G O V E R N M E N T S T R U C T U R E

Cooperation Among Local Governments

James M. Kadlecek

In general, the more knowledge that is necessary to run a contem- porary society, and the more specialization that is a consequence, then the more need of and potential for horizontal rather than ver- tical cooperative arrangements.

-Dwight Waldo

In the aftermath of the 1996 elections, many political observers provided this capsule analysis: the reason the incumbent president was reelected and the rea- son the G.0.P maintained control of the Congress was the same-they coop- erated. At least, the perception of cooperation was present because in the final months of the 1996 session, they passed the budget and several major pieces of legislation.

The voting public approved. American voters didn’t like the bickering or the stalemates that had characterized congressional-presidential relations for years, nor did they appreciate the closing down of the federal government. While as a society we usually praise and admire competitive behavior, voters had had it with the name-calling, posturing, and political wrangling. They wanted our government to be productive and make a difference in their lives. They wanted something done! It’s appropriate for candidates to compete for our votes during the campaign season, but once the election is over, most vot- ers want their elected officials to cooperate and work together in the general public interest.

The issue of cooperation in government is not limited to the friction between the president and Congress at the federal level, nor to the legislative- executive battles that occur in nearly every state. It is also a significant factor at the local level among and between units of government. Intergovernmental relationships are becoming increasingly important to the effective and efficient delivery of public services. This is particularly true in burgeoning metropoli- tan areas, where 79 percent of the population now resides, as compared to 63 percent in 1960.’

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Further complicating matters is the fact that the number of units of local government in metro areas has significantly increased. We still have just one federal government and fifty state governments, but local government units in metro areas have grown from 18,442 in 1962 to 33,004 in 1992.* The deliv- ery of public services to the 200 million residents of our nations’ metro areas is not made simpler by more units of local government.

The nation has yet to settle (and may never agree) on a governance model for metropolitan areas. Political theorists remain divided between advocates of the “consolidationist” theory on the one hand and the “polycentrist” view on the other. Would we be best served by consolidating the cities, counties, town- ships and special districts that deliver services in metro areas, or is it just as well to let these local units of government “compete” market-style, as partici- pants in a local public economy?’ Consolidation would seem to be a moot question because voters have repeatedly rejected merger plans, expressing pref- erence for local autonomy. The market model is criticized because it ignores the serious social issues of the inner cities and because it often results in the granting of unearned benefits to business, as well as excessive costs to cities (corporate welfare and community warfare).

While the theoretical debate continues among a limited audience of mostly academics, life goes on in the cities and suburbs of metropolitan regions. Streets and highways are built and maintained. Residents turn on their water taps and flush toilets and get the desired result. Garbage gets picked up, fires get put out, and crime is fought. While one can produce ample evidence of problems, inefficiencies, inequities, and even crises in metropolitan regions, people commute to work, to school, to parks, and to shopping areas. Society does not function perfectly in metro areas, but it does function.

One reason it does is that local governments cooperate. Although there may be few examples of metropolitan government (that is, a general govern- ment with jurisdiction over the whole of a metropolitan area), informal gover- nance-the making and administering of public policy-does occur in numerous location~.~ We know this from the documented work of the regional councils around the country, from studies conducted by the Advisory Com- mission on Intergovernmental Relations in St. Louis, Missouri, and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Also, several academic studies have documented met- ropolitan governance through intergovernmental cooperation. What is not well understood is how, why, and under what circumstances such cooperation occurs.

In an attempt to develop such an understanding, I studied cooperation among local governments in metropolitan Grand Rapids, Michigan, from 1991 to 1995. Not counting school districts, twenty-four separate local government jurisdictions make up the growing metropolitan area of more than a half-mil- lion persons. At the same time, I examined the literature and governance stud- ies that have been done in and for other metro areas, as well as the writings that examined the history and theory of metropolitan governance. I emerged

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from this lengthy exercise more convinced than ever of the importance of inter- governmental relations. I t is apparent that as we scale back the level of federal government, local and state governments will have to pick up the slack. The public will continue to require and demand a high level of service, despite the claims of conservatives, who argue for smaller government. State legislators and governors have been advocating devolution for some time (accompanied by the federal money, of course). As in the past, states will ultimately rely on units of local government or nonprofit agencies to produce most of these ser- vices. In metropolitan areas, where cities and suburbs and special districts are clearly interrelated economically, geographically, and environmentally, inter- governmental cooperation and coordination becomes increasingly necessary.

What I found in Grand Rapids is fairly consistent with what is happening in other metropolitan regions. An existing metropolitan organization counts most units of local government among its members. A public “visioning” process has been conducted, and a written land use development plan has been approved. While the plan is generally accepted, compliance by local gov- ernment units is voluntary. The area also has voluntary metro utility and trans- portation plans. Because transportation funding is substantially state and federal, a greater degree of compliance is achieved with that plan. A number of formal agreements are in place between communities for water and sewer service. A fair amount of staff-to-staff cooperation occurs between the com- munities for emergencies, public safety, and information sharing. Some joint purchasing occurs, encouraged by the Metro Council staff. There is a lot of symbolic cooperation, that is, of government officials giving lip service to the idea of cooperation being in the common interest of the units of government within the metro region5 A few functional service areas have been “metropol- itanized”; these are bus transit (offered by a statutory metro transit authority), library service (for which a special district exists), and economic development (which is handled by a nonprofit entity).

