Course: Intelligence and Reconnaissance 9th …...3 Reference: AJP 2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, Edition A Version 1, Brussels: NATO

Course: Intelligence and Reconnaissance 9th semester

Author: LTC Dipl. Eng. Milan Podhorec, Ph.D., Josef Říha, Ph.D.

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Table of Contents (Topics)

1 A reconnaissance in units of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) p. 4

1.1 Organization of the 53rd Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare

Regiment p. 4

1.2 532nd Electronic Warfare Battalion p. 6

1.3 102nd Reconnaissance Battalion p. 7

1.4 Reconnaissance Group of 4th Rapid Deployable Brigade p. 11

1.5 Reconnaissance Group of 7th Mechanized Brigade p. 12

2 Principles of a Reconnaissance Group (RECCE G) activities p. 13

2.1 Ways of a task fulfilment p. 13

2.2 An activity in a favor of units p. 13

2.3 Characteristic features and a restriction of a reconnaissance p. 13

2.4 Flow of information p. 15

3 Intelligence combat documents p. 17

3.1 Basic division of combat documents in intelligence warfighting function

p. 17

3.2 Intelligence reports and their content p. 18

3.3 Information documents in NATO p. 20

4 Tasks of the Intelligence warfighting function during a conduct of information

operations p. 27

4.1 1Definitions, place and task of intelligence warfighting function during a

conduct of information operations p. 28

4.2 Characteristic and definition psychological operations p. 31

5 Technical means of reconnaissance p. 36

5.1 Basic information about a vehicle p. 36

5.2 Armament of a vehicle p. 39

5.3 Special turret of a vehicle p. 40

5.4 Equipment of a vehicle p. 46

3

Reference:

AJP 2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, Edition A Version 1, Brussels: NATO

Standardization Agency, September 2014.

AJP-2.1(A), INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES, Brussels: NATO Standardization

Agency, 22 SEPTEMBER 2005.

AJP 2.7 Allied Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Brussels:

NATO Standardization Agency, July 2009, 44 pages.

ATP-77 NATO Guidance for ISTAR in Land Operations, Edition A Version 1

Ratification Draft 1, Brussels: NATO NSA, October 2013, 32 pages.

PODHOREC, M. Zpravodajská činnost na taktickém stupni [skripta S 983].

Vyškov: VVŠ PV, 2003.

HORÁK, O. Zpravodajská informace a zpravodajský cyklus. Brno: Vojenská

akademie, 2004. S-1027.

PODHOREC, M, KÁČER, J. Zpravodajská činnost v bojových a nebojových

operacích [skripta S 3595]. Brno: UO, 2005

PODHOREC, Milan, HORÁK, Oldřich. Taktický průzkum. Vojenská publikace

Praha 2006.

4

1 A reconnaissance in units of the Army of the Czech Republic

(ACR)

1.1 Organization of the 53rd Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Regiment

(53 RECCE EW Regt)

53rd Regiment of RECCE and EW

HQ and staff 102nd RECCE Battalion

532nd EW Battalion

HUMINT Co

A EW Co 1st RECCE Co

2nd RECCE Co

3rd RECCE Co

B EW Co

RT RECCE Co

Stationar systems Co

Support Co Service Support Co

ISR Centre

5

ISR Centre of 53rd RECCE and EW Regiment (53 RECCE EW Regt)

ISR is a term currently used to combined arms enabling operation of Allied weapons

which connects reconnaissance and surveillance (maneuvering task) with the

production and dissemination of intelligence (formerly described as the task of the

staff). ISR is continuous, recursive operation aimed at a gathering of relevant

information, which are analyzed to create intelligence to support the commander's

visualization and to support the operating cycle.

ISR is able to confirm the information from multiple sources or to choose more

resources to obtain information.

ISR Centre head

Planning and ISR control Department

Analysis Department

HUMINT Group

Direction and Information

Collection Department

Skupina tecnical analysis of

communication Signals Group

Means and Targets

Database Department

GEO and Tactical IMINT

Department

Tecnical Analysis

of non-communication signals Group

ISR Centre Head deputy

Technical Analysis

Department

6

1.2 532nd Electronic Warfare Battalion (532 EW Bn)

532 EW Bn is able to perform the tasks of an electronic support, an influence and a

protection on the depth of the division's area of responsibility.

Means of the Battalion allow: to acquire, to collect, to analyze and to disseminate

intelligence information and it enablse management of electronic interactions in all

kinds of combat operations.

The subordinated units of 532 EW Bn have capabilities of a continuous covert radio

and radar reconnaissance, detection of all types of impulse radars of land, sea and

air targets, an identification of resources and navigation devices and a location of

their position in 3D mode, a jamming and a location of radio networks of the enemy in

bands FM, UHF and HF. It provides mobile EW support for units in operations (C-

IED). It collects data for the creation and updating of databases of communication

and non-communication means for the needs of early warning systems mounted on

vehicles of Ground Forces and Air Forces.

7

1.3 102nd Reconnaissance Battalion (102 RECCE Bn)

Units of 102nd Reconnaissance Battalion (102 RECCE Bn) are predetermined to:

1. conduct long range, combat, optoelectronic air reconnaissance, to perform

the tasks of intelligence from human resources (HUMINT) and a monitoring of

the situation in the allotted space by allocated forces and resources in a favor

of ACR TF created in accordance with the politics- military ambitions of the

Czech Republic in combat and non-combat operations, in a day and at night,

in adverse weather and all field conditions;

2. strengthen the control of a state border, to guard important objects and

perform tasks for the benefit of the Police of the Czech Republic;

3. In addition to the above tasks can be in special cases units of 102

Reconnaissance Battalion used similarly as mechanized units.

It is characterized by a high degree of readiness and part of forces is able to perform

tasks of assault troops parachuted from a helicopter or by landing with a helicopter.

HUMINT Company (Tactical or Operational-tactical Human Intelligence Company) is

primarily destined for the tasks of intelligence gaind from human resources for the

benefit of created ACR Task Groups.

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HUMINT Company is able to:

gather intelligence from human sources from the population in the area of

deployment;

perform source and non-source operations: a basic information gathering,

military intelligence cooperation, tactical interrogation, typing, exploitation,

interrogation, contact management and hidden passive observation;

detect and eliminate ISR threats of enemy;

provide timely, accurate and relevant intelligence;

integrate into the system of ISR, JISR.

