Developm ental Science, Developmental Systems, and

1

CHAPTER 1

Developmental Science, DevelopmentalSystems, and Contemporary Theories ofHuman Development

RICHARD M. LERNER

FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TODEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 2

IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONAL METATHEORIESFOR DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 5

FROM DEFICIT TO DIVERSITY INDEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 6

VESTIGES OF REDUCTIONIST MODELS 7USING THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS

PERSPECTIVE FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,AND APPLICATION 10

DIVERSITY—A FUNDAMENTAL ASSET OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT 11

FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OF A POSITIVEHUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 11

FRAMING THE RESEARCH AGENDA OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT 12

CONCLUSIONS 13REFERENCES 14

Much like the universities within which they are typicallyformulated, theoretical innovations in human develop-ment usually move at glacial speed. As described byCairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol-ume), decades may elapse between the formulation of anew approach to human development and its ascendancyand proliferation in variations of the initial model as it isused in research and organized into a network, or “fam-ily” (Reese & Overton, 1970) of related theories. Finally,it passes from the scene, losing its role as an active or in-fluential frame for research and application. This diminu-tion of influence can occur for many reasons.

There may be the identification of (a) fundamentalconceptual f laws, including empirically counterfactualassertions (e.g., see Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook,this volume, for examples of theories that split nature-variables from nurture-variables in attempting to ac-count for human development, and also Lerner, 2004a,2004b, for a discussion of these problems in behavior

The preparation of this chapter was supported in part bygrants from the National 4-H Council and from the John Tem-pleton Foundation.

genetic and sociobiological instances of such split con-ceptions); (b) irreparable problems with the methodsassociated with the empirical tests of ideas derivedfrom the theory (e.g., see Gottlieb, Walhsten, & Lick-liter, Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume, GarciaColl, Bearer, & Lerner, 2004, and Lerner, 2002, for dis-cussions of such problems in behavior genetics and so-ciobiology); or (c) substantive “overreaching,” that is,attempting to account for phenomena beyond the scopeof the model (e.g., see Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg,Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000; Elder & Shanahan,Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Horowitz,2000; Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, thisvolume; Suomi, 2004a, 2004b, for discussions of thisproblem in genetic reductionist accounts, as occur inbehavior genetics and sociobiology, of social behavioror of the social and cultural institutions of society; seeFischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this vol-ume, and Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook,this volume, for discussions of this problem in neona-tivist accounts of cognitive development; and seeBloom, 1998, for a discussion of this problem in behav-iorist accounts of language development).

COPYRIG

HTED M

ATERIAL

2 Developmental Science, Developmental Systems, and Contemporary Theories of Human Development

Cairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, thisvolume) note as well that a theoretical innovation inone period may actually constitute a return to ideasfrom an earlier era. When theoretical ideas are initiallyintroduced, they may not become popular or even ac-cepted for several reasons. There may be a lack of con-ceptual preparedness for the ideas or vocabulary usedin a theory (e.g., see Flavell, 1963, for a discussion ofwhy Piaget’s early formulations, e.g., in 1923, were notembraced in the United States for almost 40 years). Inaddition, the ideas in a theory may not be able to betested optimally because of methodological limitations(e.g., the absence of statistical procedures for model-ing multilevel, hierarchically embedded, and recipro-cal relations across time; e.g., see Nesselroade & Ram,2004). Moreover, the “spirit of the times,” the zeitgeist(Boring, 1950), may preclude acceptance of ideas thatwould require realigning the sociology of the science.Cairns and Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol-ume) recount the challenges of instituting a truly multi-disciplinary field of child development given the morethan 50-year predominance of psychologists and ofpsychogenic (and reductionist) theories in that field.

Nevertheless, such conceptual, methodological, andsociological constraints on the acceptance of a theoreti-cal orientation may be overcome (e.g., through the sortof evidentiary process involved in the paradigmatic rev-olutions discussed by Kuhn, 1962). As such, a theory in-troduced in one historical period may be rediscovered ora newer instantiation of it may be generated, albeit being“old wine in a new bottle.”

The focus within the contemporary study of humandevelopment on concepts and models associatedwith developmental systems theories (Cairns & Cairns,Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Gottlieb et al.,Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 2002;Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) is acase in point, especially given that the roots of thesemodels may be linked to ideas in developmental sci-ence that were presented at least as early as the 1930sand 1940s (e.g., Maier & Schneirla, 1935; Novikoff,1945a, 1945b; von Bertalanffy, 1933), if not even sig-nificantly earlier. Table 1.1 presents the defining fea-tures of developmental systems theories and, as Cairnsand Cairns (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) il-lustrate, there are parallels between the ideas pre-sented in this table and the interests of and conceptsused by late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century founders of the study of child development.

Among the interrelated, and in fact “fused” (Tobach& Greenberg, 1984), defining features of contempo-rary developmental systems theories of human devel-opment are (a) relationism, the integration of levels oforganization; (b) historical embeddedness and tempo-rality; (c) relative plasticity; and (d) diversity (Damon& Lerner, 1998; Lerner, 2004a, 2004b). As discussedin the Cairns and Cairns chapter, these four componentsof developmental systems theories of human develop-ment have a long and rich tradition in the history of thefield (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, thisvolume). For example, Cairns and Cairns describeJames Mark Baldwin’s (1897/1906) interest in thestudy of development-in-context, and thus in inte-grated, multilevel, and hence interdisciplinary scholar-ship. These interests were shared as well by LightnerWitmer, the founder in 1896 of the first psychologicalclinic in the United States (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3,this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 1977).

Cairns and Cairns also describe the conception of de-velopmental processes within developmental systems the-ories—involving reciprocal interaction, bidirectionality,plasticity, and biobehavioral organization (all modernemphases)—as integral in the thinking of the founders ofthe field of human development. Wilhelm Stern (1914)stressed the holism that is associated with a developmen-tal systems perspective about these developmentalprocesses. Other contributors to the foundations andearly progress ofthe field of human development (e.g.,John Dewey, 1916; Kurt Lewin, 1935, 1954; and John B.Watson, 1928) stressed the importance of linking childdevelopment research with application and child advo-cacy (Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Zigler, 1998). This orienta-tion toward the application of developmental science is acontemporary view as well, derived from the stress onplasticity and temporal embeddedness within develop-mental systems theories.

