CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN SECURITY FORCES

PI5501 European Security – Lecture 5

Evolving War

War ‘then, now and tomorrow’ Then Now

8 characteristics of modern conflict (Colin S. Gray 2005, Parameters)

Tomorrow 4 reasons to be wary of predicting the future

(Colin S. Gray 2005, Parameters)

Today’s conflicts

1. The unchanging nature of war2. Third rate enemies3. New and not-so-new wars4. Balance of Power?5. The move to transform will disappoint6. Interstate war today7. Terrorism and the law of unintended

consequences8. Two transformations: one military, one

cultural

Tomorrow’s conflicts

1. War should not be approached in ways that would divorce it from its political, social and cultural contexts.

2. Defence establishments are apt to develop impressive military solutions to problems that they prefer to solve, rather than those that a cunning or lucky foe might pose.

3. Trend spotting and analysis is not a very helpful guide to the future.

4. Surprise happens. Some are agreeable while some are not.

Post Cold War Environment

Christopher Dandecker (1994, BJS) Risk Complexity:

Shifts of threat Globalization and regionalization

Shifts of power Political authority and the modern nation-state

Shifts in decision-making Challenges to sovereignty

Shifts of sovereignty Technology and decision-making

Shifts in public opinion

Asymmetry and Insurgency

How to fight asymmetric conflicts? (Gavin Bulloch, Parameters, 1996) The Attrition Theory

Absolute repression Not historically successful

The Manoeuvre Theory Operations

Deep – Intelligence driven Close – fixed insurgent group Rear – planning, hearts and minds

Technology and Conflict

What role does technology play in conflict? Intelligence Coordination Public Relations Effectiveness?

Technology and asymmetric warfare

Case Studies

How are European states handling these changes? United States Russia United Kingdom France Germany Eastern Europe

United States

Key doctrines in strategic reform 1984 – Weinberger Doctrine

Be ready for change 1992-1996 – Powell Doctrine

Be ready for everything 1996-2000 – Clinton Doctrine

Be ready for police action 2001-2006 – Bush/Rumsfeld Doctrine

Be ready for lighter, faster, meaner

United States

Key Conflicts Somalia 1992-1993 Bosnia 1995 - Kosovo 1999 - Afghanistan 2001- Iraq 2003-

Russian Federation

Key phases in Russian military evolution Phase I: Soviet Stagnation Phase II: Yeltsin and military decay Phase III: Yeltsin and a resurging military Phase IV: Putin and the struggle for

development Phase V: Putin and the connection between

the military and foreign policy

Russian Federation

Key events Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989) Withdrawal from Eastern Europe (1994) FSU (1991- ) Chechnya I (1994-1996) Chechnya II (1999- ) Kursk (1992-2000)

The European Context

As opposed to the US, the Europeans have been slow to upgrade and evolve

European allies (albeit not the UK) were/are peripheral in Afghanistan

Most European states lack a full set of assets necessary for significant power-projection

Most European states lack the ability to combine their forces to form an integrated team

The European Context

The UK and France are exceptions Both think in terms of power projection

(think Sierra Leone and the Congo/Chad) Others European states think it their role

to take on local issues while the US defends common interests elsewhere European states are in a self-created asset

trap: unable to project power with no assets, unwilling to acquire the assets because they are not eager to perform the mission

The European Context

European aversion to NATO (kind of) Old Europe (minus the UK and Denmark)

seek a long term solution through the European Rapid Response Force (ERRF). Problem: Petersburg tasks

New Europe, on the other hand, seeks the prominence of NATO over a European solution, but lacks the ability to gain significant assets (small, poorer, transition)

The European Context

Why is this a problem? Means that the US is only willing to use allies

when it improves chances of victory. Problem: undermines alliances and European objectives

Means that Europe cannot act alone, but instead is tied to US objectives and decision-making

Means that joint action is asymmetric thus leading to political strains on collective operations

Means that disagreements over battle plans could lead to defeat

United Kingdom

British forces are the most transformed since the end of the Cold War

British forces are the most able to work with and without the help the US

Main threats (Defence White Paper 2003): International Terrorism Weapons of Mass Destruction Failed States

United Kingdom

British focus Small to Medium size conflicts Three conflicts simultaneously OR Large scale conflict and the occasional

side show ‘Network centric’ rather than ‘platform

centric’ planning Reduction in Navy and RAF Growth in Army in terms of medium weight

capabilities Independent nuclear deterrent

United Kingdom

Force Planning, Structure and Capabilities* The Armed Forces face a broader range of tasks across

a wider geographical area than originally envisaged under the SDR. In particular, proactive engagement in conflict prevention and short notice peace support and counter-terrorist operations is expected to increase.

The UK will not be able to contribute militarily in every international crisis. Participation will generally be in coalitions with other countries.

The UK’s Armed Forces must be more prepared for asymmetric attacks by both state and non-state actors, including the use of WMD through a variety of means.

The Armed Forces must be equipped and configured to fulfil the requirements of homeland defence and countering international terrorism.

*From the 2004 Defence White Paper

Others

France: Independent defence and Security

Germany: Limited operations Eastern Europe:

Transition Low assets Low operational capabilities

Conclusion

What is the future of conflict? In Europe? Outside Europe?

Should Europe be downsizing? What are the political impediments to a

European army?