Current Foresight Activities in France, Spain, and Italy

Current Foresight Activities in France, Spain,and Italy

JEAN-ALAIN HERAUD and KERSTIN CUHLS

ABSTRACT

Recent years have brought a significant revival of public foresight activities in many European countries,including France, Spain, and Italy. The French context is rather specific in the sense that public planning andforesight (prospective) are an old tradition starting in the early post war period, but was progressively abandoneduntil its international revival during the 1990s. The recent experiences combine a mix of methods includingthe experimental reproduction of foreign experiences for long-term science and technology foresight (allowingcomparisons of the experts’ opinions between countries) and the development of a specific study of criticaltechnologies in the shorter term with the direct aim of orienting and improving the microeconomic strategiesin the country.

Spain and Italy started their own tests of foresight procedures later. The diffusion of foresight approachesand methods is certainly influenced by cultural proximities between countries of Roman civilization, but thedifferent national settings led to relatively diverse experiences. International comparisons reveal the widevariety of methods and implementations that can be contemplated at present in Europe—a living laboratoryof public foresight experiences. 1998 Elsevier Science Inc.

IntroductionAfter the revival of foresight activities began in Germany and Britain, countries

such as France and Spain started foresight activities. In this article, the recent approachesin the different countries are described together because of their common culturalbackground. The Roman culture influences the countries’ language and attitudes buttheir innovation systems are nevertheless very different so that the foresight activitiesdiffer very much in this respect.

In France, the German-Japanese Delphi study was conducted and a study on criticaltechnologies was independently developed. In Spain, the Delphi method was also applied,and in Italy, a project to identify the technologies for the next century was adapted,similar to one of the German approaches. More foresight instruments are available sincethe 1980s, but the mix of methods still has to be further developed. The use and the im-plementation of results from these formal methods by the different actors can bemuch more strategic in the future. But the enthusiasm of the countries using foresightis promising.

JEAN-ALAIN HERAUD is Professor of Economics at the University of Strasbourg, France, and headof the Bureau d’Economie Theorique et Applique (BETA).

KERSTIN CUHLS is the project manager of the second comprehensive foresight study in Germany atthe Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Karlsruhe, Germany.

Address correspondence to Dr. Kerstin Cuhls, Fraunhofer Institute (ISI), Breslauer Strasse 48, D-76139Karlsruhe, Germany.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change 60, 55–70 (1999) 1998 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 0040-1625/99/$–see front matter655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 PII S0040-1625(98)00020-1

56 J. HERAUD AND K. CUHLS

Foresight in France

OVERVIEW

In France, as in most of the main industrialized countries [1], the 1990s have broughta significant revival of public foresight activities although traditionally some efforts offoresight were part of the innovation system. The French innovation system is a verycentralized one, as the political power is concentrated in Paris. Programs and planningare still conducted to a relatively large extent by the government (Ministry of Industryand Ministry of Higher Education and Research, MESR), and the R&D budget consistsof a civilian and a military part, the latter being 30% of the public R&D expenses and15% of the global national R&D (figures for 1995) [2]. The French universities aredirectly under the responsibility of the MESR so that research can be planned andcentral regulation is relatively easy. Other innovation activities take place at the regionallevels but often in connection with central activities. Of course, French industry is alsostrong in doing research and development and takes a growing place in the domestic effort.

In all major economies, a clear necessity is felt nowadays to evaluate science andtechnology and to reorient national priorities. But the approach of foresight varies fromone country to another. Globally, one can define foresight as a systematic process ofbuilding a common perception of long-term trends. The ultimate goal is to identify areasof strategic research and emerging generic technologies that could lead to significanteconomic and/or social benefits. At least two types of foresight procedures can bedistinguished: (a) large-scale science and technology surveys scanning medium andpossible long-term developments through extensive experts’ interviews; (b) studies ofongoing technological developments—or relatively short-term perspectives—that canalready be considered as specific stakes in the national context and that the governmentfeels the necessity to monitor.

The Delphi method belongs to the first type. From 1993 to 1994, Germany andFrance successively performed the same foresight exercise, using the questionnaires ofthe Japanese Delphi, deliberately with very few modifications. Delphi surveys have a longtradition in Japan (every five years since the 1970s). The repetition of the fifth JapaneseDelphi was considered, particularly in France, as an experimental action. This is clearlyindicated by the officer in charge of the project in the Ministry of Higher Education andResearch [3]. The study resulted in a report [4], which was not widely circulated.

Another approach of technological foresight, closer to the second type, has beendeveloped in parallel by the Ministry of Industry: a study of the critical technologiesfor French industry (Les 100 technologies cles). In the introduction of the book issuedfor a large audience [5] it is emphasized that the aim of the study was to analyze thesupply and the demand of technologies in France. That foresight experience focusesmainly on the technological fields where France is or should be active; and when we say“France,” we mean French industrial actors often monitored or helped by the government.

