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Democratisation fromthe outside in: Ngo andinternational efforts topromote open electionsVikram K ChandPublished online: 25 Aug 2010.

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Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 543± 561, 1997

Democratisation from the outside in:NGO and international efforts topromote open elections

VIKRAM K CHAND

Until recently, the monitoring of elections in a sovereign country by outsideactors was extremely rare. The United Nations (UN) had signi® cant experience

in conducting plebiscites and elections in dependent territories but did not

monitor an election in a formally independent country until 1989, when it

reluctantly became involved in the Nicaraguan electoral process. At the regional

level, the Organization of American States (OAS) occasionally sent small delega-tions to witness elections in member states, but these missions were too brief to

permit any real observation of the processes, and failed to criticise fraud.1 Since

the 1980s election-monitoring has become increasingly common in transitional

elections from authoritarian to democratic rule. Non-governmental organisations

(NGOs), domestic and international, were the ® rst to become involved inelection-monitoring in the 1980s followed by international and regional organi-

sations like the UN, the OAS, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) in the 1990s. Election-monitors played a crucial role in

transitional elections held in the Philippines (1986), Chile (1989), Panama

(1989), Nicaragua (1990) and Haiti (1990). In addition, elections began to forma crucial element of UN ` peace-building’ strategies in countries torn apart by

civil strife such as Namibia (1989), Cambodia (1993) and El Salvador (1994).

By the middle of the 1990s, international election-monitoring had thus become

widely accepted, and fairly universal standards established for de® ning the term

` free and fair’ elections.This article probes the factors propelling the growth of international and NGO

election-monitoring efforts in recent years, and assesses their scope, contribution

and limits. It explores the implications of international election-monitoring for

the changing nature of sovereignty, the development of domestic civil and

political society (or what Robert Putnam calls ` social capital’2) and new patterns

of interaction among NGOs, regional organisations and the UN. The paper then

looks at these questions through the lens of a speci® c case study, the Mexican

presidential elections of 1994, which were without doubt the most ` watched’

elections in Mexican history. It concludes with an assessment of the importance

of international election-monitoring for the development of an internationalpolitical rights regime in the 1990s.

Vikram K Chand is at the Department of Government, Wesleyan University, 238 Church Street, Middletown,

CT 06459, USA.

0143-6597/97/030543-19 $7.00 Ó 1997 Third World Quarterly 543

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VIKRAM K CHAND

Explaining international efforts to promote democracy in the 1980s and1990s

The expansion of international election-monitoring activities in the 1980s and1990s was a direct re¯ ection of the growing support for democracy world-wide.

In 1991, for instance, the OAS convention at Santiago declared that member

states were required to maintain democratic forms of governance consistent with

its charter. Shortly thereafter, the OAS approved the Washington Protocol under

which any suspension of democracy in a member state would automaticallytrigger a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, followed by a meeting of the

Hemisphere’ s foreign ministers or the OAS General Assembly, in order to take

appropriate measures to restore democracy. In December 1991 the UN General

Assembly passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority of 134 to 4 calling

on the secretary-general to establish an of® ce to coordinate requests for electoralassistance by member states, leading to the creation of an Electoral Assistance

Unit in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA); in its ® rst year of operation,

the unit responded to requests for assistance from some 20 countries.3

Mean-

while, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), declared

at Copenhagen in June 1990 that free elections constituted an ` inalienable’human right. The 1990 Paris charter also called on CSCE members to ` strengthen

democracy as the only system of government within our nations’ , and mandated

the creation of a new Of® ce for Free Elections to oversee elections in CSCE

states.4

The growing support for democracy, particularly free elections, was theproduct of ® ve factors. First, the global wave of democratisation that began in

the 1970s and continued through the 1990s radically transformed the make-up of

the world’ s main international organisations. In the last quarter of the twentieth

century, more than forty countries have switched from authoritarian to demo-

cratic forms of governance. The new predominance of democratic states withininter governmental organisations (IGOs) inevitably encouraged them to become

more active in the promotion of democracy. At the same time, new democracies

were also often weak and vulnerable to attempts to roll back democracy in their

countries. Placing international organisations decisively on the side of democ-

racy thus represented a form of insurance against a potential regression toauthoritarianism, and a deterrent to anyone contemplating an attack on fragile

democratic institutions.

Second, the United States was generally supportive of attempts to strengthen

the commitment of IGOs to democracy. American leaders such as Anthony Lake

de® ned the promotion of democracy as the new central thread uniting thedifferent strands of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.5 The end

of the Cold War freed Washington from having to support dictators as an

alternative to the greater evil of global communism, produced an abrupt cut-off

of Soviet aid to several authoritarian client states, and was perceived as a major

ideological triumph in favour of capitalism and democracy.6

American of® cialsand academics also advanced a powerful national security rationale: democracies

were inherently more peaceable than dictatorships and, based on the historical

record, extremely unlikely to go to war with one another, therefore the US

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NGOs AND EFFORTS TO PROMOTE OPEN ELECTIONS

should support democracy as a way of underwriting its own security. The

reasons why the Kantian democratic peace hypothesis, recaptured by Michael

Doyle’ s 1983 article,7

was absorbed by American policy-makers so quickly lie

beyond the scope of this paper; but there is no question that it provided apowerful motive undergirding much of US democracy-promotion efforts around

the world.

Third, domestic changes, particularly the strengthening of civil and political

society, made it easier for regime opponents to garner international support

for democracy. Both the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC)of the OAS and the UN Centre for Human Rights have experienced a sharp

escalation in the number of complaints relating to violations of political rights.

This re¯ ects a secular increase in the capacity of dissidents to take their case

to the international community. The growing capacity of domestic actors to

appeal directly to international fora activates international guarantees fordemocracy, creates a tradition of international jurisprudence that forms the basis

of future appeals, and nudges the existing political rights regime towards

enforcement.

Fourth, changes in the global normative climate have contributed powerfully

to the growing involvement of IGOs and NGOs in democracy-promotion efforts.Democracy is now perceived to be the only legitimate form of government. To

some extent this is clearly the product of the demise of the Soviet Union and the

mushrooming of democracies around the world. A more neglected factor in the

shift of global norms is the role of the Catholic Church. In the wake of the

Second Vatican Council (1959±65), it abandoned historical support for authori-tarian governments, such as Salazar’ s Portugal, not to speak of Mussolini’ s Italy,

in favour of a new theological stance favouring human rights and democracy.