1st Reconnaissance Company (1 RECCE Co) is primarily destined to fulfill tasks of

long range and optoelectronic air reconnaissance in a favor of ACR created Task

Groups;

• it is able to create four Long Range Reconnaissance Groups (LRRG) of 8

persons each;

• LRRG is able to make a reconnaissance of the area about the size of 25-50

square kilometers in 24 hours and is able to perform the tasks of

reconnaissance for up to 14 days with additional supply to a distance of 100

kms from the command post of a unit;

• LRRG is capable of insertion on parachutes or from a landing helicopter;

• a part the unit is able to be inserted by special parachute jumps.

• 1 RCo is capable to allocate from its assembly 8 unmanned aerial

reconnaissance groups (UAV Raven) to perform tasks of optoelectronic

HUMINT Co

Commander

HUMINT Co

Commander Deputy

Head Warrant Officer

Command Squad HUMINT Team

FHT: 6 soldiers LR (UAZ) 1x RF 13, mobiles, NTB.

- Team leader 1 LT 1x

- specialist (collator - analyst) first sergeant 1x

- junior specialist (operator- handler) sergeant first class. 2x

- senior operator-specialist (operator – cohandler) staff sergeant. 2x

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tactical unmanned aerial reconnaissance category mini in a day and at night to

a distance of 10 km from the ground control station and make up to 3 offs with

one RAVEN complete in 24 hours.

2nd Reconnaissance Company (2 RECCE Co) is primarily destined for the tasks of

a combat reconnaissance in favor of a created ACR TGs;

• 2 RECCE Co is able to create from its composition 12 Reconnaissance

Groups (RECE G) each of one vehicle and 4 people or to create 6 RGs with

two vehicles and 8 persons each;

• RECCE G is able to make a reconnaissance of the area about the size of 25-

50 square kilometers in 24 hours and is able to perform the tasks of

reconnaissance without additional supply for 3 days within 25 kms from the

command post radio station without relay;

• RECCE Co is capable to be inserted by parachutes or by helicopter landing.

8 each

2 each

1 RECCE Co

Commander

Head Warrant

Officer

Command Squad

LRRG

1 RECCE Co

Commander Deputy

UAV Group

UAV Squad

10

3rd Reconnaissance Company (3 RECCE Co) is primarily designated for the tasks

of combat reconnaissance in favor of a created Task Groups of ACR;

• RECCE Co is able to create from its composition 12 reconnaissance Groups

(RECCE G) with one vehicle and 4 people or 6 RECCE Gs with two vehicles

and 8 persons each;

• RECCE G is able to make a reconnaissance of the area about the size of 25-

50 square kilometers in 24 hours and is able to perform the tasks of

reconnaissance without resupply for 3 days within 25 kms from the command

post radio station without rely;

• RECCE Co is capable to be inserted with parachutes or by helicopter

landing.

Logistics Company (LOG Co) is designed for all-round logistics support of 102

RECCE Bn and all running life of a staff.

LOG Co fulfills the following main tasks: to

• implement material supply for all units and battalion staff;

• provide technical support, including of carrying out routine repairs of 1st

level;

• provide logistics services for the benefit of a staff and units;

• carry out water supply;

2 RECCE Co

Commander Deputy

Head

Warrant Officer

2 RECCE Co Commander

Command Squad

RECCE Squad

1st RECCE Platoon

2nd RECCE

Platoon

3rd RECCE Platoon

RECCE Squad RECCE Squad

RECCE Squad 4 soldiers

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• ensure the functioning of battalion staff life;

• ensure the management of the assigned training camp Potštát.

1.4 Reconnaissance Group (RECCE G) of 4th Rapid Deployable Brigade (4

RDBde)

12

1.5 Reconnaissance Group (RECCE G) of 7th Mechanized Brigade (7 MBde)

13

2 Principles of a Reconnaissance Group (RECCE G) activities

2.1 Ways of a task fulfilment

An insertion of RECCE Groups:

By foot

Landing force

Motorized (wheeled or tracked vehicles)

Combination

Requirements for the reconnaissance illustrate the required capabilities of forces and

reconnaissance means necessary to meet the commander´s requirements.

These requirements are:

1. concealement

2. continousness

3. activity

4. sustainability

5. timeliness

6. precision

7. credibility

8. standardization

9. maintaining backups of reconnaissance

2.2 An activity in a favor of units

Observation of NAI (Named Area of Interest), TAI (Target Area of Interest) out

of sight of first echelon units;

Reporting directly to the commanders of units;

Guidance of an artillery fire;

The reconnaissance of the areas and the roads when moving;

Coverage of the units flanks.

2.3 Characteristic features and a restriction of a reconnaissance

Mobility

Reconnaissance organs are able to perform their tasks in all types of terrain:

primarily using reconnaissance vehicles;

or may lead reconnaissance on foot;

optionally may be transported by airplanes and helicopters.

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Tactical mobility of reconnaissance units can be increased by assigning support

engineer units and resources.

Information Retrieval

Reconnaissance vehicles are equipped with means capable to obtain information

about an enemy activity, targets strikes and to carry their identification, about the

results of their own strikes on enemy targets and conduct surveillance in a scale

beyond the possibilities of the human senses.

Reconnaissance systems are able to be used in conditions of low visibility in all

weather conditions and in most types of terrain.

Effective communication and information systems, ensure that the information is

timely and useful. This ensures that the results of the reconnaissance organs activity

have maximum influence on commander´s decisions.

Firepower

Reconnaissance organs are equipped with sensors and quick identification of targets

means and fire control means to conduct a reconnaissance. These fire sensors are

together with communications means essential for the timely destruction of key

enemy targets and objects on the battlefield by own forces firing means of direct and

indirect fire. To their own protection must be reconnaissance organs and their

vehicles equipped with firing means for a destruction of armored vehicles and tanks

of an opponent.

Protection

Reconnaissance organs are equipped with reconnaissance vehicles for its activities.

Vehicles ensure their protection against the effects of small arms fire, with a sufficient

firepower, mobility, integrated reconnaissance means, sensor systems, resources of

classified communication and information systems.

Flexibility

Reconnaissance organs provide information to the commander from the areas where

there can not be used other means or the use of its is ineffective.

