Country Report Occupied Palestinian Territory 19 Jan 2012

ReliefWebBriefing Kit for occupied Palestinian territory: Implementation ofthe European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 - Country Report:occupied Palestinian territoryCompiled on 19 Jan 2012

Contents

The EU and the Palestinian Bar Association announce the launching of a newproject ............................................................. 4The European Union supports the 8th payment under the Palestinian Authority's"Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme ......................... 8EU gives €11 million to support Palestinian private-sector and boost Palestinianeconomy ........................................................... 9The EU, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg contribute €47.7 million to the PA'spayment of December salaries and pensions .............................. 10Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on plans to construct1000 housing units in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem ............. 11Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the AFET Committee inEuropean Parliament in Strasbourg, 12 December 2011 ...................... 12The European Commission renews its assistance for the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, supporting vital government functions and refugees ................ 15European Union provides €12 million for essential social protection to families inneed in the West Bank and Gaza ....................................... 17Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton following her meeting withthe President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas .................. 18EU launch €1,5 million project to improve water availability and demandmanagement in agriculture in the West Bank .............................. 20Drinking water in Gaza and rule of law: EU supports the PA in two focal sectors ofintervention ........................................................ 22The European Union supports the 7th payment under the Palestinian Authority's"Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme ........................ 24Quartet Envoys meetings with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators .............. 25Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlement expansion inGivat Hamatos ..................................................... 26Local EU Statement: Demolition of a Palestinian mosque in Khirbet Yarza situatedin Area C in the Northern West Bank .................................... 28Statement by the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the deal betweenIsrael and Hamas on the release of Gilad

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Shalit and Palestinian prisoners ........................................ 30Council conclusions on Middle East Peace Process ........................ 32Palestinian gender delegation visits EU institutions ......................... 34PCP and EUPOLCOPPS conclude Juvenile Police training ................... 36European Union helps the Palestinian Authority provide essential socialprotection to families in need .......................................... 37Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the settlementexpansion in Gilo, East Jerusalem ...................................... 39Address to the European Parliament on the United Nations General Assembly, theMiddle East Peace Process and the Arab spring ........................... 41Parliament approves deal to boost trade with Palestinian Authority ............ 48Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton on her visit to the Middle Eastregion ............................................................ 49The EU, Finland and Sweden contribute to the Palestinian Authority's payment ofAugust salaries and pensions ......................................... 50Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton following her address at the opening of the Arab League Peace Initiative Follow-upCommittee ......................................................... 51European Union voices concern over situation in Al-Walaja village, Bethlehem ... 52Local EU Statement on the planned route of the separation barrier in the village ofAl-Walaja .......................................................... 53The EU provides further contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency forPalestine Refugees .................................................. 54High Representative Catherine Ashton concludes her visit in Israel ............ 55Japan and the European Union support the 6th payment of the PA's "PrivateSector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme .............................. 56EU High Representative Catherine Ashton meets Palestinian leaders and lays firststone for security complex in Jenin ..................................... 59Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the terrorist attacks inIsrael ............................................................. 60Local EU Statement on the closure extension of the Orient House and theChamber of Commerce of East Jerusalem ................................ 61Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlement expansion inthe West Bank ...................................................... 63Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Settlement Expansion inEast Jerusalem ..................................................... 65Japan supports the 5th payment of PA's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza"programme through EU's PEGASE mechanism ............................ 67Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlement expansionin East Jerusalem ................................................... 69The EU continues its support to the Palestinian Authority: €22.5 million to thepayment of July salaries and pensions ................................... 70Remarks by the High Representative Catherine Ashton at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 18 July ................................................... 71Council conclusions on Middle East Peace process ........................ 74PCP and EUPOL COPPS conclude pilot Human Rights Training Program ........ 75EU launches mapping study on Civil Society Organizations in the occupiedPalestinian territory ................................................. 76Speech by HR/VP Catherine Ashton on North Africa and the Arab world ....... 176European Union helps the Palestinian Authority provide essential socialprotection to families in need through the payment of social allowances ....... 184

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Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the press conference afterthe Foreign Affairs Council ........................................... 186EU High Representative Ashton visits Jordan, Egypt, Israel and Palestine ...... 190Buzek in Gaza: blockade must end ..................................... 191Japan supports 4th payment of PA's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza"programmethrough EU's PEGASE mechanism ..................................... 192Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 - Country Report:occupied Palestinian territory ......................................... 194

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The EU and the Palestinian Bar Association announce the launching ofa new project

Ramallah – The Acting EU Representative, John Gatt-Rutter, and the Chairman of the Palestinian Bar Association, NabilMushahwar, launched today a 1.4 million Euro grant to support the Palestinian Bar Association. The proposed action shallserve the overall objective of enhancing the competency, capability, proficiency effectiveness and professionalism ofPalestinian lawyers through institutional strengthening of the Palestinian Bar Association in order to deliver systematic,cost-effective, efficient and planned services to its members and community. The launching event brought togetherrepresentatives of Palestinian government bodies, legal institutions, and international organisations that implement jointactivities with the PBA.

In his opening remarks, the Chairman of the PBA, Nabil Mushahwar, stressed the importance of the European Union'ssupport to the rule of law sector in the Palestinian territories and highly appreciated the role the EU plays to support PBA’soperation and activities. Mr. Mushahwar added "The EU grant will help the PBA promote lawyers’ capacities and establishthe principle of the rule of law within the Palestinian society."

From his side, the Acting EU Representative, John Gatt-Rutter, emphasized the importance the EU relation with PalestinianBar Association. Gatt-Ruuter added: "in various forms, the EU has been one of the key actors supporting the institutionaldevelopment of the Bar Association and the running of trainings. We are confident that this new support to the activities ofthe Bar Association will provide an added value to all the work being done to date and in that respect, the role of theSEYADA II project has been crucial."

Alfons B. Lentze, Director of the EU-funded project (SEYADA-II), made a brief presentation of the project's activitiesexplaining the main objectives of this action.

The EU two-year, Euro 1.4 million grant to the PBA is part of an ongoing cooperation with the PBA. The financial grant isset to support the PBA’s capacities and upgrade the legal profession in three major components: Component (1) is designedto develop professional capacities of trainee and practicing lawyers by preparing training schemes to be operated by the PBA.These include training on relevant practical subjects to improve skills and knowledge of law graduates in their two yearstraining program managed and implemented by the PBA as well as examination rules, and monitoring and evaluationsystems. Continuing education programmes will also be offered to practicing lawyers in new, significant themes in the legalprofession. Component (2) supports launching a public sensitisation campaign on the PBA activities and citizens’ rights. Inthis context, a technical office will be established to supervise PBA publications (a periodical magazine and monthlynewsletter). Component (3) provides support to create an IT (automated) system to further promote effective and efficientPBA functions and to develop the PBA website.

For further information:

Seyada projectMr. Alfons Lentze, Team Leader & Mr. Feras Milhem, Deputy Team LeaderTel.: 02 297 6305, Email: [email protected]

Palestinian Bar AssociationAl Ersal Street, Ramallah, PalestineTelephone: 02 2982010, Email: [email protected]

European Union

19 Jan 2012

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Press Release

Ramallah

16 January 2012

The EU and the Palestinian Bar Association announce the launching of a new project

Ramallah – The Acting EU Representative, John Gatt-Rutter, and the Chairman of the Palestinian Bar Association, Nabil Mushahwar, launched today a 1.4 million Euro grant to support the Palestinian Bar Association. The proposed action shall serve the overall objective of enhancing the competency, capability, proficiency effectiveness and professionalism of Palestinian lawyers through institutional strengthening of the Palestinian Bar Association in order to deliver systematic, cost-effective, efficient and planned services to its members and community. The launching event brought together representatives of Palestinian government bodies, legal institutions, and international organisations that implement joint activities with the PBA.

In his opening remarks, the Chairman of the PBA, Nabil Mushahwar, stressed the importance of the European Union's support to the rule of law sector in the Palestinian territories and highly appreciated the role the EU plays to support PBA’s operation and activities. Mr. Mushahwar added "The EU grant will help the PBA promote lawyers’ capacities and establish the principle of the rule of law within the Palestinian society."

From his side, the Acting EU Representative, John Gatt-Rutter, emphasized the importance the EU relation with Palestinian Bar Association. Gatt-Ruuter added: "in various forms, the EU has been one of the key actors supporting the institutional development of the Bar Association and the running of trainings. We are confident that this new support to the activities of the Bar Association will provide an added value to all the work being done to date and in that respect, the role of the SEYADA II project has been crucial."

Alfons B. Lentze, Director of the EU-funded project (SEYADA-II), made a brief presentation of the project's activities explaining the main objectives of this action.

The EU two-year, Euro 1.4 million grant to the PBA is part of an ongoing cooperation with the PBA. The financial grant is set to support the PBA’s capacities and upgrade the legal profession in three major components: Component (1) is designed to develop professional capacities of trainee and practicing

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lawyers by preparing training schemes to be operated by the PBA. These include training on relevant practical subjects to improve skills and knowledge of law graduates in their two years training program managed and implemented by the PBA as well as examination rules, and monitoring and evaluation systems. Continuing education programmes will also be offered to practicing lawyers in new, significant themes in the legal profession. Component (2) supports launching a public sensitisation campaign on the PBA activities and citizens’ rights. In this context, a technical office will be established to supervise PBA publications (a periodical magazine and monthly newsletter). Component (3) provides support to create an IT (automated) system to further promote effective and efficient PBA functions and to develop the PBA website.

For further information:

Seyada project

Mr. Alfons Lentze, Team Leader & Mr. Feras Milhem, Deputy Team Leader

Tel.: 02 297 6305, Email: [email protected]

Palestinian Bar Association

Al Ersal Street, Ramallah, Palestine

Telephone: 02 2982010, Email: [email protected]

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The EU-funded project, Seyada 2, will run until August 2012 and also supports the Palestinian Judicial Training Institute, the High Judicial Council, the development of Legal Aid, and advice on Constitutional Review.

Seyada 2 is implemented by a consortium led by ICON-INSTITUT Public Sector GmbH and including the Belgian Development Cooperation Agency (BTC-CTB) and the Centre for International Legal Cooperation (CILC).

Seyada II project activities

• Seyada II will support the High Judicial Council. The project will support the work of the Council’s Inspection Office that has overall responsibility for quality control such as evaluating judges’ work, ensuring that the law and procedures are properly applied and that judgments are

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properly assessed. Seyada II will assist the Council’s Technical Office to facilitate access to information and legal resources for judges and for the legal community. The project will support the work of the Council’s Media Department and train Court of Cassation judges to ensure that judgments are well reasoned. Seyada II will help establish legal libraries throughout the West Bank, and will support the procurement of IT equipment required by the justice sector.

• Seyada II will assist the Palestinian Judicial Institute to improve legal professionalism through initial and continuing professional training programmes such as a judicial training system for judges and public prosecutors, the development of a two-year Judicial Studies Diploma Programme, training for trainers’ activities and professional education programmes for non-justice staff.

• Seyada II is the first instance of major international donor funding for the Palestinian Bar

Association to support institutional and capacity building and to run initial and continuing professional training for lawyers.

• Seyada II will assist the Palestinian Authority to extend the Legal Aid system in the Palestinian Territory so that all citizens can access justice regardless of their means.

• Seyada II aims to improve Constitutional Review by the High Court to help ensure the

compatibility of laws and regulations with Palestinian Basic Law. The project will review legislation, train judges in constitutional issues, as well as work to develop judges' knowledge and skills in judicial review.

European Union activities supporting the Rule of Law in Palestine

The EU supports a number of important initiatives to improve Palestinian rule of law, investing more than €40 million in such programmes. Current programmes include:

• New Nablus muqata complex, providing central infrastructure for the security services and detention facilities complying with international standards (€15 million).

• Construction of the Jenin muqata (€8.5million). • The EU is the single largest single donor to the Jericho Police Training Centre. • The EU works closely with many local civil society organisations on rule of law projects. • The EU will shortly deploy a team of experts in civil justice to work alongside EUPOL COPPS

which focuses on criminal justice.

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The European Union supports the 8th payment under the PalestinianAuthority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme

The European Union contributed today c.€1.1 million (c.US$1.4 million), out of a total package of €22.0 million, to theeighth payment under the Palestinian Authority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" (PSRG) programme. Theprogramme is the first large-scale initiative in support of the private sector in the Gaza Strip. This contribution isbeing channelled through PEGASE[1], the European Union's mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority established the PSRG programme to provide financial support to Gaza businesses that weredestroyed or damaged by Israel's "Operation Cast Lead". It targets businesses of all sizes in almost all sectors of activity,which need to restore destroyed or damaged assets necessary for their activities. The ultimate objective is to revitalize theeconomic activity in Gaza and provide for sustainable livelihoods for its people.

The European Union committed €22.0 million to PSRG at the end of 2009. In March 2011, the Japanese Governmentcommitted an additional US$ 6.58 million to the programme. Both contributions are being channelled through the EuropeanUnion's financing mechanism PEGASE, which is open to all donors and has been used by a number of European states. Thecontribution from Japan, which is the first non-European donor to channel contributions to a Palestinian Authorityprogramme through PEGASE, has already been fully disbursed to PSRG beneficiaries in previous payments.

The eighth PSRG disbursement amounts to c.€1.1 million (c.US$1.4 million) and will benefit 18 claims by Gaza businesses,which will receive the second and/or third instalments of their total PSRG entitlements. It follows seven earlier paymentsunder PSRG that took place in July and September 2010, and January, June, August, September and December 2011, whichbenefited the programme's around 915 eligible claims and amounted to c.€18.5 million. Further payments are expected totake place under the PSRG programme in the near future.

Background:

Most of the European Union's assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financialmechanism launched in 2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PAPalestinian National Plan (2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, Europeanfunds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line withthe plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, €1.2 billion have been disbursedthrough the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to the Palestinianpeople through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.

For further information in Arabic and English on the EU's assistance to the occupied Palestinian territory and PEGASE,please visit: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/index_en.htm

[1] Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Economique (PEGASE)

Contact:

The Office of the European Union Representative, West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWAAntonia Zafeiri, Tel: +972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mob: +972 (0) 548 024 915Shadi Othman, Tel: +972 (0) 2 541 5867, Mob: +972 (0) 599 673 958

European Union

13 Jan 2012


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EU gives €11 million to support Palestinian private-sector and boostPalestinian economy

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Acting EU Representative Mr. John Gatt-Rutter signed today afinancing agreement of €11 million supporting the private sector and building the capacity of institutions related to theEconomy. In line with the Palestinian National Development Plan 2011-2013 this agreement aims to promote in the WestBank and Gaza a sustainable, job-creating economic growth led by the private-sector.

Namely, through this agreement, the EU will provide financial support to businesses in the agricultural sector located in AreaC of the West Bank so they can resume and/or sustain their economic activity. It will also enhance the internal capacities ofbusinesses in Gaza and improve the quality of services provided to them by business service providers.

"For the last couple of years supporting the Palestinian private-sector and facilitating Palestinian trade has been a key policyobjective for the EU. We have stood by Palestinian businessmen in the West Bank but also in Gaza and we intend to continuethrough the activities put in place by today's agreement", said the Acting EU Representative John Gatt-Rutter." Over thecourse of the next 3,5 years we will build on the important work the PA and the EU have initiated to strengthen Palestinianprivate enterprises to become more competitive and to widen their market opportunities. This will be backed by strengtheningthe capacity of the Ministry of National Economy and other relevant institutions in supporting the private sector andformulating trade policies".

This agreement will also reinforce the capacity of the Ministry of National Economy and related institutions to integrate thePalestinian economy into the multilateral trading system (e.g. by proving assistance for the WTO accession, technicalassistance to develop internal expertise and capacities to help formulate policies).

To make Palestinian businesses more competitive internationally the programme will enhance the conformity withinternational technical standards through modernizing the Palestinian Quality Infrastructure. Particular attention will be givento promote an improved public-private sector dialogue and promote the involvement of women in key positions.

Background:

This agreement is part of a package of support to the Palestinians initially announced by the European Commission in August2010. The EU has supported the Palestinian Private Sector through various projects. The PA 'Private-Sector ReconstructionProgramme' in Gaza – a first large scale initiative supporting the business community in Gaza launched in 2009 - has beenone of EU's key projects supported with € 22.0 million. A € 3 million programme targeting trade diversification has alsostarted in December 2011.The EU has taken concrete actions to open its markets to Palestinian exports under the duty free,quota free agreement (agricultural, fish and fishery products) which is effective as of January 1st 2012.

Contact:

The Office of the European Union Representative Antonia Zafeiri (02 5415 859, 0548024915) and Shadi Othman (02 5415867, 0599673958) http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

European Union

11 Jan 2012


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The EU, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg contribute €47.7 million to thePA's payment of December salaries and pensions

The European Union is making today a contribution of approximately €47.7 million to the payment of the December 2011salaries and pensions of almost 85,000 Palestinian civil servants and pensioners in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Thiscontribution, which is channelled through the PEGASE[1] mechanism, is being funded by the European Commission (€26.2million) and the governments of Spain (€20.0 million), Ireland (€1.0 million) and Luxembourg (€0.5 million).

"The European Union's continuing financial support to the Palestinian Authority underlines the confidence that Europe has inthe PA's institutions and their ability to provide essential public services. This support will continue in 2012 while the PAmoves forward its objective of fiscal sustainability and economic viability", said Acting EU Representative Mr. JohnGatt-Rutter. "I would like to thank the Governments of Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg for their respective contributions andfor entrusting the PEGASE mechanism with channelling their funds."

Background

Most of the European Union's assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financialmechanism launched in 2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PAPalestinian National Plan (2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, Europeanfunds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line withthe plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, c.€1.2 billion have beendisbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to thePalestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.

For further information in Arabic and English on the EU's assistance to the occupied Palestinian territory and the PEGASEmechanism, please visit: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

European Union

05 Jan 2012


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Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on plans toconstruct 1000 housing units in the West Bank, including in EastJerusalem

Brussels, 20 December 2011

A 524/11

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of theCommission, made the following statement today:

"I wish to express my strong disapproval of the Israeli authorities' announcement that they intend to publish tenders for theconstruction of some 1000 housing units in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. I urge them not to proceed with thispublication.

The EU's position is clear: settlement construction is illegal under international law and further complicates efforts to find asolution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By ensuring the suspension of the publication of these tenders, the Israeligovernment can contribute positively to these efforts."

FOR FURTHER DETAILS:

Michael Mann +32 498 999 780 - +32 2 299 97 80 - [email protected] Kocijancic +32 498 984 425 - +32 2 298 65 70 - [email protected] Brabant +32 498 986 433 - [email protected]@ec.europa.eu

European Union

21 Dec 2011


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Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the AFETCommittee in European Parliament in Strasbourg, 12 December 2011

Brussels, 13 December 2011: Can I begin by thanking all members of the AFET Committee for the support and involvementthat you have shown over the last months. I am extremely glad that the Heads of Delegations' discussions with the Committeeare going very well and I am looking forward to your comments on them. I can tell you that the feedback from each of themis universally extremely positive. I am also extremely appreciative of the outcome of the budget discussion; you haveunderstood the very particular issues that we face.

We last met formally in March and I re-read my comments on the questions from members of the Committee then, and Iremember that the last issue we discussed was Japan. It is quite interesting that I visited the Matsushima area recently where Isaw the effects of the tsunami and had the privilege of meeting some of the people - the children and the elderly residentsespecially - who are living in quite difficult circumstances, but who were very appreciative of the work of the EuropeanUnion, the support that they have been given.

I wanted to concentrate my remarks of today on two areas: first of all the neighbourhood – east and south – and then secondlythe Horn on Africa. Of course I am sure that, although I expect all the members will want to focus on that, we might findourselves discussing other issues as well.Just to recap, I said from the beginning that I thought how we operate in our neighbourhood, the effectiveness of what we did,would define the European Union into the future. And I still believe that. It's why it is so important that, when we saw thechanges occurring, particularly in what we now call the Arab Spring or the Arab awakening, we were able to reshape ourneighbourhood policy.

Stefan Füle and I work closely together. We had already launched the review, but it was an opportunity to reflect in adifferent way about what we had done, and how we should approach this for the future.

In the renewed Neighbourhood Policy we developed the principle of mutual accountability, of holding each other accountablefor what we did: that we will support the development of democracy, the development of human rights, support for civilsociety, support for the growth of economic life, and in return we would expect that accountability would show that theresources have been used in the right way.

We also developed, and this is very much a golden rule, 'more for more': making sure that instead of just one allocation ofresources we were able to give more for those who wish to move faster in ways that we felt were developing the values thatwe hold and supporting their people.We recognise the need to have economic development and the development of democracy and that these are bound togetherthrough the rule of law in enabling societies and economies to grow. Put simplistically, that in order to get the kind ofinvestment that the countries going through change will need and to be able to develop the kind of economic life they need,they must have strong and stable bureaucracies, the rule of law and democracy.

The good example of that perhaps is Tunisia, where the recent Task Force took place at the end of September. This broughttogether not just the instruments of the European Union, but support from other institutions – the European Investment Bank,the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Bank, the World Bank and others. We were able toprovide €4 billion of support over three years to the economy of Tunisia, in a way that would demonstrate the importance ofensuring that the elections took place and that we are supporting and promoting their democracy.

I met with civil society in Tunisia on that visit, who I had first met when I went there in February. I was the first foreignhigh-level visitor to cross over their doorway since the revolution. It was a great delight to see them working now soeffectively together, and especially to see the women working as a team to try and develop and support their society.

I'm very grateful to Mr Salafranca, Mr. Panzeri and Mme Neyts who came with me to the Task Force in Tunisia and whooffered the support of this committee and this parliament. You know that we'll be trying out the model for Jordan next so Ilook forward very much to your involvement again. I think it made a significant difference to show that those who areengaged in democracy were there, able to support civil society and to make the European Parliament part of the process thatwe're engaged in.

And I hope that we will continue with that as a model that is effective and which was very much appreciated.

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I mentioned already, Mr President, working with women. I think that one of the ways in which we have to ensure that thedevelopment of society, the development of democracy and human rights is well-established, is supporting the women in thecountries that are undergoing change.

I attended the women's conference in Libya, in Tripoli, 3-4 weeks ago, and that was extremely important because 200 womenhad come together to talk about the role that they wish to play in their society, that they wish to be fully engaged in thedemocracy of their country, to be part of civil society and to be part of the leadership of their country. And I think it isextremely valuable that we are developing this women's network across our neighbourhood. It enables us to take women fromLibya to watch the Tunisian elections and to see for themselves how they could be engaged. It's absolutely critical.

It's also true of course that Libya faces the challenges of disarmament, trying to get the militia groups to go home andproviding jobs into the future. When I met with Prime Minister el-Keib, his first official visitor, it was very obvious that theyhave a great deal to do. But nonetheless, to be able to walk openly in Martyr's Square and to meet ordinary people goingabout their business, who talked about their aspirations for the future, was a day I will never forget. This demonstrates againthe importance of our support.

We have paid tribute to those who won the Sakharov Prize, and I also want to pay tribute to Mme Karman, the Nobel PeacePrize winner, who was with me last week. I saw through her the courage and conviction of those in Yemen who have beenengaged in ensuring that the Resolution from the Security Council 2014 is put into action. We have to remain committed toensuring that now that President Saleh has signed and moved on, that we are supporting the future and making sure thatPrime Minister Basindwa is able to move forward along the GCC plan. And we must have that resolution very much in theback of our minds and in the forefront of the work that we do.

Talking about countries in transition brings us to Egypt and the importance of the transfer to civil government. I've been toEgypt I think more than anywhere else this year, possibly with the exception of Israel and Palestine. In talking with thoseengaged in civil society, with women, with young people, with those who are seeking to ensure that their country movesforward, they want to see us engaged fully in that process. We're giving support to civil society and political support, and wemust ensure that we never forget support for minorities, not least the Coptic Christians who need to be supported in Egypt.

Mr President, I must of course mention a country in chaos, which is Syria. You will know that we work very closely with theArab League. Secretary General Al-Araby was at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting to discuss with us our institution toinstitution relations, and of course to focus on what's happening in Syria. The importance of backing the Arab Leagueinitiative and ensuring that we are supportive of the political work that they are undertaking is going to be a big part of howwe move forward.

We work closely with Turkey, we work with the United Nations, we still have people in Damascus who are working for theEuropean Union and we are ready to engage in any humanitarian aid and support that needs to be put in place. But I won'tsurprise you by saying how worried I am about the situation there.

On the Middle East Peace Process, we have moved from payer to player, and we're working extremely hard with PresidentAbbas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and with Prime Minister Fayyad to try and find ways in which talks can be engaged.The Quartet envoys are meeting this week again in Jerusalem to try and push things forward. But I say to you that I think it isimportant that we continue as a European Union to work as hard as we can to try and engage in what must be the solution inthe end, which is a negotiated settlement.

Meanwhile I worry very much about the violence that we see; I worry a great deal about the realities on the ground and Icondemn absolutely the settlements that are of course illegal under international law.

A lot of MEPs and members of this committee have written to me about Camp Ashraf. I am extremely grateful for thesupport that you have shown for all of the initiatives that I have taken to try and help keep these 3,400 people safe and havethem safely moved on to the world that they wish to enter, the countries that they need to go to.

I welcome the support from the UN High Commissioner and the way in which that work is being done. In the last few days, Ihave met with the UN Secretary General, with his Special Representative, with Foreign Minister Zebari, and with Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton. All of that is designed to put our support behind the UN process, to make that work as effectively aspossible with resources, with political support, to make sure that there is a proper process where people are safely able tomove on to the lives they wish to have.

I want to also touch briefly on the Eastern Neighbourhood, because we have seen a successful summit in Warsaw on theEastern Partnership. You will know that Belarus did not attend. I am very sad that Ales Byalyatsky has been sentenced forhelping distribute EU support to civil society. We have made it clear that we absolutely must see the release and therehabilitation of the political prisoners. That means enabling people to go back to the lives they had, including standing forelections and participating in political life. We will continue to work down that track.

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Mr President, I have visited the Southern Caucasus recently as well, travelling to Azerbaijan and Armenia to push the rolethat we play in helping to build confidence. While we don’t participate in the Minsk Group on Nagorno Karabakh, we wantto ensure that we are engaged with that process. I also went to Georgia to continue to support the Georgian people.

Serbia and Kosovo continue to require a great deal of time. We have had eight meetings so far of the dialogue. We willcontinue with that and we are pushing hard with Belgrade and Pristina to make real progress.

Finally, Mr President, I also wanted to say something about the Horn of Africa. The point about the Horn of Africa strategy isbringing together a common comprehensive approach. On the one hand, we have to tackle the very real issue of piracy at sea.That is something that is extremely important to us as we try to support the World Food Programme as it provides food to thepeople of Somalia who are suffering from famine. It is also important to ensure that pirates are not able to take hostages andwe are beginning to see an effect; compared to last November, when there were 35 attempted hijackings, there were only 12in November this year and only one of those was partially successful compared to 7 last year.

We also need a strategy for the land and so the Horn of Africa strategy is designed to do 3 things:One, to put together a programme that will help to support the development of Somalia and give alternatives for those whocurrently operate as pirates: often young men.

Secondly, to bring African leaders together; to work with countries of the region to enable them to provide leadership andsupport for Somalia.

And thirdly to help them develop the kind of maritime capacity they need to be able to support their coastline and theirpeople.

Mr President, we saw the terrible scenes in Kenya. We had a French woman who was kidnapped and later killed. We alsoknow the impact on those who wish to go and visit Kenya has been extraordinary; an 80% drop in tourism. We know theimpact on the coastline for trade; we know the impact on the economies of those countries and way beyond. It is an issue tobe tackled but to be tackled by providing a comprehensive approach which is what I believe that we have.Thank you.

European Union

19 Dec 2011


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The European Commission renews its assistance for the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, supporting vital government functions andrefugees

Brussels, 19 December 2011 - Today, the European Commission has adopted a new assistance package for the OccupiedPalestinian Territory for 2012, which amounts to €160.4 million.

Two thirds of this will go to the Palestinian Authority to help it cover wages and pensions for essential civilian workers(particularly medical and teaching staff) and social allowances for vulnerable Palestinian families. The funding will alsocover arrears of bills by the Palestinian Authority to the private sector for medical supplies. The remaining amount of €55.4million will be allocated to the core budget/ general fund of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).UNRWA provides basic health, education and social services for a Palestinian refugee population of five million people bothin the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in neighbouring states. The EU and its EU Member States are the biggest donors toUNRWA.

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission, said:"This decision highlights our commitment to the Palestinian people. It consolidates our support to the Palestinian Authority'sinstitution-building programme and contributes to the ability of the PA to provide essential public services. Today’s decisionalso underlines our support to Palestine refugees through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency."

EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle, announcing the adoption of thepackage said: "This is a sign of our strong political and financial commitment to build a democratic and viable Palestinianstate, as well as to contributing to the well-being of the Palestinian refugee community. We have made a special effort both tomobilise extra funds from this year's budget and to front-load those from next year to respond to the difficult financialsituation both the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA face in providing vital services to the Palestinian people. Indeed, I trustthat other donors will also share the burden of this support ".

Background

EU support to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through the EU's assistance mechanism for the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, PEGASE (French acronym for Mecanisme "Palestino - Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique) whichwas launched in 2008.

This aid to the Palestinian Authority is provided to support the implementation of the Palestinian National Development Plan,successor to the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, first presented by the Palestinian Authority at the donorconference in December 2007, held in Paris. Moreover, in August 2009, Prime Minister Fayyad presented the PalestinianAuthority's "Programme of the Thirteenth Government". The plan aims at building strong governmental institutions whichwill serve as the basis for a future independent Palestinian State. The EU has expressed its political and financial support forPrime Minister Fayyad's plan. Further to this support and to some partial and insufficient easing of restrictions on movementand access in the West Bank, the reform agenda of Prime Minister Fayyad has triggered economic and social progress. Thesituation in Gaza, however, remains unsustainable.

Today's first tranche of financing for 2012 responds to the priorities of the Palestinian Authority in supporting recurrentexpenditure and the needs of UNRWA to support Palestine refugees. The total €160.4 million package is made up of afront-loaded amount of €100 million from the 2012 budget together with €0.4 million from 2011. This means that overall2012 funds for the Occupied Palestinian Territory can reach the same level as in 2011, with a total allocation of €300 million.

For more info:

EU relations with Occupied Palestinian Territory

On the European Neighbourhood Policy

European Commission

European Union

Page 15/210

19 Dec 2011


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European Union provides €12 million for essential social protection tofamilies in need in the West Bank and Gaza

On Monday 19 December, the European Union (EU) will make this year's fourth and last contribution to the PalestinianAuthority's quarterly payment of social allowances to over 66,600 Palestinian households living in extreme poverty in theWest Bank and Gaza. The contribution, channelled through the PEGASE[1] mechanism, amounts to €12 million (ILS60,861,799) and is funded by the European Commission (€11.5 million) and the Government of Ireland (€0.5 million).

Eligible beneficiaries are identified in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Social Affairs, through thelatter's unified cash transfer programme, designed to provide basic safety net to Palestinian households living in extremepoverty. The assistance takes the form of a cash allowance.

The €12 million contribution, through PEGASE, will directly benefit 66,626 eligible Palestinian families – out of which alittle less than 40,000 live in Gaza.

The Minister of Social Affairs, Mrs Majeda Al Masri, said:

"In line with the strategy of the Ministry of Social Affairs to unify and consolidate cash assistance programs and systemsacross the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and as the result of lengthy efforts, the implementation of the cash transfer programmein Gaza finally came in effect a year after it was introduced and applied in the West Bank. This represents the first paymentunder the unified cash assistance programme. It will reach around 95 thousand poor and marginalised households living inthe occupied Palestinian territory. We would like to seize this occasion to thank everyone who contributed to this nationalachievement, especially our partners from the European Union."

The Acting Representative of the European Union, Mr John Gatt-Rutter said:

"The EU welcomes the recent integration of Gaza into the national cash transfer programme. Through this development thesame criteria are now being applied across the West Bank and Gaza to identify the poorest households. This unified databaseis a comprehensive tool in the hands of the Ministry to effectively target those most in need at a national level. Under thisunified programme, 60% of the families receiving assistance come from Gaza; this is a clear indication of the prevalence ofpoverty in the Strip and the need to provide the people with a reliable social safety net".

Payments will be made across a network of local banks across the West Bank and Gaza. Beneficiaries living in the WestBank will receive their allowance directly through individual bank accounts. In Gaza, beneficiaries will continue to collecttheir allowance over-the-counter. Beneficiaries may collect their allowances as of Monday 19 December, at the bank branchindicated by their social worker.

Background:

Most of the EU assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financial mechanism launched in2008 to support the three-year Reform and Development Plan presented in 2007. As well as helping to meet a substantialproportion of its running costs, European funds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to helpprepare the PA for statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. SinceFebruary 2008, over €1.2 billion have been disbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. Inaddition, the EU has provided assistance to the Palestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.

European Union

16 Dec 2011


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Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton following hermeeting with the President of the Palestinian Authority, MahmoudAbbas

Brussels, 14 December 2011

A 513/11

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of theCommission made the following statement:

"It was a great pleasure to welcome President Abbas and his delegation to Brussels today. We have been engaged in a mutualand determined diplomatic effort throughout the past months concerning the Middle East Peace Process and the PalestinianUnited Nations bid. We continue to work actively and in partnership on these issues.

The overarching objective of the EU remains the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinianstate, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. The EU, along with its Quartet partners, has a key role to play inthis process. A series of meetings have been held in an effort to advance the Peace Process including today in Jerusalem.

A calm and conducive environment is essential for progress. Developments on the ground, such as ongoing settlementactivity in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, are an obstacle to our peace efforts and threaten to make the two-statesolution impossible.

However, I believe we all share the understanding that ultimately direct negotiations are essential in order to fulfill thelegitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for statehood.

The EU has always been a strong supporter of the Palestinian people and remains one of the major supporters andcontributors to the Palestinian state-building efforts led by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. I trust the PalestinianAuthority will continue with its institution-building efforts and will uphold current standards in terms of transparent andefficient public finance management.

We are keen to use the time ahead to improve the situation on the ground including in Area C of the West Bank and the GazaStrip. We are also determined to further strengthen our bilateral relations.

The EU is committed to maintaining the current levels of financial assistance to the Palestinians despite the difficulteconomic situation. I take this opportunity to remind other donors to fulfill their obligations.

We also discussed the importance of Palestinian reconciliation behind President Abbas as a crucial element for the unity ofthe future Palestinian state and for the two-state solution."

PRESS


Michael Mann +32 498 999 780 - +32 2 299 97 80 - [email protected]

Maja Kocijancic +32 498 984 425 - +32 2 298 65 70 - [email protected]

Sebastien Brabant +32 498 986 433 - [email protected]

[email protected]

www.eeas.europa.eu

European Union

Page 18/210

15 Dec 2011


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EU launch €1,5 million project to improve water availability anddemand management in agriculture in the West Bank

The European Union (EU) launched a €1,5 million project to improve the livelihoods and food security levels of poor ruralfamilies through improving the availability and management of water for agricultural purposes. The project is implementedby Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) and is expected to be finalized at the end of 2012.

Availability of and access to water is one of the biggest problems Palestinian farmers and herders face. Since 2007 the regionhas suffered from severe weather conditions and rainwater scarcity affecting agricultural productivity. In addition, constraintsin accessing land and restrictions imposed on Palestinians for establishing or rehabilitating water wells have severelyimpaired farmers from realizing their potential. The project will construct and rehabilitate 450 rain feed water cisterns whichwill secure access to water for irrigation of crops, home gardens and livestock to 450 farming families in the West Bank andwill offer them a feasible and affordable way to improve their livelihood.

"There is an unquestionable need for a comprehensive response to water scarcity and difficulties in accessing water forPalestinian farmers. This project comes in addition to the EU food security programme which has focused exactly onimproving the management of water and wastewater in rural areas of the oPt to tackle these problems" said the Acting EURepresentative Mr. John Gatt-Rutter. "We are particularly proud to launch this project whose asset lies not only in givingimmediate access to water for the most impoverished rural families in the West Bank but also in directly involving the localcommunity in doing so", he added.

The construction of the cisterns will be realized through a 'cash-for-work' method creating jobs for at least 900 skilled andunskilled workers. The beneficiary farmers will also receive tailored technical support and trainings to enhance theirknowledge and skills in water management and good agricultural practices. The farmer families to be targeted will comefrom the governorates of Jenin and Hebron with priority to the most poor and vulnerable households whose farm is their solesource of income. Priority will also be given to families were women are the main bread winner.

“Without water security, there will be no food security” said the FAO Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator Mr.Cyril Ferrand. “The ability to produce food is essential to reducing poverty and encouraging social and economicdevelopment. Unfortunately, the semi-arid nature of the climate in most parts of Palestine, coupled with limited access towater and increased variability of rainfall events are significantly affecting the resilience of small-scale farmers and herders.In such a context, every drop counts and there is an urgent need to promote sustainable management of water resources. Thisis the exact nature of the new project launched by FAO and the EU in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture” heconcluded.

Background:

The EU has been supporting rural development – with particular attention to the olive oil sector and the treatment of wastewater for reuse in agriculture – for many years. In the coming years, through its food security programme, the EU will invest€ 18.2 million in supporting the livelihoods of the most vulnerable population in the oPt.

Contact:

The Office of the European Union RepresentativeAntonia Zafeiri, Tel:+972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mob: 054 8024 915Shadi Othman, Tel:+972 (0) 2 541 5867, Mob: 0599 673 958http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

FAO:The FAO programme coordination office for the West Bank and Gaza StripCyril Ferrand, Tel:+972 (0) 2 532 1950/2757, Mob: 054 8026 703http://www.fao.org/emergencies/country_information/list/middleeast/westb...

European Union

14 Dec 2011

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Drinking water in Gaza and rule of law: EU supports the PA in two focalsectors of intervention

Jerusalem PR/27/201112/12/2011

The European Union (EU) announced today its latest contribution in two major sectors of support to the Palestinian Authority(PA): the sustainable management of natural resources and the rule of law. Namely, it launched a €10 million waterdesalination facility project in the Gaza Strip and the establishment of the Diploma Programme of the Palestinian JudicialInstitute.

The Acting EU Representative signed today a Memorandum of Understanding with the Head of the Palestinian WaterAuthority (PWA) as well as representatives of the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) and UNICEF to note theagreement for the Short Term-Low Volume Desalination facility that will be constructed in the Gaza Strip over the comingthree years. As identified in the Study of comparative options for water resources (June 2011), this medium-term interventionresponds to the humanitarian water crisis in Gaza and once completed it will provide safe water for drinking and domestic useto about 75,000 inhabitants in Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates in the Strip.

“I am very pleased to be signing today an agreement with the Palestinian Authority to launch an infrastructure project inGaza. As the EU has reiterated in the past, the continued policy of closure in Gaza has damaged the natural environment,notably water and other natural resources. I hope that this intervention can bring real change for some Palestinians livingunder unsustainable conditions in the Strip”, said the Acting EU Representative, Mr. John Gatt-Rutter. “I want to thank thePWA and the CMWU for their cooperation and commitment in making this project a quality one and in securing that theoperation and maintenance of the plant will be sustainable. I also want to thank UNICEF for its important role in making theimplementation of our support possible in Gaza”, he added.

Today the EU also marked the onset of a two-year project establishing the first Diploma for Judicial Studies in the PalestinianJudicial system. Through a €1,5 million grant the EU supports the Palestinian Judicial Institute in carrying out all preparatorywork towards an initial training programme for future judges and prosecutors. The project will also upgrade the availabletraining resources by setting-up an Information Resource Centre with a specialised library to provide support to both trainersand trainees.

In the launch ceremony today the Acting EU Representative thanked the Palestinian Judicial Institute and all main institutionsof the Justice sector – Ministry of Justice, High Judicial Council and Office of the Attorney General - for their support to thisproject and for continuing to address the education needs of the judicial system; enhancing this way the judicial institutions ofthe future Palestinian state with competent, effective and professional judges and prosecutors.

Background:

Since 2011, the European Union in agreement with the Palestinian Authority directed its support to three focal sectors:sustainable management of natural resources, the rule of law and the development of the private-sector.

In the water sector the EU supports the PA in improving water supply, sewage connection and wastewater treatment acrossthe West Bank and Gaza. Over the last few years, the EU has given Tulkarem and Jenin governorates €1.3 million forinfrastructural developments to ease water supply constraints, €2 million for water networks in Hebron governorate and isnow preparing a waste water treatment plant worth €18 million to be implemented in Tubas until 2015. In Gaza, the EU –inter alia – contributes with €6million to the emergency sewage treatment developed in northern Gaza and €3.5 million forwater sanitation in Rafah and Deir Al Balah governorates. On the policy level, the EU is supporting the PA in its institutionalreform of the water sector and is fostering cooperation between water management authorities in Israel, Jordan and thePalestinian Authority.

The EU supports a number of important interventions to improve the Palestinian rule of law and especially the capacity of itsjudicial institutions. The support ranges from contributing to the infrastructure such as the building of Courthouses, theHeadquarters of the Palestinian Judicial Institute and Palestinian Bar Association to supporting specific programs of thePalestinian Authority. These include Legal Aid and Juvenile Justice Programs, capacity building and training programs suchas the Seyada Program as well as the provision of specific expertise within institutions.

Page 22/210

Contact:The Office of the European Union RepresentativeAntonia Zafeiri, Tel:+972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mob: 054 8024 915Shadi Othman, Tel:+972 (0) 2 541 5867, Mob: 0599 673 958http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

European Union

12 Dec 2011


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The European Union supports the 7th payment under the PalestinianAuthority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme

The European Union contributed today over €3.5 million (c.US$4.7 million), out of a total package of € 22.0 million, tothe seventh payment under the Palestinian Authority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" (PSRG) programme.The programme is the first large-scale initiative in support of the private sector in the Gaza Strip. This contribution isbeing channelled through PEGASE[1], the European Union's mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) established the PSRG programme to provide financial support to private sector businessesthat were destroyed or damaged by Israel's "Operation Cast Lead". It targets businesses that need to restore damaged assetsnecessary for their activities - funded items include machinery, office furniture and equipment, as well as building andbusiness premise material. The ultimate objective is to revitalize the economic activity in Gaza and provide for sustainablelivelihoods for its people.

The European Union committed €22.0 million to PSRG at the end of 2009. In March 2011, the Japanese Governmentcommitted an additional US$ 6.58 million to the programme. Both contributions are being channelled through the EuropeanUnion's financing mechanism PEGASE, which is open to all donors and has been used by a number of European states. Thecontribution from Japan, which is the first non-European donor to channel contributions to a PA programme throughPEGASE, has already been fully disbursed to PSRG beneficiaries in previous payments.

The seventh PSRG disbursement amounts to more than €3.5 million (c.US$4.7 million) and will benefit 308 claims by Gazabusinesses, which will receive first, second or third instalments of their total PSRG entitlements. It follows six earlierpayments under PSRG that took place in July 2010, September 2010, January 2011, June 2011, August 2011, and September2011, which benefited almost 660 eligible claims and amounted to c.€15.0 million. Further payments are expected to takeplace under the PSRG programme in the near future.

Background:


For further information in Arabic and English on the EU's assistance to the occupied Palestinian territory and the PEGASEmechanism, please visit: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/index_en.htm


Contact:

The Office of the European Union Representative, West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWAAntonia Zafeiri, Tel: +972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mob: +972 (0) 548 024 915Shadi Othman, Tel: +972 (0) 2 541 5867, Mob: +972 (0) 599 673 958

European Union

08 Dec 2011


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Quartet Envoys meetings with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators

On 26 October, Quartet Envoys and Quartet Representative Blair met separately with the Parties in Jerusalem to beginimplementation of the Quartet statement of 23 September 2011.

Both Parties expressed their readiness to engage with the Quartet, on the basis of its statement of 23 September, to overcomethe current obstacles and resume direct bilateral negotiations without delay or preconditions.

The Parties agreed with the Quartet to come forward with comprehensive proposals on territory and security within threemonths in the context of our shared commitment to the objective of direct negotiations leading toward an agreement by theend of 2012.

Envoys reiterated the Quartet call of 23 September upon the parties to refrain from provocative actions if negotiations are tobe effective.

Quartet Envoys agreed with the parties to meet regularly for the next 90 days to review progress.

European Union

27 Oct 2011


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Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlementexpansion in Givat Hamatos

Brussels, 15 October 2011

A 415/11

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of theCommission, made today the following statement:

"I deplore the decision by the Israeli Authorities to advance the plan for the construction of 2600 new housing units in thesettlement of Givat Hamatos and to legalize – under Israeli Law – houses in West Bank outposts. This is unacceptable. Bothactions run against roadmap obligations.

Settlements are illegal under international law. These decisions should be reversed.

The proposed constructions in Givat Hamatos are of particular concern as they would cut the geographic contiguity betweenJerusalem and Bethlehem.

The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to end all settlement activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle outpostserected since March 2001.

These initiatives run contrary to the current EU and Quartet efforts to bring about the resumption of peace negotiations and toIsrael's stated commitment to this process. Both parties are responsible for the creation of an environment of trust conduciveto negotiations."

European Union

15 Oct 2011

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P R E S S



Maja Kocijancic +32 498 984 425 - +32 2 298 65 70 - [email protected] [email protected]

www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 15 October 2011

A 415/11

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton

on settlement expansion in Givat Hamatos

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and

Vice-President of the Commission, made today the following statement:

"I deplore the decision by the Israeli Authorities to advance the plan for the construction of 2600

new housing units in the settlement of Givat Hamatos and to legalize – under Israeli Law – houses

in West Bank outposts. This is unacceptable. Both actions run against roadmap obligations.

Settlements are illegal under international law. These decisions should be reversed.

The proposed constructions in Givat Hamatos are of particular concern as they would cut the

geographic contiguity between Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to end all settlement activity, including natural growth, and

to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001.

These initiatives run contrary to the current EU and Quartet efforts to bring about the resumption

of peace negotiations and to Israel's stated commitment to this process. Both parties are

responsible for the creation of an environment of trust conducive to negotiations."

____________________


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Local EU Statement: Demolition of a Palestinian mosque in KhirbetYarza situated in Area C in the Northern West Bank

The EU missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah regret the recent demolition of a mosque in the village of Khirbet Yarza situatedin Area C in the Northern West Bank. This is the third time within a year that this mosque has been demolished. Since theyear 2000 more than 4,800 Palestinian houses and structures have been demolished for lacking a building permit in Area C.The EU calls on Israel to review its policy and planning system in order to allow for the socio-economic development of thePalestinian communities.

European Union

13 Oct 2011

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We met some errors and the attached PDF couldn't be included in this report. Please download at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EU%20Local%20Statement%20-%20mosque%20demolition.pdf.


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Statement by the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on thedeal between Israel and Hamas on the release of Gilad Shalit andPalestinian prisoners

Brussels, 12 October 2011 A 407/11

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President, made thefollowing statement today:

"I warmly welcome the news that Gilad Shalit will soon be able to return home after five years of captivity putting and end tothe long ordeal that he and his family have endured. During my visits to Israel I personally shared my concerns and expressedthe support of the EU and of the international community at large to Gilad’s family. I pay tribute to the work of all those whohave worked tirelessly to secure his release, and in particular the Egyptian and German negotiators."

European Union

12 Oct 2011

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P R E S S




www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 12 October 2011

A 407/11

Statement by the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton,

on the deal between Israel and Hamas on the release of Gilad

Shalit and Palestinian prisoners

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission

Vice-President, made the following statement today:

"I warmly welcome the news that Gilad Shalit will soon be able to return home after five years of

captivity putting and end to the long ordeal that he and his family have endured. During my visits

to Israel I personally shared my concerns and expressed the support of the EU and of the

international community at large to Gilad’s family. I pay tribute to the work of all those who have

worked tirelessly to secure his release, and in particular the Egyptian and German negotiators."