Vatican II emphasised the importance of social change in the Church’ s mission;

the right to judge ` sinful’ political and social structures in the light of the Gospel;

lay engagement; a greater focus on collegiality rather than hierarchy; and thesigni® cance of individual rights.8

The election of John Paul II as Pope in 1979 intensi® ed the Church’ s support

for democracy world-wide. In his ® rst papal encyclical the new Pope, who had

experienced the rigours of communist rule ® rsthand as Cardinal of Poland, not

only condemned human rights violations but declared that the Church was ` theguardian’ of freedom, which in turn was the basis of God-given human dignity.

Given the centralisation of the Catholic Church, theological changes at the apex

quickly spread to the lower rungs of the organisation, thereby conditioning the

normative preferences of Catholics and strengthening democratic impulses

around the world. Papal visits to several countries (Mexico, 1979, 1990; Poland,1979; Philippines 1981; Brazil, 1980; Argentina, 1982; Guatemala, Nicaragua

and El Salvador, 1983; Korea, 1984; Chile, 1987; and Paraguay, 1988) served

as a catalyst for galvanising supporters of democracy in them.9

The Church, with

its organisational resources, institutional credibility and international scope, thus

emerged as formidable opponent to authoritarian regimes. It is therefore noaccident that Catholic countries dominated the ranks of democratising countries

in the 1970s and 1980s. Major shifts within the Church strengthened global

democratic norms directly, with a powerful global actor coming out in support

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VIKRAM K CHAND

of democracy, and indirectly, by contributing to democratisation in a host of

countries.

Fifth, the rise of election-monitoring by outside actors to defend democracy

re¯ ects the erosion of traditional state sovereignty. Rising economic interdepen-dence made states more porous to outside in¯ uences including pressures to

democratise. The trend towards regional economic integration was an important

factor in¯ uencing democratic development in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the

case of the European Economic Community (EEC), and Mexico in the case of the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The collapse of the SovietUnion removed an important obstacle to US (and international) efforts to

promote democracy abroad, and opened the door to the revival of moralism in

US foreign policy. Meanwhile, states themselves have undergone a profound

mutation in recent years. The spread of urbanisation, communications, education

and economic development has produced what James Rosenau regards as aglobal improvement in civic skills,10 constraining governments and heightening

domestic pressures for democratisation. Furthermore, the rising importance of

sub-national loyalties, whether ethnic, regional, religious, poses a new challenge

to state dominance of society.

Why election-monitoring?

Election-monitoring involves a gamut of activities. These include the passive

observation of electoral processes; pressure for changes in the electoral environ-

ment; veri® cation of voter registration lists; balloting and the count; mediationbetween the government and opposition; the provision of technical assistance;

and, in the most extreme cases, the actual administration of elections by

outsiders.

Election observation serves ® ve distinct functions. First, the presence of

observers improves the credibility of the election process by deterring fraud.This encourages opposition parties to participate rather than boycott the process,

and invariably boosts voter turnout as well. Incumbent governments who expect

to win often have a strong incentive to invite international observers to give their

victory credibility in the eyes of public opinion. For example, Daniel Ortega

clearly expected the Sandinistas to win the February 1990 elections inNicaragua, and took a gamble by inviting the UN, OAS and the Council of

Freely-Elected Heads of Government chaired by Jimmy Carter to observe the

elections.

Second, observers play an important role in providing technical assistance to

improve electoral processes world-wide. Such assistance has ranged from train-ing poll-watchers, helping to design an appropriate sample for parallel vote

tabulations including quick-counts, and ® nancing the purchase of logistical

equipment. In Nicaragua, for example, the UN designed a quick-count based on

a strati ® ed sample of 8% to 10% of the vote that showed Violeta Chamorro with

a 16 point lead over Ortega.11

Third, observers can play an important role in mediating disputes, and

bridging the chasm of distrust among rival political contenders. In El Salvador,

for example, the patient mediation of both UN Secretary-General JaÂvier Perez de

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NGOs AND EFFORTS TO PROMOTE OPEN ELECTIONS

CueÂllar and his representative Alvaro de Soto kept the peace talks between the

government and the Farabundo MartõÂNational Liberation Front (FMLN) alive,

eventually resulting in a series of breakthrough agreements.12

In Nicaragua,

Carter helped broker a series of agreements between the Sandinistas and theopposition that allowed for the participation of Meskite Indians in the political

process, the adoption of a code of civility among all political parties, and the

release of much needed foreign funds for the National Opposition Union (UNO).13

The mediation of Carter, the UN’ s Elliot Richardson, and OAS Secretary-General

JoaÄ o Baena Soares helped facilitate a smooth transition from Sandinista hands toUNO in the crucial hours after the 1990 elections.14 In the Dominican Republic,

a tense stand-off between the government and the opposition, which questioned

the results of the 1990 elections, was successfully defused through deft

diplomacy by Carter’ s delegation.15

Fourth, observers play an important role in opening up the electoral processby bringing problems out into the open and pressuring for their recti ® cation. In

Namibia, the UN, which possessed the right to veto South Africa’ s conduct of

the elections, successfully pressured the South African Administrator-General

(AG) to revise the electoral law to permit voting by secret ballot, counting in the

major regional centres rather than in a single fraud-prone national centre, andfull access to voting stations by South-West African People’ s Organisation

(SWAPO) representatives.16 UN pressure also forced the AG to abandon plans to

subject Namibia’ s new Constituent Assembly to South African control by

making its decisions subject to veto by the AG and judicial review by South

African courts.17

In Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, Paraguay, Chile and Mexico,outside observers succeeded variously in pressuring governments to strengthen

the independence of election commissions, improve the quality of the voter

registration list or draw up a new one altogether, give the opposition greater

access to polling stations on election day, and permit quick-counts.

Finally, outside organisations have been called on to administer the electoralprocess or supervise it, usually as part of a wider peace-building strategy. In

Cambodia the UN organised and conducted the 1993 electoral process from start

to ® nish,18

while in Namibia it meticulously supervised an election organised by

the South African government. In Bosnia, the OSCE organised elections for a

tripartite presidency, a federal parliament and regional parliaments in September1996; but it was forced to postpone municipal elections because of a host of

dif® culties including voter intimidation, the reluctance of refugees to return

to localities where they once lived, and widespread tampering with voter

registration records.

