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Democratic Middle East, US unrealistic dream The Middle East has been an important focus of American foreign policy since the end of World War II, and a crucial one since 9/11. The American government has been aiming to bring democracy to the Middle East especially since 9/11. The events of 9/11 led to the war in Iraq to take out the oppressive dictator; Saddam Hussain and transform it to a democracy. Iraq is not the only country targeted by the American initiatives in promoting democracy in the region, as governmental and non-governmental organizations have been working in several Arab countries in democratic initiatives through American intervention in reforms, civil rights doctrines and support of opposition parties. Although the United States has been investing in the creation of democratic ideas in the Middle East, it is my thesis that the US aim of bringing democracy to the Middle East is unrealistic. In order to support my claim, I shall first examine the initiatives taken by the United States, providing criticism to the effectiveness of these initiatives. Second, I will examine

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Page 1: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

Democratic Middle East, US unrealistic dream

The Middle East has been an important focus of American foreign policy since the end of

World War II, and a crucial one since 9/11. The American government has been aiming to bring

democracy to the Middle East especially since 9/11. The events of 9/11 led to the war in Iraq to

take out the oppressive dictator; Saddam Hussain and transform it to a democracy. Iraq is not the

only country targeted by the American initiatives in promoting democracy in the region, as

governmental and non-governmental organizations have been working in several Arab countries

in democratic initiatives through American intervention in reforms, civil rights doctrines and

support of opposition parties.

Although the United States has been investing in the creation of democratic ideas in the

Middle East, it is my thesis that the US aim of bringing democracy to the Middle East is

unrealistic. In order to support my claim, I shall first examine the initiatives taken by the United

States, providing criticism to the effectiveness of these initiatives. Second, I will examine the

United States’ foreign policy acts which provide a more clear insight to the real interests of the

United States, which are on basis of American security and personal gains, and not for the sake

of democracy. Third, the American actions towards the Middle East since World War II have

created a hatred and resentment towards the United States. Ever since, a suspicion of America

and any American affiliated programs has been rising in the Arab world, which has the potential

to incapacitate relations with the Arab countries even in the case of democratic change; such

change would not necessarily promote US interests.

Page 2: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

American initiatives to promote democracy in the Middle East

The first objective of this paper is to provide criticism of the American initiatives in

promoting democracy in the Middle East. Since the events of 9/11, the Bush administration has

been pursuing a “new world order” and the US declared its support for self-determination. There

were two main channels, in which the United States government operated in order to support this

initiative: the first channel involved the usage of soft power, including programs for civil rights

doctrines and support of opposition parties and on the streets through scholarships and societal

movement towards democratic ideals. The second channel involved hard power as the United

States decided to go into Iraq in order to maintain security and in order free Iraq from the

oppressive authoritarian regime and to protect democracy; as the United States believed that Iraq

would shift towards democracy as soon as Saddam Hussain was exterminated.

Soft power

Under the Bush administration, many programs were launched in order to inject

democratic ideals. Programs such as Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Broader

Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) were launched under the Bush administration. The US

also sponsored projects including programmes on judicial reform and support and training for

journalists; civic education and human rights awareness; school curricula and educational

exchanges and vote education. These programs were good programs in order to provide

American support to the democratic ideals, mostly not by direct actions towards the perspective

governments but by influencing the country from within, as people would argue, that a change, a

democratic or other, should come from within. In order for democracy to get a clear shape, so a

democratic change should come from the people themselves in order for them to know how to

determine their own country’s faith under Bush’s self-determination preaches.

Page 3: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

The programs were a good step initially to introduce few basic democratic ideals, but not

an effective change in governmental systems. The MEPI and BMENA have carried out projects

that are very similar to already existing ones from the Clinton administration and” while these

pre-existing projects may have made important contributions, they have clearly not provided a

major impetus for reform.1 These programs have beem promoting democratic cultures and less

focues less on institutional reforms2. The second problem with these programs is the limitation in

funding. An example could be the programs supported by the US which provides support

journalists and opposition parties but lack funding, political support, and mainly protection, not

just training as the MEPI and BMENA initially do The failure in this sector could be traced back

to the disappearances of political activists and journalists during the first0 stages of the Egyptian

revolution. Although MEPI for instance is funded by the US department of States, the funding it

provides does not match the initial ambitions of the US in a shift to democratic ideals in the

Middle East on a large scale. The approach of the US suggests that monarchies have been less

vulnerable to demands for regime change. 3 “… MEPI and BMENA partnership initiatives… did

not set out any clear steps by which their proposed projects would be linked to the desired

outcome of the executive giving up power.”4

1 Dalacoura, Katerina. "US Democracy Promotion In The Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique." International Affairs: 963-979. 966

2 Azam, Muhammad , and Sagheer Ahmed Khan. "American Democracy promotion in the Arabian gulf." 11. 86

3 Cammett, Melani, and Ishac Diwan. "Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings." A Political Economy of the Middle East. 411

4 Dalacoura, Katerina 957

Page 4: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

Hard power

One of the backlashes of 9/11 was the war in Iraq in 2003. The Bush administration

decided to invade Iraq as part of its counter-terrorism agenda and support for self-determination.

