Consult Japan CP - forms.huffmanisd.netforms.huffmanisd.net/debate/CPs/Consult Japan CP - MSDI 2016.docx · Web viewMSDI 2016 Consult Japan CP. #debatelikeabear5. Consult Japan CP

MSDI 2016 Consult Japan CP#debatelikeabear 1

Consult Japan CPContentsConsult Japan CP.........................................................................................................................................1

Consult Japan..........................................................................................................................................3

1NC Consult Japan...............................................................................................................................4

2NC Assurance NB...............................................................................................................................8

A2 Alliance Resilient..........................................................................................................................10

A2 China Japan Relations...................................................................................................................11

A2 Japan Peaceful..............................................................................................................................13

A2 No Fissile Material........................................................................................................................15

A2 Relations Resilient........................................................................................................................16

2NC Consult K2 Alliance.....................................................................................................................17

2NC NK BMD K2 Alliance...................................................................................................................19

2NC Taiwan K2 Alliance.....................................................................................................................21

2NC Consult K2 Heg...........................................................................................................................22

2NC Consult K2 Stability....................................................................................................................26

2NC Turns China................................................................................................................................27

2NC Turns Korea................................................................................................................................28

2NC Turns Modernization..................................................................................................................29

2NC Turns SCS....................................................................................................................................30

2NC Turns Taiwan..............................................................................................................................32

Armitage 2K.......................................................................................................................................33

Asia War NB.......................................................................................................................................34

China Rise/Heg DA NB.......................................................................................................................35

China/Russia NB................................................................................................................................36

Democracy Net Benefit......................................................................................................................38

ECS NB...............................................................................................................................................39

Econ NB.............................................................................................................................................41

SLOCs.................................................................................................................................................42

2NC SLOCs Turns Case.......................................................................................................................44


2NC K2 SLOCs.....................................................................................................................................45

Southeast Asia NB..............................................................................................................................46

Terrorism NB.....................................................................................................................................47

A2 Japan Prolif Good.........................................................................................................................48

2NC Say Yes.......................................................................................................................................49

2NC Say Yes – BIT...............................................................................................................................50

2NC Say Yes – BMD............................................................................................................................51

2NC Consult Good.............................................................................................................................53

A2 Artificial Competition....................................................................................................................54

A2 # of Countries to Consult Large....................................................................................................55

A2 Perm do the CP.............................................................................................................................56

2NC Consult on other Issues Perm.....................................................................................................57

A2 Lie Perm........................................................................................................................................58

A2 Non-Binding Consultation............................................................................................................59

A2 Artificial Competition Justifies Intrinsicness.................................................................................61

Assurance DA – PTA CP NB................................................................................................................62

Aff Answers............................................................................................................................................63

Normal Means BMD..........................................................................................................................64

Assurance Bad – China/Japan Mod....................................................................................................65

Assurance Bad – Prolif Mod...............................................................................................................67

UNQ – A2 ECS....................................................................................................................................69

Alliance Bad – Deterrence.................................................................................................................70

Alliance Bad – War.............................................................................................................................71

A2 Economic Retaliation....................................................................................................................72

Say No................................................................................................................................................73

Say No – BIT.......................................................................................................................................74

Say No – BMD....................................................................................................................................75

Say No – Taiwan................................................................................................................................76

Perms/Theory....................................................................................................................................77

Turn – Pressure..................................................................................................................................78


Consult Japan Neg


1NC Consult Japan TEXT: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Japan on whether … ought to……with the possibility of minor modifications …We’ll clarify.It competes- excludes certainty of plan. “resolved” means “firm in purpose or intent; determined”- random house 6Japan wants consultation with the US- they won’t say no Robert Sutter, (Prof., Asian Studies, Georgetown U.), THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA, 2009, 208.

Despite its fears of fading U.S. interest, Tokyo periodically bristles at the unequal nature of the alliance. Japan seeks a more reciprocal arrangement in which Washington engages in prior consultations on security matters of importance and in which the United States does not seek to dictate Japanese government policies or actions related to the alliance, giving Japan greater autonomy. It is likely that Bush administration efforts to establish

such a reciprocal arrangement lessened this Japanese concern, but the outlook for a future U.S. government is unpredictable.

Prior binding consultation is critical- engaging in symmetrical dialogue will solve the US-Japan alliance, US hegemony, East Asian stability and Japanese nuclearizationRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

With regard to the alliance, America has three real options in the years ahead. The first option is to strive to maintain the current asymmetrical power structure with Japan for as long as possible by purposely maintaining Japanese dependencies and begrudgingly compromising on peripheral

issues to protect the core relationship. The second option is to rapidly cede substantive power to Japan , most likely through a dramatic reduction in forward based military capabilities, transform the alliance into a balanced partnership in the near term (5-10 years) before any Asian neighbor has the power or presence to prevent such a change, and build alternative basing options in the Western Pacific. Sharing power can be defined as a combination of greater accommodation on policy objectives and means, more frequent and substantive consultation, and achieving greater

balance in military roles and missions within the alliance. The third option is the middle road and, therefore, the one most likely to be followed. Here, the United States, in consultation with Japan, would slowly change the character of the relationship to reduce asymmetries as Japanese security policy changes and diplomatic power increases, while simultaneously, but

carefully, exploring alternative basing options. The first option may favor American interests in the short run, but, in the long run, the status quo will likely prove too brittle and would eventually collapse, given the trends in Japanese security policy change and its increasing sense of self-interest. The second option is too abrupt and would cause as many problems as it would solve , especially given the dynamics and memories of East Asian nations and the current uncertainties in the region. Although American power projection advocates, emboldened by the initial military success of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, may support this aggressive restructuring in the alliance, grand political strategy supports continued

engagement and forward positioning of forces in the region. The third option matches the incrementalism of Japanese policy change with alliance change, eventually reaching the same outcome of the second option while hedging for the future. This option appears, on the surface, to be the way of prudence, but why should America choose to follow such a course of divesting substantive power to an ally? History teaches that hegemonic states do not retain such overwhelming power forever. As the United States focuses on democratization, free trade, security, and human rights, the provision of such collective goods worldwide will increasingly take a toll on America’s material, human, and psychological resources. Free riders (willing to enjoy the benefits of such a system, but unwilling to pay their share for its maintenance) abound among rational nations;

as a result the costs to America of maintaining these transnational goods will eventually become prohibitive.163 The need for allies to continue the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq are but two

current examples of the limits to American resources in the far corners of the world. Additionally, the negative perceptions of hegemony foster anti-American sentiment which tends to compound these problems―a specter that is increasingly vivid in Iraq. The concern for the

United States becomes one of determining how best to maintain its influence worldwide and ensure the rooting of its values for the long run. In the American Interest. Focusing narrowly on East Asia,


for a number of reasons it is in the best interests of the United States to share power with Japan in a well-defined security partnership. First, the United States will find a growing objectives–means shortfall in the future pursuit of national security interests. The United States may increasingly find that it does not have the resources to maintain a dominant hegemonic position worldwide and will need to find like-minded partners to maintain its interests in various regions and share the burdens of maintaining peace. Second, sharing power with Japan in exchange for long-term basing guarantees maintains the American presence in Northeast Asia―all the more important since the election of President Roh and the resulting uncertainties about American force structure and bases on the Korean peninsula.

Already, concrete plans are being made to move American troops further south in Korea, or even to bring some of them home.164 These bases in Japan (especially ports for the Seventh Fleet and

airfields for the Pacific Air Force [PACAF] fighter and transport wings) are critical to the continued forward presence of the U.S. in East Asia . Third, it is vital to maintain bilateral Japanese allegiance to the United States. As of 2002, China surpassed the United States as the largest importer of goods into Japan, at over 18 percent of the import market into Japan. Likewise,

Japanese exports to China grew 32 percent from 2001, a harbinger of the growing importance of this bilateral economic relationship.165 As Japanese energy needs increase in the future, the potential for oil, coal, and natural gas imports from China will demand policy accommodation. Some have argued that Japan may tire of the alliance asymmetry, recognize the markets of China, and hedge strategically by seeking a multilateral comprehensive security structure that

includes China to supplement the purely defensive guarantees of the existing alliance.166 Although it is not in the Japanese interest to bandwagon with China, such a multilateral institution would likely become dominated by the Middle Kingdom and thus reduce American influence in the region. Next, an enhanced relationship within the alliance may allay some of the Japanese fears of insecurity that may lead to a decision to “go nuclear .” Although the vast majority of Japanese

citizens oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan, the topic is increasingly broached in the press and academic circles due to nuclear uncertainties in North Korea. The past 4 years have seen considerable change in the ability to discuss nuclear weapons. In October 1999, then Vice Minister of State for Defense Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign after suggesting in an interview that Japan should scrap its ban on nuclear weapons.

Contrast this with the relatively benign February 2003 publishing by Asahi Shimbun of a previously classified 1995 Defense Agency study on nuclear feasibility. 167 This highlights the increasing demise of the taboo on debates on nuclear weapons and the dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. The best way for the United States to maintain Japan as a non-nuclear power is to remain firmly engaged with Japan in the region and jointly enforce nonproliferation regimes so that Japan is not faced with a security dilemma

seemingly solved only by a resort to nuclear weapons. Finally, an enhanced partnership with Japan provides the United States with the most effective means to simultaneously balance and engage China . Although great care and transparency during the transformation of the alliance

would be required to prevent an overtly hostile posture toward China, such a partnership would provide the deterrent and incentives necessary to shape Chinese entrance into the superpower ranks in the most favorable and responsible manner.

Nuclear warBrooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth ‘13Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, John Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, Lean Forward, EBSCO

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they

yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of

territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier . But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that

during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United

States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington --notably, Israel, Egypt, and


Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas . There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation.

The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition ,

advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United

States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also

produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their

own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals . Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple

nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the

underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities . For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers : on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top

of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons . Some

supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises , as in the cases of Germany and

Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the

current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand

strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership . In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply . Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder . Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed

agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less


because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the

United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country , such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that

the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION

What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation . Here, too, American

leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests . After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability . U.S.

alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for

example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics . With

its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations.

Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer

is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of

rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know . Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.


2NC Assurance NB The alliance solves Japanese security concerns- this checks against a nuclear JapanNational Interest Spring 2005 p.l/n

The principal conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that Tokyo's desire to pursue a more proactive security policy is not an unreasonable response to the more threatening and volatile security environment it faces. After nearly six decades of quasi-pacifism, it is time for Japan to move beyond the ideals of the post-World War II peace constitution and participate more fully in building and sustaining regional order and

combating the emerging threats to security. Although fears that Japan might revert to militarism are real, they are ill conceived. Democracy and the rule of law are firmly entrenched, some constitutional restrictions on the use of force will remain, and the U.S. alliance ensures that Japan has no need for the nuclear weapons or major force-projection capabilities that would be inherently destabilizing and set off alarm bells in the region.

The security alliance solves for Japanese militarization and regional stabilityVogel, Prof. @ Harvard U, 2003 (Eric, Asian Studies Newsletter http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/Vogel.htm)

Why is the Tokyo government ready to pay the support for the housing of U.S. troops in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan? Because Japan’s alternatives to a security pact with the United States, developing an independent military capacity to defend themselves or engaging in unarmed neutrality, are less attractive. An independent Japanese military capacity is likely to unnerve the Chinese and Koreans, and the prospects of an arms race between Japan on the one hand and China or Korea on the other, would be high ; most Japanese would prefer to have better relations with China and Korea. Unarmed neutrality would leave Japan open to the intimidation of neighbors, including North Korea, something the Japanese public is not likely to tolerate in the long run. Given the alternatives, thoughtful people in the Diet and elsewhere in Japanese policy circles prefer an alliance with the United States. Japanese political leaders who need cooperation from other parties in Japan take a low posture and tone down their proclamations on controversial issues, but when the crunch comes they vote to keep the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. And that is why so many Japanese politicians support the Guidelines worked out between defense specialists in Japan and the United States to specify what Japan could do to respond in case of emergencies. What is the new role of the U.S.-Japan Security alliance after the end of the cold War? It is to be ready to respond in case of emergencies and to help keep a stable environment so that Japan,

China, and Korea do not feel the need to start an arms race in order for each to achieve security. Regional stability is sufficiently important that the United States, having learned the cost of isolationism in 1914 and 1941, is willing to play a considerable role in guaranteeing regional security. Chalmers Johnson wants U.S. troops to pull out of Okinawa but he wants Japan and the United States to keep their treaty alliance. Unfortunately it is not possible to do both. If the United States is to respond quickly to emergencies in places like the Korean peninsula it needs to have troops and supplies readily on hand. The North and South Koreans both know that U.S. troops would defend South Korea if the North attacks because U.S. troops are in Korea and would be affected. Most

Japanese believe that U.S. troops would fight to defend Japan. But if U.S. troops were not in Japan, many more Japanese would doubt the U.S. willingness to defend them, and the temptations to develop their own military capacity would be very real; Korea and China would be unlikely to stand idly by . The United States does not negotiate with Okinawa; it negotiates with the government of Japan, in Tokyo, and the Japanese government has chosen to keep bases in Okinawa. U.S. military officials in Okinawa have worked hard and continue to work hard to keep good relations with civilians in Okinawa and to

keep incidents to a minimum. We do not live in an ideal dream world where everyone would be perfectly happy. But preserving security in Asia and avoiding a new arms race and regional conflict is too important to the lives of all Asians to be cavalier about advocating U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan without carefully considering the consequences.


The alliance solves Japanese rearmamentThe Economist 1999 http://www2.gol.com/users/coynerhm/Japan_sail_forth.htm

There will always be understandable doubts about a militarily more active Japan. But there are two greater dangers. One is that, come the next

real crisis, one of East Asia’s best-equipped armed forces will mostly stand aside and watch. The second is that if, as a result, Japan’s alliance with the United States did fall apart, Japan would have little choice but to arm itself more aggressively, including possibly with nuclear weapons. Better for Japan to learn to work more closely with the Americans than to sail forth alone.

http://www2.gol.com/users/coynerhm/Japan_sail_forth.htm


A2 Alliance Resilient Frictions prove alliance is not a givenMurata, Assoc. Prof. @ Doshisha U, 2000 p. 21

(Koji, The Japan-US Alliance)

The Japan-U.S. alliance, however, is not ironclad. First, with the ideological conflict of the cold war over, historical legacies and cultural differences have risen to the surface , causing friction between the two nations .Second,although the Japanese and U.S. governments emphasized the seriousness of the Soviet military threat to support strengthening the alliance during the cold war era, the current argument for retaining the ::alliance has shifted to its multifunctional character. Third, in spite

of a historyof almost hall a century, the Japan-U. S. alliance has lacked certain institutions, such as a joint headquarters, to

hold it together. Fourth, the highly complementary character of the Japan-U.S. alliance has resulted in friction as well: Each side feels that it bears an unequally heavy burden for this alliance . Okinawa wants some of the U.S. military facilities on its soil ~ be removed, while the United States wants Japan to be a more active ally.


A2 China Japan Relations The US-Japan alliance solves Chinese paranoiaMark Roth, Department of the Air Force, National Defense University, 2000 (National War College, http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n005601g.pdf, accessed 8/05)

Alliances with other Asian countries contribute to United States objectives for a non-aggressive China . For

example, the US-Japan security alliance eliminates any need for China to feel threatened by Japan. So long as the United States maintains its military presence in Japan, Beijing will have no fears about a revival of Japanese militarism or that Tokyo would acquire nuclear weapons.