Synergy in election-monitoring?

Most analyses have neglected the dynamic interaction between the different sets

of actors involved in election-monitoring. Yet the patterns of interaction,

task-sharing and specialisation may turn out to be decisive in explaining thedifference between the success and failure of a mission. From a purely func-

tionalist point of view, the UN has major advantages over other organisations in

organising elections in areas that have experienced serious internal strife and

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VIKRAM K CHAND

where authority has broken down. The UN has more experience in peace-

building missions, greater organisational, ® nancial and technical resources, and

is capable of mobilising a higher level of consensus among the major powers

through such mechanisms as the ` friends of the secretary-general’ than mostregional organisations or NGOs. The Cambodia operation, for example, cost about

US$1.5 billion, involved 15 000 troops and 7000 civilians, and lasted 18 months.

In Namibia, the UN deployed 4650 soldiers, 1700 police monitors and 1600

election supervisors, at a cost of about $367 million. In El Salvador, a much

smaller country, the UN ® elded a mission of some 1500 personnel at its height;with no ® xed departure date, it cost just over $100 million.

In addition, such peace-building missions require delicate cooperation be-

tween the mission’ s military and electoral wings. In both Cambodia and Namibia

UN election of® cials relied on military assistance to prevent voter intimidation,

protect UN installations and provide logistical support. To the extent that themilitary wing was unable fully to demobilise the former antagonists and

decommission their weapons before the elections, its presence was all the more

necessary to deter armed interference with the process. In fact, demobilisation

before the elections was mostly a failure in Nicaragua and Cambodia, and only

a partial success in Namibia and El Salvador. Yet, even in major peace-buildingmissions, the UN can bene® t from the presence of NGOs and even regional

organisations. In Namibia pressure from the Organisation of African Unity and

the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the secretary-general strengthened the

UN’ s resolve in the face of unreasonable demands by the AG. NGOs also added

to the chorus of support for the UN in Namibia. In El Salvador, the UN mission(ONUSAL) depended on NGOs for assistance in implementing programmes, and for

reliable information.

In countries where an existing government remains in power and where the

UN plays only a monitoring rather than organising role, the actors are likely to

be more evenly matched. For example, the UN Observer Mission to Verify theElectoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) collaborated closely with the OAS and

Carter. In fact, the UN was by no means the dominant player. The OAS covered

far more polling stations on election day (70%) than the UN, and Carter played

a much greater role in mediating disputes than Elliot Richardson or Baena

Soares.As relatively small groups with limited resources, NGOs are driven to create

specialised niches based on comparative advantage. The International Human

Rights Law Group is particularly good at analysing election laws; the Inter-

national Foundation for Election Systems at providing electoral equipment and

technical support. The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government led byJimmy Carter has played a crucial role in democratic transitions throughout

Latin America and the Caribbean. The prestige of its members, institutional

credibility, media visibility and access to high-placed decision makers put it in

an unusual position among NGOs to exert pressure for electoral reforms, mediate

disputes among contending parties, in¯ uence the thinking of US governmentof® cials and shape public opinion. Sometimes, however, a country can be

deluged with too many inexperienced observers, leading to clashing accounts,

partisan behaviour, a failure to coordinate with others and confusion.

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NGOs AND EFFORTS TO PROMOTE OPEN ELECTIONS

Political factors can also in¯ uence the cast of characters in election-

monitoring activities. During the Cold War, Washington marginalised the UN

from Latin American affairs in favour of the OAS, which was more susceptible

to US control.19

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, however, a growingrapprochement between the UN and the OAS has taken place.20 Both organisa-

tions collaborated closely in the 1990 Nicaraguan and Haitian elections. Eventu-

ally, however, the UN came to dominate the resolution of the Haitian crisis. The

need to tighten the OAS embargo against the Haitian military junta required an

expanded UN role, which also signalled that the international community wasserious about its intent to restore democracy. Key OAS members such as Brazil,

Mexico and Chile also opposed sending military forces to Haiti,21 fearing

undermining the principle of non-intervention and distorting the purposes of theOAS. The US was thus left with little choice but to seek UN approval for the use

of armed force in Haiti through the Multinational Force (MNF).

The dilemma of sovereignty

Election-monitoring by outsiders goes to the heart of the debate about thechanging nature of sovereignty, more so than humanitarian assistance.22 The

latter occurs in the context of political and economic breakdown and can be

rationalised as a temporary expedient to deal with an emergency. The same can

more-or-less be said of elections organised by international organisations as part

of a peace-building strategy. In the case of elections monitored by outsiders infunctioning states, however, it is dif® cult to avoid the debate about the implica-

tions for sovereignty. The debate stems partly from the con¯ icting imperatives

of the UN and OAS Charters, which establish free elections as a universal human

right but also proscribe interference in the internal matters of states.23

Proponents of a ` right to democratic governance’ make several arguments tojustify election-monitoring in sovereign states.24 First, the concept of sovereignty

is itself subject to change in response to new domestic and international

conditions. Simply saying that election-monitoring interferes with sovereignty

evades the question of what sovereignty is and how it may have changed over

time. Second, election-monitoring enhances the domestic legitimacy of thegovernment and strengthens the state and its capacity for ` sovereignty’ . Third,

true sovereignty resides with ` the people’ , not the state; and, to the extent that

international election-monitors seek to empower ` the people’ , their activities are

consistent with sovereignty. Finally, states are not free agents but subject to

limitations stemming from natural rights that their citizens possess as moralbeings, as well as legal obligations voluntarily contracted by states under several

international covenants on human rights, including free elections.

Many governments are now willing to allow international observers, not

necessarily because they agree with these arguments, but because they ® nd it a

politically convenient way to gain credibility, placate the opposition and avoida deterioration of relations with the international community and the United

States. Still, election-monitoring by outsiders can frequently become a target of

suspicion and outright hostility. Some of this concern is grounded in a healthy

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VIKRAM K CHAND

scepticism of Western motives based on bitter experiences with colonialism, and

US interventionism to ` save democracy’ .25

Experience suggests that there are several ways to defuse these concerns.