They are able also to verify information obtained from other sources;

They can perform tasks not only by observation in a contact with the enemy,

but also in a depth behind the enemy front line and in our own rear area;

They allow commanders operationally manage reconnaissance organs,

quickly and efficiently change reconnaissance efforts with an emphasis on

critical tasks.

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Endurance

Reconnaissance organs are able to perform specified tasks in isolation from units 3-5

days without resupply. High requirements for maneuver of covert activities and a

considerable distance of reconnaissance organs during the execution of the tasks

require careful planning of a logistic support including the use of all means and

modes of transport.

Limitations

Execution of the reconnaissance tasks is not always organized as a combat

operation that is why the activity of reconnaissance organs in some cases requires

specially tailored support. These are primarily moments of a penetration of

reconnaissance organs in the opponent disposition, a conduct of a lunge with a

taking of captives and so on.

2.4 Flow of information

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Reference

AJP-2 (A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence; Counter-Intelligence and Security.

DRAFT 2 VERSION , NOV 2012

PODHOREC, M., KÁČER, J.: Zpravodajská činnost v bojových a nebojových

operacích, S- 3595. UO Brno, 2005

HORÁK, O., PODHOREC, M.: Taktický průzkum, S-2725. UO Brno, 2008

Pub -75-64-01 Metodika taktické přípravy průzkumných jednotek, Správa doktrín

ŘeVD, Vyškov 2008

17

3 Intelligence combat documents Introduction

Generally, information activities are included in intelligence activities. Intelligence

activity is a generic term which means all the activities of the intelligence organs,

including the activities of other members of the staffs, which focuses on the

systematic and continuous acquisition of information to evaluate the enemy, terrain

and weather in the area of intelligence interest, with emphasis on the area of

intelligence responsibility. It is carried out in advance of a battle planning, during the

planning and during a fight. Intelligence results allow to predict actions of adversary,

they assist to decision-making of a commander and to management of troops

operations.

The content of the information activity is an active activity of intelligence authorities to

obtain all kinds of information and a processing of gained documents. Information

activity simultaneously integrates both its own independent activity of intelligence

staff, as well as its interaction with other institutions, staffs activities, etc. It includes a

variety of sub-activities that are related to obtaining information about the enemy and

work with them (message encoding, transmission, decoding) their evaluation, draw

the conclusions (information activity) and their transfer to users.

Information and Intelligence is disseminated in written form through the medium of

Intelligence Reports. These are standardised across NATO and are summarised in

STANAG 2022 which contains a listing of all NATO agreed intelligence reports and

details of where the format for each report may be found.

Principles. The principles which apply to Verbal Dissemination; Clarity, Relevance

and Brevity, are equally applicable to the process of Written Dissemination.

3.1 Basic division of combat documents in intelligence warfighting function

Intelligence is the result of intelligence activity. It constitutes a comprehensive set of

assessed information, reconnaissance reports, and piece of information, data about

the enemy and his intentions, as well as other matters that are the subject of

intelligence interest. It is designed for support of decision making of a commander,

for a work of a staff, to inform subordinate units and neighbors.

According to the formation period is intelligence divided into:

intelligence processed in a preparation for combat

intelligence processed during the fight

Intelligence processed in a preparation for a fight; it usually contains information

about the construction, organization, dislocation and armor of armed enemy forces.

18

In addition, it may contain conclusions about the enemy forces to create clusters and

a utilization of destruction resources. During the fight it mainly contains information

about the combat forces assembly and intent necessary for commanders in a

particular situation.

Intelligence has not only document informative character, but also an analytical

nature. This intelligence include the evaluation of the information that may relate to

terrain and weather in the area of intelligence interest and other documents that are

processed by intelligence agencies and their contents may not apply to its own

troops. All intelligence is processed in free form in the form of a written or graphic

document. If necessary, intelligence can be supplemented with various attachments.

In writing they usually include:

General characteristics of the activity of adversary

Disposition and composition of adversary

Reports about an opponent relevant to the level of command

Likely adversary intent

As required, other additional information

The content and extent of the processing depends on the specific needs and

purpose, which is to serve the document. Treatment should be clear and simple, so

that the recipient can determine its content, easy to navigate and quickly find the

necessary information. In fact, there may be all information that may have some

meaning for the recipient.

3.2 Intelligence reports and their content

Intelligence reports are used for the transmission of information obtained by its own

forces and resources in the area of intelligence responsibility. This information is

already evaluated and it relates to the actual situation. Intelligence is transmitted from

lower to higher levels of command. Intelligence reports are summary, periodic and

promptly.

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Summary intelligence reports

This reports are made solely on a division, brigade, battalion staff. Their contents are

summarized information from a certain period of a time gained in the area of

intelligence responsibility of the appropriate level. Their content is:

the general characteristics of combat disposition and activities of the enemy,

the most important elements of enemy combat disposition,

terrain data and its engineer use,

identified losses of adversary,

reports from questioning,

analysis of warfare since the last summary intelligence reporting,

intent of adversary activity,

requirements.

Periodic intelligence reports

These reports are submitted to the senior always in a given deadlines together with

other reports of Staff. These time limits are enacted in the "Annex B" of combat order.

They contain information identified by own forces and means always to a given time.

The report states a comprehensive summary of information in order:

the general character of the enemy activity,

grouping of the enemy in the area of intelligence responsibility with the

expected interface between units,

identified important elements of adversary combat disposition,

own conclusions from the detected data, the expected development of the

activities of the enemy and its intention.

Promptly intelligence reports

The content of these messages is information that must be communicated without

delay immediately after detection. These are important elements of the adversary

military deployment, such as artillery, NBC, command posts, EW means, AD,

reserves, helicopter Air Force or such information as stated in senior commander

demands. It is directed by the "Annex B" of a combat order of a superior. Promptly

intelligence reports are processed in a free form. Applies here that the content of the

message is the most important, so it is up to the sender in which way is information

processed to tell to the recipient all necessary information.

Intelligence reports are mainly as a written document or in computer as data. To

increase their confidence and clarity attachments as maps, lists of objects, captured

documents, drawings of the situation and found objects and protocols on the

interrogation of prisoners can be added. All data in the reports shall be submitted

stating what, where, when and by whom it was found. If there is a danger of delay,

20

reports can be passed through technical means of connection. In this case, there is a

writen inscription in a record note book.