An inventory of intergovernmental agreements in the Grand Rapids metro area indicates that water-sewer cooperative agreements are the most prevalent, followed by fire services and mutual aid agreements. An analysis of the oppor- tunities for cooperative agreements revealed that, at a minimum, only about one-third of the potential for service delivery cooperation among units was being realized.

Out of at least 420 cooperation opportunities identified, public managers listed only 151 as having been pursued (53 of which were water-sewer). Poten- tial opportunities to cooperate were evident in service or expenditure areas such as purchasing, parks and recreation, planning and development, police and communication, assessments and collections, and streets.

I measured perceptions about cooperative activity by key informants in the Grand Rapids area (mayors, public managers, editors, legislators). When these well-informed persons were asked, they rated cooperation at a 5 on a 10- point scale, indicating significant room for improvement. When asked what

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factors inhibited cooperation, these observers and participants in local affairs listed parochialism and turf issues, local autonomy, politics and power, per- sonalities, tax base, annexation issues, historic rivalries, and lack of leadership. When asked what factors would likely encourage morr cooperative action, sav- ing money led the list, followed by better leadership and state-federal man- dates and incentives6

The study concluded that there are two especially significant factors in influencing cooperation among units of local government: metro leadership and political culture. In Grand Rapids, the culture is linked to conservative, entrepreneurial, work-ethic, manufacturing-oriented values. Grand Rapids is a place where people are employed making things-auto parts, furniture, plas- tic products, medical instruments, food products, and the like. It is an area where 30 percent of the jobs are in manufacturing (compared to 16 percent nationally). It is also a place heavily influenced by Dutch-German-Polish-Irish ethnic values, with over 60 percent of the population identifylng with these groups. These cultural influences have produced local officials who value con- servative practices and who display a firm (sometimes stubborn) commitment to local autonomy. Cooperation among local governments is acceptable only when autonomy is preserved and financial advantage achieved.6

Given that leadership is an important factor in regional cooperation, the Grand Rapids study revealed that no one person is elected or acknowledged as a metro-regional leader, and no credible person has stepped forward to assume the role. While a metro organization exists, it has little real power. As a result, the pursuit of cooperative ventures has not received high priority except in the water-sewer service category.

With regard to theories of metro governance, it is apparent that Grand Rapids leans toward the polycentrist concept. Interviews with key informants, the political culture of the area, and lack of metro leadership all indicate that there is little if any support for structural consolidation. Some support for func- tional consolidation has been demonstrated in transit, libraries, and utilities, and certainly there is symbolic cooperation via the metro council and metro blueprint plan. But consolidation of a structural nature is not a realistic possi- bility, and further functional cooperation will occur only with difficulty, the study concluded.

Much of what was found in Grand Rapids can be noted in other metro areas. However, the mix of influencing factors will be different in each, depending on economic, political, historical, sociological, legal, and geographic considerations. Therefore, each metro area must be examined separately There is no general model that is likely to work universally. What can be used for each region is a model for understanding the status of intergovernmental coop- eration. This assessment is essential as a first step in improving governance in metro areas. Based on the Grand Rapids study and my examination of other literature and studies of metro governance, I've developed a conceptual frame- work-a model to follow. The model begns with an understanding and analy-

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sis of the economic, demographic, and political trends that have caused met- ropolitan areas to grow. Following that is a listing of the resulting concerns and problems that this growth of multicommunity metro regions has caused. The next step is the recognition that neither the polycentrist nor the consolida- tionist theory is applicable or realistic in our society today. Those two notions, which have occupied the time and energy of academics, planners, and reform- ers, must be rejected.

What is required is a theory of metro governance that accepts the cir- cumstance the way it is (autonomous multiunit metro areas) and concentrates energy and resources on the range of cooperative methodologies (networking, cooperation, coordination, c~llaboration).~ Once the cooperation model or the- ory is acknowledged and accepted, then the metro area must be fully exam- ined so that all the factors that will either inhibit or encourage cooperative activity are understood. With this realistic understanding, it is then possible to assess what cooperation is possible. Time and resources are less likely to be wasted in exercises that involve visioning or strategic planning if this sort of understanding and assessment is first developed.

The result will be a more practical action plan to implement multicommu- nity cooperative efforts where it makes economic and political sense to do so. The goal is to make governance of these unwieldy metro regons more cost-effi- cient and effective for the benefit of the citizenry who live and work in them.

Notes

1. U S . Bureau of the Census. Population and Housing. Washington, D.C.: U S . Government Printing Office, 1960, 1990.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, 1992.

3. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Organization of Local Public Economies. (Pub. no. 20575-A-109) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. 4. Amencan Heritage Dictionary. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1982. 5 . Epling, J . W. The Politics of Regionalism: A Case Study of Interlocal Relations in Northern Vir-

6. Kadlecek. J. M. , Intergovernmental Cooperation in Metropolitan Grand Rapids, Michigan. Kala-

7. Ciglar. B. Presentation to a regional conference on multi-community cooperation, Lansing,

ginia. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1986.

mazoo: Western Michigan University, 1996.

Mich., 1993.

lames M. Kadlecek served two terms as Colorado state senator and has a doctorate in public administration from Western Michigan University.