FROM DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGYTO DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE

In the almost decade that has passed between placingthe fifth edition of the Handbook of Child Psychologyinto production and the appearance of the sixth edition,there has been a remarkably rapid change in the predom-inant theoretical foci used to study human development.Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the contemporary

From Developmental Psychology to Developmental Science 3

TABLE 1.1 Defining Features of Developmental Systems Theories

A Relational MetatheoryPredicated on a postmodern philosophical perspective that transcends Cartesian dualism, developmental systems theories are framed by arelational metatheory for human development. There is, then, a rejection of all splits between components of the ecology of humandevelopment (e.g., between nature- and nurture-based variables), and between continuity and discontinuity and between stability andinstability. Systemic syntheses or integrations replace dichotomizations or other reductionist partitions of the developmental system.

The Integration of Levels of OrganizationRelational thinking and the rejection of Cartesian splits is associated with the idea that all levels of organization within the ecology ofhuman development are integrated, or fused. These levels range from the biological and physiological through the cultural and historical.

Developmental Regulation across Ontogeny Involves Mutually Inf luential Individual ← → Context RelationsAs a consequence of the integration of levels, the regulation of development occurs through mutually inf luential connections among alllevels of the developmental system, ranging from genes and cell physiology through individual mental and behavioral functioning to society,culture, the designed and natural ecology and, ultimately, history. These mutually inf luential relations may be represented generically asLevel 1 ← →, Level 2 (e.g., Family ← → Community), and in the case of ontogeny may be represented as individual ← → context.

Integrated Actions, Individual ← → Context Relations, Are the Basic Unit of Analysis within Human DevelopmentThe character of developmental regulation means that the integration of actions—of the individual on the context and of the multiple levelsof the context on the individual ( individual ← → context)—constitute the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of the basic process ofhuman development.

Temporality and Plasticity in Human DevelopmentAs a consequence of the fusion of the historical level of analysis—and therefore temporality—in the levels of organization comprising theecology of human development, the developmental system is characterized by the potential for systematic change, by plasticity. Observedtrajectories of intraindividual change may vary across time and place as a consequence of such plasticity.

Relative PlasticityDevelopmental regulation may both facilitate and constrain opportunities for change. Thus, change in individual ← → context relations isnot limitless, and the magnitude of plasticity (the probability of change in a developmental trajectory occurring in relation to variation incontextual conditions) may vary across the life span and history. Nevertheless, the potential for plasticity at both individual and contextuallevels constitutes a fundamental strength of all human development.

Intraindividual Change, Interindividual Differences in Intraindividual Change, and the Fundamental Substantive Significanceof DiversityThe combinations of variables across the integrated levels of organization within the developmental system that provide the basis of thedevelopmental process will vary at least in part across individuals and groups. This diversity is systematic and lawfully produced byidiographic, group differential, and generic (nomothetic) phenomena. The range of interindividual differences in intraindividual changeobserved at any point in time is evidence of the plasticity of the developmental system, and makes the study of diversity of fundamentalsubstantive significance for the description, explanation, and optimization of human development.

Optimism, the Application of Developmental Science, and the Promotion of Positive Human DevelopmentThe potential for and instantiations of plasticity legitimate an optimistic and proactive search for characteristics of individuals and of theirecologies that, together, can be arrayed to promote positive human development across life. Through the application of developmentalscience in planned attempts (interventions) to enhance (e.g., through social policies or community-based programs) the character ofhumans’ developmental trajectories, the promotion of positive human development may be achieved by aligning the strengths (operationizedas the potentials for positive change) of individuals and contexts.

Multidisciplinarity and the Need for Change-Sensitive MethodologiesThe integrated levels of organization comprising the developmental system require collaborative analyses by scholars from multipledisciplines. Multidisciplinary knowledge and, ideally, interdisciplinary knowledge is sought. The temporal embeddedness and resultingplasticity of the developmental system requires that research designs, methods of observation and measurement, and procedures for dataanalysis be change-sensitive and able to integrate trajectories of change at multiple levels of analysis.

emphases on developmental systems theories, not as anew lens for the study of human development, but asa return to the historical roots of the field (e.g., in takingan integrative approach to nature and nurture, instressing multidisciplinarity, in considering the role ofspirituality as a vital dimension of human life, and in

applying developmental science). What Cairns (1998)and I (Lerner, 1998) observed in our respective chaptersin the fifth edition of the handbook as theoretical trendsor cutting-edge interests in developmental science havebecome, at this writing, clear indicators of the main-stream and distinctive features of the field. Indeed, the


centrality of systemic and multidisciplinary thinking,spanning and integrating basic and applied scholarship,has been associated with a change in the very label ofthe field during this time period.

A decade ago, most scholars studying human devel-opment labeled the field either as developmental psy-chology or, if they were not themselves psychologists(e.g., Elder, 1998), as a field wherein psychological sci-ence was the predominant lens through which to studythe span of human life. Today, however, the field hasbecome much more deeply and broadly multidiscipli-nary (and, in some subareas, actually interdisciplinaryor, in other words, disciplinarily integrative, e.g., seeElder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, thisvolume). As a consequence, more and more scholars ofhuman development refer to their field as developmen-tal science (e.g., see Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, thisHandbook, this volume; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter8, this Handbook, this volume), and at least one leadinggraduate textbook in the field has changed its title fromDevelopmental Psychology (Bornstein & Lamb, 1999)to Developmental Science (Bornstein & Lamb, 2005).

The change of name for the field studying the humanlife span reflects in large part key intellectual changesacross the past decade: (a) the certain demise of splitconceptions of the nature-nurture issue, and of reduc-tionistic approaches to either nature formulations(sociobiology or behavior genetics) or to nurture formu-lations (e.g., S-R [stimulus-response] models or func-tional analysis approaches) (Overton, Chapter 2, thisHandbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter 4, this Hand-book, this volume); (b) the ascendancy of focus on de-velopmental systems models, conceptions that seek tofuse systemically the levels of organization involved inthe ecology of human development (from biology andphysiology through culture and history; e.g., see Baltes,Lindenberger, & Staudinger, Chapter 11, this Hand-book, this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, thisHandbook, this volume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, thisHandbook, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6,this Handbook, this volume); and (c) the emphasis on re-lations among levels and not on the main effects of anylevel itself, as constituting the fundamental units ofanalysis of developmental analysis (e.g., see Bronfen-brenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this

volume; Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook,this volume; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8, thisHandbook, this volume; Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi,Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume).