Many other technology foresight experiences could be described, at various interme-diary layers such as agencies, public or private firms, regional councils, etc. In fact, theclassical foresight methods such as Delphi, cross-impact matrices, scenarios, etc., areknown and used as regular procedures of strategic management in many large organiza-tions. Although they were often invented in the context of public operations (for instance,Delphi in the post-war US military foresight [6] or the approach of la prospective [7]in the French “planification” [8] of the 1960s and 1970s, they tended to be increasinglyused at intermediary and micro-levels, and much less at the government level. Therevolution of the 1990s is precisely a return to the large public experiences after years

FORESIGHT ACTIVITIES 57

of decline of higher level foresight and planification. Nevertheless, the importance oflower level foresight experiences must be stressed, particularly as a follow up to thegovernmental experiences. A good example in the recent history of technology foresightin France is the case of the Bordeaux area experience Delphi Technopolis, conceivedin connection with both national foresight studies, Delphi, and critical technologies.

FRENCH DELPHI SURVEY ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The experimental Delphi survey organized in France in 1993/94 by the DirectorateGeneral “Research and Technology” of the Ministry of Higher Education and Research(MESR-DGRT) and analyzed by BETA (Bureau d’Economie Theorique et Appliquee,a research institute of the Strasbourg University ULP, linked to the national researchinstitute CNRS) is a typical long-term foresight exercise in the sense that it did not aimat analyzing the innovations actually at stake for the French industry, like the surveyon the critical technologies, but at studying all sorts of important technological develop-ments in various fields interesting the economy and society as a whole in the next 30years or so. It was also crucial to get from the experts an evaluation of the timing ofsuch potential inventions or innovations, in a way that stressed the existence of consensusor divergence of opinions.

As for any foresight activity, one aim of the project was, at least indirectly, to builda new arena for exchanges of information and debates among actors: a way of creatingcommon visions of the possible futures (futuribles, to use the French neologism coinedby the specialists of prospective).

The officer responsible for the project at the Ministry, Alain Quevreux [3], explainsthat Delphi can be a very well adapted communication device for expressing consensusand divergence between groups of actors. The process will not lead to public policyproposals immediately, but it aims at scanning a large set of topics and should opentwo sorts of dialogues: between experts and researchers of various fields, and betweenthe scientific community and the citizen.

In the present case of the French Delphi organized by MESR-DGRT, that descrip-tion is probably a little overoptimistic. Fulfilling such an ambitious strategic goal meantpolitical power and legitimacy in the French system that the administration did notprove to have in the precise circumstances of that time. Furthermore, when presentedas “experimental,” a part of the impact is necessarily missing.

But different objectives can be pursued with such foresight projects, like developing“learning effects” for the organizer as well as for the participants. On that dimension,the French Delphi got some interesting results as we will see. Another goal assignedto Delphi was to map the competencies in the country. Here, using the topics of aforeign experience as an external and then more neutral starting point was not, a priori,a bad idea, although it proved to be a little counter-productive from the other strategicpoints of view.

The inquiry gathered 3388 experts (in academic, industrial, and administrativecircles) and led to 1273 responses for the first round (38%) and 1122 for the second.This is a higher number of participants than in the first German experience (Table 1).

The participation of French experts was particularly important in the specific fieldsof “process technologies and materials,” “life science,” “electronics and informationtechnology,” with a number of respondents largely surpassing the German scores. Inthe case of medicine, the number of experts involved in France even surpassed the caseof the 25 old Japanese experience. The response rate (proportion of respondents in the


TABLE 1Number of Experts by Field

Initial Respondents RespondentsField file Phase 1 Phase 2

Process technology, materials 686 191 163Electronics, information technology 395 124 115Life sciences 439 163 143Elementary particles 89 30 27Marine science and earth science 158 74 65Minerals and water resources 70 25 21Energy 158 62 53Environmental sciences and technologies 264 114 103Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 124 71 65Production technologies 206 76 60Urbanization and construction 60 18 17Communication technologies 133 40 33Space 104 39 30Transports 202 67 60Medicine (medical care and health) 300 179 167Total 3388 1273 1122Return rate 38% 88%

set of consulted experts) was systematically higher than in Germany, across the 15technological fields.

However, one questionnaire proved impossible to apply after a series of initialtests: the list of items related to “culture and lifestyle.” In that case, the French expertsexpressed a very strong reluctance to deal with questions considered as “typicallyJapanese” and sometimes “absurd.” The problem arose not only with topics such as“cosmetics specially suited to Japanese skin” or “prediction and prevention systemsagainst earthquakes.” Foresighting the possibility of artificial babysitting through “thedevelopment of baby nursing systems (robots) capable of memorizing the specific charac-teristics of mothers” was felt irrelevant (and maybe sociologically incorrect) in theFrench—and also the German—context. Such a cultural rejection shows also how diffi-cult it is to reduce complex sociological issues to their sole technological aspects, evenwhen the analytical approach of technological foresight seems to recommend it.