First, in the case of peace-building missions, it may be helpful to create amechanism, consisting of the main political forces in the country, formally

vested with sovereignty. The UN in Cambodia, for example, set up a Supreme

National Council (SNC) consisting of the major Cambodian factions chaired by

Prince Sihanouk.26

Technically, the UN derived its authority from the SNC. The

UN made a concerted effort to consult with the SNC and empowered it withseveral important tasks. Second, international actors must obtain the consent of

all major political parties and the government before observing an election, and

do so in a strictly impartial fashion. The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of

Government (Carter’ s Council), for example, has an iron rule that it will never

formally observe an election if the major players do not welcome it. Third,international actors need to make sure that their work is not used by states as

pretexts for intervention, though this ` externality’ may be dif® cult to avoid. In

Panama Carter’ s denunciation of fraud in 1989 was used by Bush to justify his

invasion of the country, although Carter himself was opposed to armed inter-

vention.27

Finally, the US and other countries should forego any attempt topromote democracy that involves the unilateral use of force or runs the risk of

a serious backlash against international efforts to promote democracy.

The use of multilateral force to protect the results of an internationally

monitored election has been sanctioned only in Haiti. The UN also continued to

recognise the deposed Aristide as the legitimate ruler of Haiti, thus modifyingthe ` effective control’ standard for UN recognition in favour of one based on

democratic legitimacy.28 The shaky legal pretext for such action by the Security

Council was that the Haitian military junta posed a threat to regional peace. The

UN action in Haiti sets a political (but not legal) precedent for the use of

multilateral force to protect democracy, strengthening the enforcement capacityof the international political rights regime. The decision to intervene in Haiti was

the result of a constellation of factors that will not easily come together again,

including Haiti’ s strategic weakness as a small and dependent country; pro-

longed chaos in a country close to the US and the consequent threat of a mass

exodus of Haitian boat-people; Aristide’ s democratic legitimacy and dogged-ness; the international isolation of the Haitian military regime; and China’ s

decision not to veto the use of force by the Security Council.

Building institutions

Tocqueville’ s Democracy in America identi® ed a strong civil and political

society as the basis of a healthy democracy.29 Strong societal institutions,

including civic associations, religious institutions, a free press, political parties

and an independent judiciary, help counterbalance state power, provide a context

for developing civic skills, encourage norms of reciprocity and trust, articulatesocietal interests, and create peaceful channels for the resolution of con¯ icts that

might otherwise result in violence. Election-monitors can play a crucial role in

developing institutions in several ways. Mediation by outside actors can foster

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NGOs AND EFFORTS TO PROMOTE OPEN ELECTIONS

trust among rival parties by providing guarantees, clearing up misperceptions,

relaying information back and forth, and resolving key issues. Pressure from

outside actors can encourage governments to develop new institutions necessary

for a fair election to take place, such as an independent election commission, anaccurate voter registration list, a human rights ombudsman, an opening of the

of® cial media, transparency in the management of party ® nances, and so forth.

Technical and ® nancial assistance to domestic civic associations by international

groups can play a major role in developing election-monitoring groups that can

provide a nucleus for the formation of an organised civil society. Finally,internationally observed elections in which all major political parties accept the

results represents by itself a democratic breakthrough, because it provides for the

peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box rather than through force.

In the case of peace-building missions, the presence of neutral actors such as

the UN can represent a ` time-out’ from con¯ ict, thereby providing a window ofopportunity to reactivate civil society, construct democratic institutions and

revive the economy. In Cambodia the UN presence produced a highly successful

election under very dif® cult conditions with a turnout of 90%, the development

of relatively free press, the growth of several human rights NGOs and new foreign

aid commitments.30

At the same time the UN was unable to purge the policeforce of human rights violators, persuade the factions to demobilise and ensure

a neutral electoral environment because of the failure of both the Khmer Rouge

and the Hun Sen government to collaborate fully with the world organisation.

The result is that the outlook for Cambodia remains uncertain.

The effects of UN missions in El Salvador and in Haiti on the developmentof local institutions have also been mixed. In El Salvador, ONUSAL successfully

presided over the demobilisation of the FMLN, the cessation of the civil war, the

creation of a new civilian police force, the installation of a human rights

ombudsman, and the removal of several top army of® cials for major human

rights violations after investigation by a UN-sponsored commission. Unlike inCambodia, the 1994 Salvadoran elections were organised by the regime, which

resisted international advice and conducted a ¯ awed election.31 In Haiti the

international community was successful in dislodging the military junta, reform-

ing the police, demobilising the army and establishing order. Yet the subsequent

parliamentary elections in June 1995 conducted by the Aristide governmentwere, according to one experienced observer, ` the most disastrous technically’ ,

he had ever witnessed.32

What explains the varying success of the UN in creating institutions for

democracy? First, the ability of the UN to create institutions depends vitally on

the cooperation of the parties to the con¯ ict. If the parties fail to cooperate orrenege on prior agreements, the chances will diminish accordingly. Such

cooperation is likely to be more forthcoming if the international community

possesses both the will and the leverage to maintain pressure for the parties to

work towards a solution. Second, developing democratic institutions in countries

that lack a democratic tradition is a time-consuming process that may not beachievable in the short-term horizons of most UN and other missions. There is

a long and distinguished literature on the ` prerequisites’ for democracy that

should sound a cautionary note about efforts to transplant democracy to

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inhospitable conditions overnight.33 Still, it is possible to err on the side of too

much pessimism. Growing interdependence may have quickened the time-frame

for the development of democracy in part because of heightened outside

involvement. Nor, should one be over-deterministic about the prospects fordemocracy. India has had a highly successful democracy for almost 50 years,

despite not meeting one of the usual key pre-requisites for democracy: a medium

or high level of per capita income. The results in Cambodia, Haiti and El

Salvador are mixed; they are not an unquali® ed failure. The development of

international regimes to protect democracy where it is in danger, liberalisedtrading arrangements to expand economic activity, higher outlays of foreign aid

speci® cally tied to the development of democratic institutions, and making

respect for human rights a condition for receiving of® cial loans and participating

in multilateral institutions can go a long way towards improving the prospects

for democracy, despite unfavourable domestic conditions.

Election-monitoring: the Mexican case

The Mexican case is interesting for several reasons. First, it represents an

opportunity to study the interaction between the UN, several international NGOsand Mexican civic groups in the task of election-monitoring. Second, resistance

to outside interference has been unusually strong in Mexico, making it a good

test-case for the erosion of traditional sovereignty norms in the Western

Hemisphere. Third, the UN mandate in Mexico was not to observe the 1994

elections, but to train and ® nance domestic observers. Mexico thus represents anexcellent case study of the impact of international actors on the development of

local civil society and the thickening of social capital.

