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Democratic Middle East, US unrealistic dream
The Middle East has been an important focus of American foreign policy since the end of
World War II, and a crucial one since 9/11. The American government has been aiming to bring
democracy to the Middle East especially since 9/11. The events of 9/11 led to the war in Iraq to
take out the oppressive dictator; Saddam Hussain and transform it to a democracy. Iraq is not the
only country targeted by the American initiatives in promoting democracy in the region, as
governmental and non-governmental organizations have been working in several Arab countries
in democratic initiatives through American intervention in reforms, civil rights doctrines and
support of opposition parties.
Although the United States has been investing in the creation of democratic ideas in the
Middle East, it is my thesis that the US aim of bringing democracy to the Middle East is
unrealistic. In order to support my claim, I shall first examine the initiatives taken by the United
States, providing criticism to the effectiveness of these initiatives. Second, I will examine the
United States’ foreign policy acts which provide a more clear insight to the real interests of the
United States, which are on basis of American security and personal gains, and not for the sake
of democracy. Third, the American actions towards the Middle East since World War II have
created a hatred and resentment towards the United States. Ever since, a suspicion of America
and any American affiliated programs has been rising in the Arab world, which has the potential
to incapacitate relations with the Arab countries even in the case of democratic change; such
change would not necessarily promote US interests.
American initiatives to promote democracy in the Middle East
The first objective of this paper is to provide criticism of the American initiatives in
promoting democracy in the Middle East. Since the events of 9/11, the Bush administration has
been pursuing a “new world order” and the US declared its support for self-determination. There
were two main channels, in which the United States government operated in order to support this
initiative: the first channel involved the usage of soft power, including programs for civil rights
doctrines and support of opposition parties and on the streets through scholarships and societal
movement towards democratic ideals. The second channel involved hard power as the United
States decided to go into Iraq in order to maintain security and in order free Iraq from the
oppressive authoritarian regime and to protect democracy; as the United States believed that Iraq
would shift towards democracy as soon as Saddam Hussain was exterminated.
Soft power
Under the Bush administration, many programs were launched in order to inject
democratic ideals. Programs such as Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Broader
Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) were launched under the Bush administration. The US
also sponsored projects including programmes on judicial reform and support and training for
journalists; civic education and human rights awareness; school curricula and educational
exchanges and vote education. These programs were good programs in order to provide
American support to the democratic ideals, mostly not by direct actions towards the perspective
governments but by influencing the country from within, as people would argue, that a change, a
democratic or other, should come from within. In order for democracy to get a clear shape, so a
democratic change should come from the people themselves in order for them to know how to
determine their own country’s faith under Bush’s self-determination preaches.
The programs were a good step initially to introduce few basic democratic ideals, but not
an effective change in governmental systems. The MEPI and BMENA have carried out projects
that are very similar to already existing ones from the Clinton administration and” while these
pre-existing projects may have made important contributions, they have clearly not provided a
major impetus for reform.1 These programs have beem promoting democratic cultures and less
focues less on institutional reforms2. The second problem with these programs is the limitation in
funding. An example could be the programs supported by the US which provides support
journalists and opposition parties but lack funding, political support, and mainly protection, not
just training as the MEPI and BMENA initially do The failure in this sector could be traced back
to the disappearances of political activists and journalists during the first0 stages of the Egyptian
revolution. Although MEPI for instance is funded by the US department of States, the funding it
provides does not match the initial ambitions of the US in a shift to democratic ideals in the
Middle East on a large scale. The approach of the US suggests that monarchies have been less
vulnerable to demands for regime change. 3 “… MEPI and BMENA partnership initiatives… did
not set out any clear steps by which their proposed projects would be linked to the desired
outcome of the executive giving up power.”4
1 Dalacoura, Katerina. "US Democracy Promotion In The Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique." International Affairs: 963-979. 966
2 Azam, Muhammad , and Sagheer Ahmed Khan. "American Democracy promotion in the Arabian gulf." 11. 86
3 Cammett, Melani, and Ishac Diwan. "Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings." A Political Economy of the Middle East. 411
4 Dalacoura, Katerina 957
Hard power
One of the backlashes of 9/11 was the war in Iraq in 2003. The Bush administration
decided to invade Iraq as part of its counter-terrorism agenda and support for self-determination.