Except for this 16th questionnaire, the Japanese (and German) Delphi has beenentirely reproduced, with very marginal adaptations, and proposed to a set of Frenchexperts. The first important task was the selection of the sample of experts. For a largepart, the ministry used its own databases, operated by the Directorate of ScientificInformation. To a lesser extent, SOFRES1 and BETA contributed to the list of expertsin specific fields or types of experts. The main sources were Telelab for academic researchand France Technologie for industrial expertise. The sample was finally set up withthe following structure: 45% for industry, 30% for public research (non-university)organizations, and 25% for university. This structure fits the French research systemrelatively well—reflecting for instance the specific weight of public research outsideuniversity, which is a natural peculiarity. Furthermore, the overall response rate of 33%(end result compared to send-outs in the first round) happened to be roughly the samefor the three categories, and therefore no important bias was introduced at that level.

1 The consultancy institute SOFRES was selected to handle the questionnaires but also to help the processof setting up the sample of experts.


Up to that point, for the technical aspects, the exercise must be counted a success.The failures were revealed only in the further later stages, mainly because of the lackof continuity in the political will of the ministry for implementing the logical continuationof the foresight procedure, i.e., publishing and debating the results in large circles ofactors and citizens. The change of government during the project’s life, the complexpower system of the ministry (MESR-DGRT) itself, and maybe the competition withthe Ministry of Industry for the technological foresight studies are factors accountingfor the premature stopping. It is only thanks to a limited number of spin-offs, like theregional experience of Bordeaux, that the whole operation has not resulted in a plainwaste of public money (and of experts’ time).

It is worthwhile to examine a series of criticisms of the results expressed duringthe experience or at public presentations. We think these remarks do not lead to arejection of such experiences, but, potentially, to better qualification of the method.

Let us first consider the already mentioned reluctance of the French experts todeal with topics and questions formulated by a foreign panel of experts, and specificallyJapanese panels, which was felt to be a very different economic and cultural environment.And contrary to Germany, it was not one of the goals to confront the national expertswith “visions from Japan.” Our only comment will be to stress the fact that such anexternal starting point for a national debate is at the same time an advantage and adrawback. One should remember that it is more advantageous when the foresight projectis conceived closer to the “scanning” than to the “monitoring” edge of the potentialscope of the exercise (when the aim is to browse large lists of potentially interestingtopics instead of focusing on pre-supposed national debates).

Specialists of statistical studies have contested the validity of the results calculatedby straightforward aggregation of individual opinions. The argument is rather fundamen-tal, and aims at the very principle of the Delphi method. But a possible improvementexists, and has been tested, by using different weights for the individual opinions, derivedfrom the self-evaluation of expertise on each topic. At least by such a procedure onecan avoid summing up opinions of clearly different values. Another criticism has beenraised, seemingly more topical, concerning the legitimacy of the initial sample of experts:what is exactly the validity of a ministry’s address book used as a sample representingthe national scientific community? We want to remark here that such an argumentwould not be opposed in the case of a private foresight experience, because in this casethe list of the participants is given by definition: the members of the organization itselfor the precise network of actors under review. It is a serious problem indeed if oneconsiders a public Delphi as an inquiry for anticipating “the future” and if one hopesto find it in the brains of a selected set of “experts.” Such an approach would be certainlyrather naive. But as long as Delphi is considered as a collective strategic procedure forimproving communication and starting debates, that problem is not too serious. Fromour point of view, the preceding argument adds to the critique of the Delphi experienceperformed once and without systematic follow ups: it has a relatively weak value as anisolated inquiry and needs an implementation phase.

A lot of experts did not feel at ease with the nature of certain topics. One importantlack seems to be the technological bias of the questionnaire: topics should have beenmore systematically linked with economic (and societal) aims or circumstances. InFrance, furthermore, that purely technological point of view was often related to theJapanese origin of the questionnaire. Another source of difficulties lies in the non-systemic approach of the Delphi method: experts are asked to deal with topics indepen-dently and there is no room for the description of frame conditions. For instance, it


TABLE 2Consensus in Priority and Timing between France and Germany; Case of Field 1

“Process Technology and Materials”

Degree of Degree of Year of Year ofimportance importance realization realization

French German France GermanyTopic experts experts mediana median

(shortened title) (Index) (Index) (Q1–Q3) (Q1–Q3)

Practical use of signal responsive 81 97 2004 2004missile drugs (against tumor cells) (2001–2007) (1999–2008)

Practical use of semi, or all, synthetic 80 86 2003 2000materials for organ implants (2000–2007) (1996–2003)(with no rejection)

Development of superconductive 79 87 2005 2003materials at ordinary temperature (2000–2012) (2007–2019)

Elucidation of biocompatibility between 78 92 2005 2004materials and human tissues (2002–2009) (2001–2010)

Practical use of rechargeable high 75 90 2005 2009capacity polymer batteries (2002–2009) (2006–2014)

a In Delphi surveys, often the percentiles are given: the Median M shows at which time 50% of the expertsexpect a realization, the lower quartile Q1 represents the 25% and the upper quartile Q2 the 75% point.

was frequently observed that people with very good expertise had difficulties to expresstime forecasts about the realization of technological achievements, because of the multi-ple scenarios they had in mind. That is an additional critique of Delphi when it is notfollowed or complemented by other analytical methods. But it should also be notedthat the French culture of prospective tends to favor methods of scenarios rather thanDelphi: instead of looking for consensus about big trends, specialists of foresight tendto think in terms of contrasting but internally coherent scenarios.