The Bush administration believed invasion of Iraq was essential for both protection of US

security and democracy. The US intended to take action against the threats made by Saddam

Hussain concerning the usage of weapons of mass destruction, and also against the crimes of the

authoritarian regime in Iraq against its own people.

By the end of March 2003, the Bush administration made its decision to go into Iraq. The

first step in the invasion was stepping into Iraq on March 20, 2003, according to (ARITLCE2)

with force of 130,000 American and 25,000 British troops. The decision to use such small unit of

troops was concluded from the assumption that the Iraqi military would put up little resistance;

which proved successful as Baghdad fell after sixteen days on April 5, 2003. The US military

was able to predict the amount of force needed in order to invade Iraq, but the aftermath of the

invasion is what determined the future of Iraq.”… Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric

Shinseki told Congress that many more troops would be necessary, not to defeat the Iraqi army

but to stabilize Iraq following the mission. The White House disputed this assessment”5. Soon

after the fall of Saddam on April 9, 2003, looters created chaos in Baghdad, looters broke out

after the fall of Baghdad, but the US military was unable to prevent it or stop it6.

Iraq fell apart and the consequences of the invasion gave birth to insurgency. The

insurgent groups that formed in the after invasion Iraq were Sunni Muslim Arabs form one

insurgent group. Another group centers on Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslims, who comprise the majority of

5 Mockaitis, Thomas R.. The Iraq War learning from the past, adapting to the present, and planning for the future. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007. 24

6 Mockaitis, Thomas R. 25

Page 5: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

the country’s population. Foreign insurgents—typically referred to as terrorists—constitute yet a

third group7. The emergence of insurgents is partly due to the disputes and differences among the

existing groups, but also in part due to the US lack of preparation to the aftermath of the invasion

and the reaction of the people to the invasion. Insurgency escalated due to the lack of planning

for insurgency by the US; which took months to realize its existence and the delay in

acknowledging the threat posed by insurgency allowed it to take root, making it far more

difficult to eradicate.

American security and personal gains

My second point in my argument is that the United States’ actions in the Middle East are

not for the greater good, not for democracy to form and for monarchies to collapse. The

American actions in the Middle East are solely based on the American security and personal

gains. The American government has been promoting democratic reforms, not only on the basis

of programs and scholarships as mentioned before, but also under actual governmental reforms

in order to introduce democratic systems in the government. Although there are numerous cases

where the United States have proven to improve civil rights and allowed greater political

participation, usually through elections, but in the great majority of these countries reform has

not led to a reduction of the leaders’ power.8 Nonetheless, the United States acts in the Middle

East can be distinguished to an extend to the attitude towards their strong alliance in the region,

versus their attitude towards who are presented to some extend “foes”9. In order to illustrate my

point, the paper will discuss the American democratic approaches towards their allies;

underlying the nature of the relation the United States holds with: Saudi Arabia and Egypt

7 Krepinevich, Andrew . "TheWar In Iraq: The Nature of InsurgencyWarfare." Last accessed 21, April

2014. 38 Dalacoura, Katerina 9689 Dalacoura, Katerina 968

Page 6: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi-American relations are special relations in their characteristics and their

purpose. The interest of the US in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to1933 when King Abed Al