The main international actors in the 1994 electoral process were the United

Nations Electoral Assistance Program (UNEAP); the National Endowment for

Democracy (NED) established by the US Congress in 1983 as an autonomousbody to support democratisation initiatives around the world; the National

Democratic Institute (NDI), which conducts international outreach for the US

Democratic Party; and the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government.

The presence of international observers, euphemistically designated ` foreign

visitors’ so as not to offend nationalist sensibilities, re¯ ected the low credibilityof Mexican elections in the wake of widespread allegations of fraud in the 1988

presidential elections won by Carlos Salinas, the candidate of the of® cial

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party, which has governed Mexico unin-

terruptedly since 1929 in various guises. The PRI’ s credibility problem had an

important international dimension as well. The decision of the Salinas adminis-tration to adopt an export-orientated model based on increasing integration with

the US made it inevitable that the Mexican electoral process would be subjected

to more international scrutiny than usual. Indeed, the lack of clean elections in

Mexico quickly became a signi® cant issue in Washington debates on the

rati® cation of NAFTA.34

Growing interdependence also encouraged the emergenceof transnational coalitions to improve the human rights climate in Mexico,

involving both Mexican and foreign NGOs. Finally, the global spread of democ-

racy meant that the Mexican political system looked increasingly like an

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authoritarian anachronism in much the same category as such unpopular regimes

as those in Burma, China, Cuba, Vietnam and Indonesia. Thus the situation was

different from the past, when Mexico’ s softer and inclusionary form of authori-

tarian rule had contrasted favourably with the gross human rights violations ofthe bureaucratic±authoritarian regimes in the southern cone.35

The role of UNEAP

The UN Electoral Assistance Program was formally invited by the Mexicangovernment to provide technical and ® nancial assistance to Mexico’ s domestic

election-monitoring organisations, which the government recognised were a

crucial ingredient of a credible election.36

The government could have ® nanced

the domestic observer groups directly but this would have been seen as a

transparent attempt to co-opt them and had the opposite effect of underminingcredibility. The government also hoped that the involvement of UNEAP in training

and ® nancing domestic observer groups would make them more professional and

objective. The government was particularly worried about the Civic Alliance

(AC), an umbrella group of independent NGOs that the government felt was biased

towards the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). AC had quicklyemerged as the country’ s most credible election-monitoring group. The govern-

ment hoped that UNEAP would ® nance a variety of domestic observer groups

from across the political spectrum to ensure that no one civic organisation

acquired a monopoly on judging the elections, especially not AC. Indeed, whileUNEAP channelled $1.5 million to AC, or three-quarters of AC ’ s budget for 1994,the UN agreed to spend roughly $2.2 million to fund the observation efforts of

more than a dozen other groups, including the mammoth National Teacher’ s

Union (SNTE), with powerful ties to the PRI.

Relations between AC and UNEAP were often tense. AC bitterly resentedUNEAP ’ s determination to ® nance election-monitoring groups linked to thegovernment, which AC saw as hopelessly biased and rival claimants on UNEAP

funds, and hinted at a relationship of complicity between the Mexican govern-

ment and the United Nations. UNEAP felt it was necessary to fund a variety of

different observer groups to ensure that it was not viewed as biased towards AC,

which had already received about 41% of UNEAP ’ s budget. UNEAP also clashedwith AC over the latter’ s spending priorities, expense estimates and observation

methodology. More important, UNEAP was concerned that the left-orientated AC

suffered from a tendency to equate a PRI defeat with a victory for democracy.AC ’ s leadership chafed at UNEAP’ s perceived ` interference’ ,but its heavy reliance

on UNEAP funds prevented an open rupture between them.UNEAP’ s mission in Mexico represents a highly successful and cost-effective

intervention by outsiders to promote the development of local civil society and

social capital. Without UNEAP and international ® nancial and logistical support,AC would have been unable to mount a country-wide observation effort.

However, the fact that UNEAP’ s mission was so effective also testi ® es to thepre-existing strength of Mexican civil society. Fair elections had already become

a major societal issue, thus providing a reservoir of public support for AC. Its

seven founding groups were all closely identi® ed with highly respected ® gures

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who served as political entrepreneurs by harnessing growing domestic and

international concern for transparent elections to facilitate growth. AC itself was

organised as an umbrella group knitting together some 450 NGOs in a dense and

reciprocal network. This loose structure gave AC considerable range and¯ exibility, while cohesion was assured by the prestige of its leadership, overlap-

ping membership among its constituent organisations and a clearly de® ned goal.UNEAP ’ s mission thus took place in a societal context where a relatively small

injection of funds could have a large payoff. Had Mexican civil society not been

as developed, it is unlikely that UNEAP’ s mission would have been as successful.It is always easier to add to an existing stock of social capital than to attempt

to create it from scratch, as in wartorn countries like Cambodia.

The UN and international NGOs

The Mexican government hoped that the presence of UNEAP would act as a check

on other international actors, if only by drawing attention away from them. The

government also reasoned that UNEAP, as an of® cial international body capable

of functioning only at the behest of member states and within strictly de® ned

limits, would be easier to control than other international actors. On the ground,however, an almost symbiotic relationship developed between UNEAP and the

cluster of foreign NGOs. The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government

and NDI were in a position openly to criticise the Mexican electoral process,

which UNEAP, as an of® cial international organisation with the limited mandate

of aiding domestic election observer groups, was unable to do.Yet UNEAP had the necessary technical and ® nancial resources to facilitate the

growth of a cluster of domestic election-monitoring organisations, and the

leverage to demand a high degree of professionalism and neutrality from them.

In a few crucial instances, NGOs contributed functionally to UNEAP’ s own

objectives. By improving the design of AC ’ s quick-count, NDI helped AC allayUNEAP concerns about methodology. NGOs also acted as channels of communi-

cation between UNEAP and AC by relaying mutual concerns back and forth, and

clarifying misunderstandings. There was therefore little institutional rivalry

between UNEAP and NGOs, and the pattern of cooperation that developed in

Mexico between them may constitute a model of future interaction.