A last problem concerning the logical status of the questions must be emphasized.Many experts stressed the missing normative dimension. For certain technological inno-vations, instead of answering on the probability of occurrence, they would have preferredto give their opinion on the desirability. To a certain extent, the actual responses reflecta mix of probability and desirability and in such a case it is even worse: the observercannot sort out the different aspects. Once again, the real complete foresight processshould be one in which actors collectively determine possible and desirable futures(futuribles). The fear that a misuse of the Delphi procedure can lead to a deterministicand passive approach of the future must not be overlooked.

One last remark on the French Delphi concerns the possibility of internationalcomparisons. The following example illustrates the interesting use of exercises repeatedin several countries for testing the coherence and diversity of opinions about futuretechnological trends. Broad convergence of opinions, as observed, is a result that con-firms the validity of the method in a certain way, reassuring the actors and users bysuggesting that experts do not answer at random and seem to live on the same planet!Slight national biases in the general results as well as strong differences on specifictopics are nevertheless observed, thereby constituting interesting facts to be interpreted.

Table 2 provides a comparison between the French and German surveys for thefirst field of the inquiry, devoted to processes and materials. This list of topics intersectthe 10 (respectively 11) ranked most “important” in France and in Germany. Since theglobal list proposes 108 topics, having five in this intersection proves a real convergence


on research priorities. On looking at the respective average years of realization, arelatively similar forecast of timing of discoveries and innovations can also be concluded.

The repetition of the same Delphi in three different countries gives a uniqueopportunity to compare experts’ opinions and then to position one country’s expertiseand stakes vis-a-vis the international context (see also [9] for a larger-scale comparisonof Japan and Germany). Such a positive contribution partly compensates for the disad-vantage of importing a foreign questionnaire.

FRENCH SURVEY ON KEY TECHNOLOGIES

The French survey on critical technologies (Les 100 technologies cles) has a muchmore focused objective than Delphi. Three sorts of questions are underlying the exerciseundertaken by the Ministry of Industry: (a) Which are the important technologies forthe French industry?; (b) What is the national (and European) leadership in thesefields?; and (c) Where must the efforts be placed?

There were no a priori restrictions in the technological or sectoral scope of thestudy (except for the military area, for which specific foresight studies are performedby the Ministry of Defense), but the time horizon was relatively short for a technologyforesight study: a maximum of 10 to 15 years. The technologies considered in this studyshould not be potential but actual—existing or in development for industrial applicationin the next years. Furthermore, the project explicitly aimed at crossing two complemen-tary approaches: the autonomous dynamics of science and the technology needs ex-pressed by the market.

The practical aim of the survey’s publication was to help firms draw a best represen-tation of their own technological priorities through a precise and relevant anticipationof the evolution of the environment. And, as a strategic tool for the administration,the study should lead to an improved definition and implementation of technology policy.

The methodology used in this project was very pragmatic: setting up and conveninggroups of 10 to 20 experts representing the most important and influential actors of theFrench R&D system. In a relatively short time (November 1993 to June 1994), eachgroup dealt with a specific field either of “technology-pushed” innovations or of “market-pulled” technologies. They should provide a workable list of critical technologies forFrench industry, each technology having then to be described and assessed in thenational context. The approach is very similar to that used in the “German Technologiesat the Beginning of the 21st Century” (for an abridged version see [11]).

The first step of the project dealt with the selection criteria. The “importance” ofany technology had to be evaluated in a proper way, reflecting the various possibleviewpoints (professions, types of actors, etc.), but also leading to a large consensus. Thesteering committee set up by the Ministry selected nine criteria:

• Actual and potential markets• impact on foreign trade• social and cultural acceptability• impact on competitiveness• vulnerability in terms of industrial dependence• conbribution to national needs, like energy, environment, health,• type of connection with the national industry• diffusion capacity in the national industry• a synthetic assessment of “competitiveness.”


The Ministry would have liked to have added a criterion related to employmentbut the committee considered it to be too difficult to implement in an indisputable way.

The second step used the above criteria to identify the technologies. Five groupsof experts dealt with the job on the following fields of science and technology pushinginnovative trends: life sciences; information technology; energy; organizational andmanagerial techniques; processes and materials. Five other groups worked on the de-mand side: health and environment; services and communication; transportation systems;consumer goods; housing and infrastructures. At the end of this stage, 136 technologieswere selected.

The third step consisted of assessing the French (and European) position for eachtechnology. The position concerned industrial competitiveness as well as scientific lead-ership. The evaluation was realized between December 1994 and March 1995 on thebasis of bibliometric studies, patents analysis, and interviews with experts. Some practicalinformation was also collected in this stage: on markets, actors, cooperations, R&Dprograms, etc.