The Bush administration believed invasion of Iraq was essential for both protection of US
security and democracy. The US intended to take action against the threats made by Saddam
Hussain concerning the usage of weapons of mass destruction, and also against the crimes of the
authoritarian regime in Iraq against its own people.
By the end of March 2003, the Bush administration made its decision to go into Iraq. The
first step in the invasion was stepping into Iraq on March 20, 2003, according to (ARITLCE2)
with force of 130,000 American and 25,000 British troops. The decision to use such small unit of
troops was concluded from the assumption that the Iraqi military would put up little resistance;
which proved successful as Baghdad fell after sixteen days on April 5, 2003. The US military
was able to predict the amount of force needed in order to invade Iraq, but the aftermath of the
invasion is what determined the future of Iraq.”… Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric
Shinseki told Congress that many more troops would be necessary, not to defeat the Iraqi army
but to stabilize Iraq following the mission. The White House disputed this assessment”5. Soon
after the fall of Saddam on April 9, 2003, looters created chaos in Baghdad, looters broke out
after the fall of Baghdad, but the US military was unable to prevent it or stop it6.
Iraq fell apart and the consequences of the invasion gave birth to insurgency. The
insurgent groups that formed in the after invasion Iraq were Sunni Muslim Arabs form one
insurgent group. Another group centers on Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslims, who comprise the majority of
5 Mockaitis, Thomas R.. The Iraq War learning from the past, adapting to the present, and planning for the future. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007. 24
6 Mockaitis, Thomas R. 25
the country’s population. Foreign insurgents—typically referred to as terrorists—constitute yet a
third group7. The emergence of insurgents is partly due to the disputes and differences among the
existing groups, but also in part due to the US lack of preparation to the aftermath of the invasion
and the reaction of the people to the invasion. Insurgency escalated due to the lack of planning
for insurgency by the US; which took months to realize its existence and the delay in
acknowledging the threat posed by insurgency allowed it to take root, making it far more
difficult to eradicate.
American security and personal gains
My second point in my argument is that the United States’ actions in the Middle East are
not for the greater good, not for democracy to form and for monarchies to collapse. The
American actions in the Middle East are solely based on the American security and personal
gains. The American government has been promoting democratic reforms, not only on the basis
of programs and scholarships as mentioned before, but also under actual governmental reforms
in order to introduce democratic systems in the government. Although there are numerous cases
where the United States have proven to improve civil rights and allowed greater political
participation, usually through elections, but in the great majority of these countries reform has
not led to a reduction of the leaders’ power.8 Nonetheless, the United States acts in the Middle
East can be distinguished to an extend to the attitude towards their strong alliance in the region,
versus their attitude towards who are presented to some extend “foes”9. In order to illustrate my
point, the paper will discuss the American democratic approaches towards their allies;
underlying the nature of the relation the United States holds with: Saudi Arabia and Egypt
7 Krepinevich, Andrew . "TheWar In Iraq: The Nature of InsurgencyWarfare." Last accessed 21, April
2014. 38 Dalacoura, Katerina 9689 Dalacoura, Katerina 968
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi-American relations are special relations in their characteristics and their
purpose. The interest of the US in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to1933 when King Abed Al
Aziz granted oil concessions to Standard Oil of California. The Saudis at a time faced the
dilemma of whether or not seek the full American support. The dilemma was based on the fact
that their neighbour countries have eyes on their oil revenues. The Saudi kingdom needed
protection as it realized its military incapability, but at the same time, a full US support could be
used by regional enemies to promote propaganda against the Saudi kingdom
The Saudi preached to receive military assistance from the US in the region but as
presented in it was not until World War II that US policymaker began to perceive strategic
interests in the Gulf area10. The Saudi kingdom purchased military equipment in great numbers
during the 1950’s and 1960’s which tied up the relations. The next increase in relations was
during the Gulf war. The Saudis supported Iraq politically and financially in the war, but were
shocked from the betrayal and the Iraqi invasion. After that, the Saudi kingdom accepted the
presence of the US military which placed Saudi in commitment to the US strategy of
confrontation with Saddam Hussain11. This marks the transition between the need for US troops
in Saudi; from their existence for Saudi security issues to US strategy. The strategic important
extended as Saudi allowed US to coordinate air wars over Afghanistan and Iraq from Saudi
stations under US control. The US and Saudi are not only militarily connected but also
economically An example which underlines the increase of the importance the Saudi regime
holds to the US government is: the deal between the US and Saudi in February 1994, as the
10 Lesch, David W.. The Middle East and the United States: history, politics, and ideologies. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012. 348
11 Lesch, David W. 352
Saudi kingdom bought $6 Billion in commercial aircraft from the US rather than European
companies, and president Clinton personally lobbied Saudi leaders to the issue. This emphasizes
not only the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia, but also their economic significance to the US.