The range of chapters in this edition of the Hand-book illustrates the diverse theoretical family of mod-els that are instances of or, at the least, are framed bydevelopmental systems ideas about the relationalprocesses linking the multiple, integrated levels of or-ganization within the ecology of human development.These models conceptualize both traditional areas ofinterest within the study of human development, suchas biological development (Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5,this Handbook, this volume); perceptual and motor de-velopment (Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook,this volume); personality, affective, and social devel-opment (Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, thisvolume; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, thisHandbook, this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12,this Handbook, this volume; Magnusson & Stattin,Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Rathunde &Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this vol-ume); culture and development (Shweder et al., Chapter13, this Handbook, this volume); and cognitive devel-opment (Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, thisvolume; Fischer & Bidell, Chapter 7, this Handbook,this volume), and emergent areas of intellectual interestsuch as spiritual and religious development (Oser,Scarlett, & Bucher, Chapter 17, this Handbook, thisvolume); the development of diverse children (Spencer,Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume); and positivehuman development (Benson, Scales, Hamilton, &Sesma, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume).

Indeed, the potential plasticity of human develop-ment that is a defining feature of ontogenetic changewithin the dynamic, developmental system (Balteset al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume; Got-tlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume;Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this vol-ume) provides a rationale for both the application ofdevelopmental science (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3,this Handbook, this volume) and for the possibility thatpositive development may be promoted across the lifecourse of humans through the identification and align-ment of resources in individuals and their contexts thatfoster health and positive growth (Benson et al., Chap-ter 16, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, the em-phasis on how the individual acts on the context to

Implications of Relational Metatheories for Developmental Science 5

contribute to the plastic relations with the context thatregulate adaptive development (Brandtstädter, Chap-ter 10, this Handbook, this volume) fosters an interestin person-centered (compared with variable-centered)approaches to the study of human development (Mag-nusson & Stattin, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume;Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Hand-book, this volume). Furthermore, given that the arrayof individual and contextual variables involved inthese relations constitute a virtually open set (e.g.,there are over 70 trillion potential human genotypesand each of them may be coupled across life with aneven larger number of life course trajectories of socialexperiences; Hirsch, 2004), the diversity of develop-ment becomes a prime, substantive focus for develop-mental science (Lerner, 2004a; Spencer, Chapter 15,this Handbook, this volume). The diverse person, con-ceptualized from a strength-based perspective (in thatthe potential plasticity of ontogenetic change consti-tutes a fundamental strength of all humans; Spencer,Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume), and ap-proached with the expectation that positive changescan be promoted across all instances of this diversityas a consequence of health-supportive alignments be-tween people and setting (Benson et al., Chapter 16,this Handbook, this volume), becomes the necessarysubject of developmental science inquiry.

These theoretical emphases in developmental sci-ence have been coupled with enormous advances inquantitative statistical approaches, arguably especiallyin the longitudinal methods required to appraise thechanging relations in the developmental system be-tween the individual and the context (e.g., see Duncan,Magnuson, & Ludwig, 2004; Laub & Sampson, 2004;McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003; Molenaar, 2004; Nes-selroade & Ram, 2004; Phelps, Furstenberg, & Colby,2002; Singer & Willett, 2003; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; von Eye, 1990; von Eye & Bergman,2003; von Eye & Gutiérrez Peña, 2004; Willett, 2004;Young, Savola, & Phelps, 1991). Moreover, there hasbeen an increased appreciation of the importance ofqualitative methods, both as valuable tools for theanalysis of the life course and as a means to triangulat-ing quantitative appraisals of human development. Assuch, there has been a growth in the use of traditionalqualitative methods, along with the invention of newqualitative techniques (e.g., Mishler, 2004).

Finally, this exciting and innovative period in devel-opmental theory and methodology has been framed bya renewed appreciation of the philosophical groundingof developmental science in postmodern ideas. Thephilosophical ideas that have had the most attraction todevelopmental scientists are relational conceptions thattranscend fruitless debates (e.g., regarding maturationversus early experience as the basis for learning, orneonativist versus empiricist bases of early cognitivedevelopment; e.g., see Spelke & Newport, 1998) predi-cated on false dichotomies that split apart the fused de-velopmental system (e.g., see Overton, 1998, 2003,Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, 1998,Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume).

IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONALMETATHEORIES FORDEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE

The ascendancy of a developmental systems frame forthe conduct of developmental science has been a prod-uct and a producer of a shift in the paradigm, or philos-ophy of science, framing discourse within the field(Overton, 1998, 2003, Chapter 2, this Handbook, thisvolume). As noted, the field has changed from beingpredicated on a positivist and reductionist metatheory,wherein a key assumption was that the universe wasuniform and that it was permanent. It has shifted to apostmodernist conception that transcends Cartesiansplits between the real and the epiphenomenal (e.g., asinstantiated within past eras as nature versus nurture,maturation versus learning, continuity versus disconti-nuity, stability versus instability, or simply constancyversus change; Brim & Kagan, 1980; Lerner, 2002;Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). Theintegrative, relational metatheory that has emerged byavoiding all splits (Overton, 1998, Chapter 2, thisHandbook, this volume) focuses instead on the con-struction of relations across the range of levels oforganization constituting the ecology of human devel-opment (e.g., Baltes, 1997; Baltes et al., Chapter 11,this Handbook, this volume; Bronfenbrenner, 2005;Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Hand-book, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, thisHandbook, this volume).


Moreover, within the context of the relationalmetatheory that has served as a product and a producerof developmental systems thinking (Lerner, 2002),there has been a rejection of an idea that is derived fromthe positivist and reductionist notion that the universeis uniform and permanent—that the study of human be-havior should be aimed at identifying nomothetic lawsthat pertain to the generic human being. This idea wasreplaced by a stress on the individual, on the impor-tance of attempting to identify both differential and po-tentially idiographic laws as involved in the course ofhuman life (e.g., Block, 1971; Magnusson, 1999a,1999b), and on regarding the individual as an activeproducer of his or her own development (Brandtstädter,1998, 1999, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume;Lerner, 1982; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; Lerner,Theokas, & Jelicic, 2005; Rathunde & Csikszentmiha-lyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume). Similarly,the changed philosophical grounding of the field has al-tered developmental science from a field that enactedresearch as if time and place were irrelevant to the exis-tence and operation of laws of behavioral developmentto a field that has sought to identify the role of contex-tual embeddedness and temporality in shaping the de-velopmental trajectories of diverse individuals andgroups (e.g., see Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Hand-book, this volume; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter14, this Handbook, this volume; Elder, Modell, & Parke,1993; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook,this volume).