The fourth step intended to characterize the critical technologies for France interms of: distinctive capacities, attractiveness, and success conditions. At the end of thislast stage, no more than 105 technologies were still labeled “critical” for France (butthe whole set of 136 is described in the report). For each technology, the publicationby the Ministere de l’Industrie [5] gives a short description and a ranking of the degreeof development (for the technology itself and for its industrial application), the relativescientific leadership and the industrial competitiveness of France and Europe. A lot ofother information is available at the Ministry for each technology, like competitivesolutions, existing research programs, skills and professions that are concerned, charac-teristics of the markets, conditions for acquisition in terms of investments and humanresources, addresses of suppliers, etc.

The great impact and success of that foresight exercise has been achieved thanksto its deliberately pragmatic approach, but also through the institutional setting:

• Political power and budget endowment were sufficient to go through the wholeprocess of foresight and diffusion of the results;

• the legitimacy of the exercise and the enforcement of the implicit policy orienta-tions were considerably reinforced by the economic power of the Ministry ofIndustry: announcing the industrial research subsidies program to be reorientedalong the grid of the “hundred critical technologies” proved to be decisive forthe success of the whole exercise.

A good illustration of the successful strategy of the Ministry of Industry is theevolution of the regional foresight experience started by the science park organizationBordeaux Technopolis. At the beginning, the Delphi organized by the Ministry ofHigher Education and Research was taken as a basis (or starting point) for the regionalprocess. The final-stage results of the national Delphi were used as a sort of first roundfor the regional experts’ consultation. The specificity of the regional survey consistedin supplementary questions about the local context on every topic and a few new topicsproposed by the experts themselves.

Before the end of the project, the results of the Critical Technologies survey wererevealed and Bordeaux Technopolis realized the potential benefit that could be derivedfrom linking the regional Delphi with the newly published list of critical technologies.


The motivation of experts and actors of the regional arena was significantly enhancedby this new approach, which was more demand-oriented and explicitly embedded inthe incentive system of the administration.

Foresight in Spain

OVERVIEW

In Spain, for historical reasons the political and economic power is still relativelyconcentrated in the capital Madrid, and in few other traditionally industrialized areaslike Catalonia and Euskadi. The Spanish R&D system consists of many specific field-oriented R&D centers on the state level and very few on the private company level.The public R&D budget is coordinated by the CICYT (Comision Interministerial deCiencia y Technologıa), mainly financed through the different ministries and theirdepartments (Direcciones Generales) [12]. One point of criticism was and still is thatthere is not enough coordination between the actors in the system. A national plan(Plan Nacional de Investigacion Cientifıca y Desarollo Tecnologica) starting in 1988was supposed to overcome this deficit. There are also attempts to decentralize R&Din the different institutions [12].

In Spain, there were only very few foresight activities since the 1980s. After countrieslike Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and others started larger activities,a Spanish foresight program followed in 1995. The first phase was carried out bythe Agencia Nacional de Evaluacion y Prospectiva (ANEP), which is a governmentalinstitution. The aims of the first phase were to:

1. Develop awareness of previous foresight-related work in Spain;2. develop awareness of observation methods (e.g., R&D indicators) as well as

foresight methods;3. identify the main actors involved;4. promote the involvement of public and private sector bodies, and5. carry out pilot studies in four areas [13].

The first purpose was to conduct a comparative analysis of the different foresightmethods, topics, and international experiences. The results were discussed with R&Dprogram managers, researchers, and industrialists. Four studies using the Delphi ap-proach were carried out in the fields of optics, mobile communications, advanced materi-als, and advanced multimedia services. They were prepared by a steering group.

In the first phase of the Spanish foresight program, different methods were lookedat in order to find out the most appropriate fitting for Spain. The purpose of foresightin Spain was to:

• Identify the limits of foresight;• establish a scale of possible times for realization;• describe alternatives and options; and• develop technology strategies.

Table 3 describes the different technology foresight studies since the mid-1980s.Methods like extrapolations, indicators, methods based on logical deductions, and proba-bility methods as well as the Delphi method, the relevance tree, maps with multidimen-sional scaling, patent analysis, and patent classifications were looked at. Analyzing andcomparing international studies as well as different approaches, some specific fieldswere identified as relevant, and conclusions for Spain were drawn [14].


TABLE 3Science and Technology Foresight Approaches in Spain

Year Project Agency Method

1985 Actual tendencies in chemistry CAICYT-CSIC Seminar1986 Prospectives in geo-sciencesa CAICYT-CSIC Meetings1987 The future of food FAST-CSIC Workshop1987 Prospectives in physics ANEP-CSIC Bibliometric

and economic1987 Prospectives in oceanography CAICYT-CSIC Meetings1991–1992 Perspectives of the development Fundesco-INEM Delphi

of the labor markets in Spainuntil 1996

1992 Construction 2000 SEOPAN Expert-panel–scenarios

1993 Catalonia at the Horizon of 2010 Institut Catala d’Estudis Trends-scenariosMediterranis

1994 Analysis of the treatment of inno- Fundacion COTEC Bibliometricvation technologies in Spain

Sources: [14, 15].a Prospectives is a concept of an open, non-deterministic view of the future, which is mainly used in the

French foresight approaches.

A so-called program marco was also set up which should help to set priorities [13]in the fields of:

• Information technologies, communications;• the infrastructure of European transport;• the elimination of competitive barriers;• the formation of new technologies; and• the adaptation of the capacities of technologies and the industry.