All these documents are sufficient to achieve the goals of information activities in the

ACR. Through them, in my opinion, it is possible to well use the results of intelligence

to a decision support of commanders and staffs. Individual points are set out in a

logical sequence and yet they provide sufficient space to describe all the necessary

facts. In all documents there is the space for the evaluation of processed information.

All this provides conditions for the transmission of a wide range of information while

minimizing the risk that some will be omitted. On the other hand these facts support a

situation where may arise an excess of unnecessary information or big

descriptiveness. Therefore, it will depend on the experience and capabilities of

processors to be correctly filled information needs and requirements of beneficiaries

and those to be able to quickly and accurately navigate in the information provided.

3.3 Information documents in NATO

In the NATO information is disseminated in written form within an intelligence activity

with the help of intelligence reports. Reports fall into two categories:

routine reports

special reports

Among the routine reports belong Intelligence reports (INTREP), Intelligence

summary (INTSUM) and Supplementary intelligence reports (SUPINTREP).

Among the special reports belong a number of other intelligence reports and

summaries, which are used by individual departments or specialists.

Intelligence reports (INTREP)

These reports should always use short title INTREP (intelligence report). These

reports can be created at any level of command. They are sent spontaneously,

21

regardless of the specific schedule, whenever the information is so serious that

require urgent warnings of a commander or his staff.

INTREP should contain conclusions that can be drawn from the information and

messages to some appropriate time. Minimal processing and transmission of

INTREP should be determined at Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) at every

level of command. But that would not hinder INTREP makers in their distribution, if

they consider it necessary. Distribution will normally be limited to the closest higher

and lower and neighboring command, although due to the content of INTREP will be

sometime wider distribution necessary.

There are also formats that contain specific information. They consist of:

LANDINTREP - land intelligence report,

AIRINTREP - air intelligence report,

MARINTREP - Marine intelligence report.

Description. This is a report sent spontaneously, without regard to a specific time

schedule, whenever the information or intelligence it contains is considered to require

the urgent attention of the commander to whom it is addressed. The INTREP should

contain any deductions which can be made from the information and intelligence in

the time available. The minimum distribution of INTREPS should be laid down in

SOPs at each level of command but this should not inhibit the originator of the

INTREP from widening the distribution if he believes this to be necessary.

Format. The format of an INTREP must conform with agreed NATO standards. It

may either be sent as free text with a structured header and footer following the

format set out in The Bi-MNC Reporting Directive, or as a formatted message

following the ADatP-3 rules. In order to simplify the process, further messages which

contain specific structured data referring to Naval, Land or Air matters have been

developed and form the basis of the MARINTREP, LANDINTREP or AIRINTREP.

The structures of these messages are also contained in The Bi-MNC Reporting

Directive.

Intelligence summary (INTSUM)

Intelligence summary INTSUM (intelligence summary) is a regular brief summary of

the reports on the current situation of the enemy in the area of intelligence

responsibility of the commander. It is aimed at updating intelligence picture and to

notice important changes since the last report. It should therefore include information

22

that may be due to the reporting requirements of the commander of serious

importance and also an estimate based on the evaluation and interpretation of this

information. On a higher level of command an emphasis should be placed on

estimating the situation and not on the details. INTSUM is created at all levels of

command and is distributed at the discretion of either the sender or Regulation of

superior. To the distribution system must be included all whose interests may be

affected by the content of the summary.

There are also formats that contain specific information. They consist of:

LANDINTSUM - land intelligence summary,

AIRINTSUM - air intelligence summary,

MARINTSUM - maritime intelligence summary,

Description. The INTSUM is a concise, periodic summary of intelligence on the

current enemy situation within a commander’s area of intelligence responsibility

designed to update the current intelligence picture and to highlight important

developments during the reporting period. It should therefore include any information

which may be relevant to the intelligence requirements of any commander to whose

headquarters it is disseminated and should contain an appraisal based on evaluation

and interpretation of that information. At the higher echelons, emphasis should be

placed on appraisal and not on detail. The INTSUM is disseminated either at the

discretion of the originating commander or, at the direction of a higher formation. The

distribution of an INTSUM must include all those whose responsibilities and interests

may be affected by the contents of the summary.

Format. The format of the INTSUM must conform to agreed NATO standards. It

may either be sent as free text with a header and footer in the format set out in The

Bi-MNC Reporting Directive, or as a formatted message following the ADatP-3 rules.

There are some INTSUMs which contain specific information dealing with maritime,

land or air information in a set format. These are titled MARINTSUM, LANDINTSUM

and AIRINTSUM and their formats are set out in The Bi-MNC Reporting Directive.

Supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP)

Supplementary intelligence report SUPINTREP is processed irregularly, on specific

request or in preparation for a special activity. It focuses on providing a detailed

overview and analysis of intelligence data that were collected for a specific time

23

period. These data may relate to one or more specific areas. Distribution of

SUPINTREP will depend on its content.

Description. This report may be produced from time to time, on special request or in

preparation for a special operation. It is designed to provide detailed reviews and

analyses of all the intelligence data on one or more specific subjects which have

been collected over a period of time. The distribution of the SUPINTREP will be

governed by its content.

Format. There is no NATO agreed format for this report with the exception of the

requirement for the word SUPINTREP to appear at the beginning of each report. The

Bi-MNC Reporting Directive contains a format for a free text report with a header and

footer in a specific format.

Specialist Reports. There are a number of other intelligence reports and

summaries which are grouped either under the heading of a particular service or of a

particular specialisation.

Electronic Data Dissemination. Increasingly, intelligence is disseminated

electronically. This removes the requirement for the production of written or

formatted messages and has the advantage of enabling intelligence to be received

by its intended recipient in near real time. There are a number of applications for

electronic dissemination:

a. Database to Database. AIntP-3 sets out a common format or structure into which

intelligence which is to be disseminated electronically is to be placed. It follows

that, if intelligence data bases reflect the structure of AIntP-3, data does not have

to be altered between being extracted from a data base and transmitted and

between being received and stored in the receiving data base. In this case the

speed and ease of dissemination will be further enhanced. If, in turn, the common

data base structure is replicated at each level of command, the dissemination of

intelligence both up and down the chain of command will also be further simplified

and made faster.

b. Unstructured Data. Written intelligence such as patrol reports, INTREPs or

INTSUMs can be stored in a database as text. Using search and retrieval

software, intelligence can be ‘pulled’ from the database in near real time or

24

‘pushed‘ down to a lower level database, also in near real time.