Anti-China sentiment in Japan will collapse relationsSelf, Sr. Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Winter 2003 (Benjamin, Washington Quarterly, accessed 9-14, online: http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_self.pdf)

Even as China and Japan continue to celebrate the achievements of the friendship framework, structural and generational changes in both countries are spinning new social threads and political dynamics that collectively

threaten the school of thought behind it. One of those dynamics is the emergence of a new Japanese political generation. Its most powerful representative, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, has been an adamant proponent of a more patriotic Japan. His stances on Taiwan history and security policy provide evidence that Koizumi is ready and willing to offend the Chinese if necessary. Public support for Taiwan has always had many sources in Japan, ranging from democratic solidarity to cultural affinity. The difference from past occasions is

that Koizumi seems willing to act on that support. Former president Lee Teng-hui, for example, recently obtained a visa to visit

Japan for medical treatment in April 2001, generating diplomatic complaints from Beijing. The applause President George W. Bush received after mentioning defense for Taiwan at a February 2002 address to the Japanese Diet is additional evidence that

this support extends well beyond the prime minister. Koizumi has also visited the Yasukuni shrine twice (in August 2001 and April 2002) to pay homage to those who gave their lives for the nation during World War II, including several who were convicted as Class A war

criminals and executed by the Allies after Japan’s defeat. China has regarded Japanese leaders’ visits to the shrine as an affront that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people and in response has canceled certain cooperative ventures with Japan, such as military confidence- building measures. Overall, Japanese public opinion polls reflect a steady increase in support for Koizumi’s willingness to challenge China. A recent public opinion poll conducted by Japan’s widest-read daily revealed that only 37.3 percent of respondents believe the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can be trusted—a

response dropping below 50 percent for the first time.2 In Japan, agitated reporting about Chinese military modernization,

maritime exploration in disputed waters, and anti-Japanese education in Chinese schools, combined with concerns over Chinese criminals as well as illegal workers operating in Japan, have collectively produced a tinderbox of irritation. Any other minor provocation—the likelihood of which seems quite probable in light of the longevity of certain

contentious issues and this new impulse for insult— could inflame Japanese opinion even further. Outright anti-China sentiment has become increasingly mainstream among Japanese politicians. Japanese leaders are increasingly likely to back Taiwan, pay tribute at the Yasukuni shrine, and call for a sterner approach toward China, including further cuts in aid.


Animosity on both sides will undermine cooperative Sino-Japan relationsSelf, Sr. Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Winter 2003 (Benjamin, Washington Quarterly, accessed 9-14, online: http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_self.pdf)

On the other side of the relationship, popular attitudes in China are vehemently anti-Japanese. With a growing need to appease public sentiment, the PRC government has been forced to take a strong stand against

historical revisionism in Japan. For example, the Japanese government’s textbook screening process approved a revisionist history text for use in middle schools, leading China to protest diplomatically , even though only a minuscule percentage of schools is using the textbook. In fact, China probably made the book more popular by complaining about it. The number of people-to-people contacts between the Chinese and Japanese has increased tremendously over

the three decades since normalization. Unfortunately, expectations of honest and sincere communication have not been met. Chinese students often find Japan cold and unfriendly, while many Japanese think China is dirty and dangerous.3 The premise that contact breeds affection among people has not yet been proven. Along with these public trends, political tensions run deep. Zemin’s ill feelings toward Japan were more than apparent during his disastrous 1998 visit. What is not nearly as clear is how much Jiang’s attitude will matter after his retirement from the presidency and resignation from his position as Communist Party general secretary this fall. Will he use whatever influence he retains to pressure new leaders to be tough on Japan?


A2 Japan Peaceful Japanese culture has accepted nuclear weapons- peace movements have been disempoweredTanter, researcher @ the Nautilus Institute, Feb. 15 2005 p. http://japanfocus.org/221.html (Richard, “Japanese Militarization and the Bush Doctrine”)

The shifts in the balance of strategic incentives and disincentives for medium-sized states to acquire nuclear weapons in an era of proliferation are well understood and apply equally to Japan as to India, Iran or Israel. Less well known is the diminishing influence of once powerful domestic Japanese institutional and cultural constraints on Japanese militarization in general and nuclear weapons acquisition in particular. From the 1950s to the late eighties, powerful peace movements backed by cross-generational

public opinion and articulated by substantial opinion in the Diet, constrained Japan's nuclear option. These factors are now weak. The climate of mainstream public discussion -- what is sayable in "respectable" political circles -- has widened dramatically in the past decade. Whereas public calls for nuclear armament were once deeply shocking to the great majority of Japanese citizens, they are now almost commonplace. A slew of public comments and alleged "slips of the tongue" by senior Japanese politicians have opened the way. None of these statements expressed government policy. But their utterance in Japan's symbolically charged political force field has rendered legitimate open discussion of nuclear weapons in the mainstream of Japanese politics. Concurrently, four decades of firm non-proliferation policy in the US has been eroded in recent years by remarks by senior US policy-makers and influential journalists which have been widely reported in Japan. In March 2003, Vice-President Dick Cheney raised the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan as one consequence of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Secondly, in a visit to Tokyo the immediate past Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, asked Japanese politicians if they would consider taking that path if North Korea did in fact get nuclear weapons. Senator John McCain, went one step further, and directly warned China that if it did not prevent North Korean nuclear armament, then it was inevitable that Japan would acquire its own nuclear weapons. Prominent journalists and academics took the next step. Darling of the Bush establishment, Charles Krauthammer, argued in January 2003 that the US should warn a “recalcitrant” China that, unless it blocked a nuclear North Korea, the US would not only allow Japan to go nuclear but give it the missiles to do so. "If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China’s is a nuclear Japan. It’s time to share nightmares." Charles Pena argued for replacing the US nuclear umbrella over Japan with "two nuclear-armed democratic nations (both with vibrant economies)": Japan and South Korea. Again, while none of these

statements represented US government policy or even a significant trend in US policy circles, many Japanese leaders perceived them to reverse the near-absolute US opposition to Japanese nuclear armament over the previous half century. These American loose lips have shaken many Japanese and thereby transformed the climate of discussion on both sides. This perception was reinforced in Japan by the application of an American double standard to other regional proliferators, some of whom (Israel) were regarded favorably, some of whom were frowned upon but ultimately accepted (Pakistan and India), and some of whom remained highly constrained by American pressure (Taiwan, South Korea). When this perception is joined with the American failure to halt North Korean proliferation, many Japanese leaders feel obliged to entertain the possibility that American-extended nuclear deterrence is a dead letter, along with the prospect that Japan may have to "go-it-alone" on global nuclear security issues.

http://japanfocus.org/221.html


History proves; anti-militaristic norms do not stop Japanese militarization and arms racingLind 2004 (Jennifer, Visiting IR Prof @ Dartmouth, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck” International Security 29.1)

Furthermore, some critics might argue that antimilitarist norms led Japan to restrict itself to only defensive military capabilities. Although Japan has abstained from building ballistic missiles or so-called power-projection forces such as large-deck aircraft carriers, Japan has impressive offensive capabilities in both naval and air power. Japan's extensive base network, long-range P-3 aircraft, and powerful navy give it the ability to bottle up vital sea-lanes in East Asia (from the South China Sea to the Kamchatka Peninsula north of the Kurile Islands). The ongoing development of an aerial refueling capability will enhance Japan's already substantial ability to project power throughout the region. Japan has followed a defensively oriented grand strategy, and nothing suggests that it will become aggressive in the near future. In support of its defensive posture, however,

Japan has acquired offensive maritime capabilities that far exceed those of its neighbors. The antimilitarist argument is equally strained when it comes to nuclear capabilities. [End Page 117]Japan currently has no nuclear weapons, but many states have been content to live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, even some facing a more hostile environment than Japan. Like Japan, neither South Korea, Taiwan, nor Italy has acquired nuclear weapons—none of these states are called antimilitarist. Japan's willingness to forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella is neither exceptional nor surprising. Even more significantly, the Japanese government has repeatedly denied that Japan's constitution or "nuclear allergy" prevents it from acquiring nuclear weapons. For decades, leading Japanese politicians have publicly stated that nuclear weapons are perfectly consistent with Japan's "peace constitution."81 For example, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei said in 1973, "While we are not able to have offensive nuclear weapons, it is not a question of saying that we will have no nuclear weapons at all."82 Later, former Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro declared, "It is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan withdraw from the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear

umbrella."83 These statements are not empty threats; Japan owns a large stockpile of plutonium.84 As Ariel Levite observes, "Japan provides the most salient example of nuclear hedging to date."85 Japan's nuclear weapons policy is driven by its ability to pass the buck to the United States, rather than by an antimilitarist nuclear allergy.

Norms have no effect on Japanese arming policy- their effect is overstatedLind 2004 (Jennifer, Visiting IR Prof @ Dartmouth, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck” International Security 29.1)

Although antimilitarist norms are widespread in Japan, they have not constrained Japanese security policy. They have not prevented it from building one of the most powerful military forces in the world, with potent offensive and defensive capabilities. And, as Japan's leaders have said repeatedly, if Japan felt threatened, these norms would not even prevent Japan from building nuclear weapons . Since World War

II, Japan has followed a highly restrained foreign policy, but this restraint is explained by a strategy of buck-passing rather than by antimilitarist norms. One implication of this analysis is that the emphasis on Japanese antimilitarism—by scholars and policymakers—overstates the constraints that domestic norms impose on Japanese leaders. For example, claims that Japan would like to contribute more to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but is constrained by the peace constitution, are essentially bargaining rhetoric; the pacifist article 9 has proven to be as malleable as Tokyo wants to make it. Because many Japanese people hold deeply antimilitarist views, U.S. leaders should be cognizant of the sensitivity of military issues in Japanese society. Nevertheless, Tokyo can bring its public along when it wants to.


A2 No Fissile Material Japan has the plutonium stockpiles necessary to nuclearizeBarnaby and Burnie, Nuclear Issues Consultant to Oxford Research Group and Greenpeace Coordinator, August 2005 p. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/Japanreport.pdf

(Frank and Shaun, “Thinking the Unthinkable…”

To date most of this plutonium has accumulated in overseas reprocessing plants in France and the UK under contracts signed with Japan. However, with plans to start up the US$21 billion Rokkasho plant, Japan will have a reprocessing capacity only equalled by the world’s largest nuclear weapons states.

Japan’s necessary stockpiling policy has failed- they don’t follow itBarnaby and Burnie, Nuclear Issues Consultant to Oxford Research Group and Greenpeace Coordinator, August 2005 p. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/Japanreport.pdf

(Frank and Shaun, “Thinking the Unthinkable…”

In response to political pressure over its plutonium programme, the Japanese government declared in the early 1990’s that it would not hold

more plutonium than was necessary for commercial use. The government’s ‘no plutonium stockpile’ policy and their declared supply and demand figures for plutonium, were meant to reassure the international community, particularly in East Asia, that Japan would only possess sufficient plutonium to meet commercial requirements. However, almost from day one, Japan has possessed well in excess of its requirements, and as the 1990’s unfolded the excess stock has increased.

Japan could produce more nukes than the US and Russia combinedHayes, Assoc. Prof. of Finance @ Sophia University, 2001 p. 114-115

(Declan, Japan: The Toothless Tiger)

Japan's nuclear forays are giving its ancient enemies cause to pull in their horns. Tokyo has stockpiled over 100 tons of plutonium that would be relatively simple to transform into weapons-grade material. Japan's fast-breeder reactors (FBRs) have the capacity to squeeze over 60 times more energy from uranium fuel than can the light-water reactors of most other countries. Japan will, in other words, have the capacity to make more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of the United States and Russia hold . If nothing else, this arsenal would make an impressive bundle of bargaining chips.

http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/Japanreport.pdf

http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/Japanreport.pdf


A2 Relations Resilient Regardless of the state of relations, continued engagement is critical to sustain the allianceBalbina Y. Hwang, policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, July 7, 2005 (The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1865.cfm, accessed 8/05)

Yet, while the United States and Japan have embarked on a new alliance interaction, unhindered by many of the difficulties and tensions of previous eras, it would be a mistake for either country to become complacent about the present positive dynamic. The two countries have yet to fully address and resolve important issues—such as the strategic and practical ramifications of Japan’s new security outlook in the region—that pose significant challenges to the present harmonious relationship.Both the United States and Japan need to continue to strengthen the alliance and to utilize the current atmosphere of good will to tackle upcoming challenges. Doing so will ensure the development of a genuine global partnership that will endure well into this century.


2NC Consult K2 Alliance Genuine and binding consultation prior to implementation is key – Europe proves Mike Mochizuki, Senior Fellow @ Brookings Institute, 3/22/97 Brookings Review, lexis

As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan

has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to say "yes" to collective defense and security

missions, it should also gain the right to say "no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America's strategic relationships with the major West European allies.Consultation on China is particularly importantBlackwell Harris, AMERICA’S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000, p. 28-57

Ehance bilateral consultations. Differences will inevitably emerge between Japan and the United States in their approaches to the region. The new administration should ensure that effective consultation processes are in place that give Japan a voice in alliance policy before decisions are actually made . Consequently,

alliance management needs to be flexible, to seek greater substantive Japanese participation in the consultation process involved, and to recognize the great sensitivity of actions requiring regional support from allies. Japan is becoming more regionally oriented: to a degree, it sees itself as increasingly Asian and has carefully managed its relations with China, in particular. With this increased emphasis on regional matters , and with regional imp acts more important to

Japan than global impacts, prior consultation becomes more crucial.

The US needs to consult Japan over proliferation, human rights and TaiwanJapan Economic Newswire, February 19, 2005 Saturday, Kyodo News Service ; “Text of joint statement of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee”

Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the ministers concurred that both governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance . Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires. 10.

In the region, common strategic objectives include: - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan. - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including

its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea. - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally. - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue. - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs. - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue. - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia. - Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and


transparent regional mechanisms. - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology. - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.

Cooperation over regional issues is key to US-Japan realignmentHwang, security analyst for Heritage, July 7 2005 p.l/n

(Barbara, Heritage Briefing Paper)

Much attention was focused on the declaration's call for both countries to take steps to "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue." While incorrectly interpreted by many in Asia and the United States as a Japanese commitment to contribute actively to the defense of Taiwan,

the statement did go further than any previous joint statement on this issue. The statement does not necessarily ensure U.S.-Japan regional security cooperation, but it does signal a new willingness by Tokyo to align itself more closely and openly with Washington on regional issues. Nevertheless, certain obstacles pose challenges to the continuation of the alliance in its present positive condition. Many will be encountered during the next and crucial stage of

development of Japan's new security outlook: the implementation and operational phase. For example, a true test of Japan's willingness to support regional military operations will come in future commitments to specific shared roles and missions, such as operations to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative, to deal with North Korean aggression, or to handle a Taiwan contingency. Without concrete commitments on how to carry out the common strategic objectives articulated in the 2005 SCC joint declaration, the impetus for adopting a new defense strategy under Japan's new NDPG could lose momentum and meaning .


2NC NK BMD K2 Alliance Consultation over North Korea is critical to sustain the alliance- failure will undermine relationsCronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005 (William in Journal of World Affairs 29.1, 51-76)

The way in which the United States responds to Japan’s stronger assertion of its particular policy interests could have a significant effect both on the resolution of the confrontation with North Korea and on the longer-term future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Thus, the failure of the United States to consult closely with Japan and to take Japanese interests into consideration could have negative consequences for American political and security interests. Even as Japan moves towards much closer security cooperation with the United States, strong voices in the Japanese political world, including the current head of the Japan Defense Agency, have called for a more self-sufficient defense capability. Some senior Japanese policymakers have called for a more independent military and diplomatic stance as a better means of focusing American attention to Japanese perspectives on North Korea and other matters, rather than its traditional policy of following the U.S. lead.

