A CURTAILMENTON THE POWER TO AUGMENT FROMSAVINGS; IN OTHER WORDS, "AGENERAL PROVISION OF LAW,WHICH HAPPENS TO BE PUT IN ANAPPROPRIATION BILL."

- The veto power of the President isexpressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the

1987 Constitution.- IT ALLOWS THE EXERCISE OF THE

VETO OVER A PARTICULAR ITEM ORITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION,REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL.

- The President may not veto less than allof an item of an Appropriations Bill !THE POWER GIVEN THE EXECUTIVETO DISAPPROVE ANY ITEM OR ITEMSIN AN APPROPRIATIONS BILL DOESNOT GRANT THE AUTHORITY TO

VETO A PART OF AN ITEM AND TOAPPROVE THE REMAINING PORTIONOF THE SAME ITEM.

- The restrictive interpretation urged byGonzales et al. that the President may notveto a provision without vetoing the entirebill NOT ONLY DISREGARDS THEBASIC PRINCIPLE THAT A DISTINCT

AND SEVERABLE PART OF A BILL MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATEVETO BUT ALSO OVERLOOKS THE

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THATANY PROVISION IN THE GENERALAPPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALLRELATE SPECIFICALLY TO SOMEPARTICULAR APPROPRIATIONTHEREIN AND THAT ANY SUCHPROVISION SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITSOPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATIONTO WHICH IT RELATES.

- THE PRESIDENT PROMPTLY VETOED

SECTION 55 (FY '89) AND SECTION 16(FY '90) BECAUSE THEY NULLIFY THE

AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEFEXECUTIVE AND HEADS OFDIFFERENT BRANCHES OFGOVERNMENT TO AUGMENT ANYITEM IN THE GENERAL

APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIRRESPECTIVE OFFICES FROMSAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIRRESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS, asguaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) ofthe Constitution.

- When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY'90) prohibit the restoration or increase byaugmentation of appropriationsdisapproved or reduced by CongressTHEY IMPAIR THE CONSTITUTIONAL

AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THEPRESIDENT AND OTHER KEYOFFICIALS TO AUGMENT ANY ITEMOR ANY APPROPRIATION FROMSAVINGS IN THE INTEREST OFEXPEDIENCY AND EFFICIENCY.o The exercise of such authority in

respect of disapproved or reduceditems by no means VESTS IN THEEXECUTIVE THE POWER TOREWRITE THE ENTIRE BUDGET.


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BENGZON VS. DRILON

FACTS:

1. Petitioners ! retired justices of theSupreme Court and Court of Appeals who

are currently receiving pensions under RA910 as amended by RA 1797.

2. President Marcos issued a decreerepealing section 3-A of RA 1797 whichauthorized the adjustment of the pensionof retired justices and officers and enlistedmembers of the AFP.

3. PD 1638 was eventually issued byMarcos which provided for the automaticreadjustment of the pension of officersand enlisted men was restored, while that

of the retired justices was not.4. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297

in 1990.5. President Aquino issued the veto now

challenged in this petition.6. VETOED BILL: PROVIDED FOR THE

INCREASE OF THE PENSIONS OF THERETIRED JUSTICES OF THE SUPREMECOURT, AND THE COURT OF

APPEALS AS WELL AS MEMBERS OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION.

7. Marcos issued PD 644 which repealed RA1797, BUT IT never became a valid lawabsent its publication, thus there was nolaw !that RA 1797 was still in effect andHB 16297 was superfluous because ittried to restore benefits which were nevertaken away validly. The veto of HB 16297did not also produce any effect.

8. PETITIONERS: (1) The subject veto is notan item veto. YES, they are provisions,(2) The veto by the Executive is violative

of the doctrine of separation of powers,(3) The veto deprives the retired Justicesof their rights to the pensions due to them,(4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal

Autonomy granted by the Constitution.YES.

ISSUE:

WON the veto by the President of certain


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provisions in the GAA 1992 relating to thepayment of the adjusted portions of retiredJustices of the SC and CA is unconstitutional.YES.

RATIO: The act of the Executive in vetoing the

particular provisions is an exercise of aconstitutionally vested power.

- BUT EVEN AS THE CONSTITUTIONGRANTS THE POWER, IT ALSOPROVIDES LIMITATIONS TO ITSEXERCISE. THE VETO POWER IS NOT

ABSOLUTE.- IN THE EXERCISE OF THE VETO

POWER, IT IS GENERALLY ALL ORNOTHING.

- However, when it comes to appropriation,revenue or tariff bills, the Administrationneeds the money to run the machinery ofgovernment and it cannot veto the entirebill even if it may contain objectionablefeatures.o The President is, therefore,

compelled to approve into law theentire bill, including its undesirableparts.

o It is for this reason that the

Constitution has wisely provided the"item veto powers" to avoidinexpedient riders being attached toan indispensable appropriation orrevenue measure.

- GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: TheConstitution provides that ONLY APARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS MAY BEVETOED. The power to disapprove anyitem or items in an appropriate bill doesnot grant the authority to veto a part of an

item and to approve the remaining portionof the same item.

- THE ARE PROVISIONS, NOT items: theaugmentation of specific appropriationsfound inadequate to pay retirementpayments, BY TRANSFERRINGSAVINGS FROM OTHER ITEMS OF

APPROPRIATION IS A PROVISION ANDNOT AN ITEM. WHY? It gives power tothe Chief Justice to transfer funds from


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one item to another. There is no specificappropriation of money involved.

- WHAT THE PRESIDENT REALLYVETOED:

1. RA 1797 enacted as early as Jun 21,1957 (provided for the adjustment ofpensions of retired Justices which

privilege was extended to retiredmembers of the ConCom).

2. The Resolution of the SupremeCourt (Nov. 28, 1991).

- SINCE PD 644 NEVER REALLYBECAME A LAW (AND THE COURTHAD ALREADY RULED ABOUT THAT),IT COULD NOT HAVE REPEALED RA1797 ! VETOING THIS IS BEYONDTHE PRESIDENTS POWER.O WHY? THE EXECUTIVE HAS NOT

AUTHORITY TO SET ASIDE ANDOVERRULE A DECISION OF THESC.

O The Presidents power is merely toexecute the laws as passed byCongress.

O THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWERTO ENACT OR AMEND STATUTESPROMULAGATED BY HERPREDECESSORS, MUCH LESS TOREPEAL EXISTING LAWS.

- FISCAL AUTONOMY:1. The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the

Judiciary, the Civil ServiceCommission, the Commission on

Audit, the Commission on Elections,and the Office of the Ombudsmancontemplates A GUARANTEE OFFULL FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOCATE

AND UTILIZE THEIR RESOURCESWITH THE WISDOM ANDDISPATCH THAT THEIR NEEDS

REQUIRE.2. It recognizes THE POWER AND

AUTHORITY TO LEVY, ASSESSAND COLLECT FEES, FIX RATESOF COMPENSATION NOTEXCEEDING THE HIGHESTRATES AUTHORIZED BY LAWFOR COMPENSATION AND PLAYPLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT

AND ALLOCATE AND DISBURSE

SUCH SUMS as may be provided bylaw or prescribed by them in thecourse of the discharge of theirfunctions.