____________________


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Council conclusions on Middle East Peace Process

3117th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 10 October 2011

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The EU reiterates its full support to the High Representative in her continuing efforts on behalf of the EU to create acredible perspective for the re-launching of the Peace Process.

2. The EU reiterates its appeal to the parties to resume negotiations under the terms and within the timelines indicated inthe Quartet Statement of 23 September 2011. The EU welcomes the positive statements of both parties in that regard.The EU underlines the Quartet's crucial role in facilitating the resumption of direct talks between Israel and thePalestinians and recalls its readiness to support all efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The EUfully supports the Quartet’s call on the parties to refrain from provocative actions and to respect the obligations ofboth parties under the roadmap.

3. The EU deplores the recent Israeli decision to advance settlement expansion in the East Jerusalem settlement of Gilo,which runs counter to the Quartet’s efforts. The EU also calls upon both sides to avoid steps that run counter to theQuartet's efforts to restart negotiations.

4. The EU reaffirms its clear positions on negotiations, with regard to parameters, principles and issues, including theconclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2009, December 2010, May 2011 and July 2011, as well asthe Statement delivered on behalf of the EU at the Security Council on 21 April 2011.

5. The EU continues to follow closely developments regarding to the Palestinian initiative at the UN.

European Union

10 Oct 2011

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P R E S S

R u e d e l a L o i 1 7 5 B – 1 0 4 8 B R U S S E L S T e l . : + 3 2 ( 0 ) 2 2 8 1 6 3 1 9 F a x : + 3 2 ( 0 ) 2 2 8 1 8 0 2 6 [email protected] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/Newsroom

1

EN

COUNCIL OF

THE EUROPEAN UNION EN

Council conclusions on Middle East Peace Process

3117th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 10 October 2011


"1. The EU reiterates its full support to the High Representative in her continuing efforts on

behalf of the EU to create a credible perspective for the re-launching of the Peace Process.

2. The EU reiterates its appeal to the parties to resume negotiations under the terms and within

the timelines indicated in the Quartet Statement of 23 September 2011. The EU welcomes the

positive statements of both parties in that regard. The EU underlines the Quartet's crucial role

in facilitating the resumption of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and recalls its

readiness to support all efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The EU fully

supports the Quartet’s call on the parties to refrain from provocative actions and to respect the

obligations of both parties under the roadmap.

3. The EU deplores the recent Israeli decision to advance settlement expansion in the East

Jerusalem settlement of Gilo, which runs counter to the Quartet’s efforts. The EU also calls

upon both sides to avoid steps that run counter to the Quartet's efforts to restart negotiations.

4. The EU reaffirms its clear positions on negotiations, with regard to parameters, principles and

issues, including the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2009, December

2010, May 2011 and July 2011, as well as the Statement delivered on behalf of the EU at the

Security Council on 21 April 2011.

5. The EU continues to follow closely developments regarding to the Palestinian initiative at the

UN."

_______________


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Palestinian gender delegation visits EU institutions

A delegation of officials from the Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister’s Office, the Palestinian Civil Police andPalestinian Ministry of Women’s Affairs visited Brussels recently and met with EU officials, EU Member States, and theEuropean Parliament to discuss the achievements in the security sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Facilitated by International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe in collaboration with the Human Rights Policy andGuidelines Unit of the External Action Service of the EU and EUPOL COPPS Police Gender Advisor, the visit highlightedcooperation and achievements for stability and security in Palestine.

In particular, the delegation presented a historical precedent and achievement. Instigated by the Chief of Police, Mj. Gen.Hazem ATALLAH, the Palestinian Civilian Police are setting a global foot print in the international security sector byassigning the first Police Gender Advisor in the region and Arab world.

Major Wafaa SULEIMAN was appointed as Head of the Gender Unit in May 2011. She states that “I feel privileged to beassigned for this task and I’m ready for mission.”

With full support of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, they emphasized that “We embracethis initiative. It shows that we move forward in the field of gender in the security sector.”

European Union

10 Oct 2011

Page 34/210

We met some errors and the attached PDF couldn't be included in this report. Please download at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20111010%20EUPOL%20COPPS%20Press%20Release%20Gender%20Delegation.pdf.


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PCP and EUPOLCOPPS conclude Juvenile Police training

Jericho, 6 October 2011

The Palestinian Civil Police and EUPOL COPPS concluded today a three-week training programme for Juvenile Police onbest police practices to handle offences carried out by minors at the new Jericho Police Training School (JPTS).

The 32 participants from all West Bank districts were trained on child psychology, provisions of torture, defensive tactics,legal aspects of cases involving juveniles, first aid, and interrogation techniques, among other subjects.

The Director of the JPTS, Lt. Col. Zaher SABBAH, highlighted to the trainees at the graduation ceremony that they shouldtry to implement in the field what they have learned during the course.

Addressing the graduates, EUPOL COPPS’s Deputy Head of Mission, Sofie Mortier, said: “The course aimed at providingeach and every one of you with knowledge, skills and attitudes so that you will be able to fulfil your role within the policeand within the wider society as a whole”.

Eleven out of the thirty-two0 participants were female police officers.

This training programme was funded by the Representative Office of The Netherlands, the EU Representative Office andUNOPS.

For further information please contact:

EUPOL COPPS Press and Public Information OfficeLand line: 02-2976677 (extension 113 or 121)Cell. Press and Public Information Officer: 054-2666614 or 059-8999147Cell Press Officer: 054-2666637 or 059-9522405Cell. Public Information Officer: 054-2666627 or 059-8950843E-mail: [email protected]: www.eupolcopps.eu

European Union

06 Oct 2011


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European Union helps the Palestinian Authority provide essentialsocial protection to families in need

Press Release - European UnionJerusalemPR/23/201101/10/2011

On Monday 3rd October the European Union (EU) will be making its third contribution this year to the PalestinianAuthority's quarterly payment of social allowances to poor Palestinian households, across the West Bank and Gaza. Thiscontribution, channelled through the PEGASE[1] mechanism, amounts to over €9.9 million (ILS 50.8 million) and is fundedby the EU (€8.9 million) and the Government of Finland (€1 million).

Eligible beneficiaries are identified in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Social Affairs, through thelatter's national cash assistance programme – a programme designed to provide basic safety net to the poorest and mostvulnerable Palestinian citizens. The assistance takes the form of a cash allowance.

The €9.9 million contribution, through PEGASE, will directly benefit 50,556 eligible Palestinian families – out of 87,000receiving assistance in the framework of the National Cash Transfer Programme.

The Minister of Social Affairs, Mrs Majeda Al Masri, said:

It is our responsibility to protect the poor and the marginalised. For this reason, the Ministry of Social Affairs is striving todevelop programs that deliver efficient humanitarian and social services to improve the well-being of these vulnerablegroups. In line with the Ministry's objective to reach out to populations in need, this payment will benefit 10,000 new eligiblefamilies in Gaza. Around 87 thousand poor families and marginalised households in the West Bank and Gaza will receiveassistance in the framework of the national cash transfer programme. We continue to work in close collaboration withcommunity organisations, and no efforts are spared to deliver the highest level of services to beneficiaries of ourprogrammes. Not to forget here the role of partner donors, who have been supporting the Ministry in is endeavours bothfinancially and technically – in particular the European Union, which is the biggest partner and supporter of our programs."

The Acting Representative of the European Union, Mr John Gatt-Rutter said: "The EU and Finland are joining efforts to fundthis year's third payment of social benefits to the Ministry of Social Affairs' cash transfer programme. The EU reiterates theconclusion of the recent donor's meeting in New York (Ad Hoc Liaison Committee) that we should all work along side thePA in providing predictable budget support to the Palestinian government and assisting it in achieving fiscal sustainability.From 2008 to present, PEGASE has been systematically contributing on a quarterly basis to the payment of social allowancesto the Ministry of Social Affairs' cash assistance programme – representing a total of over €141 million. The Ministrycontinues its remarkable efforts to support the poorest of the poor in the oPt. The EU will continue to be a reliable partnerespecially at this critical time".

Payments will be made across a network of local banks across the West Bank and Gaza. Beneficiaries residing in the WestBank will receive their allowance directly through individual bank accounts. In Gaza, beneficiaries will continue to collecttheir allowance over-the-counter. Beneficiaries may collect their allowances as of Monday 3rd October 2011, at the bankbranch indicated by their social worker.

Background:

Most of the EU assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financial mechanism launched in2008 to support the three-year Reform and Development Plan presented in 2007. As well as helping to meet a substantialproportion of its running costs, European funds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to helpprepare the PA for statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. SinceFebruary 2008, approximately €1.17 billion have been disbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes.In addition, the EU has provided assistance to the Palestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperationprojects.

Contact:

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The Office of the European Union RepresentativeAntonia Zafeiri, Tel:+972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mobile: +972 (0)54 8024 915Shadi Othman, Tel:+972 (0) 2 541 5888 Ext 867, Mobile: +972 (0)599 673 958http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

Ministry of Social AffairsKhaled Al BarghoutiDeputy General Director to Combat PovertyMobile: 059-932-8586

If you wish to be added or removed from the European Commission's press releases distribution list, please email [email protected]

Please specify if you wish to receive press releases in English, Arabic or both.

European Union

01 Oct 2011


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Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on thesettlement expansion in Gilo, East Jerusalem

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of theEuropean Commission, issued the following statement today:

“Last Friday, the Quartet called on the Israelis and Palestinians to refrain from provocative actions if negotiations are toresume and be effective, and reiterated the obligations of both parties under the Roadmap.

I therefore deplore today's decision to advance settlement expansion in East Jerusalem with approximately 1000 new housingunits in Gilo. I call on the Israeli authorities to reverse this plan.

The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to end all settlement activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle outpostserected since March 2001. Settlement activity threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution and raises questionsabout Israel's stated commitment to resume negotiations.

European Union

28 Sep 2011

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P R E S S




www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 27 September 2011

A 386/11

Statement by

EU High Representative Catherine Ashton

on the settlement expansion in Gilo, East Jerusalem

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and

Vice President of the European Commission, issued the following statement today:

“Last Friday, the Quartet called on the Israelis and Palestinians to refrain from provocative

actions if negotiations are to resume and be effective, and reiterated the obligations of both parties

under the Roadmap.

I therefore deplore today's decision to advance settlement expansion in East Jerusalem with

approximately 1000 new housing units in Gilo. I call on the Israeli authorities to reverse this plan.


to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001. Settlement activity threatens the viability of an

agreed two-state solution and raises questions about Israel's stated commitment to resume

negotiations.”

____________________


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Address to the European Parliament on the United Nations GeneralAssembly, the Middle East Peace Process and the Arab spring

Catherine AshtonEU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission

Strasbourg, 27 September 2011

Mr President, Honourable Members of the European Parliament This years UN General Assembly took place at a time ofhuge change and growing tension in the world. The combination of the economic crisis, the Arab spring and the stalledMiddle East peace process creates a volatile mix. Europe must respond to the challenge - both at home and abroad.

Today - at your request - I will focus on two issues Middle East peace process and the Arab spring. However I would justnotify honourable members that during the week in NY I met with ministers from our strategic partners - Russia, China, USA, Brazil, India, Mexico and participated in a number of key events - counter terrorism forum and jointly with UN women anevent highlighting the role of women, led by the President of Brazil.

European Union

28 Sep 2011

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SPEECH/11/608

Catherine Ashton

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission

Address to the European Parliament on the United Nations General Assembly, the Middle East Peace Process and the Arab spring

European Parliament

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Strasbourg, 27 September 2011 Mr President, Honourable Members of the European Parliament

This years UN General Assembly took place at a time of huge change and growing tension in the world. The combination of the economic crisis, the Arab spring and the stalled Middle East peace process creates a volatile mix. Europe must respond to the challenge - both at home and abroad.

Today - at your request - I will focus on two issues Middle East peace process and the Arab spring. However I would just notify honourable members that during the week in NY I met with ministers from our strategic partners - Russia, China, USA , Brazil, India, Mexico and participated in a number of key events - counter terrorism forum and jointly with UN women an event highlighting the role of women, led by the President of Brazil.

Turning first to the Middle East peace process

I have visited the region 7 times this year, each time with a single purpose - to promote a negotiated settlement of the conflict and to demonstrate the importance of Europe's role. Over the summer period I have worked with quartet envoys, with the Arab League and been in discussion with the Prime Minister of Israel and President of the Palestinian Authority together with Prime Minister Fayyad.

It is clear, honourable members that these efforts have succeeded in demonstrating the EU role - a player and a payer. Our financial commitment matched by our political strength - For too long the EU has been on the sidelines of the Peace Process. I have worked to achieve a greater EU role as I believe we are ideally placed as a friend of both parties.

I've said before that my vision of the European External Action Service is a conflict prevention and resolution approach – we need now to put this vision into practice. The dividends of peace are crucial for the future stability and prosperity of our neighbourhood.

Prior to the UN discussions I had participated in Cairo in the Arab League follow up committee discussions as we considered how best to support our objective - two states - peace and security for all.

Exploratory talks with Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian leaders at the end of August led me to believe that the way forward was to put together a package of various actions with the objective of getting Israelis and Palestinians together in talks. During my September visit in the region it became clear that a Quartet statement and possibly a GA resolution in addition to what President Abbas is seeking to do would be part of such a package.

In my meetings with many Arab leaders I was impressed by the stated desire to end the conflict and the wish to bring stability and normality against the backdrop of potential unrest sparked by a lack of progress. I believe this is also understood by the Israeli leaders who see their country surrounded by uncertainty, and fear for their country’s security.

I have impressed on all those I have met in the region that now is the time to seek peace between Israelis and Palestinians on the basis of a negotiated agreement that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State as a core element of the peace agreement, and will end the occupation that is so detrimental to the development of both peoples.

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The UN speeches of President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu differed in rhetoric but shared a desire for peace. Both speeches focused on the need to go to negotiations and the wish to end the conflict.

At my instigation, the Quartet responded to this immediately by calling on both parties to enter into negotiations within four weeks, to agree on the issues of territory and security within three months, to have made substantial progress within six months, and to reach an agreement by the end of next year.

We expect both sides to agree to come to negotiations within four weeks. I believe that the EU, including this Parliament, should play a central role in that process. We are well placed and I will stay personally involved.

The Quartet has called the parties to refrain from provocative actions if negotiations are to resume and be effective. It is therefore with deep regret that I have learnt today about the decision to advance settlement expansion in East Jerusalem with new housing units in Gilo. This plan should be reversed. Settlement activity threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution and runs contrary to the Israeli stated commitment to resume negotiations.

We have also called for a Donors Conference to support further the impressive achievements of the Palestinian Authority’s state-building, and will consult on additional steps that will quickly lead to greater independence and sovereignty for the Palestinians over their affairs. Facilitating Palestinian trade is essential to support state-building and develop the Palestinian economy. We have proposed concrete action to open our markets to Palestinian agricultural and fishery products and I am glad that earlier today the European Parliament voted in favour of this important agreement.

Gaza also remains a priority. As I have always said, the crossings must be opened to allow the flow of humanitarian aid, imports, exports and people. We need to enable children to go to school and ordinary people, and the younger generation in particular, to get on with and build their lives.

I will continue to work to allow the economic recovery of Gaza while addressing Israel's legitimate security concerns.

My second issue today is the Arab Spring.

Since the popular demonstrations in Tunisia, the Arab Spring has touched every Arab state in the region. It is an event of truly historic proportions that will shape not only the future of the Arab World but our own future too. It is a revolution based on values: justice, dignity, freedom. Europe's response to these events will speak more than any form of rhetoric about its real commitment to democratic principles.

We have a once in a lifetime opportunity to build deep and lasting democracy and prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean – doing so will require vision, perseverance and a team effort from all of Europe's institutions. We need to stay focussed and committed. The scale of the challenge requires a joined-up EU response – what we do on trade and mobility are as important to the overall success of our strategy as what we do on election monitoring and supporting development.

Six months on we still need to match words with delivery. That is why I believe it is time to re-energise the process.

Last May, I set out here my vision for North Africa and the Middle East – a vision of deep-rooted democracy, and the benefits of the development which will come with it.

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My priority is delivery. After the revolutions we face a growing sense of impatience and uncertainty. It is vital that we translate our good intentions into results and assistance on the ground. The process of change was never going to be easy or fast. Real change takes time and will be measured in years, not seasons. Our response – which began in our Commission Communication of 8 March – is built on the need to acknowledge past mistakes and listen without imposing. We are doing exactly that and it requires perseverance and sustained commitment. Success should translate into what I have called "deep Democracy".

Political transformation will only succeed with economic opportunity. In the short term, the uprisings were motivated by economic hardship and have made those hardships more severe. There is no single template for our support, no one size fits all approach.

We have to develop tailor made policies in response to the needs identified by each country. Engagement with Arab partners (and the Arab League in particular) is essential – "we are working with them, not at them" which is why I was a prime mover in the establishment of the Cairo Group.

But we are in a new era where dialogue between governments is not enough: success requires engagement with and between societies. Here the European Parliament is unique in what it can offer to those in search of democracy, in Tunisia and beyond, particularly now that Constituent assemblies will become the key institutional actors. Building and sustaining political parties is essential – the experience in the EP is unmatched.

In New York I participated in a high level event on women in politics. I firmly believe that the continued central role of women in the Arab Spring is a key test of the strength and extent of the changes.

Women, as well as the younger generation, were instrumental in the protests that toppled the repressive regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and they must remain central to shaping the reforms that follow. Deep and lasting democracy must be for all of the people – not just one gender.

We had an encouraging signal on Sunday from the most unexpected place, Saudi Arabia, when King Abdullah announced that women, as from next year, will be appointed to the Shura Council. They will also be able to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections in four years’ time.

Many of us would have hoped to see women voting in this Thursday’s ballot. But this decision – if properly implemented – marks an initial step in advancing women's participation in the political, economic and social life of the country.

The future of the Arab Spring depends on Tunisia and Egypt becoming success stories. What happens there as they move to elections and build a system of civil rights and democratic values, will send vital messages elsewhere.

Time is of the essence: expectations are high, and we need to see visible results.

Tomorrow I travel to Tunisia, to set up a new EU task force for that country – It takes place in a key moment to show our support, just three weeks ahead of the first truly democratic elections of 23 October. An EU Election Observation Mission is already deployed on the ground. Given the highly political nature of the event and the key contribution from the EP to support the countries in transition, I have invited a delegation from this House to join me in Tunis. I hope this will be a model for the future.

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The Task-Force will focus on some of the key issues which will have a direct impact on the lives of Tunisians: business, investment and the economy; social development and democracy.

The Task-Force is unique in bringing around the table not only our Tunisian partners but also the international financing institutions and private sector representatives. It will be the occasion to send a very strong political message with the opening of negotiations for a new privileged partnership that reflects our shared ambitions. It will be also an opportunity to better coordinate European and international efforts to focus on faster and more effective support. This tailor made approach, based on decentralized and coordinated use of all our instruments, will be then used with other countries in transition to better identify needs and accelerate support.

In Egypt, where we expect that the interim authorities will confirm soon the date for the elections, it is urgent that the ruling military council continues to engage with political representatives and civil society to get a new electoral law for the new democratic era.

The Egyptian authorities have declined European and other international offers of involvement in direct election observation, but we will be working with them on other urgent measures, through the Instrument for Stability, to enhance the capacity of Egypt's High Electoral Commission (HEC), and help judges and poll workers to manage and effectively oversee these first free and fair democratic elections in Egypt, as well as laying the basis for the organisation of future elections. I know many in this House are working to support the strengthening of political parties in Egypt and I pay tribute to their work.

In some other countries in the region, the authorities have sought to respond to calls for greater freedoms by intensifying reform processes which were already underway before the Arab Spring.

In Morocco a new Constitution was developed and approved overwhelmingly by referendum. This promises increased separation of powers and greater public accountability as well as improved respect for human rights. Now fast and sustained implementation is key.

In Jordan the Lower House endorsed on 24th September, numerous (41) constitutional amendments which included the establishment of a constitutional court and the creation of an independent commission overseeing elections. The new elections law and the political parties’ law, which should ensure genuine political pluralism, will be debated by the Parliament in October.

Implementation is essential to keep the momentum and credibility of the process: these reforms should lead to the consolidation of the institutions safeguarding democracy and the rule of law, the enhancement of the independence of the judiciary and the empowerment of the political parties.

In the case of Morocco and Jordan we will continue to build on the Advanced Status. In Morocco we are developing a new Action Plan focusing on the reform agenda. We will shortly launch a Mobility Partnership. And we will step up technical and financial cooperation. We also look to Parliament to play its part.

We want to accelerate ongoing trade negotiations and prepare mandates for deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia.

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Approval by Parliament of the EU-Morocco Agreement on Liberalization Measures on Agricultural Products, Fish and Fishery Products, will send a signal of our desire to deepen our relationship in practical ways to the benefit of both the Moroccan people and EU citizens.

Fighting continues in Sirte, Bani Walid and a few other pockets of resistance, but Libya is transitioning fast from a crisis situation to the creation of a democracy. Last week I took part in a Friends of Libya meeting in New York, where we were able to deliver a message of strong continuing commitment to the new Libya.

President Jalil has pledged to build a society based on tolerance and reconciliation and to uphold the principles of human rights. The NTC and the international community must also establish control over the large stocks of weapons amassed by the previous regime to prevent them falling into the wrong hands. All this is essential for a successful transition.

In addition to our office in Benghazi, our new EU office in Tripoli is working closely with other partners, under UN coordination, to determine the needs there.

Libya is a rich country: our know-how and technical assistance matters more than the size of our cooperation programmes. This is, I believe, also the recommendation from those of you who have visited Tripoli. Libyans want to improve trade links with Europe, and need our help to develop a civil society that deserves that name. We are already preparing projects to support civil society and women in particular.

I have also taken note of Ana Gomes' excellent suggestion to organise a visit of Libyan officials and civil society to the upcoming Spanish elections.

In Syria and Yemen we still face crisis situations.

In Syria, a brutal regime remains unwilling to listen to its people and to change. We are pursuing a double track approach: by stepping up measures designed to undermine the regime’s support and by achieving a further isolation of the Syrian leadership.

Since the beginning of unrest in mid-March, and in view of the continuing fierce campaign by the Syrian regime against its own population, we suspended our cooperation and have progressively ratcheted up sanctions including an embargo on any Syrian oil coming into the EU. Our message to the Syrian people is clear - and so was your resolution adopted last 15 September: our sanctions are designed to have maximum impact on those supporting the Syrian regime, while minimizing any potential negative impact on the Syrian population.

In Yemen, too, we have strongly supported the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has worked tirelessly in support of political agreement. This weekend saw a carefully coordinated sequence of diplomatic responses and action on the ground to President Saleh’s unexpected return on Friday, with the GCC, Arab League, EU, US and now the UN Security Council all calling for cessation of violence, and a very rapid and concrete transfer of power. No-one will be satisfied with just another open-ended promise.

We will continue to work together. I look forward to your resolution. I continue to thank the European Parliament for its support, its constructive criticism and its advice, as the EU moves forward, armed with a clear strategy in uncertain times, and hoping for real and sustained progress both in Israel and Palestine, and across North Africa and the wider Middle East. Further steps were taken in New York last week: we must work together so that we will have real cause for celebration when the UN General Assembly next convenes in September 2012.


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Parliament approves deal to boost trade with Palestinian Authority

Parliament voted today to approve a trade agreement that will help boost the Palestinian economy by enabling the West Bankand Gaza to expand exports of farm and fisheries products to the EU from early 2012.

The agreement between the EU and the Palestinian Authority grants duty-free and mostly quota-free access to the Europeanmarket for agricultural and fisheries products from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and provides access to Palestinian marketsfor some European produce.

"This agreement offers an opportunity for the Palestinian people, a first step towards the development of a nation", said EPrapporteur Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D, EL) during the debate. She emphasized that the deal complied with the rules of originand that this should ensure that the Palestinian economy will benefit fully from the expansion in trade.

MEPs believe that opening EU markets directly to Palestinian products, which have up to now been under the direct controlof the Israeli customs authorities, will help the Palestinian people expand their economy. Now that it has Parliament´sapproval, the agreement can enter into force early next year.

The Palestinian Authority is at present the EU's smallest trading partner in the Euro-Mediterranean region and one of thesmallest worldwide. Total trade amounted to EUR 56.6 million in 2009, of which EUR 50.5 million were EU exports.Imports to the EU from the Palestinian Authority amounted to EUR 6.1 million in 2009, with agricultural products making up70.1 per cent of this total. Imports rose, however, by 32.6 per cent in the first three months of 2010.

The import conditions are valid for a period of 10 years, which can be extended. In the unlikely event that Palestinian importsof agricultural products and fisheries products increase to a point at which they distort the EU's internal market, the EU canadopt safeguard measures.

European Union

27 Sep 2011


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Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton on her visit to theMiddle East region

Brussels, 14 September 2011A 358/11

"The mandate that I have to be in the region, the Middle East, this week, is to seek ways in which we can get negotiationsmoving and to find a way in which the people of Israel and the people of Palestine can live side-by-side, in peace andsecurity. To do that I've been in Cairo discussing with the Arab League how we can work with them to ensure that whateveris finally decided upon for the United Nations fits with those objectives, to bring the international community together withthe people of both Israel and Palestine in order to achieve that. I've met with the follow-up committee of the Arab PeaceInitiative, had a long discussion with the Arab League Secretary General Mr Al-Arabi, and then met with PalestinianPresident Abbas and his team to discuss with them how best we can achieve that objective, which I believe is in the bestinterests of their people. And I'm now in Israel where I met this morning with the Prime Minister and will stay longer than Iplanned, at their request, so that we can talk again this evening in order to try and further that objective. Doing all of this withour Member States, working closely with the United States, the United Nations and Russia, our partners in the Quartet, in allof that we can try to take this further forward. And I hope that in the coming days what we'll be able to achieve together willbe something that enables the negotiations to start. That is the objective of the European Union in all that we do and as I said,it is the mandate that I have."

European Union

14 Sep 2011


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The EU, Finland and Sweden contribute to the Palestinian Authority'spayment of August salaries and pensions

The European Union is making today a contribution of approximately €16.3 million to the payment of the August salaries andpensions of more than 83,000 Palestinian civil servants and pensioners in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Thiscontribution, which is channelled through the PEGASE[1] mechanism, is being funded by the European Commission (€11.0million), the Government of Finland (€1.0 million) and the Government of Sweden (SEK 40.0 million or approximately €4.3million).

"With this new monthly contribution to the salaries and pensions of the Palestinian Authority's civil servants, the EuropeanCommission, Finland and Sweden demonstrate once more their continuous support to the Palestinian public sector indelivering services to the Palestinian population. The EU trusts that all donors will deliver on their commitments to ensurethat such services will not be disturbed at this challenging time" said Acting EU Representative Mr. John Gatt-Rutter. "Thegenerous contributions from the governments of Finland and Sweden also show the confidence that these two countries havein the EU's PEGASE mechanism as a cost-effective and efficient means of supporting the Palestinian Authority in its effortsto build the institutions of the future Palestinian State."

Background

Most of the European Union's assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financialmechanism launched in 2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PAPalestinian National Plan (2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, Europeanfunds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line withthe plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, €1.16 billion have beendisbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to thePalestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.



European Union

14 Sep 2011


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Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton following heraddress at the opening of the Arab League Peace Initiative Follow-upCommittee

Brussels, 12 September 2011A 355/11

"I have been in Cairo today to speak to President Abbas and the members of the Arab Peace Initiative Committee. I addressedthe opening of the Committee meeting upon the invitation of the League of Arab States.

I paid tribute to the successful statebuilding efforts of the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of President Abbas.

My message was clear: at a time when the whole world is focusing on this issue, the EU remains strongly committed toachieving the two-state solution, with the State of Israel and the State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security.The only way to do that is through negotiations.

The discussions which will take place at the UN in New York in the coming weeks will be an opportunity to achieve this. Iwant the Middle East Quartet to play an ambitious role and the international community to maintain strong and unitedsupport."

European Union

13 Sep 2011


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European Union voices concern over situation in Al-Walaja village,Bethlehem

Al Walaja - A group of diplomats from the European Union and EU Member States visited today the village of Al Walaja,close to Bethlehem, to voice their concern over the humanitarian impact and political implications of the planned route of theseparation barrier in the village.

Representatives of the Local Council briefed the delegation on the latest developments with regards to the effects of theconstruction of the barrier, the expansion of settlements and escalating violence by settlers. Walking around the village thediplomats met residents who face enormous hardships in their everyday life and risk to be completely separated from theirwork and agricultural land when the barrier is completed.

The EU missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah issued last week a statement expressing concern that the barrier – whencompleted – will completely encircle al-Walaja and reiterated that the barrier is illegal under international law wherever builton occupied land.

The EU has been providing humanitarian support to Al Walaja through UNRWA's health and education services and alsoworks on empowering the local community and fostering local participation via a Community Development Project withOxfam UK; which was present at today's visit.

Through the EU-Oxfam project, residents have formed a community committee which advocates for local needs and acts asan intermediary between people and the different government bodies that are responsible for serving them. The project istargeting a total of six communities in the West Bank which suffer from lack of services, such as access to water andsanitation, roads, schools, and hospitals and experience particularly high unemployment and poverty levels. Many, like alWalaja, also face house demolitions or evictions and refusal from the Israeli authorities to build in their own communities.

Background: The village of Walaja, 10km south of Jerusalem in the West Bank, is one of many communities in the WestBank affected by the route of the Israeli Barrier. With construction around the village having begun, residents face the threatof destroyed livelihoods, increased poverty and dependency on humanitarian aid. Some residents face the prospect of theirhomes soon being totally encircled.

To date, just over 60 per cent of the planned 709km West Bank Barrier has been constructed by Israel. The presence of theBarrier has had a devastating economic, social and psychological effect on communities in the West Bank, and is one of themain triggers of further displacement for already vulnerable refugees. In 2005, the International Court of Justice concluded inan advisory opinion that the route of the Barrier was illegal under international law, as it deviates from the green line.

European Union

08 Sep 2011


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Local EU Statement on the planned route of the separation barrier inthe village of Al-Walaja

The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah are deeply concerned by the humanitarian impact and political implications ofthe planned route of the separation barrier in the village of Al-Walaja, a Palestinian village situated between Jerusalem andBethlehem. The barrier, when completed, will completely encircle Al-Walaja, leaving a single access road connecting thevillage with the rest of the West Bank. The planned route of the barrier deviates from the Green Line to incorporate thesettlements of Gilo and Har Gilo. Moreover, the barrier will cut off much of the village's land, preventing many residentsfrom accessing their land, including agricultural land. The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah reiterate that the barrier isillegal under international law wherever built on occupied land."

European Union

02 Sep 2011


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The EU provides further contribution to the UN Relief and WorksAgency for Palestine Refugees

Brussels, 01 September 2011 - Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-Presidentof the European Commission, and Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy signed today inBrussels a Joint Declaration on EU support to UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the period2011-2013 with Commissioner General of UNRWA Filippo Grandi. At the same time they also signed two ContributionAgreements for a total of €45 million.

“UNRWA is a key partner organization for the European Union in the Middle East. The principal objective of the EU’ssupport to Palestine refugees is to ensure that their essential humanitarian and development needs are met until there is a just,fair and agreed solution to the refugee question. In the meantime it is essential that UNRWA is able to maintain the level ofthe basic services it provides," said Catherine Ashton.

"The EU understands the major problems UNRWA is facing in obtaining the funds necessary to provide the most basic vitalservices to the Palestinian refugee population. In recognition of the excellent work carried out by UNRWA we have made asignificant effort to increase our contribution to their core budget this year," said Commissioner Füle.

On behalf of Palestine refugees Filippo Grandi expressed gratitude to the EU for its renewed multiyear commitment toPalestine refugees and UNRWA and, for its contribution this year which is particularly important at a time of significantchanges in the region.

Through the signature of multi-year Joint Declarations with UNRWA, the EU gives an indication of its support toUNRWA’s General Fund, thus underpinning UNRWA’s ability to provide essential core services to Palestine refugees. TheEU’s indicative contribution to UNRWA's General Fund in 2011-2013 would be around €80 million a year, subject tobudgetary allocations.

The first of the two Contribution Agreements signed today, for €40 million, represents a further contribution to UNRWA'sGeneral Fund on top of a Contribution Agreement for the same amount signed earlier this year. The second, for an amount of€5 million, is specifically dedicated to Food Security and is designed to enable the organisation to provide nutrition for thepoorest and most vulnerable refugees.

The EU and its Member States are the biggest donors to UNRWA. Together with humanitarian aid and support from theInstrument for Stability, the EU contribution for 2011 now stands at €125 million. Indeed between 2000 and 2010 the EUprovided more than €1.2 billion in support to the Agency.

Background

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established inDecember 1949. Its mission then was to provide humanitarian relief for the refugees and displaced persons forced to flee theirhomes in Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Today, the Agency is the largest UN operation in the Middle East, withover 30,000 employees, almost all of them refugees themselves.

UNRWA is unique because it has maintained this commitment to just one group of people, spanning four generations. Today,UNRWA provides assistance to nearly 5 million Palestinian refugees in the West Bank & Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon andSyria.

UNRWA’s assistance goes far beyond basic material support. By enabling refugee families and their children to attendschool, to receive medical attention and to survive economically, UNRWA keeps alive the values of humanity, solidarity anddignity. In its Medium Term Strategy (2010-2015), UNRWA reaffirmed its willingness to continue this good work into thefuture.

European Union

01 Sep 2011


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High Representative Catherine Ashton concludes her visit in Israel

Brussels, 29 August 2011 A 337/11

Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission,has today concluded her visit to Israel. On Sunday she has met with President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Kadima Chairwoman Tzipi Livni, while today she had a meeting with ForeignMinister and Deputy PM Avigdor Liberman.

"I came to Israel to discuss how we move forward with peace negotiations. I believe the changes we witnessed in theneighbourhood, changes in countries around Israel, give even more momentum to the need to try and find solution that willenable the people of Israel and the people of Palestine to live in peace and security together. We have a real opportunity tosee what more can be done to take this forward and find ways in which both countries could find the future together," saidCatherine Ashton of her visit to Israel.

"Israel has seen violence in the last days and the EU has condemned these acts of terrorism," she also said. "The security ofthe people of Israel is a top priority for the EU and negotiations are the best way forward to find a lasting solution to theconflict that ensures that two states live in peace and security."

Catherine Ashton repeated the call for the immediate release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was celebrating his 25thbirthday on Sunday. "Gilad Shalit is still in captivity. I share the desire to see him home long before his next birthday. Mythoughts are with his parents," said Catherine Ashton.

High Representative Ashton came to Israel from the visit to occupied Palestinian authority and will end her travel to theMiddle East on Monday with the visit to Jordan.

European Union

30 Aug 2011


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Japan and the European Union support the 6th payment of the PA's"Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" programme

PR/20/2011

The Japanese Government and the European Union have made a contribution of over €1.7 million (c. US$ 2.5 million) to thesixth payment under the Palestinian Authority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" (PSRG) programme. Thisprogramme is the first large-scale initiative in support of the private sector in the Gaza Strip. The Japanese and Europeancontributions (c. €1.2 million and c. €0.5 million respectively) are both being channelled through PEGASE[1], the EuropeanUnion's mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) established the PSRG programme in the aftermath of Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" toprovide financial support to private sector businesses that were destroyed or damaged. It targets businesses that need torestore damaged assets necessary for their activities - funded items include machinery, office furniture and equipment, as wellas building and business premise material. The ultimate objective is to revitalize the economic activity in Gaza and providefor sustainable livelihoods for its people.

The European Union committed €22 million to PSRG at the end of 2009. In March 2011, the Japanese Governmentcommitted an additional €6.2 million to the programme, which was publicly announced in the presence of PA Prime MinisterFayyad, the Representative of Japan Naofumi Hashimoto and EU Representative Christian Berger in May 2011. Bothcontributions are being channelled through the European Union's financing mechanism PEGASE, which is open to all donorsand has been used by a number of European states. Japan is the first non-European donor to channel contributions to a PAprogramme through PEGASE.

The sixth PSRG disbursement, which will be covered with both Japanese and European Union funds, amounts to more than€1.7 million (c. US$ 2.5 million) and will benefit 32 claims by Gaza businesses that will receive second and third instalmentsof their total PSRG entitlements. It follows five earlier payments under PSRG that took place in July 2010, September 2010,January 2011, June 2011, and August 2011, which benefited almost 660 eligible claims and amounted to c. €13.2 million.Further payments are expected to take place under the PSRG programme in 2011.

Background

Most of the European Union's assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financialmechanism launched in 2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PAPalestinian National Plan (2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, Europeanfunds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line withthe plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, €1.14 billion have beendisbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to thePalestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.

Japan’s assistance to the PA is extended in a kind of budget support or based on the specific development projects. Japan hasbeen supporting financially and technically economic development efforts exerted by key ministries, to help prepare the PAfor statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Japan has also providedassistance through UNRWA and other UN agencies including humanitarian assistance, as well as to local NGOs and localcouncils for their grassroots development projects. Japan’s assistance exceeds US$ 1.19 billion in total since 1993, includingaround US$ 100 million extended in Japan’s fiscal year 2010.



Contacts:The Office of the European Union Representative:Antonia Zafeiri: 02 5415 859, 0548 024 915; Shadi Othman: 02 5415 867, 0599 673 958

Representative Office of Japan to the Palestinian Authority:

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Keiko Honda: 050 5503832; Nezar Marouf Abdelfattah: 02 241 3120/1

European Union

Government of Japan

29 Aug 2011

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We met some errors and the attached PDF couldn't be included in this report. Please download at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F_Rep_2.pdf.


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EU High Representative Catherine Ashton meets Palestinian leadersand lays first stone for security complex in Jenin

Brussels, 28 August 2011 A 336/11

Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission,has today concluded her visit to occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) by laying the ceremonial first stone for construction ofSecurity Compound (Muqata) in Jenin, West Bank, together with Prime Minister Fayyad.

"The Security Compound in Jenin will contribute importantly to the rule of law and security of the people. As a project itdemonstrates the significance of the work going on every day to build the Palestinian state and provide for people. I wouldlike to pay tribute to Prime Minister Fayyad for his amazing work to build the institutions of a state," said Catherine Ashtonat the stone laying ceremony for the construction of the Security Compound, which the European Union is cofinancing with9.24 million euro as part of the wider contribution to security sector reform of the Palestinian Authority.

The EU has currently ongoing activities of over 40 million euros in support of improved Palestinian Rule of Law, includinginfrastructure, capacity building to different judicial institutions, support to Palestinian Civil Police as well as civil societyactive in the field of human rights and security. The Security Compound in Jenin, due to be built by 2013, will house theGeneral Commander, the Brigadier, the National Guard Service and the Police.

During her two-day visit to oPt the High Representative met President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad aswell as Hanan Ashrawi, Member of the PLO Executive Committee. She also met with the Norwegian Foreign Minister JonasGahr Støre, who is travelling in the region.

"I came to the region to continue deliberations with the Palestinians and the Israelis on the Middle East Peace Process. WithPresident Abbas and PM Fayyad I discussed the future of the Palestinian people and my desire to see the peace negotiationsrestarted and for them to reach a satisfactory conclusion," said Catherine Ashton after her meetings in Ramallah.

From oPt Catherine Ashton will today travel to Israel where she will meet with President Shimon Peres, Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Ehud Barak, Foreign Minister and Deputy PM Avigdor Liberman and KadimaChairwoman Tzipi Livni.EUHR Ashton will end her travel to the Middle East on Monday with the visit to Jordan.

The coverage of the trip is available on the Europe by Satellite.

FOR FURTHER DETAILS:Michael Mann +32 498 999 780 - +32 2 299 97 80 - [email protected] Kocijancic +32 498 984 425 - +32 2 298 65 70 - [email protected]@ec.europa.euwww.eeas.europa.eu

European Union

29 Aug 2011


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Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the terroristattacks in Israel


"I have learned with deep concern of the series of terrorist attacks that has taken place in Southern Israel today, includingagainst civilian targets, and in which several Israelis are reported to have lost their lives and many more to have been injured.I condemn unreservedly all such acts of terror, extend my condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in theseattacks and express my wishes for a full and speedy recovery to the injured."

European Union

20 Aug 2011


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Local EU Statement on the closure extension of the Orient House andthe Chamber of Commerce of East Jerusalem

The EU missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah deeply regret the recent Israeli decision extending once again the closure orderagainst the Orient House and the Chamber of Commerce of East Jerusalem. These institutions have now been closed for tenyears. The EU firmly believes that these institutions should be allowed to re-open and resume their operations as focal pointsfor Palestinians in East Jerusalem, as required under the Roadmap. The EU urges Israel to reconsider the closure and to fullyreview its decision.

END

For media enquiries please contact:

EU Press Office on +972-2-541 5888

European Union

17 Aug 2011

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Jerusalem, 17 August 2011

Local EU Statement on the closure extension of the Orient House and the Chamber of Commerce of East Jerusalem

The EU missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah deeply regret the recent Israeli

decision extending once again the closure order against the Orient House

and the Chamber of Commerce of East Jerusalem. These institutions have

now been closed for ten years. The EU firmly believes that these institutions

should be allowed to re-open and resume their operations as focal points for

Palestinians in East Jerusalem, as required under the Roadmap. The EU urges

Israel to reconsider the closure and to fully review its decision.

END For media enquiries please contact: EU Press Office on +972-2-541 5888


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Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlementexpansion in the West Bank

A 319/11


"I deeply regret the announcement indicating that over 200 building permits were granted on Monday for housing units to belocated in the West Bank Settlement of Ariel.

This is the third time since the beginning of August that the Israeli Government has approved settlement expansion in theWest Bank, including in East Jerusalem.

Parties must do their utmost to avoid acts on the ground which undermine confidence. It is in their interest not to derailcurrent efforts to resume direct negotiations. All settlement activities are illegal under international law and threaten theviability of an agreed two-state solution."

European Union

17 Aug 2011

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P R E S S




www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 17 August 2011

A 319/11


on settlement expansion in the West Bank



"I deeply regret the announcement indicating that over 200 building permits were

granted on Monday for housing units to be located in the West Bank Settlement of Ariel.

This is the third time since the beginning of August that the Israeli Government has

approved settlement expansion in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem.

Parties must do their utmost to avoid acts on the ground which undermine confidence. It

is in their interest not to derail current efforts to resume direct negotiations. All

settlement activities are illegal under international law and threaten the viability of an

agreed two-state solution."

_______________


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Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on SettlementExpansion in East Jerusalem

A 318/11


"It is with deep regret that, once again, I received information of the publicly stated intention of the Israeli government tocontinue settlement expansion in East Jerusalem.

The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to end all settlement activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle outpostserected since March 2001.

Settlement activity threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution and undermines ongoing efforts to resumenegotiations."

European Union

12 Aug 2011

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P R E S S




www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 12 August 2011

A 318/11


on Settlement Expansion in East Jerusalem



"It is with deep regret that, once again, I received information of the publicly stated intention of the

Israeli government to continue settlement expansion in East Jerusalem.


to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001.

Settlement activity threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution and undermines on-

going efforts to resume negotiations."

_______________


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Japan supports the 5th payment of PA's "Private SectorReconstruction in Gaza" programme through EU's PEGASEmechanism

PR/19/2011

Jerusalem: The Japanese Government has contributed over €1.1 million (c. US$ 1.6 million), out of a total package of €6.2million, to the fifth payment under the Palestinian Authority's "Private Sector Reconstruction in Gaza" (PSRG) programme.This programme is the first large-scale initiative in support of the private sector in the Gaza Strip. The Japanese contributionis being channelled through PEGASE[1], the European Union's mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) established the PSRG programme in the aftermath of Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" toprovide financial support to private sector businesses that were destroyed or damaged during that Operation. It targetsbusinesses that need to restore damaged assets necessary for their activities - funded items include machinery, office furnitureand equipment, as well as building and business premise material. The ultimate objective is to revitalize the economic activityin Gaza and provide for sustainable livelihoods for its people.

The European Union committed €22 million to PSRG at the end of 2009. In March 2011, the Japanese Governmentcommitted an additional €6.2 million to the programme. Both contributions are being channelled through the EuropeanUnion's financing mechanism PEGASE, which is open to all donors and has been used by a number of European states. Japanis the first non-European donor to channel contributions to a PA programme through PEGASE.

The fifth PSRG disbursement, which will be covered entirely with Japanese funds, amounts to over €1.1 million (c. US$ 1.6million) and will benefit 21 claims by Gaza businesses that will receive second and third instalments of their total PSRGentitlements. It follows four earlier payments under PSRG that took place in July 2010, September 2010, January 2011 andJune 2011, which benefited almost 660 eligible claims and amounted to c.€12.2 million (USD 16.1 million). Furtherpayments are expected to take place under the PSRG programme in 2011.

Background


Japan’s assistance to the PA is extended in a kind of budget support or based on the specific development projects. Japan hasbeen supporting financially and technically economic development efforts exerted by key ministries, to help prepare the PAfor statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Japan has also providedassistance through UNRWA and other UN agencies including humanitarian assistance, as well as to local NGOs and localcouncils for their grassroots development projects. Japan’s assistance exceeds USD 1.21 billion in total since 1993, includingaround USD 100 million extended in Japan’s fiscal year 2010.



Contacts:

The Office of the European Union Representative:

Antonia Zafeiri, 02 5415 859, 0548 024 915 & Shadi Othman: 02 5415 867, 0599 673 958

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Representative Office of Japan to the Palestinian Authority:

Hideaki Yamamoto (Deputy Rep.): 0545 428 103, Nezar Marouf: 02 241 3120/1

European Union

11 Aug 2011


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Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on settlementexpansion in East Jerusalem

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Commission Vice President issued the followingstatement today:

“I have been following the situation in East Jerusalem with concern and I am profoundly disappointed by yesterday’sapproval of more than 900 housing units in the settlement of Har Homa in East Jerusalem. The EU has repeatedly urged theGovernment of Israel to immediately end all settlement activities in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. Allsettlement activities are illegal under international law.

This further expansion of settlements is particularly regrettable at a time when the EU, together with its international partnersand the parties, is striving to create a credible perspective to relaunch negotiations, leading to a just and durable solution tothe conflict. Continued settlement activity undermines trust between the parties and efforts to resume negotiations. This isespecially true with regard to Jerusalem.

I believe there can be no sustainable peace in the Middle East without a two-state solution with the State of Israel and a viableand contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security. Settlement activity damages this prospect.”

European Union

05 Aug 2011


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The EU continues its support to the Palestinian Authority: €22.5 millionto the payment of July salaries and pensions

Today, the European Union (EU) is contributing €22.5 million (around NIS 110 million) to help the Palestinian Authority paythe July salaries and pensions of almost 83,000 Palestinian public service providers and pensioners. This contribution ischannelled through PEGASE, the European mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The €22.5 million contribution comes from the overall €145 million financial package in direct support to the PalestinianAuthority budget of 2011, which the European Union agreed to frontload at the request of Prime Minister Fayyad in order tomeet the Palestinian Authority's urgent financial needs and to respect the EU's commitment to being a regular and reliabledonor.

"This is a clear message of our solid commitment toward the Palestinian people at this critical time" said Christian Berger, theEU Representative. "We join our voice to PM Fayyad and call on other donors to respect and fulfil their commitments to thePA to ensure that the Palestinian people will continue to receive the essential services and the progress that been achieved bythe Palestinian Authority so far is sustained."

Background Most of the European Union's assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, thefinancial mechanism launched in 2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PAPalestinian National Plan (2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, Europeanfunds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line withthe plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, €1.12 billion have beendisbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to thePalestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.


Contact:

The Office of the European Union Representative, West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA Antonia Zafeiri, Tel: +972 (0) 25415 859 , Mob: +972 (0) 548 024 915Shadi Othman, Tel: +972 (0) 2 541 5867 , Mob: +972 (0) 599 673 958

European Union

02 Aug 2011


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Remarks by the High Representative Catherine Ashton at the pressconference following the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 18 July

Brussels, 18 July 2011A 288/11

Today we began our discussions with the Middle East Peace Process and I was able to debrief Member States on thediscussions at the Quartet. From there we had an opportunity to talk about the issues that lie before us in the Middle East andespecially my strong desire to see the two parties return as quickly as possible to talks and to get those moving as quickly aswe possibly can.