SPANISH DELPHI SURVEY

More detailed studies using the Delphi method were conducted in some of thefields mentioned above. Before a large Delphi survey started, according to the program,a Delphi on the future of multimedia services [16] with 38 topics and 14 participants(53 questionnaires sent out) was conducted. The Spanish Delphi study was part of theforesight program and dealt with the chosen scientific-technological directions. Thestudy was conducted in 1996/97 in two rounds by a group for studies in social trends.This group consisted of professors from various universities in cooperation with someacademics of the social sciences, the Foundations Ramon Areces and ONCE, and theUNICAJA y la Caja de Ahorros de Extremadura [17]. This Delphi study was startedwith the following objectives [17]:

1. To determine the major tendencies of scientific-technological innovations duringthe next year;

2. to examine in which segments major future innovations will take place;3. to assess the importance which experts attibute to these foreseen innovations; and4. to evaluate the major consequences and future impact of these innovations.

In this Delphi study, 123 experts from universities and from technology-orientedcompanies participated (Table 4). Forty-nine percent of the experts came from universi-ties, 14% from R&D-related institutions, 22% from companies, and 15% from other


TABLE 4Basic Statistics of the Spanish Delphi Report

Total TotalQuestionnaires responses responses Response

Questionnaire sent out (first round) (second round) rate (%)

Information and communication 44 24 22 50.0Robotics 42 26 25 59.5Biogenetics 37 26 25 67.6Total 123 76 72 58.5

Sources: [16, 17]

organizations. Looking at the participants per field, it must be stressed that they arevery few compared to other Delphi studies. In the first round, the major focus of thesurvey was on the time of realization: the accuracy of the forecast, the possible year ofrealization, and the importance (ratings from 1 to 5). Space for remarks was also given.Then, it was asked which are the three major innovations for the next years, which arethe major impacts for individuals, and which are the consequences or impacts for society.In the second round, according to the Delphi method the answers and a feedback ofthe comments were given to re-evaluate and comment, again.

A comparison with the 1993 topics of the fifth Japanese Delphi study in informationand communications followed (only times of realization) and was also done with theBritish Delphi (telecommunications), and the French (importance and time of realiza-tion). In biogenetics, a comparison with the fifth Japanese and German Delphi ’93 ismade for specific topics, and provides further information for interested Spanish experts.Five scenarios for the future are drawn.

The results of the Delphis study are used to draw some scenarios for the futureas seen from the present stage of development. Most of the technologies are supposedto be realized between 2001 and 2010. The tendencies in the different fields are alsodescribed in the report [17]. The information can be used by interested persons fromuniversities or companies.

Comparing the Spanish point of view with international views on future tendencies,it can be noted that there is a large coincidence. As ANEP and other organizations areforcing and supporting foresight activities, there will be other studies in the future. Theapproaches are still new, so that nothing can be said about an implementation, yet.

Foresight in Italy

OVERVIEW

Until 1990, foresight in Italy was mainly based on small-scale approaches devotedto specific technologies. They are conducted to provide strategic information especiallyfor small and medium companies which are the main motor of Italian industry. The Italiantechnology policy is very much influenced by the division of the country into the “richer”northern part with its high economic potential, banks, trade, many R&D institutions etc.,and the “poorer” southern part with less economic power, high unemployment rates, anda lower standard of living. Since the 1980s, the modernization process in Italy has beenaccelerated by process and product improvements, technology imports, and internationalcooperations especially in the high technology fields.

Traditionally, the different Italian actors in R&D act independently and do notbelong to public networks. The actors are mainly the universities, the National Research


Council (CNR) and its institutions, the institutions in big sciences, the public companies,industry, and the research centers of state holdings [12]. It is often claimed that thecooperation between universities and industry is not sufficiently developed [12].

Lanzavecchia [18] gives a short overview on approaches using indicators, extrapola-tions, or scenarios. In the 1990s, especially inspired by the United States’ approachesto search for “National Critical Technologies” [19], some Italian studies on the technol-ogy of the future were conducted [18]. These studies are not only devoted to technologicalaspects but also considered political, social, environmental, and labor aspects. Someforecasting studies explicitly deal with societal problems or the economy.

ITALIAN “NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH”

One recent study is looked at in more detail. It is called “National Priorities forIndustrial Research” [20] (complete report: [21]). The method applied is adopted fromthat of the German study. “Technology at the Beginning of the 21st Century” (T21),conducted by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research [10]. Threestages of the project were defined [20]:

1. Selection and classification of the emerging technologies;2. definition of the criticality/priority criteria; and3. application of the “criticality/priority” criteria to the selected emerging technolo-

gies. The classification of the technologies was directly adopted from the GermanT21 study.