Communications. It is unlikely that the J2 staff will be able to influence the

provision of communication systems but where there is a choice of systems, the

following factors should be taken into consideration when deciding which system to

use.

a. Speed. In dissemination of intelligence, speed is of the essence. Therefore,

wherever possible, an electronic communication system should be used to pass

intelligence in near real time.

b. Encryption. Electronic encryption is instantaneous and has no effect on the time

taken to disseminate the intelligence. Manual encryption is time consuming and it

must be remembered that the process of decryption at the recipient’s end of the

communication system will take as long, if not longer than the encryption. If there

is no alternative to manual encryption and the intelligence is urgent, then the risk

of compromise must be weighed against the requirement to get the intelligence to

the user in time.

c. Bandwidth. The bandwidth of the system will determine the rate at which the

intelligence can be sent over the system; the narrower the bandwidth, the slower

the transmission rate. This consideration will affect the exchange of large

quantities of data between databases rather than the dissemination of relatively

small amounts of intelligence. If, however, the dissemination involves graphics

such as maps, photographs or sketches, then bandwidth may again become a

consideration as the transmission of all three of these categories of material is

demanding of bandwidth.

d. Language. If the intelligence is to be disseminated in a language different from

that of the recipient, a situation which may quite often be the case in combined or

coalition operations, consideration may have to be given to dissemination by a

Liaison Officer fluent in the recipient’s language. This method of dissemination

although slow, will prevent the possibility of the intelligence being misunderstood.

e. Point to Point or All Informed Communications. The decision whether to use

point to point communications such as a telephone or facsimile system or whether

to use an All Informed system such as broadcast radio must be dictated by the

25

nature of the intelligence which is to be disseminated.

The Dissemination of Targeting Data. Because targets rarely stay static for long,

targeting data has a very rapid decay rate. It is therefore imperative that targeting

data reaches its destination as quickly as possible. The expression ‘Sensor to

Shooter’ is a very general description of the links that must be put in place to ensure

that Targeting Data is received by the Offensive Fire Support organisation in as near

real time as possible. In real terms, there will always be a human in the Sensor to

Shooter path and although much of the targeting process may be automated, for the

foreseeable future the human will have the last word on the employment of strike

systems.

Intelligence collection plan (ICP)

26

ISTAR synchronisation matrix

Reference





HORÁK, O.: Zpravodajská analýza, Vojenská publikace. MO OVPzEB Praha, 2006

27

4. Task of intelligence warfighting function during a conduct of information operations Introduction

Present-day time is characteristic by huge development of communications and

information technology, whereby diffusion, availability and utilization of information

becomes easier. With their help obtaining picture about affairs, which happen in

surrounding and help us to form our own opinion and attitude towards this affairs.

Information represent big potential and with their help it is possible to affect behaviour

and bearings of people and eventualy and it affects their decision making. According

to world's polimetrician the dominance task of the state at the beginning third

millennium will be determinated not only by his economic potential, but above all by

his ability to control informations and their diffusion.

Experience from last wartime conflict show, that by management of distributing of

information it is possible to make support not only to military operation, but also to

political and diplomatic effort. Therefore such a controlled dissemination of

information is suitable by resources and manners with the goal to affect listeners,

spectators, readers (recipient information) and get their support.

However can we count an information as a "weapon" Generally weapons, which may

be lethal or paralyzing we use as a source for achievement of requested behaviour

near target object. At the same time with the help of modified and in the appropriate

manner given information, we get the same result, it means achievement of

requested behaviour on target object, which just on their basis forms its posture and

opinion framing resulting behaviour. It follows, that the information can be thought in

some case as a weapon.

Dissemination of data, news and information is running in communication

environment, that is created by subjects producing informations, recipient of

informations, communication infrastructure and environment to distributing

information. Czech army with authorities and technical resources is its part as well .

So communication environment becomes part of battlefield. This document will

characterize communication environment, his subject, threats and will define

activities, which are running inside.

28

4.1 Definitions, place and task of intelligence warfighting function during a

conduct of information operations

Information is an element of combat power. Information operations (IO) are one

means commanders use apply it. Focused IO-synchronized with effective information

management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-enable

commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for

achieving information superiority.

Information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary and influence

others’ decision making processes, information, and information systems, while

protecting one’s own information and information systems. IO encompasses

attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while

protecting friendly C2 systems from adversary disruption (defensive IO). Effective IO

combines the effects of offensive and defensive IO to produce information superiority

at decisive points.

Offensive IO destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence

adversary decision makers and others who can affect the success of friendly

operations. Offensive IO also target the information and information systéme

(INFOSYS) used in adversary decision making processes.

Defensive IO protects and defends friendly information, C2 systems, and INFOSYS.

Effective defensive IO assures friendly commanders accurate common operational

picture (COP) based not only on a military perspective, but also on nonmilitary factors

that may affect the situation. An accurate COP is essential to achieving situational

understanding.

According to definition of using information operations, Czech army will exploit

possibilities of forces and resources for leading information operation, which are able

to pursue information activities with informations, information processes and in

communication infrastructure. On pictures below there are illustrated some military

activities, which can contribute on conducting of information operations of the Czech

army.

29

Military activities of the Czech army for conducting INFOPS

Primarily it is about utilization of public informing authority. Task of this authority is to

inform native representants through media and worldwide public about our plan ,

intention, serve explication to news and so on. Destined for this purpose these

authorities must be perfectly identified with our intentions and goals in order to be

able to present that. On these basics individuals and groups of people make their

personal opinion and posture.

Our information are transfer through the media, therefore it is possible to get

distortion or deliberate adjustment or disclosure of an information. public informing

authorities must be compet to watch our dissemination, but also by next official

representatives of disinterested states and analyze their impact on production

opinion and posture near objective individuals and target groups of people and

propose effective countermeasure by communication experts.

Next, no less important task of organs of informing of public will be to pursue

analyses of possible effects of informations, distributed by forces and resources of

information operations

Forces and

resources for

conducting of

combat in

command and

control area

civil

military

cooperatio

n

Information

of puplic

electronic

warfare

psychological

operations

Physical

destruction

Deception

operational

security

30

NATO and our Allies, on our national, civil and military organizations and suggest

procuration to their prevention.