The role of international NGOs

AC also received small grants from external NGOs, including $150 000 from NED

and $50 000 from NDI.37

The fact that AC was supported by NED, with itsbipartisan US Congressional support and distinguished board of directors, set AC

apart from other domestic observer groups by giving it a fund of international

legitimacy, particularly among US opinion makers. AC ’ s ability to in¯ uence

international opinion may in turn have worked to enhance its bargaining power

vis-aÁ -vis the Mexican government. However, Civic Alliance leaders fretted aboutthe dangers of accepting US Congressional support through the NED, which could

lead to AC being tarred as an instrument of US interventionism. NED ’ s decision

to award its prestigious 1995 Democracy Award to Sergio Aguayo, one of the

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founding members of AC, represented a public endorsement of AC ’ s work by the

international community.NDI’ s involvement in designing the quick-count conducted by AC in the wake

of the closing of the polls signi® cantly improved both its technical soundnessand believability. NDI also supported regional fora on AC electoral observation

efforts in the cities of San Luis PotosõÂ, Guadalajara and Veracruz which brought

together some 200 local civic leaders in each city, the national coordinators ofAC and international civic leaders from Chile, Paraguay and the Philippines. In

addition, NDI sponsored an AC seminar in Mexico City to train election observersand brought together 120 community leaders from all the Mexico’ s 31 states

and the Federal District.38 These conferences played an important role winning

over regional elites for AC’ s electoral monitoring efforts and facilitated its

development as a nation-wide organisation.

Another important international player in the 1994 Mexican elections was theCouncil of Freely-Elected Heads of Government led by Jimmy Carter. The

government s attitude towards the council was mixed. On the one hand, the

government was reluctant to invite the council to observe the process formally

because this could signal a breakdown of the Mexican electoral system and

potentially reduce the regime’ s control over the process. On the other hand,senior government of® cials knew that the presence of an objective international

observer group might give credibility to the election results if the PRD refused to

accept the results, a highly likely outcome. The PRD failed to support the 1993

electoral reforms and split over whether to approve a further round of reforms

in 1994. The other main opposition party, the centre-right PAN, had voted forboth reform initiatives, giving them at least some credibility.

The reforms continued the overhaul of the voter registration list begun in

1990, introduced a new tamper-proof photo identity card for voters, enhanced

the autonomy of the Federal Election Institute (IFE) and allowed international

observers in for the ® rst time. Government of® cials were concerned that withoutthe presence of international observers such as The Council of Freely-Elected

Heads of Government, the PRD would be able to discredit even a clean election,

given the culture of distrust surrounding the conduct of Mexican elections, and

plunge the country into a political crisis. The council could potentially play a

crucial role in the regime’ s strategy of legitimising the elections because of itsability to in¯ uence public opinion in the Western Hemisphere and within the

Clinton administration.

For the council, the main risk in observing the electoral process was that its

presence could be used to legitimise an unfair election. However, not to become

involved would have meant giving up the chance to in¯ uence the process at all.In view of these competing considerations, the council’ s approach was low-key.

It sent two international delegations (in September 1993 and June 1994) to report

on Mexico’ s electoral reforms, ® elded only a small observer mission on election

day, and chose not to bring Carter to Mexico at all. The government’ s decision

to permit international observers came far too late, less than three months shortof the elections, for the council to mount a fully ¯ edged observation mission.

The council had always been concerned that the government would eventually

decide to invite international observers in order to bolster the credibility of the

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elections but not give them enough time to do a serious job. In effect, there was

a danger that the government would pull the wool over the eyes of the

international observers by using them to improve con® dence in a process that

could not be properly observed because of time constraints. President Carterhimself was unwilling to go to Mexico without a formal invitation from all

political parties and the Mexican government. Of all the three major political

parties, only the PRD was willing to consider inviting Carter. There was also the

danger that, in a country like Mexico, Carter would become an issue himself. He

had historically observed elections and also played a mediating role. Mexicanpolitical actors, although separated by a wide chasm of distrust, were simply

unwilling to turn to an ex-US President to sort out their differences. What was

possible in Nicaragua was impossible in Mexico; and the council had to adjust

its strategy accordingly.

The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government made a useful contribu-tion to the democratisation of the electoral process. First, by inviting Mexican

civic leaders like Sergio Aguayo to participate in missions in Haiti, Guyana and

Paraguay, the council sensitised them to the role of international and domestic

observers in promoting fair elections and helped develop a relationship between

the council and the leaders of Mexico’ s emerging election-monitoring groups.Second, by holding meetings with Mexican government of® cials on electoral

issues, the council was able to bring the weight of international public opinion

to bear directly on decision makers. Mexican leaders knew that their actions

were under direct international scrutiny. Third, the council issued two detailed

reports on the Mexican electoral process that were widely circulated amonggovernment of® cials, academics and NGOs throughout the hemisphere.

These reports in effect helped internationalise some of the more arcane but

critically important issues of electoral reform. For example, in September 1993

the council conducted the ® rst ever study of voting patterns in the General

Council of IFE and concluded that the supposedly independent magistratecouncillors had supported the PRI on all important decisions that came before the

council in an 11-month period between October 1990 and September 1991. The

report thus undercut the government’ s assertion that the magistrate councillors

were objective, gave opposition parties more ammunition in their bid to reformIFE, and ensured that international public opinion would not take IFE seriouslyunless its governing structure was reformed to allow full independence for the

magistrate councillors. Fourth, the council’ s intimate knowledge of the pre-

electoral environment and close ties with major Mexican political leaders meant

it was the only international actor able to offer an assessment of the entire

electoral process leading up to election day and beyond. Finally, as the ® rstinternational actor to become involved in Mexican elections, the council helped

pave the way for the government’ s eventual decision to allow international

observers, thereby contributing to an important opening of the Mexican electoral

system that few could have predicted.

On election day, 21 August 1994, the Council in conjunction with NDI and theInternational Republican Institute ® elded 80 observers in all 31 states and the

Federal District. The largest international delegation was sent by Global Ex-

change, an NGO that ® elded 105 representatives. Overall, 943 individuals were

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of® cially accredited as international observers representing 283 organisations

from around the world; the majority came from the US (68%) followed by

Canada (7.6%) and Argentina (3%).39

International observers probably exerted a

psychological in¯ uence on the election far out of proportion to their numbers.Their mere presence, which was widely reported in the media, may have helped

convince ordinary Mexicans that the elections would be clean, thus contributing

to the extraordinarily high rate of turnout among voters. The fact that most

observers agreed that the irregularities characterising the elections had not

affected the overall results of the presidential race, and that there wasno identi® able pattern to them that might indicate fraud contributed to the

credibility of Zedillo’ s victory and Mexican elections generally.40

According to post-election surveys, about 61% of those asked thought that the

elections were clean while 24% did not and 15% did not know. In addition, 64%

felt that the IFE had performed very well. This contrasted sharply with pre-election polls taken in June 1994 when 35%±45% of those surveyed expected

fraud while 65% expected violence.41 In fact, one of the most impressive features

of the elections was the almost complete lack of violence during and after the

elections. By improving the credibility of election results the presence of

international observers almost certainly helped reduce the risk of violence.42

Anattempt by the PRD to protest at what it claimed was a fraudulent election without

presenting much evidence ® zzled out for lack of public support.