Aziz granted oil concessions to Standard Oil of California. The Saudis at a time faced the

dilemma of whether or not seek the full American support. The dilemma was based on the fact

that their neighbour countries have eyes on their oil revenues. The Saudi kingdom needed

protection as it realized its military incapability, but at the same time, a full US support could be

used by regional enemies to promote propaganda against the Saudi kingdom

The Saudi preached to receive military assistance from the US in the region but as

presented in it was not until World War II that US policymaker began to perceive strategic

interests in the Gulf area10. The Saudi kingdom purchased military equipment in great numbers

during the 1950’s and 1960’s which tied up the relations. The next increase in relations was

during the Gulf war. The Saudis supported Iraq politically and financially in the war, but were

shocked from the betrayal and the Iraqi invasion. After that, the Saudi kingdom accepted the

presence of the US military which placed Saudi in commitment to the US strategy of

confrontation with Saddam Hussain11. This marks the transition between the need for US troops

in Saudi; from their existence for Saudi security issues to US strategy. The strategic important

extended as Saudi allowed US to coordinate air wars over Afghanistan and Iraq from Saudi

stations under US control. The US and Saudi are not only militarily connected but also

economically An example which underlines the increase of the importance the Saudi regime

holds to the US government is: the deal between the US and Saudi in February 1994, as the

10 Lesch, David W.. The Middle East and the United States: history, politics, and ideologies. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012. 348

11 Lesch, David W. 352

Page 7: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

Saudi kingdom bought $6 Billion in commercial aircraft from the US rather than European

companies, and president Clinton personally lobbied Saudi leaders to the issue. This emphasizes

not only the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia, but also their economic significance to the US.

The question which always frustrates people is: how come the strongest ally of the US in

the Gulf is an authoritarian kingdom with limited rights? How come the US still cooperates with

Saudi without strong pressure for change in the Saudi kingdom? The reason behind these

controversial actions by the US to support authoritarian regimes as they preach about democracy

and their commitment to democracies can be traced to the fact that democracy is eventually

desirable. There are concerns about democratization outcomes. It is not as the US does not want

Saudi to become a democracy, but according to the book The Stakes by Shibley Telhami “from

historical cases…even if democracy leads to more stability, transitions to democracy are often

extremely unstable and , in the end unpredictable. Rapid radical transitions from authoritarianism

to democracy in places like Saudi Arabia are likely, but were they to occur, the resulting

instability or unpredictable, outcomes, such as the possibility of a militant Islamist regime being

democratically elected, may seem even more threatening to American interests than the status

quo”12.

Egypt

The US did not only ally itself with Kingdoms such as Saudi as we discussed earlier or

Jordan or Morocco for instance. In fact, one of the closest allies of the US in the Middle East in

the past thirty years up until the Arab Spring had been Egypt. The Egyptian government, starting

with the first elected president Jamal Abed-El Nasser formed a system of a fake democracy.

12 Telhami, Shibley. The stakes America in the Middle East : the consequences of power and the choice for peace. Updated with a new epilogue. ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 20042002. 160

Page 8: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

The Egyptian system of fake democracy has been quite the same during the eras of

Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. The focus of this paper will be on the Sadat and Mubarak eras as the

US relations grew stronger in those years, versus the years of Nasser where he was closer to the

Soviets. During the era of Sadat, he introduced multi-party elections and economic liberalization

measures such as “Infitah” which encouraged foreign investment and introduced private

enterprise13. Nonetheless, as soon as opposition parties started to gain power and challenge his

power and authority, he cracked down on the groups arrested political opposition members

including leftists, Islamists and Nsserists. He also banned several of them such as the New Wafd

and the National Progressive Unionist Party.

After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak stepped into power in 1981 until the revolution

in 2011. During those years, Mubarak presented a vision in perusing political liberalization,

establishing a free media, fair party politics and independent judiciary14. The US promotion to

democracy during Mubarak’s rule produced some result, such as Mubarak’s reformation of his

own political party, the National Democracy Party, and the introduction of multi-party

presidential elections.

The Mubarak presidency was placed on three key elements: the first was consolidation of

his power, the second was increase military capabilities and the third was increase the public

sector to boost the economy15. Even though it seems on the surface that Mubarak seek

democratic transition, he still repressed anyone who challenged him as well. Mubarak’s

democratic movement was as the “symbolic political liberalization measures”16. When the new

13 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. "The Limited Impact of the USA on Political Liberalization in Egypt during the Mubarak Era." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11: 48. 214 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5015 Owen, Roger. The rise and fall of Arab presidents for life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012. 6716 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 50

Page 9: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

coalition of the Islamic Alliance and the Socialist Labour party and the liberal Party; which

represented the Muslim Brotherhood emerged, Mubarak slowed down political liberalization.

Also, increasing terrorist attacks by Islamists during the 1990s forced Mubarak to revert to

previous repressive policies17.

Since the presidency of Sadat, and under the fake democracy, Egypt was still one of the

most important US allies in the region. In fact, the US supported the Egyptian military and

helped it keep control of opposition groups and maintain control and stability to the government.