Arguably, the most profound impact of the relationalmetatheory on the practice of developmental sciencehas occurred in the conceptualization of diversity, ofinterindividual differences, in developmental trajecto-ries (Lerner, 2004a, 2004b; Spencer, Chapter 15, thisHandbook, this volume). From the perspective of theuniformity and permanence assumptions, individualdifferences—diversity—were seen, at best, through alens of error variance, as prima facie proof of a lack ofexperimental control or of inadequate measurement. Atworst, diversity across time or place, or in the individ-ual differences among people, was regarded as an indi-cation that a deficit was present. Either the persondoing the research was remiss for using a research de-sign or measurement model that was replete with error(with a lack of experimental control sufficient to elimi-nate interindividual differences), or the people whovaried from the norms associated with the generic

human being—the relations among variables that weregeneralizable across time and place—were in some waydeficient (cf. Gould, 1981, 1996). They were, to at leastsome observers, less than normatively human.

FROM DEFICIT TO DIVERSITY INDEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE

For colleagues trained in developmental science within thepast decade, the prior philosophical grounding and associ-ated philosophical assumptions about science may seemeither unbelievably naive or simply quaint vestiges froman unenlightened past. In what, for the history of science,is a very short period (Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, thisHandbook, this volume), participants in the field of humandevelopment have seen a sea change that perhaps qualifiesas a true paradigm shift in what is thought of as the natureof human nature and in the appreciation of time, place,and individual diversity for understanding the laws ofhuman behavior and development (Bronfenbrenner &Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume; Elder &Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume; Over-ton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Shweder et al.,Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter4, this Handbook, this volume).

The publication in 1998 of the fifth edition of theHandbook of Child Psychology, edited by WilliamDamon, heralded that the field of human developmentrejected the hegemony of positivism and reductionism.As evidenced by the chapters in all four volumes of theDamon (1998) Handbook, and arguably especially in thevolume of that edition that corresponds to the presentone, Theoretical Models of Human Development (Damon& Lerner, 1998), the majority of the scholarship thendefining the cutting edge of the field of human develop-ment was associated with the sorts of developmentalsystems models of human development that fill thepages of the present edition of this volume of the Hand-book and that, as projected by Cairns and Cairns in1998, were at the threshold of their time of ascendancywithin developmental science.

The view of the world that emerged from the chaptersin the fifth edition of Volume 1 of the Handbook (Damon& Lerner, 1998) and that is confirmed across the chaptersof the present volume (including those chapters repre-sented in both editions and those chapters new to thisedition) is that the universe is dynamic and variegated.Time and place therefore are matters of substance, not

Vestiges of Reductionist Models 7

error; and to understand human development, one mustappreciate how variables associated with person, place,and time coalesce to shape the structure and function ofbehavior and its systematic and successive change(Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume;Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,this volume; Benson et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook,this volume; Elder, 1998; Elder, Modell, & Parke, 1993;Magnusson, 1999a, 1999b; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998,Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Shweder et al.,Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume; Spencer, Chap-ter 15, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter 4,this Handbook, this volume).

Accordingly, diversity of person and context hasmoved into the foreground of the analysis of human de-velopment (Lerner, 1991, 1998, 2002, 2004a, 2004b).The dynamic, developmental systems perspective fram-ing the contemporary study of human development doesnot reject the idea that there may be general laws ofhuman development. Instead, there is an insistence onthe presence of individual laws as well and a convictionthat any generalizations about groups or humanity as awhole require empirical verification, not preempiricalstipulation (Lerner, 2002; Magnusson & Stattin, Chap-ter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Overton, Chapter 2,this Handbook, this volume).

To paraphrase the insight of Kluckhohn and Murray(1948), made more than a half century ago, all peopleare like all other people, all people are like some otherpeople, and each person is like no other person. Today,then, the science of human development recognizesthat there are idiographic, differential, and nomotheticlaws of human behavior and development (e.g., see Em-merich, 1968; Lerner, 2002). Each person and eachgroup possesses unique and shared characteristics thatneed to be the core targets of developmental analysis.

Differences, then, among people or groups are notnecessarily indicators of deficits in one and strengths inthe other (Spencer, Chapter 15, this Handbook, this vol-ume). Certainly, it is not useful to frame the study ofhuman development through a model that a priori setsone group as the standard for positive or normativedevelopment and where another group, when differentfrom this normative one, is therefore defined as being indeficit. If there is any remaining place in developmentalscience for a deficit model of humans, it is useful onlyfor understanding the thinking of those individuals whocontinue to treat diversity as either by definition indica-

tive of error variance or as necessarily reflective of adeficiency of human development.

VESTIGES OF REDUCTIONIST MODELS

Despite the contemporary emphasis on a relationalmetatheory and on developmental systems theories, theremnants of reductionism and deficit thinking still re-main at the periphery of developmental science. Theseinstances of genetic reductionism exist in behavior ge-netics (e.g., Rowe, 1994; Plomin, 2000), in sociobiology(e.g., Rushton, 1999, 2000), and in at least some formsof evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss, 2003). These ap-proaches constitute today’s version of the biologizingerrors of the past, such as eugenics and racial hygiene(Proctor, 1988).

As explained by Collins et al. (2000), these ideas areno longer seen as part of the forefront of scientific the-ory. Nevertheless, their influence on scientific and pub-lic policy persists. Renowned geneticists, such as Bearer(2004), Edelman (1987, 1988), Feldman (e.g., Feldman& Laland, 1996), Ho (1984), Lewontin (2000), Müller-Hill (1988), and Venter (e.g., Venter et al., 2001); andeminent colleagues in comparative and biological psy-chology, such as Greenberg (e.g., Greenberg & Haraway,2002; Greenberg & Tobach, 1984), Gottlieb (1997,2004), Hirsch (1997, 2004), Michel (e.g., Michel &Moore, 1995), and Tobach (1981, 1994; Tobach, Gianut-sos, Topoff, & Gross, 1974), alert us to the need for con-tinued intellectual and social vigilance, lest such flawedideas about genes and human development become thefoci of public policies or social programs.

