Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat: Besatzungspolitik, Kollaboration und Widerstandim Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren by Detlef BrandesReview by: F. L. CarstenThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 462-464Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4207894 .

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462 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

of Olomouc desired to acquire new church bells even this application was granted, whereupon one of the bells was inscribed 'to the heroes who died believing in Germany's greatness' (p. 142). The rival Sudeten German organizations vied with each other in securing German funds. These, as the author states, 'served to encourage the Sudeten German middle classes to maintain their nationalist intransigence, preserved their tendency towards political dependence and in the long run prepared the way to a growth of German influence' (p. I44). With this state of affairs the German subsidies paid to the Henlein movement in the 1930S were only a continuation of much earlier policies and seem in no way excep- tional. Surprising, however, is the author's description of Henlein as 'a little shy p.t. instructor from the provinces with an indistinct physiognomy and without a strong charisma' (p. 1 77): might not some of these character- istics in retrospect also be applied to the person of Adolf Hitler?

Yet this is a minor criticism of a book that contains a mass of fascinating detail and, one hopes, will serve as an antidote to surviving Sudeten German nationalism. What is entirely missing in it is an evaluation and description of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party and its relations to the other political parties of the area. As a separate Sudeten Communist Party did not exist, its omission is more understandable. Perhaps we may hope that Dr Jaworski will discuss the Sudeten German Left in a subsequent volume.

London F. L. CARSTEN

Brandes, Detlef. Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat: Besatzungspolitik, Kollaboration und Widerstand im Protektorat BhAmen und Mahren. R. Oldenbourg, Munich and Vienna, i969-75. 2 vols. 372 and 205 pp. Bibliographies. Indexes. DM I Io the set.

THE subject of the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia', of German rule in the Czech lands and of Czech resistance has been investigated by several historians, inside as well as outside Czechoslovakia. Outstanding among the latter is the work of one of the participants, Professor Vojtech Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule (reviewed in SEER, L, II 9 (I972), PP. 314 if.), but unfortunately it only covers the years to the assassination of Heydrich. Dr Brandes's two volumes, on the other hand, span the entire six years of the 'Protectorate', and the last part contains a fascinat- ing account of the Prague Rising of May I945. The other principal differ- ence with Dr Mastny's work is that Dr Brandes devotes much space to a description of the German administration and of German political and economic measures, while Dr Mastny focuses on Czech reaction and opposition to German rule. Dr Brandes also supplies more detail on the efforts of the Czech government of the 'Protectorate' to avoid the worst effects of Nazi policy by procrastination and passive resistance: efforts which were often approved by the Benes government in London. Thus the picture that emerges from these volumes is considerably more balanced and covers almost every aspect of 'Protectorate' politics.

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REVIEWS 463 As to German policy during the years of occupation, there seems to have

been little change in its main lines, whether Neurath or Frick was the 'Protector', whether Karl Hermann Frank, Reinhard Heydrich or Kurt Daluege called the tune under the figurehead of the 'Protector'. Sur- prisingly enough, the principal aim of German policy always remained the assimilation and Germanization of the large majority of the Czechs, in contrast with the policy followed in occupied Poland and Soviet Russia. Neither Dr Mastny nor Dr Brandes provides a satisfactory explanation for this deviation from Nazi attitude towards the Slavs. On the rational plane one might argue that the industries of the 'Protectorate' were so important to Hitler's war machine that a fairly lenient treatment was meted out to the Czechs who in their majority responded by working to the satisfaction of their masters. But, as Nazi racialist policy was fundamentally irrational, this does not seem a plausible explanation. It would only explain why, for example, even Heydrich tried to win over the Czechs through increased food rations and social benefits. We also know that Frank as well as some of the German racial specialists believed that there was such a considerable percentage of German blood among the Czechs that it was only necessary to strengthen this German element to achieve the desired Germanization; but there is no evidence that this abstruse view was shared by Heydrich, or accepted by Hitler. It also comes as a surprise that, from the evidence supplied by Dr Brandes, Frank's policy hardly differed from that of Neurath, that he often tried to avoid the worst, and that the view then widely held by the Czechs that Neurath was a 'moderate' and Frank a fanatic cannot be substantiated. Apparently Neurath was only too willing to toe the line and to accept Nazi racialism and Nazi standards.