Consultation over North Korea is a key issue for the allianceCronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005 (William in Journal of World Affairs 29.1, 51-76)

The problem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has emerged as the driving force of Japan’s growing security consciousness and activism and as a principal issue in U.S.-Japan alliance relations. North Korea’s increasingly threatening nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been central to a major post-Cold War shift in Japan’s security outlook toward both increasing direct military cooperation with the U.S. and greater defense self-sufficiency. For example, in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi provided unprecedented noncombat logistical support to U.S. military operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan has also played a leading role in organizing and providing international assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Additionally, on the highly contentious issue of Iraq, the Koizumi government broke with traditional Japanese reticence and gave strong and outspoken diplomatic support to the Bush administration before the American and British-led attack. In early 2004 Japan sent noncombat troops to Iraq to conduct humanitarian relief and to assist reconstruction, despite the absence of a clear United Nations mandate. Despite highly restrictive operational restrictions and rules of engagement, this cooperation is widely viewed as stretching the limits of Article 9 of Japan’s U.S.- imposed “peace constitution.”1


North Korea is a litmus test for the alliance- consultation is critical to sustain relationsCronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005 (William in Journal of World Affairs 29.1, 51-76)

The United States faces something of a paradox. On one hand, alliance cooperation has never been closer or more extensive, and Japan continues to remove legal and policy barriers to support for U.S. forces in combat situations. On the other

hand, Japan also has never been more materially and psychologically prepared to become a “normal” country, since the concept was first proposed by a prominent nationalist politician, Ichiro Ozawa, in the early 1990s, to develop an

independent defense and power projection capability. Japan’s concerns about a rising China have also caused nervousness about any indication that the United States might find a “strategic” partnership with Beijing in the U.S. interest. Already, a number of Japanese analysts have warned that the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance for more than five decades is unprecedented. On the other hand, the October 2004 report of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Commission on Defense

Capabilities and indications of the contents of the new National Defense Program Outline covering the period 2005 to 2009, continue to emphasize the absolute necessity of maintaining Japanese defense policy on the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance. These trends and indicators suggest that alliance relations could go in two very different directions, depending on how well the United States manages its current opportunity to forge a closer and more effective alliance. In the near term, the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and other WMD is likely to be the crucible in which the vitality of the alliance is determined. In the longer term, greater Japanese security activism appears to be taking on a life of its own . That is, the expanded role and operational freedom that has been given to the Japanese military in response to Japan’s concerns about keeping the United States attentive to its interests regarding North Korea has acquired momentum that is not necessarily connected with any specific threat or

conflict scenario. The Japanese challenge, at the moment, is to acquire the political will and cross-ministry cooperation to forge a new national strategy that reflects not only the need to maintain a strong alliance with the United States, but that also one that is comprehensive with respect to the totality of Japan economic, diplomatic, and military interests.


2NC Taiwan K2 Alliance Failure to consult over Taiwan policy will crush the allianceOsius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. 29-30 (Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)

Still, noted Tokyo University professor Tanaka Akihito, "Taiwan is the central focus of the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy."z2 Nationalist dictates will not likely lessen with the ascent to power of a new generation of PRC leaders in 2002. And the desire of at least some of Taiwan's

people for self-determination will probably continue. Although the United States and Japan have overlapping interests regarding Taiwan, they have been unclear, even to each other, about their respective roles and responses if in the near future Beijing uses force or establishes an economic blockade of Taiwan, or if Taipei declares independence. To avoid a damaging rift in the alliance, Tokyo and Washington must address these issues through quiet dialogue and alliance planning, even if they risk a hostile response from Beijing.


2NC Consult K2 Heg Binding consultation with Japan is a precondition to US leadershipOsius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. 75-76 (Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)

The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of "burdensharing" into "power-sharing. Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential

campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will

become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretentions.-The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship

reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind . Although it is difficult to

imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution's lvo Daalder, implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides.... Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account." Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's complex global issues . Watching America's contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral approaches, gives Tokyo an

excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America's historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions.


The US-Japan alliance is key to US leadership- power projection, credibility and political influenceRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty about the future for all countries involved in the region. The nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have led to serious ruptures in the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan . The global war on terrorism and widely perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States has, ironically, enhanced the confidence of China to portray itself as a multidimensional leader in Asia. The growing strength of the Kuomintang in Taiwanese politics and its agenda to build a closer relationship or even confederation with mainland China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upend the security assumptions of the region.1

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has reinforced the concepts of transformation and power projection from a more limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while at the same time

highlighting America’s need for allies in the war on terrorism. It is a region awash in uncertainly, but one in which the United States must remain firmly engaged to protect its vital interests. In the breadth of its reach and influence, the United States is often described by others as hegemonic and the world’s sole superpower. This is a very clumsy caricature, however. Colin Powell recently quipped, “We are so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day

checking on everybody.”2 The extent of that reach and the means necessary for achieving American interests around the world depend greatly on cooperative efforts with other like-minded nations, if only in “coalitions of the willing” built by the United States for ad hoc purposes. In Northeast Asia, the United States has two vital alliances―with Japan and South Korea―already in place . Although the American relationship

with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is undeniably critical to security on this strategically important peninsula, the relationship is very narrow in its scope and its future in some doubt.3 The relationship with Japan, however, offers greater potential to achieve American interests in the long run in Asia, beyond simply the defense of Japan. Being off the shores of mainland Asia and combining the two biggest economies in the world,4 this alliance offers significant long-term opportunities to more actively promote peace, prosperity, and liberal values in the region.

The alliance is critical to sustain US dominance in East AsiaRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

Although the United States is the sole superpower in the world, it increasingly faces an objectives-means shortfall in attaining its global interests unilaterally. Sustaining its engagement in the far reaches of the world requires the partnership of capable, willing and like-minded states. In the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance will remain vital to achieving both countries’ national interests in the next 2 decades because of a lack of strategic options, though the commitment of both partners is likely to be sorely tested. Should conditions arise that give either the United States or Japan a viable alternative to advance stability and national interests, the alliance could be in doubt.


The alliance is critical to solve backlash against the US- Japan solves US power in the East AsiaIkenberry, Prof. of Geopolitics @ Georgetown, 2004 p. 51 (John, Beyond Bilateralism)

The major question today is how America's post-September 11 global campaign against terrorism will influence the American presence in the region as well as the wider set of regional great-power relationships. It does appear that at least two competing visions of American grand strategy coexist within the Bush

administration. The multilateral vision of Secretary of State Powell and others emphasizes traditional military partnerships and multilateral cooperation. It is a pragmatic vision that essentially represents continuity with the broad thrusts of American grand strategies both realist and liberal-over the

postwar era. The other vision is an aggressive unilateralism that is deeply skeptical about operating within a rule-based international

order. It is an imperial view of America's role that was largely pushed to the sidelines during the Cold War and the Clinton era. It is a vision of a country that is big enough, powerful enough, and remote enough to go it alone, free from the dangerous and corrupting conflicts festering in all the other regions of the world .- The dynamics of American foreign policy since September 11 are paradoxical. The unilateral wing of the Bush administration has been strengthened by the success of the military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. American military capacity has been demonstrated, and many in the administration want to assert that unipolar military power in new operations around the world. At the same time, however, the administration's antiterrorism campaign has led to closer ties with Russia and China. The great

powers-the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and China-are now as closely aligned as they have been since the Concert of Europe in 1815. Whether this new great power accord lasts or America's unilateralist impulses trigger a global backlash will shape the future of America's role in East Asia.

The alliance is the best means of preserving US interests in the PacificRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)Nonetheless, multilateralism must continue to play a major (although not primary) role in American policy toward East Asia. The United States should pursue multilateral regimes as mechanisms to help ease tensions through confidence-building measures, further integrate economies, prevent proliferation of weapons and missiles, and facilitate the peaceful entry of China into the community of democratic and prosperous

nations. Such regimes have considerable merit in a number of areas for advancing many American interests. Not least of all, Japan remains a stronger proponent of multilateralism than does the United States, as seen in the building of ARF and the Koizumi initiative toward stronger economic integration in Southeast and East Asia, presented in Singapore in January 2002. The tripartite declaration in Bali in October 2003 in which Japan, China, and South Korea committed to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear crisis also

reflects this bias toward multilateralism. However, in East Asia in particular, such institutions do not have the deterrent value necessary to maintain the peace. Even more so than the alliance with the ROK, the alliance between the United States and Japan represents the single best course for maintaining American interests in the Pacific. Given the coming changes in Japanese security policy, the United States must stay the course with Japan and decide how best to make the alliance work.

The alliance is key to sustain US power projection globallyHughes, Senior Research Fellow @ University of Warwick, 2004 p. 147(Christopher, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power)Japan's decision to lock itself into the US-Japan alliance will have wider effects on global security. Japanese Support for the Afghan campaign and Iraq has shown that the US -Japan alliance is no longer just an East Asian or Asia-Pacific alliance, but one that functions to reinforce the US's global military reach. Japan is crucial to US global military hegemonv not only in the provision of key bases for the projection of military power from the Asia-Pacific to the Middle Last, but also is a provider of boots on the ground for militarv coalitions. Finally Japanese devotion to the alliance will affect global security by adding one more large militarv power to the mix, while lessening Japan’s interest in making a difference using economic


power. As a result Of this trade-off, and Japan’s finl abandonment of it, position as an exemplar of non-military approaches to security, the world may be he poorer.


2NC Consult K2 Stability Consultation is critical to rebalance the alliance- this solves Chinese aggression, opens sea lanes, and curbs proliferationRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

Having depended on the United States for security for over 50 years, Japan is now actively trying to chart its new path for the future. Japan is in the midst of a fundamental reexamination of its security policy and its role in international relations that will have a dramatic impact on East Asia and the Pacific. Within Japan, many see the traditional means of security policy as being out of balance and vulnerable in the post-Cold War environment. The triad of economic diplomacy,

engagement with international organizations, and a minimalist military posture predicated on a capable selfdefense force with American guarantees of protection, heavily weighted toward economic diplomacy, is not seen by the Japanese to be adequately achieving the national interests and influence that country seeks. Regardless of the more realist imperatives, Japan remains deeply ambivalent toward security expansion . However, despite domestic restraints, Japan will continue slowly and incrementally to remove the shackles on its military security policy. Attitudinal barriers, such as pacifism, anti-militarism, security insulation, and desire for consensus combine with institutional barriers, like coalition politics, lack of budget

space, and entrenched bureaucracy, to confound rapid shifts in security policy, though those changes will eventually occur. The ambivalence Japan feels clouds the ideal path to the future for the nation in trying to find a way forward among competing goals of preventing either entrapment or abandonment by the United States and pursuing self-interest. Because Japan is risk-averse, but increasingly self-aware, dramatic (in Japanese terms) security policy changes will continue to be made in small, but cumulative steps. These changes in security policy and public acquiescence to them will create pressure on the alliance to reduce asymmetries

and offensive burdens since the ideal, long-term security future for Japan does not rely on the current role vis-à-vis the United States. Both Japan and the United States must move out of their comfort zones to create a more balanced relationship that involves substantial consultation and policy accommodation, a greater risk-taking Japanese role in the maintenance of peace and stability of the region, and coordinated action to resolve conflicts and promote prosperity in the region. Because neither country has a viable alternative to the alliance for the promotion of security and national interests in the region, especially given the uncertainties of the future trends in China and the Korean

Peninsula, for the next couple of decades the alliance will remain central to achieving the interests of both Japan and the United States. A more symmetrical alliance can be a positive force for regional stability and prosperity in areas of engagement of China, proactive shaping of the security environment, the protection of maritime commerce routes, and the countering of weapons proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Without substantive change, though, the centrality of the alliance will diminish as strategic alternatives develop for either the United States or Japan


2NC Turns China A weak alliance causes more Chinese aggression Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2013 (Aaron Friedberg, teaches politics at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, and Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, February 22, 2013, “America Must Stop China's Bullying of Japan,” http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/02/22/america_must_stop_chinas_bullying_of_japan_100574-2.html)

The pivot, of course, was the Obama administration's signature first-term foreign policy initiative. Starting in 2012, in response to signs of increasing Chinese assertiveness, Washington began a series of steps designed to reassure its friends and allies in the region by

bolstering the U.S. presence in Asia. The pivot was an appropriate and widely-welcomed response to the growth of Chinese power and the worrisome trends in its behavior. Mr. Abe's visit provides a highly visible test of the President's resolve to

follow through on his initiative.¶ Over the past several years, Japan has been on the receiving end of much of China's belligerence. The perpetually insecure Chinese Communist party leadership appears to believe that confrontation with Japan will stir nationalist sentiment, buttressing its public support and its grip on power.¶ To that end, Beijing has:¶ • escalated a minor incident involving a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain into a major diplomatic crisis;¶ • blocked exports to Japan of rare earth minerals essential to high-end electronic manufacturing;¶ • permitted (and perhaps encouraged) violent mass demonstrations that resulted in extensive destruction of Japanese property in China;¶ • stepped up provocative movements by air and sea around disputed islands controlled by Japan;¶ • allegedly "painted" Japanese naval vessels with fire-control radar, risking escalation into a shooting war.¶ It is this brinkmanship that has Prime Minister Abe in a state of genuine anxiety about Japan's security. North Korea's most recent nuclear test, under indifferent Chinese eyes, has only exacerbated his fears. He is traveling to Washington in search of reassurance.¶ Unfortunately, there are reasons to fear that he will not find what he is seeking. There are signs that President Obama's Asia policy could end up more closely resembling a full pirouette than a pivot.¶ For one thing, there is a new team in Washington. former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her tough-minded deputy, Kurt Campbell, have departed the scene, as has Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chuck Hagel (nominated as Panetta's successor at the Pentagon) hold strikingly different views about the exercise of American power.¶ While the Obama administration, in its first term, stressed the need to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in Asia, Mr. Kerry has already cast doubt on this commitment, declaiming in his confirmation hearings that "I'm not convinced that increased military ramp-up is critical yet" and that we already have "a lot more bases out there [in the Pacific] than any other nation in the world, including China today." In any event, whatever Mr. Kerry intends, and even if sequestration can be avoided, the administration's planned cuts in defense spending have already called its promises into question.¶ That is the backdrop. On the foreground are some more subtle shifts in the Obama administration's disposition that have left Tokyo perplexed and dismayed. After talking tough over the last two years, the administration has toned down its rhetoric in ways that have not gone unnoticed in the region. Indeed, the blunt word pivot has been excised from its diplomatic lexicon, replaced by the bland accounting term of "rebalancing."¶ That rhetorical shift is part of a broader effort to reassure the new Communist leadership in Beijing that America's highest priority is avoiding confrontation. Specifically, on the hottest-button current issue, while the administration has reiterated its position that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are covered under the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty, it has simultaneously displayed nervousness about being forced to take sides in Tokyo's territorial disputes. Administration officials fended off Mr. Abe's initial request for a visit to the White House and they have reportedly declined proposals for a joint press conference out of concern for what the Japanese leaders might say in

public.¶ There is no doubt that it would be foolish to get involved in an unnecessary confrontation with China. But is attempting to propitiate China by trying to appear even-handed the best way to reduce the risk of bloodshed, or would we be better off maintaining a posture that is unmistakably strong enough to deter aggressors and reassure friends? The administration appears to be tilting toward the former approach, but the latter is the only

reliable pathway to continued peace in Asia.¶ American policy should reflect the fact that Tokyo is not the party primarily responsible for ratcheting up tension in the region. To be sure, there is a nasty streak of Japanese nationalism and politicians, including Mr. Abe, have occasionally flirted with it, to the detriment of Japan's reputation and position in the world. But it is risible to equate a handful of offensive

statements about the past with the virulent and violent strain of nationalism unleashed by the Chinese government.¶ It is China that has been probing, testing the strength of the alliance, building up its forces, and seeking to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo. The paramount danger here is that if we seek to put distance between ourselves and Japan, we will actually encourage more Chinese aggression. And after too much such encouragement, we might well find ourselves forced either to come to Japan's defense or watch our alliances in Asia crumble. If this happens, the Obama administration will have earned the dubious distinction of accomplishing the very outcome it most seeks to avoid.


2NC Turns Korea Cooperation with Japan is critical to solve the North Korea issueRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

North Korea and its quest for nuclear weapons represent a salient opportunity for the alliance to act in concert for the stability of Northeast Asia. No resolution of the current crisis on the Peninsula will be possible without both Japan and the United States working together within an agreed strategic framework.

US-Japan alliance is key to deter North Korean aggressionOkamoto 02 (Yukio, Security Adviser to Japanese Cabinet, Washington Quarterly25.2 p. 59-72)

The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000 U.S. Army

troops are stationed near Seoul. Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces

at the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan .

US Japan relations deters North KoreaBuel, Staff Writer, May 2 2005 (Meredith, Voice of America News, http://www.vnis.com/story.cfm?textnewsid=1485

In reassuring South Korea, Japan and other U.S. allies in the Pacific, Ms. Rice pointed out the United States has a robust military capability in the region. "We have, after all, a very strong alliance with South Korea and a very strong alliance with Japan. Of course, the United States maintains significant, and I want to underline significant, deterrent capability of all kinds in the Asia-Pacific region," she said. "So I don't think there should be any doubt about our ability to deter whatever the North Koreans are up to. But that doesn't mean that it is not a serious problem and that the North Koreans should not come back to the six-party talks because all of their neighbors consider this to be a problem. This is not just between the United States and North Korea." Pyongyang announced earlier this year it was dropping out of six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons program

The US-Japan alliance solves the terminal impact of North Korea nuclearizationKato, Japanese Ambassador, March 5 2005 (Ryozo, The National Journal)

NJ: If North Korea were to test a nuclear weapon, could you imagine Japan deciding to develop its own nuclear arsenal as a deterrent? Kato: That's an interesting question. My own assessment is that such a decision would primarily depend on the health and effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As long as our alliance is in good shape, I don't think Japan would feel the need to develop our own nuclear weapons. In fact, Japan's going nuclear could actually undermine and even destroy the U.S.-Japan security alliance. For that reason, I don't think it makes any sense at this stage for Japan to consider going nuclear. Having said that, whether or not Japan goes nuclear at some future date is something that the Japanese people should decide for themselves.


2NC Turns Modernization The alliance solves China’s perception of encirclement- they know the US is a stopper to Japanese militarizationIkenberry and Takashi, Geopolitics Prof @ Gtown and PoliSci Prof @ U Tokyo, 2003 p. 7-8 (G. John and Inoguchi, Reinventing the Alliance…)

The alliance system and the U.S. Japan security pact in particular has also played a wider stabilizing role in the region. The American alliance with Japan has solved Japan's security problems, allowing it to forego building up its military capability, and thereby making itself less threatening to its neighbors. This has served to solve or reduce the secu rity dilemmas that would otherwise surface within the region if Japan were to rearm and become a more autonomous and unrestrained Great Power. At the same time, the alliance makes American power more predictable and connected to the region. This too reduces the instabilities and "risk premiums" that countries in the region would need to incur if they were to operate in a more traditional balance-of-power order. Even China has seen the virtues of the U.S.-Japan alliance . During the Cold War it was at least partially welcome as a tool to balance Soviet power-an objective that China shared with the United States. But even today, as long as the

alliance does not impinge on China's other regional goals-most importantly the reunification with Taiwan-the alliance does reduce the threat of a resurgent Japan.


2NC Turns SCS The US-Japan alliance guarantees freedom of navigation in the South China SeaRowan, Fellow in Strategic Studies @ SMS, 2005 p. Proquest (Josh, “The US-Japan Security Alliance..” in Asian Survey Vol. 45 #3)

However, Beijing’s accession to the TAC in October 2003 and Tokyo’s promise in December that year to ratify the document both demonstrate that

multilateralism—via ASEAN—is working. Moreover, the absence of recent conflict in the South China Sea region suggests that a peaceful resolution to the dispute can be reached . Yet, to ensure long-term stability there, the U.S.- Japan security alliance must be involved, for a variety of reasons. First, the U.S. Navy is the only reliable guarantor of freedom of navigation in Asia. Tokyo’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the naval component of

Japan’s military, are quite capable but now limited by Tokyo’s recent accession to the TAC, specifically the non-intervention clause. Other claimant states are ill-equipped to deal with any future violations of treaties or multilateral agreements by the PRC .

Moreover, ASEAN, unlike NATO, does not maintain a standing army, navy, or air force capable of ensuring compliance with regulatory agreements. In this sense, only the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet can play the role of an honest broker, enforcing future China-ASEAN pacts. Second, the United States—a non-claimant state—can highlight violations of state sovereignty and treaty abrogations before the international community, using the U.N. Security Council. For example, the PRC claims entitlement to a 200-nautical mile zone of sovereignty around mainland China. Beijing also claims all of the reefs and islands of the South China Sea and suggests that the sovereignty zone extends out from

each of these geographic features. However, under traditional maritime law a state is only entitled to a 12-mile zone of sovereignty. With the exception of China, only the United States has a permanent seat on the Security Council—and the soft power to bring about an

international consensus against infractions by parties to the TAC and UNCLOS. Finally, Japan can insist that all sides withdraw military personnel currently stationed on fortifications in the South China Sea until competing claimant states formulate a temporary set of guidelines in the absence

of a formal treaty. Tokyo, unlike the United States, is well positioned to make such demands . The countries in Southeast Asia are the largest recipients of Japanese foreign aid. Moreover, Japan’s decision to sign the TAC at the December 2003 ARF meeting has given Prime Minister

Koizumi a voice in discussions on regional issues, including the South China Sea dispute. In summary, the South China Sea continues to be a region in flux. Southeast Asia’s geostrategic importance to the United States and Japan necessitates that future disputes be resolved peacefully and in accordance with customary international law. Yet, the U.S.-Japan security alliance alone will not suffice to resolve the maritime conflict. Washington and Tokyo must rely on ASEAN’s established diplomatic channels to bring about a long-term, peaceful solution to this potential flashpoint.

A blockade of the South China Sea will crush the global economyNoer, Writer for the Int’l National Strategic Studies and the NDU, 1996

(John, “”Southeast Asian Chokepoints Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open” online: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_98/forum98.html)

In practice, however, it turns out that blockage of these SLOCs would matter a great deal. Nearly half the world fleet would be required to sail farther, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. All excess capacity of the world fleet might be absorbed, depending on the number of straits closed and how long they remained closed. The effect would be strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk such as iron ore and coal. (See Table 2.) Closure of the Straits of

Malacca would immediately raise freight rates. Denial of the SLOCs passing the Spratly Islands to merchant shipping would disrupt world shipping markets even more severely generating shortages . Freight rates around the world would be affected, thus adding costs to American imports and exports. All trading nations have a vested

interest in preserving stability on the SE Asian SLOCs. The experience with the closure of the Suez Canal seems to indicate that such a disruption might increase freight rates by as much as 500 percent . Note that military or physical SLOC

closure is not required. Suppose war-related uncertainty over the Spratlys caused maritime insurers to either increase rates or deny coverage in the region. Shippers might be motivated to reroute shipping via safer


sea lanes. The factor that converts a localized maritime concern (SLOC blockage) to a global economic event

(freight rate crisis cum capacity shortfall) is the huge volume of shipping involved in the South China Sea.


2NC Turns Taiwan The US-Japan alliance is critical to stop Chinese aggression against TaiwanYukio Okamoto, special advisor to the Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 2002, p. 59

The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem .

Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force . When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters

as a sign of its disapproval of China's belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities . Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japan's basic stance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution.

US-Japan cooperation is key to deter conflict over TaiwanOsius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. 23

(Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)

To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei from declaring independence and Beijing from forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the mainland.3

Given China's size and resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent militarv capabilities. Taipei relies on Beijing's fear that the United States would defend it in the event of a cross-strait conflict. Because U.S. .forward-deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S.-Japan alliance.

US-Japan coordination over Taiwan is the only way to deter conflictHayes, Assoc. Prof. of Finance @ Sophia University, 2001 p. 63

(Declan, Japan: The Toothless Tiger)

In order for an invasion to ultimately succeed, Beijing would have to conduct a multifaceted campaign, including air assaults, airborne incursions into Taiwanese space, special operations raids behind Taiwanese lines, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations, and conventional missile strikes. Although the PLA would currently encounter great difficulty in conducting such a sophisticated campaign, over the next decade, it will improve its capability. Time is, after all, on its side. So too are the numbers-and the world's

diplomatic community. Eventually, only Japan and the United States could stop the takeover. Taiwan could not hope to survive alone. Taiwan's air force has over 500 combat aircraft, and these include top of the line U.S. F-16s and French Mirage 2000-5s. Taiwan's air defenses are so strong that China could not hope to launch an effective air campaign in the near future. Taiwan's 68,000 strong navy has more than thirty-six frigates and destroyers as well as four submarines, and it would wreak havoc on a Chinese invasion armada

under current conditions. Behind Taipei's well-honed forces stands the awesome armada of the Japanese-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, together with its carrier battle Groups, which can be quickly deployed into Taiwanese waters. China is currently powerless against the Seventh Fleet. Therefore, as long as America continues to underwrite Taiwan's security, a direct invasion is not a credible possibility . However, the continued presence of the

Seventh Fleet cannot be taken for granted. When the Seventh Fleet goes, so too will Taiwan, Asia's key buffer state.



Armitage 2K Solves Asia nuke warArmitage et al 2000 (Richard L. Armitage, Armitage and Associates; Dan E. Bob, Office of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.; Kurt M. Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group LLC; Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; James A. Kelly, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Edward J. Lincoln, Brookings Institution; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; Kevin G. Nealer, Scowcroft Group; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Torkel L. Patterson, GeoInSight; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Robin H. Sakoda, Sakoda Associates; Barbara P. Wanner, French and Company; and Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, October 11, 2000, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, online)

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states.

Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances¶ that remain the region’s de facto security

architecture.¶ In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well- equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.


Asia War NB Rebalancing the US-Japan alliance is critical to prevent emerging conflict in AsiaArmitage, former deputy Sec. of State, Aug. 14 2005 p l/n (Richard, The Daily Yomiuri)

It might very well be difficult to isolate the elements associated with "the ascent of China" without giving due consideration to other dynamic

changes unfolding in Asia--but even if possible, it would be a mistake to do so if the ultimate objective is to produce better policy options. The ascent of China is best understood from a broader perspective on Asia as a whole. It is important to note that China's evolution is unfolding at a time of other profound changes in Asia. The region is also witnessing the reemergence of Japan. Japan is acting with increased confidence, a greater comfort in assuming new roles and missions, and is exploring the scope of what might constitute a renewed position of leadership in Asia. Throughout their very long respective histories, it has virtually always been the case that there has been clarity regarding the power relationship between China and Japan. At times China was the dominant power, and on occasion, Japan has been the stronger country. It is rare indeed that the two countries see one another, and in fact, are equal powers. In terms of economic might, military capability, and diplomatic influence, China and Japan appear poised to share

a coequal power status in the near term. In addition to the reemergence of Japan, the region is also seeing subtle signs of the Asianization of India. By shear virtue of the size of its population, India has always possessed the potential to be a larger player in Asia.

But it is only a recent development that India itself shifted policies to the net effect of ending its self-imposed economic isolation. With a lingering feud with its neighbor to the west, India is increasingly drawn to Asia and vice versa. Economic interaction is likely on the leading face of India to Asia. Potential competition with China for resources and influence cannot be discounted. While it may be true that the aforementioned trends lead us to more question than answers, policymakers must endeavor to set the wisest course in the face of uncertainty. The stakes may very well be high as we know from history that when emerging powers seek to be accommodated by the existing powers and the existing international system, there is a high risk of political tension and military conflict. In Asia, we are seeing the emergence of two large powers--China and India--and the reemergence of another--Japan. Policy response From a U.S. perspective, I believe our orientation to the challenges associated with China

should consist of three elements. First, our approach to China should be rooted in a clear vision for Asia, and a commitment to sustaining a strong bilateral alliance with Japan . Second, the United States should continue to promote comprehensive and sophisticated engagement of China. And third, we should begin to address challenges of a global nature--particularly the energy challenge--in a direct, head-on manner during what is still an early juncture in China's transformation to country with a global power

mentality. Regarding Asia, the United States should seek to sustain and strengthen bilateral alliances with Australia,

Japan and South Korea--with a particular focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance. While it is true that virtually every article on U.S.

policy toward Asia begins with this point, it is not a mere platitude. The United States should welcome Japan's emergence as a more proactive player in Asia, and we should grow more comfortable as an alliance in planning for future uncertainties in the security environment--China's posture in Asia very much included. On questions of Asian history we can stand back--but we should in no way posture ourselves as neutral if China provokes tension in its relationship with our treaty ally Japan. Related to our alliance, it is also essential that the United States adopt a force posture that is appropriate for 21st century challenges in Asia--the uncertainties related to China's strategic direction very much included. There are certainly other things the United States should do to bolster our standing in Asia--we should strengthen relationships in Southeast Asia, and demonstrate a genuine interest in the problems and challenges of friendly countries there. We should seek to strengthen existing multilateral organizations like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum. And we can even explore the creation of new multilateral security mechanisms. However,

U.S. Asia policy will be significantly weaker if we do not take on the necessary and hard work of strengthening The U.S.-Japan alliance. While it is commonly observed that Japan can't go it alone, it is also true that the United States can't succeed in Asia without strong relations with the government in Tokyo.


China Rise/Heg DA NB Japan is the lynchpin of our China balancing strategyEnnis 2011 (Peter Ennis, U.S. Correspondent/Columnist for Brookings, May 2011, “Why Japan Still Matters,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/05/10-japan-ennis)

Moreover, China’s huge, unexplained military buildup has continued, and Beijing has shown a disturbing tendency to try to bully neighboring East Asia neighbors, including Japan, over disputed territories. ¶ One result of these difficulties with China has been an Obama administration effort to reenergize alliance relationships in East Asia, and to cultivate broader political and security relationships with nonaligned nations, all carefully calibrated to dissuade Beijing from trying to throw its growing weight around the region. ¶ The highpoint came last September, when a conflict flared between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, south of Okinawa. Washington quickly reaffirmed its stance that the disputed islands are covered by the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.¶

Washington’s fast reaction greatly reduced the static level in U.S.-Japan communications.¶ Still, it was hard to ignore the sense that at least some in Washington were viewing support for Japan as a necessary piece in a broader strategy to balance China, rather than as support for an alliance with great bilateral, regional, and global value in its own right.¶ Japan as a “linchpin”¶ But there are indications the administration may be moving more clearly toward the broader alliance view. Shortly after the Japan-China scrap last fall, Vice President Biden spoke in Washington before the U.S.-Japan Council, a group spearheaded by Senator Daniel Inouye to promote grassroots support for close U.S.-Japan ties. He presented a view of U.S.-Japan relations that gave real substance to the

alliance. Simply put, he said, Japan is the “linchpin” of an effective American strategy in Asia. This means, among other things, that the United States cannot deal with China without “going through” Japan. The Vice President praised Japan’s cooperation on nonproliferation efforts toward Iran and North Korea, on humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and in stabilization efforts in war-torn Afghanistan.

Alliance precludes the rise of challengers in AsiaHughes, Senior Research Fellow @ University of Warwick, 2004 p. 146

(Christopher, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power)

The tightening of US-Japan security cooperation means that there is unlikely to be any return to a system of bipolaritv or tripolarity in East Asia.} China, despite its phenomenal economic growth and the continued upgrading

of its military, is highly unlikely to be able to rise to the position of a `counter pole' to the combined strength of the US and a remilitarising Japan. Japan's continued close attachment to the US in security terms, despite its economic gravitation towards China, means that it is improbable that Japan would seek to form a third pole in regional security. Moreover, its continued subordinate and dependent position on the US in the bilateral alliance rules out a US-Japan joint partnership, or 'bigemony', in managing security affairs in the region, as 'Japan handlers' in the US would like to argue.;


China/Russia NB Strengthening the US-Japan alliance is critical to loosen Sino-Russian tiesBrookes, Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 8-15-2K5 (Peter, “An Alarming Alliance: Sino Russian ties tightening” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a.cfm, accessed: 8-15-2K5)

First, the Pentagon must make sure the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review balances U.S. forces to address both the unconventional terrorist threat and the big-power challenge represented by a Russia-China strategic partnership. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen its relationship with its ally Japan to ensure a balance of power in Northeast Asia — and also encourage Tokyo to improve relations with Moscow in an effort to loosen Sino-Russian ties.

Sino-Russian relations trigger renewed Russian aggressionMenges, Sr. Fellow at the Hudson Institute, 2K5 (Constantine, “China: The Gathering Threat” pg. 426)

Of equal concern is the possible reemergence of an authoritarian dictatorship in Russia under President Putin or a successor, whether ultranationalist or Communist. Our in-depth analysis of President Putin has included insights into his personal development, his work in the Soviet foreign intelligence service (KGB), and his actions since assuming the presidency of Russia on January 1, 2000. Putin is an intelligent, disciplined, and systematic leader, determined to assure that Russia is, in his words, a "strong state," under a "dictatorship of law" and that Russia has a major

role in the world.' Putin declares his support for political democracy and movement toward a market-oriented economy, but the evidence to date suggests that Russia is gradually moving toward a more autocratic path. As Russia moved toward dictatorship, Putin would attempt to maintain a Potemkin democracy for the purpose of deceiving the major democracies, so that they would continue providing needed

economic support for Russia. The ever-closer relationship between Russia and China strengthens the author itarian tendencies within Russia, thereby increasing the risk that it will become more aggressive internationally. As the Chinese government develops relations with the Putin government, the Chinese Communist Party has revived direct relations with the Communist Party in Russia and also ties between the Chinese and Russian parliaments. These multiple relationships, all coordinated from the Chinese side through its Communist Party, provide many opportunities to cultivate allies in Russia and to fan suspicion of the U.S. and of democracy. This is especially true of China's ever-expanding and mutually profitable relationships with the Russian military and its military production and research entities.

http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a.cfm


This causes nuclear conflictCohen, Fellow @ Heritage, 1996 (Ariel, “The New Great Game” accessed 8-24-2K5, online: http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm)

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to

Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security

services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.