Such applications of counterfactual ideas remain realpossibilities, and in some cases unfortunate realities,due at least in part to what Horowitz (2000) described asthe affinity of the “Person in the Street” to simplisticmodels of genetic effects on behavior. These simple and,I must emphasize, erroneous models are used by the Per-son in the Street to form opinions or to make decisionsabout human differences and potentials.

Genetic reductionism can, and has, led to views ofdiversity as a matter of the “haves” and the “have nots”(e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Rushton, 1999,2000). There are, in this view, those people who mani-fest the normative characteristics of human behaviorand development. Given the diversity-insensitive as-sumptions and research that characterized much of the


history of scholarship in human development even intothe 1990s, these normative features of human develop-ment were associated with middle-class, EuropeanAmerican samples (Graham, 1992; McLoyd, 1998;Shweder et al., Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume;Spencer, 1990, Chapter 15, this Handbook, this vol-ume). In turn, there are those people who manifestother characteristics, and these individuals were gener-ally non-European American and non-middle-class.However, if the former group is regarded as normative,then the characteristics of the latter groups are re-garded as nonnormative (Gould, 1996). When such aninterpretation is forwarded, entry has thus been madedown the slippery slope of moving from a description ofbetween-group differences to an attribution of deficitsin the latter groups (Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b).

Such an attribution is buttressed when seen throughthe lens of genetic reductionism because in this concep-tion, it must be genes that provide the final, material,and efficient cause of the characteristics of the lattergroups (e.g., see Rowe, 1994; Rushton, 2000). Thesenon-European American or non-middle-class groups are,in the fully tautological reasoning associated with ge-netic reductionism, behaviorally deficient because of thegenes they possess, and because of the genes they pos-sess, they have behavioral deficits (e.g., see Rushton,2000). Simply, the genes that place one in a racial groupare the genes that provide either deficits or assets in be-havior, and one racial group possesses the genes that areassets and the other group possesses the genes that aredeficits.

As shown in Table 1.2, these genetic reductionistideas may have profound and dire effects on public poli-cies and social programs (Lerner, 2004a, 2004b). Thetable presents “A” beliefs about whether genetic reduc-tionist ideas are believed to be either (1) true or (2) false.The table presents also “B” public policy and social pro-gram implications that would be associated with geneticreductionism were it in fact (1) true or (2) false undereither of the two belief conditions involved in “A.” More-over, the “A.2.B.2.” quadrant of the table not only pres-ents the policy and program implications of believingthat the genetic reductionist conception is believed to befalse when it is in fact false. In addition, this quadrant il-lustrates the policy and program implications of believ-ing developmental systems theory to be true when it is infact the case. Table 1.2 demonstrates that if genetic re-ductionism is believed to be true, then irrespective ofwhether it is in fact true (and, it must be emphasized thatit is incontrovertibly not true), a range of actions may bepromoted that constrain people’s freedom of associa-tion, reproductive rights, and even survival.

In contrast, Table 1.3 presents the different implica-tions for policies and programs of strict environmental(radical contextual) reductionist theories. As empha-sized by Overton (1998, 2003, Chapter 2, this Hand-book, this volume), split and reductionist conceptionsare equally philosophically problematic and empiricallyflawed. Both of these split conceptions thus can be ex-pected to result in problems for the conduct of scienceand for the application of science to policies and pro-grams. This comparability of problems between genetic

TABLE 1.2 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Hereditarian (Genetic Reductionist) “Split ” Conception of Genes(A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False

A. Hereditarian “split ” conception is believed to be:

1. True 2. False

B. Public policy and social program implications if hereditarian “split ” position were in fact:

1. True 2. False 1. True 2. False

Repair inferior genotypes, makingthem equal to superior genotypes

Miscegenation laws

Restrictions of personal liberties ofcarriers of inferior genotypes(separation, discrimination, distinctsocial tracts)

Sterilization

Elimination of inferior genotypes fromgenetic pool

Same as A.1, B.1 Wasteful and futile humanitarianpolicies

Wasteful and futile programs ofequal opportunity, affirmativeaction, equity, and social justice

Policies and programs to quell socialunrest because of unrequitedaspirations of geneticallyconstrained people

Deterioration of culture anddestruction of civil society

Equity, social justice, equalopportunity, affirmative action

Celebration of diversity

Universal participation in civic life

Democracy

Systems assessment and engagement

Civil society

Vestiges of Reductionist Models 9

TABLE 1.3 Policy and Program Implications That Arise If the Strict Environmentalist (Radical Contextual) “Split ” Conceptionof Context (A) Were Believed to Be True or False; and (B) Were in Fact True or False

A. Strict environmental “split ” conception is believed to be:

1. True 2. False

B. Public policy and social program implications if environmentalist “split ” position were in fact:

1. True 2. False 1. True 2. False

Provide all children with sameeducational or experiential regimento maximize their common potential /aptitude

Eliminate all individualizededucational or training programs

Standardized assessments for allchildren

Penalties for parents, schools, andcommunities when children manifestindividual differences in achievement

Educate all parents, caregivers, andteachers to act in a standard way inthe treatment of all children

Same as A.1, B.1 Wasteful and counterproductivediversity-sensitive policies

Wasteful and counterproductiveprograms based on individualdifferences

Policies and programs to quell socialunrest because of unrequitedaspirations of people promised thatthe individualized program theyreceived would make them equal toall other people

Deterioration of culture anddestruction of civil society

Programs that are sensitive toindividual differences and that seekto promote a goodness of fit betweenindividually different people andcontexts

Affirmative actions to correctontogenetic or historical inequitiesin person-context fit

Celebration of diversity

Universal participation in civic life

Democracy

Systems assessment and engagement

Social justice

Civil society

and environmental reductionist approach can be seen inthe A.2.B.1. quadrant of Table 1.3. In turn, and as wasalso the case for the A.2.B.2 quadrant in Table 1.2, thisquadrant of Table 1.3 presents the policy and programimplications of believing that the split, environmentalistconception is (correctly) believed to be false and is infact false. As in Table 1.2, then, this quadrant illus-trates the policy and program implications of believingdevelopmental systems theory to be true when, in fact,it is true.