3. Fiscal autonomy means FREEDOMFROM OUTSIDE CONTROL.

4. The Judiciary, the Constitutiona

Commissions, and the OmbudsmanMUST HAVE THE INDEPENDENCE

AND FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN THEDISCHARGE OF THEIRCONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES.

- THE FREEDOM OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE IS WITHHELD: TO MAKE

ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UTILIZATIONOF THE FUNDS APPROPRIATED FORTHE EXPEDITURES OF THEJUDICIARY, INCLUDING THE USE OF

ANY SAVINGS FROM ANYPARTICULAR ITEM TO COVERDEFICITS OR SHORTAGES IN OTHERITEMS OF THE JUDICIARY.O It knows its priorities just as it is

aware of the fiscal restraints.- Retired Justices have a vested right to the

accrued pensions due to them pursuant toRA 1797.


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MILLER VS. MARDO

FACTS:

1. CASE 1: Manuel Gonzales filed complaintagainst Bill Miller at the Department of

Labor, claiming that he is a driver of Millerand was arbitrarily dismissed withoutseparation pay.

- Miller filed petition for prohibitionagainst Hearing Officer Mardo of theDept. of Labor on ground that HOhas no jurisdiction to hear anddecide on the case.

- Court rendered decision thoughthat Reorg. Plan 2-A did notrepeal Judiciary Act that conferred

to CFI original jurisdiction to takecognizance of money claimsregarding violations of laborstandards.

2. CASE 2: Cresencio Estano filed complaintat the Department of Labor against ChinHua Trading Co., for not being paidovertime and vacation leave pay as adriver in the company.

- Court issued permanent injunctionagainst hearing the cases by the

Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-Ais null and void.

3. CASE 3: Numeriana Raganas filed withCFI a complaint against Sen Bee TradingCompany for being underpaid, not beingpaid overtime, without sick leave andvacation leave pay, as a seamstress

- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, andinsisted that CFI does not have

jurisdiction as money claims must befiled with Regional Office of

Department of Labor under Reorg.Plan 2-A

4. CASE 4: Vicente Romero filed caseagainst Sia Seng at the DOL Sia Leng didnot file an answer and a decision wasrendered in favor of Romero.

- But Labor Administrator Hernandorefused to issue the writ of executionof the decision as he believed thatSia Seng deserved to be heard.


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- They insist as well that Reorg. Planis not validly passed as a statute andunconstitutional.

5. CASE 5: Mariano Pabillare filed at theDOL a complaint against Fred Wilsonand Co., as he was summarilydismissed without cause, without

separation pay, and without sufficientnotice.

- They moved to dismiss as it is onlyan administrative body, with nopower to adjudicate money claims.

ISSUE:

WON the par. 5, Art. VI of Reorganization PlanNo. 20-A is valid. NO.

RATIO: Under this provision, the regionaloffices of the Department of Labor have beengiven ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVEJURISDICTION OVER:

1. All cases falling under the WORKMENSCOMPENSATION LAW.

2. All cases affecting MONEY CLAIMSarising from VIOLATIONS OF LABORSTANDARDS ON WORKINGCONDITIONS, UNPAID WAGES,

UNDERPAYMENT, OVERTIME,SEPARATION PAY AND MATERNITYLEAVE OF EMPLOYEES ANDLABORERS.

3. All cases for UNPAID WAGES,OVERTIME, SEPARATION PAY,VACATION PAY AND PAYMENT FORMEDICAL SERVICES OF DOMESTICHEALTH.

Before, DOL had no authority over B and C !

ONLY AUTHORITY: to mediate merely orarbitrate when the parties so agree in writing !ERGO, B and C ARE NEW CONFERMENTOF POWER.

- NOT VALID BECAUSE: THESEFUNCTIONS (RA 1241 ! CREATINGTHE GOVERNMENT SURVEY ANDREORGANIZATION COMMISSION)REFER MERELY TO ADMINISTRATIVE,

not judicial functions.- Why? THE GSRC was created to carry

out the reorganization of the EXECUTIVEBRANCH OF THE NATIONALGOVERNMENT, which plainly DID NOTINCLUDE THE CREATION OF COURTS.

- Constitution: the Judicial power shall be

vested in one SC and in such inferiorcourts as may be established by law.

- THE LEGISLATURE CAN CONFER ROADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS OR BODIESQUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS !MUST BESTATED IN ITS INTENTION INEXPRESS TERMS THAT WOULDLEAVE NO DOUBT, AS EVEN QUASI-JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES MUST BELIMITED, IF THEY ARE TO BE VALID !ONLY INCIDENTAL TO OR IN

CONNETION WITH THEPERFORMANCE OF JURISDICTIONOVER A MATTER EXCLUSIVELYVESTED IN THE COURTS.

- CANNOT BE IMPLIED FROM A MEREGRANT OF POWER TO A BODY SUCH

AS THE GSRC.- COROMINAS V. LABOR STANDARDS

THELEGISLATURE MAY NOT ANDCANNOT DELEGATE ITS POWER TOLEGISLATE OR CREATE COURTS OF

JUSTICCE TO ANY OTHER AGENCYOF THE GOVERNMENT.

- THE PLAN BECAME A LAW BY NON-ACTION ON THE PART OFCONGRESS:

1. The Reorganization Commissionsubmitted Reorganization Plan No20-A to the President.

2. President transmitted the same toCongress.

3. Congress adjourned WITHOUT

PASSING A RESOLUTIONDISAPPROVING OR ADOPTINGTHE SAD PLAN.

- Violates the constitutional provisionrequiring POSITIVE and SEPARATE

ACTION BY EACH HOUSE of Congress! REVERSAL OF DEMOCRATICPROCESS.


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EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

ARTICLE 2 OF CCLAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER 15DAYSFOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THEIRPUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE,UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED.

THIS CODE SHALL TAKE EEFECT ONEYEAR AFTER SUCH PUBLICATION

unless otherwise provide this phrase refers tothe date of effectivity and nit the publication isindispensable.

TANADA VS. TUVERA: nakalimutan ko nakasi tong case na to !

EO 200

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OFLAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIALGAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OFGENERAL CIRCULATION IN THEPHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FORTHEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code

partly provides that "laws shall take effectafter fifteen days following the completion oftheir publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided . . . ;" cdasia

WHEREAS, the requirement that forlaws to be effective only a publicationthereof in the Official Gazette will sufficehas entailed some problems, a pointrecognized by the Supreme Court inTaada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No.63915, December 29, 1986), when it

observed that "[t]here is much to be said ofthe view that the publication need not bemade in the Official Gazette, considering itserratic release and limited readership;"

WHEREAS, it was likewise observedthat "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of generalcirculation could better perform the functionof communicating the laws to the people assuch periodicals are more easily available,

have a wider readership, and come outregularly;" and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoingpremises Article 2 of the Civil Code shouldaccordingly be amended so the laws to beeffective must be published either in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.AQUINO, President of the Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vested in me by theConstitution, do hereby order:

SECTION 1.Laws shall take effectafter fifteen days following the completion oftheir publication either in the OfficialGazette or in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the Philippines, unless it is

otherwise provided. cdtaiSECTION 2.Article 2 of Republic Act

No. 386, otherwise known as the "CivilCode of the Philippines," and all other lawsinconsistent with this Executive Order arehereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 3.This Executive Order shalltake effect immediately after its publicationin the Official Gazette.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th

day of June, in the year of Our Lord,Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.

Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83 No26 Page 3038-A on June 29, 1987.

QUESTION HOUR AND LEGISLATIVEINVESTIGATION

SEC21-22 OF THE CONSTITUTION


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ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

FACTS:

1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE- The Philippine government LEASED

FROM SAN JUAN DE DIOSHOSPITAL FOR 25 YEARS theBuenavista estate ! had anOPTION TO PURCHASE THESAME FOR P 3 MILLION.

- Republic tendered the owner thesum of P 3 million !REJECTED !deposit the said funds in Court,together with the accrued rentals ofP 324,000.

- SAN JUAN DE DIOS ON JUNE 29,

1946 SOLD THIS SAMEPROPERTY TO ERNEST H. BURT,a non-resident American for P5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with thebalance payable under veryfavorable terms ! BURT WASUNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THETERMS AGREED.

2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE- THE SAME BURT PURCHASE

FROM PHILIPPINE TRUSTCORPORATION, THETAMBOBONG ESTATE FOR P 1.2MILLION WITH A DOWNPAYMENTOF P 10,000.00.

- THERE WAS HOWEVER NOOTHER PAYMENT RECEIVEDFROM BURT.

- THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT,THROUGH THE RURALPROGRESS ADMINISTRATION,

ACQUIRED THIS SAMEPROPERTY FROM ITS ORIGINALOWNER FOR THE SUM OF P750,000 ! instituted a notarialdemand upon Burt FOR THERESOLUTION ANDCANCELLATION OF HISCONTRACT OF PURCHASE WITHPHILIPPINE TRUST FOR NONPAYMENT.


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3. FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER,DESPITE THE FACT THE PHILIPPINEGOVERNMENT ALREADY OWNEDBOTH THE ABOVE ESTATE, IT AGAINBOUGHT THE SAME FROM BURT: P4.5million = Buenavista and P500k =Tambobong).

4. The government paid initially P1,000,000 for Buenavista and the fullamount of P 500,000 for Tambobongthrough TWO CORPORATIONS ACTING

AS BURTS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT !REPRESENTED IN THE TRASACTIONBY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON,PET. JEAN L. ARNAULT.

5. The transactions resulted into a publicoutcry which led into THE PHILIPPINESENATE ADOPTING RESOLUTION 8

WHICH CREATED A SPECIALCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THEBUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONGESTATES DEAL.

6. Among the witnesses and apparently themost important was PET. JEAN

ARNAULT, THE PERSON WHOREPRESENTED BURT IN THETRANSACTIONS.

7. During the said hearing, ARNAULTCONFIRMED RECEIVING THE MONEY

FROM THE GOVERNMENT ANDWITHDRAWING, IN CASH, P440,000WHICH HE GAVE TO SOMEONE ONINSTRUCTION OF BURT.

8. WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY THEPERSON HE GAVE THE MONEY TO,HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOWHIS NAME DESPITE THE FACT THATHE MET THE PERSON ON MANYOCCASIONS.

9. WHEN PRESSED TO ANSWER, HE

ALSO SAID THAT ANSWERING THEQUESTION MIGHT INCRIMINATE HIM! SENATE ARRAIGNED HIM FORCONTEMPT AND SUBSEQUENTLYFOUND HIM GUILTY OF THE CHARGE.

10. He was committed to the custody of theSenate Sergeant at arms until he revealsthe name of the person he gave themoney to.

11. PETITIONER: (1) Senate has no power to


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punish him for contempt for refusing toreveal the name of the person BECAUSESUCH INFORMATION IS IMMATERIALTO, AND WILL NOT SERVE, ANYINTENDED OR PURPORTEDLEGISLATION AND HIS REFUSAL TO

ANSWER THE QUESTION: NOT

EMBARASSED, OBSTRUCTED, ORIMPEDED THE LEGISLATIVEPROCESS. (2) The Senate lack authorityto commit him for contempt FOR A TERMBEYOND ITS PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVESESSION (Lopez vs. De los Reyes). (3)He would incriminate himself if he shouldreveal the name of the person to whom hegave the money.

12. SENATOR SUMULONG, CHAIRMAN OFTHE COMMITTEE: the investigation had

NOT BEEN COMPLETD because of thecontumacy of the witness.

- Res. No. 16: his committee wasempowered and directed to continueits investigation ! THEEXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

ISSUE:

WON the question for the refusal to answerwhich the petitioner was held in contempt by

the Senate is pertinent to the matter underinquiry.YES.WON the Senate lack authority to commit himfor contempt for a term beyond its period oflegislative process. NO, they have suchauthority.

RATIO: THE POWER OF INQUIRYWITHTHE PROCESS TO ENFORCE ITIS ANESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE

AUXILLARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE

FUNCTION.

- A legislative body cannot legislate wiselyor effectively IN THE ABSENCE OFNFORMATION RESPECTING THECONDITIONS WHICH THELEGISLATION IS INTENDED TO

AFFECT OR CHANGE.- MERE REQUESTS FOR SUCH

INFORMATION ARE OFTEN


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UNAVAILING, and also that informationWHICH IS VOLUNTEERED IS NOT

ALWAYS ACCURATE OR COMPLETE!SO SOME MEANS OF COMPULSIONIS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN WHAT ISNEEDED.

- Does NOT by necessary implication

EXCLUDE THE POWER TO PUNISHFOR CONTEMPT ANY OTHERPERSON.

- BUT no person can be punished forcontumacy as a witness UNLESS HISTESTIMONY IS REQUIRED IN AMATTER INTO WHICH THAT HOUSEHAS JURISDICTION TO INQUIRE.

THE MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTIONMUST BE DETERMINED BY ITS DIRECT

RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRYand not by its indirect relation to any proposedor possible legislation.

- The necessity or lack of necessity forlegislative action and the form andcharacter of the action itself aredetermined by THE SUM TOTAL OF THEINFORMATION TO BE GATHERED AS ARESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION.

- THE RULING OF THE SENATE ON THE

MATERIALITY OF THE INFORMATIONSOUGHT FROM THE WITNESS ISPRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.

- The Court cannot determine, any morethan it can direct Congress, whatlegislation to approve or not to approve !THAT WOULD BE AN INVASION OFTHE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE.

- THERE IS NOTHING T PREVENT THECONGRESS FROM APPROVINGOTHER MEASURES IT MAY DEEM

NECESSARY AFTER COMPLETINGTHE INVESTIGATION ! It is not withinthe Courts province to determine orimagine what those measures may be:Same as RE CHAPMAN.

- IF THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATIONBEFORE THE COMMITTEE IS WITHINTHE RANGE OF LEGITIMATELEGISLATIVE INQUIRY AND THEPROPOSED TESTIMONY OF THE


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WITNESS CALLED RELATES TO THATSUBJECT,OBEDIENCE TO ITSPROCESS MAY BE ENFORCED BY THECOMMITTEE BY IMPRISONMENT.

- Until after the Senate shall havedetermined who the parties responsibleare and shall have taken such measures

as may be within its competence to taketo redress the wrong that may have beencommitted against the people as a resultof the transaction.

THE SENATE O FTHE PHILIPPINES IS ACONTINUING BODY.