The limits of election-monitoring

International actors in Mexico thus played an important role in supporting

domestic observer groups ® nancially, morally and technically. But they also

exerted an independent effect on the electoral process by nudging the regime

further down the path of reform, acting as a psychological deterrent to election

fraud and bolstering the credibility of the ® nal results, thereby reducing the riskof violence.

A contrary view is that international observers may have unwittingly abetted

fraud by legitimising it. The possibility that election observers may legitimise

fraud is a danger intrinsic to the task of election-monitoring, and it applies

equally to domestic and international election observers. This can occur ifobservers fail to detect fraud and pronounce the election ` clean’ , or maliciously

ignore evidence of fraud. Neither of these two eventualities came to pass in 1994

in Mexico. The domestic network of observers covered virtually all areas of the

country. The quick-count ruled out any chance of fraud at the counting stage.

And only PRI-linked observer groups possessed any incentive to cover upevidence of fraud, assuming this was possible, while AC and most international

observers had every incentive to expose it.

More problematic is a situation where the of® cial party pro ® ts from its huge

advantages in terms of ® nancial resources and media access during a campaign,

but otherwise holds a clean election. Here the risk is that observers may end uppronouncing an election fair on the basis of results that, although obtained

through impeccable voting, may re¯ ect unfair campaign conditions. There is no

question that the PRI as a state party enjoyed massive advantages over its rivals,

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particularly with regard to media access and ® nancial reserves. It is, however,

virtually impossible to demonstrate the effects of such advantages on the election

outcome. Also, both domestic and international observer groups throughout the

campaign strongly criticised the government for allowing such inequities be-tween political parties. AC conducted several studies of the electronic media to

track coverage of the presidential race. Pressure by domestic and international

observer groups and opposition parties in turn contributed to the ® rst serious

discussion about campaign and political party ® nance issues in Mexico. The

government’ s unprecedented decision to permit a televised debate between thethree main presidential candidates had an important effect on the race by

enhancing the public perception that the opposition could win. Without the

presence of observer groups, there would have been less pressure on the

government to address these questions.

Finally, experience from other countries, where the government has enjoyedvast advantages over its rivals, suggests that entrenched regimes can lose

elections even if the playing ® eld is highly uneven provided the voter regis-

tration list, the balloting and the count are conducive to a clean election. More

than one dictator has overestimated the advantages of incumbency, called an

election to legitimise his authority at extremely short notice, invited internationalobservers to make the election acceptable to the global community, and then

proceeded to lose in a landslide victory to the hastily organised opposition.

` Stunning’ elections like these have occurred in India in 1977, the Philippines in

1986, Poland in 1989 and a host of other countries.43

Opposition parties can

therefore overcome the advantages of state parties if the election itself is clean,which in turn may depend partly on the presence of international observers. The

fact that PAN has won gubernatorial elections in four states and several cities,

despite highly unequal campaign conditions, is further evidence in this direction.

International observers focus on elections. Elections go to the heart of

democracy, but obviously democracy involves something more than just elec-tions. Merely holding a clean election will not necessarily resolve such maladies

as the maldistribution of income, weak institutions or deep ethnic cleavages.

Elections may simply be a form of ` skin-deep’ or ` easy’ democratisation. Yet

clean elections can over time contribute to the growth of institutions such as

political parties and civic associations, give the poor a voice in the politicalsystem, punish corruption at the ballot box, and facilitate the development of

rules to deal with con¯ ict. Amartya Sen has shown how competitive political

environments can provide an early warning system to prevent famine, while the

accountability intrinsic to democracy may induce policy makers to correct

misguided policies before it is too late.44

The ` skin-deep’ criticism is thusexaggerated and misleading.

Conclusion

The dramatic growth of election-monitoring since the mid-1980s is intimatelytied to fundamental changes in the structure of both domestic and international

politics. That election-monitoring has become so widespread in so short a period

of time, despite the fact that it so often runs afoul of a state-centric notion of

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sovereignty, testi® es to the depth of these changes. The growth of election-

monitoring has major implications for building democratic institutions. Election-

monitoring not only facilitates reasonably fair elections but the development of

basic democratic institutions and habits as well. The crucial role of NGOs ininternational monitoring has contributed to greater pluralism in global society,

and produced a web of largely cooperative ties based on niche specialisation

between IGOs and NGOs. Finally, election-monitoring is nothing more than a way

of enforcing the political rights enshrined in major international covenants. As

external election-monitoring becomes more widely accepted and practised, theeffective scope of these rights will expand accordingly.

Election-monitoring has thus become the central element of a rapidly develop-

ing international regime to preserve and extend democracy. The United Nations

should continue to develop and intensify the patterns of collaboration with

international and indigenous NGOs documented in the Mexican and other cases.A better international division of labour between the UN and NGOs would foster

democracy.