We then talked about the report I have put before Member States on CSDP, Common Security and Defence Policy. This is areal opportunity to try and fulfil what the Lisbon Treaty is all about - which is to bring together the different ways in whichEurope operates in the world and to put a framework around that.

I often give the example of what we are doing off the coast of Somalia in support of the World Food Programme. We areensuring that 12 million people are able to get food, by protecting shipping against piracy and joining the international effortsto make sure that trade routes are kept open and people are kept safe.

European Union

19 Jul 2011

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P R E S S




[email protected] www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 18 July 2011

A 288/11

Remarks by the High Representative Catherine Ashton at the

press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council,

Brussels, 18 July

Today we began our discussions with the Middle East Peace Process and I was able to debrief

Member States on the discussions at the Quartet. From there we had an opportunity to talk about the

issues that lie before us in the Middle East and especially my strong desire to see the two parties

return as quickly as possible to talks and to get those moving as quickly as we possibly can.

We then talked about the report I have put before Member States on CSDP, Common Security and

Defence Policy. This is a real opportunity to try and fulfil what the Lisbon Treaty is all about -

which is to bring together the different ways in which Europe operates in the world and to put a

framework around that.

I often give the example of what we are doing off the coast of Somalia in support of the World Food

Programme. We are ensuring that 12 million people are able to get food, by protecting shipping

against piracy and joining the international efforts to make sure that trade routes are kept open and

people are kept safe.

That is part of a much bigger plan to try and support the development in Somalia, with all the

challenges that we are well aware of, and to work collaboratively with other nations beyond the

European Union, not least in those states that surround Somalia who are able to offer that kind of

support.

I use that example to describe the work we need to do to make sure that our missions fit into a

broader strategy and a broader plan as part of what Lisbon was all about, to make things fit together.

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2

EN

In that connection, this morning before the Council began, I went to see the new EU Situation

Room which itself is bringing together different ways in which we monitor crisis, we support our

missions and delegations. We have got a new and better operation and I am pleased to say at no

extra cost, all being done within existing resources.

We also talked today about the Southern Neighbourhood and our growing concern regarding the

situation in Syria. We all had hopes that the national dialogue could bring the opposition on board

and lead to real and fulfilling conversations. That does not appear to have happened. As you know,

we have continued to look at sanctions, the kind of pressure to put on Syria. We also had the Syrian

ambassador come and see the EEAS last week because of our concerns of what was happening with

embassies in Syria, not least the embassy of France.

We talked as well about Libya. We had the Contact Group meeting on Friday in Istanbul and the

focus of that meeting was about how we deal with a post-conflict Libya, what we do on Day One

and how we make sure that the international community works together.

For my part I have been engaged in working with the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab

League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference - what we call the Cairo Group - to try and

develop that work. Last week I also had conversations in Washington with the United States and

with Turkey.

This is all under the umbrella of the United Nations and the Special Representative al-Khatib. We

want to make sure that the UN, in pursuit of Resolution 1973, is making headway in thinking

through the planning that will need to take place. And that builds on my visit to Benghazi and the

opening of the EU office there.

Then we talked about the importance of stability in Egypt and Tunisia and the need to move

forward on both the political side, helping to support the elections, helping to support the building

of the political process - what I keep calling 'deep democracy' - and also the economic issues that

confront the neighbourhood, particularly in the context of the Neighbourhood Policy that I have put

together with Stefan Füle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy.

Over lunch, we talked about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I was pleased to invite Secretary General

of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen to join us for that discussion. This is part of the EU-NATO

cooperation that goes on all the time. It was important to have him participating in a discussion on

how the EU can move forward in support of the people of Afghanistan and support of the people of

Pakistan.

You will know that that covers a number of different elements. We discussed the importance of our

police mission in Afghanistan, the importance and significance of supporting the development of

police service for civilian use in Afghanistan and development projects. Andris Piebalgs has just

returned from the region and was able to update us on that. And on Pakistan, we discussed our

continuous desire to see ways in which we can support them through trade and through the

economy, so significant after the floods they suffered last year.

__________________


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Council conclusions on Middle East Peace process

3106th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 18 July 2011


"The EU continues to believe that urgent progress is needed towards a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.The EU reiterates its concern at the continuing stalemate in the Peace Process and calls on the parties to show the highestsense of responsibility and to resume direct and substantive talks.

The EU stresses the central role of the Quartet and fully supports the High Representative in her continued efforts for theQuartet to create a credible perspective for the re-launching of the peace process.

The EU has set out and will continue to promote actively its position with regard to parameters as contained in CouncilConclusions of December 2009, December 2010 and May 2011."

PRESSRue de la Loi 175 B – 1048 BRUSSELS Tel.: +32(0)2 281 8239 / 6319 Fax: +32(0)2 281 [email protected] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/Newsroom

European Union

19 Jul 2011


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PCP and EUPOL COPPS conclude pilot Human Rights TrainingProgram

The Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) and EUPOL COPPS concluded today, 14 July, a six-day pilot Human Rights TrainingProgram for 23 police officers, which was held in Jericho.

Throughout the program, a strong emphasis was placed on participatory and interactive training techniques with eachafternoon session being devoted to exercises where the practical application of Human Rights provisions for operationalpolice officers was underlined. These practical exercises were conducted in the new scenario-training houses at the JerichoPolice Training Centre in order to test these houses as training facilities.

The trainees displayed great openness and frankness while discussing the various Human Rights themes covered by thisprogramme. Although there can at times be some resistance to Human Rights principles at the beginning of such programs,the trainees were clearly showing more acceptance of Human Rights concepts as the days progressed. The trainees also saidthat they felt the Human Rights program was wholly comprehensive, covering all the main Human Rights priority topics ofsignificance for the PCP.

Lt. Col. Abdul Hakim ABURRUB, Deputy Director of the PCP’s Training Department, attended the final day of the coursealong with EUPOL COPPS’ Deputy Head of Mission, Jesper FRIEDRICHSEN, handing out the graduation certificates.

ABURRUB addressed the trainees in a graduation ceremony highlighting that: “We pay special attention to this coursebecause it enhances the experience of the police in the field”. He also added that: “I wish that all of you will implement whatyou have got from this course on the ground, which goes in line with the Palestinian law”.

This pilot training program was coordinated by EUPOL COPPS Human Rights expert, Diane HALLEY, and counted on theparticipation of all the members of the PCP human rights training working group, in addition to other local human rightsexperts who gave lectures on human rights values and procedures that need to be strictly followed in police work.

Alongside the PCP, various local Palestinian Human Rights organization representatives participated in the six-day programas trainers, belonging to the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre forSupport to Victims of Torture, the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, the UN Office of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights, the National Commission for the Disabled and Defence for Children International.

This Human Rights police training program focused on such priority Human Rights topics as the Torture/Ill-treatmentprohibition, Gender/Domestic Violence, gender and Prisoner/Detainee Rights, among other themes. Participants pledged toimplement what they have learnt in their day-to-day police work.

European Union

14 Jul 2011


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EU launches mapping study on Civil Society Organizations in theoccupied Palestinian territory

Yesterday in the Red Crescent Society Halls in Ramallah, the EU released its study on Civil Society Organisations (CSO) inthe occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). The report aims to provide a comprehensive overview of CSOs in the oPt, includingtheir capacity-building needs and recommendations for possible intervention areas to be supported by forthcomingcooperation programmes.

The launch was attended by representatives of the donor community and local organizations. In the opening speech, MsFabienne Bessonne, Head of the Social Affairs section of the EU Representative's Office said: "This study does not only mapthe civil society in the oPt but also puts the civil society on the map for its critical impact at all levels of society and in a widerange of sectors. "

A presentation highlighting the main findings and recommendations was given by Mr. Jamal Atamneh, the Civil SocietyExpert of SOGES. Mr. Atamneh noted that the civil society organisations in the oPt appear to be a wide and vibrant set ofactors, managing a large variety of activities (over 90% of social services in the oPt are managed by CSOs). CSOs appear towork in all sectors, maintain the most precious of Palestinian human resources and hold an important reservoir of informationand knowledge, constituting a main bridge between the oPt and the rest of the world.

Nonetheless, there are a number of concerns and issues that CSOs in the oPt have to face which include – inter alia - : anunclear relation with the political field, the permanent condition of insecurity and emergency due to the political situation, theexclusive focus on service delivery, the lack of a common voice of Palestinian civil society and the lack of recognition ofcivil society out of the NGOs.

Background:

The study was completed in June 2011 and a total of 262 CSOs (including Community Based Organizations, NGOs,Charitable Societies, coalitions and platforms) were consulted so as to have an adequate representation of the dynamics andprocesses characterising Palestinian civil society at the national and local levels. The overall objective of the study is tostrengthen the position of civil society in public debate and to further the implementation of development strategies,complementing the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions. The study reflects some specific issues that emerge whendealing with East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

European Union

14 Jul 2011

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Final Report Page 1 of 99

FRAMEWORK CONTRACT COMMISSION 2007 Lot Nr 4 Contract Nr 2010/254278

Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the occupied Palestinian territory

Final Report

May 2011

Experts Gianfrancesco Costantini

Jamal Atamneh Khaled Ayesh

Feda Al Husseini

This Project is funded by the European Commission Project implemented by

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The content of this report is the sole responsibility of the authors and should in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

For further information on the EC thematic programmes in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), please visit the following websites:

European Union Representative Office the West Bank and Gaza:

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm

EuropeAID page on oPt:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/occupied-palestinian-territory_en.htm

An electronic version of the Mapping Study can be downloaded from the following link: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... 7

1. Background: Institutional Framework and Objectives ............................................................... 12

2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework ............................................................................. 13

2.1. Theoretical framework of the study................................................................................... 13

2.2. Methodological framework of the study ........................................................................... 14

2.3. An overview of the primary sources of information .......................................................... 16

2.4. An overview of the secondary sources of information ...................................................... 18

2.5. Problems and challenges .................................................................................................... 19

3. The Context ................................................................................................................................ 20

3.1. A diachronic view ............................................................................................................... 20

3.2. The legal framework........................................................................................................... 23

4. Main Issues and Stakes for Palestinian Civil Society................................................................... 28

4.1. A general perspective ......................................................................................................... 28

4.2. The issues and stakes arising in East Jerusalem and in Gaza ............................................. 31

5. An Analytical View of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations .................................................... 35

5.1. First level organisations ...................................................................................................... 36

5.2. Second level organisations ................................................................................................. 46

5.3. Third level organisations .................................................................................................... 63

5.4. Fourth level organisations .................................................................................................. 66

6. The Resources for Supporting CSOs ........................................................................................... 68

6.1. The EU ................................................................................................................................ 68

6.2. European donors ................................................................................................................ 70

6.3. Other donors ...................................................................................................................... 74

6.4. International NGOs............................................................................................................. 75

6.5. Further resources ............................................................................................................... 77

7. Operational Recommendations.................................................................................................. 78

7.1. A general strategy for supporting CSOs ............................................................................. 78

7.2. Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 79

7.3. The cooperation with stakeholders ................................................................................... 81

7.4. Making the most of available resources ............................................................................ 81

7.5. Opportunities and options ................................................................................................. 82

7.6. Priorities for sector based intervention ............................................................................. 85

Annex 1 – Bibliographical and documentary references .................................................................... 89

Annex 2 – Met 2nd level Civil Society Organisations .......................................................................... 95

Annex 3 – Organisations Participating in the Focus Group Meetings................................................. 97

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ACRONYMS

ADA Austrian Development Agency

Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association

Al Haq Al Haq Institute

Al Mezan Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights

Al Tareeq The Palestinian Institution for Development and Democracy

AMAN Coalition for Integrity and Accountability

ARIJ Applied Research Institute

ATTA Aid to the Aged Services

BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights

BDS Campaign for Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel

BISAN Centre for Research and Development

CAC Community Action Centre

CBO Community Based Organisation

CSO Civil Society Organisation

Data Applied Studies and Research Institution Society

DCI Defence for Children International – Palestine Section

DED German Development Service

DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development

EC European Commission

ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid

ECRC Early Childhood Resource Centre

ELCJHL Evangelical Lutheran Church in Jordan and the Holy Land

ESCS The Elderly Supportive Community Services Society

EU European Union

Euromed Euro-Mediterranean

FOEME Friends of the Earth Middle East

FSD Social and Development Fund

GCMHP Gaza Community Mental Health Program

GCRC General Commission for Regulating Cooperatives

GTZ German Development Agency

HDIP Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute

HR/GG Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat

Hurryyat Centre for Defence of Liberties and Civil Rights

HWC Health Work Committees

HWC Health Work Committees

ICB International Centre of Bethlehem

ICCO Inter-church Organisation for Development Cooperation

ICP Institute of Community Partnership

IEPALA Instituto de Estudios Politicos para America Latina y Africa

INGOs International Non Governmental Organisations

IO International Organisations

IPCRI Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information

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IPPC International Peace and Cooperation Centre

LFC Fund for Local Cooperation

MA’AN MA’AN Development Centre

MAS Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute

Masader Masader Web Portal set up by the NGO Development Centre

MIFTAH Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy

MIP Micro Intervention Programme

MUSAWA Palestinian Centre for the Independence of Judiciary and Legal Profession

Muwatin Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy

NDC NGO Development Centre

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

NORAD Norwegian Aid Agency

NORWAC Norwegian Aid Committee

NPA Norwegian People’s Aid

NSA Non State Actors

OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

oPt occupied Palestinian territory

PA Palestinian Authority

PalVision Palestinian Vision

PANORAMA Panorama Centre for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community

Development

PAP UN Programme for supporting the Palestinian People

PARC Palestinian Agricultural Development Association – Palestinian Agriculture Relief

Committees

PASSIA Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

PCC Palestinian Counselling Centre

PCHR Palestinian Centre for Human Rights

PENGON Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network

PFPPA Palestinian Family Planning & Protection Association

PFU Palestinian Farmers Union

PLC Palestinian Legislative Council

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PNA Palestinian National Authority

PNCR Palestinian Network for Children Rights

PNGO IV World Bank “Palestinian NGO Project IV”

PNGO Palestinian NGO Network

PNIN Palestinian National Institute of NGOs

POGAR Programme on Governance in the Arab Region

PPC Palestinian Peace Coalition

PYALARA Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation

REEF REEF Finance - Rural Microfinance

SAWA All the Women Together Today and Tomorrow

SDC Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation

SFCG Search for Common Ground

Sharek Sharek Youth Forum

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency

TIRI TIRI Make Integrity Work

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TRC Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture

UAWC Union of Agricultural Work Committees

UHCC Union of Health Care Committees

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNIFEM United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

USAID United States Agency for International Development

US United States of America

WA Welfare Association

WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene

WEDO Water and Environmental Development Organization

WHO World Health Organisation

WWW World Wide Web

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Executive Summary

1. Introduction and methodological framework In January 2011, the Office of the EU Representative in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) launched the Mapping Study on Civil Society Organisations in the oPt. The study aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of CSOs in the oPt, including their capacity-building needs and recommendations for possible intervention areas to be supported by forthcoming cooperation programmes. The study was finalized in May 2011. The geographic scope of the study included the entire oPt: the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. A total of 262 CSOs were consulted so as to have an adequate representation of the dynamics and processes characterising Palestinian civil society at the national and local levels. Of these organisations:

87 were met with and involved in interviews (49 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 38 in the Gaza Strip) and also filled out questionnaires; thus, different tools for the collection of information were administered to these organisations with the aim of obtaining information on different features of the organisation and also for the aim of crosschecking gathered information.

100 participated in focus groups (73 in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 27 in the Gaza Strip) and filled out questionnaires, as per the above description. These organisations were studied using two different tools for the collection of information.

75 CSOs only filled out questionnaires. Moreover, among these CSOs, 68 participated in feedback meetings and seminars, held in Ramallah and Gaza. The feedback meetings and seminars served as a further tool for verifying the study findings.

2. The main issues and stakes for the Palestinian civil society A peculiar characteristic of Palestinian civil society organisations is the fact that – unlike most civil societies and against the concept of civil society itself – most of the CSOs were created out of an established “state framework.” As many authors point out, most organisations emerged and developed in the absence of the state, the absence of national independence, the absence of sovereignty over land and the absence of citizenship. Following the creation of the Palestinian National Authority this situation changed, as also remarked by the promulgation of the “Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organisations” in 2000. In the last decade, a process of concentration of CSOs on service delivery activities became apparent, while their engagement in the policy arena was often marked by difficulties, also if in specific cases policy dialogue and the engagement of CSOs in local governance improved. At first glance, civil society organisations in the oPt appear as a wide and vibrant set of actors, managing a large variety of activities (over 90% of social services in the oPt are managed by CSOs), working in all sectors, maintaining the most precious of Palestinian human resources and a most important reservoir of information and knowledge, constituting a main bridge between the oPt and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, CSOs in the oPt face an important set of issues and are somehow actors in a risk situation, namely:

an unclear relation with politics and the need to find a new and specific role in the process of political transformation and state building which is under course in the oPt;

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the exclusive focus on service delivery, which implies for Palestinian civil society the risk to completely leave the policy arena, the risk of competing with the public authorities in service provision and the risk of being relegated into the peripheral space of the provision of services to the so-called “special groups” i.e. the poor and destitute, persons with disabilities, etc.;

the permanent condition of insecurity and emergency created by the Israeli occupation and the periodic armed clashes in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, which also generates divide within the Palestinian civil society;

the lack of a common voice of Palestinian civil society, despite the long experience, the great number of organisations, the accumulated knowledge assets and the economic dimension of civil society activities in the oPt;

the lack of recognition of civil society out of the NGOs and a limited recognition of grassroots organisations and the tendency of most NGOs to lose their linkages with communities and original constituencies;

the increasing tendency towards the emergence of competition and conflicts among CSOs, with a decreasing effectiveness in the use of available resources;

the inadequacy of internal governance, accountability and transparency, and the persistence of non-democratic practices within CSOs, which results in limited public trust and mobilization capacity.

Some specific issues emerge when dealing with East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The special context of East Jerusalem produces a two-fold set of challenges for civil society organisations. On the one side, their legitimate existence and activity are at risk; while on the other side the increasing social exclusion conditions create a growing demand for services and for human rights protection activities. The siege situation of Gaza seriously affects the CSOs. There is a decrease of trust among the organisations, with constituencies and with political authorities. There is also little space for political dialogue and participation in governance, a lack of access for qualified human resources, equipment and materials, and a dependency on external donors and resources. Despite all this, CSOs are sometime assuming a role of change catalysts, fostering technological innovation and social change concerning gender and age, supporting active social integration of underprivileged groups, mitigating and reducing the long-term and structural effects of the “closure” of social space, supporting access to information and knowledge.

3. An analytical view of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations Palestinian CSOs were analysed in reference to four different organisational levels. As summarized below, for each level specific capacity building needs were identified. For first level organisations (which include grassroots groups and the different categories of CBOs):

Individual capacity and skill-building needs emerge regarding “needs analysis”, project management, policy monitoring and for the construction of a recognized “volunteer profile” for activists.

Organisational capacity needs particularly concerning the definition and strengthening of the organisation identities, the management of relations and negotiation with local authorities; the raising and management of local resources; the monitoring of services and processes in the communities and at the local level.

Context and institutional environment-related needs concern: the recognition of local CBOs as actors and not as simple beneficiaries or project implementing agencies, the strengthening and

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reconstruction of CBOs relationships with communities, the recognition of CBOs at the local level by local authorities without passing for the registration process, construction of space for dialogue on development policy at the community/local level involving CBOs and local authorities.

For second level organisations (that comprise NGOs and other intermediary organisations):

Individual capacity and skill-building needs emerge regarding project design and management, policy analysis, the civil society role in governance, and fund raising.

Organisational capacity needs particularly concerning the organisational governance; the recognition and support to CBOs; the communication and transparency functions; the participation in local governance; the monitoring of public policies and services; the negotiation and management of partnerships and relations with public authorities.

Context and institutional environment related needs concern: the creation of space for policy dialogue at a national level; the recognition of the civil society role by public authorities; the recognition of new CSOs by the older ones and the opening of existing coalitions and networks to a larger number of CSOs.

For third level organisations (including the aggregations of CSOs focusing on a sector, a geographical area or a campaign) and fourth level organisations (that consist of the general aggregations of CSOs, such as the national civil society platforms):

Individual capacity and skill-building needs emerge regarding project design and management, policy analysis, the civil society role in governance, fund raising.

Organisational capacity needs particularly concerning the organisational governance as regarding the relationships with member organisations; the volunteers and activists management; the communication and transparency functions; the negotiation and management of partnerships and the relations with public authorities; the analysis of “constituency needs”.

Context and institutional environment related needs concerning the creation of space for policy dialogue at the local and national levels; the recognition authorities; the enlargement of network and platform constituency, the recognition by public authorities.

4. The resources for supporting CSOs The resources for supporting CSOs in the oPt have also been considered, focusing on the EC, the European donors and the international aid agencies, the international NGOs and national public authorities and non state actors. While a large amount of resources are available for supporting Palestinian CSOs, most of them are used to support project-based service delivery initiatives. Resources for CSO engagement in local and national governance and policy dialogue activities are seldom available. Support for long-term programmes is also scarce. Current allocation of resources risks fostering a further concentration of Palestinian CSOs on service delivery – sometime in competition with public authorities – and to produce effects such as the increase of competition among CSOs, the tendency to attribute to grassroots CSOs only the role of “beneficiaries” and the escape of CSOs from governance functions.

5. Operational recommendations Based on the study, operational recommendations were defined. These recommendations find their main context in the setting of a general strategy for supporting CSOs in the oPt adopting the global objective to strengthen the position of civil society in public debate and in the elaboration and implementation of development strategies, complimentary with the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions.

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In relation to this objective, three main strategies were identified, namely:

supporting a shift from service provision to governance, involving a CSOs increased engagement in the policy setting process, in the monitoring of policy implementation and public service management, in the setting and functioning of local and national councils on development, and in supporting civic participation in decision making;

supporting the integration of the CSO community and the matching of first and second level organizations, particularly through the construction of a shared vision of Palestinian society, the setting of stronger collaboration relationships among CSOs at different levels and the greater recognition of 1st level organisations by the 2nd level ones, not as simple beneficiaries but as active, autonomous actors;

supporting the opening of space for local agenda setting and for policy dialogue in which CSOs can represent the perspectives emerging at the grassroots level.

The three strategies identified above may be concretized through the adoption of three specific objectives: the diffusion of capacities for assuming a governance role by CSOs; the creation of space for “policy making from below” and the facilitation of policy dialogue and the improvement of local sustainable development initiatives. This would also require the adoption of a common framework by stakeholders and the construction of conditions for making the most of available resources. This can be facilitated by increasing consultation activities with CSOs, by supporting CSOs in front of public authorities, by pulling together the resources from different donors and by fostering the adoption of measures for increasing the relevance and consistency of CSOs initiatives. Finally, opportunities and options for supporting civil society development were identified as well as sector priorities. Opportunities and options focus on:

supporting first level organisations to maintain their “grassroots” links and functions, while achieving greater capacities and sustainability; maintaining grassroots links and functions is strongly connected with the possibility and capacity to play an active role in the management of local public services and development initiatives;

supporting second level organisations to increase their pro-activity in the policy arena and their attitude to recognize first level organisations as “policy actors”;

supporting third and fourth level CSOs in achieving higher participation by member organisations, in being able to perform permanent and continuous activities and in increasing their influence on policy making, both at national and at local level.

Sector priorities concern the EU thematic programmes (NSA, EIDHR, PfP, IIP/Gender, Cultural Activities, and East Jerusalem). Namely:

NSA Programme can provide a privileged space for promoting mutual recognition among civil society organisations and other actors, including the PA and other NSA, through initiatives aiming at knowledge production and sharing; promoting the formulation of common perspectives (conferences, workshops, etc.); construction of partnerships for policy setting or for solving local problems.

EIHRD’s priorities comprise: strengthening existing coordination and collaboration platforms; advocacy for an effective application of existing legislation on associations and CSOs; advocacy for the opening of space for public recognition of “unregistered” community based, grassroots organisations; research and monitoring; activities focusing on citizenship rights in the daily life (accessibility and quality of basic services, relationships among citizens and public bureaucracy, etc.).

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Partnership for Peace Programme’s emerging priorities are: public discussion on peace perspectives (including state building) and on peace building policies; improvement of the CSOs capacity to face the threats produced by political divides and by the “political invasion” of civil society space; support to local committees and initiatives for promoting the recognition of Palestinian CSOs and their role in the occupying authorities; support to CSO initiatives aimed at making visible conflict impact and at promoting local initiatives for solving and reducing them.

Investing in People/Gender thematic programme emerging priorities concern: the strengthening of the cooperation among women’s organisations and the fostering of a policy focus on gender, aimed at increasing the recognition that it is not only a matter of individual rights (and of protection of these rights) but also a matter of collective rights.

For Cultural Activities, priorities emerge concerning the access of CBOs and small CSOs to national and international cultural arenas and concerning the possibility of opening opportunities for sharing cultural production outcomes.

Cooperation initiatives in East Jerusalem identified key priorities, such as: the recognition of Palestinian civil society actors by the occupying authorities; the opening of space for negotiation and dialogue in which Palestinian citizens’ organisations can play a role other than the simple provision of basic services; the assumption of a mediation, legitimating and political support role by international donors.

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1. Background: Institutional Framework and Objectives In January 2011, the Office of the EU Representative in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) launched a Mapping Study on Civil Society Organisations in the oPt. The study was finalized in May 2011. The framework in which the study was carried out is two-fold. On one side, it includes the process of recognition of Non State Actors (NSA) by the European Commission, which in all recent documents considers Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) not only as service providers or implementers of EC strategies, but also as key political actors in development processes. Strong civil society involvement in policy dialogue and in influencing policies is in fact recognized as an important element contributing to making development processes more effective and hence promoting democratization. On the other side, the framework of the study includes the need to promote more structured and effective participation of CSOs in policy dialogue and in sustainable development processes in the oPt. The current situation in the oPt is characterised by territorial, legal and political fragmentation – where East Jerusalem is under Israeli control, Hamas rules the Gaza Strip and Fatah the West Bank. This fragmentation caused difficulty in the recognition of civil society actors and their role in development, as well as their participation in policy dialogue, setting and monitoring.

Overall and specific objectives Within this complex framework, this study has one overall objective: “to strengthen the position of civil society in public debate and in the elaboration and implementation of development strategies, complementarily with the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions.” Therefore, the specific objective of the study is to “provide a comprehensive overview of CSOs in the oPt, including their capacity-building needs and recommendations for possible intervention areas to be supported by forthcoming cooperation programmes.” In fulfilling these objectives, assuming both the perspective of policy dialogue that includes influencing government decision making processes, monitoring policy implementation and performing an effective advocacy role at all levels and of sustainable development, the study is expected to:

Identify key organisations and structures in civil society, as well as their key constraints and their primary capacity building needs.

Identify the key policy areas in which CSOs could successfully engage, given their current capacities, the political context and the current state of the sector.

Provide an overview of current donor strategies in civil society development and an indication of future trends in terms of overall involvement and areas of focus.

Elaborate an operational strategy for effectively promoting civil society engagement, including recommendations on possible usage of existing EC instruments (bilateral assistance, thematic programmes, geographic programmes, etc.).

In implementation of this study a team was established comprising of: Gianfrancesco Costantini (Team Leader), Jamal Atamneh (Civil Society Expert), Feda Al Husseini and Khaled Ayesh (Field Researchers).

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2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

2.1. Theoretical framework of the study The study’s theoretical framework is based on the operationalisation of a set of concepts and analytical instruments applied for the purpose of identification and analysis of relevant actors, including a study of the processes and dynamics in which these actors are involved. These instruments include:

Adoption of an operational concept (or working definition) of civil society, which focuses not only on NGOs, but also on a wider and multifaceted universe of organisations. According to this operational concept, actors can be present at any of the following four tiers or main organisational levels: the first level includes grassroots groups and CBOs; the second level is composed of NGOs and other intermediary organisations; the third level comprises the aggregation of CSOs focusing on a certain sector, geographical area or a campaign; the fourth level consists of general aggregations of CSOs, such as the national civil society platforms. Moreover, according to the concept adopted in the research, civil society actors are those entities with a focus on social responsibility, since they are operating in favour of the collective interest and of social and economic development in their own territory.

A Graphic Representation of the Levels of Civil Society Organisations

Identification of a set of dynamics to be considered when analysing the strategic dimension and positioning of civil society and CSOs, particularly vis-a-vis local development processes and EU policies. These dynamics concern governance and the participation in policy dialogue; service delivery and project implementation; knowledge; bonding and bridging functions (i.e. the strengthening of internal links and cohesion vs. the linking with external actors, increasing social capital and external “trust relationships”); innovation and sustainability.

CIVIL SOCIETY PLATFORMS

SECOND LEVEL

ORGANISATIONS

NGOs NON PROFIT

RESOURCE

CENTRES

CHARITIES OTHER

INTERMEDIARY &

SUPPORT

ORGANISATIONS

FIRST LEVEL

ORGANISATIONS

COMMUNITY

BASED

ORGANISATIONS

POPULAR

COMMITTEES LOCAL RESOURCES

MANAGEMENT GROUPS

WOMEN’S GROUPS

PARENTS’ GROUPS

YOUTH, SPORT

AND CULTURAL

GROUPS

OTHER GRASSROOTS

ORGANISATIONS

FOURTH LEVEL

ORGANISATIONS

THIRD LEVEL ORGANISATIONS

REGIONAL

NGO

NETWORKS

SECTOR

NETWORKS

THEMATIC

COORDINATION BODIES &

PLATFORMS

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Focusing on factors influencing the possibility for CSOs to adopt a relevant role in sustainable development initiatives and in policy dialogue, taking into consideration that both the exogenous factors representing constraints and opportunities (i.e. external dimension) and the endogenous factors, such as resources, capacities, organisational structure, organisational culture and short-medium-long term goals, as well as the governance setting of the organisations (i.e. internal dimension).

The analysis of CSO capacities and relevant needs, focusing on three main dimensions: individual skills, such as strategic leadership; organisational internal dynamics, such as organisational identity (values, mission and ethics), efficient and effective management and available resources; organisation’s interactions with other actors and the external context.

2.2. Methodological framework of the study The Mapping Study was not characterised as a census of civil society organisations and has not conduced a general survey. Rather it consisted of a study aimed at understanding the main processes and challenges that Palestinian civil society is facing. To this aim, from the methodological perspective the study is characterized by some main features, such as:

A general methodological approach based on the use and integration of a variety of information sources.

Integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Reference to “facts” and “representations” as indicators of the considered phenomena.

Construction of knowledge through an iterative process, aimed at bringing in the stakeholders perspective.

The scope of the study

The geographical scope of the study includes the entire oPt, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that some studies were previously carried out to produce an overview of Palestinian civil society (e.g. the MAS NGOs Mapping of 2007, carried out in collaboration with the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) the universe of Palestinian CSOs appeared in the theoretical and the methodological perspective of this mapping study is an “unknown universe”1. To portray such a universe, some main choices were made:

1. Making a distinction between two main groups of CSOs: a) organisations based in the West

Bank and East Jerusalem (since most large Jerusalem organisations now have their

headquarters in Ramallah, and many Jerusalem CSOs that do not have an office in the West

Bank currently have an “informal” character) and b) the organisations based in the Gaza

Strip.

2. Consulting the organisations belonging to the 4 organisational levels.

3. Consulting organisations active in all the recognised “sectors” and mandate areas including agriculture and the environment, human rights and democracy; women’s rights; special needs; education, health, etc.

Without being able to define statistical representation of Palestinian CSOs, a sociologically meaningful representation was built up. A further choice concerned the identification and selection

1 As a matter of fact, most previous studies were based on an administrative definition of NGOs, including in one only set all kinds of different “registered” associations and without adopting any distinction among levels and social functions of organisations. Moreover, the estimates made by previous studies and the public authorities (such as the Ministry of Interior) are very diverse where the number of CSOs is esteemed to range between 1400 and 2200.

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of informants. This was a particularly sensitive operation mainly when looking at CSOs. To identify key organisations among the wide group of CSOs, the following criteria were adopted:

the central position in the Palestinian Civil Society, identified by examining the participation in national networks and at the geographic and organisational range of action;

the capacity to provide information, determined by the previous research activities and by the experience and relations with other organisations;

the engagement in at least one of the sectoral areas considered in the mapping study.

Quantitative features of the study

As explained in the following paragraphs, a total of 262 CSOs were consulted. 100 belong to the 1st level, 152 belong to the 2nd level and 10 belong to the third and fourth levels. Of these organisations:

87 were met with and involved in interviews (49 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 38 in the Gaza Strip) and also filled out questionnaires; thus, various tools for the information collection were administered to these organisations with the aim of obtaining information on different features of the organisation and also for the aim of crosschecking gathered information.

100 participated in focus groups (73 in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 27 in the Gaza Strip) and filled out questionnaires, as per the above description. Also these organisations where studied using two different tools for information collection.

75 organisations filled out questionnaires. Moreover, among these CSOs, 68 participated in feedback meetings and seminars in Ramallah and Gaza. The feedback meetings and seminars served as a further tool for verifying the study findings.

Information sources The information sources identified for implementing the study can be classified in two main sets, as presented in the following table.

Source of Information

Primary sources

Representatives of CSOs

Representatives of donors and other international partners of Palestinian CSOs

The European Union delegation task managers involved in cooperation initiatives with CSOs

Representatives of public authorities, both at the central and local level

The CSOs participating in activities carried out during the study (interviews, field visits, focus groups, etc.)

Secondary sources

Databases and CSO registers

Documents produced by CSOs to present themselves and their activities

CSO websites

Projects reports, both from CSOs and donors

Donors evaluation reports

Project – Programme documents

Policy documents concerning CSOs and their role in the oPt and Middle East

Academic essays, studies and research reports

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The tools for consultation of information sources The consultation of information sources was carried out through a variety of methods, including:

individual in-depth interviews;

collective interviews with 2nd , 3rd and 4th level organisations;

focus groups with 1st level organisations;

visits to organisations and their projects;

analysis of documents;

self-administered questionnaires filled out by the involved organisations;

feedback meetings and restitution seminars. For the consultation of information sources through these different methods the tools presented in the following table were used.

Tools for the Consultation of Information Sources

Primary Sources

Grid for the analysis of 3rd

and 4th

level organisations

Grid for the rapid appraisal of 2nd

level organisations

Interview guide for donors and other partners

Discussion Guide for 1st level organisations collective interviews - focus groups

Self-administered questionnaire for 2nd level organisations

Self-administered questionnaire for 1st level organisations

Feedback meetings and restitution seminars

Secondary sources

Grid for the collection of data on 3rd and 4th level organisations

Grid for the collection of data on 2nd level organisations Guidelines for the analysis of documents

2.3. An overview of the primary sources of information In reference to the aforementioned methods and tools, this paragraph provides an overview of each of the tools used to collect data from primary sources of information, each classified by region and organisational level.

In depth interviews As stated previously, the first modality for consulting information sources consisted of in- depth individual and group interviews with a total of 87 CSOs. These were made using grids for the analysis of organisations.

Type or Organisation West Banks and East Jerusalem

Gaza Strip Total

2nd Level (NGOs, etc.) 42 35 77

3rd Level (networks, etc.) 5 2 7

4th Level (networks, etc.) 2 1 3

Total 49 38 87

In addition to interviews with civil society organisations, in-depth interviews were also carried out for consulting donors and technical partners of the Palestinian CSOs. A total of 10 interviews were conducted, involving researchers, representatives of donors, PA ministries, local authorities, international NGOs and other resource centres.

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Focus groups The second modality for consulting information sources consisted of focus groups with 1st level organisations. These focus groups were carried out using a discussion guide with groups that contained, in average, 8 to 15 CBOs and other grassroots groups. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, seven focus groups were held with the participation of 73 of the 1st level organisations. Whereas, in the Gaza Strip, two focus groups were organised for 27 organisations.

Questionnaires Another important means of consulting primary information sources consisted of the collection of self-administered questionnaires, answered by CSOs at the different level, as per the table below:

Type or Organisation West Banks and East Jerusalem

Gaza Strip Total

1st Level (CBOs, etc.) 71 27 98

2nd

Level (NGOs, etc.) 90 62 152

3rd

Level (networks, etc.) 3 2 5

4th Level (networks, etc.) 2 1 3

Total 166 92 258

Feedback meetings and restitution seminars

A final means of consulting primary information sources consisted of feedback meetings and restitution seminars to discuss the findings of the Mapping Study with relevant organisations. Considering the nature of the meetings, only 2nd, 3rd and 4th level organisations will participate in them. In fact, rather than focusing on the experience or needs of the single organisation, meetings were focused on the general overview of CSO experiences. A selection was therefore made among the consulted organisations, with preference to involve only those organisations that have a general view of the processes, such as those engaged in the study of civil society sector and those engaged in capacity building and networking actions. The participants were classified by level and regions as in the table below:

Type of Organisation West Banks and East Jerusalem

Gaza Strip Total

2nd Level (NGOs, etc.) 30 30 60

3rd Level (networks, etc.) 3 2 5

4th

Level (networks, etc.) 2 1 3

Total 35 33 68

Overview of the consulted primary information sources

In the table below an overview is presented of the primary information sources, according to the various consultation modalities.

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Overview According to Consultation Modalities

Type of organisati

on

West Banks and East Jerusalem Gaza Strip Total

In d

epth

In

terv

iew

s

Focu

s gr

ou

ps

Qu

esti

on

nai

res

Fee

db

ack

mee

tin

gs /

se

min

ar

In d

epth

In

terv

iew

s

Focu

s gr

ou

ps

Qu

esti

on

nai

res

Fee

db

ack

mee

tin

gs /

se

min

ar

1st

Level 73 71 27 27 198

2nd Level 42 90 30 35 62 30 289

3rd Level 5 3 3 2 2 2 17

4th Level 2 2 2 1 1 1 9

Total 49 73 166 35 38 27 92 33 513

Since the various tools and consultation methods were sometimes applied to the same organisations, the above table does not present the number of consulted organisations. That is the subject of the following table. As already stated, a total of 262 CSOs were consulted: 100 belonging to the 1st level, 152 belonging to the 2nd level and 10 belonging to the3nd level. Of these organisations:

87 were met with and involved in interviews (49 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 38 in the Gaza Strip) and filled out questionnaires;

100 participated in focus groups (73 in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 27 in the Gaza Strip) and filled out questionnaires;

75 organisations only filled out questionnaires.

2.4. An overview of the secondary sources of information Existing documentary information was considered an important element of the research study. As a matter of fact, existing documents offer relevant information for identifying the processes and the challenges faced by the oPt civil society, as well as information on their capacities and activities. The following categories of documents were analysed:

Reports produced by Palestinian CSOs, regarding their activities, their organisational features and the context of their work (43 documents);

Studies carried out by international organisations on Palestinian CSOs, aimed at providing an overview and analysis of the sector (10 documents);

Reports produced by donors on their cooperation activities with CSOs (about 50 documents);

Academic research studies (books, essays and scientific articles, totalling 25 documents). In addition to these documents, the study examined two databases on Palestinian NGOs managed by NDC (NGO Development Centre) and by the PNGO-Gaza (Palestinian NGO Network in Gaza Strip).

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Analysis of Donor Activities Donors were asked to provide documentation on their activities. Moreover, the study team carried out specific search for documents using the Internet and other sources. The study examined documents available online, furnished by the following donors:

Agency Country Provided by the Agency WWW and other sources

Austria *

Belgium *

Denmark *

France *

Finland * Germany *

Italy *

Ireland *

Netherlands *

Spain *

Sweden *

Switzerland *

UK *

USA *

UNDP and other UN Agencies *

World Bank *

2.5. Problems and Challenges The main problem met during the implementation of field activities was the limitation on mobility, due to the political situation in the oPt. Particularly, support to the field researcher in the Gaza Strip was mainly provided through frequent Internet, telephone and Skype communication. In fact, a field visit by the Team Leader to the Gaza Strip was only possible during the second mission. However, the difficulty in entering in the Gaza Strip had a limited negative impact as in this geographical area organisations were individually met, focus group meetings were also regularly held and questionnaires were filled by the expected number of organisations, providing a diverse picture of the many existing CSOs. The limitations on mobility also affected field work in the West Bank, work in East Jerusalem was also difficult for one of the field researchers and travel among the different areas of the West Bank was somewhat restricted (both for researchers and representatives of organisations invited to participate in meetings). The political control and conflict between the local ruling parties, and the CSOs considered to be “linked to other parties”, had little influence on the field study. Organisations with different political and religious affiliations participated in focus groups meetings, sometime expressing concern about the closure of organisations or the forced changes in their respective board of directors. Paradoxically, a greater influence was observed in the filling of questionnaires. The uncertain situation of some organisations precluded them from accepting to respond to questionnaires. It is well known that in some cases NGOs and CBOs have been “closed” by the authorities, so that even if they continue to have some activities they tend to adopt a very low profile. Taking this into consideration, some organisations were excluded from the questionnaire administration, while their existence was considered as a specific phenomenon to be analysed. As a further measure for ensuring the consistency of data from questionnaires, an analysis of organisations registered in existing databases – such as those of NDC “Masader” Portal and those of the PNGO in Gaza – was carried out.

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In general, compared with other countries, the need for all organisations to be registered makes it more difficult to distinguish between 1st and 2nd level organisations. Under the term “Associations” which is used in Palestinian Law, organisations having different natures are registered. As a general principle, organisations that have contracted workers are considered NGOs, while organisations based on voluntary work are considered CBOs. The need for registration, together with the presence of resources and an uncertain organisational identity often creates a self-perception of CBOs as NGOs, as well as a wide group of organisations that are still mainly at the grassroots level, but use paid professionals. Frequently CBOs tend to present themselves as NGOs and try to transform themselves into NGOs. However in many cases, grassroots organisations maintain an informal character and tend not to participate in meetings and even “hide” themselves in a complete way, declaring that they are not “permanent” or organising themselves as “local branches” under the umbrella of national NGOs and associations. Also because of the reasons illustrated above, the administration of questionnaires proved to be time-consuming and required greater work than expected. In fact, most organisations proved not to have an interest in filling out questionnaires (of 700 questionnaires sent, 191 were returned2). This implied a huge workload for collecting questionnaires. This also explains the need to use extra sources—not only the questionnaires—for collecting data for quantitative analysis. During the administration of questionnaires, assistance from field researchers was necessary due to the potential contrary interpretation of some items once translated into Arabic. However, thanks to the assistance work carried out, the questionnaire process was generally consistent. Some of the collected data- particularly those concerning the CSO budget - required further checks by field researchers. Final validation of collected information and questionnaires was carried out during their processing. Interpretation and use of data was facilitated by the pre-test activity carried out in the first mission, which also implied some changes in the question formulation.

3. The Context

3.1. A diachronic view A peculiar characteristic of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations is the fact that unlike most civil societies – and against the concept of civil society itself – most CSOs were created out of an established “state framework.” As many authors point out, most organisations emerged and developed in the absence of the state, the absence of national independence and sovereignty over land and citizenship3. The origins of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations are often identified as emerging in the 1920s, including faith-based and religious organizations, women’s organizations, charitable societies and youth clubs4.

2 One of the reasons reported by CSOs for not filling out the questionnaires is that EU funds are considered too difficult to obtain, so organizations are often not interested in being known by the EU. Other reasons include the fact that organizations are inundated by questionnaires. In some cases, the national networks used for disseminating questionnaires have now little influence and mobilization capacity on member organizations. 3 Salem W., Palestinian Civil Society: Characteristics, Past and Present Roles, and Future Challenges, 2006; De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009; Bisan Center for Research and Development in PNGO, Guidebook of Member Organizations in the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network in the West Bank, Ramallah, 2010. 4 In 1922, under the British Mandate, a law on private and non-profit making companies laid the foundation for organizations. Prior to 1922, the Ottoman Law of Association of 1907 guaranteed the right of association in a limited manner. Groups had to report to authorities their intensions before receiving a license to start work (De Voir and Tartir A., 2009; Challand B., Palestinian Civil Society, Routledge, 2009). According to some researchers the development of Palestinian charities was parallel to that of the Jewish Zionist movement (Sullivan, cited in DeVoir and Tartir, 2009).

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These organizations continued to exist and exercise their activities until 1948. After the creation of Israel, the context changed for Palestinian organizations where some continued to work in the Israeli territory, working on the maintenance of the Palestinian identity, others established themselves outside Israel, mainly in Arab countries. The latter focused their activities on two main issues including the liberation of Palestine and the Arab national identity. During this period, the West Bank was annexed to Jordan, which gave it the name of the “West Bank of Jordan.” Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian administration, but without being annexed to Egypt. This matter produced the first difference in the development of Palestinian civil society. In Gaza, civil society organizations began to work openly, and established relationships with political parties, such as the Palestinian Communist Party of Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhoods' Gaza Branch, and also the Gaza Branch of the Arab Nationalist Ba’ath Party. This led to the development of political institutions in Gaza such as the Palestinian National Council in 1948 and the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1963. In the West Bank, organizations continued to exist, but they did not have the ability to work in a public manner – other than for the purpose of providing services and assuming the form of “charities” under Jordanian law. A Federation of Charities was then established in 1958. According to the law, charities were obliged to ask permission from the authorities for carrying out any activity (even meetings). In the period between 1964 and 1988, the development of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations is closely linked to that of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its various factions. The PLO supported the establishment of voluntary work committees, grassroots youth and women's organizations. Health and education NGOs also emerged in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1970's and the 1980's. Many key civil society organizations originated in this period and environment. The charities (at least partially faith-based) continued to work and exercise their functions in service provision in this period, particularly focusing on the key issues of health and education. In the absence of a state and under occupation, the main activities carried out by civil society organisations during these decades can be summarised in two broad categories, which are service provision and relief work. Policy was out of the field of action of civil society organisations within the oPt, but was the focus of the PLO based abroad. Since 1948, a privileged location in which CSOs developed was in refugee camps. In these camps, people organise themselves with the support of external actors (such as political parties and UNRWA). Many community-based organisations started to work as a means for organising and distributing aid to the camp population. With the surge of the First Intifada in 1987 a new period emerged for civil society organisations. A new agenda and priority emerged. There was a focus on setting a political agenda within the oPt, the creation of a vision of development within the framework of protracted conflict and the long, continuing occupation, and the priority for defending human rights – mainly against the violations committed by the Israeli occupation. Moreover, while the traditional PLO-linked NGOs tended to lose ground in the field, new grassroots organizations emerged, including different types of so-called popular committees that constituted the main participants in the Intifada. This is also the period that Islamic charitable organizations began to adopt a new role, much more related to political participation. In addition, this is the environment in which Hamas emerged as an active participant in the Intifada in 1988. The 1990s represented another defining period for Palestinian CSOs. While the capacity of political parties to represent the actors and interests of Palestinian society became weaker, CSOs expanded and started to adopt an agenda focusing on the internal social conditions of the oPt. The focus on

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service provision continued to be the top priority, but because of the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and of its engagement in the provision of services, CSOs also intervened on other issues including: democracy building, institution building, different approaches to development, PA violations of human rights, advocacy and lobbying, anti-militarization plans, peace and non-violence projects, as well as the representation of specific interest groups, such as the disabled, youth and women. In 1994, the estimated number of civil society organizations reached 1400 in the oPt. This number decreased following the establishment of the PA (according to MAS about 800 organisations disappeared) and a new generation of organizations was founded after the creation of the PA (about 40% of organizations in 1996 were founded after the establishment of PA)5. In fact, the PA invited civil society organizations to become incorporated in its structures (this occurred with some NGOs, particularly closely linked to Fatah, such as the Health Service Council, that ran 62 clinics and merged into the PA). However, many CSOs refused to merge, and thus competition over funds and activities emerged as a new phenomenon. This created tensions between the PA and CSOs. In this framework, the PA began imposing control over the NGO sector and in 1997 a first draft of a law was presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council providing for the Ministry of Interior to “license” NGOs rather than simply “registering” them. It is said that during this period, despite growing tensions, some reforms were advocated by CSOs and entered in the PA agenda. Two other trends emerge in this period, the further expansion of Islamic organizations within Palestinian society and the increased presence of international agencies and NGOs (in 1993, INGOs increased to 200 and international agencies jumped from 3 to 29). As a result of this trend, competition over local human resources emerged and a new group of local NGOs was created but this group was without linkages to communities or social groups and was mainly engaged as implementing bodies in INGO activities6. In the year 2000, the new decade began with the promulgation of a law on civil society organizations, the “Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organisations.” Despite the inclination of the PA to increase its control over civil society organizations, thanks to the mobilization of CSOs and foreign governments, the law recognized the right of the NGOs to work via registration and not by permit. People were therefore free to create organizations, and the PA did not have the legal basis to claim that such NGOs are prohibited or otherwise not allowed to function. Additionally, the law provided independence to NGOs to make their decisions solely according to their governing boards, without the imposition of policies and decisions on them from the outside7. However, the Second Intifada – and the return to a period of armed conflict – forced actors to once again change their activities and orientations. Political parties returned to armed struggle, and CSOs returned to focus on relief work. In 2004 and 2005, international funds for Palestinian NGOs and the PA increased again and became dependent on their activities. According to a study carried out in 2009, external aid funds to Palestinian NGOs reached less than 50% of their total funding in 1999 to close to 80% in 20088.