- THE RESOLUTION OF COMMITMENTWAS ADOPTED BY THE SENATE,WHICH IS A CONTINUING BODY AND

WHICH DOES NOT CEASE TO EXISTUPON THE PERIODICAL DISSOLUTIONOF THE CONGRESS OR OF THE HOR! no limit as to time to the Senatespower to punish for contempt in caseswhere that power may constitutionally beexerted ! THE INVESTIGATION HASNOT BEEN COMPLETED.o If NOT, the Senate would have to

resume the investigation andREPEAT THE CONTEMPT

PROCEEDINGS ! absurd,unnecessary, and vexatiousprocedure !AVOIDED.

- HIS INSISTENT CLAIM BEFORE THEBAR OF THE SENATE THAT IF HESHOULD REVEAL THE NAME HEWOULD INCRIMINATE HIMSELF,NECESSARILY IMPLIED THAT HEKNEW THE NAME!UNBELIEVABLE.

- HE GAVE THE MONEY TO AREPRESENTATIVE OF BURT IN

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LATTERSVERBAL INSTRUCTION ! no basisupon which to sustain his claim that toanswer might incriminate him.

- HE HAS A CLEAR DUTY AS A CITIZENTO GIVE FRANK, SINCERE, ANDTRUTHFUL TESTIMONY BEFORE ACOMPETENT AUTHORITY. THE STATEHAS THE RIGHT TO EXACTFULFILLMENT OF A CITIZEN'S

OBLIGATION, CONSISTENT OFCOURSE WITH HIS RIGHT UNDER THECONSTITUTION.


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ARNAULT VS. BALAGTAS

FACTS:

1. While still in confinement in Bilibid, PET.ARNAULT EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT!

history of the government purchase andNAMING JESS SANTOS AS THEPERSON WHO RECEIVED THE P440k:presented evidence in corroborationthereof.

2. The Senate Committee conducted aninvestigation.

3. At the end of the hearing, THECOMMITTEE DID NOT BELIEVE

ARNAULTS STATEMENT ! Res. No.114: continued confinement of Arnault

until HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OFCONTEMPT.

4. PET. ARNAULT filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus.

5. CFI-Pasay City declared the CONTINUEDDETENTION AND CONFINEMNT ISILLEGAL!Senate: GAD.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioner had already purged himselfof the contempt charges when he disclosed thefact that the one to whom he gave the moneyis Jess Santos. NOT YET.WON the Court can review the findings of theSenate Special Committee regarding thepetitioners statement. NO.

RATIO: SENATE FINDING: the fact thatPETITIONER "HAS FAILED AND REFUSED,

AND CONTINUES TO FAIL AND REFUSE,TO REVEAL THE PERSON TO WHOM HEGAVE THE AMOUNT OF P440,000" ANDTHAT THE SITUATION OF PETITIONER"HAS NOT MATERIALLY CHANGED SINCEHE WAS COMMITTED TO PRISON."

- CFI, arrogating unto itself the power toreview such finding, held that THE"PETITIONER HAS SATISFACTORILY


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EVERY ACT OF REFUSAL, EVERY ACTOF DEFIANCE, EVERY ACT OFCONTUMACY AGAINST IT, THELEGISLATIVE BODY MUST RESORT TOTHE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE

APPROPRIATE REMEDY?- LEGISLATURE: THE PROCESS BY

WHICH A CONTUMACIOUS WITNESSIS EALTH BY THEM IS TO ENABLE ITTO EXERCISE ITS LEGISLATIVEPOWER OF AUTHORTIY ! necessaryconcomitant of the legislative power orprocess.O LEGISLATURE'S AUTHORITY TO

DEAL WITH THE DEFIANT ANDCONTUMACIOUS WITNESSSHOULD BE SUPREME, and unlessthere is a manifest and absolute

disregard of discretion and a mereexertion of arbitrary power comingwithin the reach of constitutionallimitations, the exercise of theauthority is not subject to judicialinterference.

- DIFFERENT FROM JUDICIARY: THEPROCESS BY WHICH OFFENDERS

ARE BROUGHT TO THE COURTS OFJUSTICE FOR THE MEETING OF THEPUNISHMENT WHICH THE CRIMINAL

LAW IMPOSES UPON THEM ! has todo with the enforcement and applicationof the criminal law.

- In order that the petitioner may beconsidered as having purged himself ofthe contempt, IT IS NECESSARY THATHE SHOULD HAVE TESTIFIEDTRUTHFULLY, DISCLOSING THE REALIDENTITY OF THE PERSON SUBJECTOF THE INQUIRY.

- THE SENATE COMMITTEE REFUSED

TO BELIEVE, AND JUSTLY, THAT ISTHE REAL NAME OF THE PERSONWHOSE IDENTITY IS BEING THESUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.O Be taken as insult to the intelligence

of the honorable members of thebody that conducted theinvestigation.

- Period of punishment for contemptalready exceeded? NO. ONLY 5

MONTHS HAD PASSED: AFFIDAVIT !Dec. 13, 1951; RESOLUTON: Nov. 61952.


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BENGZON VS. SEN. BLUE RIB.COMMITTEE

FACTS:

1. The RP (rep. PCGG) filed with the

Sandiganbayan civil case: RP vs.Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez ! allegesthat defendants BENJAMIN andJULIETTE R. took advantage of theirrelationship with defendants Ferdinandand Imelda Marcos TO ENGAGE INSCHEMES TO ENRICH THEMSELVES

AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FILIPINOPEOPLE.

2. THE SENATE MINORITY FLOORLEADER, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

! a speech "on a matter of personalprivilege" before the Senate ON THE

ALLEGED "TAKE-OVER OF SOLOILINCORPORATED, THE FLAGSHIP OFTHE FIRST MANILA MANAGEMENT OFCOMPANIES (FMMC) BY RICARDOLOPA" and called upon "THE SENATETO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBLEVIOLATION OF THE LAW IN THE CASE,PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TOREPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, THE ANTI-

GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICESACT."

3. Referred by the Senate to theCOMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OFPUBLIC OFFICERS (BLUE RIBBONCOMMITTEE).

4. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committeestarted its investigation on the matter.

5. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa weresubpoenaed by the Committee to appearbefore it and TESTIFY ON "WHAT THEY

KNOW" REGARDING THE "SALE OFTHE THIRTY-SIX (36) CORPORATIONSBELONGING TO BENJAMIN "KOKOY"ROMUALDEZ.

6. LOPA ! declined: his testimony mayunduly prejudice the defendants of theCivil Case. BENGZON ! refused:invoked his constitutional right to dueprocess.

7. SBRC REJECTED the please. THE


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Security pushed through, WITH ONLYCOL. BALUTAN AND BRIG. GEN.GUDANI AMONG ALL THE AFPOFFICIALS INVITED ATTENDING.

9. For defying President Arroyo's orderbarring military personnel from testifyingbefore legislative inquiries without her

approval, BRIG. GEN. GUDANI ANDCOL. BALUTAN WERE RELIEVEDFROM THEIR MILITARY POSTS ANDWERE MADE TO FACE COURTMARTIAL PROCEEDINGS.

10. Another investigation on the allegedmismanagement and use of the fertilizerfund!most of them failed to attend.

11. Budget hearings ! communicated theirinability to attend due to lack ofappropriate clearance from the Pres.

ISSUES:

WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power ofinquiry vested in Congress.YES.