Notes1

R A Pastor, ` Elections, monitoring’ , in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed), Encyclopedia of Democracy,

Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, p 409.2

R D Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1993, especially ch 6.3

Ibid.4

T M Franck, ` The emerging right to democratic governance’ , American Journal of International Law, Vol

86, No 1, 1992, p 66±68.5

A Lake, `The enlargement of democracy’ , From Containment to Enlargement, US Department of State

Dispatch, 3 (39), 27 September 1993, pp 658±664.6

See F Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books, 1992.7

M W Doyle, ` Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs’ , Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 12, Nos 3 and

4, 1983, pp 205±235, 323±353. Doyle was not the ® rst to point out the connection between peace and

democracy. Earlier works on the topic are D Babst, ` A force for peace’ , Industrial Research, April 1972,

pp 55±58; and R J Rummel, Understanding War and Con¯ ict, Los Angeles: Sage, 1975±81. Doyle’ s article,

provoked far greater interest in the topic.8

D H Levine, `Religion and politics, politics and religion: an introduction’ , in Levine (ed), Churches andPolitics in Latin America, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979. See also S P Huntington, The Third Wave:

Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989, p 78.9

Huntington, The Third Wave, p 83.10

J N Rosenau ` Sovereignty in a turbulent world’ , in G Lyons & M Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia:

State Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995,

pp 204±209.11

The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, Observing Nicaragua’ s Elections, 1989± 1990,

Atlanta, GA: Carter Center of Emory University, 1990, pp 25±26.12

C EguizaÂbal, ` Las Naciones Unidas y la consolidacioÂn de la paz en CentroameÂrica’ , in O. Pellicer (ed), La

Seguridad Internacional en AmeÂrica Latina y el Caribe, Mexico City: Instituto Mat õÂas Romero de Estudios

DiplomaÂticos, 1995, pp 119±127.13

The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, Observing Nicaragua’ s Elections, 1989± 1990,

pp 16±21.14

Ibid, pp 25±33.15

J McCoy, L Garber & R Pastor, ` Pollwatching and peacemaking’ , in L Diamond & M F Plattner (eds), The

Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p 181.16

National Democratic Institute, Nation Building: The UN and Namibia, Washington, DC: National Demo-

cratic Institute, 1990, pp 26±34. See also L Cliffe, The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner, 1994, especially chs 4, 6±8.17

National Democratic Institute, Nation Building: The UN and Namibia, pp 35±36.

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18See M W Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC ’ s Civil Mandate, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,

1995.19

On the relationship between the OAS and the UN in Latin America, see R Greene, ` El debate ONU-OEA:

nuevas competencias en el ambito de la paz y la seguridad internacional’ , in O. Pellicer (ed), Las NacionesUnidas: VisioÂn de MeÂxico, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1994, pp 72±102; and S N

MacFarlane & T G Weiss, ` The United Nations, regional organizations, and human security: building theory

in Central America’ , Security Studies, Vol 2, No 1, Autumn 1992, pp 6±37.20

A K Henrikson, ` The growth of regional organizations and the role of the United Nations’ , in L Fawcett

& A Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp 142±147.21

R A. Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1992, p 282.22

On the implications of humanitarian assistance for sovereignty, see T G Weiss & J Chopra, ` Sovereignty

under siege: from intervention to humanitarian space’ in Lyons & Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia,

pp 87±114.23

Pastor, ` Elections, Monitoring’ , p 409.24

See, for example, Franck, `The emerging right to democratic governance’ . See also G H Fox, ` The right to

participation in international law’ , Yale Journal of International Law, Vol 17, No 539, 1992, pp 539±607;

and F TesoÂn, ` Changing perceptions of domestic jurisdiction and intervention’ , in T J Farer (ed), Beyond

Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1996, pp 29±51.25

For a sceptical view of Western efforts to promote human rights in Asia, see B Kausikan, ` Asia’ s different

standard’ , Foreign Policy, Vol 92, 1993, pp 24±51.26

Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, p 84.27

See National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute for International Affairs, The May9, 1989 Panamanian Elections, Washington, DC: NDI/IRI, 1990.

28For a discussion of UN recognition practices and an argument in favour of democratic legitimacy as the

standard for recognition see, G H Fox, ` Multinational election monitoring: advancing international law on

the high wire’ , Fordham International Law Journal, Vol 18, No 5, May 1995, pp 1658±1667.29

A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol 1. ed J P Mayer, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969, Part

I, pp 62±84; Part II, pp 174±195, 262±311.30

Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, pp 32±34, 40±58.31

EguizaÂbal, `Las naciones Unidas y la consolidacioÂn de la paz en CentroameÂrica’ , pp 128±137.32

R Pastor in The Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, Mission to Haiti #3: Elections for

Parliament and Municipalities, Atlanta, GA: Carter Center of Emory University, 1995, p 19. See also,

Robert Maguire et al, Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986± 1996,

Occasional Paper #23, Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 1996.33

See, for example, R Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

1971; S M Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday, 1960. See also, Z

Arat, `Democracy and economic development: modernization theory revisited’ , Comparative Politics, Vol

21, 1988, pp 21±37.34

R A Pastor, Integration with Mexico: Options for US Policy, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1993,

especially pp 27±28, 65±67.35

See Huntington, The Third Wave. See also L Diamond, J Linz & S M Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing

Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990; and Diamond &

Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy.36

See Unidad de Asistencia Electoral, Posibilidades de Apoyo a Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de

Observadores Electorales en Mexico, Mexico City: UN Mission, 23 May 1994.37

The grounds for classifying NED and NDI as NGOs lies in their autonomy from Congress and the executive

in the case of NED and from the Democratic Party, in the case of NDI. Likewise, the Council of

Freely-Elected Heads of Government was created as a private initiative by former President Carter, and

operates independently of any government.38

`Brie ® ng paper for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International

Republican Institute’ s Joint International Delegation to the 1994 Mexican elections’ , August 1994, p 14.39

Instituto Federal Electoral, Informe Sobre Observadores y Visitantes Extranjeros, Mexico City: Instituto

Federal Electoral, 1994.40

For the view of international observers (including this author) on the 1994 elections, see The Council of

Freely-Elected Heads of Government, The August 21, 1994 Mexican National Elections, Fourth Report,

Atlanta, GA: Carter Center of Emory University, November 1994. On the views of Mexico’ s most important

domestic observer group, the Civic Alliance, see Alianza Civica, La Calidad de la Jornada Electoral del

21 de Agosto de 1994: Informe de Alianza Civica ObservacioÂn `94, Mexico City: 19 September 1994. For

the views of other domestic and international groups, see Instituto Federal Electoral, Proyecto de Informe

a la Camara de Diputados, Addenda 21, 22 and 23, Mexico City: Instituto Federal Electoral, 1994.

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41J McCoy, ` On the Mexican elections’ , Hemisphere, Fall 1994, p 28.

42For examples from other countries on the possible functions of international observers, see J McCoy, L

Garber & R Pastor, ` Pollwatching and peacekeeping’ , Journal of Democracy, Vol 2, No 4, 1994,

pp 102±114.43

See Huntington, The Third Wave, pp 175±180.44

A Sen, `Freedoms and needs’ , The New Republic, 10 and 17 January 1994, pp 31±38.

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