Both tables demonstrate that if the split, reductionistconceptions of human development are believed to betrue, then irrespective of whether they are in facttrue (and they incontrovertibly are not true; e.g., seeGottlieb, 1997; Hirsch, 1997; Horowitz, 2000; Lerner,2002; Venter et al., 2001), a range of actions constrain-ing the freedom of association, reproductive rights, andeven survival of people would be promoted. Thus, asshown in Table 1.2, if the hereditarian conception werecorrectly regarded as false (and conversely the develop-mental systems conception were correctly seen as true),then policies and programs aimed at social justice andcivil society for the diverse families and children of theUnited States would be promoted. Similarly, Table 1.3shows that if the developmental systems perspective iscorrectly seen as true and if the strict environmentalistconception is correctly regarded as false, correspondingresults for social justice and civil society are promoted.

This result obtains although the strict environmentalistperspective is associated with a set of problematic pol-icy and program implications that differ from thoseproblems linked to the hereditarian perspective.

Despite the theory and research that lends support toa dynamic conception of gene ↔ experience coaction,some proponents of genetic reductionism maintain thatconcepts and methods regarding genes as separable fromcontext are valid and overwhelmingly, or irrefutably, ev-ident. The media continue to tell this story and, perhapsmore often than not, the Person in the Street is per-suaded by it.

The challenge that such language use and public dis-course represents is not merely one of meeting our sci-entific responsibility to amend incorrect disseminationof research evidence. Horowitz (2000) reminds us thatan additional, and ethical, responsibility is to supportsocial justice. She emphasizes that such action is criticalin the face of the simplistically seductive ideas of ge-netic reductionism, especially when coupled with thedeficit model. She explains:

If we accept as a challenge the need to act with social responsibility then we must make sure that we do not usesingle-variable words like genes or the notion of innate insuch a determinative manner as to give the impression thatthey constitute the simple answers to the simple questionsasked by the Person in the Street lest we contribute to beliefsystems that will inform social policies that seek to limit


experience and opportunity and, ultimately, development,especially when compounded by racism and poorly advan-taged circumstances. Or, as Elman and Bates and their col-leagues said in the concluding section of their bookRethinking Innateness (Elman et al., 1998), “If our careless,under-specified choice of words inadvertently does damageto future generations of children, we cannot turn with inno-cent outrage to the judge and say ‘But your Honor, I didn’trealize the word was loaded.’ ” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 8)

Overton (Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) pointsalso to the need to appreciate the subtlety of language toavoid loading our scientific language with phrases that, ona manifest level, may seem to reject the split thinking ofgenetic reductionism but, on a deeper, structural level,employ terms that legitimate the language of such think-ing remaining part of scientific discourse. He notes:

In its current split form no one actually asserts that mat-ter, body, brain, genes or society, culture, and environmentprovide the cause of behavior or development: The back-ground idea of one or the other being the privileged deter-minant remains the silent subtext that continues to shapediscussions. The most frequently voiced claim is that be-havior and development are the products of the interac-tions of nature and nurture. But interaction itself isgenerally conceptualized as two split-off pure entities thatfunction independently in cooperative and/or competitiveways (e.g., Collins et al., 2000). As a consequence, the de-bate simply becomes displaced to another level of dis-course. At this new level, the contestants agree thatbehavior and development are determined by both natureand nurture, but they remain embattled over the relativemerits of each entity’s essential contribution. (Overton,Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume, p. 33)

Similarly, he explains:

Moving beyond behavior genetics to the broader issue ofbiology and culture, conclusions such as “contemporaryevidence confirms that the expression of heritable traitsdepends, often strongly, on experience” (Collins et al.,2000, p. 228) are brought into question for the same rea-son. Within a relational metatheory, such conclusionsfail because they begin from the premise that there arepure forms of genetic inheritance termed “heritabletraits” and within relational metatheory such a premiseis unacceptable. (Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, thisvolume, p. 36)

Whereas contemporary development science rejectsthe philosophical, theoretical, and (in large part)methodological features of the split thinking associated

with genetic reductionist approaches to human develop-ment, found in both behavior genetics and sociobiology,subtle and nuanced problems of language continue tosuggest that these split approaches to human develop-ment remain legitimate. I have noted the potentiallyenormous negative consequences of such problematiclanguage in our scientific discourse—especially if thePerson in the Street believes that employing such termsmeans that the genetic reductionist ideas about socialpolicy should be countenanced. As a consequence, wemust be assiduous and exact in the terms we use to ex-plain why split conceptions in general, and genetic re-ductionist ones in particular, fail as useful frames forscientific discourse about human development. Indeed,as Lewontin (1981, p. 245) has cautioned, “The price ofmetaphor is eternal vigilance.”

USING THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMSPERSPECTIVE FOR THEORY, RESEARCH,AND APPLICATION

Developmental systems theories offer another vision ofand vocabulary for the role of genes and, more gener-ally, of biology in human development. As illustrated inTables 1.2 and 1.3, these theories of human developmentprovide a different view of the role of genes in behaviorand development and offer a different, if admittedlymore complex, story to the Person in the Street (Lerner,2004a, 2004b). It is predicated on a relational metathe-ory (Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume)and thus eschews splits between nature and nurture, or-ganism and environment, or any of the other Cartesiandualities that have been part of the discourse in past his-torical eras of developmental science (see Cairns &Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Overton,Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chap-ter 4, this Handbook, this volume). Developmental sys-tems theories stress that genes, cells, tissues, organs,whole organisms, and all other, extraorganism levels oforganization composing the ecology of human develop-ment are fused in a fully coacting, mutually influential,and therefore dynamic system (Bronfenbrenner, 2005;Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,this volume; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Hand-book, this volume; Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5, this Hand-book, this volume; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, thisHandbook, this volume; Tobach, 1981).

This bidirectional relation between the individualand the complex ecology of human development may be

Features and Implications of a Positive Human Development Perspective 11

represented as the individual ↔ context. Because thebroadest level of the context is history, temporality is al-ways a part of the fused systems of individual ↔ contextrelations. Thus the potential for systematic change(plasticity) exists across the life span (Baltes et al.,1998, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume; Elder, &Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume). Ofcourse, the system that promotes change through thecoaction of multiple levels of organization can also actto constrain it. Therefore, this fusion of the potential forboth constancy and change makes plasticity relative andnot absolute (Lerner, 1984, 2002).