RATIO: POWER OF INQUIRY: SEC. 21, ART.VI: may conduct inquries IN AID OFLEGISLATION.

- Essential and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function.- A legislative body cannot legislate wisely

or effectively in the absence of informationrespecting the conditions which thelegislation is intended to affect or change;and where the legislative body does notitself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recoursemust be had to others who do possess it.

- BROAD ENOUGH TO COVEROFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE

BRANCH.- THE OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT,

BEING A LEGITI-MATE SUBJECT FORLEGISLATION, IS A PROPER SUB-JECTFOR INVESTIGATION.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: the power of theGovernment to WITHHOLD INFORMATIONFROM THE PUBLIC, THE COURTS, AND


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THE CONGRESS (Schwartz).

- The right of the President and high-levelexecutive branch officers to withholdinformation from Congress, the courts,and ultimately the public (Rozell).

- Premised on the fact that CERTAIN

INFORMATIONS MUST, AS A MATTEROF NECESSITY, BE KEPTCONFIDENTIAL IN PURSUIT OF THEPUBLIC INTEREST.

1. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE:information is of such nature that ITSDISCLOSURE WOULD SUBVERTCRUCIAL MILITARY ORDIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES.

2. INFORMERS PRIVILEGE: theprivilege of the Government NOT TO

DISCLOSE THE IDEN-TITY OFPERSONS WHO FURNISHINFORMA-TION OF VIOLATIONSOF LAW to officers charges with theenforcement of that law.

3. GENERIC PRIVILEGE: for internaldeliberations ! intragovernmentaldocuments reflecting advisoryopinions, recommendations anddeliberations comprising part of aprocess by which government

decisions and policies areformulated.

- REQUIRED INFO MUST FALL WITHINONE OF THE TRADITIONALPRIVILEGES + PRIVILEGE NEEDS TOBE HONORED IN A GIVENPROCEDURAL SETTING.

- US VS. NIXON: (privilege againstproduction of certain tapes anddocuments relating to the Watergateinvestigations) rejected the President's

claim of privilege, ruling that THEPRIVILEGE MUST BE BALANCED

AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST INTHE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OFCRIMINAL JUSTICE.

- ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ: The privilegeis fundamental to the operation ofgovernment and inextricably rooted in theseparation of powers under theConstitution . . .


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- CHAVEZ VS. PCGG: governmentalprivilege against public disclosure withrespect to state secrets regarding military,diplomatic and other national securitymatters.

- CHAVEZ VS. PEA: The right toinformation does not extend to matters

recognized as "privileged informationunder the separation of powers," by whichthe Court meant Presidentialconversations, correspondences, anddiscussions in closed-door Cabinetmeetings.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, WHETHERASSERTED AGAINST CONGRESS, THECOURTS, OR THE PUBLIC, ISRECOGNIZED ONLY IN RELATION TOCERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION OF

A SENSITIVE CHARACTER.- While executive privilege is a

constitutional concept, A CLAIMTHEREOF MAY BE VALID OR NOTDEPENDING ON THE GROUNDINVOKED TO JUSTIFY IT AND THECONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS MADE.

SECTION 1 (VALID ON ITS FACE): applied todepartment heads not made to depend onthe department heads possession of any

information which might be covered byexecutive privilege.

- The consent is grounded on ART. VI, Sec.22: QUESTION HOUR !ATTENDANCEWAS MEANT TO BE DISCRETIONARY.o OBJECTIVE: to obtain information in

pursuit of Congress oversightfunction. .

- Sec. 21: ATTENDANCE WASCOMPULSORY IN INQUIRIES IN AID OF

LEGISLATION.o OBJECTIVE: to illicit information that

may be used for legislation.- The power of Congress to compel the

appearance of executive officials underSection 21 and the lack of it under Section22 ! basis: principle of separation ofpowers.

- WHILE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS ACO-EQUAL BRANCH OF THE


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LEGISLATURE, IT CANNOTFRUSTRATE THE POWER OFCONGRESS TO LEGISLATE BYREFUSING TO COMPLY WITH ITSDEMANDS FOR INFORMATION.

- ONLY ONE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL MAYBE EXEMPTED FROM THIS POWER

THE PRESIDENT ON WHOMEXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED exceptthrough the power of impeachment.WHY? DUE RESPECT ACCORDED TO

A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OFGOVERNMENT WHICH ISSANCTIONED BY A LONG-STANDINGCUSTOM.

SECTION 2(b) [INVALID BECAUSE IT IS NOTASSERTED, MERELY IMPLIED]: executive

privilege actually covers PERSONS !MISUSE: exec. Privilege is properly invoked inrelation to specific categories ofINFORMATION, and NOT TO CATEGORIESOF PERSONS.

- REQUIREMENT: he first secure theconsent of the President prior toappearing before Congress ! bars theappearance of the official concernedunless the same is permitted by the

President.o IMPLIED CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS

NOT ALLOWED: 1) secure theconsent 2) President has notreversed such determination.

o THE LETTER ASSUMES THATTHE INVITED OFFICIALS ARECOVERED BY EO 464.

- SECTION 3 [INVALID]: requires all thepublic officials (i.e. department heads,Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the

PNP, and the National Security Adviser)enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure theconsent of the President prior toappearing before either house ofCongress.

- The letter of respondent ExecutiveSecretary quoted above, THE IMPLIEDCLAIM AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 3 OFE.O. 464 IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY

ANY SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF THE

BASIS THEREOF (E.G., WHETHER THEINFORMATION DEMANDED INVOLVESMILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC SECRETSCLOSED-DOOR CABINET MEETINGSETC.).o Congress has the right to know WHY

THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERS THE

REQUESTED INFORMATIONPRIVILEGED.

o A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE, BEING ACLAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM ANOBLIGATION TO DISCLOSEINFORMATION, MUSTTHEREFORE, BE CLEARLYASSERTED ! THE FACTS MUSTBE ESTABLISHED.

o ABSENT THEN A STATEMENT OFTHE SPECIFIC BASIS OF A CLAIM

OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGETHERE IS NO WAY OFDETERMINING WHETHER ITFALLS UNDER ONE OF THETRADITIONAL PRIVILEGES, ORWHETHER, GIVEN THECIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT ISMADE, IT SHOULD BERESPECTED ! AN IMPROPERLYASSERTED CLAIM OF PRIVILEGEIS NO CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE.

O BUT Congress must not require theexecutive to state the reasons for theclaim with such particularity as tocompel disclosure of the informationwhich the privilege is meant toprotect.

- OTHERVIOLATIONS: 1) AGAINSTRIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION2) PUBLICATION.


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6. AGAIN, CHAIRMANSABIO REFUSEDTO APPEAR.

7. Another notice was sent to ChairmanSabio requiring him to appear and testifyon the same subject matter, but ChairmanSabio still did not comply (3rdTIME).

8. UNCONVINCED, THE COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS ANDPUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND THECOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICESISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTINGMAJOR GENERAL JOSE BALAJADIA(RET.), SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS,TO PLACE CHAIRMAN SABIO AND HISCOMMISSIONERS UNDER ARRESTFOR CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE !BEARS THE APPROVAL OF SENATEPRESIDENT VILLAR AND THE

MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEES'MEMBERS.