The question which always frustrates people is: how come the strongest ally of the US in
the Gulf is an authoritarian kingdom with limited rights? How come the US still cooperates with
Saudi without strong pressure for change in the Saudi kingdom? The reason behind these
controversial actions by the US to support authoritarian regimes as they preach about democracy
and their commitment to democracies can be traced to the fact that democracy is eventually
desirable. There are concerns about democratization outcomes. It is not as the US does not want
Saudi to become a democracy, but according to the book The Stakes by Shibley Telhami “from
historical cases…even if democracy leads to more stability, transitions to democracy are often
extremely unstable and , in the end unpredictable. Rapid radical transitions from authoritarianism
to democracy in places like Saudi Arabia are likely, but were they to occur, the resulting
instability or unpredictable, outcomes, such as the possibility of a militant Islamist regime being
democratically elected, may seem even more threatening to American interests than the status
quo”12.
Egypt
The US did not only ally itself with Kingdoms such as Saudi as we discussed earlier or
Jordan or Morocco for instance. In fact, one of the closest allies of the US in the Middle East in
the past thirty years up until the Arab Spring had been Egypt. The Egyptian government, starting
with the first elected president Jamal Abed-El Nasser formed a system of a fake democracy.
12 Telhami, Shibley. The stakes America in the Middle East : the consequences of power and the choice for peace. Updated with a new epilogue. ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 20042002. 160
The Egyptian system of fake democracy has been quite the same during the eras of
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. The focus of this paper will be on the Sadat and Mubarak eras as the
US relations grew stronger in those years, versus the years of Nasser where he was closer to the
Soviets. During the era of Sadat, he introduced multi-party elections and economic liberalization
measures such as “Infitah” which encouraged foreign investment and introduced private
enterprise13. Nonetheless, as soon as opposition parties started to gain power and challenge his
power and authority, he cracked down on the groups arrested political opposition members
including leftists, Islamists and Nsserists. He also banned several of them such as the New Wafd
and the National Progressive Unionist Party.
After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak stepped into power in 1981 until the revolution
in 2011. During those years, Mubarak presented a vision in perusing political liberalization,
establishing a free media, fair party politics and independent judiciary14. The US promotion to
democracy during Mubarak’s rule produced some result, such as Mubarak’s reformation of his
own political party, the National Democracy Party, and the introduction of multi-party
presidential elections.
The Mubarak presidency was placed on three key elements: the first was consolidation of
his power, the second was increase military capabilities and the third was increase the public
sector to boost the economy15. Even though it seems on the surface that Mubarak seek
democratic transition, he still repressed anyone who challenged him as well. Mubarak’s
democratic movement was as the “symbolic political liberalization measures”16. When the new
13 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. "The Limited Impact of the USA on Political Liberalization in Egypt during the Mubarak Era." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11: 48. 214 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5015 Owen, Roger. The rise and fall of Arab presidents for life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012. 6716 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 50
coalition of the Islamic Alliance and the Socialist Labour party and the liberal Party; which
represented the Muslim Brotherhood emerged, Mubarak slowed down political liberalization.
Also, increasing terrorist attacks by Islamists during the 1990s forced Mubarak to revert to
previous repressive policies17.
Since the presidency of Sadat, and under the fake democracy, Egypt was still one of the
most important US allies in the region. In fact, the US supported the Egyptian military and
helped it keep control of opposition groups and maintain control and stability to the government.