5 De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West

Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009. 6 De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West

Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009; Challand B., Palestinian Civil Society, Routledge, 2009. Among the immediate effects of the presence of INGOs, the increase in salaries of NGO professionals was a most apparent, becoming the basis for public discourse about rich and corrupted NGOs, making profit on resources to be addressed to the poor. 7 Hanafi S., Tabar L., The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, Muwatin, Ramallah, 2005. 8 De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West

Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009.

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A portion of these funds was dispersed to support governance, democracy and human rights activities as well as to support initiatives concerning “peace building” and “normalization” of relationships with Israel9. Paradoxically, the rise of NGO projects on these themes resulted in a decrease of civil society engagement in advocacy for policy setting. A further factor leading to a decrease of CSO engagement in policy advocacy in this period was the limitation of funding to organizations considered to be linked to groups jeopardizing the peace processes (such as Islamic organizations or those promoting initiatives against Israeli occupation). On the other hand, as apparent in the results of the second Palestinian Legislative elections in January 2006, this period was characterized by a further increase of consensus towards Islamic organizations, at least partially based on Palestinian public opinion of the PA and NGOs as dependent on international aid and prone to corruption. The work on other issues also continued, like the advocacy for policy reforms, but somehow this work was annulled by the mainstream agenda of both civil society organizations and the PA. The divide of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the main feature of the period following the 2006 elections. Two main processes became apparent following the separation: increased pressure on CSOs to become affiliated and loyal to the local ruling party (open conflicts between political authorities and CSOs, the stop of CSOs activities by security forces and even the nomination by political authorities of new boards to run organizations’ activities are among the most apparent phenomena that emerged in both Gaza and the West Bank) and further concentration of CSOs on service delivery activities, avoiding active participation in local governance if not specifically requested by the political authorities and competing with the PA on funding, also due to the lack of definition of a clear division or responsibility. Still, it can be said that in this difficult situation, some improvements took place at least on the local level. As a matter of fact, in some cases, municipal authorities established “local councils” involving CSO representatives, and ministries often consult “specialized” CSOs, which remain a major partner of public authorities in certain sectors.

3.2. The legal framework

Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organisations The main element of the regulatory framework concerning civil society organizations is the “Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations” (Law No. 1, Year 2000)10. This law11, that emanates from the Palestinian Legislative Council, formalizes the right of Palestinian citizens “to practice social, cultural, professional and scientific activity in all freedom, including the right to establish and run Associations and Community Organizations” (article 1), and it defines the conditions and the modalities for exercising this right, according to the main norms briefly reported below. The law provides a definition of concerned organizations:

9 “People to people” or “peace from below” activities based on the good practices tested in other regions became a

fashionable activity. However, these activities are not considered very effective and are often viewed with suspicion in the CSO environment. The scarce effectiveness of the “peace from below” activities also emerged by some evaluation studies (PAL Vision, Evaluation Study for the Exchange and Reunion of Palestinian Israeli Youth Aiming to Urge the Peace Process through Dialogue and Accord, Palestinian Vision, 2008). 10 By effect of this law the preceding laws on CSOs, the Ottoman Law of Charitable Organizations issued on 29 Rajab 1327 A.H. and the Law of Charitable Organizations number 33 for the year 1966 effective in Palestine were repealed. 11

Palestinian Legislative Council, Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations, Law No. 1, Year 2000 (http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/laws/associations/charlaw-comorg-pal-00-e.pdf).

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Any charitable Association or Community Organization with an independent judicial personality, established upon an agreement concluded among no less than seven persons to achieve legitimate objectives of public concern, without aiming at attaining financial profits to be shared among the members or achieving any personal benefits.

Moreover, the law also considers: foreign associations or organizations (identified as any foreign charitable Association or Community Organization which has its main headquarters or centre of activities outside the oPt or the majority of whose members are foreigners) and the union among organizations (as the process of unification of two or more associations or organizations whereby a single representative body is established, but each association or organization maintains its independent judicial personality). According to the law, a community activity is defined as any social, economic, cultural, community, developmental or other service or activity, undertaken voluntarily, that would lead to the improvement of social, health, professional, material, spiritual, artistic, sports, cultural or educational conditions in society. The competent ministry is identified as the Ministry of Interior. Concerning the registration of associations and organizations, the law provided for the creation of three general registries: a) demands of registration, b) registered organizations (organizations that have been registered)12 and c) associations whose requests for registration have been refused13. The procedure of registration foresees that the founders of an organization submit a written application in compliance with a set of conditions14 to the Competent Department for registration set up under the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry must then issue its decision regarding the compliance of the application with the conditions of registration within a period not exceeding two months from the date of submission of the application. If the two-month period following the submission of the application for registration expires without a decision being made, the association is considered registered by law. If the Minister rejects the application for registration, it must then specify the reasons for the rejection and the applicants have the right to contest this decision before the competent court. According to the law, associations have certain obligations and entitlements. The first ones address: the keeping of records (article 11); the deposit with the Ministry of Interior of statements regarding amendments and changes of headquarters, by-laws, objectives and purposes, board of directors (article12); the yearly presentation to the ministry of a report on activities and of an audited financial report (article13). The latter ones include the exemption from taxes and customs duties on the transferable and non-transferable funds necessary for the implementation of its objectives.

12 For each organization, the following items should be recorded: names, fields of activity, objectives and any other facts that the Competent Department considers necessary for the information of all competent bodies. 13

The register should record their objectives and the reasons for the refusal, and any other additional information that the Competent Department considers necessary. 14

Conditions includes some formal elements (i.e. the signatures of three founding members authorized to register and sign on behalf of the association; copies of by-laws signed by the members of the founding committee, indicating the name, address and purposes; the main headquarters; the financial resources and way they are used; the conditions for membership; the organizational structure and rules concerning its amendment; the procedures for convening the general assembly; the method of financial supervision; the rules for the dissolution of the association, etc.(see article 5 of the law) and some conditions concerning its objectives and modalities of work, concerning the funds, the activities, the organizational and governance structure; the merger and union among organizations, etc.

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The law also establishes modalities and reasons for dissolving an association. The decision to dissolve an association can be taken by its General Assembly or by the Ministry. In the latter case, two main reasons can be the origin of the dissolution:

The fact that an organization does not commence its actual operations within the first year from its date of registration or of obtaining its license;

The proven fact that an organization has committed a substantive violation of its by-laws, and has not rectified the above conditions within three months from the date of notification to that effect by the Minister or the Department.

The decision of the Ministry to dissolve an organization must formalize the cause/s in writing and this decision can be contested before the competent court. If the decision is contested, the association has the right to continue its work until a (temporary or final) judicial decision is issued. The law also defines other conditions as guarantees of association independence and freedom. Mainly, it is not permissible to take possession of the finances of any association or organization, or to close or conduct a search of its headquarters or any of its premises or branches without an order issued by a competent judicial body (article 41). Currently the Law 1/2000 is debated:

On the one hand, the PA and the Ministry of Interior claim for greater authority and control over the CSOs. According to their point of view, the issue of coordination among CSOs and public authorities is not well defined. No control exists over the activities actually carried out by CSOs and their impact and CSOs often hide specific political interests or even private interests.

On the other hand, NGOs and charities want greater autonomy and independence and want a more accurate use of the law (bureaucratic reasons for CSO registration delay is common).

Moreover, both CSOs and public authorities consider the law as a tool unable to guarantee the quality of CSOs and their actions. Both sides want greater attention to corruption and bad internal governance15. Based on the experience of other countries, a solution promoted by NGOs with the support of international aid has been the setting of a self-regulatory framework, namely under the name of “Code of Conduct” (see box below).

The NGO Code of Conduct In 2006, following a broad based consultation that involved more than 250 NGOs, the NDC (NGO Development Centre) formulated a “Code of Conduct for NGOs.” The code states the ethical values and principles with which NGOs are expected to comply, namely: - Compliance with Covenants & Law; - Priorities of Development (in line with the national agenda without any normalization activities with

the occupier) - Participation - Networking and Coordination - Transparency - Accountability - Equality and Inclusiveness - Prevent Conflict of Interest - Influence and Effectiveness - NGO’s Integrity - Dispute Resolution

15

According to a survey carried out by AMAN, the Palestinian Coalition on Transparency and Accountability, over 90% of the Palestinian population views NGOs as corrupted.

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After the definition of the code (2008), a dissemination activity among NGOs and Charitable Associations was promoted by NDC in cooperation with the main umbrella NGO networks (Palestinian General Union for Charitable Societies; Palestinian NGO Network, National Institute for Palestinian NGOs, Palestinian General Union for NGOs – Gaza) creating the “Code of Conduct Coalition.” The Code of Ethics was then operationalized, through the preparation of manuals and guidelines, and a further action was launched to put the code in operation. Such an action is based on three main steps: 1) Ratification and Promotion of the Code of Conduct by the individual CSOs: more than 500 NGOs have

adopted the Code. The Code was also adopted by the Arab League as a model for Arab countries; 2) Capacity Building for Good NGO Governance, aimed at supporting organisations in actually practicing the code, through a set of technical assistance and coaching activities involving 50 organisations for 24 preparation and dissemination of a “toolkit”; 3) Setting a compliance mechanism to assure the enforcement, through consultation with all concerned stakeholders on possible enforced mechanisms, including: self regulation (audit program), third party certification and introduction of a ranking system (incentive system). Source: Kasabreh G., Accountability and Reliability. Enhancing Democratic Governance of Palestinian NGOs. A Voluntary Code of Conduct, NDC, 2010; Code of Conduct Coalition, The Palestinian NGOs Code of Conduct, 2008.

What is currently apparent is that most relations between the political authorities and the CSOs occur both in the West Bank and in Gaza with little reference to the existing legal framework: registration and temporary or permanent closure of organizations16 is often attributed to political linkages rather than based on the rule of law. Moreover, some changes in the existing local framework are produced through Government decisions, such as in the West Bank the Decision No.20, 2007 of the Minister of Interior, requiring associations to submit registration procedures to security agencies. The obligation of civil society organisations to become registered produced further results: the proliferation of registered organisations and increased difficulty in distinguishing and identifying “first level” grassroots organisations (as “self-help groups”, committees, community based organizations) and “second level” organizations where in 2009 over 2100 associations were registered in the West Bank and over 890 in Gaza. As a matter of fact, the only difference in registration is among organisations based on “voluntary work” and organisations using paid workers. However, as some studies point out, increasingly “voluntary work” is paid and an increasing number of small local organisations (family run) tend to self-define themselves as NGOs in order to access donor funds. The proliferation of registered organisations indeed is another factor hindering the possibility to verify the quality of actions and internal governance. While this activity can be performed by the Ministry of Interior for a relatively small number of organisations, it became an impossible task when these organisations number in the thousands and have very different features.

Other relevant laws In the West Bank and Gaza, other relevant laws are those addressing cooperatives and sport clubs; the first are registered under the Ministry of Labour, and the latter under the Ministry of Youth and

16

Closure of organisations, the forced change in the board of directors and the search and occupation of CSO offices were frequently reported in interviews carried out – and are widely reported in the media – as occurring both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. In 2008, 28 Interim Committees were appointed in the West Bank for running organizations; in 2009, another 11 were appointed; in 2008, 58 associations were reported as being dissolved, and another 22 in 2009, because of political affiliation and “national security” reasons. In these actions, hardly any judicial decision was involved but the “de facto” authority of public and private security forces legitimated by the discourse of the “war against terror.” Paradoxically, the current situation of limited application of the law pushes for lesser transparency and visibility of CSO activities and in some cases of the same organizations.

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Sport17. Frequently, organisations that play a role in local development are registered under these ministries.

The Cooperatives Law 600 cooperatives are operational in the oPt and the majority of them work in the agriculture and housing sectors18. Until 2010, the Palestinian cooperatives were established under the authority of the Directorate General of Cooperatives in the Ministry of Labour, following two legal frameworks: West Bank cooperatives were under Jordanian law; Gaza cooperatives were under the Egyptian law. A new law was endorsed by the Council of Ministers in July 2010 and forwarded to the Palestinian President’s Office for approval. Once operational, the unified cooperative law will end the “dual structure” of cooperatives in the West Bank and Gaza; instead, it calls for the establishment of a new and semi-autonomous cooperative development administration. In addition, the General Commission for Regulating Cooperatives (GCRC) will take over the functions of the Directorate General of Cooperatives in the Ministry of Labour. The GCRC will be represented by a tripartite Board of Directors comprised of relevant government agencies, the cooperative movement, and workers’ and employers’ organizations. By virtue of this new law, the GCRC will serve as an independent technical service delivery centre, providing cooperatives with technical assistance to improve their performance and upgrade their structures and operations. The Palestinian cooperative law is considered as a model in the Arab world19. However, the most important regulative framework in the considered context seems to be the Israeli law. As a matter of fact, organisations active in East Jerusalem and also in Area B of the West Bank are under the Israeli authority (in Area B, organisations should be under the Palestinian Authority civil control, but are subject to Israeli security actions). No Israeli law prohibits unregistered groups and organisations from operating and in 2009, Israel’s Supreme Court recognized the “freedom of association” as a fundamental human right. Nevertheless, organisations are required to be authorized by the Registrar of Associations, which is under the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Three main sets of rules regulate the freedom of association:

Law of Associations (1980), regulates the formation and operation of NGOs, corporations and cooperative associations;

Criminal Law, and particularly the “Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance” (1948), the “Law implementing the Interim Agreement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (1994) and the “Law on the Prohibition of Terror Funding” (2005);

Restrictions to the practice of professions, requiring professionals to belong to Professional Associations, such as the “Bar Association.”

The Palestinian Law, and also the Israeli Law of Association provides that organisations may be dissolved because of the will of members or by a court order, on request of the Attorney General or Registrar of Associations, but only after failing to comply with written warnings. Moreover, the law mainly focuses on two kinds of offenses by associations: fraud and administrative irregularities. Actually, measures against organisations are often taken in an arbitrary fashion and based on political (and military) opportunities/reasons. It is, for instance, the case of the “Ansar Al-Sajeen” (Prisoners’ Friends Association) being declared illegal by the Israel’s Defence Minister (2006) or the

17 An example of these activities is “Ruwwad, The Palestinian Youth Empowerment Programme.” This is a project carried out by the Ministry of Youth and Sport in cooperation with local sports clubs and with some national NGOs, with the support of USAID and the American “Education Development Centre” (http://www.ruwwad.org/). 18

ILO, Concept note. Support to Palestinian Cooperatives for Employment and Income Creation, 2010. 19 Huseyin Polat, Cooperatives in the Arab World, ILO, 2010

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case of the “Nidal Centre for Community Development20” closed in June 2009, pursuant to the 1948 “Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.” Israeli authorities closed over 25 organisations in similar contexts. These include the Orient House, the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, and the Arab Studies Association21.

4. Main Issues and Stakes for Palestinian Civil Society

4.1. A general perspective At first glance civil society organisations in the oPt appear as a wide and vibrant set of actors. These organizations manage a large scale of activities (over 90% of social services in the oPt are managed by CSOs), work across all sectors, and maintain precious Palestinian human resources and reservoirs of information and knowledge. They constitute a key bridge between the oPt and the rest of the world. Still, CSOs in the oPt are facing an important set of issues and are actors in a risk situation. These issues, analysed in the following paragraphs, were identified in the framework of the study through consultation with many different sources, and are not always perceived as issues by the CSOs themselves. Therefore, the identification of these issues offers both a key for the analysis of CSOs and a framework for CSO reflection.

An unclear relationship with politics and the need to find a new role Looking diachronically at Palestinian civil society, its development has been strongly influenced by the political situation of Palestine: the presence of the British Mandate, the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt, the conflict with Israel and the Israeli occupation, and the following peace agreements. The political situation is therefore a factor that cannot be eliminated when considering the main issues and stakes for Palestinian civil society. The risk of being “occupied” by the political dynamics and losing the nature of civil society appears indeed as a main risk factor for CSOs. CSOs not only have to face the pressure of political parties and political authorities which seldom understand the autonomous nature of civil society, but they also have to identify a specific role in the process of political transformation and state-building which is under course in the oPt. Many key actors in Palestinian civil society have been created in the past with clear roles such as supporting Palestinian people in the absence of a Palestinian state, allowing Palestinian people to resist occupation, and producing “grassroots governance” in a situation in which political power was not allowed to exist22. This is the case of many NGOs and CSOs participating in the main Palestinian NGO network (PNGO). Now, their functions and roles have to change, but it is not always clear how. In fact, there is no debate on the role of CSOs and some organisations have different ideas of their role. Some think they should resume their old role because of the uncertain 20 The Centre provides mainly educational and vocational training activities, but claimed being affiliated to the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” designated as a terrorist organization under the Israeli Law. 21 Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem, cited in Lendman St., Freedom of Association Restrictions and Discrimination in Israel and Occupied Palestine, March 2010 (www.thepeoplevoice.org). 22 This situation was also characterized by the presence of strong links between the political parties and civil society organizations. Civil society organizations represent often the only possibility to take part in the management of local social and economic processes. After 1994, the linkages with parties became looser. The crisis of parties in the period between 1994 and 2006 resulted in the further increase of CSO autonomy and in many cases the emergence of new identities and new leadership, legitimated by technical capacities. The original functions of these organizations – governing in the absence of government – made them, despite their linkages with political parties, actors that are fully consistent with the roles and features attributed to civil society in sociological literature – an expression and a vehicle for the expectations and needs of social groups out of the state (political representation) and of the private sector (market) dynamics.

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situation of PA, others believe they should assume a watchdog role, a third group assumes to have a role linked to social change, a still a further group focuses on the need to continue to deliver services. However, most CSOs are not even reflecting about their role.

The exclusive focus on service delivery On the opposite side, another emerging risk for Palestinian civil society is that of completely abandoning the policy arena in favour of specialising in service delivery. As opposed to the past, a state structure is emerging in the oPt, also playing functions linked to the management of public services (and particularly health and education), an exclusive focus on service delivery implies for CSOs two further risks. One is that of competing with the public authorities in service provision namely for financial resources and for “beneficiaries” (in fact, these are sometimes considered as a captive group of clients, rather than as citizens bearing rights). Competition is already an important phenomenon, involving particularly the 2nd level CSOs, that managed resources which are frequently perceived as “escaping” public authority control and producing consensus-building processes that do not always benefit public authorities) and/or that to be relegated into the peripheral space of the provision of services to the so-called “special groups” of the poor and destitute, persons with disabilities, etc. In both cases, CSOs would lose their capacity to produce an impact on social reality. A focus on citizenship and on the representation of citizens' point of view in the process of state-building can be a perspective in such a difficult context. This would imply increasing the participation both to policy setting (providing the PA with information and knowledge, and facilitating the integration of citizens’ perspectives in public policies) and to monitoring the function of public authorities and services delivery, claiming for greater transparency and accountability. This would imply as well an effort to cooperate with public authorities not only in service delivery, but also (and mainly) in setting space for policy dialogue and in recovering the existing dialogue space that entered in a crisis situation in recent years (despite the participation of many CSOs in setting the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, dialogue between political authorities and CSOs is often made difficult by the lack of reciprocal trust and by the attempts of political authorities to control CSOs activities and policies).

Conflict and emergency Another area of risk for Palestinian CSOs is linked with the Israeli occupation. Israeli occupation and the periodic armed clashes in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza produce a permanent condition of insecurity and emergency. As a response to this situation, relief activities and an orientation to work according to emergencies increased their weight in the functioning of Palestinian CSOs, making the setting of a clear agenda and the production of mid and long term plans an uncommon feature. Moreover, the permanence of the Israeli occupation and conflict situation produced a set of divides within Palestinian civil society. A first important divide is among the organisations assuming the national perspective and the struggle against Israeli occupation as the focus of their identities and those that focus their action mainly on service provision avoiding direct engagement on “conflict related activities” (such as the information and awareness campaign at international level or the “Boycott Israel” campaign). Another important divide is that among the organisations, some focus their action on the resistance against occupation and some focus their action on “peace building.” A further divide follows the lines of Palestinian politics. Among the organisations, some are linked to Fatah, others to Islamic movements and still others belong to the Palestinian national secular tradition. Often, divides appear to be linked to external (donors or PA) agendas more than to civil society strategies focusing on the representation of the interests and needs of citizens. Developing a local agenda focusing on citizenship must be viewed as a main path to escaping the cage imposed by the seemingly permanent conflict situation. Developing a civil society agenda based on peace-building

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would also be a means for informing the governmental policy agenda and the development of public opinion.

The construction of a common voice Despite extensive experience, the great number of organisations, the accumulated knowledge assets and the economic dimension of civil society activities in the oPt, CSOs do not share a common voice. The main umbrella organisations only regroup a small percentage of organisations and have an unclear role. The 3rd level and 4th level organisations exist, but only a small number of 2nd level organisations are actually participating in their activities. As will be further analysed in following paragraphs, the need for a common voice is not even perceived. Some main factors for the lack of attention to this matter include the increased focus on service provision and the competition for resources among CSOs. The lack of political, collective interpretation concerning the organisations’ sustainability and the lack of debate on CSOs' role in Palestinian society are also notable factors. The same issues also apply to the initiatives aimed at improving the capacity, reliability and accountability of CSOs (such as the “Code of Conduct” initiative) if not directly related to the access to resources. Often, participation in networks and coalitions is seen by organisations as interference in their activity. In such a sense, a challenge for civil society organisations is that of going beyond the formal establishment of networks and umbrella organisations to develop a common vision and to formulate joint strategies. In such a process, a further challenge is integrating and facilitating the participation of all actors and sectors in Palestinian civil society. This includes faith-based organisations, which often seem to be part of a “separate environment.”

The recognition of civil society and the representation of constituencies An even greater challenge for civil society in the oPt emerges when considering the 1st level CSOs and their relations with more established NGOs and charities. A vibrant civil society exists at the grassroots level, made up of many informal groups and committees. Still, the existing legal framework and the reference to CBOs just as beneficiaries of NGO actions tends to reduce grassroots organisations visibility and public recognition as a relevant actor for governance and policy making. Research and outreach by NGOs and public authorities aiming at facilitating the recognition of local civil society are lacking. A tendency emerges among registered CBOs. They often adopt the organisational shape and service providers' function of NGOs. This also causes them to lose links with communities and original constituencies. Links with their own constituency actually emerges as a major risk for Palestinian CSOs. Indeed, both NGOs and charities (which often involve a reduced number of “members” and a large number of “workers” and “beneficiaries”) and smaller, less structured 1st level organisations tend to adopt as a reference model that of “service providers.” They risk assuming a main focus of “sustainability” of their own organisation, rather than that of organisations aggregating common interests and needs. Recognising civil society and CSOs’ constituencies implies moving away from an approach based on “targeting beneficiaries” to an approach based on participation. It also implies another shift: moving away from an approach based on “access to services or to benefits” to an approach focusing on supporting actual exercise of citizenship.

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Making the most of resources In recent years, the availability of financial resources resulted in a set of processes that risk producing crises and conflict among CSOs, particularly at the 2nd and 1st levels. The following phenomena can be considered indicators of these risks:

the proliferation of CSOs without a real constituency and without mid or long term vision;

the competition for qualified human resources;

the increasing dependency not only concerning financial resources but also concerning the setting of agendas and the identification of activities and projects;

the growing tendency of CSOs to act as simple “implementing agencies” or “contractors”;

the widening of the gap among key organisations and those that were mainly created for implementing a project;

a tendency of community based organisations to adopt the shape and features of NGOs, so as to access available funds without the intermediation of other actors;

a tendency of small NGOs and CBOs to perceive themselves in competition with others for financial resources, resulting in a reduction of inter-organisational cooperation and communication.

How to make the most of resources? According to different estimates, the amount of external aid to Palestinian CSOs is between 110 and 210 million Euros per year; this is about 10% of the external aid to West Bank and Gaza Strip23. But these resources risk being used in a very inefficient and ineffective manner if a common agenda or harmonisation measures are not established.

Internal governance, accountability and transparency Palestinian civil society has come under attack for being corrupt and non-democratic. There is an absence of proper internal democratic structures (out of those required under the law, but often mainly just a formal arrangement). According to some analysts, this is because of the permanence of patrimonial and neo-patrimonial structures. Despite the increasing diffusion of the “Code of conduct”, participation, transparency, accountability and rotation of authorities inside the civil society organizations are still an exception rather than the norm. Due to this situation, other important challenges emerge. It becomes difficult for CSOs to diffuse information and knowledge about their “new” accountability and about the great extent of their activities, so as to change the “common opinion” and to improve their participation and mobilization capacities. The exclusive dependency of CSOs on external aid also diminishes the capacity to mobilize local financial and human resources.

4.2. The issues and stakes arising in East Jerusalem and in Gaza Out of the main issues mentioned above, the following specific issues emerge for East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

East Jerusalem The special context of East Jerusalem produces a two-fold set of challenges for civil society organizations. On the one hand, their legitimate existence and activity are at risk. On the other hand, the increasing social exclusion conditions create a growing demand for services and for human rights protection activities.

23

See the debate on external aid to Palestine in DeVoir and Tartir, Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian NGOs in the WB and Gaza, MAS, 2009.

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It is important to consider some main factors contributing to the emergence of these challenges:

The disconnection of Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank has led to negative economic and social consequences, access to resources and markets was lost as well as access to social and safety networks. East Jerusalem suffers from a double marginalization. Israeli authorities often adopt discriminatory policies and PA policies are mainly addressed to the rest of the West Bank24.

Social and economic marginalisation of the city has contributed to the rise of many negative phenomena, e.g. drug use, violence, disorders and crime in the Palestinian community in Jerusalem.

Palestinian communities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip hold an idealized and false image of the city. This is due to the fact that the new generation of Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza does not know Jerusalem and has never seen or visited it.

The transformation process in the urban structure and population, characterised by a growing impoverishment of the population and by the lack of basic services and infrastructures (including education, water supply and sanitation, space for youth and children, primary health service and hospitals).

Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem lack citizenship. This exposes them to discriminatory practices and reduces the possibilities of having them participate in policy making, even at local level.

Since the closure of the “Orient House” there is not any representation of Palestinian Authorities in the city, and there is no agreed upon leadership in urban management.

Human rights violations and harassment of Palestinians by the Israeli security forces occur frequently.

There is a gap between Palestinian residents and the municipality, which is characterised as an illegitimate Israeli institution.

The loss of Palestinian heritage and cultural presence in the city is ongoing, particularly in the neighbourhoods mostly inhabited by the Palestinian population.

The risk of eviction of many Palestinian Jerusalemites due to conflicts on land property, occupation, lack of appropriate housing solutions and difficulties that Israeli urban regulations create for the construction or renewal of buildings that results in the irregularity of new buildings.

Israeli authorities are hostile towards Palestinian organisations and prohibit public activities by Palestinian organisations. Twenty-four civil society organisations were closed, 33 NGOs in Ramallah were forced to relocate and experienced a reduction in the capacity to support both Palestinian populations and Palestinian local committees and grassroots organisations.

The need for civil society organisations to provide answers to a wide range of demands, that involve in most cases an over-diversification of the activities carried out (in the absence of adequate capacities).

Mobility is restricted. It is difficult to gain access to the city and there is a disconnection of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.

Reliable and updated information on the processes of urban change in Jerusalem is scarce.

There is an inadequate allocation of resources both by donors and the PNA for CSOs and other institutions to serve the Palestinian community in the city, that also results in an increase of conflicts and competition among civil society actors.

24

Despite the “Strategic Multi-sector Development Plan for East Jerusalem” prepared in 2010 by the Jerusalem Unit of the Office of the President of PA, Jerusalem remains outside main Palestinian development policies.

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Most of CSO work and actions focuses on individual rights; they are far from being able to produce qualitative results on the collective rights level and to collectively empower, with the consequence of de-motivating both CSO activists and ordinary citizens.

The possibility of having civil society organisations adequately respond to these challenges is closely linked to:

increase of resources for supporting access to human resources and the launching of initiatives both on service delivery and policy issues, particularly focusing on the development of cooperative arrangements among civil society actors in East Jerusalem;

the possibility of identifying and implementing solutions for reconstructing space for policy dialogue in the East Jerusalem;

maintaining Jerusalem based CSOs and the strengthening of their capacities particularly regarding good governance, the link between social processes and policies; human rights and urban planning;

recovering civil society capacities, particularly regarding the access to information and knowledge; the access to qualified human resources; the reduction of dependency on external funding; the setting of arrangements for mitigating competition and improving coordination; and the building of more effective governance systems;

reconstruction of linkages between NGOs and Jerusalemite communities, enhancing the relationships between 2nd level organisations and “popular committees”;

increasing “international protection,” of the capacity to monitor urban transformation and social processes and of the capacity to mobilize international organisations and INGOs for supporting local CSOs.

Gaza

The siege on Gaza and its political division from the areas under the responsibility of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank seriously affected daily life and the development of the Gaza Strip. Gaza became a crowded enclave for about 2 million people, in which small villages and cities are agglutinating in a large and partially informal settlement, with little space for agriculture25, few economic activities (because of the blockade of goods entrance by Israel), complete dependency by foreign donors “humanitarian” aid and a local politically difficult situation. Civil society organisations are naturally affected by this situation. Some main processes emerge:

The political and geographical divide undermines the capacity of organisations to address the needs of their constituencies and at the same time the functioning of organisations; some NGOs were closed, some were threatened by the authorities to report them constantly and to select specific target groups in their activities; in some cases authorities even intervened in the mandate of CSOs; the coordination of branches of national organisations with Ramallah became difficult if not impossible. Trust among the organisations, with constituencies and with political authorities was lost.

The freezing of the legislative council and of most space for pluralistic political discussion undermines the possibility of CSOs establishing a functioning political dialogue and to actually exercise activities such as policy monitoring and contribution to policy setting . Some CSOs continue to carry out advocacy activities particularly in favour of special needs groups, but this must take place through direct contacts with authorities and without a public debate.

25 30 to 40% of the land in the Gaza Strip is considered agricultural land. In reality the expansion of inhabited areas together with the decrease of available water resources (both because of internal consumption and because of the water withdrawal from the Israeli neighborhoods) is producing a progressive reduction of this area and of its productivity.

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The difficulties in access and movement of goods and people prevent CSOs from access to qualified human resources, equipment and materials. The consequence is growing competition for qualified human resources, a progressive degradation of CSO infrastructures (offices, spaces for service provision, etc.), delay and untimely arrival of needed materials and equipment also for “humanitarian” activities. Moreover, access to human resources development opportunities is more difficult, as well as direct contact with donors and the participation in national and international events. Nevertheless, information and knowledge are accessible through Internet connection: electronic communication and local dissemination of information, knowledge and culture become in this framework an important intervention space for civil society organisations.

Dependency on external donors, and particularly on international organisations and international NGOs, is even more important than in the other areas of the oPt. Moreover, both the way the blockade is managed and the increasingly local urgent needs produced a fairly exclusive focus on “emergency” and “humanitarian” aid. Also, initiatives with a development potential are often carried out under this headline. This also impacted design of projects and their implementation, focusing always on a short time span and on immediate impact.

Dependency on external resources also results in increased competition for funding. It also creates a reduction of cooperation and information exchange among organisations, and in the fact that larger NGOs are often questioned for their strategic partnerships with donors and are asked to “channel” financial resources more than support the “development” of smaller organisations. A further consequence of the increased competition risks is increased sector fragmentation along numerous lines, the most common of which are factionalism, political affiliation or family affiliation and loyalty, in addition to local vs. national, religious vs. secular and traditional vs. Modern values.

Dependency on external resources and the local economy crisis also played a role in diffusing a “dependency culture.” Rather than increasing the subjectivity and mobilization capacity of citizens, the current situation feeds a growing attitude to wait for help, to not enter in conflict with local authorities, and to avoid taking initiative. This culture affects both CBO development (as a fact, many CBOs mention the resistance of their communities and constituencies as an issue) and the work of NGOs.

Development intervention sustainability became in this situation an empty phrase. While many organisations are achieving the capacity to continue to exist on the long-term (about 50% of local organisations were created more than 10 years ago) also thanks to the availability of a large donor community, their activities (and particularly those that are “programme” or process based, as mental health services or WASH activities) are frequently affected by stops and by the shortcomings of the lack of continuous funding (fund recovery from service provision is a diffused but ineffective practice in the local environment).

The weakness of local authority service provision and the dependency of service provision on external donors working through international organisations, international NGOs and local NGOs have a “de facto” influence the role CSOs can play. They tend to replace public authorities in service provision and tend to recede from internal “advocacy” for better quality or the respect of citizenship rights in public services. Local CSOs frequently carry out “advocacy” activities, but these activities are aimed at claiming assistance for certain special needs groups (i.e. people with disabilities), at claiming for the “end” of external politically related actions (such as the blockade or even in some cases the “division”) or at claiming for fair relationships among the local political authorities and NGOs (asking for the reopening of “closed” organisations, such as in the recent case of the “Sharek Youth Forum”).

The role of change catalysts emerges in the closure context as an important role that some CSOs (both CBOs and NGOs) are assuming. There many different ways to play such a role. These include fostering technological innovation, fostering social changes concerning gender and age, supporting active social integration of underprivileged groups, mitigating and

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reducing the long-term and structural effects of the “closure” of social space, and supporting access to information and knowledge.

5. An Analytical View of Palestinian Civil Society Organisations

The diffusion and geographical distribution of CSOs in the oPt As previously mentioned, all citizens’ organisations in the oPt are requested to register. Nevertheless, the specific number and distribution of organisations is not known; different estimates exist as well as different “ideas” about the number of organisations that really have activities. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, in September 2009 there were 2126 registered organisations (without distinction among 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th levels)26. Considering the various intervention sectors, the registered organisations have the following distribution (2006):

Sector Distribution of NGOs in 2006

Intervention Sector %

Education and Culture 22.1

Charity & Relief 18.3

Youth and sports 13.0

Children 9.8

Women 8.8

Health 7.1

Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment 6.0

Social Development and Assistance to Vulnerable Groups 5.8

Governance, Human Rights and Democracy 3.5

Research + Scientific Education 4.9 Source: Elaboration on the data provided by MAS, Mapping Palestinian NGOs in the WB and GS, 2007

It is apparent the prevalence of NGOs (and CBOs, considering that all the organisations are registered together) on sectors in which the delivery of social service is the main scope of activity. Less than 4 % of organisations are actively engaged in policy-related issues and putting together the organisations working on areas “policy sensible” as women, agriculture and environment and governance, the percentage remains under 20%. It should however be noted that in a growing manner in the last decade (and also most recently) activities concerning youth and sports and activities concerning culture acquired a role in policy making (particularly when looking at youth participation in local governance, at youth civic engagement, and at youth initiatives regarding peace). It should also be noted that over 23% of organisations are focusing their activities on relief or assistance to especially vulnerable groups (such as the disabled, elderly, etc.). The Mapping Study carried out by MAS also provides information on the geographic distribution of organisations among governorates. The MAS study as mentioned does not distinguish among 2nd and 1st level organisations. However, it considers the percentage of organisations that receive funds from external aid, and this can be considered as a “proxy” indicator of being a 2nd level organisation.

26 De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009. More recent data was not made available by the Ministry of Interior during the study.

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In the Northern West Bank region (Jenin, Nablus) there are a high number of organisations (250) but only about 24% are funded from external sources. About 130 organisations are based in the Central West Bank Region (Ramallah, El-Bireh), with over 70% of these organisations receiving funds from abroad (thus the percentage of 2nd level organisations here can be expected to be very high if compared with community based organisations). In Jerusalem the organisations total 63, but only 23% are receiving funds from outside sources (as in the north a prevalence of CBOs characterises the area). In the Southern West Bank, organisations reach over 230, with less than 50% receiving external funds. In the Gaza Strip over 380 organisations exist, more than 70% of them receive funds from international aid. Organisations receiving external funds are therefore mainly based in Ramallah and in the Gaza Strip, this is due to the fact that most national NGOs have headquarters in Ramallah and the second factor is the fact that the Gaza Strip has become a main target area for international aid in the 2000s. However, organisations are distributed in all of the oPt and their distribution doesn’t only depend on international funding and this suggests that a vibrant and vital civil society exists and it is less dependent in the “public discourse” on Palestinian civil society. While not distinguishing between first and second level organisations, the MAS mapping observes that a hierarchy among local organisations exists. Large professional NGOs working on the regional and national level are based in the Central West Bank with over 29% of the organisations in this area claiming to work at the national level. This percentage drops to about 4% in the North, 9% in the South (including Bethlehem) and to 7.8% in the Gaza Strip. According to MAS, the powerful, nationally oriented organisations act as patrons to smaller NGOs and CBOs spread throughout the remainder of the oPt27.

5.1. First level organisations A large number of grassroots organisations exist in the oPt. A rough typology should include the following:

informal groups existing in most communities in order to solve daily problems (school, water, etc.);

(local) popular committees working on land and agricultural issues (often having linkages with NGOs, or participating in campaigns);

village, community or “refugee camp” committees, involved in the delivery of services and relief activities on behalf of NGOs, public authorities and international organisations (such as UNRWA and UNICEF, that promoted the creation of committees for community based education and rehabilitation activities);

youth informal groups, particularly in schools and universities;

cooperatives working on agriculture and housing;

local Youth and sports clubs;

local women’s organisations;

local faith-based charities;

refugee camp CBOs (different from the committees considered above) involved in income generating activities28;

local relief organisations created by communities in an autonomous manner to foster the access to resources and help.

27 De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009. 28

UNRWA offers a wide range of social services by partnering with 103 CBOs in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip and the West Bank

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The “End the Division” March As in other Arab countries, the oPt witness the emergence of new movements that are not represented by parties and that seem to be scarcely represented by “registered” civil society organisations. These movements often are based on informal networks and on the use of the so-called Internet based “social networks” as a major communication mean. On March 15, 2011, a march was organised based on a Facebook page, called “End the Division.” Youths from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon participated. About 15,000 people were involved in the initiative. Source: Sherwood H., Guardian.co.uk, 24 February 2011

Mission and action relevance and coherence

Despite the “specialised names,” often CBOs carry out several types of activities, responding to local needs and orientations. This is the case for a CBO near Hebron that was formally registered with a focus on sports and youth and is involved in a wide range of activities, such as: sports activities (involving boys and girls); cultural and art activities (theatre, music dance, etc.), creation of women’s groups and development of income generation activities. The lack of specialisation and of a reference to a specific sector also emerges regarding the activity sectors, as in the following tables.

In the Gaza Strip none of the consulted CBOs specialises in one sector only, the majority of them are active in more than five sectors. As is apparent in the figure, the situation is partially different in the West Bank. Also in this case about 43% of CBOs are engaged in five sectors or more and another 18% are involved in four sectors. About 20% of the organisations are involved in two sectors and 5% in only one sector. CBOs are not specialised, but tend to practice few kinds of activities. Most CBOs are involved only in service delivery, sometimes “implementing contracts” for other organisations, particularly in the West Bank. Few CBOs carry out “policy focused” activities, such as policy monitoring, advocacy or the participation in local committees and other governance bodies are very few (about 6% in the West Bank and less than 10% in Gaza).

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In the Gaza Strip, the participation in local committees and advocacy activities appears slightly more diffused than in the West Bank.

Key Activity Areas of CBOs in the Gaza Strip - Food assistance, household livelihood and relief - Empowering women to undertake small-scale projects through vocational training and creation of

productive units - Psychosocial support and conflict resolution - Special education and rehabilitation services - Orphan sponsorship - Children’s activities, nurseries, mother and child protection - Providing elderly support program - Educational development activities and training - Advocating women and legal aid support - Providing nursery services - Production and marketing of organic agriculture and dissemination of agricultural good practices Source: focus group with CBOs in Gaza

From the focus groups and meetings carried out some more important elements emerge regarding the grassroots organisations’ actions, relevance, and coherence:

There is a strong linkage with communities and the orientation to respond to “community needs” is diffused, because of the involvement of community member in organisations.

Resources are limited and do cover actual projects expenses. Maintaining and developing CBO activities are not budgeted and have no alternative resources.

Many of the CBOs are not self-created but NGO level 2 or INGO created, when project or activity is over, the connection is over, too.

Internal political division is much more apparent at the CBO level. Activists in such groups are very often highly sensitive to political disputes leading to tensions within the same community.

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Despite this orientation, CBOs are unable to respond to local needs “because they are linked to donors’ agendas.” Moreover, this last fact entails that “the majority of CBOs are engaged in similar programs and are imitating each other in their activities.”

Even more worrying, local communities are in some areas increasingly dependent on donors in the definition of their own needs.

Gaza Strip Specific Features The consultation of CBOs and other civil society organisations in the Gaza Strip permits us to identify some issues that are particularly important at the local level: - CBOs are engaged in responding to relief and recovery activities, which increases the tendency of the

local community to be dependent on relief services and food assistance; in fact, most CBOs only carry out relief activities and do not actively promote local development;

- Lack of trust exists among CBOs and other civil society organizations, thus often access to funds is considered as the result of political affiliation or as guided by hidden agendas and by personal relationships.

- INGOs and donors are sceptical about working directly with local CBOs and they are now leaning towards delivering the services directly to the end beneficiaries and through local committees without engaging the local CBOs in the process.

- Many new CBOs are being registered and allowed to deliver same/similar activities and working in the same sector in the same region, resulting in duplication of efforts and resources, increasing the level of competition and in the fact that many CBOs have few or no real activity.

- Lack of space for dialogue is an obstacle in conciliation of conflicts emerging among CBOs. - Problems emerge in access to funds also for CBOs, due to the restriction and political divides. - Political divide and the split between Gaza and the West Bank is an obstacle for setting partnerships,

particularly with public authorities. - Political divide and the split produced a greater difficulty of organizations in representing their

constituencies, particularly when voices are to be raised in front of authorities. Source: focus group with CBOs in Gaza

Institutional dynamics and organisational consistency

Formal institutional requirements are generally respected by CBOs, as most of them have an assembly and governing bodies that are functioning according to the organisations by-laws (only four consulted CBOs state that their assemblies are not properly working). In some cases and in addition to the formal bodies, informal committees or executive committees exist for facilitating the work of organisations. Despite these institutional features, often CBOs are very dependent on the personality of founders (a dependency that is increased by the small number of members CBOs normally have. Most CBOs responding to the questionnaire have a membership under 15 units). Together with the focus on service delivery and the dependency on external resources, the small number of members and the dependency on one leader are factors contributing to the tendency to change the nature of CBOs to professionalised NGOs. Most CBOs have a relatively strong organisational consistency. Some have “executive committees” for managing activities. Most of them have an office, in some cases rented, often owned. Many have a relatively long-term permanence with 50% of consulted CBOs in the Gaza Strip created before 2000 and about 30% of the CBOs consulted in the West Bank were created prior to 2000. A further element for analysing the organisational consistency is the presence of an “organisational” ideal culture, represented by a set of shared ideal references and a set of defined objectives. Almost all CBOs consulted during the study have both. Few of the organisations lack ideal references (or that are not willing to define them in an explicit manner) with eight over the

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whole set of CBOs consulted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A further element to be stressed in this context is the fact that nearly all the CBOs expressed their ideal references in a secular manner, including the few faith-based and religious organisations participating in the focus groups and consultation activities. Communication is a further area in which the consistency of CBOs is also visible. In the West Bank, about 20% of the consulted CBOs have a website or a blog. Only 1% does not have an e-mail address. In Gaza, over 50% of consulted CBOs have a website.

Accountability and transparency While CBOs are generally considered to be able to work with communities closer than other organisations, their accountability and transparency have been questioned both by individual informants (mainly from second level organisations) and in the framework of focus groups (by the representatives of CBOs themselves). Lack of accountability and little transparency are considered mainly a feature of “established” CBOs, which tend to transform themselves to “NGOs.” However, for the smaller CBOs – like those set up or supported by international NGOs – accountability and transparency are not a real problem, they appear as dependent appendixes of other organizations, having little autonomy in the management of resources.

Funding A common feature emerging both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is the dependency of CBOs on other organisations – both Palestinian national NGOs and international organisations – for the financial resources needed to carrying out activities. The dependency on external actors implies in many cases the weakening of linkages with local communities and with the original constituency, as well as the growing “professionalization” (that perhaps is linked to a growing tendency to practice “paid voluntarism” rather than to the acquisition of new and more specialised knowledge) and the emergence of new situations of competition at the local level with (informal) “local committees.” In fact, many informants report that international NGOs and donors are growingly sceptical about working directly with “registered CBOs” and tend to directly deliver services to final beneficiaries or to pass through “local committees”, especially in areas where there is a suspicious CBOs that could be politically affiliated with Islamist political parties (perhaps, often these committees are artificially created as a service/benefit delivery tool). Competition over financial resources also influences the cooperation among CBOs. In all focus groups the lack of cooperation (including information sharing) was reported as a main issue. When looking at the data on the consulted CBOs, the importance of external funds is apparent: about 90% of CBOs in Gaza receive funds from international NGOs, while those receiving funds from international organisations are about 60%. The CBOs funded by international NGOs in the West Bank are over 50% and those getting funds from international organisations are about 40%. As expected, an important source of resources is represented by Palestinian NGOs (intermediate with international NGOs and international agencies). Direct fund recovery from service delivery is practiced in the West Bank by about 40% of CBOs and in the Gaza Strip by about 33% of organisations. Most CBOs used to collect funds from their members.

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The fact that most organisations declare receiving funds from international NGOs and international organisations is not an indicator of the autonomy of the CBOs. It seems on the contrary an indicator of two risky processes: the fact that – as referred both by CBOs and NGOs – often international agencies and NGOs prefer to “go directly” to the beneficiaries, skipping the national NGOs. It also shows that CBOs are increasingly changing their “nature” and assuming the function of NGOs, leaving a void at the grassroots level.

Partnerships CBOs maintain partnership relationships with various actors. This is shown in the following figures. Both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank the main partner of CBOs are Palestinian civil society organizations (which include other CBOs). The second partner is represented by international NGOs; however, these represent a partner for little less than 80% of CBOs in Gaza, while less than 60% of the organisations in the West Bank collaborate with international NGOs. A more similar situation exists between CBOs and international organisations. The following partner is represented by public authorities: in Gaza they partner with about 30% of CBOs, while in the West Bank the partnership increases to 40%, in addition to those involving local authorities, that concern about 30% of CBOs.