“as a result of its positive role in the peace process, geo-political situation and strategic

significance in the region, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of the US foreign

assistance, receiving an annual average of close to $2 billion in economic and military aid.”18

There are 3 reasons for the US military and economic support; First, Egypt’s position was

crucial for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt was the first country to recognize

Israel post Camp David, producing an important first step towards peace and stability in the

region19. By maintain its bilateral partnership with Egypt, the US aimed to increase its influence

in the Middle East, North African and the Mediterranean regions, in the hope Egypt’s pro-

American policies would have an effect on other countries in the region. Second, Egypt was

important for the US in order to protect its oil supplies in the region and to keep using Egypt’s

airspace and Suez Canal as a transit point from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the Arabian

Sea and the Indian Ocean. Third, the US support for the Egyptian army was also a sign of

support to the government against Islamic political radicalism. Especially after 9/11, the US

believed democratization in the region in order to supress radical Islamist groups, but the US

government believed that although it supported democracy in Egypt, American-Egyptian

17 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5018 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 5219 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. 52

Page 10: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

relations mainly dependent on the US’s economic and security interests which make it necessary

to have close ties with the region’s autocratic regimes.20

After we examined the US relations with its allies in the region, now I will present the US

initiative to democratic promotion in countries which are considered “foes”. In order to examine

the US nature of democratic promotion initiatives and its dependency on US interests and

security in foes countries; I will take the case of Palestine.

Palestine

One of the clearest examples of the US involvement in the Middle East only for their

personal interests and security can be observed by the treatment of the US to Hamas in the 2006

elections. The elections prove, that a democracy is wanted and perused by the US, and wanted,

but only when the democracy in hand is one that serves the interests of the United States. These

words bring a reminder to the US involvement in Iran as the CIA worked in Iran to promote a

coup d’état against the popularly elected Khomaini who was a nationalist who opposed western

interest, and brought back the authoritarian, repressive, pro-west Shah. In the case of Palestine,

Hamas was a religious nationalist liberation movement which preached the Islamic religion,

although simultaneously, its key was armed resistance to Israel. Although Hamas has a militant

sector, Hamas is also a well-organized organization which spreads its involvement to different

institutions and sectors. Hamas established welfare institutions which provided essential service

to Palestinian population including pre-school, health care, social assistance to ones in need,

support for people with mental and physical issues, and women income generating activities

(getting women involved in the economy), care of orphans, and youth and sport activities.

Although Hamas has an Islamic front, anyone was welcomed in their facilities. Hamas ultimately

20 Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan.53

Page 11: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

pursues “Islamization” but slowly and not forcefully, as they did not oppress other religions, and

did not ban alcohol for instance.

In the 2006 elections, Hamas did not expect much and decided to participate to gain as

much seats as they could. Prior to the elections, the failure of the PLO and the corruption within

it the people started noticing, because of the strong political approach it presented; where leaders

looked for their own interests, Fatah lost its credibility among the Palestinians, and Hams

emerged surprisingly as winners in the elections. As Hamas won the elections, the West;

primarily the US, refused to support Palestine economically unless Hamas recognized Israel and

recent agreements (Oslo), and renounce the use of fire. Hamas responded to the requests to the

West as they said they would not recognize Israel until Israel withdraws from the illegitimate

territories they hold in Palestine, but they would accept the Israeli reality. Hamas also proposed

10 years of cease fire, during which the PLO and Israel need to work on reaching agreement as

they refused to be front in the negotiations. These requests by Hamas to reach an agreement with

the West were all rejected, and they were forced out of power. Palestine was struggling through

the years to form a unified governing entity, and post-Oslo they were able to form free elections,

and even though the elections were in fact free, and the legitimate winner Hamas was denied

power, as Hamas was still recognized by the US as a terrorist group, even though Hamas tried to

reach middle ground with the West towards their legitimacy they were denied it, and were forced

out, in favour of the already corrupt Fatah. The government under Fatah was easier to negotiate

with and at least maintain a status-quo in the Israeli-Palestinian case, as where with Hamas, a

negotiation would be much harder to reach.

Arab suspicion of the US

Page 12: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

After we finished explaining the reasons behind the unrealistic American aim to promote

democracy in the Middle East based on their insufficient programs and their attitude towards

Arab countries on the basis of US security and interest; I will now argue that, the Arab world still

has resentment to the American actions towards the Middle East, does not trust the US and is not

interested in relations with the US. That is, the people on the street, not governments.

First, it is important to note that the negative perception of the US is not unique to the

Arab and Muslim world, but it is a worldwide perception, which is shaped by US policies.