“as a result of its positive role in the peace process, geo-political situation and strategic
significance in the region, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of the US foreign
assistance, receiving an annual average of close to $2 billion in economic and military aid.”18
There are 3 reasons for the US military and economic support; First, Egypt’s position was
crucial for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt was the first country to recognize
Israel post Camp David, producing an important first step towards peace and stability in the
region19. By maintain its bilateral partnership with Egypt, the US aimed to increase its influence
in the Middle East, North African and the Mediterranean regions, in the hope Egypt’s pro-
American policies would have an effect on other countries in the region. Second, Egypt was
important for the US in order to protect its oil supplies in the region and to keep using Egypt’s
airspace and Suez Canal as a transit point from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the Arabian
Sea and the Indian Ocean. Third, the US support for the Egyptian army was also a sign of
support to the government against Islamic political radicalism. Especially after 9/11, the US
believed democratization in the region in order to supress radical Islamist groups, but the US
government believed that although it supported democracy in Egypt, American-Egyptian
17 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5018 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5219 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 52
relations mainly dependent on the US’s economic and security interests which make it necessary
to have close ties with the region’s autocratic regimes.20
After we examined the US relations with its allies in the region, now I will present the US
initiative to democratic promotion in countries which are considered “foes”. In order to examine
the US nature of democratic promotion initiatives and its dependency on US interests and
security in foes countries; I will take the case of Palestine.
Palestine
One of the clearest examples of the US involvement in the Middle East only for their
personal interests and security can be observed by the treatment of the US to Hamas in the 2006
elections. The elections prove, that a democracy is wanted and perused by the US, and wanted,
but only when the democracy in hand is one that serves the interests of the United States. These
words bring a reminder to the US involvement in Iran as the CIA worked in Iran to promote a
coup d’état against the popularly elected Khomaini who was a nationalist who opposed western
interest, and brought back the authoritarian, repressive, pro-west Shah. In the case of Palestine,
Hamas was a religious nationalist liberation movement which preached the Islamic religion,
although simultaneously, its key was armed resistance to Israel. Although Hamas has a militant
sector, Hamas is also a well-organized organization which spreads its involvement to different
institutions and sectors. Hamas established welfare institutions which provided essential service
to Palestinian population including pre-school, health care, social assistance to ones in need,
support for people with mental and physical issues, and women income generating activities
(getting women involved in the economy), care of orphans, and youth and sport activities.
Although Hamas has an Islamic front, anyone was welcomed in their facilities. Hamas ultimately
20 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan.53
pursues “Islamization” but slowly and not forcefully, as they did not oppress other religions, and
did not ban alcohol for instance.
In the 2006 elections, Hamas did not expect much and decided to participate to gain as
much seats as they could. Prior to the elections, the failure of the PLO and the corruption within
it the people started noticing, because of the strong political approach it presented; where leaders
looked for their own interests, Fatah lost its credibility among the Palestinians, and Hams
emerged surprisingly as winners in the elections. As Hamas won the elections, the West;
primarily the US, refused to support Palestine economically unless Hamas recognized Israel and
recent agreements (Oslo), and renounce the use of fire. Hamas responded to the requests to the
West as they said they would not recognize Israel until Israel withdraws from the illegitimate
territories they hold in Palestine, but they would accept the Israeli reality. Hamas also proposed
10 years of cease fire, during which the PLO and Israel need to work on reaching agreement as
they refused to be front in the negotiations. These requests by Hamas to reach an agreement with
the West were all rejected, and they were forced out of power. Palestine was struggling through
the years to form a unified governing entity, and post-Oslo they were able to form free elections,
and even though the elections were in fact free, and the legitimate winner Hamas was denied
power, as Hamas was still recognized by the US as a terrorist group, even though Hamas tried to
reach middle ground with the West towards their legitimacy they were denied it, and were forced
out, in favour of the already corrupt Fatah. The government under Fatah was easier to negotiate
with and at least maintain a status-quo in the Israeli-Palestinian case, as where with Hamas, a
negotiation would be much harder to reach.
Arab suspicion of the US
After we finished explaining the reasons behind the unrealistic American aim to promote
democracy in the Middle East based on their insufficient programs and their attitude towards
Arab countries on the basis of US security and interest; I will now argue that, the Arab world still
has resentment to the American actions towards the Middle East, does not trust the US and is not
interested in relations with the US. That is, the people on the street, not governments.
First, it is important to note that the negative perception of the US is not unique to the
Arab and Muslim world, but it is a worldwide perception, which is shaped by US policies.