Nevertheless, the temporality of human developmentand the presence of at least relative plasticity indicatethat one may be optimistic that means may be found, atone or more levels of the ecology of human development,to apply developmental science in ways that promote pos-itive development across the life span (Bronfenbrenner,2005; Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 2002, 2004c; Mag-nusson & Stattin, 1998). Moreover, because no two peo-ple, even monozygotic (MZ) twins, will have the samehistory of individual ↔ context relations across the lifespan, the individuality of each person is lawfully assured(Hirsch, 1970, 1997, 2004). As noted, the presence ofover 70 trillion potential human genotypes means that theprobability of two genetically identical children arisingfrom any set of parents is quite small—about one in 6.27billion—and that the probability of two genetically iden-tical but non-MZ children arising from one specific cou-ple is slightly less than one in 160,000 (Hirsch, 2004);thus, there is an obviously low probability that any twopeople, with the exceptions of MZs, will have an identicalbiological genotype (to use a redundancy).

However, the probability that two people, includingMZs, will have an identical history of events, experi-ences, and social relationships, that is, a social genotype(to use an oxymoron), is so dismally small as to beequivalent to what most of us would regard as impossi-ble. The integration of biology and context across timemeans that each person has a developmental trajectory(a dynamically changing phenotype) that is, at least inpart, individually distinct.

DIVERSITY—A FUNDAMENTAL ASSETOF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Diversity is a distinctive and, in fact, a defining featureof the human life course (Spencer, Chapter 15, thisHandbook, this volume). Within an individual over time,

diversity—seen as the potential for systematic intraindi-vidual change, represents a potential for life-spanchange. Therefore, diversity, characterized as intraindi-vidual plasticity, is a key asset or developmental strengththat may be capitalized on to promote a person’s posi-tive, healthy developmental change. Across people, di-versity, characterized as interindividual differences,represents a sample of the range of variation that definesthe potential material basis for optimizing the courseof human life. Any individual may have a diverse range ofpotential developmental trajectories and, as well, allgroups—because of the necessarily diverse developmen-tal paths of the people within them—will have a diverserange of developmental trajectories. Diversity, seen asboth intraindividual change and as interindividual differ-ences in intraindividual change, is both a strength of indi-viduals and an asset for planning and promoting means toimprove the human condition (Benson et al., Chapter 16,this Handbook, this volume; Lerner, 2004c; Spencer,Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume).

The diversity of individual ↔ context relations thatcomprises change within the dynamic developmentalsystem, along with the optimism about improvinghuman life that derives from the relative plasticity ofhumans, means that it is possible to apply developmentalscience to promote positive development across the lifespan (Benson et al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Damon, 1997, 2004; Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b,2004c). As such, it is useful to describe the features andimplications for science and application of the positivehuman development perspective derived from develop-mental systems theories.

FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OFA POSITIVE HUMANDEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

The fused system of individual ↔ context relations thatprovides the potential for relative plasticity across the lifespan constitutes a fundamental strength of each person.This strength is present to differing extents in all infants,children, adolescents, adults, and aged individuals. Rela-tive plasticity diminishes across the life span but, as theresearch of Baltes, in the Berlin Study of Aging (e.g.,Baltes et al., 1998, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Baltes & Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2002), elegantlydemonstrates, there is evidence for the presence of plas-ticity into the 10th and 11th decades of life.


The fused developmental system provides a potentialfor change not just in people but also in the contexts inwhich individuals develop. This latter potential meansthat families, neighborhoods, and cultures are also rela-tively plastic and that the level of resources—or devel-opmental assets—that they possess at any point in timemay also be altered across history. Contextual strengthsand assets in support of positive development may be en-visioned within the terms suggested by Benson et al.(Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume), as the com-munity nutrients for healthy and positive development.These assets can be grown, aligned, and realigned to im-prove the circumstances of human development.

At any given place or point in time, both individualsand levels of the context within this plastic developmen-tal system may manifest problems or may be deficient insome aspect of individual, family, or community lifethat is needed for improved functioning. The presence ofplasticity does not mean that people are not poor or thatthey do not lack social nutrients that would enhancetheir development. What relative plasticity across thedevelopmental system does mean, however, is that allpeople have strengths that, when integrated with the de-velopmental assets of communities, may be capitalizedon to promote positive change. As such, problems ordeficits constitute only a portion of a potentially muchlarger array of outcomes of individual ↔ context rela-tions. Problems are not inevitable, and they are certainlynot fixed in a person’s genes.

The role of developmental science is to identify thoserelations between individual strengths and contextualassets in families, communities, cultures, and the natu-ral environment, and to integrate strengths and assets topromote positive human development (Lerner, 2004a,2004b). A system that is open for change for the better isalso open for change for the worse. The research and ap-plications of developmental scientists should be aimedat increasing the probability of actualization of thehealthy and positive portions of the distribution of po-tential outcomes of individual ↔ context relations.

The scientific agenda of the developmental scientist ismore than just to describe and to explain human develop-ment. It is also to work to optimize it (Baltes, 1968,1987, 1997; Baltes et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, thisvolume). Efforts to enhance human development in itsactual ecology are a way to test theoretical ideas abouthow systemic relations coalesce to shape the course oflife. These efforts stand as well as ethical responsibili-ties of human development scholars, in their roles both as

researchers involved with human lives and as citizens ofa civil society (Fisher, 1993, 1994, 2003; Fisher, Hoag-wood, & Jenson, 1996; Fisher & Tryon, 1990).

Moreover, without a scientific agenda that integratesdescription, explanation, and optimization, human de-velopment science is, at best, an incomplete scholarlyendeavor. A developmental science that is devoid ofknowledge of the individual and group ranges among di-verse groups, and that is devoid of knowledge of therange of assets in diverse contexts, is an incomplete de-velopmental science. It is also inadequate, when seenfrom the perspective of the need for evidence-based pol-icy and program applications.