The purpose of the Italian project was to create a suitable basis for public bodiesto make selective choices of strategies and programs, supported by a realistic and widelyshared assessment of their impact on Italy’s economic and social system. The skills ofexperts in the field of industrial research together with those of university lecturers andresearchers from public agencies were used, and a large pool of experts was involvedin the complex consultation procedure [20]. This foresight process is mainly seen as aninstrument for formulating technology policies, not to forecast single trajectories. Theprocess is not seen as a neutral one but depending on the interests of the variousoperators within the technical and scientific system. The above mentioned structure ofthe Italian R&D system is well represented by the participants of the study: TheFondazione Rosselli is located in Milano and most of the experts were also from thenorth of Italy. The Fondazione Rosselli, an independent research institute, sees itselfas a forum for comparison and debate on potentially opposing points of view.

A set of criteria was defined to assess the technologies’ chances and weaknesses.The criteria followed the fundamental questions [20]:

• What are the requirements/opportunities in the economic and social domains withwhich the new technologies will be faced (or to which they will have to respond)?

• What are Italy’s strengths and weaknesses as regards taking advantage of thenew technologies’ potential and acquiring assets that can be compared with thoseof other countries?

• What advances have been made in the scientific knowledge required to developthe new technologies?

• What are Italy’s strengths and weaknesses as regards her capacity to take advan-tage of scientific potential, in comparison with other countries?

• What are the costs and how great are the scientific and technological resourcesrequired to obtain the forecasted economic and social benefits from the new tech-nology?


Characteristics of the technologies could be:

• The fundamental requirements of the country;• the effects on the national (industrial) production system; and• the intrinsic relevance.

As indicators were chosen:

• Growth of employment;• the expansion and diversification of the industrial system;• the quality of the environment;• health;• cultural and social progress.

With reference to the effects on the national systems, the following were alsoexamined what impact the technology will have on international competitiveness (costs,services); on the industrial structure (sector mix, company size etc.); on dependence onforeign strategic resources, and on Italy’s position in the international division of labor.The indicators for intrinsic relevance were:

• All-embracing and generic nature;• size of the final market (niche or not); and• specialization and intensity of the fields of application.

For the feasibility concerning state-run research and industrial research indicatorslike the costs of R&D and programs for the future, researcher skills and the quality ofresearch in progress, total human resources, the technological infrastructure for R&D,technological transfers between state research and industrial innovation, and the nationalcompetitive position were looked at. Further indicators were community programs,inter-company agreements, and the international distribution of competencies. Applyingthese criteria, a synthetic diagram was drawn for each technology. The list of technologiesand its structure [20] is very similar to that of the German list of technologies at thebeginning of the 21st century [10]; for the sake of brevity it is not reproduced here.

For every technological area, the subfields and their present situation are described.The eight stages in the innovation process are defined as in the German T21 project[10], which range from I Initial exploratory research carried out in scientific institutesover III Fully developed research with first technical creations and/or prototypes toVIII Distribution in and penetration of differentiated markets, industrial R&D activityof less importance (for details see [20, 21]). For each technological family of the techno-logical areas the present stage of innovation was defined and the innovation stage inthe year 2004 estimated. The tables look like the example in Table 5.

For each technological family, the above mentioned criteria were also appliedqualitatively; e.g. for biomaterials the increase in business is expected to be medium,the environmental quality low, the impact on international competitiveness high, theexpenditure levels in R&D and programs on the future in Italy low, researcher skillsand quality of research progress medium for state research and high for industrialresearch, the national position medium and soon (all tables are found in [20]).

For every technological area some conclusions are drawn, for instance, on technol-ogy policy or market strategies. The major conclusions for technology policy in generalare that it has to be:


TABLE 5Biomaterials

Technologies/stages

Biomaterials I II III IV V VI VII VIII

Polymers # *Metals # *Ceramics # *Composites # *Biointeractives # *

# Stage today.* Stage in 2004.Source: [20]

• Selective, namely it must concentrate resources;• aimed mainly at emerging critical technologies;• based on an international vision of both emerging technological opportunities

and the actual possibilities of their being used by Italian industry; and• two-dimensional (at least in concept), with a “technological” dimension (the

main one) and a “sectoral” dimension, even if there must be strong interactionbetween the two in the sense that the choice of priority technologies is made takinginto account possible applications in current and future sectors of Italian industry.

Specific recommendations (guidelines) for Italy are to:

• Strengthen structures for technological transfer;• stimulate universities and their collaboration in research with industry;• stimulate businesses to get involved in technical/scientific collaboration with

universities and public research bodies; and• give strategic perspective to the initiatives relating to set up scientific and technol-

ogy parks.

Providing this kind of information for technology policy was one of the main aimsof the study. As there is no centralized program, the application and the use of theresults cannot easily be evaluated because it takes place inside the decentralized ItalianR&D system.

ConclusionsIn France, Spain, and Italy, foresight activities have reached a new dimension.

Although some of the countries had experiences in short- and medium-term foresight,they now started to look into the longer-term future with more holistic approaches.The first step of starting foresight has already been taken. But the foresight activitiesin the above mentioned countries still need more experience in the application of allkinds of methodology and in the implementation of the knowledge about the futureinto strategic activities.