According to the International Herald Tribune in The Stakes a pull published in August 2001
found that majorities of Europeans believed that American foreign policy disregard their
interests21. Another pull, by Gallup in April 2002, found that “majorities in four European
countries expressed the view that the US does not take allied interests into account in conducting
the war on terrorism and that the US acts in its own interests in the fight against terrorism.”
These beliefs are worldwide shared, but the lack of credibility in the Middle East “lie in the US
policy towards the region over the last few decades, during which the US has frequently allied
itself with authoritarian regimes and has supported Israel against the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people.22”
The main argument of the Arab resentment is that according to Bush’s speech “They hate
what we see right in this chamber- a democratically elected government… they hate our
freedoms-our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech our freedom to vote and assemble and
disagree with each other. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a
way of life.” The notion of hatred towards “them” expanded to include all Arabs and Muslims,
not merely those who participated in the 9/11 attacks. This perception of the Arabs and Muslims
21 Telhami, Shibley 4022 Dalacoura, Katerina.972
as evil and anti-west is false. A Gallup poll released in February 2002 showed, for example that
views of the United States are more unfavourable than favourable in all but one of the nine
Muslim countries studied, while France was more unfavourable in all but two of the Muslim
countries23. Such evidence illustrates the unlikelihood of Arab hatred to “Western ideals” and is
politically centred.
Now that we proved that the Arab and Muslim resentment against the US is not based on
cultural and values differences but rather political; something that Huntington anticipated as the
“clash of civilizations” where the next mass war would be between cultures and not countries. As
we presented that such act is unlikely, it is now time to ask the question: “If the US would
succeed in promoting democracy in the Middle East, would that actually benefit the US?” real
democracy, one which is by the people, for the people, is where government is elected to
promote the interests and requests of the people. The question is now, what type of government
would it be? The Americans were concerned with a radical Muslim government in most of the
countries in the Arab world, especially the Gulf; where Islam is a stronger factor of the society
and the already governing system that a change might radicalize the country more and increase
its hostility to the US.
Those anticipated perception of democratic change in the Middle East turned into reality
in the case of Egypt. The American government could not act against the protests of the people
against Mubarak since they are entitled to supporting democracy, even against the American
ally-Mubarak. The change that occurred seemed first as secular but it was indeed took an Islamic
shape as the government which was elected was by the leadership of Mursi and the Muslim
brotherhood. The relations ever since only went downhill between the US and Egypt, and also
between Israel and Egypt. This is proof that the belief that democracies do not attack each other,
23 Telhami, Shibley 46
or at least are somewhat allies is false. A fairly elected government would serve the people, and
if the people of the country are not interested in American strong relations, regardless of the
democracy in the country, is plausible.
The United States as we have examined above has an unrealistic aim in promoting
democracy to the Middle East; The initiatives and programs which are funded by the US are
insufficient to make an actual tangible change; The US foreign policy aimed to promote
American interests and based on American security; and in case of democratic change, the
change could also be one which would not benefit the US. As far as the US is concerned “the US
will commit money and troops to support democracy only when its vital interests are affected
further reinforces the impression that democracy is a secondary goal when juxtaposed with vital
security concerns”.24
24 Dalacoura, Katerina 972
Bibliography:
- Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. "The Limited Impact of the USA on Political
Liberalization in Egypt during the Mubarak Era." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of
International Relations 11: 48.
- Azam, Muhammad , and Sagheer Ahmed Khan. "American Democracy promotion in
the Arabian gulf." 11.
- Cammett, Melani, and Ishac Diwan. "Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings." A Political Economy of the Middle East.
-
- Dalacoura, Katerina. "US Democracy Promotion In The Arab Middle East Since 11
September 2001: A Critique." International Affairs: 963-979.
- Krepinevich, Andrew . "TheWar In Iraq: The Nature of InsurgencyWarfare." Last
accessed 21, April 2014
- Lesch, David W.. The Middle East and the United States: history, politics, and
ideologies. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012.
- Mockaitis, Thomas R.. The Iraq War learning from the past, adapting to the present,
and planning for the future. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 2007.
- Owen, Roger. The rise and fall of Arab presidents for life. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Telhami, Shibley. The stakes America in the Middle East : the consequences of power
and the choice for peace. Updated with a new epilogue. ed. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 20042002.