FRAMING THE RESEARCH AGENDA OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT

What becomes, then, the key empirical question fordevelopmental scientists interested in describing, ex-plaining, and promoting positive human development?The key question is actually five (5) interrelated “what”questions:

1. What attributes (?) of

2. What individuals (?) in relation to

3. What contextual /ecological conditions (?) at

4. What points in ontogenetic, family or generational,and cohort or historical, time (?) may be inte-grated to promote

5. What instances of positive human development?

Answering these questions requires a nonreductionistapproach to methodology. Neither biogenic, nor psy-chogenic or sociogenic approaches are adequate. Devel-opmental science needs integrative and relational models,measures, and designs (Lerner, Dowling, & Chaudhuri,2005). Examples of such methodology in developmentalsystems-oriented research are the scholarship of Ecclesand her colleagues on stage ↔ environment fit (e.g., Ec-cles, Wigfield, & Byrnes, 2003); of Damon and his col-leagues on the community-based youth charter (Damon,1997, 2004; Damon & Gregory, 2003); of Benson and hiscolleagues at Search Institute on the role of developmen-tal assets in positive youth development (e.g., Bensonet al., Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume; Leffertet al., 1998; Scales, Benson, Leffert, & Blyth, 2000); ofTheokas (2005; Theokas & Lerner, 2005; see too Lerner

Conclusion 13

et al., 2005) on the role of actual developmental assetsassociated with families, schools, and neighborhoodson positive youth development; and of Leventhal andBrooks-Gunn (2004), and of Sampson, Raudenbush, andEarls (1997) on the role of neighborhood characteristicson adolescent development.

The methodology employed in individual ↔ contextintegrative research must also include a triangulationamong multiple and, ideally, both qualitative and quanti-tative approaches to understanding and synthesizingvariables from the levels of organization within the de-velopmental system. Such triangulation may usefully in-volve the classic approach offered by Campbell and Fiske(1959) regarding convergent and discriminant validationthrough multitrait-multimethod matrix methodology.Diversity-sensitive measures are needed within such ap-proaches, and they must be used within the context ofchange-sensitive—and hence longitudinal—designs(Cairns & Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Lerner et al., 2005; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter8, this Handbook, this volume). Trait measures developedwith the goal of excluding variance associated with timeand context are not optimal choices in such research. Toreflect the richness and strengths of our diverse human-ity, our repertoire of measures must be sensitive to thediversity of person variables, such as race, ethnicity, re-ligion, sexual preferences, physical ability status, anddevelopmental status, and to the diversity of contextualvariables such as family type, neighborhood, community,culture, physical ecology, and historical moment.

It is particularly important that our designs and ourmeasures be sensitive to the different meanings of time.Insightful formulations about the meanings of time in thedynamic developmental system have been provided byElder (1998; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 6, this Hand-book, this volume), Baltes (Baltes et al., Chapter 11, thisHandbook, this volume), and Bronfenbrenner (2005;Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook,this volume). Our methods must appraise, then, age, fam-ily, and historical time and must be sensitive to the roleof both normative and nonnormative historical events ininfluencing developmental trajectories.

Finally, our designs should be informed not just bycolleagues from the multiple disciplines with expertisein the scholarly study of human development. Our meth-ods should be informed as well by the people and com-munities we study (Lerner, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c;Villarruel, Perkins, Borden, & Keith, 2003). They, too,are experts about development—a point our colleagues

in cultural anthropology, sociology, and communityyouth development research and practice have been mak-ing for several years. Most certainly, participants in ourcommunity-based research and applications are expertsin the character of development in their families andneighborhoods. Accordingly, research that fails to capi-talize on the wisdom of its participants runs the real dan-ger of lacking authenticity and of erecting unnecessaryobstacles to the translation of the scholarship of knowl-edge generation into the scholarship of knowledge appli-cation (Jensen, Hoagwood, & Trickett, 1999).

CONCLUSIONS

Contemporary developmental science—predicated on arelational metatheory and focused on the use of develop-mental systems theories to frame research on dynamicrelations between diverse individuals and contexts—con-stitutes a complex and exciting approach to understand-ing and promoting positive human development. It offersa means to do good science, informed by philosophically,conceptually, and methodologically useful informationfrom the multiple disciples with knowledge bases perti-nent to the integrated, individual ↔ context relationsthat compose human development. Such science is alsomore difficult to enact than the ill-framed and method-ologically flawed research that followed split and reduc-tionist paths during the prior historical era (Cairns &Cairns, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume; Overton,Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; Valsiner, Chapter4, this Handbook, this volume). Such science is also moredifficult to explain to the Person in the Street.

As illustrated eloquently by the work discussed inthis volume, the richness of the science and the applica-tions that derive from developmental systems perspec-tives, as well as the internal and ecological validity ofthis work, are reasons for the continuing and arguablystill growing attractiveness of this approach. Moreover,this approach underscores the diverse ways in which hu-mans, in dynamic exchanges with their natural and de-signed ecologies, can create for themselves and othersopportunities for health and positive development. AsBronfenbrenner (2005) eloquently puts it, it is these re-lations that make human beings human.

Accordingly, the relational, dynamic, and diversity-sensitive scholarship that now defines excellence in de-velopmental science may both document and extend thepower inherent in each person to be an active agent in


his or her own successful and positive development(Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this vol-ume; Lerner, 1982; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981;Lerner, Theokas, et al., 2005; Magnusson & Stattin,1998, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume; Rathunde& Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, thisvolume). A developmental systems perspective leads usto recognize that, if we are to have an adequate andsufficient science of human development, we must inte-gratively study individual and contextual levels oforganization in a relational and temporal manner(Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Zigler, 1998). Anything lesswill not constitute adequate science. And if we are toserve the United States’ and the world’s individuals,families, and communities through our science, if weare to help develop successful policies and programsthrough our scholarly efforts, then we must acceptnothing less than the integrative temporal and rela-tional model of diverse and active individuals embod-ied in the developmental systems perspective.

Through such research, developmental science hasan opportunity to combine the assets of our scholarlyand research traditions with the strengths of our peo-ple. We can improve on the often-cited idea of KurtLewin (1943), that there is nothing as practical as agood theory. We can, through the application of ourscience to serve our world’s citizens, actualize the ideathat nothing is of greater value to society than a sciencethat devotes its scholarship to improving the lifechances of all people. By understanding and celebrat-ing the strengths of all individuals, and the assets thatexist in their families, communities, and cultures topromote these strengths, we can have a developmentalscience that may, in these challenging times, help us, asa scientific body and as citizens of democratic nations,to finally ensure that there is truly liberty and justicefor all.

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