Democracy Net Benefit US-Japan cooperation is critical to democracy promotionRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

Finally, the alliance can provide the continuity of peace and trust necessary for the growth of liberalism throughout the region. Success for the United States and Japan will increasingly be measured in terms of an increased community of vibrant, pacific, free-market democracies in Asia. Making the two publics aware of the idealistic benefits of the alliance will make more headway toward acceptance of a deepening partnership than simply focusing on the alliance’s

role in power politics in the region. Creating the conditions for that liberal development and tamping down the anticipated frictions that will arise along the way can best be accomplished in tandem. In the long run, this liberalism backed by the concerted power of the United States and Japan will bring lasting stability to the region.

Democracy solves multiple scenarios for war and extinctionLarry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former

Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have

utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.


ECS NB US-Japan solves North KoreaHribernik 13 (Miha Hribernik, Research Coordinator at the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels and an analyst at Wikistrat, February 11, 2013, “Abe and a Strengthened Japan – By Way of North Korea?,” Gtown Journal of International Affairs, http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/11/abe-and-a-strengthened-japan-by-way-of-north-korea-by-miha-hribernik/)

Following his electoral victory, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to take a firm foreign policy stance. Even though in practice some of Abe’s initial steps are less assertive than his campaign rhetoric—and can perhaps best be described as “firm but flexible”—signs of a confident and increasingly militarily-capable Japan are on the horizon. The first (albeit minor) increase in defense spending in a decade, the looming possibility of constitutional changes and the recently initiated revision of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines are just three examples. Although the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations will help ensure that Japan’s internal political milieu will remain

relatively favorable to a more proactive security role in the Asia-Pacific, it is the DPRK rather than China that will continue to remain the primary justification for continued reform and defense spending once the current flare-up in tensions

with Beijing subsides. As Japan attempts to become one of the four tips of the envisioned ‘democratic security diamond,’ the bellicose actions of Pyongyang will provide a welcome justification for additional security expenditures, a tightening of Japan’s alliance with the United States and potential legislative or constitutional changes. All of these would be difficult or even impossible to advocate solely through the prism of China without reigniting tensions and eroding Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing to a dangerously low level.¶ This is nothing new. The growing threat emanating from North Korea’s nascent nuclear and missile programs during the 1990s prompted the 1997 revision of the U.S-Japan defense guidelines, which expanded the scope of Tokyo’s responsibilities within the alliance; the DPRK’s launch of a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan in 1998 led to the deployment of Japan’s first Intelligence Gathering Satellite (IGS) in 2003; and the use of force in responding to the 1999 and 2001 incursions of North Korean spy vessels into Japanese waters, according to Christopher Hughes, represented “an important breach of the normative restrictions on the use of defensive military power in Japan” and created a precedent for similar future acts. Then, as now, such changes may have indeed been induced by North Korea, but their effects are extensive and strategic in scope. Most importantly, although nominally aimed at the DPRK, these changes concurrently strengthen Japan’s military capabilities vis-à-vis China.¶ The recently announced increase in defense spending, unveiled in the weeks following North Korea’s December rocket launch, was another example of such a measure. Japan specifically singled out the procurement of PAC-3 missiles—a prominent element of its multi-tiered Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) established due to the North Korean missile threat—as one of the reasons for the spending increase. The BMD system is, however, just as applicable to any potential future conflict

with China, which possesses its own substantial stockpile of ballistic missiles.¶ Every North Korean provocation also provides further incentive for intensified security cooperation with the United States. The ongoing revision of defense guidelines is taking place in a period of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and could hardly come at a better time for the alliance. Once concluded, any increase in Japan’s role within the security alliance will likely cite Pyongyang as the primary justification (as was the case after the last modification in 1997), especially if tensions with China subside by the time of the revision’s completion, which is expected about a year from now. This will be all the more likely if the changes lead to the removal of Japan’s ban on collective self-defense—a notable recommendation in the 2012 Armitage–Nye Report—which would be a development likely to raise alarm in Beijing.

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globallySteven Metz 13, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war

Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the

bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to

official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so , though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous . ¶ In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council


recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then

threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953

armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true.

¶ No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack . After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation ; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn

underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. ¶ Since the

regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and

reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the

recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to

think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. ¶ The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of

missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons , but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. ¶ The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether

U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. ¶ The second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft . The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time,

even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war . Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia . ¶ Eventually, though, the United States and its allies

would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. ¶ China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. ¶ Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. ¶ If the aftermath

of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the result could easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not

inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.


Econ NB The alliance is key to the global economyLaura D’Andrea Tyson, Former Economic Advisor to the Clinton Administration and total MILF, 2000 Council on Foreign Relations Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan

The ongoing changes within Japan's economy provide both American policymakers and businesses with opportunities to craft a new economic relationship between Japan and the United States. Task Force members agree that this relationship must rest on the premise that a healthy Japanese economy serves America's economic and geopolitical interests. Despite its decade-long stagnation, Japan remains the largest economy in Asia, America's third-largest trading partner, and its major ally in the Asia-Pacific region.


SLOCs The US-Japan alliance guarantees freedom of navigation in the South China SeaRowan, Fellow in Strategic Studies @ SMS, 2005 p. Proquest (Josh, “The US-Japan Security Alliance..” in Asian Survey Vol. 45 #3)

However, Beijing’s accession to the TAC in October 2003 and Tokyo’s promise in December that year to ratify the document both demonstrate that

multilateralism—via ASEAN—is working. Moreover, the absence of recent conflict in the South China Sea region suggests that a peaceful resolution to the dispute can be reached . Yet, to ensure long-term stability there, the U.S.- Japan security alliance must be involved, for a variety of reasons. First, the U.S. Navy is the only reliable guarantor of freedom of navigation in Asia. Tokyo’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the naval component of

Japan’s military, are quite capable but now limited by Tokyo’s recent accession to the TAC, specifically the non-intervention clause. Other claimant states are ill-equipped to deal with any future violations of treaties or multilateral agreements by the PRC .

Moreover, ASEAN, unlike NATO, does not maintain a standing army, navy, or air force capable of ensuring compliance with regulatory agreements. In this sense, only the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet can play the role of an honest broker, enforcing future China-ASEAN pacts. Second, the United States—a non-claimant state—can highlight violations of state sovereignty and treaty abrogations before the international community, using the U.N. Security Council. For example, the PRC claims entitlement to a 200-nautical mile zone of sovereignty around mainland China. Beijing also claims all of the reefs and islands of the South China Sea and suggests that the sovereignty zone extends out from

each of these geographic features. However, under traditional maritime law a state is only entitled to a 12-mile zone of sovereignty. With the exception of China, only the United States has a permanent seat on the Security Council—and the soft power to bring about an

international consensus against infractions by parties to the TAC and UNCLOS. Finally, Japan can insist that all sides withdraw military personnel currently stationed on fortifications in the South China Sea until competing claimant states formulate a temporary set of guidelines in the absence

of a formal treaty. Tokyo, unlike the United States, is well positioned to make such demands . The countries in Southeast Asia are the largest recipients of Japanese foreign aid. Moreover, Japan’s decision to sign the TAC at the December 2003 ARF meeting has given Prime Minister

Koizumi a voice in discussions on regional issues, including the South China Sea dispute. In summary, the South China Sea continues to be a region in flux. Southeast Asia’s geostrategic importance to the United States and Japan necessitates that future disputes be resolved peacefully and in accordance with customary international law. Yet, the U.S.-Japan security alliance alone will not suffice to resolve the maritime conflict. Washington and Tokyo must rely on ASEAN’s established diplomatic channels to bring about a long-term, peaceful solution to this potential flashpoint.

A blockade of the South China Sea will crush the global economyNoer, Writer for the Int’l National Strategic Studies and the NDU, 1996

(John, “”Southeast Asian Chokepoints Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open” online: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_98/forum98.html)

In practice, however, it turns out that blockage of these SLOCs would matter a great deal. Nearly half the world fleet would be required to sail farther, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. All excess capacity of the world fleet might be absorbed, depending on the number of straits closed and how long they remained closed. The effect would be strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk such as iron ore and coal. (See Table 2.) Closure of the Straits of

Malacca would immediately raise freight rates. Denial of the SLOCs passing the Spratly Islands to merchant shipping would disrupt world shipping markets even more severely generating shortages . Freight rates around the world would be affected, thus adding costs to American imports and exports. All trading nations have a vested

interest in preserving stability on the SE Asian SLOCs. The experience with the closure of the Suez Canal seems to indicate that such a disruption might increase freight rates by as much as 500 percent . Note that military or physical SLOC

closure is not required. Suppose war-related uncertainty over the Spratlys caused maritime insurers to either increase rates or deny coverage in the region. Shippers might be motivated to reroute shipping via safer


sea lanes. The factor that converts a localized maritime concern (SLOC blockage) to a global economic event

(freight rate crisis cum capacity shortfall) is the huge volume of shipping involved in the South China Sea.


2NC SLOCs Turns Case China could seize the entire South China Sea, choking of all sea lanesRowan, Fellow in Strategic Studies @ SMS, 2005 p. Proquest

(Josh, “The US-Japan Security Alliance..” in Asian Survey Vol. 45 #3)

Skeptics of U.S. involvement in East Asia—specifically in the South China Sea dispute—have traditionally asked an important question: Why should the United States care about a dispute among Asian countries in a region so far from the United States when there are far more pressing

U.S. foreign policy considerations? This question is insightful and worth addressing. Valencia outlines two major reasons for U.S. involvement. First, the PRC treats the nine-dashed line as a de jure claim to the entire sea region. If this claim were accepted, freedom of navigation there would virtually vanish, crippling seafaring transportation in Southeast Asia. Second, concomitantly, after ratifying the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Beijing drew territorial lines around the Paracel Islands and then suggested that it might take similar action on the Spratlys. If this notion were accepted, the PRC could demand that vessels entering and leaving the South China Sea obtain China’s permission to do so, further restricting international sea lanes. As Harvey Feldman, a former U.S. ambassador in Asia noted, this action would turn the South China Sea into a “Chinese lake.”47


2NC K2 SLOCs Alliance key to manage crucial energy straits and piracyRapp, Lieutenant Col. With a PH.D in IR from Stanford, 2004 (William E., “Paths Diverging? Accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB367.pdf)

In addition, the powerful American and Japanese navies can help to guarantee the maintenance of the vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) running through Southeast and East Asia.209 About 52 percent of all commercial sea cargo (59 percent of supertankers) transit this region amid thorny and unresolved issues of territorial boundaries, intrastate governance problems, and piracy .210 For Japan, the routes are even more important―over 85 percent of the oil

Japan imports sails through these sea lanes.211 Piracy in South and Southeast Asian shipping lanes remains a major hazard , especially

in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca.212 At present, Japan is committed to protect only SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from Osaka and Tokyo.213 This arc of committed sea lane protection does not even extend all the way

through the vital Bashi Channel to the southern end of Taiwan and the northern entrance to the South China Sea. Increasing this Japanese maritime reach through port calls, freedom of navigation cruises into the Indian Ocean, and combined exercises should be encouraged.214 Aiding in the provision of unfettered SLOCs, which benefit most of Southeast and East Asia, also may reassure Asia about the future role of the Japanese military, thus increasing Japan’s ability to comprehensively engage ASEAN.

Alliances’ substantial military capabilities protect sea lane integrity promoting Japanese growthMakins, Flake, and Watanabe, Prez Atlantic Council, Exec. Direc Mansfield Center, and Prez. Research Institute for peace, 2002 p. 3

(Christopher, L. Gordon, and Akio “New Frontiers for US-Japan Security Relations: the report of a joint working group)

While terrorism is an important new frontier, the alliance will continue to perform a wide variety of important "traditional" functions. Among its many benefits, the alliance: • Provides a stable, secure environment necessary for economic and political development. Japan, for example, depends heavily on imported energy and foreign trade. This requires keeping sea lanes open. This need is met in part by tasking the Japanese maritime forces to protect sea lines of communications out to 1,000 nautical miles. Coupled with the global reach of U.S. forces, the allies' combined capabilities are substantial .

The alliance is key to deter disruptions of critical commercial sea lanesKato, Japanese Ambassador, March 5 2005 (Ryozo, The National Journal)

Kato: Really, what has motivated a change in Japan's strategic thinking is the end of the Cold War. Clearly, the threat that was represented by the former Soviet

Union was drastically reduced, but, unfortunately, the end of the Cold War did not prove a panacea in terms of securing stability in the Asian-Pacific region. What most stands out when you consider Japan's particular position is our dependence on Middle Eastern oil ,

which accounts for almost 90 percent of our energy. That great distance between the Middle East and Japan produces very long sea lanes that cross the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea. Because those vital sea lanes are vulnerable to disruption at many different choke points and hot spots, it's only natural for Japan to seek the best means for securing those sea lanes. And that can be accomplished only within its close strategic alliance with the United States. The absolutely indispensable security element for us is the strategic alliance with the United States.


Southeast Asia NB The alliance is key to stabilize Southeast AsiaOkamoto 02 (Yukio, Security Adviser to Japanese Cabinet, Washington Quarterly25.2 p. 59-72)

In recent years, Japan has had to begin sharing the foreign affairs spotlight in Southeast Asia with China. Although some claim that Japan's status in the region is in irreversible decline, Japan's intentions are probably viewed with far greater warmth than those of its erstwhile regional

rival. Some consider China a ferocious competitor, a country that has robbed Southeast Asia of foreign direct

investment (FDI) and export markets for its manufactured goods. Conversely, Japan is seen as a complementary power, a country that provides technology, FDI, general finance, and a market for Southeast Asia's products. In

terms of security, the perception of Japan is shifting from that of a former conqueror to a significant member of an evolving security network answering the challenge of rising Chinese military and political might. Japan and the United States must work together to meet other serious, long-term foreign policy challenges in Southeast Asia. Indonesia must be guided back to stability. The political stalemate in Myanmar must be resolved and the state returned to membership in the international community. Vietnam and Cambodia must emerge from the ravages of war and calamitous social policies.

Southeast Asian stability solves terrorism and global economic declineThe Asheville Citizen-Times January 1, 2005

We should not underestimate the impact of the tsunami on the people in the nations surrounding the Indian Ocean, or the

importance of a successful recovery effort, for it will affect a great many things. In the short term there are millions at risk. In the longer haul, a successful recovery will help keep the world economy from slipping and it could also be a great boon in the war against terrorism. Indonesia, devastated by the tsunami, is the world's largest Muslim nation and a not-unfamiliar recruiting area for the likes of al-Qaida. A solid international relief effort would go far in debunking some of the anti-West rhetoric of radical groups. An ineffective effort could help create the sort of chaotic conditions -- poverty, joblessness and want -- that make for the fertile breeding grounds in which terror groups flourish.


Terrorism NB Japanese cooperation on the War on Terror is key to engaging the Muslim worldOkamoto 02 (Yukio, Security Adviser to Japanese Cabinet, Washington Quarterly25.2 p. 59-72)

Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential intermediary [End Page 70] between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japan's close relations with Arab governments, Muslim oil-producing states, and the nations of Central Asia; its relatively more flexible stance on human rights policies; and

the absence of a strong tie to Israel. Japan can contribute to a U.S.-Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an inconsistent U.S. commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the industrialized world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also needs to explain its reluctance to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights standards as those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.