As we know from other sources, Czech resistance throughout the war years remained comparatively weak; the terror spread by the measures of the Gestapo to a large extent achieved its object; in spite of all the efforts of the Benes government to fan the opposition it cannot really be compared with that in the other occupied countries. We also learn from these pages how successful the Gestapo was in infiltrating and using opposition groups for its own purposes, in dominating the underground Communist net- work and in making use of arrested Communist functionaries and non- Communist parachutists sent from London: a truly amazing picture which partly accounts for the ineffectiveness of the resistance. Another obvious explanation is the geography of the Czech lands which does not facilitate partisan warfare on a large scale. The many acts of sabotage enumerated by Dr Brandes were in their large majority on so small a scale that they could not affect the German war effort, and what damage there was was quickly repaired. Perhaps the German authorities were not all that far from the truth when they compared the Czech attitude to that adopted by them towards the Habsburg Monarchy during the First World War; perhaps centuries of submission to Habsburg rule had their after-effects for many years. As it was, the activities of the opposition were largely confined to planning for the post-war period. The plans envisaged a radical social programme, a planned economy, nationalization of many industries and large properties, the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, and

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464 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

no autonomy for the Slovaks: demands that were carried out to a large extent after 1945. If these plans also envisaged a road to socialism very different from the Russian example, it is possible to recognize in them the ideas which were to reappear during the Prague Spring. After all, the leading Communist representative on the Czech National Council at the end of the war was Josef Smrkovsky.

Dr Brandes has provided the reader with a large amount of interesting mnaterial from Czech as well as German archives. His conclusions and interpretations are well founded and cautious, but unfortunately he was denied the use of the Czech archives for his second volume, so that this contains considerable gaps. Yet his is the most impartial and substantial account of a troubled period which has been published so far, and for this we have to be grateful to him. London F. L. CARSTEN

Kalvoda, Josef. Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy. University Press of America, Washington, 1978. xiii + 38I pp. Conclusion. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $8.75.

PROFESSOR JOSEF KALVODA is a very industrious scholar, with a weakness for documents and original sources in many languages. The scholarly appara- tus of his book is truly impressive: in his present study, sixty pages of notes are complemented by twenty-six pages of bibliography. There is not a single book, perhaps even a single reference to Czechoslovakia, relevant to his argument and published before the year 1976, which he has missed. He is so absorbed by his subject that, even in his conclusion, he pursues it still further rather than concluding it.

Professor Kalvoda opens his enquiry with the conflict between the Czechoslovaks and the Bolsheviks, on Russian soil, which began late in May i 9I8; he then traces the relations mainly between Prague and Moscow, but also between the Czechoslovak Communists and other political parties, until the time of the Czechoslovak reform movement in I968. In line with other Czechs who have recently indulged in soul- searching, he argues that his former compatriots (Professor Kalvoda is Professor of History and Political Science at Saint Joseph College, West Hartford, Conn.) are politically gullible and liable to deceive themselves; and that they have assisted the global communist conspiracy, that 'their gaining a foothold in the heart of Europe enabled them (the Communists) to consolidate their power in East Central Europe and to use the latter as a bridgehead for a further penetration of distant areas of Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia, and the Middle East.' In fact, Professor Kalvoda's work with his original sources, most of them having a local, central European relevance, is aimed to underpin a much more comprehensive argument.

The author produces a warped pictuire of both the worlds he deals with, of the world of Communism and of the Central and East European microcosm. The clue to the study is its obsessive search for the politicians

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