9. CHAIRMAN SABIO FILED WITH THISCOURT A PETITION FOR HABEASCORPUS against the Senate Committeeon Government Corporations and PublicEnterprises and Committee on PublicServices, their Chairmen, SenatorsRichard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo andMembers.

ISSUE:WON EO No. 1, Section 4(b), is repealed bythe 1987 Constitution.YES.

RATIO: Sec. 21, Art. VI, 198 Constitution "!EO No. 1.

- The power of inquiry is INHERENT in thepower to legislate.

- BRIGGS VS. MCKELLAR: The right to

pass laws, necessarily implies the right toobtain information upon any matter whichmay become the subject of a law. It isessential to the full and intelligent exerciseof the legislative function !THE POWEROF INQUIRY IS "AN ESSENTIAL AND

APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY TO THELEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

- ARNAULT: THE OPERATION OFGOVERNMENT, BEING A LEGITIMATE


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SUBJECT FOR LEGISLATION, IS APROPER SUBJECT FORINVESTIGATION" AND THAT "THEPOWER OF INQUIRY IS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE POWER TOLEGISLATE.

- WE FIND SECTION 4(B) DIRECTLY

REPUGNANT WITH ARTICLE VI,SECTION 21. SECTION 4(B) EXEMPTSTHE PCGG MEMBERS AND STAFFFROM THE CONGRESS' POWER OFINQUIRY ! NOWHERE IN THECONSTITUTION IS ANY PROVISIONGRANTING SUCH EXEMPTION.

- The Congress' power of inquiry, beingbroad, ENCOMPASSES EVERYTHINGTHAT CONCERNS THE

ADMINISTRATION OF EXISTING LAWS

AS WELL AS PROPOSED ORPOSSIBLY NEEDED STATUTES !extends "TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIESCREATED BY CONGRESS ANDOFFICERS WHOSE POSITIONS AREWITHIN THE POWER OF CONGRESSTO REGULATE OR EVEN ABOLISH." !PCGG belongs to this class.

- A mere provision of law cannot pose alimitation to the broad power of Congress,in the absence of any constitutional basis.

- ALSO INCONSISTENT WITHPRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC

ACCOUNTABILITY: IT PLACES THEPCGG MEMBERS AND STAFF BEYONDTHE REACH OF COURTS, CONGRESS

AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVEBODIES. INSTEAD OF ENCOURAGINGPUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, THE SAMEPROVISION ONLY INSTITUTIONALIZESIRRESPONSIBILITY AND NON-

ACCOUNTABILITY.

- ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLEXI, SECTION 1 OF THECONSTITUTION: THE POWERS SODELEGATED TO THE OFFICER AREHELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE

AND ARE TO BE EXERCISED INBEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OR OF

ALL CITIZENS WHO MAY NEED THEINTERVENTION OF THE OFFICERS.o Such trust extends to all matters

within the range of duties pertainingto the office. In other words, publicofficers are but the servants of thepeople, and not their rulers.

- ALSO OF SEC. 28, Art. II (full publicdisclosure of all transactions involvingpublic interest), SEC. 7, Art. III (the right

of people to information on matters ofpublic concern).

- THE PEOPLE ARE EQUALLYCONCERNED WITH THISPROCEEDING AND HAVE THE RIGHTTO PARTICIPATE THEREIN IN ORDERTO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS !theextent of their participation will largelydepend on the information gathered andmade known to them. In other words, theright to information really goes hand-in-

hand with the constitutional policies of fulpublic disclosure and honesty in the publicservice.

- NO ACT SHALL BE VALID, HOWEVERNOBLE ITS INTENTIONS, IF ITCONFLICTS WITH THECONSTITUTION.


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NERI VS. SENATE

FACTS:

1. April 21, 2007: DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATION (DOTC) ENTEREDINTO A CONTRACT WITH ZHONG XINGTELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT(ZTE) ! for the supply of equipment andservices for the National BroadbandNetwork (NBN) Project IN THE AMOUNTOF U.S. $ 329,481,290(APPROXIMATELY P16 BILLIONPESOS).

2. The Project was to be financed by thePeoples Republic of China.

3. The Senate passed various resolutionsrelative to the NBN deal.

- P.S. Res. No. 127 (Senator AquilinoQ. Pimentel, Jr), entitledRESOLUTION DIRECTING THEBLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ANDTHE COMMITTEE ON TRADE ANDINDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN

AID OF LEGISLATION, THECIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TOTHE APPROVAL OF THE

BROADBAND CONTRACT WITHZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BYTHE OFFICIALS CONCERNED INGETTING IT CONSUMMATED"

- P.S. Res. No. 144 (Senator MarRoxas), entitled A RESOLUTIONURGING PRESIDENT GLORIAMACAPAGAL ARROYO TODIRECT THE CANCELLATION OFTHE ZTE CONTRACT.

- P.S. Res. No. 129 (Senator Panfilo

M. Lacson), entitled RESOLUTIONDIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ONNATIONAL DEFENSE ANDSECURITY TO CONDUCT ANINQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATIONINTO THE NATIONAL SECURITYIMPLICATIONS OF AWARDINGTHE NATIONAL BROADBANDNETWORK CONTRACT TO THECHINESE FIRM ZTE


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CORPORATION.- P.S. Res. No. 136 (Senator Miriam

Defensor Santiago), entitledRESOLUTION DIRECTING THEPROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TOCONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OFLEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL

AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONOF THE NATIONAL BROADBANDNETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OFTHE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

4. September 18, 2007, JOSE DE VENECIAIII TESTIFIED THAT SEVERAL HIGHEXECUTIVE OFFICIALS AND POWERBROKERS WERE USING THEIRINFLUENCE TO PUSH THE APPROVALOF THE NBN PROJECT BY THE NEDA.

5. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited

to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.6. HE APPEARED IN ONE HEARING

WHEREIN HE WAS INTERROGATEDFOR 11 HOURS AND DURING WHICHHE ADMITTED THAT ABALOS OFCOMELEC TRIED TO BRIBE HIM WITHP200M IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS

APPROVAL OF THE NBN PROJECT !he informed President Arroyo about thebribery attempt and that she instructedhim not to accept the bribe.

7. HOWEVER, WHEN PROBED FURTHERON WHAT THEY DISCUSSED ABOUTTHE NBN PROJECT, PETITIONERREFUSED TO ANSWER, INVOKINGEXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.

8. In particular, he refused to answer thequestions on: (a) whether or not President

Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)whether or not she directed him toprioritize it, and (c) whether or not shedirected him to approve.

9. HE LATER REFUSED TO ATTEND THEOTHER HEARINGS.

10. Ermita sent a letter to the senate averringthat the communications between GMAand Neri are privileged and that the

jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied.

11. HE WAS CITED IN CONTEMPT OFRESPONDENT COMMITTEES AND ANORDER FOR HIS ARREST AND


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DETENTION UNTIL SUCH TIME THATHE WOULD APPEAR AND GIVE HISTESTIMONY.

12. PETITIONER: Contempt Order wereissued with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

- MATTERS RELATING TODIPLOMACY OR FOREIGNRELATIONS

- Conversations with President Arroyoare "candid discussions meant toexplore options in making policydecisions."

- These discussions "dwelt on theimpact of the bribery scandalinvolving high government officialson the country's diplomatic relations

and economic and military affairsand the possible loss of confidenceof foreign investors and lenders inthe Philippines."