A2 Japan Prolif Good The alliance is critical to Japanese deterrenceMorton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning at State Department, 2000 (The Nuclear Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/Halperin-US-Japan.pdf)

Another major objective of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks on U.S. allies, especially Germany and

Japan. In Europe, this issue has generally arisen in the context of the Soviet use of nuclear threats against Germany in a crisis or the initiation

of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union against NATO forces in the field during a conventional war in Europe. In Asia, it is discussed under the rubric of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan and is generally understood to be designed to prevent Russia or China (or more recently the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) from coercing Japan by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.


2NC Say Yes Fear of abandonment means Japan will say yesIto, IR Prof. @ Meiji University, 2003 p. 11

(Go, Alliance in Anxiety)

Two kinds of responses are likely to follow when an ally experiences such a shift. First, in the short run, fear of abandonment makes the ally prone to succumb to its partner's demand. When Nixon announced the opening to China, Japanese leaders' immediate and principal fear was abandonment, driven by concern that the U.S. government would shift to reliance on the PRC for containment in East Asia. Thus, following the announcement of the Sino-U.S. accommodation, the Japanese government granted concessions in

economic negotiations with the United States. The excessive reliance on the U.S. provision of security and economic guarantees prevented Japan from warding off U.S. demands on textiles and currency adjustment.

Japan perceives the alliance as supreme- they won’t say noLincoln, Senior Fellow on Council of Foreign Rels, 2003 (Edward, “Japan: Using Power..” in Wash Qrtly)

Because the Japanese government has not pressed for a stronger voice in regional and global affairs, the soft power arising from its economic strength might appear to be illusory. Such a conclusion would be a mistake. The Japanese government has indeed been able to use nonmilitary means to influence its external environment and has done so quite successfully. Elements of this soft power have come from Japan's economic size and affluence, ownership of a massive amount of assets abroad, substantial direct investments abroad, and large amounts of foreign aid.

These elements provided the government with financial resources to spend (or withhold) abroad to influence foreign governments. Had the Japanese government chosen to make a splash on the global scene, it could have done so. The timidity of the government's forays at the World Bank and other multilateral institutions a decade ago was not caused by the lack of leverage. The real cause

was a lack of interest. The Japanese government has been relatively satisfied with the international status quo; the multilateral economic institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) have worked reasonably well for Japan, so why rock the boat? Therefore, the government was content to focus on the more immediate needs of the nation in ensuring peace and economic stability for the Japanese. That strategy has involved a deliberate choice to subordinate the nation to the United States on security policy and a major effort to keep Americans sufficiently satisfied with Japanese behavior as to eschew policies that would harm Japan's economic or security interests. Toward the rest of the world, the government has also pursued a policy of containing protectionist urges or other behavior damaging to Japanese economic interests, but always with an eye to U.S. reactions.

Common interests guarantee Japan will say yesMasaharu Kohno, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY, Fall 1999, http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm

Furthermore, Japan is often criticized for "always following the United States." The fact is that Japan, as an ally of the United States, shares fundamental values and ideas with the United States, and as such, its foreign policy naturally moves in a direction similar to that of the United States. The Japanese decision- making process has been described as an accumulation of slow actions based on precedents. According to this view, due to general restraint in its foreign

policy decisions and other various considerations, Japan has refrained from unnecessarily overturning precedents. This reflects a pattern of behavior that exists throughout the Japanese bureaucracy, but is not necessarily unique to Japan.


2NC Say Yes – BIT Japanese policy staunchly support development aid to ChinaKato, Japanese Ambassador, March 5 2005 (Ryozo, The National Journal)

Kato: For a long time it has been the policy of Japan to give China a lot of development assistance. I believe China accounts for over 10 percent of our total bilateral overseas development aid. Our line of thinking was, there can be a variety of different scenarios in terms of how China develops. We felt all along that the best of those scenarios was for China to consider economic development as its top priority. This will ensure that China develops international dependence, which also requires stability. So our policy remains that of encouraging China to give top priority to its economic development . We think that's best not only for China, but also for the international community. As a result, China has developed into a huge market and an economy that has grown faster than many of us suspected.

Japan is a leader in giving development assistanceLincoln, Senior Fellow on Council of Foreign Rels, 2003 (Edward, “Japan: Using Power..” in Wash Qrtly)

Concurrent with its economic boom, Japan emerged as the largest provider of foreign aid among major industrial nations, with its foreign aid budget reaching $9 billion by 1990, almost triple what it had been just a decade earlier. 2 Over the past half century, many governments have viewed foreign aid as a potential means to buy friends and influence among developing nations. Whereas Americans saw this means of influence through the Cold War lens of keeping developing countries out of the clutches of

communism, the Japanese appeared to be playing the game for mercantilist economic reasons, or commercial advantage, by providing grants and loans for large infrastructure projects to developing countries tied to purchases from the Japanese. [End Page 112] Since the late 1980s, Japan has been the largest supplier of foreign aid to developing countries in East and Southeast Asia; for example, in 1990, 54 percent of aid to the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was from Japan. 3 At the time, some outside observers saw this aid to Asia as one element in a Japanese effort to create an economic bloc in Asia, within which Japanese firms would have preferential access to neighboring markets at the expense of U.S. and European firms.

Japan will agree to development assistanceOkamoto, special adviser to Japan’s task force on IR, 2002 p. MUSE

(Yukio, “Japan and the US” in Washington Quarterly”)

Although Japan's biggest concern with the United States is the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism, the United States finds worrisome Japan's

pacifist tendency in the face of international security issues. Prior to September 11, Japan was making only economic contributions to the security of the world beyond its immediate neighborhood. Through trade, soft loans, and Official Development Assistance, Japan has made sizeable contributions toward improving the lot of the world's poor. Japan is the world's greatest donor of nonmilitary aid and one of the most generous per capita providers of economic assistance.


2NC Say Yes – BMD Japan will say yes to any US plan for nonproliferation cooperationFuyabashi, 2000 (Yoichi, Director of Tokyo Foundation Security Studies, Washington Quarterly 23.3)

The third shock was a chain of events that rocked the foundations of the global nonproliferation regime: nuclear testing by India and then Pakistan in 1998, and the U.S. Senate's decision not

to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of 1999. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, nonnuclearization and nuclear disarmament are very powerful themes for the Japanese, which explains Japan's desire to play a larger diplomatic role in the global nonproliferation regime such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or CTBT. These recent events were thus a blow to Japan, and international confidence in the existing nonproliferation regime eroded as a result. Japan was particularly shocked by the U.S. Congress's rejection of CTBT ratification, giving credence to Japanese suspicions that the United States is no longer willing to sustain its commitment to allied cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and that it is only interested in its own security .

Japan fears Chinese vertical & horizontal proliferation- they will agree to US pressureThe International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2005 (NEWS; Pg. 1, “China poses a growing concern for U.S. military” by Jim Yardley And Thom Shanker, Source: The New York Times l/n)At a time when the American military is consumed with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, global terrorism and the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea

and Iran, China is presenting a new and strategically different security concern to America, as well as to Japan and Taiwan, in the Western Pacific, Pentagon and military officials say. China, these officials say, has smartly analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the American military and has focused its growing defense spending on weapons systems that could exploit the perceived U.S. weaknesses if the United States ever

needs to respond to fighting in Taiwan. A decade ago, American military planners dismissed the threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan as a 100-mile infantry swim. The Pentagon now believes that China has purchased or built enough amphibious assault ships, submarines, fighter jets and short-range missiles to pose an immediate threat to Taiwan and to any U.S. force that might come to Taiwan's aid. China's South Sea Fleet is based at Zhanjiang. In the worst case in a Taiwan crisis, Pentagon officials say that any delay in American aircraft carriers' reaching the island would mean that the United States would initially depend on fighter jets and bombers based on Guam and Okinawa, while Chinese forces could use their amphibious ships to go back and forth across the narrow Taiwan Strait. Some U.S. military analysts believe China could now defeat Taiwan before American forces could arrive at the scene, leaving a political decision about whether to attack, even though Taiwan would already be lost. Even the most hawkish officials at the Pentagon do not believe China is preparing for an imminent invasion of Taiwan. Nor do analysts believe China is any match for the U.S. military. But as neighboring North Korea is erratically trying to play the nuclear card, China is quietly challenging America's reach in the Western Pacific by concentrating strategically on conventional forces. "They are building their force to deter and delay our ability to intervene in a Taiwan crisis," said Eric McVadon, a former military attache at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. "What they have done is cleverly develop some capabilities that have the prospect of attacking our niche vulnerabilities." China's rapid military modernization is the major reason President George W. Bush has warned the European Union not to lift its arms embargo against Beijing. At the same time, some in Washington, particularly on

Capitol Hill, would like Taiwan to buy more American arms to beef up its own defenses. Japan, America's closest ally in East Asia and China's rival for regional

dominance, is also watching China's buildup and reorganizing its own military. The Japanese prime minister, Junichiro

Koizumi, has echoed Bush by calling on Europe to leave the arms embargo against China in place . A research center affiliated with Japan's Defense Ministry has also criticized China's increased military spending and cautioned that Beijing was rushing to prepare for possible

conflict with Taiwan, an assertion China sharply denied. The growing friction between Japan and China, fueled by rising nationalism in both countries, is just one of the political developments adding to tensions in East Asia . In March, China passed a controversial new "anti-secession" law authorizing a military attack if top leaders in Beijing believed Taiwan was moving too far toward independence. China's most recent military white paper also alarmed American policy makers because it mentioned the United States by name for the first time

since 1998. It stated that the U.S. presence in the region "complicated security factors." China, meanwhile, accused the United States and Japan of meddling in a domestic Chinese matter when Washington and Tokyo recently issued a joint statement that listed peace in Taiwan as a "common strategic objective." "The potential for a miscalculation or an incident here has actually increased, just based on the rhetoric over the past six months to a year," one American intelligence analyst in Washington said. In 1996, when China fired warning-shot missiles across the Taiwan Strait before Taiwanese elections, President Bill Clinton responded by sending a carrier battle group to a position near Taiwan. Then, China could do nothing about it. Now, analysts say, it can. In fact, American carriers responding to a crisis would now initially have to operate at least 800 kilometers, or 500 miles, from Taiwan, which would reduce the number of fighter sorties they could launch. This is because China now has a modern fleet of submarines, including new Russian-made nuclear subs that can fire missiles while submerged. America would first need to subdue the submarines.



2NC Consult Good Consultation counterplans are legitimate – conditioning the plan is the only way to preserve the option of solving the case which checks unpredictable 2ac add-ons and plan clarifications. This risk is compounded by the aff monopoly on pre-round prep and structural advantages in late developing debates.


A2 Artificial Competition It’s not artificial- consultation has a direct impact on the way the policy is plays out- the idea that our policies should be conditioned on Alliance input is a pertinent question- look at the Iraq war- this is relevant education.Its tests resolved- the only way to test resolved is to counterplan because no disadvantage can advance the crucial question of opportunity cost in policymaking.Not consulting is a disadvantage to the plan- it’s a reason why the plan is a bad idea- this counterplan is no different than an agent counterplan and a politics disad except it doesn’t steal the whole plan.Breeds good policymaking- artificial competition forces decisions about what the best avenue towards policy change should be- limiting the strategic choices on the negative is on balance worse for education because policymakers in Congress are not constrained- this doesn’t’ legitimize abusive arguments like “Perm- do the counterplan” however because in the real world that would be interpreted as legislative assent to the negative proposal meaning a victory.Opportunity cost is an important issue in policymaking that can only be foregrounded by a consultation counterplan- the possibility for consultation on an issue is always trashed by the resolved affirmatives; the only way to demonstrate the value of consultation is with a counterplan.Not a voting issue- the idea that we should lose because of a theory argument is enthymematic- it implies that what we did is so bad that we should lose- make the affirmative detail why we should lose, instead of why the counterplan itself should just be discounted.


A2 # of Countries to Consult Large Counter-Interpretation- only consulting regional actors is legitimate- this guarantees a balance between predictability and critical education over relations with key actors in East AsiaLit checks- gotta be someone who says we must genuinely bindingly consult a nation fo the counterplan to be runnable.Net benefits determine relevance- if these trivial counterplans have no net benefit they will not be run- the Aff is in a Catch-22- any consultation counterplan that can win is by definition non-trivial.Multiple consultable entities is GOOD- we conduct foreign policy by negotiating and discussing with dozens of nations around the globe- this proves such counterplans are non-trivial.To be fair, its not infinite- it’s a little under 200.This logic of infinite regression would destroy all counterplans- there are literally hundreds of government agencies- their interpretation would destroy all agent counterplans which are crucial to negative strategies to test the agent of action and policy relevance of a particular affirmative.


A2 Perm do the CP The perm is theoretically illegit:The affirmative severs out of the resolution and immediacy of the plan- immediacy should be viewed as part of the affirmative because without it the affirmative could delay the plan to get out of all disadsSeverence is a voter because it skews strategy- it makes the plan text conditional which undermines the only stable advocacy on the affirmative- severance allows the aff to spike out of all negative arguments


2NC Consult on other Issues Perm The perm is intrinsic because it consults over an issue not intrinsic to the plan or the counterplan. Intrinsicness is a voter because it skews negative strategy- it justifies reading additions to their plan text in order to solve for any disadvantage or counterplan

This doesn’t solve the net benefit- our evidence is specific to consultation over China policy because Japan wants input in policy over regional issues


A2 Lie Perm The perm is severance – consultation is an ongoing process and the plan is not adopted until after the consultation. This severs out of the immediacy of the plan. Severance is illegitimate and a voting issue because the aff can get out of any disad links if they can discard the plan.

The perm is intrinsic – it adds an entirely new form of non-binding consultation. Our counterplan only advocates binding consultation. Intrinsicness is illegitimate and a voting issue because the aff can add on anything to their plan to dodge disad links.Japan will discover the lie- government representation will leak the secretJames Q. Wilson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, and John J. DiIulio, Professor of Political Science at Princeton, 1998 [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world. The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories. Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long. Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution.

Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad. There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in party because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.

This crushes relations- genuine consultation is the only means of sustaining the allianceC. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, October 2001 (352 pp, http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/105/7iie2865.pdf, accessed 8/05)

Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply of international issues that they face. This includes both economic and security issues, as well as each country’s positions in the international institutions. The Armitage Report (IISS

2000) contains numerous specific recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with Washington—such as the AMF proposal in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched unilaterally in recent years—are

unlikely to succeed.The alternative to making the alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current circumstances, without significant regional organizations to mediate festering historical animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia. Its huge costs , to

Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United States relationship—including in the economics sphere—in a modern and normal direction.


A2 Non-Binding Consultation Binding consultation is a precondition to US hegemonyOsius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. 75-76 (Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)

The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of "burdensharing" into "power-sharing. Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential

campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership.... To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership

will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretentions.-The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship

reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. Although it is difficult

to imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution's lvo Daalder,

implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides.... Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account." Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's complex global issues. Watching America's contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral

approaches, gives Tokyo an excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America's historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions.

The perm is theoretically illegitimate:Nonbinding consultation is not intrinsic to the plan or the counterplan because the only consultation is nonbindingIntrinsic permutations are a voter because they skew negative strategy- it justifies reading additions to their plan text in order to solve for any disadvantage or counterplan


Genuine consultation is the only means of sustaining the allianceC. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, October 2001 (352 pp, http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/105/7iie2865.pdf, accessed 8/05)

Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply of international issues that they face. This includes both economic and security issues, as well as each country’s positions in the international institutions. The Armitage Report (IISS

2000) contains numerous specific recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with Washington—such as the AMF proposal in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched unilaterally in recent years—are

unlikely to succeed.The alternative to making the alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current circumstances, without significant regional organizations to mediate festering historical animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia. Its huge costs , to

Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United States relationship—including in the economics sphere—in a modern and normal direction.