According to the International Herald Tribune in The Stakes a pull published in August 2001

found that majorities of Europeans believed that American foreign policy disregard their

interests21. Another pull, by Gallup in April 2002, found that “majorities in four European

countries expressed the view that the US does not take allied interests into account in conducting

the war on terrorism and that the US acts in its own interests in the fight against terrorism.”

These beliefs are worldwide shared, but the lack of credibility in the Middle East “lie in the US

policy towards the region over the last few decades, during which the US has frequently allied

itself with authoritarian regimes and has supported Israel against the legitimate rights of the

Palestinian people.22”

The main argument of the Arab resentment is that according to Bush’s speech “They hate

what we see right in this chamber- a democratically elected government… they hate our

freedoms-our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech our freedom to vote and assemble and

disagree with each other. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a

way of life.” The notion of hatred towards “them” expanded to include all Arabs and Muslims,

not merely those who participated in the 9/11 attacks. This perception of the Arabs and Muslims

21 Telhami, Shibley 4022 Dalacoura, Katerina.972

Page 13: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

as evil and anti-west is false. A Gallup poll released in February 2002 showed, for example that

views of the United States are more unfavourable than favourable in all but one of the nine

Muslim countries studied, while France was more unfavourable in all but two of the Muslim

countries23. Such evidence illustrates the unlikelihood of Arab hatred to “Western ideals” and is

politically centred.

Now that we proved that the Arab and Muslim resentment against the US is not based on

cultural and values differences but rather political; something that Huntington anticipated as the

“clash of civilizations” where the next mass war would be between cultures and not countries. As

we presented that such act is unlikely, it is now time to ask the question: “If the US would

succeed in promoting democracy in the Middle East, would that actually benefit the US?” real

democracy, one which is by the people, for the people, is where government is elected to

promote the interests and requests of the people. The question is now, what type of government

would it be? The Americans were concerned with a radical Muslim government in most of the

countries in the Arab world, especially the Gulf; where Islam is a stronger factor of the society

and the already governing system that a change might radicalize the country more and increase

its hostility to the US.

Those anticipated perception of democratic change in the Middle East turned into reality

in the case of Egypt. The American government could not act against the protests of the people

against Mubarak since they are entitled to supporting democracy, even against the American

ally-Mubarak. The change that occurred seemed first as secular but it was indeed took an Islamic

shape as the government which was elected was by the leadership of Mursi and the Muslim

brotherhood. The relations ever since only went downhill between the US and Egypt, and also

between Israel and Egypt. This is proof that the belief that democracies do not attack each other,

23 Telhami, Shibley 46

Page 14: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

or at least are somewhat allies is false. A fairly elected government would serve the people, and

if the people of the country are not interested in American strong relations, regardless of the

democracy in the country, is plausible.

The United States as we have examined above has an unrealistic aim in promoting

democracy to the Middle East; The initiatives and programs which are funded by the US are

insufficient to make an actual tangible change; The US foreign policy aimed to promote

American interests and based on American security; and in case of democratic change, the

change could also be one which would not benefit the US. As far as the US is concerned “the US

will commit money and troops to support democracy only when its vital interests are affected

further reinforces the impression that democracy is a secondary goal when juxtaposed with vital

security concerns”.24

24 Dalacoura, Katerina 972

Page 15: Democratic Middle East, American Unrealistic Dream

Bibliography:

- Aknur, Müge , and Erkan Okalan. "The Limited Impact of the USA on Political

Liberalization in Egypt during the Mubarak Era." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of

International Relations 11: 48.

- Azam, Muhammad , and Sagheer Ahmed Khan. "American Democracy promotion in

the Arabian gulf." 11.

- Cammett, Melani, and Ishac Diwan. "Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings." A Political Economy of the Middle East.

-

- Dalacoura, Katerina. "US Democracy Promotion In The Arab Middle East Since 11

September 2001: A Critique." International Affairs: 963-979.

- Krepinevich, Andrew . "TheWar In Iraq: The Nature of InsurgencyWarfare." Last

accessed 21, April 2014

- Lesch, David W.. The Middle East and the United States: history, politics, and

ideologies. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012.

- Mockaitis, Thomas R.. The Iraq War learning from the past, adapting to the present,

and planning for the future. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 2007.

- Owen, Roger. The rise and fall of Arab presidents for life. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 2012.

- Telhami, Shibley. The stakes America in the Middle East : the consequences of power

and the choice for peace. Updated with a new epilogue. ed. Boulder, Colo.:

Westview, 20042002.