Outbreak of crisis in target region evokes undulation of increased care of media

representants about the situation, which displays their presence here. Requierement

and endeavour about their free movement on the battlefield may be evoked by

intention of giving the most realistic information about the situation or too reduce the

trust of our goals near official representatives, individuals and groups of people of

noninterested states. Authorities well-informed public on all level of command must

be therefore competently watch and operate movement of news representatives in an

area of operation of the Czech army and contribute to affecting of public meaning

about our operations and tasks.

For conducting of information operations it is also possible to use authorities of civil-

military cooperation (CIMIC). Advantage of these authorities is, they are determined

to work among official representative of a civil state administration, population and

international and nongovernmental representastives aton in the area of our interest.

Their influence can help to achive support of our goals among members of target

groups and at the same time helpto decrese stress among fighting groups in our area

of operation. Other part of their activities will be following responses mentioned men

on development of the situation and administration of needed information for

planning and evaluatingof transaction procuration.

Problems of information war on battlefield isn't centrally solved and is neither exactly

defined by the Czech army. North atlantic alliance uses conception Command

Control Warfare (C2W)to mark activitiesfor obtaining information superiority on

battlefield , that includes electronic warfare, psychological operation, physical

destruction, deception and operational security.The Czech army has a force and

means to conduct mentioned military activities and for this reason it can be said, that

it is able to conduct information warfare on a battlefield. In the field manual of the

army there are mentioned activities described for usage in our conditions (problems

of operational security is included the protection of our forces), setting of tasks of

mentioned activities, except electronic fight, are solved separately by single

commander of all level of command and control.

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4.2 Characteristic and definitiv psychological operations

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are defined as: “planned psychological activities

in peace, and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to

influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military

objectives.“ They include Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA), Psychological

Consolidation Activities (PCA), and Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA)” (APP-

6). Target audiences may be the military or civilian population of hostile or neutral

nations, an adversary commander and his staff and also friendly military or civilian

populations.

PSYOPS intent and activities vary with the mission and target audience. This chapter

describes the purpose and categories of PSYOPS, and provides guidance to

commanders and staffs involved in allied joint operations on their planning and

implementation. In such operations, although PSYOPS are a key function in INFO

OPS it is important that they are closely coordinated with the entire staff, particularly

where PSYOPS activities extend beyond actions coordinated by the INFO OPS staff.

Coordination must be effected at the strategic, perational, and tactical levels in order

to preserve credibility and consistency of effort in the overall allied joint campaign.

Offensive PSYOPS. The aim is to weaken the will of the enemy’s troops or civilian

population. Weak points in the enemy’s political, economic, social or military

situations are identified and evaluated for importance, accessibility and vulnerability.

A co-ordinate, consistent attack is then launched at the selected target audience

using carefully chosen, credible and, if possible, simple themes designed to draw

attention to the selected weakness and thus erode enemy morale. The attack is

delivered through the complementary use of various media: radio, television, press

reports, magazine articles, speeches, poster campaigns or leaflets. If planned and

executed properly, the attack will create doubt in the enemy’s mind: doubt regarding

the righteousness of his cause, competence and integrity of his leaders,

dependability of his allies, outcome of the war and, most important, the likelihood of

his own survival.

Defensive PSYOPS. The aim is to protect the morale of the friendly population and

to win the support of neutral or uncommitted groups. Themes selected for these tasks

32

aim to reduce the emery’s real or potential prestige, counter the effects of his

propaganda and inform about our own intentions and measures.

Characterization of Operations. PSYOPS are planned operations conducted to

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their

emotions, motives, objectives, and reasoning and ultimately to influence the behavior

of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of

PSYOPS is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the

originator’s objectives.

Characterization by Apparent Source. Black, gray, and white activities reflex any

information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the

opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit

the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

Black. Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true

one.

Grey. Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source .

White. Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an

accredited agency.

Characterization by Objective.

Cohesive PSYOPS are directed at friendly and neutral audiences with the aim of

creating goodwill, understanding, friendship, confidence, and co-operation.

Divisive PSYOPS are directed at the enemy target audience with the aim of lowering

morale, creating apathy, defeatism, and discord and promoting dissension,

subversion, panic, uncertainty, defection, and surrender. Weak points in the

adversary’s political, economic, social, or military situations are identified and

evaluated for importance, accessibility and vulnerability. A coordinated, consistent

attack is then launched at the selected target audience using carefully chosen,

credible and to the extent possible, truthful and simple themes designed to draw

attention to the selected weaknesses and thus, erode the opposition’s morale. The

attack is delivered through the complementary use of various media: radio, television,

magazine articles, speeches, poster campaigns, leaflets, or weapon systems. If

33

planned and executed properly, the attack will create doubt in the adversary’s mind:

doubt regarding the righteousness of his own cause, competence and integrity of

his leaders, the effectiveness of his equipment, his own abilities, dependability of his

allies, outcome of the war and, most important, the likelihood of his own survival.

Types of Operations. In accordance with the agreed NATO definition, there are four

categories of PSYOPS, Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA), Psychological

Consolidation Activities (PCA), Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA), and a new

category, Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA). These classifications have

been established primarily to facilitate division of responsibility between national

authorities, host nations and operational commanders. The NATO military authorities

are primarily responsible only for the conduct of Battlefield Psychological Activities

(BPA) for combat operations. Useful as they are in this respect, it should be kept in

mind that PSYOPS do not lend themselves to easy compartmentalization. In practice,

there is much essential overlap between the three types of activities:

Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA). These are high level (i.e.,nationalb

government level) psychological operations conducted in peace, crisis, and war,

which pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral

countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of potentially hostile countries to

wage war. Conduct of strategic psychological activities is a national responsibility.

Psychological Consolidation Activities (PCA). PCA are planned psychological

ctivities in crisis and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under

friendly control in order to achieve a desired behavior, which supports the military

objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders.

Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA). BPA are planned psychological

activities conducted as an integral part of combat operations and designed to bring

psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under enemy control in

the battle area, to assist in the achievement of operational and tactical objectives.

Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA). PSPA are planned psychological

activities conducted as an integral part of peace support operations, designed to

create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to cooperate among the parties in

conflict and civilian population in the area of operations, to protect the force and

assist in¨the achievement of mission objectives.

34

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are defined like a planned and purposeful

psychological incidence, made in peacetime, during the state of outer jeopardy of the

state and in time of war, intent on target groups to influence their posture and

behaviour, for achievement of political and military goals rated by representatives of

the state and the Czech army.

103.Centre CIMIC/PSYOPS is determined to support units up to level of division,

furthermore to incidence as a single workplace, which are determined to strengthen

mechanized brigade and to supports NATO troops in area of operation.

Purpose of this unit is to weaken the determination of target enemy's group, or

potential enemy, put up a resistance or conduct active combat activity, furthermore to

contribute to general assessment of the situation in our area of operation from

psychological point of view on an enemy. Next goal is to strengthen support of our

Allies for specified political-military purposes andto get support and cooperation of

disinterested and pending groups of people.

Conclusion

In future conflict or in solving of crisis the state can not stay out of support of

population and official representatives of disinterested sides, international political

and nongovernmental organization. Certain state will be obliged to conduct activities,

like an information campaign and diplomatic effort, which enable him to obtain

requested support in mentioned subjects at the expense of his antagonist.

Information operations will represent tool, using ability of the army, to support of

mentioned activities obtaining information superiority. At the same time it is possible

to exploit force and means for conducting of information operations in operations for

assertion of international sanctions. In the Czech army information operations will be

planned on strategic level of command and control and will be realized on all

subordinate levels. They do not substitute conduction of an information warfare on a

battlefield, but spread out utilization of resources to its conducting even to other

regions.

35

For conducting of information operations the Czech army will not have to build-up

new unit, but it will benefit from possibilities of forces and resources of the Czech

army itself.

As an aspect to utilization of forces and resources of the fight in the command and

control area for conducting of information operations, it is suitable to determine one

element in the structure of General Staff of the army of the Czech republic to sustain

their planning and control.

Information operation place more and more emphasis to growing quantity of

intelligence informations, because an essence of information operation indicates the

rate of growth of raising information requirements and on intelligence informations.

Therefore it is clear, that here exists direct relation between improved abilities of

intelligence information processing, resulting from complex of intelligence,

surveilance, reconnaissance and determination of targets and among raising

demands on intelligence information following from information warfare.

36

5. Technical means of a reconnaissance 5.1 Basic information about a vehicle

Wheeled infantry fighting vehicle PANDUR II 8x8 - reconnaissance, without a locator

is designed for:

• reconnaissance units (RECCE Group/ MBn or LMOBn/ Mechanised Brigade)

of a light or mixed type to conduct a reconnaissance in a favor of a

mechanized brigade (MBde) to conduct combat operations from gun-carriaged

weapons in the opponent's military deployment area;

• reconnaissance units (RECCE Group) destined for a mechanized brigade of

light and mixed type of divisional ensemble, to conduct the reconnaissance in

a favor of MBde, to conduct combat operations from gun-carriaged weapons in

a tactical depth of enemy combat disposition;

• reconnaissance units (reconnaissance company) destined for the

implementation of a combat reconnaissance and combat operations from gun-

carriaged weapons in great depth of enemy fighting disposition (optional);

• high mobility and maneuverability makes it ideal to make quick maneuvers in

penetrating the enemy dispositions and for a transportation of recce specialists

under armored protection in the area of reconnaissance;

• to immediately perform a reconnaissance, combat and other tasks within the

mechanized brigade of light and mixed type.

TTD of the vehicles

• Max. speed of 105 kms / hour

• Engine power 335 kW

• The speed while floating 10 kms / hour

• Max. gradient 35%

• Number of axles 4

• Number of driven wheels 6 (8 in 8x8 mode)

• Number of steered axles 2 (1st and 2nd)

• Turning circle of 21.6 ± 0.5 m

• Crew 5 + 1 (driver, commander, gunner-operator, operator IPZS, operator BRL

+ possibility of transporting 1 person)

• Fight. Weight unmanned 20 045 ± 200 kg

37

• Fight. weight with a crew of 20 885 ± 200 kg

• Max. weight for floating 20 100 kg

• Max. permissible weight 20 885 kg

• Max. weight of the braked trailer. 18,000 kg

• Max. weight of the towed IFV-braked CA 20800 kg

The main components of the vehicle

• Drive unit - one set - POWERPACK

• Cummins engine (6 cylinder, 455 HP, 8900 cc max. 2200 rev. / Min.)

• Gearbox ZF 6-speed

• weapon systems RAFAEL 30 mm cannon, machine gun 7.62 mm

• Central tire inflation you honor CTIS

• Emergency range RUN-FLAT

• The swimming forward and backward

• Air Filter System FVZ 98m

• Night vision device CDND-1 Meopta

• Radio RF13250 (External Communications)

• Inner voice equipment VICM 100

• Fire protection system Deugra type 643

• Navigation and diagnostics Bevis

• The detection and indication of irradiation

• Radio station R150M2 (External Communications)

38

Spaces of the vehicle

1. The engine - transmission space

2. Space for a driver

3. Space for a platoon (team) commander

4 Combat space

5. Room for special extension

39

5.2 Armament of the vehicle

RCWS 30 - gun-carriages

1. 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun M240;

2. column SDIO;

3. pointer shooter;

4. model launcher PTRS SPIKE;

5. 30 mm automatic cannon MK44;

6. drive of horizontal angle azimuth;

7. rotary converter

(commutation);

8. drive vertical angle;

9. the lower tray 30 mm ammunition;

10. upper tray 30 mm ammunition;

11. 30 mm ammunition conveyor (trough);

12. sight of a commander;

13. cap gun;

14. holder of a case for ammunition 7.62 mm

40

5.3 Special turret of the vehicle

Commander´s space

1. ethernet linking S8;

2. unit of commander listening cue VICM 107C;

3. interior lighting;

4. control block filter ventilation;

5. notebook holder;

6. ethernet linking S10;

7. internal 24 V socket;

8. RF transceiver 13250;

9. Raid XP

Space for a shooter-operator

1 multifunction display (MFD) operator-gunner;

2 a master control panel (MCP);

3 Enhanced communication unit 103 VICM operator-gunner;

4 inner light;

5 power supply unit (PSU);

6 the main drive control unit (MDCU);

7 gun control unit (GCU)

41

42

Space Operator IPZS

1 control and display unit for the operation;

2 TFT display operator IPzS;

3 pressure PPZ fire bottle;

4 joystick;

5 keyboards;

6 folding table.