A2 Artificial Competition Justifies Intrinsicness We’ll win that we’re not artificially competitive because our evidence is specific to consultation over Japan- this doesn’t justify additions to the plan

Intrinsic permutations aren’t justified- the War on Iraq proves that consultation counterplans are legitimate opportunity costs. Allowing them to add to their plan text to solve the counterplan isn’t an even tradeoff


Assurance DA – PTA CP NB Japan wants US cooperation on trade issuesAutoparts Report, September 16th, 2002 (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UDO/is_24_15/ai_92001627#continue, accessed online 8/05)

The Japanese and U.S. trade ministers agreed to cooperate in pressing China into complying with an increase in its vehicle import quota, a Japanese trade official said, according to Kyodo News. Japan's Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Takeo Hiranuma and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick agreed to press China on its commitments as a World Trade Organization member at an upcoming meeting of the WTO transitional review, the official said, according to the report. The annual review mechanism to start in late September is designed to check China's compliance with its terms of admission to the Geneva-based world trade watchdog, which it joined in December last year. Tokyo and Washington share concerns that Beijing might be failing to fulfill its pledge to increase the $8 billion annual quota on auto imports by 15 percent every year up to 2005, said the official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Along with the quota increases, China promised to cut auto tariffs in stages toward

2005, when it is to scrap the quota system, according to the official. Hiranuma and Zoellick also share concerns about the widespread piracy of trademarks and copyrights in China and agreed to urge the Chinese government to enhance measures to crack down on them.


Consult Japan Aff Answers


Normal Means BMD Consultation is normal means US State Department, July 2005 (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm, accessed online 8/05)

Because of the two countries' combined economic and technological impact on the world, the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope. The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including development assistance combating communicable disease such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, and protecting the environment and natural resources. Both countries also collaborate in science and technology in such areas as mapping the human genome, research on aging, and international space exploration. As one of Asia's most

successful democracies and its largest economy, Japan contributes irreplaceable political, financial, and moral support to U.S.-Japan diplomatic efforts. The United States consults closely with Japan and the Republic of Korea on policy regarding North Korea. In Southeast Asia, U.S.-Japan cooperation is vital for stability and for political and economic reform. Outside Asia, Japanese political and financial support has substantially strengthened the U.S. position on a variety of global geopolitical problems, including the Gulf, Middle East peace efforts, and the

Balkans. Japan is an indispensable partner on UN reform, and broadly supports the United States on nonproliferation and nuclear issues. The U.S. supports Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.


Assurance Bad – China/Japan Mod

Relations strong now- top officials and business agreements solveSEKIGUCHI and WONG 14 Japanese government and politics correspondent and Chinese politics correspondent for the WSJ TOKO and CHUN HAN, “China-Japan Relations Ease Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-japan-relations-ease-back-from-brink-1411650347

Relations between Asia's two biggest economies are finally thawing after two years of rising tensions that included near-clashes in the air. China and Japan have eased back from the brink, quietly in recent weeks and more openly this week, with representatives of the two nations holding what they described as cordial talks on maritime security and business relations. Outside observers caution that little progress is visible on the fundamental issues dividing the world's second- and third-largest economies. But they

say the chance has risen that at a regional summit in Beijing in November, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will achieve his long-standing wish for direct talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. "I hope very much to meet" Mr. Xi, said Mr. Abe on Monday in

New York, where he was visiting the United Nations. "A meeting and a handshake between leaders alone can lead the way to regional peace and security." On Wednesday, senior Chinese and Japanese diplomats along with defense officials wrapped up two days of discussions in the eastern Chinese city of Qingdao on the topic of East China Sea. That

is the location of the small islands, controlled by Japan and claimed by Beijing, that have often been a flash point between the two nations. The two have established overlapping air-defense zones, and earlier this year military aircraft from the two sides were just about 30 meters (yards)

apart in an East China Sea encounter, according to the Japanese side. But the meetings this week had a calmer tone and ended with agreement to try to develop better channels of communication. "Leaders at the top on both sides have

apparently made a decision that relations were too dangerous, and that it's not in the interests of both countries to be so tense," said Harvard University professor Ezra Vogel, an expert on both Japan and China. Both sides recognize that warmer ties are good for business. Two-way trade was down 6.3% in 2013, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, hurting Japanese

exporters. Many Japanese companies have shifted their investment sights to Southeast Asia because of a perception that they aren't welcome in China. That is a problem for Beijing , which is coping with slower growth and a troubled property market. On Wednesday, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang in Beijing met Japan's largest trade delegation to China to date, made up of more than 200 business leaders. Mr. Wang told the Japanese delegates he was seeking to

resume high-level economic discussions with Tokyo soon—talks that have been suspended since August 2010. "The economy is one factor" behind improved ties, said Liang Yunxiang, a professor of international politics at Peking University. "Another could be that Xi Jinping senses he has secured his political authority, thanks to his anticorruption drive and assertion of control over the military, which gives him more space to maneuver on foreign policy." Still, neither side has made the kind of bold gestures that would be expected to precede a deeper rapprochement. Both are expanding military spending. Mr. Abe, who angered China by visiting a controversial Tokyo war shrine in December 2013, has continued to make offerings to the shrine on ceremonial occasions, although people close to the prime minister expect him to refrain from another visit. "It's hard to see either side making any major concessions. The relationship has been moved from the freezer to the refrigerator," said Yasuyuki Miyake, a professor of China studies at Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan. Mr. Abe's latest cabinet, named early this month, includes several ministers with conservative views, such as internal-affairs minister Sanae Takaichi, who said she would continue to visit the shrine during her term. Mr. Abe retained education minister Hakubun Shimomura, who has pushed for an end to what he describes as the overly apologetic view of history taught in Japanese schools. China reiterated Thursday that any formal talks between the two leaders would depend on Tokyo. "The key is that the Japanese side should show sincerity and take concrete actions to remove the political obstacles that stand in the way of the normal development of bilateral ties," said foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying. Christopher Hughes, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, said Mr. Xi's standing could be undermined if he is perceived as reconciling with Japan in the absence of concessions. "In some ways, Mr. Abe's domestic position is more secure than Mr. Xi's," Mr. Hughes said. "China won't want to be seen as weak—they want to portray themselves as negotiating on their own terms, from a position of strength."

http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-japan-relations-ease-back-from-brink-1411650347

http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-japan-relations-ease-back-from-brink-1411650347


US-Japan relations kill Sino-Japan relationsBanning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser are Washington-based consultants who have written extensively on the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese strategic triangle, Chinese strategic perceptions, and Asian security, April 1997, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Published by the University if California Press, Vol. 37, No.4, pg. 383~402, JSTOR

The interaction between China and Japan as well as their relations with the United States will be critical in determining the future of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. Protracted tensions or conflict between Beijing and Tokyo could destabilize the region and strain U.S. bilateral ties with one or

both countries. Efforts by the United States to strengthen relations with one power may strain ties with the other or between the

two. This triangular dynamic is especially evident in China's reaction to steps taken by Washington to revitalize and reshape the U.S.-Japan alliance for the post-Cold War era and in Japan's uneasiness about improvements in Sino- American relations.

Failure of China-Japan relations turns their impact and causes warAnton La Guardia, The Telegraph, “The clouds of nuclear war are still hanging over Hiroshima,” March 8 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/08/03/do0301.xml

In Asia, however, wartime resentments of Japan are still acute. Several anti-Japanese riots broke out in China last spring, tolerated by the authorities, after the publication of new textbooks seen as playing down Japanese atrocities. Even a democratic country such as South Korea harbours a deep resentment of Japan, and there

have been protests in Seoul over the status of islands claimed by the two countries. It is difficult to see Asia's leaders standing side by side any time soon to remember the fallen as Europe's leaders do for joint commemorations of the Second World War. The idea of a major new war, seen as unthinkable in Europe, is far from outlandish in Asia. Academics now compare the growing Sino-Japanese competition for natural resources and economic dominance to the contest between Germany and Britain at the start of the war-blighted 20th century. North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles over Japanese territory in 1998. Three

years later, the Japanese coastguard chased and sank a North Korean spy ship. Last year Japanese ships and planes tracked a Chinese submarine snooping in territorial waters. As China devotes much of its new wealth to modernising its armed forces, the likeliest flashpoint is Taiwan, a former Japanese colony. China has made no secret of its readiness to resort to force to stop the island from seceding formally, and the US is committed to defending Taiwan. It is unlikely that Japan could escape involvement. Indeed, one scenario is that China could emulate Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor with a pre-emptive strike on US forces in Okinawa. Japan has started to flex military muscles atrophied by decades of pacifism. Its forces are developing the ability to operate at greater distances and the war-renouncing constitution has been stretched to the limit with deployments in East Timor, the Indian Ocean and now the "reconstruction" mission in southern Iraq. Japan is demanding a

permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council alongside the victors of the Second World War. Even in Hiroshima, some Japanese have started to talk of the ultimate taboo: developing a nuclear deterrent.


Assurance Bad – Prolif Mod Relations prevent Japan independence and military leadershipBandow, 2010, senior fellow at the Cato Institute Doug, May 12, “Japan Can Defend Itself,” available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804

World War II ended 65 years ago. The Cold War disappeared 21 years ago. Yet America's military deployments have little changed. Nowhere is that more evident than on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Okinawans are

tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since. The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units. Most Japanese people also preferred to keep the U.S. military presence on Japan's most distant and poorest province, forcing Okinawans to carry a disproportionate burden of the

alliance. Whatever the justifications of this arrangement during the Cold War, the necessity of both U.S. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. It's time to reconsider both Tokyo's and Washington's regional roles. The United States imposed the so-called "peace constitution" on Japan, Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military. However, American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. Today's "Self-

Defense Force" is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision. Nevertheless, both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan's military role. Washington's willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary.

That solves their impactPreble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335,

The Japanese public appears to be generally sympathetic to the Taiwanese cause, suggesting that Tokyo’s decision to show support for Taipei goes beyond narrow security concerns, and also beyond a desire to please Washington. An estimated 2.3 million tourists travel between Taiwan and Japan each year, and Japan is Taiwan’s largest trading partner.73 Favorable sentiment does not necessarily translate into support for independence among Japanese, however. In a September 2002 Japan Times survey, 71 percent of Japanese declared they were satisfied with the status quo on Taiwan; in other words, they favored neither reunification with the PRC nor independence from it.74 This may reflect a recognition on the part of the Japanese public that Taiwanese independence may provoke the Chinese to military action, which would certainly prove detrimental to Japanese security. But doubts and fears about the PRC do not completely overwhelm Japanese affinity for Taiwan and

the Taiwanese. A Mainichi poll taken in 2001 asked Japanese citizens to identify countries and regions friendly to Japan. Taiwan ranked third, behind the United States and South Korea.75 On balance, the Japanese like Taiwan and the feeling is apparently mutual. “The Japanese built universities, roads, and other infrastructure. They educated us, they turned us into a more modern society,” said Hwang Kuan-hu, a national policy adviser to Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, “We welcome Japan becoming more involved again with Taiwan.”76 Whether this mutual appreciation would translate into a formal Japanese pledge to assist Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression remains to be seen, but that should ultimately be a decision for the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, consistent with their own security concerns. The presumed wishes or desires of the United States

should not be the determining factor. Given Taiwan’s strategic location across crucial Japanese lines of communication, the Japanese would view PRC control over the island as a security threat . Although Japan currently has only a limited capacity for blocking military annexation, a strong statement , building

on the February 2005 joint declaration, may help deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. Even a position of deliberate ambiguity, holding out the possibility that Japan might employ military means to repel Chinese aggression, would likely be more credible coming from a regional military power than is the current ambiguous pledge originating with a United States that is struggling to sustain a host of commitments around the globe.

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804


Nuclear weapons are better than ballistic missile defense – multiple reasons – reliable, fast development, geographical diversity and elimination of threats.Clifton W. Sherrill (Florida State University) July/September 2001 "The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent" COMPARATIVE STRATEGY Vol 20 Issue 3 EBSCOhost

In recognition of the new post–Cold War security environment, some have suggested that rather than develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, Japan should be satisfied with a BMD system. Undoubtedly BMD would constitute a major security asset to Japan either independent

of or in conjunction with a nuclear weapons program. Even the most promising current BMD systems available to Japan, however, are penetrable if the threat is large. Although BMD deters through the capacity to potentially deny an adversary its

intended goals, a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a qualitatively different type of deterrence—one based on retaliation. Different regimes may be motivated, or deterred, by different things. Whereas potential denial deterrence may be more effective against some, retaliatory deterrence may weigh more heavily with others. Second, opponents of BMD routinely resort to criticism regarding the cost of maintaining an effective BMD system. Such an argument is less appealing with respect to developing a nuclear weapons

arsenal [8]. Japan already has operational space launch vehicles that give it technological expertise and experience that can be translated easily into ballistic missiles capable of bearing nuclear warheads . Likewise, Japan already has an established nuclear infrastructure and tremendous plutonium stocks because of its giant nuclear energy program. Experience with nuclear physics and raw materials necessary for developing nuclear weaponry are already in Japanese possession.

Thus, the Japanese easily could construct nuclear weapons in a short time for a relatively low cost . Third,

nuclear weapons would provide at least a modicum of deterrent capability across a greater geographic area. A BMD system likely would be restricted to protecting the Japanese islands—it likely would have no capability comparable to that found in the concept of extended deterrence. For example, Japan could provide its own extended deterrence to the Philippines. A hostile power’s encroachment into the Philippines would jeopardize Japanese national security by potentially cutting off the

flow of natural resources through the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea. Japanese possession of a nuclear deterrent could prevent potential adversaries from tacit nuclear threats and permit conventional forces to counter hostile aggression. Although extended deterrence has intrinsic limitations, its credibility increases in direct proportion to the significance that the protected area holds for the security of the deterring state. Thus, whereas the natural resource base and the relatively isolated geographic position of the United States readily permit a self-reliant security policy, the same factors diminish the credibility of an American extended deterrent. In the case of the resource-barren Japanese islands, however, dependence on a secure flow of mineral, food, and energy imports and the absence of a large buffer zone between Japan and potential adversaries such as China, North Korea, and Russia combine to upgrade the credibility of a potential Japanese extended deterrent. In the same vein, Japanese SDF deployed outside the protective bubble of BMD would be more vulnerable than forces protected by the “universal” applicability of a retaliatory deterrent.