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Both in the West Bank and Gaza, an orientation of CBOs to participate in networks and coalitions also emerges from questionnaires. Of the CSOs consulted in Gaza about 15% do not take part in any network. Most organisations participate in local and sectoral networks (i.e. Community Rehabilitation Network, Child Protection Network, Cooperative Development Network or local CBOs networks) and networks that are related to their funding sources (i.e. INGO networks, Euromed, Handicap International, etc.). Some organizations are affiliated with national CSO unions (i.e. Cultural Centre Union, Farmers’ Union). The participation in networks and coalitions seems to somehow contrast with the tendency of CBOs to concentrate their activity on service provision. In fact, more than a way to carry out advocacy initiatives or to exert pressure over public authorities or other actors, networks and coalitions are used by CBOs as a gate for accessing funding opportunities. This also explains why very local and small organizations choose to participate in international networks. Another critical element influencing formation and participation in networks is the access and movement barriers created by Israel (checkpoints, walls, sieges, security interventions, etc.) which contributed to the development of new daily practices formed on the basis of absence of movement, the decrease of trust among actors and the tendency to consider geographic proximity and knowledge of the others as the main indicator for reliability of networks and distance cooperation.

Sector specificities As previously stated, most CBOs are engaged (or are willing to engage) in several sectors. Still, the activity of CBOs appears particularly strong in the following areas:

women and children’s issues;

education and health;

youth, sport and culture;

agriculture and rural development29;

assistance to vulnerable people (disabled, elders, homeless).

29 Also due to the presence of local cooperatives among CBOs

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The following table demonstrates the involvement of organisations in the various sectors, aggregating together those CBOs that were consulted in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

As it can be expected, in many cases the CBOs engaged in women’s issues also provide services for children. Those working on education engage in youth related activities, too.

Emerging needs In order to indentify the emerging needs for CBOs, we have to take into consideration the CBOs self-perceived strengths, weaknesses, advantages and obstacles/threats. These elements should then be interpreted considering the context and the “factual” elements emerging through the general analysis of organizations.

CBOs Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses Advantages Obstacles

West Bank

Experience Lack of permanent funding and dependency on external funding

Relevance of activities based on local demands

Israeli occupation and limited mobility

Connection with communities at local level

Lack or inadequacy of infrastructure (offices, equipment, etc.)

Location close to beneficiaries

Political orientation of funds

Internal governance and leadership

Fluctuating commitment of members in project implementation

In-kind resources are available for CBOs within their closest local authorities

Lack of support and competition by the public authorities

Strong relations with local authorities and good level of cooperation

Limited and insufficient resources under local authorities control

Internal political fragmentation and division

Cooperation and networking with other organisations, NGOs and international

Volunteers’ lack of capacity

Limited linkages with donors

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Despite the differences among geographic areas, both positive and negative elements are similar and somehow reflect the difficulties organisations face when looking at themselves as “project making bodies” rather than citizen’s organisations. The main differences concern the importance given in the Gaza strip to the political situation, including both the political divide within the oPt and the Israeli blockade, and to the relationships with international NGOs, that are both an important partner and a competitor as well as the “dependency” on external actors. Considering all this, probably, when thinking about the main needs of CBOs the most important seems to be that of reinforcing themselves in their nature as “citizens’ organisations” and avoiding their transformation to NGOs. Such a transformation in the nature of CBOs risks indeed producing several effects. Some of these are:

The further reduction of the possibilities for communities to have their voice heard by external actors (including public authorities, donors, the NGOs, etc.). This widens the gap existing among citizens and “service deliverers.”

The increase of dependency of communities on external actors and resources, because of the elimination of resources at the grassroots level and their “transfer” to a higher one.

The reduction of local absorption capacity through the elimination of local actors that due to their link with the community can mediate the intervention of external actors – such as public authorities and NGOs – that when directly intervene always risk to produce negative impact such as the creation of conflicts, the strengthening of client-patron relationships, etc.

The increase of competition for resources through the “proliferation” of NGOs that look for resources necessary to maintain the “organizations” rather than at impacting the communities to which they originally belong.

The decrease of quality of projects and local development interventions, since the new (local) organizations seldom have professional capacities existing in larger/more experienced NGOs and since these latter would not be able to find at the local level the needed “local capacities.”

An increase of conflicts within civil society, linked to the lack of recognition among organizations. New, local NGOs would easily not recognize the legitimacy of older (national) NGOs to intervene at the local level. Also, the latter would not easily accept a peer relationship with organizations not having the same capacities and resources (and de facto such a relationship would be a false one, biased as it is by the older and larger organizations).

organisations

Gaza

Internal governance and leadership

Lack of permanent funding and dependency on external funding

Relevance of activities based on local demands

Israeli blockade

Experience Lack of permanent staff

Political uncertainty

Connection with communities at local level

Inadequacy of infrastructure and equipment

Political conflicts and the closure of organisations

Cooperation and networking with other organisations, NGOs and international organisations

Lack of professional capacities

Little attention given to smaller organisations

Flexibility Dependency on external actors, including both donors and users

Concurrence of INGO engaged in direct implementation

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Considering all this, the intervention for strengthening CBOs would have to focus on the following capacity building needs.

Capacity Building Needs for 1st Level Organisations

West Bank Gaza Strip

Individual capacities

Needs analysis Needs assessment and analysis

Project management Project management

Policy analysis and monitoring Policy analysis and monitoring

Construction of a recognized volunteer profile

Construction of a recognized volunteer profile

Organisation capacities

Definition and strengthening of the organisation’s identity

Definition and strengthening of the organisation identity

Management of relations and negotiation with local authorities


Management and raising of local resources


Monitoring of services and processes in the communities

Monitoring of services and processes at the grassroots level

Needs linked to the context / Institutional environment

Recognition of local CBOs as actors and not as simple beneficiaries or project implementing agencies

Recognition of local CBOs as actors and not as simple beneficiaries or project implementing agencies

Strengthening and reconstruction of CBO relationships with communities

Constructing local dialogue space for facilitating interaction between CBOs and PNGOs/INGOs and the PA

Supporting the recognition of CBOs at local level by local authorities without passing for the registration process

Supporting the recognition of CBOs at the local level by local authorities without passing for the registration process

Construction of space for dialogue on development policy at community/local level involving CBOs and local authorities

Construction of space for dialogue on development policy at community/local level involving CBOs and local authorities

East Jerusalem represents in this framework a special case in which the following capacity building needs emerge:

Capacity Building Needs for 1st Level Organisations

East Jerusalem


Needs analysis

Project management

Policy analysis and monitoring

Hebrew language


Definition and strengthening of the organisation identity



Monitoring of services and processes in the communities

Advocacy and campaigning

Needs linked to the context / institutional environment

Strengthening and reconstruction of CBO relationships with communities

Form legal umbrella to facilitate and coordinate legal issues allowing CBOs to act formally and legally.

High level of policy analysis information and services to be disseminated among activists and CBOs.

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5.2. Second level organisations Many typologies have been built about civil society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.30 Mainly, they tend to distinguish among “NGOs” (including all citizen’s associations), professional organizations and trade unions (workers trade unions, professional associations, chambers of commerce, etc.), political parties and social movements. In this section of the report, the attention was focused only on a group of citizens organizations, including those characterised by being permanent, having a formal status (which in the Palestinian situation is represented by registration) and a structured organization, supporting a group of beneficiaries that is larger than and different from “organisation members.” Within these limits, it is possible to identify the following groups of organizations concretely:

charitable and welfare organisations (these organizations are not simply “self-help” groups or zakat committees);

service-provision associations and NGOs having a professional capacity, focusing on health care, child- care, education, etc.;

development NGOs and research organisations, that differs from the previous ones because they operate more clearly within “developmental” frameworks; this group often includes organisations that have no grassroots linkages (but are sometimes linked to universities);

human rights and democracy associations;

special issue and interest group organisations; focusing on women’s rights, youth and children's rights, detainee rights, land confiscation, and social and economic rights;

cultural Organizations (music, theatre, lectures, film, poetry, readings, exhibitions, art schools, etc.).

Taking into account the survey carried out in 2007 by MAS31, this whole set of organizations can be estimated at about 50 to 60% of the about 1,500 registered organizations. Of this total number, about 19.2% is composed of sports and youth clubs and 52% is composed of charitable societies. From these two categories of organizations only a few can be identified as “2nd level organizations.”

Mission and action relevance and coherence In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 2nd level organisations are engaged in all sectors, from scientific and technological research to education (particularly focusing on special education or on higher – graduate and post graduate education) to health, agriculture, water and environment, human rights and democracy, gender, youth-related issues, peace building, etc. Main sector articulation of Palestinian NGOs may be recognized as follows:

Agricultural, including a small number of large organisations, like PARC providing research and extension services, or the Palestinian Farmers Union, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (aggregating a large number of local committees and cooperatives); in recent years some new, smaller organisations focusing on agriculture emerged, specialising in organic agriculture or on specific crops and other “development organisations” like MAAN are intervening in the sector (for instance fostering the adoption of innovative agricultural practices – as fish ponds – in the context of relief activities).

Children Care, Development and Protection, including organisations working on Education (e.g. Al Muntada – Young Scientists’ Club), organisations supporting mother and child (ECRC,

30

Source: “Civil Society in Palestine, a Literature Review” by Dr. Jamil Hilal. 31 MAS, Mapping of Non Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Ramallah, 2007

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Mother Guidance & Child Care Society), organisations working on “special needs” (i.e. the Arab society for Orphans or the Care for Children with Special Needs Society) and organisations working on children’s rights protection (e.g. Defence for Children International – Palestine).

Cultural, which include a number of organisations fostering art and culture, with a focus on the promotion and maintenance of the Palestinian cultural identity, on peace culture and on cultural dialogue. In this group organisations such as the Khalil Sakakini Centre or the Sabreen Association have found their space.

Educational, which include both organisations that directly deliver education services (such as the “Al-Quds Open University” or the many smaller NGOs managing schools and training courses, particularly focusing on “community education”) and organisations working on the innovation and improvement of public education (e.g. the Teacher Creativity Centre or Alwarid).

Health, in which most organisations have been involved for years in providing primary health care to the Palestinian population and in recent times has been specialising in the provision of care activities to special groups or in remote areas. Organisations include for instance the Health Work Committees (HWC) and the Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC), and more specialised organisations such as the “Gaza Mental Health Programme” or many rehabilitation and “community rehabilitation” organisations.

Social Assistance and Development, in which organisations are engaged in supporting disadvantaged groups or in mitigating emerging social problems (organisations in this sector include ATTA working with the elderly, the PFPPA working on family planning, the Palestinian Counselling Centre or the Centre for Community Service – Jerusalem or MA’AN).

Human Rights, Democracy and Governance, includes a large number of organisations working both on legal defence (Addameer, Jerusalem Legal Aid, Al Haq), on advocacy activities (Al Haq, Hurryyat, MIFTAH, etc.) and on research and training initiatives (Muwatin, BADIL, MUSAWA).

Environmental, mainly includes research institutes, such as ARIJ (Applied Research Institute), Land Research Centre or the Palestinian Hydrology Group; often the organisations engaged in this sector work with those engaged in agriculture.

Women, includes a relatively large number of organisations – ranging from feminist to Muslim women’s organisations are involved in some main kinds of activities: advocacy of women’s rights; education and empowerment of women and of women’s CBOs; legal defence and protection of women.

Youth, includes organisations involved in organising Youth and in advocating the recognition of youth as an actor in Palestinian society; in this framework both are active “old” organisations such as the Palestinian Youth Union and “new” organisations such as PYALARA (focusing on Media) or Sharek (focusing on “participation” and integration of Youth in social and political life, as its name indicates).

Peace Building, more than a specific sector, this an area of engagement with organisations often involved in other sectors.32 This is the case for PANORAMA and PalVision, which are involved also in human rights and democracy and in youth initiatives, or of the Palestinian Hydrology Group, which mainly focuses on water resources.

32 “Peace building” activities and NGOs are currently under discussion in Palestinian civil society. Peace building and particularly “people to people” peace activities are often blamed of risking to “normalise” the situation linked to Israeli occupation or of producing a false reality, not recognizing the actual situation of the Palestinian territories that suffer from the occupation of main cities, the separation wall, the blockage of main roads and of the siege of the Gaza strip. Also see: Ophir A., Givoni M., Hanafi S., The Power of Inclusive Exclusion. Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Zone Books, New York, 2009.

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If we look at most 2nd level organisations, an articulation of activities across different sectors is frequent, both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Those focusing on just one sector are few and mostly refer to special intervention areas, such as health and rehabilitation.

In regards to sector specialisation, a difference emerges among the geographical areas of the oPt. While in the West Bank the 2nd level organisations tend to maintain their specialisation fields, in East Jerusalem and in Gaza their tendency is to intervene in an integrated manner, focusing on more than one sector. Particularly, this is linked to “relief” activities in the Gaza Strip and to interventions concerning “urban condition” in East Jerusalem, where the initiatives on urban environment, social services and legal protection of human rights often merge. The integration and flexibility of actions is to be considered in this framework as a coping strategy for increasing the relevance of NGO activities in front of local demands. “Community Demands” are a main element in the identification of 2nd Level Organisation activities. They constitute a basis for project identification for about 57% of organisations in the West Bank and for about 48% of organisations in the Gaza Strip. Another diffused measure for project formulation is represented by diagnostic studies that are used by 66% of the organisations in the West Bank and 70% of those in the Gaza Strip. However, the relevance of activities and their coherence with organisations’ mission is somehow reduced. Most organisations discussed in meetings, focus groups and literature, need to adhere to donors’ agendas. 60% of organisations in the Gaza Strip and about 57% of organisations in the West Bank consider a key reference in the formulation of their projects the existing funding opportunities.

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Relevance of activities is assured also by the interaction of different modalities for project identification. Both in Gaza and the West Bank, about 60% of organisations use at least three modalities for project identification. Those basing project identification are just about 11% of the total.

When looking at the types of activities carried out, it emerges that 2nd level organisations mainly play the role of “service providers.” As it appears in the following table, almost all organisations carry out “service delivery” activities, but a smaller percentage are involved in advocacy activities, policy monitoring or in the work of local policy dialogue or governance bodies .

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It is noticed that a relatively large share of organisations are engaged both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in carrying out “advocacy” activities. However, these activities mainly include the participation in national and international campaigns against the Israeli occupation, the participation in local communication and awareness raising campaigns (on gender, people with disabilities, environment and water, etc.) or the claim for services on special needs (e.g. rehabilitation care). Advocacy is therefore often to be considered as another means to deliver services, through the performance of communication. Another element to be recalled is that over 70% of organisations carry out their activities in force of “contracts” and “project funding agreements” with other bodies. This further reduces the space for autonomous intervention in policy dialogue. In addition to the focus on service delivery, a further element that reduces the policy role of civil society organisation is the difficulty they experience in implementing strategic plans and in introducing long-term plans in short-term programming. While almost all organisations define “long-term plans” and have strategic plans, less than 10% have short-term programming and monitor the strategy implementation (indeed, the stronger NGOs practice these activities). In Gaza particularly, the planning process is jeopardized by the permanent crisis, the emergency situation, and by the fact that activities (also when continuous service provision) are only “project based” and addressed at satisfying immediate needs.

Institutional dynamics 2nd level organizations show in most cases long-term permanence. In the West Bank about 50% of organizations were created before 1994 (some of them were in the past registered with Israeli authorities; some organisations are still based or working in East Jerusalem). Those created from the year 2000 to 2007 consist about the 30% in the West Bank, and those created after 2007 are a small minority, about 4%. In the Gaza Strip, 2nd level organizations are younger and about 40% were created between the years 2000 and 2007, those created after 2007 are the 7% and those created before 2000 consist of about 50%.

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The presence of a large number of organisations with a long history implies the emergence of a generational issue. In most organisations the founders are still active and still play a leadership role. As a consequence, the change of (actual) leadership is difficult, so that often younger professionals tend to create new organisations (producing a proliferation of new NGOs) or tend to follow new emerging professional opportunities, including those in other NGOs and in international NGOs. This produces a high staff turnover and a low capacity to retain staff in Palestinian CSOs. Related to this issue, both from the interviews and from the documentary analysis33, a tendency to centralise power was observed. In many organisations a small group of people actually influence decision-making. This is often due to the presence and permanence in the organisation of the original leaders and founders. This tendency is further reinforced by the fact that the “founders” and leaders are the ones with longer experience, maintaining the public relations and holding the greater access to donors. This tendency is also reinforced by the fact that most organisations do not have a large membership basis and have a board that is made up of prestigious individuals, coming from the NGO sector, from the academic environment and (in some cases) from political parties34. This fact results in practice to double centralisation of authority and decision-making. Not only few people participate in decision making in each single organisation, but in general few people participate in the setting of decisions and the agenda. Such a generational issue seems to be scarcely impacted by the fact that all NGOs have a formal status and an institutional structure that is “formally” regularly working (almost 95% of the consulted organizations declared to have functional institutional bodies, such as assemblies or boards of directors). In many cases – particularly in Gaza – organisations have highlighted the fact that rules, procedures and administrative and membership criteria are not responsive to the ongoing progress of the organisations activities anymore.

Organisational consistency As easily expected, organisational consistency is not uniform in these second level organisations. A number of NGOs – particularly the key ones and the oldest ones – can be considered as large pools of resources, including both professional capacities and financial resources (among older NGOs the availability of an endowment producing a constant flow of financial resources is not rare, also even if normally the resources produced in such a way are not enough for sustaining the organisations activities), many NGOs are also told to be “one man” organisations, “one project” organisations or “family businesses.” This last point seems particularly to be the case of NGOs created after 1994. A feature of these organisations has been recognized by most consulted informants in their lack of participation in coalitions and umbrella organisations. It is to be pointed out that these organisations are very visible in the public debate, but are not so visible in the consultation activities nor in the field. While many organisations registered themselves in networks and data bases as the one established by NDC (that is often viewed by NGOs as a portal for accessing funds), these organisations tend not to participate in activities that are not immediately linked to funding. It is the case, for instance, of the same distribution of the questionnaire carried out for this mapping exercise, so that this group of organisations are underrepresented.

33 Hanafi S., Tabar L., The emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite. Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs, Institute of Jerusalem Studies – Muwatin, 2005. 34

This is due, in some cases, to long term relationships existing between parties and NGOs: some NGOs were created as “party social organizations.”

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As a fact, most organisations that participated in the consultation showed good organisational consistency, from different points of view:

the majority of organisations existed for a long period of time (those created after 2006 are less than 1 % in the Gaza Strip and 4% in the West Bank and East Jerusalem35);

almost all of them (100% in the Gaza Strip, 90% in the West Bank) have a complex “organisational culture” represented by a set of cultural and ideological references and by a set of principles guiding their actions and establishment of objectives; such a culture seems mostly to be coherent with organisations’ mandates and activities 36 ;

the great majority of organisations (72% in the Gaza Strip, 74% in the West Bank) have a long-term or strategic plan;

all organisations, in both the considered areas, maintain at least one office and have permanent staff (organisations with 10 to 30 paid workers consist of 23% in the Gaza Strip and the 35 % in the West Bank);

most organisations participate in networks and coalitions (74% in the Gaza Strip; 76 % in the West Bank).

Accountability and transparency

All CSOs are reporting their financial statements and audited reports annually. The majority have reports addressing the organisational activities and funding. They regularly report donor reporting and disseminate information to donor and related officials. Moreover, when looking at the best-known organisations, the reported strength was often the “accountability” and the trust relations with donors and beneficiaries. Nevertheless, for most organisations the publication and disclosure of reports and information to the general public appears to be poor. This partly explains why since the beginning of 2000s, Palestinian NGOs and charities were heavily criticized for not being accountable and transparent. According to recent AMAN studies, the most common opinion in Palestinian population is that NGOs are corrupt and unaccountable, and the misuse of funds is among the most common reason/s for the closure of NGOs and charities by the Palestinian National Authority. In addition to the poor capacity to disclose information and reports, different elements contribute to this situation:

the small membership (among the organisations responding to the questionnaire those with more than 20 members are below the 10 %);

35 The difference between the percentage of new organizations in Gaza Strip and Ramallah can be explained by two main reasons. The first is access to funds: in Gaza most available resources are aimed at “humanitarian” aid and often are channelled through INGO, NGOs and IO that prefer to partner with community-based grassroots organization and do not ask them to officially register, and the possibility for these organizations to extend their range of action and became autonomous is very low because of the existing restrictions. In the West Bank, more often local organizations tend to “grow up” assuming the shape and functions of an NGO and extending their range of action to wider geographical areas. The second is the bureaucratic process related to registration that despite the harshening of controls on organisations in the current political conditions seems to be easier in the West Bank. 36 The great majority of 2nd level organisations refer to secular principles and cultures. This may have different reasons, including: the diffusion of a mainstream “civil society” culture; the fact that donors are normally considered to be suspicious about faith based organisations, so that religious motivations are underrepresented when presenting the organisations; the political origin of a number of CSOs in Palestine and their reference to a “national” rather than to a “religious” identity; the fact that a gap exists among “civil society” and the “religious organisations”, which are in some cases directly affiliated to political parties (e.g. Hamas) or in other cases directly linked with religious institutions (the waqf) and tend not to participate in the many spaces (discussion fora, journals, networks, seminars and workshops, training activities, etc.) in which the “Civil Society Community” concretizes its existence.

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the unclear constituency (few organisations are linked to specific beneficiaries or social groups, many function as a “shop” providing professional services);

the availability of a great quantity of resources (according to MAS estimations annual funding for Palestinian CSOs is around 210 Million Euros) coming from external donors, in ways that are not always transparent for local actors;

the increase of funds for relief activities, which implicate fast delivery, limited controls and evaluation activities, frequent conflicts between stakeholders (in many cases the targeting of resources is a reason of conflict between the local authorities and the service provider or the hostility/lack of trust of those that are not targeted), etc.;

the lack of publicity and visibility of activities and their impact;

the increased presence of international NGOs, which impacted the labour market for NGO professionals, draining qualified resources from local organisations and diffusing higher expectations concerning fees and the image of rich NGO professionals.

The increase in accountability and transparency is a main focus of the programme of NGO Development Centre (World Bank, PNGO IV). This programme will be aimed at increasing the application of the NGO Code of Conduct. A main tool used for this aim will be the establishment of a “rating system” among NGOs, rewarding their transparency and accountability. However, the establishment and application of such a rating system will imply the emergence of some problems regarding the legitimacy of the actor that will be charged of the evaluation and rating of NGOs.

Funding Funding is identified by most organisations as a problem, both because of the lack of “core funds” and because of the dependency of funding from projects. Some organisations do have an endowment that allows them to have at least a basis of funds not dependent on projects (e.g. PARC, the Welfare Alliance). Nevertheless, looking at the organisations’ budget, most of them declare it is stable in time and about 25% of Second level organizations in the West Bank declare that their budget increased in the last years. Concerning funding sources, about 60% of organisations rely on a plurality of funding (more than three external sources). Nevertheless, about 13% depend only on one type of funding source, and about 30% depend on only two funding sources: these are principally international NGO and the international organisations.

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Many organisations also receive member contributions. When providing services to the public, they also receive recovery funds from service delivery (including services not related to the core activities of organisations, such as renting equipment or hall); none of these sources however constitute an important part of organisations’ budgets (in Gaza for instance, organisations declared that these two sources cover less than 10% of costs of the organisations functioning, while 80 to 85% of resources needed for the functioning of organisations depended on external donors).

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Main donors in the West Bank The donors that 2nd level organizations more frequently refer for project funding in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are: - NGO Development Centre (that channels funds from many international donors); - Welfare Association; - UNDP and the UN Agencies (UNDEF, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNESCO, etc.); - USAID (directly and through intermediary NGOs); - European Union; - Arab and Islamic organizations (particularly on relief activities) Other funding sources include the bilateral agencies of European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, France, Spain, Italy), the European NGOs (e.g.. Save the Children, Diakonia, IEPALA, Kvinna till Kvinna, ICCO, etc.) and the Swiss and Norwegian Cooperation and NGOs (e.g. Norwegian People’s Aid).

Main donors in the Gaza Strip The donors that 2

nd level organizations more frequently refer for project funding in the Gaza Strip are:

- UNDP and the UN Agencies (UNRWA, UNDEF, UNICEF, UNIFEM, etc.); - Local public authorities - Islamic Relief - NGO Development Centre; - Arab and Islamic development funds; - USAID (directly and through intermediary NGOs); - European Union, with a large presence of ECHO - European Bilateral Agencies (often through European NGOs) - European and International NGOs (funds from campaigns) Other funding sources include the local authorities of some European countries, the bilateral agencies of many non-European countries and private sponsors. While many funding sources are similar, in Gaza a larger percentage of funds are destined for “relief” activities, including food aid and the “job creation” initiatives aimed at involving people in paid communal activities. The lack of funding for “development” and organisational development initiatives was claimed in individual meetings, focus groups and questionnaires as a main issue for the Gaza organisations.

Partnerships

In the West Bank and Jerusalem, 75% of 2nd level organisations participate in partnerships and coalitions. Only about 23% declare not to have linkages with networks or coalitions. In the Gaza Strip, the participation in networks and coalitions is even higher; 84% of organisations are taking part in one or more partnership. Over 77% of organisations have as main partners international NGOs. However, about 60% of organisations maintain a permanent relationship with more than two types of partners and the organisations only maintaining links with INGO are a small minority (less than 5 %). In the West Bank, about 63% of 2nd level organisations support smaller NGOs and CBOs and just few organisations – about 11% are not providing any support to smaller NGOs and CBOs (mainly these organisation are involved in very specific cultural activities or in the direct provision of services to the public, as in the case of some charitable organisations). In the Gaza Strip the percentage of NGOs supporting smaller NGOs and CBOs decreases to less than 30%, while the 36% formally declare that they do not provide support to other NGOs.

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This most significant difference between Gaza and West Bank 2nd level organisations may be mainly attributed to their nature and activities. In the West Bank an important share of organisations consists of:

national organisations and of organisations based on the aggregation of smaller groups (e.g. PARC, the Palestinian Farmer Union, Sharek, AMAN, Ma’an);

organisations that have as a clear mandate of providing support and resources to other organisations (as in the very different cases of Al Qattan Foundation, of the NDC or of the Welfare Association);

organisations that are based in urban areas (i.e. primarily Ramallah and the heads of governorates and work “through” local organisations, that need to be supported.

In the Gaza Strip, on the contrary:

an important percentage of organisations are local or are local branches of national organisations (these local branches are often increasing their autonomy because of the closure of the Gaza Strip and of the political “division”);

many organisations are directly involved in service delivery;

in many cases, moreover service delivery in the Gaza Strip is related to relief operations, so that actors involved at the very community level are assuming the role and shape of “beneficiary committees” supporting aid distribution more than the role of local partners;

smaller organisations are often able to directly access international donors and NGOs because of their local presence, so they refer for support directly to them, skipping the intermediation of national or larger organisations (e.g. women’s organisations with UNIFEM, UNICEF and UNRWA).

However, in the Gaza Strip there are also examples of larger organisations empowering local and smaller CBOs and examples of partnerships in which the autonomous statute and the capacity of local smaller CBOs are recognised exist. Examples can be identified as the collaboration of the Gaza Mental Health Programme with local committees, the experience of “community based rehabilitation” initiatives, those of women’s organisations, and the collaboration of small local agricultural cooperatives with national organisations. Despite the orientation to collaborate with smaller organisations that emerge among the largest ones, particularly in the West Bank a phenomenon clearly emerges that of the lack of trust of older and greater NGOs in the new emerging ones. New NGOs are frequently described as “one man” organisations or initiatives and are accepted with difficulty both in the larger NGO networks (PNGO has a closed membership, applicants should be accepted by the existing members – now about 90 organisations are involved in PNGO activities, mainly sharing the same general features) and in specialised networks and coalitions (such as the coalition of human rights organisations, in which less than 10 organisations participate). In addition to partnerships between organisations that are mainly focused on projects, most organisations participate in coalitions and networks. These include:

local coalitions (such as the Coalition for Jerusalem and the local coalitions referring to other geographical areas as the “Union of Tulkarem Institutions”);

thematic coalitions and coordination bodies (such as the Union of Local Committees for rehabilitation, PENGON, the youth NGO networks, human rights and women’s organisations’ networks);

issue or campaign based coalitions (e.g. the “Stop the Wall Campaign” or the Boycott Campaign, Violence against Women Forum, Establishment of Abortion Coalition; the Coalition for Fostering Legal Reforms on Penal Code and Family Law);

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international networks, both based on geographic and cultural areas (i.e. EuroMed Forum, Union for the Mediterranean, or the “Arab NGOs Network”) or on themes (i.e. Habitat International Coalition, etc.);

networks related to donors or projects (i.e. Anna Lindh Foundation Palestinian National Network, the Humanitarian Country Team within OCHA, the NDC network, etc.);

the national platforms, such as PNGO (PNGO participation is not a very important phenomenon in the West Bank, because if closed to a limited number of NGOs, it is very important in the Gaza Strip, where almost 65% of NGOs take part in this network), the Union of Charitable Societies and the Union of Palestinian Civil Societies.

Sector specificities

Agriculture and Environment

Within this sector, a clear leadership emerges of few large organisations at the national level, such as PARC, the Union of Agricultural Committees (UAWC), the Land Research Centre and the Palestinian Hydrology Group. According to a MAS 2007 survey and 2009 study that tracked the external aid to Palestinian NGOs, most funds are channelled through only four organisations. Some of the larger organisations, such as PARC and UAWC, have a nationwide network of smaller organisations through which final beneficiaries are targeted. In addition to the large national organisations, smaller organisations are emerging as an active actor for innovation and the construction of food security conditions. These include cooperatives focusing on biological and organic agriculture, on oil production, etc. In many cases, these smaller organisations are supported by academic institutions (i.e. the Community Development Centre at Bethlehem University) or are involved in international technical and scientific networks. Collaborations among these groups and the national organisations often exist. Within this sector a growingly important action is concerning the mitigation of the effects of the “Separation Wall” and the actions against the wall. Actors engaged in agriculture and environment are involved in all geographic areas of the oPt, in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Good governance

Good governance and the better functioning of the Palestinian National Authority and local authorities is a relatively small sector, mainly involving national organisations and their local branches. Leading organisations include: AMAN Coalition, the BISAN Centre for Research and Development, Muwatin (Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy), PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs). These organisations work in very different ways, while AMAN is directly involved in monitoring public services and public bodies and in promoting campaigns for transparency and accountability, the others are more often engaged in policy research and in activities for directly influencing policy makers. A focus on the reform and management of judiciary system is characterising MUSAWA (Palestinian Centre for the Independence of Judiciary and Legal Profession). The organisations engaged in good governance are mainly based in Ramallah and in general this sector is relatively weak in the Gaza strip, where only the AMAN Coalition works. Human Rights

The conflict situation, the many violations of human rights linked to Israeli occupation of the oPt and to the maintenance of a permanent political emergency situation in the West Bank and Gaza made human rights a field of action for most organisations. Specialised organisations are active in this field but so are most of the other ones. For organisations working on the agriculture and

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environment, as well as for those working on child development or on health, human rights monitoring, advocacy and fostering is a central theme of action. A more focused action on human rights is carried out by many organisations on the whole Palestinian Territory. Among specialised organisations, Al-Haq Institute plays a leading role. Other key organisations include: BADIL (Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights), MIFTAH, Addameer Prisoner’s Support and Human Rights Association, Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Centre, Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza. Within this sector, organisations working on specific areas, like gender and women’s rights (such as the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling) and those working on workers’ rights (such as the Democracy and Workers’ Rights Centre), are also to be mentioned. Another important actor in this sector is the Institute of Law of Birzeit University37, which provides research and training support to human rights organisations. Children and Youth

Children and youth has been in the last decade a growing sector in the oPt civil society. Out of the many NGOs and charitable societies involved in the provision of child care activities and services (that absorb an important share of external aid to the oPt), some organisations are assuming a key role because of the innovativeness and the policy impact of their work. These are: Sharek Youth Forum; PYALARA; and Defence for Children International – Palestine section. Health

Health service provision has been for a long time a most important area for civil society organisations in the oPt. However, after the creation of the National Palestinian Authority many health centres and hospitals previously managed by NGOs and charitable societies were transferred to the public authorities (according to MAS, the transfer of many health activities to the PNA produced a sensible reduction in the number of NGOs after 1994). Key civil society actors in this sector include: the Health Work Committees (HWC), the Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC), the Palestinian Counselling Centre (PCC) – which are directly involved in the management of care centres; the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) – mainly working as a resource centre; and the Gaza Mental Health Programme – working as a care and innovation centre in the Gaza Strip, mainly with a focus on community-based care and on the health – rights relationship. Many other organisations exist focusing on special groups and on rehabilitation services. These many organisations tend to complement the health care activity managed by public authorities. Among care providers, informal coordination often exists at the local level on targeting beneficiaries and on care delivery. Women’s rights

As discussed, women’s rights and gender issues are the focus of a number of organisations that increased in the last decade. Key organisations in this sector continue to be the oldest, often having a feminist perspective. These organisations are better able to link the provision of services for protecting and supporting women with policy work, focusing on the status of women in the Palestinian society and in the family38.

37

http://lawcenter.birzeit.edu/iol/en/index.php 38 Palestinian women organizing in Jerusalem, UNDP – PAPP / Kvinna till Kvinna, 2010.

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Key organisations include the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, the Palestinian Working Women Society for Development, SAWA, Union of Palestinian Women Committees. Apart from campaigns on specific issues (the family law) women’s organisations tend not to organise a permanent coalition or coordination. Peace building

Since the beginning of the 1990s peace building has been an important focus of international donors in the oPt. This implied the development of a specific group of organisations within Palestinian civil society, as well as a wide debate on the effectiveness of peace building activities. Particularly the initiatives working on “people to people” peace building have been criticized and blamed for “normalizing” the current situation of occupation and a special principle was included in the “Code of Conduct of Palestinian NGOs” against the participation in initiatives for “normalisation.” Despite the vivid discussion on peace building, some of the main organisations involved in peace activities are engaged in the mainstream association of Palestinian NGOs, including Panorama Centre for the Dissemination for Democracy and Community Development that in cooperation with the Israeli Peres Centre for Peace has assumed the leadership of the Palestinian Israeli Peace NGO Forum39. Palestinian NGOs involved in the Forum include: Al-Quds Association for Dialogue and Democracy; Al Tareeq, the Youth Forum for Development, the Centre for Applied Research in Education, FOEME - Friends of the Earth Middle East40, International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPPC), The Jerusalem Centre for Women, PPC Vision, Shorouq Charitable Society for Women, Centre for Democracy and Community Development, Water and Environmental Development Organization (WEDO). An important element regarding the Palestinian NGOs involved in the Palestinian Israeli Peace NGO Forum is the relatively short duration. All of them save a few were established after 2004. The recent foundation of most of these organizations is a further element of potential conflict with the larger national organizations, which were mostly created as part of the resistance movement for the liberation of Palestine. Most of these latter organizations may have occasional collaboration with Israeli organizations – particularly in advocating human rights or in the legal protection of Palestinian citizens in Israeli courts – but refuse to have permanent partnerships with them.

Emerging needs Asked about their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, 2nd level organisations reported the following.


WES

T B

AN

K A

ND

EA

ST

JER

USA

LEM

Effective leadership Project focus Relevancy of service activities

Absence of government support / hostility of government to non affiliated organisations

Access to information

Inability to respond to the demands

Networking and coordination

Difficulty in finding qualified professionals

Knowledge Lack of “core funding” and the dependency on

“Global support” available for supporting causes -

Spread of a culture of dependency -expectations by

39 http://www.peacengo.org/history.asp 40

This organization based in Bethlehem is not part of the PENGON (Palestinian Environmental NGO Network) which is associated with Friends of the Earth International. FOEME is blamed for the collaboration with Israeli NGOs.

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donors International support to oPt

partnerorganisations

Experience Gap among plans and actual activities

Availability of knowledge resources for capacity building

Little societal and private sector support

Neutrality Lack of evaluation and capitalization of experience

Reduced mobility because of the Israeli occupation

Good relations with local institutions

Inadequate communication

Political situation and instability

Ability to network with national and international NGOs

Weak knowledge and information management

Changes in donor policies and procedures

Professional staff Internal democracy Cultural resistances to change

One man show, or one group show

Competition with public bodies and the other CSOs

Unclear mandate and specialization area

Politicisation of society and affiliation processes

Duplication and tendency to replicate activities as long as there is funding available

Lack of trust of old and greater NGOs towards the new emerging NGOs

GA

ZA S

TRIP

Capacity to represent local actors and community trust

Limited resources in front of the needs

Available human resources at community level

Political divides

Services responding to local needs

Dependency of most organisations on projects

Existence and diffusion of local committees

Closure of Gaza Strip

Availability of qualified staff and experience of most organisations

Weak donor relationship of many, particularly smaller organisations

Presence of forms of coordination and cooperation at sector level

Competition with new established NGOs

Unbalanced distribution of skills among organisations, particularly for policy analysis, project design, advocacy, training

Presence of international organisations

Poor communication between Gaza and West Bank/ geographical divide

Networking/ partnership with INGO

Weak administration of resources by most organisations

Lack of benchmarking

Coordination

Dependency on volunteers and temporary staff: excessive staff turn over

Restriction imposed by local authorities / local authorities interventions and pressure

Geographical coverage

Weak Monitoring & Evaluation in most projects

Limited access to information on donors

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Independence

Weak communication capacities and little capacity to involve media

Limits imposed on women staff

Inadequacy of equipment for many organisations

Dependency on relief services/ limited resources for long term activities

Inadequacy of procedures and management systems in most organisations

Limited resources for organisation development / knowledge management

Donor procedures / lack of common standards

Presence of unreliable organisations & implementing agencies

Capacity building needs for 2nd level organisations

Capacity building has been a main focus of attention for the donors – and particularly for the World Bank – during the last decade. The efforts for strengthening Palestinian NGOs have been centred on two main areas:

transparency and governance (it is in this framework that the NGO Code of Conduct was formulated);

service delivery and project implementation (it is in this framework that NDC identified needs concerning project management, proposal writing, project/programme design).

Both of these two areas continue to be relevant in order to increase the capacity of 2nd level organisations to provide services to the Palestinian population, particularly when considering the emergence of large groups of special needs people – such as people with disabilities or the victims of the specific processes linked to Israeli occupation (the closure of space in the West Bank, the multiple social exclusion processes in East Jerusalem, the blockage of Gaza) – that the public authorities are unable to serve, and when considering the fact that a State is still in an early building stage should need to concentrate on priority public services, leaving some work to other actors (e.g. for instance in the education sector, concentrating on primary and secondary education, leaving “pre-school” activities and “open university” initiatives to other actors, or – in the health sector – leaving “community based rehabilitation” and “primary health care” to local non state actors). A prevalent focus on the service delivery is also shared by the 2nd level organisations when they identify their capacity building needs. Both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, organisations main self-detected needs concern: fund raising, project design and project management, monitoring and evaluation, and then - in a different way in the two geographical areas: training and capacity building, human resource management, external communication, strategic planning. Few organisations identify needs regarding the capacities for advocacy, because policy analysis as well as a limited number is interested in volunteers’ and activists’ management.

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Training and Capacity Building Needs Identified by 2nd Level Organizations (%)

Gaza West Bank

Fund raising 77 72

Project Management/Project Design 68 50

External Communication 51 45

Monitoring and Evaluation 38 49

Training and Capacity Building 52 33

Strategic Planning 49 32

Organisation Management/ Leadership 41 26

Human Resource Management 24 36

Financial Management 35 22

Advocacy 17 32

Policy Analysis 21 27

Activists/Volunteers Management 18 24

The extensive experience of NGOs and charity organisations in providing services and in substituting the “State” since the early decades of XX century, together with strong linkages with academic institutions, contributed to pooling important capacities and knowledge within Palestinian civil society to fulfil these roles. As a matter of fact, a large share of social services are provided in the oPt by NGOs (according to estimates more than 90% of services to groups such as people with disabilities, women, children). However, the role of service provider is just one of the roles that 2nd level civil society organisations should play. Other roles of civil society organisations linked to their specific linkage with “citizens” and “communities” concern governance, advocacy, policy making, and policy or public service monitoring. It is particularly in these roles that civil society organisations can assume the status and function of a policy actor, capable to represent and to bring to attention the specific perspectives of those parts and spheres of society that are only partially represented in political institutions. As presented above, many 2nd level organisations carry out advocacy activities, and fewer participate in other policy functions related to the representation of citizens in front of public actors. In a large part of the oPt, spaces for participatory governance do not exist41. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of advocacy activities shows that very often they concern the issues linked with Israeli occupation (e.g. the violation of human rights, the degradation of land resources or the conflicts on space) and the Palestinian cause in front of the international community, while to a lesser extent they regard the functioning of local authorities and more in general local governance and development policies. Moreover, despite the fact that the word “governance” often appears in international initiatives on civil society in the oPt, in the last decade, the emerging needs related to the siege of Gaza, to the setting of the Separation Wall and to the pressure over the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, further contributed to maintaining the attention of CSOs and of donors focused on service (mainly relief) delivery and away from “governance.” Considering all this, emerging needs may be identified particularly regarding this last area of intervention.

41 As seen, this is true for East Jerusalem in which a gap exists between the “municipality” and the Palestinian community and no other Palestinian institutions exist and are recognized at a local/neighborhood level, but this is also true in many urban and rural areas under the Palestinian National Authorities and in the area of Gaza Strip.

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Capacity Building Needs for 2st level Organisations

West Bank Gaza Strip East Jerusalem


Project design and management


Policy Analysis

Fund raising Fund raising Civil society and governance

Policy analysis Policy analysis

Civil society and governance


Policy and public service monitoring


Organisational governance

Organisational governance

Participation in Local governance

Recognition and support to CBOs

Support to CBOs Support to CBOs

Communication and transparency


Partnership negotiation and management

Local governance Local governance Management of relationships with public authorities



Targeting and coordination of service provision

Management of relationships with public authorities



Needs linked to the context/ Institutional environment

Creation of space for policy dialogue at national level

Creation of space for policy dialogue at national level

Creation of space for policy dialogue at local level

Recognition of the CS role by public authorities


Policy setting on the relationships with Israeli authorities

Strengthening and “opening” networks and coalitions


Recognition of new CSOs by older CSOs

5.3. Third level organisations Activities involving groups of organisations are frequent in Palestinian Civil Society. Lobbying and advocacy activities both for sustaining the national Palestinian cause and for supporting the causes of a variety of social groups often are carried out through the mobilization of many organisations together. Examples of mobilization include the Campaign for the Right to Enter the Occupied Palestinian Territory42; the Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem43; the Campaign for boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against Israel44; the Grassroots and the Palestinian anti-apartheid Wall Campaign - Stop the Wall45. Campaigns were also launched focusing on domestic issues, particularly for the advancement of women’s rights (i.e. in the framework of drafting laws concerning personal status, the family and the access to health services) and for

42 http://www.righttoenter.ps/index.php 43 http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/ccdprj.ps/new2/index.php 44

http://www.bdsmovement.net/ 45 http://www.stopthewall.org/

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promoting the recognition of groups with special needs (i.e. people with disabilities) or the recognition of children’s and youth rights. Moreover, at local level, service provider organisations often create formal and informal coordination bodies for improving the targeting of relief and field activities. In a more limited number of cases, permanent coalitions or platforms are created with a thematic or geographic focus. Examples of these last groups of platforms include:

the Palestinian Network for Children Rights (PNCR)46, which collects 45 organisations (both NGOs and CBOs) and acts as a coordinator with international organisations;

the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON) which aggregates 14 environmental organisations, and it is registered as an NGO47;

the Coalition of Human Rights Organisations, which aggregate about 12 organisations engaged in the defence of human rights, and has an informal nature, not being registered;

the Gaza branch of the Palestinian NGO Network, which is under the “umbrella” of the national NGO network but is autonomous, has a different membership and constituency, and manages own programme of activities48;

the (already considered) Palestinian-Israeli Forum of Peace NGOs, which was created as a project with a special fund provided by the EC49.

Mission and action relevance and coherence

Mission and action relevance and coherence are a main feature of 3rd level organizations in the oPt. Indeed, because these organisations are often created for coordinating a specific action or for being a discussion forum on a special issue, the mandate and scope of these organisations are in most cases well defined and delimitated. Moreover, the fact that in many cases these organizations maintain a completely or partially informal status (legalized organisations as PENGON are an exception) forces them to maintain their original focus. When the scope of action changes or does not respond to the needs and expectations of members anymore, these organisations dissolve.

The institutional dynamics and organisational consistency The same reasons that facilitate these organisations maintaining their relevance and focus are also a factor of fragility from the institutional and organisational perspectives. While legalised networks present a clear and stable institutional setting, with proper institutional arrangements and regulations50, organisational consistency is a main issue for most 3rd level organisations. Often they are dependent on the goodwill of an organisation assuming the weight of organisational functions, but also assuming the leadership of the network or coalition. Among the phenomena that were reported by consulted organisations, the following can be mentioned:

in some cases, the network/umbrella organisation coordinator is one of the organisations, thus if formally he/she is accountable to the whole network, he/she is actually accountable to only one organisation;

46 http://www.pncr.org/arabic/home.asp 47 http://www.pengon.org/ 48 http://pngoportal.org/arab/ 4949 Badioli F., Said N., Zemach M., Evaluation of the EU Partnership for Peace Programme, EU – SOGES, 2010 50 As some organisations reported, the registration of “collective” organisations proved sometimes to be more difficult than the registration of “normal” NGOs, mainly because of the insistence of the Ministry of Interior on formal institutional arrangements.

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in some cases, the organisational work is covered by only one member organisations, normally those promoting the network; if the organisation policy changes then the dissolution of the network is a likely event;

sometimes a rotation arrangement is foreseen among the member organisations for the management and running of the network secretariat, but in fact, such a rotation often proves to be difficult or impossible, because of the accumulation of knowledge and experience in only one organisation or because the other organisations do not have the capacity or willingness to maintain the secretariat;

in most cases, the coalitions and networks do not have an autonomous office or equipment, also for this reason they depend on the goodwill, interest or capacity of member organisations;

weakness of umbrella organisational and institutional arrangement is often linked to the reluctance of member organisations, which perceive the networks as possible competitors in fund raising;

competition among member organisations is also a factor for avoiding establishing stronger platforms, that would facilitate the sharing and circulation of knowledge and information and would produce a “too close” collaboration among different organisations.

Funding

Funding is problematic for 3rd level organisations. The few ones – as PENGON – that are able to access funding sources in an autonomous way often risk entering into collision with member organisations. This can occur when funding is linked not to “networking activities,” but to project implementation and service delivery: many projects and services that are provided by the network (information dissemination, awareness campaigns, training, etc.) may also be provided by member organisations. This creates a delicate balance situation particularly when a “leader organisation” exists. In most cases, 3rd level organisations do not have direct access to funding sources and are sustained by the resources of the member organisations. The consequence of this is often a lack of resources for implementing activities other than simple coordination. Local or thematic coordination carrying out other functions are very rare. An example is the Gaza branch of PNGO which carries out both advocacy activities for defending civil society organisations from the excessive interference of political authorities, intermediate access to donors for smaller member organisations and also carries out training activities. However, this happens also because of the special situation of CSOs in Gaza.

Accountability and transparency Accountability and transparency are another weakness of 3rd level organisations. The more structured ones, such as PENGON, were blamed for having deficiencies in the administrative system, in the governance and in the sustainability51. Recently misuse of funds was the reason for closing a local Union of Charitable Organisations52. In informal 3rd level organisations, accountability and transparency are even fewer, influencing the actual engagement of member organisations. It is also on the basis of the detection of this area of capacity building needs that NDC programmes include a special set of activities regarding the reinforcement of “sector” institutions, such as networks and platforms.

51

NDC, Supporting Palestinian Umbrella NGO networks and thematic networks. 52 Meetings with stakeholders in April 2010.

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Capacity building needs identified by NDC for networks and umbrella organisations - Communication (websites) - Program management (appointing coordinators) - Strategic planning - Providing support and capacity building to network members - Administrative systems - Internal governance - Economic sustainability

Capacity building needs

3rd level organisations identify Fund Raising, External Communication, Activists and Volunteers Management and Financial Management as priority areas for capacity building. When considering the obstacles, facilitations and their strengths and weaknesses, the 3rd level organisations mainly refer to internal factors. The differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not seem to influence the capacity building needs of these organisations in a significant manner.