43

Space for an Operator BRL

1. manual switch PPZ;

2. control column BRL;

3. securing the hatch;

4. AKB charger;

5. indoor lighting;

6. storage bin;

7. Extended Communication Unit VICM 103D.02C operator BRL;

8. 24 V socket inside;

9. stationary transceiver amplifier with radio R150M2;

10. telescopic table;

11. socket;

12. visual and audible signal voltage drop;

13. holder VICM 109;

14. external amplifier PA 3150;

15. document box.

44

SDPZ carried out system is designed for remote reconnaissance outside the

vehicle.

1 frame for Zarges boxes;

2 Zarges boxes;

3 canister 20 l;

4 tools of the vehicle;

5 belt;

6 belt.

45

BRL carried out system used for a monitoring of surroundings outside the

vehicle.

1 frame for fiber optic cable coils;

2 coils of optic cable;

3 terminal SDPz;

4 belt;

5 belt

46

5.4 Equipment of the vehicle

1. protective armor helmet;

2. Protective Mask OM-90;

3. bulletproof vest;

4. dosimetric apparatus DP-86;

5. chemical detector CHP-71

47

Imposition of an equipment of a vehicle crew outside the vehicle 1 cover for RCWS;

2 design supporting laminate;

3 External AKB LiPol (4 pieces);

4 tripod SDPZ;

5 Car Antennas 2.55 m;

6 5 m whip antenna;

7 10L tank and nozzle to the tank;

8 large backpacks - Backpacks 120 L;

9 Central backpacks - Backpacks 60 L

RCWS 30

Mk 44 automatic cannon caliber 30 mms

• The maximum effective distance shooting (target IFV) 2 000 m

• The maximum effective distance shooting (target PCV) 2 500 m

• The maximum effective distance shooting (other unarmored targets), 3 000 m

• Carried ammunition in the magazine 350 pieces

• Carried emergency ammo 200 pieces

• The maximum rate of fire of 200 rounds / min

48

FN MAG M240 machine gun 7.62 mms

• The maximum effective distance of shooting (unprotected infantry) 1 800 m

• Rate of fire 650-950 rounds / min

• Carried ammunition in the magazine 1 500 pcs

• Carried emergency ammo 250 pc

Launcher system ATM SPIKE LR

• The maximum length of effective fire 4 000 m

• The warhead 1 pc tandem warhead

• Guidance system manual or automatic (fire and forget)

• Carried ammunition in the magazine 2 pcs

• Carried emergency ammo 2 pcs

INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF RECONNAISSANCE IPZS

• telescopic column

• Height retracted (after locking) max. 870 mm

• Height eject max. 3 000 mm

• Capacity max. 50 kg

• Operating temperature -32 ° C to +49 ° C

Thermal imaging camera LIRC 640

• Operating temperature range -32 ° C to +49 ° C

• Reach to the target

- Detection 9.3 km

- Reconnaissance 3.8 km

- Identification 2.0 km

Laser rangefinder LDM 38

• Safety class M 1, eye-safe

• Minimum distance measuring 100 m

• Maximum distance measuring 20,000 meters

• Accuracy of measurement of distance ± 5 m

49

TV camera HK-170 (Color)

• TV camera HK-170: Reach the target of TANK (2.3 m x 2.3 m) according to

STANAG 4347 from the spot when the vehicle is in a rest, when the

meteorological visibility is 10 kms, and contrast of a target to background is

30%:

- Detection 9.1 km



TV camera MERLIN-2 (B & W)

• TV camera MERLIN-2: Reach the target of TANK (2.3 m x 2.3 m) according to

STANAG 4347 from the spot when the vehicle is in a rest at meteorological

visibility 10 km, contrast of a target against the background of 30% and NFOV:

- Detection 9.4 km



BATTLEFIELD RADAR SQUIRE

Radar unit

• Reach the target type of walker 10 km

• Reach the target type of light vehicle 15 km

• Reach the target type of heavy vehicle 24 km

• Reach the target type of helicopter 14 km

• Reach in the artillery mode 20 km

• accuracy

- In the direction 5 mils

- In the distance 15 m

• Power consumption of radar unit 50 W

SYSTEM FOR REMOTE RECONNAISSANCE SDPZ

Thermal imaging camera THV 5/20 UC

• Reach the target of TANK (2.3 m x 2.3 m), ΔT = 2 K; σ = 0.2 km-1; Probability.

50%:

- Detection 4.1 km

- Recognition 1.5 km


TV camera MERLIN-2 (monochrome)

50

• TV camera MERLIN-2: Reach the target of TANK (2.3 m x 2.3 m) according to

STANAG 4347 from the spot when the vehicle is in a rest, at meteorological

visibility 10 km, contrast of a target against the background is of 30% and

NFOV:

- Detection 9.4 km



TV camera RYS-36

• TV camera RYS-36: Reach the target of TANK (2.3 m x 2.3 m) according to

STANAG 4347 from the spot when the vehicle is in a rest, when the

meteorological visibility is 10 kms, contrast target against background 30%

and NFOV:

- Detection 7.6 km



Laser rangefinder LRF-5K

• This type of laser is diode

• Safety class 1 M eye safe

• Minimum distance measuring 20 m

• Maximum distance measuring 5 000 meters (standard mode)

• Accuracy of measurement of distance ± 5 m

Optical transmission line

• Cable length 200 m

• Weight 16 kg

The transmission path DVF

• Frequency Band 5.470 to 5.725 GHz

• Operating range (in any weather) to 3.2 km

External AKB LiPol

• Number 4 pcs

• Rated voltage 26 V DC

• Capacity of 40 Ah

• Weight 10.5 kg

51

Reference





HORÁK, O., PODHOREC, M.: Taktický průzkum, S-2725. UO Brno, 2008

Pub -75-64-01 Metodika taktické přípravy průzkumných jednotek, Správa doktrín

ŘeVD, Vyškov 2008

Documents

Course: Intelligence and Reconnaissance 9th …...3 Reference: AJP 2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, Edition A Version 1, Brussels: NATO