UNQ – A2 ECS Japan is making concessions over the islands in the status quoKeck 14 formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat Zachary, “Japan Caves to China on Senkaku Island Dispute,” The Diplomat, October 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-caves-to-china-on-senkaku-island-dispute/

In order to secure a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping , Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe agreed to a significant concession in Tokyo’s ongoing dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, according to Japanese media outlets. As Shannon noted earlier today on China Power, Japanese officials now expect there to be a brief meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe during next month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Beijing. The meeting would be the first between the two heads of state since they took their current positions. It comes after a prolonged Japanese charm offensive towards China, which resulted in extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations

aimed at securing a heads of state meeting at APEC. The meeting, which Japanese officials acknowledged would be more symbolic than substantive, did not come cheaply for Japan. Indeed, if Japanese media reports are accurate, Tokyo appears to have caved on the major issue that prevented a heads-of-state meeting to date . On Thursday, Mainichi reported that Japan made a three-prong proposal to China in order to secure the meeting between the two heads of states next month. According to the report, which cited “Japanese government sources,” Japan proposed that during his meeting with Xi, Abe would first reassert that the Senkaku Islands are an

inherent part of Japanese territory, but then “acknowledge that China has a case as well” to the islands . He would then propose that China and Japan seek to settle the issue through mutual dialogue over time. None of this would be included in a joint statement or any other documents

officially released after the summit meeting. Still, if the report is accurate, Abe’s acknowledgement that a territorial dispute exists and proposal to settle the issue through mutual dialogue represent huge concessions to long-standing Chinese demands. The Japanese government has always refused to acknowledge that a territorial dispute even exists with China over the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing refers to as the Diaoyu Islands. “There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands,” Japan has said on numerous occasions. China’s main precondition for agreeing to a heads of state meeting between President Xi and Prime Minister Abe has long been Japan’s acknowledgement that the territorial dispute exists. As Kyodo reported in June 2013, “Even after the change of government last December with the inauguration of the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, China has continued to call for Japan to acknowledge that a territorial dispute exists as a precondition for holding a summit.” That same report noted that Japan had refused to do this, and thus that a leadership summit appeared unlikely for the foreseeable future. The two sides also publicly fought over the issue during the UN General Assembly meeting in September of last year. First, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a think tank speech before the UNGA opened that China was willing to reopen dialogue with Japan, but first “Japan needs to recognize that there is such a dispute. The whole world knows that there is a dispute.” Prime Minister Abe appeared to respond to Wang in a press conference following his appearance at the UN summit. “Senkaku is an inherent part of the territory of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon international law, and the islands are under the valid control of Japan,” Abe said at the press conference. While Tokyo would not escalate the situation and wanted to open dialogue with China to avoid an armed conflict, Abe insisted that “Japan would not make a concession on our territorial sovereignty.” Some in China are already taking the concession as a sign of Japanese weakness. Specifically, the Global Times quoted Yang Bojiang, director of Japanese studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, as saying: “Abe is under economic pressure to resume talks with China and advance the bilateral relationship, so he has to show the world his willingness to talk.”

http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-caves-to-china-on-senkaku-island-dispute/

http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-caves-to-china-on-senkaku-island-dispute/


Alliance Bad – Deterrence Their impact is outdated – U.S. deployments in Asia are no longer credible and bilateral action like the counterplan decreases our deterrence.Clifton Sherrill, September 2001, adjunct professor at Florida State University, Comparative Strategy 20:3

With the end of the Cold War came major reductions in American defense forces. American policy makers, anxious to capitalize on the economic benefits presumed due as a legacy of the Cold War's death, took immediate action to slash the defense budget. The forward defense policy was brought into question, and phase-outs

of forward deployments quickly were begun. Downsizing efforts , in terms of both troops and equipment, diminished the American capability to simultaneously project power in multiple theaters of operations. In the Asia—Pacific this resulted in a draw-down from over 125,000

troops to approximately 100,000 "forward-deployed" troops. Although the operational effects of such reductions were significant, perhaps more important was the signal the reductions sent regarding American regional commitment . In East Asia the scale-backs followed the American withdrawal from Vietnam and base closures in Thailand and Taiwan in the 1970s, and the loss of, and failure to replace, America's largest overseas military bases, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, in the early 1990s. In the Spratly Islands abutting the strategically vital sea lines of communication traversing the South China Sea, the United States has adopted a policy characterized by vagueness and inaction in response to aggressive Chinese activity, despite questions surrounding American security assurances in the area pursuant to the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the

Philippines. This pattern of retreat lends credence to the perception that American commitment in the region is tenuous at best. In addition to the American pullout, there are questions surrounding the will of the U nited States

to act unilaterally if need be. Recent history and contemporary official planning and posture statements suggest that the United States is dependent on reaching international consensus before taking action and is unlikely to use force in other than multilateral operations. Such requirements tend to lead to least-common-denominator missions, burdened by the constraints of maintaining unity, as evidenced in the NATO Kosovo operations of Spring 1999. Given that likely potential adversaries in the Asia-Pacific include either or both of the People's Republic of China and Russia, each of which occupies a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it is unlikely that the United Nations would provide the forum for consensus desired by the United States. Furthermore, there is no NATO

equivalent in the Asia—Pacific [5]. Such resistance to unilateral action contributes to skepticism about U.S. willingness to act, further diminishing the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee .

There’s no risk of the net benefit – the counterplan can’t allay Japanese erosion of confidence in American security guarantees – the security commitment will inevitably collapseClifton Sherrill, September 2001, adjunct professor at Florida State University, Comparative Strategy 20:3

Japanese, American, and East Asian security interests each would be better served by a Japanese state that publicly admits to possession and accepts the

responsibility of nuclear weapons. Japan can no longer rely on the U.S. security guarantee and , in particular, on the American nuclear deterrent , and for internal political and security reasons Japan should not be dependent on others to provide Japanese security in

this era of proliferation. The era of justified unequivocal Japanese reliance on the American security apparatus is drawing to an end. It is time for Japan to assume the international security role fitting of a leading economic and industrial power. In the particular

circumstances of Japan, this entails joining the ranks of the acknowledged nuclear weapons states . Japanese, American, and East Asian security interests each would be served better by a Japanese state that publicly admits to possession and accepts the responsibility of nuclear

weapons [1]. The primary reason necessitating the development of Japanese nuclear weapons is quite simple—Japan no longer can rely on the U.S. security guarantee and, in particular, on the American nuclear deterrent . Undermined by a series of ill-considered

political decisions, the American deterrent has been marked in recent years by declining credibility . As stated by former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, "It is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan withdraw from the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear umbrella" [2].

Secondarily, Japan is a major power in its own right, one that should occupy a place as a powerful American ally rather than that acceding to the role of military dependent. In an era of proliferation, for internal political and security reasons Japan should not be dependent on others to provide Japanese security.


Alliance Bad – War Security assurances actually hasten Japanese militarizationWu Xinbo Winter 2005/2006 "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance" WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

This is particularly true in Beijing, which believes that enhanced security cooperation between Washington and Tokyo compromises China’s

security interests. For years, many Chinese analysts regarded the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a useful constraint on Japan’s remilitarization. Developments since the mid-1990s and especially during the past few years, however, have convinced them that the alliance has become an excuse for Japan to pursue a more active security policy. Moreover, the “China factor” has played an even

stronger role in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation under the Bush administration than in previous years. Concern with checking rising Chinese power and deterring a possible Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait has caused Washington to push for more assertive Japanese security policy, shaping both the form and substance of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Indeed, as Beijing continues to expand its material power and influence in Asia, Washington has sought to balance China’s

rise through its campaign to return Japan to a “normal nation.” Contrary to past policies, the United States is now driving rather than constraining Japan’s rearmament. In the foreseeable future, short of a major adjustment of U.S. regional security strategy, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will act as a propellant of, rather than as a cap on, Japan’s military development. At least as far as China is concerned, the bright side of the U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be gone.


A2 Economic Retaliation Japan would not economically retaliate if the security guarantee was withdrawn and even if they do the impact is small.Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms

Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

The final issue to be considered regarding America’s withdrawal from Asia is the possibility of economic retaliation by U.S. allies. Japan might retaliate for an American withdrawal from the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by escalating its export competition with American industry or by raising the interest rates at which it is willing to loan money to the United States.51 Although neither of these alternatives would threaten American security, both could attack the other core American goal: prosperity. These concerns are unfounded. First, a significant fraction of Japanese politicians favor a transition to a “normal” international role, including expanded attention to self-defense. The political ramifications of the rape of a twelve- year-old Japanese girl by U.S. Marines on Okinawa revealed considerable popular support for American disengagement.52 If American military withdrawal were greeted with a favorable response from the electorate, even leaders who favor America’s presence might not retaliate. Second, the Japanese have few levers to inflict additional economic pain on America. In the trade case, it is hard to imagine how the Japanese could compete more intensively than they already do or how they could more decisively stonewall American market-opening initiatives. In fact, one of the benefits of a policy of restraint might come in the realm of international trade, if the reduction in American resources spent on the military resulted in better American industrial competitiveness, or if the reduction in U.S. defense spending led to a higher domestic savings rate. Restraint could promote a macroeconomic environment better suited to reducing America’s trade deficit.53 These sanguine observations aside, it is possible to envision new Japanese financial regulations or nationalist choices by Japanese banks to discourage lending to the United States. Many have observed that America has imported massive sums of Japanese capital each year for more than a decade, implying that the United States would be vulnerable to a reduction or cutoff in that flow. But that vulnerability is exaggerated , because international capital flows freely and non- Japanese sources could readily substitute for restricted Japanese investment in the United States .54 The only route whereby Japanese reactions to U.S. withdrawal might hurt U.S. prosperity is if Japanese defense expenditures increased substantially, consuming Japanese investment dollars that would otherwise have gone to international capital markets. But the reduction in the supply of global capital would be compensated by a reduction in worldwide demand for borrowing, because the U.S. defense budget burden would be substantially lightened. Furthermore, if investors fear international instability in the wake of U.S. military retrenchment , it is likely that more money would flow to the U nited S tates seeking a “safe haven ,” potentially reducing American interest rates further and faster than those of the rest of the world.55


Say No No solvency—Japan will say noOgawa Kazuhisa, pub. date: 7-19-99, Analyst of International Politics, Japan Quarterly

The current Japanese discourse, however, is far from sufficient. If we compare the policy-making process to a twin-engine aircraft, Japan is lumbering along with a failed engine. Even though Japan and the United States are allies, their national interests are not always identical . For example, they can clash overp China policy. In such a situation, one or both of the allies may repeat " We don't think so" to the other. In the worst case, they would be throwing no's back and forth.

Fait accompli – presenting Japan with the plan is implicit pressure to say “yes” – no ally would feel like their opinion mattered, maintains their role as a “junior partner.”


Say No – BIT Japan will say no – wants IPR pressure Agence France Presse November 15, 2004 (“Japanese, US business leaders call for China to step up WTO commitments” l/n)

Japanese and US business leaders called on China Monday to ensure transparency in approving foreign investment and take tough action to curb copyright piracy. At the end of a two-day meeting here, they issued a joint statement describing the Chinese economy as "one of the major engines of growth for Japan and the United States given that China is a leading trade partner for both". The statement called on the three governments to make "renewed efforts to implement China's WTO (World Trade Organisation)

commitments on schedule, particularly with regard to transparency, IPR (intellectual property rights) protection, and market access in services". The 41st annual meeting of the so-called US-Japan Business Conference was attended by US businessmen including Henry McKinnell, chairman and chief executive officer of pharmaceutical giant Pfizer Inc. and Stephan Newhouse, the president of global financial services firm Morgan Stanley. The Japanese side was led by Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the Japan Business Federation and chairman of Toyota Motor Corp. The meeting took up China as one of its main themes for the first time and also exchanged views on the recovery of the Japanese economy, the US economy following the reelection of President George W. Bush and information and communications technology. To ensure the continued inflow of foreign direct investment in China, the statement called for "further steps to increase transparency of the investment approval process and enhance investor certainty about terms/conditions of

investment". On intellectual property rights, it encouraged "stronger IPR enforcement by the Chinese government at all levels that leads to material, verifiable reductions in counterfeiting and copyright piracy in all its forms". The statement also called on the Chinese government to step up environmental protection by cooperating with business to "achieve the appropriate balance between environmental and economic objectives, including through greater utilization of anti-pollution technologies". Concerning the US economy, the statement pointed to the "risk that rising oil prices pose to corporate and consumer sentiment". It also warned that "high current-account and fiscal deficits may lead to further depreciation of the dollar and higher long-term interest rates". Japan's economic growth was seen as likely to slow "mainly due to the deceleration of overseas economies", the statement said, adding such growth will nonetheless be "sustainable in the near to mid-term". Progress in bad-loan disposals may prevent the recurrence of financial turmoil in Japan, the statement said. "If wage increases become steady, the Japanese economy will surely depart from the current deflationary situation," it said.


Say No – BMD Japan favors heavy pressure on North KoreaCronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005 (William in Journal of World Affairs 29.1, 51-76)

A number of initiatives by the Koizumi government to strengthen Japan’s own military capabilities vis-á-vis North Korea, and its cooperation with the United States on measures aimed at putting pressure on Pyongyang to change its course, go well beyond what Japan has been prepared to do even in the recent past. In February and June 2004 Japan’s Diet passed legislation that would give the government the authority to impose economic and financial sanctions on Pyongyang, including measures against the pro-Pyongyang Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in

Japan), such as cutting off financial remittances, and banning North Korean ships from Japanese ports under certain circumstances. The legislation regarding port visits appears to be aimed at the Mangyongbong-92, the North Korean ship that provides the only ferry connection between the two count ries.20 As stated earlier, several political leaders and government officials have openly

described the proposed legislation as a “bargaining chip” in negotiating the nuclear and abduction issues, but others, who have low expectations of Pyongyang, also view sanctions as simply a means of punishing Pyongyang for its recalcitrance.


Say No – Taiwan

Japan will say yes to pressure regarding Taiwan- energy interestsKato, Japanese Ambassador, March 5 2005 (Ryozo, The National Journal)

Kato: We're more than just concerned. But we have to be very careful. Both the United States and Japan, for instance, have long shared a clear recognition that the security of Taiwan is one of the most important contributors to the security of Japan. That goes back to our long sea lanes and energy supply. If a hostile regime were ever created on Taiwan, for instance, it would represent a potential choke point for our oil supplies that would be very troubling in terms of Japan's security. If you remember, back in 1996, China fired missiles in advance of a presidential election on Taiwan. Those missiles fell very close to Japanese territory. At the time, the United States dispatched two aircraft carriers close to the Taiwan Strait, which calmed the situation. So this is not the first time tensions have arisen over the issue of Taiwan.

Not only does Japan follow the US on the Taiwan question, but they historically oppose reunificationXinhua Online August 1st, 2005 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/01/content_3160660.htm, accessed online 8/05)

Although Japan has misgivings about the prospect of reunification between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, peace and stability across the Straits and preserving the free access to the sea channel are some of the overlapping areas of shared

interests. In 1996, under a US initiative, the US-Japan Alliance was readjusted to cover the whole Asia-Pacific region, viewing China as a principal target to guard against. But for a long time, Japan kept a low profile in handling the Taiwan question, thus maintaining a degree of independence from the United States. Whenever China criticizes the Japan-US Alliance's intervention in affairs of the Taiwan Straits, Japan has always responded by saying that "happenings in the surrounding area" do not refer to

geographic location. Since last year, we have seen a noticeable change in Japan's attitude; it has quickly moved closer to the United States. Late last year, it issued a set of new defence guidelines, questioning the military modernization

of the People's Liberation Army of China. Early this year, it again accepted a US proposal, stating in a US-Japan security declaration that security in the Taiwan Straits was the common strategic target. Recently, Japan was completely

on the US side, when it explicitly opposed the lifting of the EU's ban of arms sales to China. With Sino-Japanese relations plummeting to new depths, Japan has more and more closely aligned itself with the United States on the Taiwan question, which sends out the wrong message to Taiwan. It has strengthened its ties with the United States. If this continues, what would happen in a US-China confrontation? In exchanges with Japanese officials and scholars, we often hear that it would be Japan's biggest nightmare if the country has to take sides in such a military confrontation and ends up in another war with China. Indeed, China and Japan have a series of historical issues that are not yet addressed. How can the two countries get along with each other if Japan interferes in the Taiwan question, which will entangle it in another Sino-Japanese war? This is a question that Japanese politicians must ponder hard.


Perms/Theory This counterplan is a voting issue – it co-opts 2AC offense which ruins aff strategy. We have to win that Japan opposes the plan and that the risk of a veto outweighs an unpredictable artificial net benefit. This creates generic debates that hurt fairness and topical education.

Perm - do the counterplan then the plan

Perm: do the counterplan – must be functionally and textually competitive.

Certainty-based competition is bad - impossible to weigh the AFF - infinite, unpredictable conditions, shifts debate away from the topic.

‘Should’ does not mean mandatory.Atlas, 1999, Collaboration, “Use of shall, should, may can,” rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html

shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a

good example. "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. should ' should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.

Perm do the plan and consult Japan on another issues.


Turn – Pressure If you win that your consultation is quick it will be perceived as pressure – turns your net benefit and ensures say no.David D. Newsom, 1992, Professor of Diplomacy, University of Virginia and Former Undersecretary of Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, The Allies and Arms Control edited by Fen Osler Hampson, p. 281

Inherent problems exist normally in consultations among sovereign nations: they can be found, as well, in the discussions

between the United States and the other members of NATO. With few exceptions, those representing governments are polite and cautious in official meetings. The full impact of a negative political assessment may be so hidden in discreet talk that others

miss its message. When affairs between nations relate to political as well as military matters, differences in both fact and nuance in the respective channels can create confusion . In multilateral meetings among nations in an

alliance, exchanges tend to drop to the lowest common denominator of inoffensive rhetoric, further obscuring true opinions . Official meetings , especially at their ministerial or head-of-state level, are held often under extreme pressure of time. It is entirely possible, for example, that in the hurried initial conversations between Secretary of State James

Baker and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, the U.S. side missed the full significance of the chancellor's domestic political problems—problems that, a few days later, caused a potentially serious risk of a sharp disagreement between the two nations.

Documents

Consult Japan CP - forms.huffmanisd.netforms.huffmanisd.net/debate/CPs/Consult Japan CP - MSDI 2016.docx · Web viewMSDI 2016 Consult Japan CP. #debatelikeabear5. Consult Japan CP