Capacity Building Needs for 3rd Level Organisations


Project design and management Fund raising

Policy analysis



Organisational governance particularly considering the relation with member organisations

Volunteers and activist management


Support to member organisations



Analysis of constituency needs



Enlargement of network /platform constituency

Recognition by public authorities

5.4. Fourth level organisations Few general umbrella organisations exist in the oPt. These are:

the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (including a main general branch in the West Bank and another one in the Gaza Strip that was considered among 3rd level organisations) – PNGO;

the Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies;

General Palestinian Union for NGOs in Gaza;

the Palestinian National Institute of NGOs (PNIN). These organizations involve only a part of civil society organisations in the oPt with less than 1000 on a total number of active organisations (1st and 2nd level) that is over 1450. Particularly the PNGO, which is normally considered as the most important umbrella organization, has less than 100 members (membership is not open; new members must be admitted by the current one and must be in compliance with statutes and principles of the network). The General Union of Charitable Societies is the most extensive network with about 500 members (including many community based organizations).

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While the General Union of Charitable Societies mainly includes organisations involved in social assistance activities (child care, rehabilitation and care for people with disabilities, relief for the poor, etc.), the member institutions in the PNGO come from different sectors and very often play a key role at sector level. From the institutional point of view and from the perspective of transparency and accountability, the general umbrella organisations seem to be in compliance not only with the “Associations’ Law” (in fact, they are more often scrutinized than other NGOs), but also with the “NGOs’ Code of Conduct.” Despite the fact that both the main network collects a large pool of resources in terms of knowledge, capacity and even financial resources, they are actually suffering from lack of resources (they particularly lack adequate permanent staff) and of lack of engagement in member organisations in fostering a stronger role for umbrella organisations. While sectoral coordination exists and is often the space for initiatives, coordination and information sharing, such a role is scarcely played by general umbrella organisations. The General Union of Charitable Society is currently assuming a main role of diffusing – together with NDC – the “NGO Code of Conduct.” The PNGO in the West Bank is coordinating the advocacy activities of member organisations on matters of general interest for NGOs, such as the revision of the “Law of the Association” and the actual affirmation of the freedom of association, defending the organisations from the interference of political parties. None of the general umbrella organisations are currently involved in special projects. Their capacity to convene member associations and to mobilise their resources appear somehow limited. Moreover, the general umbrella scarcely manages information and knowledge circulation among member organisations.

Capacity building needs Immediate capacity building needs are recognized by general umbrella organisations as mainly related to fund raising, policy analysis and the management of volunteers and activists (this point is particularly important because of the lack of permanent staff). Obstacles met by umbrella organisations mainly consist of:

lack of resources for network development;

lack of adequate engagement of member organisations;

the political division between Gaza and the West Bank and the necessity to deal with political interferences in civil society life;

the difficulties linked to the closures in the West Bank and East Jerusalem;

the unclear relationship with donors, that sometimes establish their own (artificial) network53 and in other cases prefer not to have relationships with umbrella organisations;

the difficulty in providing support to member organisations without taking their place and entering in competition with them;

53 Among the consulted organisations many recognize the Masader Portal (www.masader.ps) established in the framework of NDC activities for supporting civil society development as a network or consider NDC as the general network of Palestinian NGOs. Actually NDC, even if it is registered as an NGO and has an assembly and a board in which the representatives of the civil society networks are involved, it is not properly a civil society organisation: it was created as a result of the World Bank funded “Palestinian NGO Project” and it continues to play a role of intermediation among the donors – to which it is accountable - and civil society organisations.

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the difficulty in creating unity of voice, message, priorities and needs emerging in the sectoral networks and platforms;

the high competition among NGOs that limit their cooperation within the framework of general umbrella organisations.

On this basis, the following needs may be identified.

Capacity Building Needs for 4th Level Organisations



Fund raising

Policy analysis Civil society and governance


Organisational governance particularly considering the relation with member organisations Volunteers and activist management

Policy and agenda setting


Support to member organisations


Management of relationships with public authorities and with donors

Analysis of constituency needs



Enlargement of network /platform constituency

Recognition by public authorities

6. The Resources for Supporting CSOs

6.1. The EU The European Commission supports civil society organisations mainly through the “thematic programmes”, including:

the European Initiative for Democracy of Human Rights;

the “Investing in People Programme” (health, knowledge and skills, culture, employment & social cohesion, gender equality, youth and children);

Environment and Sustainable Environmental Management Programme (including Energy)

Non state Actors and Local Authorities in Development;

Food Security;

Migration and Asylum. Moreover, within the framework of regional cooperation the Partnership for Peace Programme was launched involving a number of CSO from the oPt. Out of initiatives concerning peace building and human rights, which focus on the creation of “coalitions” among the organisations, most of the activities supported by the EU concern the provision of services and support to the population in different fields. Nevertheless the European Union was recently involved in the introduction of some important innovations, namely:

The launch of structured dialogue with CSOs in the framework of regional ENP Initiative;

the start of consultation of local CSOs on EU programmes (two consultation meetings were organised, in Ramallah and in Gaza);

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the adoption of “sub-granting” mechanisms within the projects, which allow small organisations to receive funds that other wise would be used and managed only by large civil society organisations (the well structured and experienced NGOs which normally access EU funds).

A further innovation context for EU support to civil society in the oPt is represented by the “Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development” Programme: three calls for proposals were launched under the programme in the oPt, one in 2008 (2.4 million Euros), one in 2009 (4.8 million Euros) and one in 2011 (2.4. million Euros, plus another 2.4 million Euros under approval), 18 projects funded through the initiative are currently implemented in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, involving European and Palestinian organisations.

Palestinian CSOs in the “the Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development Programme”

Palestinian Centre for Democracy and Conflict Resolution

Gaza Literacy for children

Sharek Youth Forum Ramallah Vocational training

Right to Live Society Gaza Essential services for people with Down’s Syndrome and Autism

Palestinian Paralympic Committees Ramallah Sport for youth with disabilities

PYALARA Ramallah Children as social actors

Al Najida Social Association Gaza Food plant

Human Supporters Association Nablus Children, youth and women’s rights

Palestinian Youth Union West Bank Community centres for youth and women’s empowerment

Palestinian National Theatre East Jerusalem and West Bank Refugee Camps

Places and space for socio-educative support to youth and children

Economic and Social Development Centre

Salfit and Qualqilya Strengthening of 15 cooperatives

Palestinian Vision

West Bank Community change and governance Ansar Centre for Children

Women’s Study Centre

Miftah

Arab Studies Society Shufat Refugee Camp Play and work to avoid isolation

Save Youth Future Society

Palestinian youth advocacy and vocational training

Palestinian Information & Technology Association

Al-Quds Association for Almawassi Development

Gaza Strip Reinforcing 5 women CBOs

Al-Nassir Charity Association

Hopefulness Candles Ass. South Association for Women Health

Bunian Association

Renascence Association for Rural Development

Aftaluna Society for Deaf Children Gaza Strip Services for the rights and needs of deaf children

Palestinian Red Crescent West Bank: Jericho and Jerusalem

Access to rehabilitation for persons with disabilities

Remedial Education Centre Gaza Inclusion of children with special needs in primary schools

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6.2. European donors

Austrian Cooperation The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) mainly intervenes in support to the Palestinian CSOs through the Welfare Association (WA). A programme was established with the name “Support to Community Services through Local NGOs in the oPt.” Through this programme, 21 organisations were funded with the first funds provided to the Programme (400.000 Euro), mainly focusing on CBOs, both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Qalqilya, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jenin/Tubas). In addition to providing funds for project implementation, the WA provided training and technical assistance54 to the involved CBOs and NGOs. The program and the CBO projects were mainly supporting the provision of services for women, young people, persons with disabilities and children.

Belgian Cooperation Belgian Technical Cooperation support to CSOs in the oPt is channelled through:

Belgian NGOs, such as 11.11.11 and Broederlijk Delen, supporting the strategic development plan of local NGOs;

Belgian NGOs involved in humanitarian aid;

small-scale developmental projects by the local people who are in direct need through the Micro Intervention Programme (MIP), which focuses on vulnerable and marginalized groups; income generating and gender oriented initiatives; the education sector and local socio-economic development;

direct funds to Palestinian NGOs for project implementation (3 to 6 NGOs are funded every year).

British Cooperation

DFID has been engaged for over 16 years in the oPt, with the aim to support the creation and development of the state. Coherently with this aim, about 67% of DFID funds were focused on governance, while the second major share of funds support humanitarian assistance. In this framework, the most important programmes supporting civil society in the oPt comprise:

the initiatives against corruption and for good governance, through Transparency International;

the initiative on Civil Society Engagement to Make Governance and Transparency Work for Poor and Vulnerable Communities through Tiri, in cooperation with the Birzeit University and the AMAN Coalition for Integrity and Accountability;

the Ma'an Network: a non-profit media organization founded in 2002 to strengthen independent Palestinian media, build links between local, regional and international media, and consolidate freedom of expression and media pluralism as keys to promoting democracy and human rights in the oPt55;

the initiative Search for Common Ground (SFCG)56,Football-based Media to strengthen Good Governance and Transparency.

54 Support particularly in modifying and finalizing the proposals, writing, budgeting, report-writing, and using the purchasing and procurement procedures as required by the WA (Partners in Creative Solution, Support for Community Services Through Local NGOs in the OPT. External Evaluation Report, ADA – WA, March 2008 55 http://www.maannet.org/ 56 Founded in 1982, Search for Common Ground works to transform the way the world deals with conflict - away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem-solving. We use a multi-faceted approach, employing media initiatives and working with local partners in government and civil society, to find culturally

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Danish Cooperation Danish Cooperation adopted in the oPt three main focuses: peace building; state building and improved livelihood. The Danish initiative include:

support to Palestinian civil society in East Jerusalem;

support to the Human Rights/Good Governance NGO Secretariat jointly with Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, and the NDC – NGO Development Centre.

support to culture and art, considered as a tool for development and peace building and as a way to overcome the isolation and closure situation that characterise the oPt, through NGO projects (e.g. “Women’s Film Festival” organised by the NGO “Shashat” in Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jerusalem); “Sabreen Production” initiatives for the Palestinian participation in the Eurovision Song Contest; Yabous Cultural Centre in East Jerusalem and Ashtar Theatre in Ramallah.

Finnish Cooperation

The Finnish Cooperation is mainly supporting the Palestinian CSOs through the Fund for Local Cooperation (LFC). In this framework, initiatives are funded concerning: culture, governance, human rights, gender, peace building and health. Funds are provided in a direct way to Palestinian NGOs (e.g. International Centre of Bethlehem (ICB); Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Jordan and the Holy Land (ELCJHL), Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR); Data – Applied Studies and Research Institution Society, The Elderly Supportive Community Services Society (ESCS).

French Cooperation The French Cooperation activity focusing on civil society organisations is based on different mechanisms, managed by the French Consulate and by the Agence Française de Développement. Since 2007 a funding mechanism was set, called Social and Development Fund (FSD). The fund is based on co-funding (up to 70%) from Palestinian NGOs and local authority initiatives. At the end of 2010, 18 projects were funded focusing on different sectors, such as:

Agriculture and water;

Capacity building for CBOs and women’s organizations;

Childhood protection and youth (focusing on health);

Culture;

Economic development (promotion of income generating activities);

Social development (focusing on health);

Media (focusing on vocational training). The funding mechanism is based on open call for proposals. The focus is currently on the provision of service delivery. The sustainability of initiatives through:

a) the limitation of funding duration;

b) the fact that one project or “idea” cannot receive funds a second time;

c) the co-funding approach (maximum funding amounts to 70% of the total budget, while another 20% must be provided by other donors).

appropriate means to strengthen societies' capacity to deal with conflicts constructively: to understand the differences and act on the commonalities (http://www.sfcg.org/)

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The 18 funded projects were carried out by 22 CSOs (including NGOs and CBOs57) and one municipality. Funded initiatives were spread across the West Bank i.e. Jenin, Jericho, Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem, Ramallah, East Jerusalem (one project) and Gaza (four projects). The 2011 call for proposals targets four priority areas: the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem as well as locations in Area C, enclosed by or bordering the wall, and refugee camps. Out of FSD, French Cooperation provides smaller grants to CSOs, focusing on culture (visual art, cinema, etc.), humanitarian and social activities (education, women’s rights, health, etc.), and university-related activities (i.e. Franco- Palestinian research and networks). Further support is provided to civil society development through the NDC – NGO Development Centre (with the World Bank, France is the main donor for the PNGO IV programme starting in 2011).

German Cooperation GTZ58 - DED since 2005 has been involved in supporting civil society organisations. DED focuses on CBOs in marginalized areas in the Northern and Southern West Bank, with the aim to empower groups to act according to their needs. Support was provided to strengthening Women and Youth CBO networks. Initiatives were carried out in Salfeet, Nablus, Tubas, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Jenin, Hebron, Yatta and Dura. From 2009 to 2012, GTZ launched a programme addressing reinforcing local authority’s capacity to provide services and respond to local demands. Strategic development and investment plans were elaborated in eight local authorities, actively involving local NGOs, private sector associations and CBOs (particularly women’s organisations). To foster the organisations’ development, the German cooperation provides support for a duration of up to six years.

Italian Cooperation The Italian Cooperation support to civil society organisations is mainly channelled through Italian NGOs that serve as mentors to local organizations, both NGOs and CBOs. However, they maintain the full responsibility for the projects. In many cases the distance between “mentoring” and direct action by the involved international (Italian) NGOs is not clearly defined. Project duration is variable between 12 and 36 months. The funding of the Italian Cooperation cannot be over 70% of the total cost of projects. About 24 Italian NGOs are involved in these activities59, focusing both on development initiatives (about 1/3) and for emergency aid (particularly in the Gaza Strip).

57 Organisations involved in the implementation of FSD projects include: Greenhouse Farmers Association, PSRS, Darna, Aseeia Cooperative society, SUNBULA, Guidance and Training Centre, TAM Women, Media and Development, Palestinian Child Club, Multipurpose Community Centre, Palestinian Consultative Staff, Palestinian Farmers Union (twp projects), Union of Agricultural Work Committees, Palestine Avenir for Childhood Foundation, Palestinian Society for Care and Development, The Centre for Jerusalem Studies, Theatre Day Production, Burj Al Luq Luq Social Centre, Rehabilitation and Development Association for Wall Villages in Western Jenin (Riyada, FSD – French Funding Mechanism for Palestinian Civil Society Support, Consulat Général de France à Jérusalem, 2010) 58 http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/maghreb-naher-osten/palaestinensische-gebiete/20750.htm 59 The following Italian NGOs are engaged in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Acs, Aispo, Arcs, Avsi, Ats, Cesvi, Cic, Cric, Ciss, Coopi, Cospe, Differenza Donna, DisVi, Educaid, Gvc, Ics, Nexus, Overseas, Oxfam Italia, Prosvil, Save the Children Italian, Terre des Homme, Vis, Vento di Terra.

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Local civil society organizations are also involved in the programmes managed by the Italian Development Cooperation technical local office (education, health, women’s empowerment, agriculture, governance and human rights).

Irish Cooperation The Irish Cooperation to Palestinian civil society is mainly based on the provision of core funds to a limited number of CSOs. In selecting the beneficiary organisations, Ireland focuses on human rights and governance. The main targeted themes are Rule of the Law in the PA territories, women’s rights, prisoners’ rights, freedom of movement and planning rights in East Jerusalem. Funded organisations are based in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

Netherlands’ Cooperation The Netherlands’ Cooperation supports CSOs through a variety of channels, comprising the direct funding of Palestinian NGOs, the provision of funds to Dutch and international NGOs (such as War Child) sustaining local NGOs and CBOS; and the participation in basket funds, such as the HR/GG Secretariat. This secretariat is run by NDC that channel the pooled funding to Israeli and Palestinian NGOs working to promote and protect Human Rights/Good Governance in the oPt, as “core funding” (28 organisations60) and through “small grants” (13 organisations)61. From the geographical point of view, funding was concentrated in Jerusalem (16 CSOs) and Ramallah (16), Gaza (5 CSOs), Nablus (2), Salfit, Bethlehem (1). Directly funded NGOs comprise AMAN (on good governance and struggle against corruption), together with Norwegian Cooperation and Luxembourg; PARC (agriculture) and REEF (rural finance); GCMHP (mental health); TRC (rehabilitation of victims of torture); PAISSA (religious studies).

Spanish Cooperation Spain’s support to Palestinian CSOs is provided through project funding. Projects are selected in five sectors:

Social services;

Humanitarian aid;

Peace building;

Culture;

Agriculture and water.

60

The core funding recipients are: Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies; B’tselem- The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; Musawa (The Palestinian Centre for the Independence of Judiciary and the Legal Profession); Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy (PCPD); HaMoked: Centre for the Defence of The Individual; Women For Life; BADIL Resource Centre For Palestinian Residency Rights; The Arab Thought Forum; The Palestinian Working Women Society for Development; Adalah; Miftah; Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Centre; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel; Women's Studies Centre; Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling; Addameer; Jerusalem Centre for Women; ACRI - Association for Civil Rights in Israel; BIMKOM; Al-Haq; Kav La'Oved; Gisha; The Israeli Committee Against Houses Demolition; Defence of Children International- Palestine Section; Al-Dameer Association for Human Rights, Gaza; Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights; WAC - Women's Affairs Committee; and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) 61 Hurryyat: Centre for Defence of Liberties and Civil Rights; QADER for Community Development; Women And Family Affairs Centre (WAFAC); Human Rights and Democracy Media Centre "SHAMS"; Joint project with CARE Centre for Applied Research in Education, Shiraa and Mahawer; Young Artists Forum; All For Peace Palestinian-Israeli Radio Station; Al-Maqdese for Society Development (MSD); Rabbis for Human Rights; Applied Research Institute ARIJ; Al Quds University- Al Quds Human Rights Clinic (AQHRC); HADAF Centre For Human Rights ; and the Palestinian Commission for Refugees

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Projects can be proposed both by local NGOs, universities, local authorities and public bodies (i.e. the Palestinian Water Authority). Often projects involve an international partner (INGO or international organisations). Among the peculiarities of Spanish Cooperation, the funding of “Coalition projects” is to be highlighted. In this framework, support was given to the “East Jerusalem Covenant” for the protection of the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem through the strengthening of Civil Society and to the “PLATAFORMA 2015” COVENANT for Peace Building and Human Rights Defence.

Swedish Cooperation In its strategy for the oPt, SIDA identifies two main priorities, to promote peace building and to promote a democratic Palestine in form of state building. Support to civil society is considered important for both priorities. The support is provided through project and programme funding, and it is often channelled through Swedish NGOs. Covered sectors include: health, community based rehabilitation, human rights (through NDC and through Swedish partners), culture and democracy; women, and media. SIDA is among the organisations also providing “core funding” supporting the implementation of 3 – 5 year strategic plans. In this case, funds can be used by the beneficiary organisation in an independent way but according to the agreed framework. Capacity development of local partner organisations is a priority in all sectors and it is fostered by giving preference to long-term partnerships with CSOs (a time span of 10 years is sometime considered). The strategy for 2012 – 2015 will have a geographical focus on East Jerusalem, the “C Zone” and Gaza. The strategy will mainly address reinforcing the role of civil society actors in contributing to democratization in a fragile state62. The following priorities will be considered:

Dissemination of knowledge on the democratic process;

Advocacy (an Advocacy Fund is being considered);

Better knowledge of Palestinian civil society;

Enhancing policy dialogue between the CSOs and the PA. SIDA support is provided directly or through intermediary organisations such as the NDC.

6.3. Other donors The other main donors supporting civil society development include:

The World Bank has focused its aid on the construction of the NGO Development Centre since 1997. Currently the fourth NGO Project (PNGO IV) is starting to focus on the establishment of a grant making mechanism including three main intervention areas: a) Grants to NGOs for service delivery; b) Sector development activities (regarding the dissemination and enforcement of the NGO “Code of Conduct”, the information exchange and coordination among NGOs, and the implementation of studies); c) Project management and monitoring (actions for strengthening NDC).

Among the main donors supporting CSOs in West Bank and Gaza, USAID support project implementation by local NGOs normally in partnership with international or US NGOs. Projects focus on service provision, but also include activities for capacity strengthening and raising awareness of governance issues (e.g. the Wadi Gada Project, involving a local NGO

62 Riyada Consulting, Review of Swedish Support to Civil Society, 2009

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consortium in environmental campaigns; the “Shadow Local Youth Councils” projects, involving of a variety of NGOs and the CHF International63). It adopts a strong policy of not supporting organisations that are participating in initiatives against the Israeli occupation (as participating in the “Boycott Campaign”).

Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDS). In addition to supporting the Independent Commission for Human Rights and the HR/GG NGO Secretariat that is managed by NDC, the Swiss Cooperation provides support to CSO micro-projects and projects, focusing on economic development, good governance, youth activities and gender.

Norwegian aid. Peace-building and State-building are the main long-term goals of NORAD support to CSOs in the oPt. Direct support to Palestinian NGOs (70 NGOs and the Jerusalem Fund for Cultural Activities) and funding to Norwegian organisations (such as Norwac and NPA) to work with local NGOs are the main mechanisms.

Decentralized cooperation of European regional and local authorities is an increasingly important source of funding for Palestinian CSOs, often through the intermediation of European NGOs. Decentralized cooperation funds are mainly supporting local projects and the initiatives of CBOs.

United Nations. In 1980 UNDP launched the programme supporting Palestinian People (PAP). The programme includes grants for CSOs, both for service delivery and for capacity building. Funding provision to one NGO or to one project can be repeated, so that long-term partnerships are often established64. Most United Nations agencies sub-contract activities to NGOs and CBOs. Activities include relief and development projects. UNRWA, WHO and UNICEF are among the organisations more involved in supporting CSOs. It is however to be highlighted that more than “partners” in setting policies and agenda, CSOs are playing the role of executive agencies or even beneficiaries. Nevertheless, at least in some cases UNRWA, WHO and UNICEF activities provided a supportive environment for the development of local autonomous organisations (e.g. in the case of CBOs involved in community rehabilitation, health and education initiatives). Support to civil society development is also provided through regional initiatives, e.g. POGAR - Programme on Governance in the Arab Region65.

6.4. International NGOs The total number of international NGOs (INGOs) engaged in the oPt is not known as different numbers are sometimes suggested, from over 100 to over 200. Actually, the number of INGOs holding activities in the oPt greatly changes if only those having an office in the oPt are considered or if only those providing funds are included. About 80 INGOs have activities and provide funding and often long-term engagement in the oPt taking part in AIDA (Association of International Development Agencies). AIDA is a membership-based body having mainly coordination functions that was founded in 1995. AIDA is currently organised in subcommittees concerning the main intervention areas of INGOs in the oPt: Gaza Strip, advocacy, health, agriculture and education66. Through AIDA, often INGOs coordinate – at least formally – their actions among themselves and with Palestinian authorities and other actors engaged in the country, mainly through the participation in sector “clusters” hosted by ministries (i.e. Education Cluster). Moreover, AIDA

63 Young Women at the Forefront of Democracy in Palestine, CHF International, 2010 (http://www. Chfinterna-tional.org) 64 www.undp.ps/en/newsroom/publications/pdf/focus/04v2.pdf; see also: www.wildlife-pal.org; www.lrcj.org; www.arij.org; www.sharek.org, www.pcc-jer.org, www.qou.edu, www.aldameergaza.org; www.phg.org; www.resc.org.ps 65

http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=2&cid=14 66 AIDA Association of International Development Agencies (http://www.aidajerusalem.org)

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constitutes a forum for sharing practices and experiences and for discussing common positions and assuming a common voice. Finally, it has – or tries to have – a self-regulating role for member organisations (in such a context, for instance, a “Code of Conduct” was discussed concerning aid activities in the Gaza Strip). INGOs adopt a great variety of roles, including:

Advocating for the Palestinian cause at international level;

Direct implementation of local development projects, relief activities and service delivery, often mobilizing or assuming local CSOs as implementing partners at local (village) level;

provision of funds to Palestinian CSOs, including both project funding and core funding;

project based partnerships with Palestinian CSOs, involving the direct intervention of international partners in the delivery of activities or services;

the setting up of long-term, strategic partnerships, in which the international partners provide “core fund” and/or technical assistance to local partners based on “institutional development plans” or “strategic plans” ;

promotion/participation in international or regional project based partnerships, using international funds and sometimes involving organisations from Israel and other neighbouring countries.

Direct involvement in activity implementation and the engagement (mainly with a leadership role) in project based partnerships and funding (sometimes channelling bilateral agencies funds) are the most diffused roles. Moreover, these roles became more diffused in recent years, because of the restrictions on movement for Palestinian NGOs and because, given the conditions set by some international donors, INGO can represent “safe” implementing agencies. Strategic partnerships are relatively few: two main groups of INGOs are involved in long-term partnerships: those having the traditional/main modus operandi (such as some organisations from Belgium and from Netherlands) and those having a long permanence in the oPt, that allows the setting of partnerships that are permanent even if they are project based. In some cases, INGOs directly involved in activity implementation or in the management of short-term partnerships with local CSOs carry out a kind of bridging action, facilitating the access of local CSOs to knowledge and innovation, international networks and funding opportunities, and so on. Also, in some few cases, INGOs directly involved in the field play a “political role”, protecting local CSOs from political risks and even – in some cases – “legitimating” and recognising first level organisations as relevant policy actors at the local level. However, these actions and roles seem to be scarcely recognised by local CSOs. When talking about INGOs, Palestinian CSOs refer at least partially to the conflict situation, mainly linked to:

competition in fund raising (INGOs are blamed for having a greater capacity in project formulation and in administrative management, that results in unfair competition in the accessing international funding opportunities);

orientation of INGOs to create “unbalanced” partnerships, in which local CSOs are mostly involved as providers of workforce (sometimes INGOs are even blamed for leaving just small percentages of received funds to local CSOs);

competition in the recruitment of human resources (INGOs are blamed for offering better wages than those local CSOs can pay to key professionals);

the orientation to impose agendas and approaches that are imported from abroad and often have little capacity to understand local conditions (particularly for “new coming” INGOs);

the fact that very often local partners are maintained in a dependency situation (the INGOs are in fact the channel for accessing resources and local autonomous capacities and conditions to access resources are not developed).

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The condition of INGOs in front of Palestinian CSOs (and particularly of small and medium CSOs) seems to be similar to that of Palestinian CSOs in front of Palestinian public opinion. Even if they provide services and resources, they have a negative image. Limited coordination exists among INGOs and local CSOs and – even if in certain sectors strong cooperation initiatives exist, as in the case of human rights or education – there is not a common umbrella.

6.5. Further resources Not all resources for Palestinian civil society come from external donors. The Office of the President of the PA provides support to CSOs in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Both the Palestinian Authority ministries and the local government in Gaza often fund CSOs, mainly using them as implementing agencies, but sometimes also supporting their autonomous activities (in this last case often the organisations supported are characterised by a kind of informal affiliation to parties or by the presence of personal links with government). In some cases, local authorities also provide resources for CSOs (however, these local authorities normally have little autonomy from the PA or the Hamas-ruled government in Gaza). A more important role in supporting CSOs is played by universities - particularly Birzeit University (to which reference was already made), Bethlehem University (particularly through the Institute of Community Partnership67) and Al-Quds University (among other initiatives though the Community Action Centre, supporting CBOs in East Jerusalem68) – and by two main organisations, formally registered as NGOs but having special features. These are:

the Welfare Association69, which is a foundation registered in Switzerland channelling to Palestinian CSOs resources from the private sector and from the Palestinian communities abroad – funds from the Welfare Association are mainly addressed to support service delivery in a variety of sectors, including: education, culture and arts; economic development; health; agriculture and emergency; the WA also supports advocacy of Palestinian rights;

the NGO Development Centre, which channels resources of international donors and fosters a wide range of capacity-building activities nationwide (see following box).

NDC – The NGO Development Centre The NGO Development Centre (NDC) is a non-profit nongovernmental organization established in response to the need of having a sustainable Palestinian mechanism for providing support to the NGOs sector. Through providing technical and financial support, NDC works on developing the capacities of Palestinian NGOs in providing quality services, especially to the poor and the marginalized, on enhancing their self-reliance, and on empowering them to be more sustainable. At the same time, NDC contributes towards the development of the NGOs sector as a whole by facilitating the sharing and exchange of information and experience, by supporting research and policy development, and by strengthening NGOs relationships with development partners. In the past years, NDC has received a total amount of 8 million Euros from the World Bank to implement a third phase of the Palestinian NGO Project (PNGO III). The funding was directed towards the NGO sector in the form of granting schemes and capacity building aimed at improving the effectiveness, self-reliance and sustainability of civil society over a period of three years (2007 – 2009). Moreover, since 2008, NDC managed the Secretariat of Human Rights and Good Governance, channelling the funds of some European donors to human rights organisations.

67 http://icp.bethlehem.edu 68

http://www.guni-rmies.net/observatory/bp.php?id=202 69 http://welfare-association.org/

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Current activities include the Phase II of the Secretariat of the Human Rights and Good Governance (2010 – 2013) with a total fund of about 12 Million Euros, and the management of the Palestinian NGO Project - PNGO IV, with a fund of about 6 Million Euros from the World Bank and the AFD, the French Development Agency. A further activity of NDC consists of the management of the Palestinian NGO Portal (Masader). This is an internet portal aimed at serving and empowering the NGO sector in terms of assisting NGOs in overcoming geographic limitations and providing them with opportunities for communicating amongst each other and among other relevant parties. Source: http://www.ndc.ps/main.php?id=110

7. Operational Recommendations As recalled in the first paragraph of this report, the Mapping Study on CSOs in the oPt has the specific objective to provide a comprehensive overview and to define recommendations for the possible intervention areas to be supported by EC in the forthcoming cooperation programmes. These recommendations constitute the subject of this chapter. Defined recommendations are based on the EC recognition of CSOs not only as service providers or implementers of EC strategies, but also as key political actors in the development processes. Such recognition implies that engaging in a structured dialogue with civil society becomes a specific priority for the EC, as a way to contribute towards making development strategies more effective and to promote democratisation.

7.1. A general strategy for supporting CSOs Assuming the perspective of the general framework identified above, a general strategy for supporting CSOs in the oPt should adopt the global objective to strengthen the position of civil society in public debate and in the elaboration and implementation of development strategies, complimentarily with the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions70. Based on the findings presented in the previous paragraphs, this global objective can be articulated in a set of specific strategies, mainly dealing with the need to reinforce CSOs participation in policy-making and governance both at the local and national level. As a matter of fact, currently CSOs are a main actor in the provision of services and in the provision of support to needy populations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, but they are not effectively engaged in the setting and monitoring of public policies and public services, both due to external factors – such as the reduction of policy dialogue space deriving from the intensification of internal political conflicts and by the harshening of Israeli occupation practices and because of internal weaknesses – such as the focus on services delivery, the limited “policy analysis” capacities and the limited engagement of organisations in development policy issues, the lack of recognition of the actors existing at the grassroots level, and the weakness of most networks and umbrella organisations. Considering this, three main strategies may be identified, namely: supporting a shift from service provision to governance; supporting the integration of the CSO community and the matching of first and second level organizations; and supporting the opening of space for local agenda setting.

70 See the Terms of Reference of the Study, pag.4.

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Supporting a shift from service provision to governance As observed, the main focus of Palestinian CSOs appears to be service provision. Also, when dealing with issues having a strong embedded policy aspect, such as human rights and democracy, organisations often tend to work mainly by delivering services, in the term of legal defence and protection of people from rights violations and in the terms of “communication” and “advocacy campaigns.” Few CSOs actively try to influence policy-making or to identify alternative or complementary policies in front of those set up by the national and local authorities. In other words, mostly CSOs tend not to actively participate in governance processes. A shift towards a greater integration of service delivery activities with participation in governance at the local and at national level seems therefore to be an emerging need, involving a CSO’s increased engagement in the policy setting process, in the monitoring of policy implementation and public service management, in the setting and functioning of local and national councils on development, and in supporting civic participation in decision making.

Supporting the integration of CSO community and the matching of first and second level organizations

The assumption of a greater role in governance is legitimate for the CSO only by their capacity to bring into the policy arena the perspectives emerging among social actors at the grassroots level. As a matter of fact, specialised NGOs are often consulted by policy makers, but always based on their technical competences, but they are not considered as legitimate representatives of Palestinian society. On the contrary, their linkage with people is often put into discussion. Recovering a greater role in governance and policy dialogue would therefore strongly depend, on the one hand, on the capacity of CSO communities to achieve greater integration, constructing a shared vision of Palestinian society, and on the other hand, the possibility of having stronger collaboration of the CSOs at different levels and particularly a greater recognition of 1st level organisations by the 2nd level ones, not as simple beneficiaries but as active, autonomous actors.

Supporting the opening of space for local agenda setting A third necessary strategy should focus on the building of space for local agenda setting and for policy dialogue. Indeed, having a greater engagement of CSOs in policy dialogue and governance – and having an integrated civil society able to represent the perspectives emerging at the grassroots level – would be without any use if space does not exist for policy dialogue and for setting local development agendas. In the current oPt setting, similar space is very scarce, because of the lack of trust and recognition among stakeholders, because of political conflicts and faction-based divides, because of the situation linked to Israeli occupation (particularly in East Jerusalem), because of the prevalence of international agendas and because of agendas focusing on international relations. The opening of space for policy dialogue and development agenda setting is in such a context strongly dependent on the capacity of external actors (such as donors and international partners) to adopt an active role for legitimating different stakeholders and for creating the conditions for their collaboration.

7.2. Objectives The three strategies identified above may be concretized through the adoption of the following specific objectives, concerning: the diffusion of capacities for assuming a governance role by CSOs; the creation of space for “policy making from below”; the facilitation of policy dialogue and the improvement of local sustainable development initiatives.

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Diffusion of the capacities for assuming a governance role The first objective is centred on building CSO capacities for assuming a greater role in governance. With this aim capacities should be reinforced regarding three dimensions:

the “individual dimension” of the skills and competences of civil society activists and professionals;

the “organisational capacities” of CSOs, which are both necessary to make the most of competences and skills and to actually engage in policy making and governance;

the “institutional” or “sector” conditions that can allow organisations to play new roles in policy making and governance.

There is not a unique set of capacities to be strengthened or a “one size fits all” recipe. As observed in the analysis presented in previous chapters, capacity building needs change according to the levels of organisations and according to the geographic areas. Moreover, the individual features of the single organisations should be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of capacity building initiatives.

Presence of space for policy making from below A second objective to be achieved concerns the actual presence of space for “policy making from below”. The current situation in the oPt is characterised by a centralization of power, decision making and policy making: policy making is mainly conducted within the PA in Ramallah and the local government in the Gaza Strip, while the space of East Jerusalem is characterised by the dependency from “occupant” authorities. In such a condition, a tiny space for CSO participation in policy dialogue and governance exists. Measures should therefore be adopted for constructing new space, including the creation of steering committees for the Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Programme in which CSOs are involved; the creation of public monitoring and evaluation committees for international funded programmes; the support to local authorities for creating local councils involving civil society and so on.

Facilitated policy dialogue The third objective to be achieved focuses on a facilitated policy dialogue. As often observed, little trust exists among stakeholders in the oPt development policies. Policy dialogue can be an actual perspective only if external stakeholders play a facilitation role. Facilitated policy dialogue would therefore require:

the pressure on stakeholders for mutual recognition;

the creation of opportunities and occasions for policy dialogue;

the direct engagement for facilitating the effective implementation of policy dialogue outcomes;

the engagement in making visible policy dialogue processes and their outcomes. A special initiative is needed in this framework regarding East Jerusalem, in which a specific role played by the EC can be that of creating space for negotiation between Palestinian and Israeli local authorities (indeed, for making these spaces functioning is a starting point should be the transparent relation and recognition of the existing conflict).

Increased impact and relevance of local sustainable development Initiatives A greater engagement in governance and policy-making would not be legitimated for most CSOs if their participation in local sustainable development initiatives does not have an increased impact

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and relevance. While in the oPt many CSOs are well recognized for their contribution to local development, in the case of many others this contribution is considered low, both because of their adherence to donor agendas rather than to local needs and because of their low project/programme design and implementation capacity. Based on that, an increased impact and a greater relevance of local sustainable development initiatives by CSOs is recognised as another specific objective to be accomplished. Achieving this objective requires:

to increase the autonomy of CSOs and their capacity to define strategies and to find resources without depending on external actors;

to avoid the funding of projects aimed at short-term goals, preferring projects which are part of programmes with a focus on the management and support to long-term change and development processes;

to harmonise procedure and standards among donors, increasing the focus on relevance of funded activities and reducing the effort required for formal and administrative tasks in proposal formulation.

7.3. The cooperation with stakeholders Some pre-conditions emerge for the achievement of the above objectives. The construction of these conditions should be the object of specific actions carried out directly by donors and particularly by the EU.

Recognizing CSOs as a partner rather than a beneficiary is the first condition. It requires that consultation activities should be continued and intensified, allowing more organisations to take part in them and allowing them to influence the setting of cooperation agendas. Moreover, it requires reinforcement in the already existing efforts to increase the access of smaller organisations to funds (e.g. through sub-granting and through the provision of small grants).

Facilitating the interaction and cooperation among CSOs and the PA is the second condition. It requires the EU and other donors to support CSOs in front of public authorities, actively intervening to protect the autonomy of CSOs and to avoid the interference of public authorities in their life, functioning and projects.

Pushing for more relevant supporting action by donors. In an environment as rich of donors and funding opportunities as the Palestinian one, the efforts of only one donor risks having little effectiveness in modifying prevalent conditions. A specific initiative should therefore be adopted by the EU for involving European member states and other donors in adopting coordinated strategies, particularly for promoting a greater CSOs local governance and policy involvement (for instance avoiding support to projects not including a fall-out on local governance).

Pulling resources for overcoming project based support to CSOs. Short-term funding is among the major causes of the malfunctioning of Palestinian CSOs and of their increased engagement in service delivery. However, pulling resources from different donors for supporting long-term programmes and initiatives can allow overcoming the shortcoming of project-based support by individual donors. This would require greater coordination, a greater resource to co-funding initiatives, and the exploration of new funding approaches.

7.4. Making the most of available resources CSOs in the oPt are the target of a large amount of international funds (about 210 million Euros per year, according to MAS estimates). However, funding is perceived as a main issue by most organisations. Based on this, an effort seems necessary to make the most of available resources.

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EU can improve the use of its funding not only fostering coordination among donors, but also by adopting measures aimed at:

increasing policy awareness of CSOs;

promoting an increase of the strategic relevance of their activities;

fostering the development of CSOs’ roles and functions that are consistent with their nature and their levels;

fostering “priority action” not only at each level of CSOs, but also focusing on sectors, according to existing opportunities and needs.

Indeed, these actions can involve widening the impact of CSO actions. In the following paragraphs, some concrete actions are suggested.

7.5. Opportunities and options The different kinds of measures and initiatives considered above can find a concrete implementation in the following possible activities. As it will be clarified in the following paragraphs, some of these activities can be carried out in the framework of thematic programmes, while others can be promoted through the interaction and coordination among thematic and geographic programmes and through the coordination with other donor initiatives.

Support to first level organisations Supporting first level organizations (CBOs, grassroots and self-help groups) should assume the main aim of allowing them to maintain their “grassroots” links and functions, while achieving greater capacities and sustainability. Maintaining grassroots links and functions is strongly connected with the possibility and capacity to play an active role in the management of local public services and development initiatives. This can be achieved, for instance, by:

Supporting the creation of “local funding schemes” in which communities and their organised bodies are involved – without caring about pre-set agendas – in the identification and definition of priorities and in the selection of projects and activities to be funded71;

Creation of local (village or community level) Monitoring & Evaluation Committees for following up project activities carried out locally, both by Palestinian and international NGOs (for instance in the case of projects funded by the EC, or in those funded by other donors) or by public authorities (in the case of actions implemented in the framework of geographic cooperation programmes);

Providing assistance to local authorities in the setting-up and management of local committees for planning local development interventions, so as to promote recognition of CBOs as policy actors to be involved in existing schemes and avoid consideration that they are just implementing actors or beneficiaries72 (actions can include training and technical assistance, particularly on civil society consultation, on participatory budgeting, on strategic

71 As discussed in previous chapters, experiences of local management of funds and of locally based funding schemes have been experimented in the oPt by some small NGOs (e.g. Dalia Association). 72 Experiences that can be considered as relevant examples and reference are those that GTZ is implementing in some Palestinian municipalities. An opportunity for scaling up these kinds of activities is offered by the Municipal Development and Lending Fund, that has been recently reformed and that is currently under implementation with the support of some European aid agencies and the World Bank. Currently MDLF is already interacting with civil society organisations. But CSOs, as well as the private sector, are mainly involved as service providers (both in delivering services to the public or in providing consulting services to MDLF and LGU) or as beneficiaries of MDLF funds.

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planning – such an activity can be carried out in cooperation with the actions fostered by other donors for promoting NGO sector development73);

Cooperation with other European donors to establish local committees for the follow up and monitoring of existing initiatives of local development and improvement of public services (including those supported by MDLF);

Using thematic programmes (particularly NSA Programme) for launching partnership initiatives in which NGOs (both national and international) are engaged in long-term (programme based) actions for reinforcing CBOs capacities and involvement in monitoring public services and local resources (including water, housing and the environment) and for launching (institutional and sector) capacity-building initiatives along the lines presented in chapter 5;

Using thematic programmes (including NSA, PtP, gender, etc.) for launching initiatives in which local first level CSOs are involved in the setting and monitoring of quality standards for service provision reflecting the needs, desires and expectations of their constituencies (this can be conducted regarding services delivered both by public authorities and by private providers/NGOs – areas in which participated standard setting and monitoring can be implemented include urban services, child care, health services, education;

Particularly through thematic programmes, fostering the creation and development of local coalitions for solving local problems, in which first level CSOs are involved as “full capacity” actors together with NGOs and public authorities (special areas in which such kinds of actions can promoted are those in which the effectiveness of solutions depends on the participation of the various involved actors, such as the management of environmental resources and of public space).

Promoting – both in the framework of thematic programmes and in the framework of geographic cooperation –the improvement of knowledge and recognition of first level CSOs presence and roles by public authorities and by NGOs; to this aim research studies (e.g. local or sector mapping studies) as well as seminars, publications and the use of media (i.e. production of documentaries, etc.) can be used.

Support to second level organisations Support to second level organisations (particularly, NGOs and charitable societies) can be provided assuming two main orientations: the increase of NGOs’ proactivity in the policy arena and the increase of the attitude to recognize first level organizations as “policy actors.” This can be achieved, for instance, by:

Promoting a greater involvement and a stronger role of NGOs in sector coordination:

Setting priorities in the calls for projects of thematic programmes aimed at selecting projects which include policy development actions and which are part of long-term programmes;

Promoting the launching of sub-granting and support schemes in which NGOs adopt the role of mentor of CBOs, rather than simply using their implementation capacities;

Adoption of two-step procedures for project selection and provision of support and funding for participatory formulation to the projects that have been selected in the first step (project formulation is often based on previous studies and contacts with beneficiary communities, almost never on a real and effective consultation of local partners: a main obstacle for adopting such a modality of project formulation is the lack of resources for doing that);

Introducing criteria to verify the actual involvement of CBOs in project formulation;

73

A specific reference can be the IV Palestinian NGO Project, funded by the World Bank and the French Cooperation and implemented by NDC.

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Introducing criteria to verify the fact that long-term and “peer to peer” partnerships are established (e.g. fund distribution among partners, programme governance systems, etc.)

Involving local NGOs in the activities identified above for supporting first level organizations (thus creating consortiums among resource providers – such as research or capacity building specialized NGOs – and local NGOs that can be involved in the management of activities and in the delivery of long-term coaching and technical assistance to CBOs);

Supporting the creation/development of permanent local coalitions/partnerships and consultation spaces in which local NGOs and “specialised NGOs” are involved together with CBOs and with local authorities, focusing on problem solutions or on policy monitoring (this kind of initiatives can be supported in the framework of NSA thematic programme);

Fostering medium and long-term institutional capacity building programmes for NGOs, by giving preference to projects that are integrated in longer programmes (this would imply the definition of indicators for selection looking at the existence of longer capacity-building programmes) and through the coordination among donors for funding the different parts of only one long-term programme;

Fostering the identification and implementation of initiatives responding to the priorities identified in Chapter 5.

Support to third and fourth level organisations

Third and fourth level CSOs (sector based platforms, coalitions, regional and local networks, general umbrella organisations, etc.) seem mainly to need support to achieve higher participation by member organisations, to be able to perform permanent and continuous activities and to have a greater influence on policy making, both at national and local levels. A major issue in this framework is to avoid the building of new (artificial or funding-based) networks, that are likely to disrupt the fragile existing networks and to produce conflict with the stronger ones. Instead, it would be possible to support already existing “structuration” processes by opening the space for a more active role for these organisations. Possible actions comprise:

Promoting greater involvement and a stronger role of NGO networks in sector coordination activities, for instance, calling the representatives of sectoral platforms and network to assume an active role in the management of the existing “sector coordination groups” among development partners (assuming such a role can consist in taking the responsibility for the secretariat and for the setting of meeting agendas – however networks would need to have funding for playing such a role);

Supporting preparatory meetings among CSOs for sector coordination groups, with the aim of producing a common voice and proactive participation; networks and platforms can be asked to prepare these meetings;

Active involvement of sector and geographic platforms and networks in the preparation and organisation of the structured consultation activities that are already held by EU (this can allow for the organisation of local consultation in which local NGOs and CBOs participation can be facilitated);

Provision of technical assistance and resources to platforms for launching and implementing institutional development plans or for improving functioning and provision of “network” services (i.e. knowledge management, production and dissemination; information activities; coordination and agenda setting; representation of member organisations, producing sector or geographically focused CSOs mapping, etc.) this can be conducted by increasing within the thematic programmes the specific actions aimed at supporting networking and platform development74;

74

Activities focusing on network and platform development have been already supported by EC, in the framework of different programmes, for instance regarding gender and peace-building.

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Opening space at national level and at local level in which CSOs networks can represent member organisations, including monitoring and evaluation committees for projects and development initiatives (note those indicated above) and the creation of committees for the discussion and following up on EU geographic cooperation initiatives (such as the activities under PEGASE), including infrastructure;

Supporting the assumption of a guiding role of networks and platforms in the activities supporting CSOs development; in this framework networks and platforms should be invited to act as a “leading” body and to leave implementation of activities to other specialised bodies; participation of networks and platforms should not be limited to the election of representatives in the boards leading the actions75.

7.6. Priorities for sector based intervention Based on the study findings, some priorities can be identified also regarding sector based intervention, as those included under the EU thematic programmes (NSA, EIDHR, PfP, IIP/Gender, Cultural Activities, East Jerusalem). These priorities are identified below.

Non State Actor (NSA) Programme The NSA Programme can provide a privileged space for promoting mutual recognition among civil society organisations and other actors, including the public authorities and the political parties, as well as the private sector. Such recognition should regard both the different nature of the various actors, their functions and their autonomy and can be promoted through the production of knowledge (research), the sharing of knowledge and the promotion of common perspectives (conferences, workshops, etc.) and the construction of partnerships for policy setting or for solving local problems. The NSA Programme can also offer an important opportunity for supporting the development and dissemination of a “public service culture.” This can be done both among public officers and public bodies on the one side and among CSOs on the other. In this framework, priority is represented by:

Initiatives based on people’s participation to the setting and monitoring of quality standards for service delivery;

initiatives based on people’s participation in the monitoring of public services and public policies;

initiatives based on formulating demands for services and policies through citizen involvement.

Finally, the NSA Programme represents a privileged space to promote and improve local democracy and participatory decision-making. Possible actions can involve the qualification of CSO participation in existing councils and participatory planning bodies (see previous information).