As we have seen, a lot of different methodologies have been tested recently in France,Spain, and Italy. These experiences are the expression of the will to learn (or revisit) thelarge set of existing technology foresight tools, but also to respond to various objectives;from scanning possible future opportunities in a very large scope of fields, to monitoringmedium-term evolution of the national industrial specializations. It is not surprising tofind similar experiences in the different countries, for instance Delphi approaches oflong-term science and technology trends, and “critical technology” surveys for settingthe national priorities for industry. But it seems that most countries have given aparticular weight to the latter sort of “monitoring” activity.


Besides the aim of selecting national priorities, another very important role assigned tothese experiences is clearly to trigger learning effects in the whole research and innovationsystem. Private as well as public actors are expected to train strategic thinking, to exchangeinformation, and then to build a common understanding of the possible futures.

The methods used depend very much on culture, technology policy approaches,and the R&D system but also on the promotion by the different actors. If muchcommunication is planned, the Delphi method seems to be convenient, but only ifpublications are diffused and follow-up activities take place. In other cases, panel ap-proaches fit much better into the landscape. The different countries still need their owntesting and decisions.

Beyond global convergence in objectives and methods, national specificities canbe stressed. For instance, Italy was more interested in developing surveys on criticaltechnologies with the specific intent to inform and stimulate small and medium enter-prises. Spain wanted to study and experience a relatively large scope of methods. Franceconducted two very different foresight projects at the same time, in the specific contextof two different ministries—one more experimental on long-term perspectives, with thepossibility of international comparisons, and the other on technological developmentsinteresting the French industry in the relatively short term.

Very new are also concerted foresight activities which need a large communicationeffort but save other resources and omit national biases in a globalized world. The newconcepts are not only used to look into the future or to make forecasts, but to stimulatethe country-wide communication about the future, to set priorities, and to find the pathsfor the future. Although the future is unknown, action or nonaction at present willinfluence it.

References1. STI Review 17, OECD, Paris, France, 1996.2. Office of Science and Technology (OST): Science and Technology Indicators. Economica, Paris, France,

1998.3. Quevreux, A.: Les dynamiques technologiques pour l’an 2010 en France (l’approche par enquete Delphi),

STI Review 17, OECD, Paris, France, 1996.4. Ministry of Higher Education and Research: Enquete sur les Technologies du Futur par la Methode Delphi,

Ministere de l’Enseignement Superieur et de la Recherche (DGRT), Paris, France, April–May 1995.5. Ministere de l’Industrie (DGSI): Les 100 Technologies Cles pour l’Industrie Francaise a l’Horizon 2000.

Paris, France, 1996.6. Gordon, T. J., and Helmer, O.: Report on a Long Range Forecasting Study, No. P-2982. The Rand Corp.,

Santa Monica, CA, 1964.7. Berger, G.: Etapes de la Prospective. P.U.F., Paris, France, 1967.8. Masse, P.: Le Plan ou l’Anti-hasard. Gallimard, Paris, 1965.9. Cuhls, K., and Kuwahara, T.: Outlook for Japanese and German Future Technology, Comparing Technology

Forecast Surveys. Physica. Heidelberg, Germany, 1994.10. Grupp, H., ed.: Technologie am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. Schriftenreihe des Fraunhofer-Instituts fur

Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung. Vol. 3. Physica, Heidelberg, Germany, 1993.11. Grupp, H.: Technology at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management

4(6), 379–409 (1994).12. Grupp, H., and Schnoring, T., eds.: Forschung und Entwicklung fur die Telekommunikation, Internationaler

Vergleich mit zehn Landern. Vol. 2. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 1991.13. European Commission, eds.: Technology Foresight in Europe: Results and Perspectives. TSER/ETAN-

Workshop, Brussels, Belgium, 1996.14. Pereda, J. A. M., Castaner, L., Vazquez, L., and Presmanes, B.: Analisis de Metodos de Prospectiva y su

Aplicacion internacional. ANEP, Spain, 1995.15. Cabrera, J. A., Castaner, L., Jimenez, F., Presmanes, B., and Vazquez, L.: S&T Foresight Exercise in Spain.

Madrid, Spain, 1997.16. Martinez, J. P., and Martin, L. C.: Escenario Futuro de los Servicios Avanzados Multimedia. Estudio Delphi

de los sucesos relevantes. Estudio des Mercado, CITAM, Madrid, Spain, 1995.


17. Tezanos, J. F., Diaz, J. A., Morales, R. S., and Lopez, A.: Grupo de Estudio sobre Tendencias Sociales:Estudio Delphi Sobre Tenencias Scientifico Tecnologicas en Espana. Editorial Sistema, Madrid, Spain, 1997.

18. Lanzavecchia, G.: Technology Foresight: A Survey. Expert Group Meeting on Technology Forecasting andForesight Activities. Beyond Latin America 2000 [Manuscript]. Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 1996.

19. Office of Science and Technology (OST): National Critical Technologies Report. OST, Washington, DC,1995.

20. Rosselli Fondazione, ed.: National Priorities for Industrial Research. Synthesis, Turin, Italy, 1996.21. Roveda, C. ed.: Le Priorita Nazionali della Ricerca Industriale. Milano, Italy, 1996.

Received 14 January 1998; accepted 19 February 1998

Documents

Current Foresight Activities in France, Spain, and Italy