13. RESPONDENT COMMITTEES:(1) Petitioner's testimony is material and

pertinent in the investigationconducted in aid of legislation;

(2) There is no valid justification forpetitioner to claim executiveprivilege;

(3) There is no abuse of their authorityto order petitioner's arrest; and

(4) Petitioner has not come to court withclean hands.

ISSUE:

WON those questions are covered by thepresidential communications privilege.YES.WON the respondent committees committedGAD.YES.

RATIO:

WHY?

1. The communications relate to a"QUINTESSENTIAL AND NON-DELEGABLE POWER" of the President,i.e. the power to enter into an executiveagreement with other countries. This


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authority of the President to enter intoexecutive agreements without theconcurrence of the Legislature hastraditionally been recognized in Philippine

jurisprudence.2. The communications are "RECEIVED" BY

A CLOSE ADVISOR OF THE

PRESIDENT. Under the "OPERATIONALPROXIMITY" test, petitioner can beconsidered a close advisor, being amember of President Arroyo's cabinet.

3. There is no adequate showing of acompelling need that would justify thelimitation of the privilege and of theunavailability of the information elsewhereby an appropriate investigating authority.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES

PRESIDENTIALCOMMUNICATIONSPRIVILEGE

1. Communications,docu-ments orother materialsthat reflectpresidential deci-

sion-making anddelibera-tions andthat the Presidentbelieves shouldremainconfidential.

2. Applies todecision-making ofthe President.

3. Rooted in theconstitutional

principle ofseparation ofpower and thePresidents uniqueconstitutional role.

4. Applies todocuments in theirentirety, andcovers final and

DELIBERATIVEPROCESSPRIVILEGE

1. Advisoryopinions,recommendations anddeliberations

comprising partof a process bywhichgovernmentaldecisions andpolicies areformulated.

2. Applies todecision-making ofexecutive

officials.3. Rooted on

common lawprivilege.


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post-decisionalmaterials as wellas pre-deliberativeones.

5. Congressional orjudicial negation ofthe presidential

communicationsprivilege is alwayssubject to greaterscrutiny thandenial of thedeliberativeprocess privilege.

6. MEANT TOENCOMPASSONLY THOSEFUNCTIONS

THAT FORM THECORE OFPRESIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY !QNDP such acommander-in-chief power,appointment andremoval power,the power to grantpardons and

repress, the sole-authority to receiveambassadors andother publicofficers, the powerto negotiatetreaties.

- ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIALCOMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE (Nixon,In Re Sealed Case):

1. The protected communication mustrelate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."

2. The communication must beauthored or "solicited and received"by a close advisor of the President orthe President himself. The judicialtest is that an advisor must be in"operational proximity" with the


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President.3. The presidential communications

privilege remains a qualified privilegethat may be overcome by a showingof adequate need, such that theinformation sought "likely containsimportant evidence" and by the

unavailability of the informationelsewhere by an appropriateinvestigating authority.

- Presidential communications privilege arePRESUMPTIVELY PRIVILEGED and thatthe presumption can be overcome only bymere showing of public need by thebranch seeking access to conversations.

- THE PETITIONER MADE HIMSELDAVAILABLE TO THEM DURING 9/26HEARING, WHERE HE WAS

QUESTIONED FOR 11 HOURS !expressly manifested his willingness toanswer more questions from theSenators, with the exception of thosecovered by his claim of executiveprivilege.

- ART III, Sec. 7 ! right of people toinformation on matters of public concernSUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS ASMAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW ! there isa recognized public interest in the

confidentiality of certain information.- NOTE: right of Congress of its

Committees to obtain information in aid oflegislation NOT EQUAL TO peoples rightto public information.

- While Congress is composed ofrepresentatives elected by the people, itdoes not follow, except in a highlyqualified sense, that in every exercise ofits power of inquiry, the people areexercising their right to information.

- ENUMERATION IS NOT EVENINTENDED TO BE COMPREHENSIVE!

just only to assure that the Committeeswill not be left in the dark.

- GAD:1. There being a legitimate claim of

executive privilege, the issuance ofthe contempt Order suffers fromconstitutional infirmity.

2. Respondent Committees did not

comply with the requirement laiddown in Senate vs. Ermita ! theinvitations should contain the"possible needed statute whichprompted the need for the inquiry"along with "the usual indication of thesubject of inquiry and the questions

relative to and in furtherance thereof.3. Only a minority of the members of

the Senate Blue Ribbon Committeewas present during the deliberation!MAJORITY.

4. Resp. Com. Violated Sec. 21 of ArtVI of the Constitution, requiring thatthe inquiry be in accordance with theduly published rules of procedures.! subject hearings in aid oflegislation conducted by the 14th

Senate are procedurally infirm.

Issuance is arbitrary and precipitate ! respcom. Should have exercised the samerestraint, after all petitioner is not even anordinary witness. HE HOLDS A HIGHPOSITION IN THE CO-EQUAL BRANCH OFGOVERNMENT.


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GARCILLANO V. HOR

FACTS:

1. Then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.Escudero delivered a privilege speech,

"Tale of Two Tapes", and set in motion acongressional investigation jointlyconducted by the Committees on PublicInformation, Public Order and Safety,National Defense and Security,Information and CommunicationsTechnology, and Suffrage and ElectoralReforms (respondent HouseCommittees).

2. NBI submitted to the respondent HouseCommittees seven alleged "original" tape

recordings of the supposed three-hourtaped conversation.

3. The tapes were eventually played in thechambers of the House.

4. The hearings for HELLO GARCI tapeswere suspended on Aug. 3, 2005indefinitely.

5. ALARMED, PET. GARCILLANO filed torestrain the committees from using thesetape recordings of the ILLEGALLYOBTAINED wiretapped conversations !

DISCUSSION STOPPED #6. AFTER TWO YEARS, Senator Panfilo

Lacsons speech: promised to provide thepublic "the whole unvarnished truth thewhat's, when's, where's, who's and why's"of the alleged wiretap, and sought aninquiry into the perceived willingness oftelecommunications providers toparticipate in nefarious wiretappingactivities.

7. Senator Lacson's speech was referred to

the Senate Committee on NationalDefense and Security, chaired by SenatorRodolfo Biazon, who had previously filedtwo bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale,purchase and use of wiretappingequipment and to prohibit the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP) fromperforming electoral duties.

8. Senate proceeded with its publichearings.


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HELD: Court dismissed PET. GARCILLANOspetition for BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.THEY WERE ALREADY PLAYED.

- The Senate cannot be allowed to continuewith the conduct of the questioned

legislative inquiry without duly publishedrules of procedure, in clear derogation ofthe constitutional requirement.

- WHY THE NEED FOR PUBLICATION?To satisfy the basic requirement of dueprocess.

- Publication is indeed imperative, for it willbe the height of injustice to punish orotherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law or rule of which hehad no notice whatsoever, not even a

constructive one.- With respect to the present Senate of the

14th Congress, however, of which theterm of half of its members commencedon June 30, 2007, no effort wasundertaken for the publication of theserules when they first opened their session.