European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy (EIHRD) EIHRD has already been a space for supporting policy engagement of CSOs, particularly in advocacy activities. Priorities in this framework can be identified as regarding:

Support to the structuration and strengthening of existing coordination and collaboration platforms;

75 A relevant example to be considered as an ineffective way of mobilising networks and platforms is the involvement of CSO networks in the directors’ board of NDC: elected people when participating in NDC activities are not actually playing a representation role, but are expressing their personal capacities and knowledge (and most of them were selected because of their capacities and knowledge). Rather, having a (permanent) representative in boards, networks can be involved in having institutional representation and participation and in consultation activities.

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Support to advocacy for a more effective application of existing legislation on associations and CSOs and for the opening of space for public recognition of “unregistered” community based and grassroots organisations;

Support to research & monitoring (which is already a major activity in the sector);

Fostering of activities focusing on citizenship rights in daily life: transport, access to basic services, quality of education and health service delivery, the relationships among citizens and public bureaucracy, the relationships between citizens and security services, etc.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Under the Partnership for Peace Programme, a variety of initiatives have been carried out, including activities aimed at peace-building from below, activities aimed at creating and maintaining communication among communities in the oPt and Israel and activities aimed at networking among CSOs involved in peace initiatives at the regional level. PfP has sometimes been blamed by Palestinian CSOs for not taking fully in account the fact that the occupation situation implies that a “conflict” exist and cannot be denied or considered as a normal situation to deal with. Based on previous experience and on the debate existing among Palestinian CSOs, the following priorities can be singled out:

Support a public discussion on peace perspectives (including state-building) and on peace-building policies, so to increase the possibility to achieve a common position and voice among CSOs and to increase the possibility of CSOs defining a specific role;

Support cooperation among Palestinian, Israeli and other regional NGOs for improving the citizen organisations capacity to face the threats produced by political divides and by the “political invasion” of civil society space (including the closing of CSOs both in the oPt and Israel);

Support to local committees and initiatives for promoting the recognition of Palestinian CSOs and their role and autonomy by the occupying authorities;

Support to CSO initiatives aimed at making conflict impact visible and at promoting local initiatives for solving and reducing them (i.e. on water resources and transports).

Investing in people/Gender

Under the umbrella of the “Investing in People” thematic programme, a main focus was assumed in the oPt on gender. As a fact, women’s organisations constitute an important group within the Palestinian CSOs’ community, however among women’s organisations cooperation is scarce and it is mainly emerging in specific occasions (such as supporting law reforms). This appears currently as a major issue, both regarding the possibility to promote the diffusion and development of a culture that looks at gender relations according to an “equal opportunities approach” and that is recognising gender differences, and as regarding the possibility to assume – by women’s CSOs themselves – a more “political” perspective, considering the gender issue not only as matter of individual rights (and as matter of protection of these rights) but also as a collective rights matter. Based on that, two main priorities can be identified:

Support to coalition-building and to setting permanent cooperation and coordination platforms;

Support to the assumption of a policy focus, in which defence of women’s rights is framed in a wider political and policy action.

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Cultural activities Cultural activities are a main focus of activity of first level organisation and of a relatively small number of NGOs in the oPt. Very often, cultural activities are linked to specific strategies and sometimes it is not easy to identify a strategy of finding a way to mobilize and keep together groups of people. However, cultural activities represents both a main factor for setting up and maintaining a common identify and a main factor for producing social change, as in the case of many youth focusing initiatives. No coordination or platforms seem to exist which focus on culture. Also in this case a main priority is that of sustaining coalition-building. Another emerging issue is that of sustaining access to culture and to opportunities in remote areas. The issue in this case is not so much that of “producing local cultural activities” (many CBOs are already involved in that), but in supporting a kind of “bridging” function cultural activities can play. This mainly implies to support the opening of opportunities for sharing production outcomes. This also implies providing smaller NGOs and CBOs with resources for actually participating in initiatives such as festivals, competitions and so on. Sub-contracting schemes may prove to be a relevant tool in this framework.

East Jerusalem As discussed in previous chapters, East Jerusalem represents many peculiarities. However the most important ones are: the disconnection from the rest of the oPt; the growing marginalisation, impoverishment and social crisis which determine a growing service and relief activity demand; the loss of a “real” knowledge of the city and its transformation; the lack of citizenship status and the lack of political participation for Palestinian people; the lack of representation of Palestinian people and the lack recognition of Palestinian civil society actors. Within this large set of issues, the key priority and the main condition for being able to tackle the many other issues is the recognition of Palestinian civil society actors by the Occupying authorities and the opening of space for negotiation and dialogue in which Palestinian citizens’ organisations can play a role other than the simple provision of basic (education, health and relief – including the defence from human rights violations) services. Regarding these two priorities, in addition to project funding and support to CSOs, international donors have a mediation, legitimate and political support role to play.

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ANNEXES

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Annex 1 – Bibliographical and Documentary References

“Right to enter” Campaign (http://www.righttoenter.ps/index.php)

“Young Women at the Forefront of Democracy in Palestine”, CHF International, 2010 (http://www.Chfinternational.org)

A.M. Qattan Foundation, Serving Culture and Education in Palestine and the Arab World. Annual Report 2009 – 2010

AECID, Cooperation with CSOs in OPT: Social Services, Humanitarian Aid, Peace Building, Culture, Agriculture and Water (unpublished, 2011)

Ahmad T.H., Conceptual and Practical Indicators of Good Governance at Local Palestinian Authorities, An-Najah Scholars, 2008

Aldaamer (www.aldameergaza.org)

Al-Haq, Al-Haq, Ramallah, 2010

Al-Quds University, Community Action Centre (www.qou.edu)

AMAN, “Enhancing Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in the Palestinian Society” Phase IV (May 2010- April 2013), Proposal, 2010

AMAN, Annual Corruption Report 2008, Ramallah, 2009

AMAN, Corruption Report – Palestine. Combating Corruption in Public Institutions - 2009, Ramallah, 2010

ARIJ (www.arij.org)

Arik Institute, Toledo Peace, Civil Society: A joint Israeli – Palestinian Strategy for Peace, Madrid 2005

Badioli F., Said N., Zemach M., Evaluation of the EU Partnership for Peace Programme, EU – SOGES, 2010

BDS – Boycott Movement (http://www.bdsmovement.net/)

Birzeit University, “The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Society Building and Empowerment of the Palestinian People”, in UNDP, Human Development Report 2008

BISAN, Civicus - Civil Society Index Research Project. Country Report – Palestine, Welfare Association Consortium – CIDA, Ramallah, 2006

Blinder A., Meier C., Steets J., Humanitarian Assistance: Truly Universal? A mapping study of non-western donors, CPPi, 2010 (www.gppi.net)

Caritas Jerusalem, Activity Report 2009, Jerusalem, 2010

Celiska-Ismail B., Gaza Community Mental Health Program. Strategic Plan 2008-2010, GCMHP, Gaza, 2007

Challand B., Palestinian Civil Society, Routledge, 2009

Challand B., “A NAHḌA of charitable organizations? Health Service Provision and the Politics of Aid in Palestine”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40:2008

Code of Conduct Coalition, The Palestinian NGOs Code of Conduct, 2008

Colliard C., Hamad B.A., Evaluation of the Gaza Mental Health Program, SDC, 2010

Community Action Centre (CAC) at the Arab University of Jerusalem (http://www.guni-rmies.net/observatory/bp.php?id=202)

Community Action Centre, Annual Edition 2007, Jerusalem 2007

Community Action Centre, Annual Edition 2008, Jerusalem 2008

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Consulat Général de France, Fonds Social de Développement, Guidelines 2011

Consulat Général de France, Liste des ONGs et des Projets, (2010, unpublished document)

Costantini G. (SOGES – ECO), Study on Civil Society Mapping in Asia – Operational and Methodological Note, Brussels, October, 2010

Critiquing NGOs: Assessing the Last Decade, Middle East Report 214, 2000 (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer214/214_pitner.html)

Dalia Association. A Palestinian Community Foundation, Jerusalem, 2010

Danish Representative Office, Cooperation initiatives with Palestinian CSOs (2011, unpublished)

Danish Representative Office, Danish Culture and Development Strategy for Palestine 2008-2010 (2008)

De Voir J., Tartir A., Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008, MAS – NDC, Ramallah, 2009

DED, Promotion of the Civil Society, 2009 (www.giz.de)

DeVoir and Tartir, Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian NGOs in the WB and Gaza, MAS, 2009

DFID, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Key Facts and Projects (www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/.../OPT)

EC (internal note) Conclusions of the Consultation Workshop with CSOs in the OPT on the Non State Actors Programme (22 & 24 February 2010)

EC (internal note), Subgranting

EC (Non paper), Strengthening the Civil Society Dimension of the ENP. Expanding the Proposals contained in the Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Strengthening the ENP” -– COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 DECEMBER 2006

EC, Communication “Governance in EU Consensus on Development” (2006)

EC, Communication on “Governance and Development” (2003), EU Consensus on Development (2005)

EC, Communication on NSA participation in Development (2002)

EC, Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of 18 December 2006 establishing the financing instrument for development cooperation (2006)

El-Kholy H. Tschirgi N., Local Governance in Complex Environments. Project Assessment, UNDP, Cairo, 2010

Finland Representative Office, Activities supported in 2009-2010 with the Fund for Local Cooperation - LFC (unpublished, 2011)

Fischer M., Civil Society and Conflict Transformation, Berghof, 2006

Floridi M., Sanz Corella B., Verdecchia S., Capitalisation study on Capacity building support Programmes for Non State Actors under the 9th EDF, 2009

FSD, Tableau de bord (2010, unpublished document)

Giacaman G., In The Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future, Muwatin (www.muwatin.org/george/after_oslo.html)

GTZ (http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/maghreb-naher-osten/palaestinensische-gebiete/ … htm)

GTZ, Programme of Support for Civil Society at Local Level in the Palestinian Territories, 2009-2012 (http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/maghreb-naher-osten/palaestinensische-gebiete/20750.htm)

Hanafi S., Tabar L., The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite. Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs, Institute of Jerusalem Studies – Muwatin, 2005.

Hasson Sh., Supporting Jewish-Arab Relations – The Case of Jerusalem, NearEastQuarterly, 2010

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Health Work Committees, Annual Report 2009

Helpdesk Research Report: Civil Society and Accountability in the OPT, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2010

Helpdesk Research Report: NGOs in the Palestinian Territories, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2010

Hilal J., Civil Society in Palestine, a Literature Review (no date)

ICP (http://icp.bethlehem.edu)

ILO, Concept note. Support to Palestinian Cooperatives for Employment and Income Creation, 2010

Institute of Law, Birzeit University (http://lawcenter.birzeit.edu/iol/en/index.php)

IrcJ (www.lrcj.org)

Irish Aid, Human Rights and Democratisation Scheme’s Partners in Palestine, 2011 (unpublished, 2011)

Jad I. (Birzeit University), NGOs: between buzzwords and social movements (no date)

Jerusalem Coalition (http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/ccdprj.ps/new2/index.php)

Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Centres, IJAC’s Annual Report 2009

Jerusalem Unit of the Office of the President, Strategic Multisector Development Plan for East Jerusalem”, Office of the President / European Union, Ramallah 2010

Kasabreh G. , Accountability and Reliability. Enhancing Democratic Governance of Palestinian NGOs. A Voluntary Code of Conduct, NDC, 2010

Kroessin R.M., “Islamic charities”, in Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 38: 2007 (www.odihpn.org)

Lendman St., Freedom of Association Restrictions and Discrimination in Israel and Occupied Palestine, March 2010 (Thepeoplevoice.org)

Lester Murad N., The Imperative to Decrease Palestinian Civil Society’s Dependence on International Aid. Concept Paper for Dalia Association, A Palestinian Community Foundation, Jerusalem, 2007

Ma’an Network (http://www.maannet.org/)

Maher I., Palestinian Civil Society in Search of an Identity, Common Ground News Service, 2010

MAS, Mapping of Non Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Ramallah, 2007

MAS, Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 1999 – 2008. A study commissioned by NDC and implemented by MAS, 2009

Masader Portal (www.masader.ps)

MIFTAH, Annual Activities Report 2009

Monaghan L., Careccia G., The Annexation Wall and its Associated Regime, Al-Haq, Ramallah, 2009

NDC (NGO Development Center), (http://www.ndc.ps/main.php?id=110)

NDC (NGO Development Center), Annual Report 2009

NDC (NGO Development Center), Corporate Social responsibility and Palestinian Civil Society: Potential Cooperation, 2009

NDC (NGO Development Center), Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat in the oPT (no date)

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NDC (NGO Development Center), Human Rights/Good Governance Program, Proposal, March 2010

NDC (NGO Development Center), NDC Enhances the Financial Conditions of the Poor and Marginalized Palestinians, Al-Dahriye Society for Rural Development, Hebron (Job Creation beneficiary NGO), (no date)

NDC (NGO Development Center), Proposed Strategy for the Development of the Palestinian NGO sector, NDC, 2006

NDC (NGO Development Center), Sector Development Program - Thematic Networks Grant Recipients (unpublished)

NDC (NGO Development Center), Strategic Plan 2010 – 2014

NDC (NGO Development Center), Supporting Palestinian Umbrella NGO Networks and Thematic Networks (no date)

Netherlands Representative Office (NRO), Funded NGOs Project, 2010 (unpublished)

Nicolaou-Garcia S., Civil Society in the West Bank. Between the Rock of Occupation & The stone of the Palestinian Authotiry, Middle East Monitor, 2010

OMP, Building bridges to olive oil market. Promoting Olive Oil Production and Market Access for Small-Scale Olive Producers, ICP – University of Bethlehem, Bethlehem,2010

Ophir A., Givoni M., Hanafi S., The Power of Inclusive Exclusion. Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Zone Books, New York, 2009

PA, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of the Thirteenth Government, August, 2009

PAL Vision, Evaluation Study for the Exchange and reunion of Palestinian Israeli Youth aiming to urge the peace process through dialogue and accord, Palestinian Vision, 2008

Palestinian Environmental NGO Network (http://www.pengon.org/)

Palestinian Israeli Peace NGO Forum (http://www.peacengo.org/history.asp)

Palestinian Legislative Council, Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations, Law No. 1, Year 2000 (http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/laws/associations/charlaw-comorg-pal-00-e.pdf)

Palestinian NGO Network – Gaza, PNGO Portal (http://pngoportal.org/arab/)

Palestinian Women organizing in Jerusalem, UNDP – PAPP / Kvinna till Kvinna, 2010

PARC – Gaza, Maintaining and Developing the Cash Crops Sector in Gaza Strip (2010 – 2012), Proposal, 2010

PARC – Gaza, Responding to the Early Recovery Needs and Enhancing the Livelihoods for Damaged Farmers and Areas in the Gaza Strip (2010 – 2012), Proposal, 2010

Partners in Creative Solutions, Support for Community Services Through Local NGOs in the OPT – External Evaluation Report, Welfare Association – Austrian Representative Office/Austrian Development Agency, 2008

PCCJ (www.pcc-jer.org)

PFU, Presentation of the Palestinian Farmers Union. Objectives, Strategy and Programs, Ramallah, 2010

PHG ( www.phg.org)

PNCR (http://www.pncr.org/arabic/home.asp)

PNGO, Guidebook of Member Organizations in the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network in the West Bank, Ramallah, 2010

Polat H., Cooperatives in the Arab World, ILO, 2010

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PYALARA (Awwad H. et. al. ), Random Traveling on the Internet: A study of the Interaction between the Palestinian Youth and Social Media, Pyalara, Ramallah, 2011

PYALARA, Semi-Annual Narrative Report - August 2010, Ramallah, 2010

Rabah J., Mapping of Organizations Working with Youth in the oPt, Near East Consulting - UNDP/PAPP, Sharek, 2009

Rajab Kh., M&E capacity building initiatives of the local government units in Palestine: The experience of Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) in developing its M&E system, 2009

RESC (www.resc.org.ps)

Riyada Consulting, FSD – French Funding Mechanism for Palestinian Civil Society Support, Consulat General de France à Jerusalem, 2010

Riyada Consulting, Review of Swedish Support to Civil Society, 2009

Ruwwad. The Palestinian Youth Empowerment Programme (http://www.ruwwad.org/)

Said Mira, Decent Work Agenda and CSO response, DWRC, Ramallah 2010

Salem W., Palestinian Civil Society: Characteristics, past and present roles, and future challenges, 2006

SDC, Cooperation Strategy (CS) 2006 – 2010 for the OPT, Berne, 2007

Search for Common Ground (http://www.sfcg.org/)

Sharek (www.sharek.org)

Sharek Youth Forum, Partners Program, Sharek – SDC, 2010

Sharek, Youth in Action: Promise for the Future. Progress Update 2008 -2009 - 2010, Ramallah, 2011

Sheila Carapico, NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs: Making Sense of Non-Governmental Organizations (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer214/214_pitner.html)

Sherwood H., “Young Palestinians call for protests on 15 March”, Guardian.co.uk, 24 February 2011

SIDA, Policy for Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries within Swedish Development Cooperation, 2009

SIDA, Strategy for Development Cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza (January 2007 – June 2008)

SIDA, Strategy for Development Cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza (July 2008 – December 2011)

Sidoti Ch., Quazzaz H., Review of the Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat supporting NGO working in the OPT, Final Report, NDC, 2009

Srour A., Palestinian Civil Society: A time for Action, The Atkins Paper Series, 2009

Stop the Wall Campaign (http://www.stopthewall.org/)

Tabar N., The Jerusalem Trap, Al-Haq, Ramallah, 2010

The EU “Investing in People Programme” (2010)

The Palestinian Center for Peace & Democracy, Annual report 2009, Ramallah, 2010

The Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies, Ramallah, 2010

The World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Palestinian NGO Project II, April 2007 (Report No. ICR 0000189), The World Bank – Sustainable Development Department – MENA Region, Washington DC, 2007

The World Bank, Improving the Quality and Sustainability of NGO Social Service Delivery, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 2010

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The World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, Palestinian NGO-IV Project, May 2010 (Report No. 54133-GZ), The World Bank – Sustainable Development Department – MENA Region, Washington DC, 2010

TIRI – AMAN, Integrity in Reconstruction. Palestine Executive Summary, TIRI, 2007

Tocci N., The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation, MICROCON, Brighton, 2008

UN, Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator, 2006

UNDP, Focus. Palestinian Civil Society (www.undp.ps/en/newsroom/publications/pdf/focus/04v2.pdf)

UNDP, POGAR - Palestine http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=2&cid=14

UNRWA, Relief and Social Services. Community Based Organizations, Amman, 2009

USAID, The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society, Center for the Study of the Presidency of United States, Washington D.C., 2008

Van de Pol J., Hammad M., Evaluation of the activities financed by the Netherlands Representative Office (NRO) to the Palestinian Authorities in the Agricultural Sector, 2009 (unpublished)

Welfare Association (http://welfare-association.org/)

Welfare Association, Annual Report 2009

Wildlife Palestine (www.wildlife-pal.org)

Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, Forced Evictions. Assessing the Impact on Palestinian Women in East Jerusalem, Ramallah, 2010

Young Artist Forum (presentation of the organisation and projects, no date)

Zamareh B., Kamesh I.A., Palestinian Youth and Political Parties. Fear and Disappointment, Sharek, Ramallah, 2010

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Annex 2 – Met 2nd level Civil Society Organisations

A.M. Qattan Foundation Ramallah

Al Haq Ramallah

Al Haq Ramallah

Al Majd Women Association Gaza

Al-Najda Association for the Development of Palestinian Women Gaza Alternative information centre Jerusalem

Aman –Transparency Palestine Ramallah

Arab Centre For Agricultural Development Gaza

ARD EL AFTAL /Palestine Hebron

AWCSW, Association of Women Committees For Social Work Ramallah

AWCSW, Association of Women Committees For Social Work Ramallah

Bisan Centre for Research and Development Ramallah

CAC, Community Action Centre – Al-Quds University Jerusalem

Caritas Jerusalem Jerusalem

Coalition for Jerusalem Jerusalem CWLRC - Centre For Women's Legal Research & consulting Gaza

Dalia Association Jerusalem DCI, Defense for Children International-Palestine Ramallah

DWRC, Democracy and Workers’ Rights Centre Ramallah

Faisal Husseini Institute Jerusalem

Gaza Community Mental Health Programme Gaza

General Union Of Disabled Palestinians Gaza HADAF, Centre For Human Rights Gaza

HWC – Health Work Committees Ramallah

HWC – Health Work Committees Ramallah

IPCC, International Peace and Cooperation centre Jerusalem Jabalia Rehabilitation Society Gaza

JCSER, Jerusalem centre for social and economical rights Jerusalem

Juzoor Foundation for Health and Social Development Ramallah

Labor Resources Centre Gaza

MA'AN Development Centre Ramallah

MA'AN Development Centre Ramallah

MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute Ramallah

Miftah, Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy

Ramallah

MUSAWA, Palestinian Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession

Ramallah

Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy Ramallah

National Council for Development Hebron

National Society for Democracy and Law Gaza

NDC, NGO Development Centre Ramallah

NDC, NGO Development Centre Ramallah

PACF, Palestine Avenir for Childhood Foundation Gaza

SDPRC - Palestinian Commission for Refugees Rights Protection Gaza

Palestinian counseling centre Jerusalem

Palestinian Food Industry Association Gaza

Palestinian General Union Of Charitable Societies Ramallah

Page 171/210


Palestinian Hydrological Group Ramallah

Palvision – Palestinian Vision Jerusalem

Panorama Centre Ramallah

PARC, Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees Ramallah



PCDCR, The Palestinian Centre for Democracy & Conflict Resolution

Gaza

PCPD, Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy Ramallah

PENGON, Palestinian Environmental NGO Network Ramallah

PFU, Palestinian farmers union Ramallah

PFU, Palestinian farmers union Ramallah

PHD - Palestinian Commission for Human Development Gaza

PNGO, Palestinian NGOs Network Ramallah PNGO, Palestinian NGOs Network – Gaza Strip Gaza

PYALARA, Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership And Rights Activation

Ramallah

Right To Live Society Gaza

Rowwad Foundation for Development Work Gaza

Rural women development institute Ramallah

Safe Agriculture Producing Cooperative SAPS Gaza Save the youth future Gaza

Sawa Centre Jerusalem

Shams – Human Rights and Democracy Media Centre Ramallah

Sharek Youth Forum Ramallah

Sharek Youth Forum – Gaza Gaza

Teacher Creativity Centre Ramallah University of Bethlehem - Institute community Partnership – ICP Bethlehem

LDC - Wall damages registration committee Ramallah

War child Holland Jerusalem

War child Holland Jerusalem

WCLAC - Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling Ramallah

WCLAC - Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling Ramallah Welfare Association Ramallah

Woman's Affairs Centre – Gaza Gaza Young Artists Forum Ramallah

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Annex 3 – Organisations participating in the Focus Group Meetings

Alkarmel Youth Sports Club Hebron- Yatta, Al karmel

Southern Society for Rehabilitation Hebron- Yatta

Cooperative Association for Olive Pressing Hebron- Yatta- Al karmel

Yatta Charitable Society Hebron- Yatta

Alistklal Sports Club Hebron-Yatta, Raqaa Islamic Association for Orphans Care Hebron- Yatta

Community Based Rehabilitation – CBR Hebron- Yatta

Hebron Rehabilitation Committee Hebron

Family Development Foundation Hebron- Mashtal

Women's Work Society Hebron- Mashtal

Cooperative Association for Protecting and Developing Local Seeds Hebron- Halhoul Women's Programmes Centre Nablus-Balata camp

Hewar for Children Centre Nablus

Borqa Women Club-Rural Women Development Nablus-Borqa

Mothers School Association Nablus-Sabastia Nablus Zakat Committee Nablus-Sabastia

Tubas Charitable Society Tubas Green Agricultural Association Tubas - Kardalah

Ein Albeeda Cooperative for handicrafts Tubas - Ein Albeeda

Tamoun Cooperative for handicrafts Tubas-Tamoun

Cooperative Rural Association for Saving and Credit Tubas

Cooperative Association for Agricultural production Tubas-Tamoun

Holy Tree Agricultural Cooperative Association Tubas Alaqaba Cooperative Association for Housing the Displaced Tubas-Alaqabeh

Rural Women's charitable Association Tubas-Alaqabeh

Jericho and Alaghwar cooperative for beekeeping Jericho- Aqabet Jaber camp

Alqamar Charitable Society Jericho

Jericho Women's Charitable Society Jericho

Aloja Cooperative Association for Rural Development Jericho - Aloja Fisheries association Jericho-Mish Alkhatef

Palestinian Women Relief Jericho

Al Awda Centre for Childhood and Youth Tulkarem

Cultural Centre for Child Development Tulkarem

Al-Harah Theatre Beit Jala

Manhal Cultural Centre for Women and Children Nablus- Rafidia

Jerusalem Social Solidarity Association Jerusalem-

Yaffa Cultural Center Nablus-Balata camp

Sebastia Charitable Association (BARA'EM) Nablus-Sabastia

Children Happiness Centre Hebron Hekaya Theatre Foundation Ramallah-Um asharayet

The Freedom Theater Jenin- Refugee Camp

Innovation and Talent for Children and Youth Ramallah – Sateh marhaba

Jabal Annar Club Nablus

Jerusalemite Youth Culture Forum Jerusalem- Selwan Jifna Club Ramallah-Jifna

Kofr Allabad Sports & Cultural Club Tulkerem-Kofr Allabad

Kufr Ra'i Charitable Association for Development and Culture Jenin-Kufr Rai

Popular Development Centre (Land Defense Committee) Ramallah

Page 173/210


Nur Shams Association for Handicapped Rehabilitation Tulkarem-Nur Sams

Women Programme Centre Tulkarem-Nur Sams

Palestinian Child Arts Centre Hebron

Jerusalem Culture and Civilization “ SIWAR” Jerusalem- Silwan

Jenin Association for family interdependence and solidarity Jenin

Youth Development Society Nablus-Sebastia

Rural Women Development Society Nablus-Sebastia

Youth and Childhood Ajyal Centre Jenin-Berqin

Women's Charitable Society Alola Salfeet-Qarawa

Center for Palestinian Women Development in AL-Aghwar Jericho –Jiftlik

Dar Al-Fonon Wa Al-Torath Center Nablus

Women's Cultural Society for Palestinian Popular Heritage Jenin

Mother Guidance & Child Care Society Nablus

Sourif Association for Higher Education Hebron-Surif

Women and Family Affairs Centre Nablus

Alaqaba Agricultural Cooperative Association Tubas-Alaqaba

Cultural Forum Society Qlqilia

Local Committee for Rehabilitation Nablus - New Askar camp

Borqa Women Society for Social Development Nablus-Borqa

Borqa Cultural and Social Sports Club Nablus-Borqa

Bardala Cooperative Association for Herbs Tubas-Bardala

AFAQ for Development Eastern Gaza, Gaza Safe AgriculturE Producers Society Biet Hanoun, North Gaza

Women's Programme Center Tal El Sultan-Rafah

BENA' for Empowerment and Development Jabalia Village , North Gaza

Al Rahma Society for Charitable Jabalia Camp, North Gaza

Al Ata'a Al Khairya Beit Hanound, North Gaza

Beit Lahia Development association Beit Lahia, Gaza

Labor Resources Centre Gaza City, Gaza

Society for the care of disabled families Rafah, Gaza

Deir El-Balah Rehabilitation Society D/Balah, Gaza

Buriej Sociaty Care and Rehabilitation Buriej Camp, Middle Area, Gaza

Agriculture Cooperatives for Strawberries, Vegetables and flowers Producers Association

Beit Lahia, North Gaza

Psycho Social Support Association Remal, Gaza

Palestine Association for serving society Beach Camp, Gaza

Northern Association for Social Development North Gaza - Jabaliya camp

Al Karamah Comission for Culture and Art Rafah, Gaza

Hiker el Jamie` youth organization D/Balah, Gaza

Al Satter Al Gharbi for Developing Community and Farmers Kh/Younis, Gaza Culture and Arts Gaza Association Gaza City Gaza

Childrens Friends Society Jabalia City, Gaza Human First Charity Association Jabalia Camp, Gaza

Al Ahleya Association for the Development of Palm and Dates D/Balah, Gaza

Association of Culture, Arts and Popular Heritage Beach Camp, Gaza City

El Wafa charitable society Al shejaeya, Gaza

Remedial Education Centre Jabalia Camp, Gaza Strip

Palestinian National Association for Youth Gaza

Benevolent Community Centre Association Beit Lahia, North Gaza

Page 174/210



Page 175/210


Speech by HR/VP Catherine Ashton on North Africa and the Arabworld

SPEECH/11/504

European Parliament Strasbourg, 6 July 2011

Mr President, Honourable Members, the last time I spoke in this Parliament, in early May, I said that statements could andshould be made – but that the priority is action.

You will remember that I announced my intention to establish an EU office in Benghazi.

The EU flag now flies above the courthouse in the newly-named Freedom Square – a symbol not just of our solidarity with itspeople, but of our practical commitment.

The office is now up and running, experts are arriving each week – working at how to support the security needs ofd thepeople, and help build the capacity of civil society.

And last week my team was in New York, coordinating our work on Libya with the UN.

Outside the courthouse in Freedom Square, I met some of the people who have been bringing democracy to life in Libya.

They thanked me; they thanked you; they thanked the European Union.

They know that we will stay with them over time, and today I am sure you join me in saluting again the enormous courage ofthe Libyan people – whether in Benghazi, Misrata, the Western Mountains, Tripoli or the South.

We have stepped up sanctions, to stop arms and money reaching the regime.

We have provided €140 million of humanitarian assistance to those most in need.

And we continue to work for a political resolution to the conflict, in the Contact Group (which will meet in Istanbul nextweek) and in the “Cairo Group”, where – at our instigation – we continue to work with the UN Secretary General and SpecialEnvoy Mr Al Khatib, the Arab League, the African Union and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where we preparefor the days, weeks and months after Gaddafi leaves.

Actions must be rooted in strategy.

The EU was the first to offer a serious response to the Arab Spring, with our 'Partnership' Communication of 8 March.

Two months later, we launched a new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy.I am delighted to have Stefan Fule with me today – my close and trusted partner in conceiving the new ENP, and on ensuringdelivery on our promises.

You know the core principles of the Policy: mutual accountability; individual approaches to individual countries dependingon their circumstances and aspirations; offering more support, for more reform – in Stefan's words: 'more for more'.

It has financial backing to match, in the form of an extra €1.2 billion for the next two years, on top of the €5.7 billion alreadypledged – so, nearly €7 billion.

To this, we should add a sum in the region of €7-8 billion, the result of the concerted efforts I initiated to unlock newinvestment funds from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The goal is clear: the promotion of what I call ‘deep’ and sustainable democracy and – with it – economic prosperity.

We know full well that democracy is hollow without food, safety, and jobs.

Page 176/210

European Union

06 Jul 2011

Page 177/210

SPEECH/11/504 Catherine Ashton

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission

Speech on North Africa and the Arab world

European Parliament

Strasbourg, 6 July 2011

Page 178/210

2

Mr President, Honourable Members, the last time I spoke in this Parliament, in early May, I said that statements could and should be made – but that the priority is action.

You will remember that I announced my intention to establish an EU office in Benghazi.

The EU flag now flies above the courthouse in the newly-named Freedom Square – a symbol not just of our solidarity with its people, but of our practical commitment.

The office is now up and running, experts are arriving each week – working at how to support the security needs ofd the people, and help build the capacity of civil society.

And last week my team was in New York, coordinating our work on Libya with the UN.

Outside the courthouse in Freedom Square, I met some of the people who have been bringing democracy to life in Libya.

They thanked me; they thanked you; they thanked the European Union.

They know that we will stay with them over time, and today I am sure you join me in saluting again the enormous courage of the Libyan people – whether in Benghazi, Misrata, the Western Mountains, Tripoli or the South.

We have stepped up sanctions, to stop arms and money reaching the regime.

We have provided €140 million of humanitarian assistance to those most in need.

And we continue to work for a political resolution to the conflict, in the Contact Group (which will meet in Istanbul next week) and in the “Cairo Group”, where – at our instigation – we continue to work with the UN Secretary General and Special Envoy Mr Al Khatib, the Arab League, the African Union and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where we prepare for the days, weeks and months after Gaddafi leaves.

Actions must be rooted in strategy.

The EU was the first to offer a serious response to the Arab Spring, with our 'Partnership' Communication of 8 March.

Two months later, we launched a new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy.

I am delighted to have Stefan Fule with me today – my close and trusted partner in conceiving the new ENP, and on ensuring delivery on our promises.

You know the core principles of the Policy: mutual accountability; individual approaches to individual countries depending on their circumstances and aspirations; offering more support, for more reform – in Stefan's words: 'more for more'.

It has financial backing to match, in the form of an extra €1.2 billion for the next two years, on top of the €5.7 billion already pledged – so, nearly €7 billion.

To this, we should add a sum in the region of €7-8 billion, the result of the concerted efforts I initiated to unlock new investment funds from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The goal is clear: the promotion of what I call ‘deep’ and sustainable democracy and – with it – economic prosperity.

We know full well that democracy is hollow without food, safety, and jobs.

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3

So now is the time for all of us – EU institutions and Member States – to deliver on our shared objectives.

Beyond the new ENP, I have taken two further regional initiatives since we last met.

First, to enhance our political effectiveness, presence and visibility, I have appointed an EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean – Bernardino Leon.

His task will be to assist us in strengthening the EU’s political influence in the region, in dialogue with governments, and with civil society and international organizations.

And to cooperate closely with the European Parliament.

Second, I have established a Task Force to draw together our work and bring in the EIB, the EBRD, other International Financial Institutions and other international partners – to turn commitments into reality and to synchronise and work closely together.

And that reality is about democracy and it is about the economy we wish to see on the ground.

In Tunisia and Egypt, you see the evidence of the economic upheavals of the last months.

When I was in Egypt a few days ago, I talked to shopkeepers and hotel managers, and all tell me the same story.

Tourism revenues and foreign direct investment have fallen – they need support to revive the economy.

That is why, for instance, we are supporting a major Egyptian social housing initiative.

We are also launching a major programme to support the poorest areas in the greater Cairo region, as well as a €20 million programme to support Egyptian civil society.

We are ready to help Egypt reform its security sector; we have offered EU election observation and assistance and support for democracy.

Deputy Prime Minister El Gamal is leading the electoral process, the drafting of the constitution.

An eminent lawyer, it falls to him to sort out a constitution that will, in my words, be the guardian of the people.

Similarly, in Tunisia, I met with Foreign Minister Kefi on Friday.

Support for civil society and for the preparation of October's Constituent Assembly elections is well underway.

We have been asked to deploy an Election Observation Mission, and will do so.

EU security reform and regional development programmes are also in motion.

The Tunisian government, meanwhile, advances its own reform agenda.

We applaud the consensus that was reached on the date for the elections, and the fact that the principle of male-female parity for the lists of candidates has been retained.

I am concerned that the voice of women continues to be heard, and their engagement certain.

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4

There is a fear, expressed to me, that - having taken part in their revolutions - their place in the future is not guaranteed.

We need to support them - practically by offering our resources to support them, and politically by making it clear that we expect their engagement.

We funded a conference with UN Women in Tunisia, so that women could come together from across the region to consult and gain strength from each other.

There is more to do - and incidentally this morning I have issued a statement of concern on the recent arrest of women journalists, artists and women's right defenders in Iran.

But perhaps our greatest concern today is for the people of Syria – who are denied the right to play their part in the charting their country's future.

What began as small local demonstrations, against corruption in local communities, has become a national outpouring – and been met with violence and repression.

Yesterday in Homa 11 people died, adding to a total of over 1500 civilians and 350 security personnel.

And 10,000 people have been detained.

We condemn without reservation these acts of violence and repression.

Since we last met, I have increased our sanctions twice, continued to make our voice heard, worked with our international partners, and sought action at the Security Council - all with the objective of sending a single message to stop the violence, create the dialogue, and prepare for change.

President Assad's promises of reform and dialogue remain weak - he has only recently announced that a committee will meet to prepare the framework for a dialogue.

Let us be clear any dialogue must be inclusive – the opposition must take part, and all who participate must do so without fear.

Our EU Delegation remains on the ground in Damascus – meeting every day with individuals and groups, working with other representatives, sending out our messages.

Our Delegation in Ankara has been visiting the refugees who have arrived over the border in Turkey in their thousands, and I have been in close touch with Foreign Minister Davotoglu - offering support for the future should they need it, and discussing the political situation on their borders.

And the instability in Syria has echoes in Lebanon, where, following the indictments, the Special Tribunal must now carry forward its work.

And this brings us to the search for peace in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine.

The changes in the surrounding neighbourhood, the speech of President Obama in May, the moves towards Palestinian reconciliation, the approaching UN General Assembly: all these bring a renewed focus on the possibility of talks and a solution.

I have worked tirelessly for this possibility – working closely with President Abbas, Prime Minister Fayyad and Prime Minister Netanyahu and with many others in the region; and with our Quartet partners and with the Arab States to look for a strong and ambitious way forward, in which the EU plays the leading role this Parliament wishes us to.

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5

The UN, the US and Russia responded to my letter requesting a Quartet meeting in Washington next Monday.

This will build on the Quartet meeting I chaired in Munich earlier this year.

Since then, the envoys have met intensively - and also, for the first time, with negotiators from both sides.

I do not underestimate the challenge, but my objective is clear - to try and adopt a statement next week that will help the Israelis and Palestinians to bridge the gap, and allow for a return to the negotiating table.

Many are looking to September - and the prospect of a resolution.

We don't yet know what that might say, and what reaction it might bring.

But I am clear that my energies should focus on trying to use this time to get the talks moving – and, on that, the EU is united.

And we have a strong position from the Council Conclusions – a united position.

I understand very well the concerns for the people of Gaza, having visited twice and seen for myself the situation.

I stress the need to get the crossings open, to provide what people need, and to ensure the security that Israel needs.

It is there that our energy should lie - and I am encouraged by meetings this week on the ground - but there is much more to do.

I thank Greece for its offer to route humanitarian aid to Gaza, in coordination with the UN.

I want to turn to two kingdoms – those of Morocco and Jordan – where the EU supports and encourages the strong commitment to reform.

On 12 June, King Abdullah of Jordan outlined ambitious reform proposals concerning political parties and the electoral process.

I have been in regular contact on this reform agenda with Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh – most recently on my last visit, two weeks ago.

And finally, this last weekend, there was good news from Morocco, with a referendum endorsing the new Constitution on Saturday.

The reforms proposed are a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people.

I now hope that Moroccan citizens will remain at the centre of the implementation process, and that the dialogue will now widen and strengthen.

We are ready to give Morocco full support in this endeavour.

In Algeria, the state of emergency has been lifted, and the President's promises of reform now need to become action – something I raised with Foreign Minister Medelci recently at the EU-Algeria Association Council.

In Bahrain, I have continued to express my concern at the persistence of human rights violations, from trials lacking in due process, to the handing down of death sentences, and the disgraceful treatment of doctors who have tried to help those in need.

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6

There may be some steps in the right direction: last week I was pleased to see that an independent international commission of inquiry into the events of the past few months has been established: so my and others’ calls had been heard.

But we will remain as vocal as we need to be, as the national dialogue finally gets under way.

And finally, turning to Yemen, crippled by political stalemate and worsening humanitarian and economic conditions - as I discussed with the President before he was injured - the only way forward is a truly inclusive political transition, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative.

I have continued to work closely with our international partners, with the US and with the Council, in trying to unblock the situation and find a solution.

As President Saleh begins to recover, he must transfer power and follow through on his commitment to the transition.

We have made it clear that we are ready, alongside our international partners, to provide further humanitarian, political and practical support. I don't need to tell Honourable Memers how serious the situation is in Yemen.

We are also ready to help prepare elections, and to re-establish a working Parliament – but the transition must begin now.

I close by thanking this Parliament for its steadfast support for our efforts to safeguard and promote these fundamental democratic values, rights and freedoms.

Honourable Members, this Parliament is unique in what it can offer to those in search of democracy.

You are the representatives of democracy: you demonstrate the power of the citizen, and the qualities of open debate and freedom of expression.

Many of you know only too well the challenges of building democracies, fighting for causes, and working for people.

You have much to offer, and I know you will be generous in your support for those trying to find their own path to democracy.

In Benhgazi, a young man, imprisoned by Gaddafi for 8 years, said to me: "We want what you have: democracy as everyday life..."


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European Union helps the Palestinian Authority provide essentialsocial protection to families in need through the payment of socialallowances

Press Release - European Union Jerusalem

PR/15/2011

Friday 24 June 2011

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

On Monday 27 June 2011, the European Union (EU) will be making its second contribution this year to the PalestinianAuthority's quarterly payment of social allowances to poor Palestinian households, across the West Bank and Gaza. Thiscontribution, channelled through the PEGASE[1] mechanism, amounts to just over €9.8 million (ILS 48,103,002 million) andis funded by the EU (€8.8 million) and the Government of Ireland (€1 million).

Beneficiaries are identified in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Social Affairs, through the latter'snational cash assistance programme – a programme designed to provide basic safety net to the poorest and most vulnerablePalestinian citizens. The assistance takes the form of a cash allowance.

The €9.8 million contribution, through PEGASE, will directly benefit 49,578 eligible Palestinian families – out of which26,185 are in Gaza.

The Minister of Social Affairs said:

"Through its diverse programmes reaching-out to the poorest and most marginalised populations, the Ministry of SocialAffairs seeks to alleviate poverty and promote a life with dignity for its most vulnerable citizens. The national cash transferprogramme is at the forefront of the Ministry's activities, with over 87,000 households in the West Bank and Gaza benefitingfrom regular cash-based assistance. The Ministry of Social Affairs is consistently looking to improve the level and quality ofservices provided to its beneficiaries, while upholding their dignity. For this reason, and starting with this payment, assistancewill be channel through individual bank accounts for beneficiaries in the West Bank. We thank all stakeholders involved inthe process, and in particular the European Union for is support to this programme."

The European Union Representative, Mr Christian Berger said:

"Firstly, I would like to thank Ireland for its generous contribution to the programme, which attests the fruitful cooperationbetween the EU and its Member States in supporting the Palestinian Authority in its state-building plan. Over the last periodwe have seen a number of joint achievements in the road of building a strong Ministry of Social Affairs; the latest being theadoption of a business strategy for the coming couple of years. I am certain that with the EU's regular contribution to thepayment of social allowances and its capacity-building support we will soon see the materialization of a comprehensivesocial protection scheme able to support effectively all Palestinians in need.

Payments will be made across a network of five local banks all through the West Bank and Gaza. For the first time sincesocial cash transfers have been established, beneficiaries residing in the West Bank will receive their allowance directlythrough individual bank accounts. In Gaza, beneficiaries will continue to collect their allowance over-the-counter.Beneficiaries may collect their allowances as of Monday 27 June 2011, at the bank branch indicated by their social worker.

Background:

Most of the EU assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financial mechanism launched in2008 to support the three-year Reform and Development Plan presented in 2007. As well as helping to meet a substantialproportion of its running costs, European funds support major reform and development programmes in key ministries, to helpprepare the PA for statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. SinceFebruary 2008, €1.03 billion have been disbursed through the PEGASE Direct Financial Support programmes. In addition,the EU has provided assistance to the Palestinian people through UNRWA and a wide range of cooperation projects.

Page 184/210

Contact:

The Office of the European Union Representative Antonia Zafeiri, Tel: +972 (0) 2 5415 859, Mobile +972 (0) 548 024 915Shadi Othman,Tel: +972 (0) 2 541 5888 ext 867, Mobile: +972 (0) 599 673 958 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/

Ministry of Social Affairs Khaled Al Barghouti,Deputy General Director to Combat Poverty,Mob: 059-932-8586

European Union

24 Jun 2011


Page 185/210


Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the pressconference after the Foreign Affairs Council

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011A 241/11

We began this morning with a discussion about Sudan and our concern about the deteriorating security situation there. Youwill know that recent fighting in South Kordofan has cost the lives of civilians and led to a serious humanitarian situation.

We urge all sides to stop the violence and to engage urgently and constructively with President Mbeki and the work of theAfrican Union.

Both the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan need to make sure that they are allowing access to thosein need of assistance from those who can offer humanitarian aid.

We agreed today on continued EU engagement for peace, stability and for development for Sudan, and we adopted a"comprehensive approach" to both North and South Sudan.

This includes a range of different measures, including stepping up our development work and helping with the developmentof accountable government based on human rights and the rule of law.

We are also very conscious that we are less than 3 weeks away from South Sudan's independence.

I was extremely pleased with the positive response to the new European Neighbourhood Policy.

The council welcomed the creation of the Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean, which I hope will give extra coherenceto the work that we and the international financial institutions and others are doing in the region.

I hope very soon that we will have the name of the Special Representative to the region who will support me with the TaskForce.

You know that I have talked often about the need for us to make sure that we see deep and sustainable democracy in theneighbourhood and that we need an approach that is based on mutual accountability and what I have called the 3 Ms: money,market access, mobility.

So we will start work and we have already begun to develop the strategy.

European Union

21 Jun 2011

Page 186/210

P R E S S




[email protected] www.eeas.europa.eu

EN

EUROPEAN UNION Luxembourg, 20 June 2011

A 241/11

Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton

at the press conference after the Foreign Affairs Council

We began this morning with a discussion about Sudan and our concern about the deteriorating

security situation there. You will know that recent fighting in South Kordofan has cost the lives of

civilians and led to a serious humanitarian situation.

We urge all sides to stop the violence and to engage urgently and constructively with President

Mbeki and the work of the African Union.

Both the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan need to make sure that they

are allowing access to those in need of assistance from those who can offer humanitarian aid.

We agreed today on continued EU engagement for peace, stability and for development for Sudan,

and we adopted a "comprehensive approach" to both North and South Sudan.

This includes a range of different measures, including stepping up our development work

and helping with the development of accountable government based on human rights and the rule of

law.

We are also very conscious that we are less than 3 weeks away from South Sudan's independence.

I was extremely pleased with the positive response to the new European Neighbourhood Policy.

The council welcomed the creation of the Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean, which I

hope will give extra coherence to the work that we and the international financial institutions and

others are doing in the region.

I hope very soon that we will have the name of the Special Representative to the region who will

support me with the Task Force.

You know that I have talked often about the need for us to make sure that we see deep and

sustainable democracy in the neighbourhood and that we need an approach that is based on mutual

accountability and what I have called the 3 Ms: money, market access, mobility.

So we will start work and we have already begun to develop the strategy.

This weekend I have been in the region; I have been talking with Jordan, with Egypt and of course

with people in Israel and with the Palestinians. But in our dialogues with our neighbourhood, we are

conscious of their needs and conscious of our requirement to step up what we are able to do.

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2

EN

There have been Council Conclusions today as well on Libya, Syria and Yemen.

Of course, each country is unique and each situation different but we do have a

consistent approach on the need to stop violence against citizens, to ensure that governments listen

to their people and begin the process of transition.

On Syria, we have already imposed two sets of sanctions and we are preparing to expand our

restrictive measures.

We condemn in the strongest possible terms the continuing repression in the country.

President Assad must launch a credible, genuine and inclusive dialogue and it is up to the Syrian

people to judge the willingness to reform.

But I have to say that at first glance, his speech today was disappointing.

On Libya, we are intensifying our pressure on the regime, and last week extended our sanctions list

to six ports.

On Saturday I was in Cairo for the meeting of what we call the Cairo Group which is under the

umbrella of the United Nations and which brings together the EU, the African Union, the Arab

League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. We met together with Ban Ki-Moon by

video link.

Together we were looking at how we support the development of Libya and the post conflict

reconstruction of a democratic post-Gaddafi Libya.

On Yemen, we remain extremely concerned by the situation on the ground. I am in daily contact

with our head of delegation there in order to see what more we can do in terms of offering support

and Kristalina Georgiva, the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, as you know recently visited

Yemen in order to ensure that we are able to provide humanitarian support there.