- RULES OF SENATE, RULE XLIV,UNFINISHED BUSINESS: All pendingmatters and proceedings shall terminateupon the expiration of one (1) Congress,

but may be taken by the succeedingCongress as if present for the first time.o Undeniably from the foregoing, all

pending matters and proceedings,i.e., unpassed bills and evenlegislative investigations, of theSenate of a particular Congress areconsidered terminated upon theexpiration of that Congress and it ismerely optional on the Senate of thesucceeding Congress to take up

such unfinished matters, not in thesame status, but as if presented forthe first time.

- RESPONDENTS: never been amendedsince 1995; published in booklet formavailable for anyone for free!NO.

- The constitutional mandate to publish thesaid rules prevails over any custom,practice or tradition followed by theSenate. WHY? Carpio: they put a

persons liberty at risk.- Invocation of RA 8792!INCORRECT.- The conduct of inquiries in aid of

legislation by the Senate has to bedeferred until it shall have caused thepublication of the rules, because it can doso only "in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure".- NOTE: very recently, the Senate caused

the publication of the Senate Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation in the October 31, 2008 issuesof Manila Bulletin and Malaya. ! THERECENT PUBLICATION DOES NOTCURE THE INFIRMITY OF THEINQUIRY SOUGHT TO BE PROHIBITEDBY THE INSTANT PETITIONS.

9. OTHER POWERS

a, oversight


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ABAKADA VS PURISIMARepublic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimizethe revenue-generation capability andcollection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). Itprovides a system of rewards and sanctionsthrough the creation of Rewards and Incentives

Fund (Fund) and a Revenue PerformanceEvaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOCofficials and employees if they exceed theirrevenue targets. It covers all officials andemployees of the BIR and the BOC with atleast six months of service, regardless ofemployment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers,filed this petition challenging theconstitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform

legislation. They contend that the limiting thescope of the system of rewards and incentivesonly to officials and employees of the BIR andthe BOC violates the constitutional guaranteeof equal protection. There is no valid basis forclassification or distinction as to why such asystem should not apply to officials andemployees of all other government agencies.

Respondent contends that the allegation thatthe reward system will breed mercenaries is

mere speculation and does not suffice toinvalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with thedeclared objective of RA 9335, the law validlyclassifies the BIR and the BOC because thefunctions they perform are distinct from thoseof the other government agencies andinstrumentalities.Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional OversightCommittee. There is hereby created a Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee composedof seven Members from the Senate and sevenMembers from the House of Representatives.The Members from the Senate shall beappointed by the Senate President, with atleast two senators representing the minority.The Members from the House ofRepresentatives shall be appointed by theSpeaker with at least two members


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representing the minority. After the OversightCommittee will have approved theimplementing rules and regulations (IRR) itshall thereafter become functus officio andtherefore cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

in RA 9335 was created for the purpose ofapproving the implementing rules andregulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM,NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006,it approved the said IRR. From then on, itbecame functus officio and ceased to exist.Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachmenton the executive function of implementing andenforcing the law may be considered moot andacademic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good atime as any for the Court to confront the issueof the constitutionality of the JointCongressional Oversight Committee createdunder RA 9335 (or other similar laws for thatmatter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (nowChief Justice) Puno on the concept ofcongressional oversight in Macalintal v.Commission on Elections34is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversightembraces all activities undertaken byCongress to enhance its understanding ofand influence over the implementation oflegislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversightconcerns post-enactment measuresundertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor

bureaucratic compliance with programobjectives, (b) to determine whetheragencies are properly administered, (c) toeliminate executive waste and dishonesty,(d) to prevent executive usurpation oflegislative authority, and (d) to assessexecutive conformity with thecongressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be


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intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itselfand integral to the checks and balancesinherent in a democratic system ofgovernment. x x x x x x x x x

Over the years, Congress has invoked itsoversight power with increased frequency to

check the perceived "exponential accumulationof power" by the executive branch. By thebeginning of the 20th century, Congress hasdelegated an enormous amount of legislativeauthority to the executive branch and theadministrative agencies. Congress, thus, usesits oversight power to make sure that theadministrative agencies perform their functionswithin the authority delegated to them. x x x x xx x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in theexercise of its oversight powers may be dividedinto three categories, namely: scrutiny,investigationand supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser

intensity and continuity of attention toadministrative operations. Its primary purposeis to determine economy and efficiency of theoperation of government activities. In theexercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress mayrequest information and report from the otherbranches of government. It can giverecommendations or pass resolutions forconsideration of the agency involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as apassive process of looking at the facts that arereadily available, congressional investigationinvolves a more intense digging of facts. Thepower of Congress to conduct investigation isrecognized by the 1987 Constitution under


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section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form bywhich Congress exercises its oversight poweris thru legislative supervision. "Supervision"connotes a continuing and informed awarenesson the part of a congressional committeeregarding executive operations in a givenadministrative area. While both congressionalscrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into

past executive branch actions in order toinfluence future executive branch performance,congressional supervision allows Congress toscrutinize the exercise of delegated law-makingauthority, and permits Congress to retain partof that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over theexecutive agencies through its veto power. Ittypically utilizes veto provisions when grantingthe President or an executive agency the

power to promulgate regulations with the forceof law. These provisions require the Presidentor an agency to present the proposedregulations to Congress, which retains a "right"to approve or disapprove any regulation beforeit takes effect.Such legislative veto provisionsusually provide that a proposed regulation willbecome a law after the expiration of a certainperiod of time, only if Congress does notaffirmatively disapprove of the regulation in themeantime. Less frequently, the statute providesthat a proposed regulation will become law ifCongress affirmatively approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it isnecessary to maintain the balance of powerbetween the legislative and the executivebranches of government as it offers lawmakersa way to delegate vast power to the executivebranch or to independent agencies whileretaining the option to cancel particularexercise of such power without having to passnew legislation or to repeal existing law. Theycontend that this arrangement promotesdemocratic accountability as it provideslegislative check on the activities of unelected


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administrative agencies. One proponent thusexplains:

It is too late to debate the merits of thisdelegation policy: the policy is too deeplyembedded in our law and practice. It suffices tosay that the complexities of modern

government have often led Congress-whetherby actual or perceived necessity- to legislate bydeclaring broad policy goals and generalstatutory standards, leaving the choice of policyoptions to the discretion of an executive officer.Congress articulates legislative aims, butleaves their implementation to the judgment ofparties who may or may not have participatedin or agreed with the development of thoseaims. Consequently, absent safeguards, inmany instances the reverse of our

constitutional scheme could be effected:Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.One safeguard, of course, is the legislativepower to enact new legislation or to changeexisting law. But without some means ofoverseeing post enactment activities of theexecutive branch, Congress would be unableto determine whether its policies have beenimplemented in accordance with legislativeintent and thus whether legislative interventionis appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislativeveto as undue encroachment upon theexecutive prerogatives. They urge that anypost-enactment measures undertaken bythe legislative branch should be limited toscrutiny and investigation; any measurebeyond that would undermine theseparation of powers guaranteed by theConstitution. They contend that legislativeveto constitutes an impermissible evasion of

the Presidents veto authority and intrusion intothe powers vested in the executive or judicialbranches of government. Proponents counterthat legislative veto enhances separation ofpowers as it prevents the executive branch andindependent agencies from accumulating toomuch power. They submit that reportingrequirements and congressional committeeinvestigations allow Congress to scrutinize only


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K. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION

L. POWER OF IMPEACHMENT

Documents

CONSTI FINALS NOTES-2.pdf