We want to see the transition in line with what the Gulf Cooperation Council has already indicated

as being the most appropriate way forward.

I can't stress enough how much we support the democratic reforms in Egypt. I made this very clear

to the deputy Prime Minister when I met him on Saturday but of course in the Council this is a

consistent thing as is indeed our continuing support for Tunisia, where people are visiting very

regularly to help them prepare for the upcoming elections.

We also reflected on the significance of the King of Morocco's reform speech at the weekend.

I think if it is fully implemented that it would be a major step forward but it would be up to

the people to decide in the referendum on July 1. And in my meetings in Jordan on Thursday I have

reiterated the welcome we have for the recent announcements by the King of Jordan and the

political and economic reforms that they have set in train.

Let me turn to the Middle East Peace Process. In the Council discussions this afternoon I was

briefing ministers on my weekend visit to the Middle East.

Everyone here is aware that we have put a lot of effort into trying to find ways to persuade the

parties to get back to the negotiating table.

I talked to the ministers as well about my call for a meeting of Quartet principals, which I hope will

happen very soon. And you will know that the Quartet envoys meet on Friday under European

chairmanship.

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We are looking to see how much we can push for this clear framework that will enable both sides to

return to the negotiating table.

It is extremely important in the context of recent developments that we see the parties think very

carefully about moving back into negotiations. It is extremely important that they do so not least

because in the changing world of our neighbourhood it is essential that they recognize that this

crisis in the middle of the neighbourhood needs a resolution.

Our position on this is clear, we have spelled it out and I have reiterated that in my conversations

with Prime Minister Netanyahu with President Abbas and with others.

We also reviewed the situation in Belarus 6 months after the Presidential elections of December.

We are faced with a serious deterioration of the political situation: more than 40 people have

been convicted in politically motivated trials, 30 to prison terms, including ex-Presidential

candidates.

We want to see immediate release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners and we strongly

condemn the continued repression of Belarusian civil society, independent media and opposition.

We have decided on further measures in response to the deteriorating situation; introduced an

embargo on arms and riot gear and for the first time targeting certain business interests linked to the

regime. But as we have said consistently we remain committed to the Belarusian population and

will continue to reach out to them, for example through the invitation to negotiations on visa

facilitation.

Finally, after this Press conference we will conclude our day with the Western Balkans forum,

where we will be joined by foreign ministers from the region to look at how we can promote the

European perspective, in particular regional cooperation.

There have been very important developments in the region recently: the arrest of Mladic, launch of

the structured dialogue with Bosnia Herzogovina and the start of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

We want to see this progress built upon and we want to see concrete results from the Belgrade-

Pristina discussions as soon as possible.

And good progress too in the reform agenda ahead of the reports the Commission will adopt this

autumn.

And we want to see the swift conclusion of the electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Albania.

In Albania, the situation is particularly worrying. We want to see the immediate restoration of

political dialogue and a new focus on reform.

_____________________


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EU High Representative Ashton visits Jordan, Egypt, Israel andPalestine

Summary: 15 June, Brussels - Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and European CommissionVice President, travels this week to Jordan, Egypt, Israel and Palestine, for high level meetings with government leaders andinternational partners including the United Nations, Arab League, African Union, and the Organisation of the IslamicConference.

EU HR Ashton's visit comes six months after the beginning of the 'Arab Spring' and at a key moment for the Middle EastPeace Process. Following the trip, she will fly immediately to Luxembourg for discussions with EU foreign ministers.

"I look forward to meeting Israeli and Palestinian leaders and encouraging them to seize the opportunity and engage innegotiations," Catherine Ashton said. "With the momentous events going on in North Africa and following PresidentObama's speech last month, it is more urgent than ever that we kick start the Middle East Peace Process. I have proposed ameeting of the Quartet to help relaunch negotiations and will be looking for positive signs from all sides. I will also beattending the meeting of the Cairo Group, which brings together international organisations to support the democratictransition in a free and united Libya."

On Thursday, the High Representative will meet Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judehin Amman.

On Friday, she will meet Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni, Palestinian PrimeMinister Salam Fayyad, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

On Saturday in Egypt, at the Headquarters of the Arab League, where Secretary General Amre Moussa will host a meeting ofthe Cairo Group, she will discuss Libya with UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon (by video-link), Jean Ping, President of theAfrican Union Commission, and with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

On Sunday, she will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, before flying to Luxembourg forthe meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday.

Ref: EU11-207EN EU source:UN forum:Date: 15/6/2011

European Union

16 Jun 2011


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Buzek in Gaza: blockade must end

Gaza City - Monday 13/06/2011

European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek made the following statement after visiting EU-funded and UNWRA (UnitedNations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) projects in the Gaza strip during his official visitto the Palestinian territories and Israel:

"I met the people of Gaza, including teachers, students, construction workers and the unemployed. There are three mostimportant things for the people in Gaza: dignity, security and prosperity. They want to work, they want to prosper, and theywant to have normal lives.

I saw today the human misery caused by the blockade in Gaza. The Gaza blockade must end. It serves no one. Gaza shouldbe opened to the outside world. The blockade has wiped out the formal economy in Gaza, causing very high unemployment,poverty and frustration. Let's end this vicious circle where the lack of opportunity leads to poverty and poverty breeds angerand radicalism.

I pay tribute to the work of UNRWA in the Palestinian Territories. I visited a school for deaf children, a food distributioncentre training college and other projects. The work being done in Gaza is extraordinary and contributes to better lives despitethe extremely tough political, economic and social conditions.

We can feel the wind of freedom blowing throughout the region. It is the moment to start serious negotiations and achieve anagreement. We support the agreement to form a new Palestinian government which renounces violence, accepts Israel's rightto exist and respects all previous accords."

Referring to Palestinian plans to unilaterally seek recognition by the U.N, the EP President said:

"Unilateral actions simply cannot bring lasting peace in the way that comprehensive negotiation would do."

Background:

The President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek is on an official visit to the Palestinian Territories and Israel from12-15 June 2011. He visited the Gaza strip and the West Bank at the start of his visit to the Palestinian Territories on 12-14June and will be in Israel on 14 -15 June. He will have meetings at the highest political level as well as meet with students,NGOs and civil society.

Note to editors:

TV footage of today's visit will be available for download in broadcast and web quality after its broadcast on Europe bySatellite at 20.00 CET:

http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/ebs/schedule.cfm?page=1&date=06/13/2011&i...

European Union

14 Jun 2011


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Japan supports 4th payment of PA's "Private Sector Reconstruction inGaza" programme through EU's PEGASE mechanism

PR/14/2011

The Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Dr. Salam Fayyad, the Representative of Japan, Mr. Naofumi Hashimoto,and the European Union Representative, Mr. Christian Berger, jointly marked today the USD3.8 million (€2.5 million)contribution by the Japanese Government to the fourth payment under the Palestinian Authority's "Private SectorReconstruction in Gaza" (PSRG) programme. This programme is the largest initiative of direct financial support of theprivate sector in the Gaza Strip since Israel's "Operation Cast Lead". The Japanese contribution is being channelled throughPEGASE[1], the European Union's mechanism for support to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) established the PSRG programme in the aftermath of Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" toprovide financial support to private sector businesses that were destroyed or damaged during that Operation. It targetsbusinesses that need to restore damaged assets necessary for their activities - funded items include machinery, office furnitureand equipment, as well as building and business premise material. The ultimate objective is to revitalize the economic activityin Gaza and provide for sustainable livelihoods for its people.

The EU committed €22 million to PSRG at the end of 2009. In March 2011, the Japanese Government committed anadditional €6.2 million to the programme. Both contributions are being channelled through the European Union (EU)'sfinancing mechanism PEGASE, which is open to all donors and has been used by a number of European states. Japan is thefirst non-European donor to channel contributions to a PA programme through PEGASE.

The fourth PSRG disbursement, which will be covered entirely with Japanese funds and will take place at the end of thisweek, will benefit 103 claims by Gaza businesses and amounts to USD3.8 million (€2.5 million). It follows three earlierpayments under PSRG that took place in July 2010, September 2010 and January 2011, which benefited over 590 eligibleclaims amounting to USD 12.2 million (€9.6 million). Further payments are expected to take place under the PSRGprogramme in 2011.

The Representative of Japan to the PA, Mr. Naofumi Hashimoto, said: “Supporting Gaza for its recovery and reconstructionis one of priorities in Japan’s assistance to the Palestinian people. Private sector has crucial roles for sustainable economicand social developments as well as for achieving their national goals. Bearing this in mind, Japan has decided thiscontribution through EU/PEGASE and also has been supporting the Palestinian Government for its efforts in establishingJericho Agro-Industrial Park."

The European Union Representative, Mr. Christian Berger, said: “I would like to thank the Japanese Government for theirgenerous contribution to the Palestinian Authority's Private Sector Reconstruction programme and for choosing the EU'sPEGASE mechanism in channelling this support. I also want to take this opportunity to reiterate EU's call for a full economicrecovery of the Gaza Strip which can only be achieved with the revival of the private-sector.

Background

Most of the EU assistance to the Palestinian Authority is channelled through PEGASE, the financial mechanism launched in2008 to support the PA Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010) and the subsequent PA Palestinian National Plan(2011-2013). As well as helping to meet a substantial proportion of its running costs, European funds support major reformand development programmes in key ministries, to help prepare the PA for statehood in line with the plan put forward byPrime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Since February 2008, €1.08 billion have been disbursed through the PEGASEDirect Financial Support programmes. In addition, the EU has provided assistance to the Palestinian people through UNRWAand a wide range of cooperation projects.

Japan’s assistance to the PA is extended in a kind of budget support or based on the specific development projects. Japan hasbeen supporting financially and technically economic development efforts exerted by key ministries, to help prepare the PAfor statehood in line with the plan put forward by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in August 2009. Japan has also providedassistance through UNRWA and other UN agencies including humanitarian assistance, as well as to local NGOs and localcouncils for their grassroots development projects. Japan’s assistance exceeds USD 1.19 billion in total since 1993, includingaround USD 100 million extended in Japan’s fiscal year 2010.

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Contacts: The Office of the European Union Representative: Antonia Zafeiri, 02 5415 859, 0548 024 915 & Shadi Othman:02 5415 867, 0599 673 958

Representative Office of Japan to the Palestinian Authority: Hideaki Yamamoto (Deputy Rep.): 0545 428 103, DialaZaineddin: 02 241 3120/1

Prime Minister's Office, Palestinian Authority: Dana Abdul Hamid, 0598 929 727

European Union

31 May 2011


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Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 -Country Report: occupied Palestinian territory

Brussels, 25/05/2011 SEC(2011) 644 JOINT STAFF WORKING PAPER

{COM(2011) 303}

1. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Palestinian Authority (PA) and the European Community first established contractual relations in 1997 when the EC andthe Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), on behalf of the PA, concluded an Interim Association Agreement on trade andcooperation. The trade part of the agreement cannot be fully implemented due to obstacles raised by Israel, which considers itincompatible with the economic provisions of the Oslo Agreements (the Paris Protocol). On the basis of the agreement, theEU-PA European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) was approved in May 2005 for a period of three to fiveyears.

This document reports on the overall progress made on the implementation of the EU-PA ENP AP between 1 January and 31December 2010, although developments outside this period may be considered where appropriate. For further information onregional and multilateral sector processes, please refer to the sectoral report.

In addition to a number of high-level visits to both Brussels and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), four subcommitteesand one joint committee were held successfully in the course of 2010. These meetings demonstrated the PA’s increasedinstitutional and coordination capacity. Work has also started on a new Action Plan, which is expected to be concluded in2011. Throughout the reporting period, the EU continued to support the PA with a view to contributing to the implementationof the two-state solution.

The PA also submitted a formal request to increase the current number of four subcommittees.This increase is in line with existing practice in the other ENP partner countries and would demonstrate its increasedinstitutional capacity. The main priorities of the new Action Plan are consistent with the PA’s statebuilding plan and the newPalestinian National Plan (PNP 2011–2013).

The reformist agenda of the government is producing good results. The PA has made steadfast progress in building itscapacity to run the future State of Palestine. This was acknowledged in the World Bank’s report for the Ad Hoc LiaisonCommittee (AHLC) meeting in September 2010, which also highlights the main issues ahead of summer 2011, when the statebuilding plan implementation should be completed. Reforms were limited to institutions in the West Bank.

Progress in many areas (governance, public finance management) was achieved in a context of occupation, where Israeliincursions into areas formally under the control of the PA continued. There has also been some progress on the rule of law.However, concerns about human rights violations, in particular by the security forces, have not declined and further effortsare needed to strengthen the judiciary. The late cancellation of the local elections in the West Bank in July 2010 casts somedoubt on the capacity of the Palestinian political forces to compete democratically. The economic and social situation in Gazaremains grim due to the blockade. The EU has proposed a comprehensive package to upgrade the Kerem Shalom aid, tradeand persons.

The economy of the oPt continued to grow in 2010 by 9,3 %. In this period, the Palestinian Authority, through fiscalperformance broadly in line with the 2010 budget, reduced its fiscal deficit. There was also progress in the implementation ofthe structural reforms set out in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, and reflected in the AP, in particular onimproving financial accountability and on sound management of public finances. Also, the PA made some progress inreducing dependency on international aid and supporting private sector activity. Further actions are planned for the nearfuture.

Despite several reconciliation efforts, no progress can be reported towards bridging the internal split between the governancestructure in the West Bank under President Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas-led de facto authority in the Gaza Strip. Thelatter imposes a strict military regime and reports confirm a steady deterioration of humanitarian indicators in the Gaza Strip.

The achievements of the state-building agenda of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s government need to move ahead in parallelwith progress in the political process. The latter looks increasingly difficult especially in view of renewed settlement

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construction in the West Bank and recent developments in East Jerusalem.

European Commission

European Union

26 May 2011

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 25/05/2011 SEC(2011) 644

JOINT STAFF WORKING PAPER

Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 Country Report: occupied Palestinian territory

{COM(2011) 303}

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EN 2 EN

JOINT STAFF WORKING PAPER

Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 Country Report: occupied Palestinian territory

1. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Palestinian Authority (PA) and the European Community first established contractual relations in 1997 when the EC and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), on behalf of the PA, concluded an Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation. The trade part of the agreement cannot be fully implemented due to obstacles raised by Israel, which considers it incompatible with the economic provisions of the Oslo Agreements (the Paris Protocol). On the basis of the agreement, the EU-PA European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) was approved in May 2005 for a period of three to five years.

This document reports on the overall progress made on the implementation of the EU-PA ENP AP between 1 January and 31 December 2010, although developments outside this period may be considered where appropriate. For further information on regional and multilateral sector processes, please refer to the sectoral report.

In addition to a number of high-level visits to both Brussels and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), four subcommittees and one joint committee were held successfully in the course of 2010. These meetings demonstrated the PA’s increased institutional and coordination capacity. Work has also started on a new Action Plan, which is expected to be concluded in 2011. Throughout the reporting period, the EU continued to support the PA with a view to contributing to the implementation of the two-state solution.

The PA also submitted a formal request to increase the current number of four sub-committees. This increase is in line with existing practice in the other ENP partner countries and would demonstrate its increased institutional capacity. The main priorities of the new Action Plan are consistent with the PA’s statebuilding plan and the new Palestinian National Plan (PNP 2011–2013).

The reformist agenda of the government is producing good results. The PA has made steadfast progress in building its capacity to run the future State of Palestine. This was acknowledged in the World Bank’s report for the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting in September 2010, which also highlights the main issues ahead of summer 2011, when the state building plan implementation should be completed. Reforms were limited to institutions in the West Bank.

Progress in many areas (governance, public finance management) was achieved in a context of occupation, where Israeli incursions into areas formally under the control of the PA continued. There has also been some progress on the rule of law. However, concerns about human rights violations, in particular by the security forces, have not declined and further efforts are needed to strengthen the judiciary. The late cancellation of the local elections in the West Bank in July 2010 casts some doubt on the capacity of the Palestinian political forces to compete democratically. The economic and social situation in Gaza remains grim due to the blockade. The EU has proposed a comprehensive package to upgrade the Kerem Shalom

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crossing, and intends to further contribute to the eventual opening of all Gaza crossings for aid, trade and persons.

The economy of the oPt continued to grow in 2010 by 9,3 %. In this period, the Palestinian Authority, through fiscal performance broadly in line with the 2010 budget, reduced its fiscal deficit. There was also progress in the implementation of the structural reforms set out in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, and reflected in the AP, in particular on improving financial accountability and on sound management of public finances. Also, the PA made some progress in reducing dependency on international aid and supporting private sector activity. Further actions are planned for the near future.

Despite several reconciliation efforts, no progress can be reported towards bridging the internal split between the governance structure in the West Bank under President Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas-led de facto authority in the Gaza Strip. The latter imposes a strict military regime and reports confirm a steady deterioration of humanitarian indicators in the Gaza Strip.

The achievements of the state-building agenda of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s government need to move ahead in parallel with progress in the political process. The latter looks increasingly difficult especially in view of renewed settlement construction in the West Bank and recent developments in East Jerusalem.

2. POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND REFORM

Development of enhanced political dialogue and cooperation

In September Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians were launched, with support of the US, the EU and the Quartet, following a four-month period of proximity talks. Talks reached an impasse shortly after the decision by the Israeli government to end the settlement moratorium on 27 September 2010.

The implementation of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) progressed in 2010. Efforts made in setting up a national monitoring and evaluation mechanism have borne initial results. In July 2010, the ministry of planning provided the first monitoring report on the PRDP, which used qualitative data in the analysis of progress achieved under the Plan. The newly-established Anti-Corruption Commission has not yet become visibly operational.

The PA aims to continue with structural reforms to increase efficiency in the public sector, reduce dependency on international aid, and support private sector activity. In this respect, a number of important reforms are planned, including streamlining social assistance, privatising electricity distribution, enhancing the legal and regulatory framework for businesses, improving the sustainability of the public pension system, and implementing civil service reform.

Democracy and the rule of law

Despite the long-standing insistence of the international community on the elaboration of a system of civilian oversight over all security services, there is still little evidence of greater integration of security services under the umbrella of the ministry of interior. The EU Police Mission in the occupied Palestinian territory (EUPOL COPPS), continued to provide training, including training on human rights, to help build a professional civil police. The EU is

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investing substantial resources in reinforcing the rule of law through support to the main actors in the justice sector as well as to the civil police.

In June 2010, the government adopted the Justice and Rule of Law National Sector Strategy 2011–2013, which provides a basis for the continuous strengthening of the three justice sector institutions: the ministry of justice (MoJ), the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the Attorney General’s Office .

Under the auspices of the Office of the President, these institutions worked with the Palestinian Bar Association and a representative of the military court system to produce a draft joint memorandum of understanding which clarifies their respective mandates. The MoJ has been especially active in drafting and reforming legislation. The ongoing and significant reform of the Criminal Code involves all relevant institutions. The MoJ also set up a Human Rights Unit in the ministry.

The PA continues to be ruled under the emergency powers conferred on the government by President Abbas. Legislation is adopted by Presidential decree without passing through the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). Limited democratic oversight over the PA is carried out by civil society organisations and by informal sessions of remaining PLC members in Ramallah. The Hamas PLC members in the Gaza Strip claim legitimate representation and hold regular sessions in which laws are being adopted, further widening the political and institutional divide between West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The decision to postpone local elections in July 2010 met only limited political resistance from the small PLO faction and from civil society organisations. Nevertheless four electoral lists, with the assistance of three human rights NGOs, challenged the Cabinet’s decision in court. In December, the HJC ruled that the Cabinet’s decision was illegal but did not provide clear guidance on how and when to organise new elections. The EU continued with financial support for the development of the Central Elections Commission and launched a new capacity-building programme for the PLC Secretariat, to prepare this fragile institution for an effective resumption of parliamentary business.

Human rights and fundamental freedoms

The situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms continued to suffer setbacks.

The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) received numerous complaints related to violations to the right to proper legal process and just procedures in the West Bank and in Gaza. Most of the complaints received refer to actions by the security services. Palestinian human rights organisations report little progress regarding arbitrary detention. The ongoing tensions between the two major political factions have resulted in a continued trend of arrests on political grounds. In total, 655 complaints were documented by the ICHR over political detention in the West Bank and 60 in the Gaza Strip.

Human rights organisations continue to record steadily complaints of human rights abuses by the security services in the whole of the oPt, including the West Bank. After the marked decline in November 2009, complaints about torture and ill-treatment in detention (mainly police interrogations and intelligence services) have risen again. Although the PA claims as an achievement the fact of ‘stopping torture in detention centres and taking punitive measures against violators’, there is no documented evidence of the punishment of violators in the absence of sufficient transparency in the military court system and of disciplinary

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mechanisms in the security services. The oPt continues to benefit from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights support.

The United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report on protection of civilians indicates that since the beginning of 2010, Israeli forces have injured 1145 Palestinians in the West Bank during demonstrations or clashes, a 45 % increase compared to the equivalent period in 2009. Israeli forces conducted a weekly average of 90 search and arrest operations in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) in 2010. Such operations also often resulted in damage to property.

In 2010, 71 Palestinians (including 24 civilians) were killed and 283 (including 246 civilians) were injured in the context of Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Gaza Strip. The majority of casualties occurred near the fence dividing Israel and the Gaza Strip. Israeli restrictions on access to areas up to 1500 metres from the fence continue. 17% of the Gaza Strip’s territory is within 1500 metres of the fence. In 2010, 91 Palestinian workers have been injured in incidents related to restrictions on access to land near the fence.

Children have remained significant victims of the conflict. In the first half of 2010, four Palestinian children lost their lives and 141 were injured in incidents directly related to the conflict; two were killed as a result of internal violence. In addition, one child was killed and two were injured as a result of handling of explosives.

At the end of December 2010, 6252 Palestinians were being detained in Israel. This number had slightly decreased throughout 2010 from 6831 in January 2009. With regard to the practice of administrative detention, the number of Palestinians detainees (those held without charge or trial) also decreased compared to the previous reporting period. At the end of December 2010, 205 Palestinians were being held in administrative detention in Israel, compared with 278 in December 2009.

Limitations on the freedom to demonstrate are still enforced. In 2010 Israel renewed Order 101, which severely restricts the right of assembly of persons protesting in the West Bank. At the end of June 2010, there were 31 Palestinian human rights defenders from the West Bank villages of Ni’lin, Bil’in, Budrus, Nabi Saleh, Beit Ummar and Al-Ma’sara held in Israeli custody. The Office of the European Union Representative, together with EU member states, followed up and monitored the military court cases against prominent Palestinian human rights defenders who had peacefully protested against the separation barrier, e.g. Abdallah Abu Rahma - the head of the Bil’in Popular Committee against the Wall and Settlements. The EU issued a statement in August 2010 expressing concerns over his conviction, as by the EU he is considered as a Human Rights Defender committed to non-violent protests against the route of the Israeli separation barrier through his West Bank village of Bil’in.’ The EU reiterated that it considered the route of the Israeli separation barrier, where it is built on Palestinian land, to be illegal.

No death sentences were issued in the West Bank during the reporting period. Death penalty sentences have continued to be issued in the Gaza Strip. In total, 17 death sentences were issued by the de-facto Gaza authorities for murder and treason and three executions were carried out.

Demolitions continued in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, reaching a total of 431 Palestinian structures demolished in 2010. Most of the demolitions took place in the Jordan Valley while 78 structures were demolished in East Jerusalem. The EU has expressed its deep concern about this and has urged the Israeli authorities to prevent the demolition of

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Palestinian homes and the issuing of eviction orders in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. The EU called on the Israeli authorities to suspend these practices, considering them an obstacle to peace, contrary to the Israeli Roadmap obligations and to international law.

Settler violence against Palestinians and their property continued between July and October 2010, including vandalism against a mosque in Beit Faijjar village, Bethlehem, on 4 October and against a girls’ secondary school in As Sawiya village, Nablus, on 27 October. The ongoing impunity continues to favour settlers. In 2010, one child was killed and 133 Palestinians were injured in attacks by Israeli settlers. In addition, over 3700 olive trees were vandalised during the olive harvest. On the other hand, four Israeli settlers were killed.

The EU has reminded Israel of its obligations according to international law and international humanitarian law vis-à-vis the Palestinian population in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Respect for freedom of religion has not improved and is hampered by access restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities. The Israeli army imposed a general closure of the West Bank during Easter. As a result, many Palestinians of Christian faith wishing to participate in the Easter ceremony at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were not able to do so. Access to Haram-al-Sharif (El Aqsa Mosque)/Temple Mount was on many occasions closed or limited to men above the age of 50.

Access and movement in the West Bank has generally improved, with the smallest number of obstacles since 2005. The closure of the Gaza Strip continued.

Financial accountability and sound management of public finances

In 2010, the ministry of finance continued to modernise its Financial Management Information System and to adapt its financial regulations to ongoing treasury reforms, including the introduction of a commitment control system.

In the first half of 2010, the ministry produced a draft Public Financial Management Strategy for 2011–13 as part of the Palestinian National Development Plan. It also continued to improve the transparency of public finances by providing monthly website information on PA public debt from June 2010. In August, the government approved an action plan for the reform of the public pension systems as a measure to ensure the PA’s long-term financial sustainability.

In the area of internal audit, with EU assistance the ministry of finance initiated the first phase of decentralisation while continuing to conduct checks and risk assessments under the supervision of its High Level Audit Committee.

With regard to external audit, the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB) finalised its 2008 financial statement in September 2010, while its 2009 statement is due to be sent to the President, Cabinet and Legislative Council Secretariat in early 2011. Work also continued on preparing for the modernisation of the Audit law.

On corruption, the 2005 law on illegal gains was amended in June 2010 leading to the establishment of a new anti-corruption commission. Ongoing progress on internal audit reforms, the work of the Audit Committee and the enhanced capacity of the SAACB bode well for fraud prevention.

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3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM

Macroeconomic framework and functioning of the market economy

In 2010, the GDP of the oPt rose by 9.3 % compared to 7.4 % in 2009. Growth was due to significant amounts of international donor assistance, to further relaxation of restrictions on movement of goods and access to people in the West Bank and to the lifting of certain import controls in the Gaza Strip. Public services, construction, agriculture and external trade all expanded, while manufacturing remained subdued (see section on trade).

The economy of Gaza grew rapidly at the start of the year driven by inflows of humanitarian aid, as well as goods entering through tunnels at the Egyptian border. A large amount of donor aid continued to be channelled into small scale infrastructure projects, including the construction and rehabilitation of roads, water networks, sewage systems, schools and clinics, and residential housing. Disbursements from the EU-financed Gaza Private Sector Recovery Programme, implemented in co-operation with the PA (EUR 22 million committed in 2009) began in 2010. The aim of this programme is to provide support to re-launching legitimate private sector businesses which had been destroyed or damaged by "Operation Cast Lead". These actions are of short impact on the population in Gaza. Long term interventions that are currently hampered by access restriction to Gaza are urgently needed particularly in the water sector to avoid a disaster to happen in the near future.

While these factors helped boost private sector activity, the economies of both the West Bank and Gaza remain severely constrained. Real GDP is more than 10 % below the level of 1999 in the West Bank and at least 40 % below that level in Gaza. The revival in economic activity has therefore come from a low base and is still held back by current restrictions. For example, in the West Bank, agriculture is hindered by sanctions on products, such as fertilisers, considered to pose a threat to security, and access to land. Consequently, while agricultural output has risen, it still only accounts for around 5.5 % of GDP, compared to 13 % in 1994.

Inflation rose slightly in 2010 to 3.7% compared to 2.8% in 2009 due to sharp rises in food prices toward the end of 2010 and despite tighter monetary policy in Israel and the relaxation of some import restrictions in the Gaza Strip. FAO has estimated that 96% of staple food items are imported, in addition to other food commodities used for production; hence the economy is highly exposed to shifts in international food prices, which have returned to the levels of 2008. In the West Bank, unemployment fell to 15 % of the total labour force while in the Gaza Strip it remains at around 40 %. Fiscal performance was broadly in line with the 2010 budget. The recurrent fiscal deficit narrowed to 16 % of GDP in 2010 from 26 % in 2009. This was the result of continued progress by the Palestinian Authority on the PRDP for 2008–10, which aims at increasing revenue, reducing expenditure and restoring fiscal sustainability. The improved tax collection has partly supported the increase of the gross revenue. Current expenditure, including the public sector wage bill and net lending, fell over the same period. However, due to lower than expected international aid, the PA was obliged to borrow from domestic banks and accumulate arrears on existing loans. The PA plans to progressively consolidate public finances in order to reduce reliance on international aid and encourage private sector growth. At the same time, the PA aims to make public expenditure more effective by shifting resources away from wages and subsidies and toward investment. A comprehensive public pension reform action plan for 2010–12 was adopted in July 2010.

Employment and social policy

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The unemployment rate decreased from 25 % in 2009 to 24 % in 2010 (20 % in the West Bank and 40.5 % in the Gaza Strip) — note that International Labour Organisation (ILO) standard unemployment figures do not take into account workers discouraged from seeking jobs. The labour force participation rate remained very low and fell from 41.6 % in the third quarter of 2009 to 40.5 % in the fourth quarter of 2010. The PA continued to work with the ILO on an employment programme and on promoting the inclusion of women in the labour market. The ILO also supported specific job creation and skills development programmes in Gaza.

As regards social dialogue, in February 2010 the Tripartite Labour Policies Committee launched a declaration outlining its vision, plan of action and institutional framework. The declaration focuses on improving industrial relations and promoting effective and transparent governance of the labour market through social dialogue. The planned measures include revision of labour agreements in line with Arab and international standards, enhancement of the labour administration and inspection and reform of labour legislation.

The standard of living in the oPt is exceptionally low in comparison to other partner countries, with an overall poverty rate of 55 %; an estimated 80 % of people living below the poverty line in the Gaza Strip. To increase social protection and advance the fight against poverty, the ministry of social affairs finalised its first ‘Social Protection Sector Strategy’. The ministry is now developing a business strategy, on the basis of which an Action Plan 2011–2013 will be drawn up.

In June 2010, the PA launched the Cash Transfer Programme (CTP), as part of the Palestinian National Programme for Social Protection. The CTP targets families below the extreme poverty line. The CTP is now well established in the West Bank and in November 2010 the Gaza Strip announced its wish to be covered by it. The Gaza Strip beneficiaries are expected to be fully included in the new system in the first half of 2011. The EU, apart from providing the majority of the funds for social security payments, has also actively supported the reform of the social security system in co-operation with the ministry.

From July to December 2010, the EU contributed EUR 16 million to two rounds of the Vulnerable Palestinian Families programme payments as part of the CTP. An average of over 50 000 extremely poor households from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip benefited from the CTP.

In August 2010, the Council of Ministers approved an action plan for the reform of the public pension system. The plan includes the consolidation of the pensions’ administration of all four schemes within the Pensions Authority, the elimination of early retirement, and a gradual increase in the retirement age.

4. TRADE-RELATED ISSUES, MARKET AND REGULATORY REFORM

After two years of contraction, bilateral trade between the EU and the oPt increased during the reporting period: exports from the oPt to the EU increased by 43.7 % while EU exports to the oPt increased by 56.8 %. The oPt trade with the EU and other partners in the region remains very limited.

The ninth Union for the Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Meeting, which took place in Brussels in November 2010, endorsed a package of measures to facilitate trade in Palestinian products with other Euro-Mediterranean partners in line with the EUROMED Trade Roadmap

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for 2010 and beyond. In December 2010, the EU and the PA initialled a draft agreement on further liberalisation of trade in agricultural products, processed agricultural and fish and fishery products. Further market opening on the EU side is expected to support the development of the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

During the reporting period, the ministry of agriculture worked on the implementation of the Agricultural Sector Strategy and on the formulation of the relevant Action Plan aiming, among other things, at setting up sustainable agriculture, capable of achieving both food security and competitiveness in the local and foreign markets.

Access and movement in the West Bank generally improved. The restrictions on trade in goods and in access between urban areas were eased in the West Bank (but not with East Jerusalem). This helped support internal trade. Over 10 % of obstacles to movement of goods and persons, such as check points, were removed, leaving an estimated 500 obstacles in place in the West Bank. Despite the easing of the Gaza Strip blockade in June 2010, imports of raw materials and capital goods continue to be heavily restricted and the ban on exports continues to depress the economy.

The PA customs, with EU assistance, completed the implementation of the third phase of the automated system for customs data ‘ASYCUDA World’. As a result, the latest version of the system was rolled out, new customs procedures (including a direct trader input mechanism) were launched, and customs staff, employees of line ministries and users from the private sector, were trained. The ‘Al Siyadeh’ programme, which aims at modernising the administrations responsible for revenue collection and border management, is under implementation. The PA set up a customs prosecution department and worked on the establishment of customs courts, with a view to better enforcing customs revenue collection. As far as legislation is concerned, in spite of several attempts with the help of donor states, there is still no approved Palestinian customs code. All activities in the area of customs, including actions to obtain WCO membership, are undertaken by the PA as part of its state-building process. Regarding the strengthening of cooperation to combat irregularities and fraud in customs, the PA participated in the ‘SIROCCO’ joint operation carried out in June 2010. SIROCCO is a joint customs operation, coordinated by the European Commission Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and carried out by the customs administration of the EU and 11 partner countries from the southern rim of the Mediterranean1.

No progress can be reported on the unification of tax administrations of the West Bank and the Gaza strip due to the political situation. In December 2010, the IMF recommended the elaboration of a medium-term strategy with a view to laying the foundations of a modern revenue administration. Increased enforcement efforts, combined with economic growth, led to improved performance in terms of domestic tax revenue collection.

Concerning free movement of goods and technical regulations, there is no progress to report.

The PA and the EU stepped up dialogue on sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) issues. A TAIEX SPS assessment mission visited the oPt to prepare a gap analysis on legislation and institutional capacity. The PA is upgrading its SPS legislation and expressed interest in

1 SIROCCO focused on deep sea containers loaded in China or the United Arab Emirates and arriving in

countries of the Union for the Mediterranean. Around 40 million cigarettes, 1243 kg of hand-rolled tobacco, 7038 litres of alcohol and 8 million other counterfeits were seized during the operation.

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gradual approximation with EU standards with a view to developing a ‘farm to fork’ approach. In 2010, the PA adopted a law on animal health.

Improvements in the areas of starting a business and enforcing contracts contributed to a better business climate. The Company Law and the Consumer Protection Law are still awaiting adoption, and there is still no legal regime for competition.

No progress is to be reported in the areas of accounting and auditing.

In the field of financial services, the banking sector has been largely unaffected by the global economic crisis due to limited exposure to global financial markets and conservative lending practices. However, the sector has built up substantial credit exposure to the PA and its employees. This makes it particularly sensitive to public finances. The banking sector also continued to face an ongoing problem of excess liquidity as Israeli banks do not accept cash deposits from banks in the West Bank. In 2010, the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) continued to implement Basel II standards, including guidelines on the disclosure of financial information and regulations governing mergers.

Progress was recorded in the enforcement of the ‘fair lending regulations’ and in the implementation of the new payment system. In August 2010, the PMA adopted regulations on mergers and acquisitions procedures. The PMA credit scoring system became fully operational in July 2010, as part of the online credit registry, and the system contributed to the growth recorded in private sector deposits. The president signed the new banking law in November 2010.

Other key areas

The PA drafted a revised law on public procurement that will unify procurement procedures in PA ministries and agencies. It will replace all the previous laws and acts governing PA procurement on its entry into force, planned for 2011.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) completed phase one of its ‘Metadata System’ and a special website was launched to serve that purpose. A special team was formed to revise, further develop, document, and disseminate metadata. So far, the PCBS has documented more than 20 surveys on the new system, which uses the Accelerated Data Programme. The first ever agriculture census was implemented in the oPt, partly funded by the EU. The PCBS continued to benefit from EU assistance including through the recently launched MEDSTAT III programme.

With a view to ensuring an appropriate legal framework for a modern statistics system based on impartiality, reliability, transparency and confidentiality of data, the PCBS carried out a Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) exercise in order to check its ability to meet SDDS requirements in terms of periodicity and timeliness. In September 2010 the PCBS also received the ‘ISO 9001’ certificate for 2008.

The PA continued to strengthen public finance management through several actions, in particular enhancements to the financial management information system, including the introduction of a commitment control system and a budget preparation module accessible to all government departments.

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On enterprise policy, the PA continued the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise and its participation in industrial cooperation activities. The European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund implemented the largest private sector recovery programme in the Gaza Strip. The ministry of national economy presented a new SME strategy during the first meeting of the Private Sector Development & Trade Sector Working Group in July 2010.

5. ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Due to the political situation, transport operators’ activities remained mostly limited to the national territory. Nevertheless, the transport sector contributes directly to 8 % of GDP. In 2010, the ministry of transport introduced a new regulation on the Higher Traffic Safety Council. The Palestinian Traffic Law and related regulations were completed. The ministry is involved in the ‘national spatial plan project’, preparing road and transport master plans, and it is completing studies to merge the current 90 public transport companies into four companies and redistribute the bus routes. Active Palestinian participation in the technical dialogue on transport through EUROMED structures and its involvement in setting up the future Trans-Mediterranean transport network are important.

The oPt remained heavily dependent on energy imports from Israel. Energy reforms continued on the basis of the energy action plan 2009–2011. The Palestinian Energy Authority launched an Energy Sector Strategy for 2011–2013. In February 2010, on the basis of the 2009 Electricity Law, the PA set up the Electricity Regulatory Council under the Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources Authority. It drafted implementing legislation for the electricity law on, for example, tariffs and the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources.

The PA continued to transfer electricity supply services from municipalities to newly established regional distribution companies. It began a feasibility study on the construction of a power plant in the Northern West Bank. It pursued the upgrade and reconstruction of electricity networks on the West Bank and in Gaza. More than 99 % of Palestinians now have access to electricity although it remains a challenge to electrify villages between settlements. The PA pursued the installation of pre-paid electricity meters in the West Bank and started a pilot project in the Gaza Strip.

The PA continued the implementation of an energy efficiency programme and remained committed to developing the use of renewable energy, also in trilateral cooperation with the EU and Israel. In 2010, with EU support, the PA began preparations for the electrification of 50 isolated West Bank villages through the development of photovoltaic solar projects. The PA also continued to work on a pilot wind energy project for the Hebron hospital and finalised a feasibility study on a 10 MW solar plant in Jericho.

The EU remains committed to re-activating trilateral energy cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and Israel, which is stalled due to the regional conflict. The aim remains establishing a joint energy office and facilitating the development of projects of common interest, such as the joint ‘Solar for Peace’ initiative.

In the field of climate change, the Council of Ministers approved the setting-up of a National Committee on Climate Change.

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The state of the environment in the Gaza Strip remains a serious concern. Works on the first phase of the Northern Gaza wastewater treatment plant were concluded and preparations for the second phase are under way. In the West Bank, preparations for the construction of waste-water treatment plants and landfills continued.

The EQA plans to review and update the environmental law and other related bylaws. Draft bylaws were prepared on waste management, hunting, nature reserves and stone quarries. Environmental standards are being developed or updated on the use and disposal of treated sludge, the treatment of industrial wastewater, ambient air quality and gas emissions from heavy duty vehicles. The EQA developed an Environment Sector Strategy for 2011–2013 and updated the emergency plan on nature protection. The Council of Ministers adopted a National Solid Waste Management Strategy and a Wastewater Strategy for 2011–2013.

A major challenge is to revive administrative implementation capacity. There is a need for coordination between relevant authorities with regard to the management and the use of fresh water resources.

Representatives of the PA participated in activities under the Horizon 2020 Initiative and the EU Water Initiative. Cooperation and information exchange took place between the European Commission and the PA, including on water, waste management, de-pollution and management of environmental information.

In the field of civil protection, representatives of the PA were actively involved in the Euro- Mediterranean Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and man-made Disasters, which has reached mid-term implementation.

Concerning information society issues, the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology issued ‘The Palestinian National Authority Statement of National Telecommunications Policy’ in April 2010. The difficult situation with Israel does not allow the oPt authorities to manage spectrum — the rights to use frequencies to operate in the oPT are granted by the Israeli authorities — and available frequencies are apparently insufficient to cope with market developments (two active operators, with total penetration reaching 80 %). For the fixed line market, the Palestine Telecommunications Company (Paltel) still holds a monopoly. Paltel’s internet and data services are offered via a number of subsidiary companies. Local loop unbundling has yet to be regulated.

Concerning audiovisual issues, the ministry of information submitted a new draft of the broadcasting law to the Cabinet in March 2010. This draft addressed concerns expressed about an earlier version of the law which imposed certain restrictions on media freedom.

In the area of research and technology, participation by Palestinian researchers in Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) up to March 2011 has substantially improved (82 Palestinian applicants, of which 11 are main listed) — mainly in agriculture, the environment and socio-economic humanities — accessing about EUR 1 million.

6. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS, EDUCATION AND HEALTH

In March 2010, the ministries of education and higher education adopted the Education Development Strategic Plan as the new Education Strategy for 2011–13 with renewed focus on equitable access, quality, planning and management, special needs and education in Jerusalem. Draft strategies on early childhood and adult education were also prepared.

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Education accounts for over 30 % of PA expenditure with plans for rapid expansion, though investment remains heavily dependent on donor support. In October 2010, staff and board members of the Commission for the Development of the Teaching Profession were designated. Adoption of the national teaching professional standards and teacher licensing can only proceed when the Commission has been set up. The ministry defined and tested core standards in pilot classrooms as of September 2010 alongside a draft teacher code of conduct. In the area of higher education, the EU/World Bank Tertiary Education project concluded in December 2010 with good results in terms of programme development and institutional management as well as on improving competitiveness and developing partnerships with industry.

Improving the quality and labour-market relevance of vocational training and education remains a priority under the Education Strategy. The ministries of education and higher education and of labour adopted a revised Technical Education and Vocational Training strategy in November 2010 to establish a coherent national system based on technical skills development for employment. The EU undertook to support its implementation through a three-year sector support programme. It will foster local development through reinforced partnerships between public training institutions and the private sector while anticipating labour market training demand. Both ministries demonstrated strong commitment to the Torino Process spearheaded by the European Training Foundation in particular on the study on linking education and business. In this context, the development of entrepreneurial learning and the development of quality assurance systems were identified for future work.

The Tempus programme continued to support reform of higher education and greater cooperation with EU universities with three projects selected under the third Tempus IV call for proposals. No Palestinian students or scholars benefited from scholarships under Erasmus Mundus Action 1 in 2010 but student and academic mobility was enhanced through the expected award of 37 grants for the academic year 2010–11 under Action 2. Greater effort is required to ensure Palestinian participation in all actions. For the first time, in 2010 a Jean Monnet module on European integration and a project for a conference on the EU and the Middle East were awarded to An-Najah National University.

The ministry of youth and sport published its Cross-Sector National Strategy for Youth 2011–13 in November incorporating joint policy plans in areas such as education, health, the environment, culture, sports and recreation. Its implementation demands continuing multi-stakeholder involvement. Palestinian young people and youth organisations continued to benefit from the opportunities offered by the Youth in Action Programme, through youth exchanges, voluntary service and cooperation activities in non-formal education. In November 2010, the ministry confirmed Palestinian participation in Euro-Med Youth IV, officially launching the programme and capacity building activities in December.

In the area of culture, Palestinian organisations continued active participation in the regional Euromed Heritage IV. In addition, three Palestinian cultural organisations were selected under the call for proposals of the 2010 ENP Special Action under the Culture Programme.

In terms of cooperation with civil society, the European Union’s Partnership for Peace Programme continued support for projects contributing to conflict resolution and mutual understanding in areas such as science education, protection of shared cultural heritage and peace education. However, the political situation continues to seriously impede project implementation, principally due to obstacles to free movement and access.

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In March 2010, the PA adopted a new health strategy covering 2011–2013. Its priorities include: governance, human resources, healthy lifestyle, access to quality health services, financing, aid effectiveness, public-private partnerships and cross-sectoral cooperation. The EU continued to substantially support the Palestinian health sector. The PA built or expanded primary health clinics and, in August 2010, opened the Ramallah medical complex. The political situation in the region (e.g. the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the situation in East Jerusalem, Israeli restrictions on the movement of persons and goods) continues to have a negative impact on the physical and mental health of Palestinians. The health situation in Gaza, particularly, is deteriorating. In March 2010, in the context of last year’s influenza A (H1N1) epidemic, the EU and the PA established communication channels for the exchange of epidemiological information in the event of a public health emergency of international concern. The PA pursued participation in the ‘Episouth’ network on communicable diseases for the EU, Mediterranean and Balkan countries.

The EU has increased the annual allocations it provides to support Palestinian health, education and economic-development institutions in East Jerusalem.

7. FINANCIAL COOPERATION — 2010 KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

Cooperation framework

Due to the continuing emergency situation in the West Bank and Gaza there is no National Indicative Programme (NIP) under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) covering the period 2011–2013. Funding committed under the bilateral allocation of the ENPI to the occupied Palestinian territory for 2010 came to EUR 377.9 million.

Implementation

Most of the assistance is channelled through the ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l’Aide Socio-Economique’ (PEGASE) which is geared to supporting the achievement of key policy objectives as outlined in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) covering the years 2007–2010 and the Palestinian National Plan (2011–2013) soon to be adopted. PEGASE provides significant direct financial support to the PA to pay the salaries and pensions of essential service providers, both in Gaza and the West Bank, in particular doctors, nurses and schoolteachers. PEGASE is also intended to help the PA become the cornerstone of the future Palestinian State by moving away from the emergency assistance provided under the previous Temporary Implementation Mechanism and focusing more on institutional capacity-building and social and economic development. To this end, the EU is investing substantial resources in reinforcing the rule of law through support to the main actors in the justice sector and to the civil police. It has also actively supported the reform of the social security system.

The EU also provides significant funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) responsible for the provision of health, education and social services to the Palestine refugee population in West Bank and Gaza, and in the neighbouring countries. UNRWA benefited in 2010 from a total of EUR 102.7 million from ENPI and other EU instruments.

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The implementation of the measures covered by the 2009 and 2010 financial years is under way. Progress is being made in the provision of infrastructure facilities for various Palestinian institutions and of technical assistance to PA ministries which have a vital role to play in state-building, notably the ministry of social affairs, ministry of finance and ministry of planning and administrative development. Projects aimed at reinforcing Palestinian schools and hospitals in East Jerusalem are also being implemented.

In addition to this bilateral allocation, the occupied Palestinian territory continues to benefit from cooperation activities financed under the ENPI multi-country and regional programmes, in particular the ‘Partnership for Peace’ initiative for civil society organisations.

Other EU instruments supplement the ENPI assistance package. The oPT benefited from cooperation activities financed under horizontal instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR- oPt continues to benefit from its country-bases support strategy, with an allocation of EUR 1.2 million) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) thematic programmes: Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development (NSA-LA), Investing in People and Food Security. These thematic lines have the additional advantage of permitting the EU to intervene directly in support of civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip. The Food Facility provided EUR 39.7 million for the period January 2009 to June 2011, taking account in particular of the difficult situation in the Gaza Strip. The occupied Palestinian territory also benefited from humanitarian assistance provided by the European Commission (EUR 51 million in 2010, of which EUR 14 million is allocated to UNRWA). Overall the total allocation for the Palestinian refugees in the oPt and Lebanon in 2010 amounts to EUR 58 million and the total allocation to UNRWA equals EUR 16.5 million.

Donor coordination

The EU is the largest donor to the PA and UNRWA and plays a major role as a reliable, predictable and punctual provider of support. Under a specific EU lead donor group and with the support of the European Commission as secretariat and facilitator, 12 EU sector strategies have been developed in cooperation with the PA in the following sectors: Security (UK), Justice (COM), Public Finance Management (COM), Education (France), Health (Italy), Private Sector Development (COM), Agriculture (Spain), Water and Waste Water (Germany), Electricity (COM), Jerusalem (COM), Municipal Development and Local Government (Denmark) and Refugees (COM). This represents significant progress towards the Paris Declaration aid effectiveness principles, and will soon allow coordinated programming between the EU, its member states and the PA.

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