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Objective: Schmidt
© Bounding Fire Productions, LLC, 2017, all rights reserved
HMG
6-12
35PP
12factors(SBR 9)
(1)-0-6
2-2-7
G
25 -3-6
DummyMinefield
AT
Mines
MTR
81*
M11M1
3-75
3
9-2
Radio
8
1PP
(SBR 6)
7 Morale
?7-0
9-1
8-0
8-1
BAZ44
8-4
1PP
X11
MTR
*60
3M2
5PP
3-45
HMG
8-16
3.50 cal
5PP
MMG
4-10
23PP
DISASTER AT SCHMIDT
MISSION: The Americans win at game end by accumulating > 24 VP. Control of each one-hex stone building is worth 1 VP and control of each multi-hex stone building is worth 2 VP.
OS-5Designed By: Chas Smith
Foxhole
5 1SOVR, OBA: +4
Other: +2
2
25 -4-6
1
36 -6-6 1-2-6
[ELR: 3] [SAN: 3]
th th3 -112 Infantry Regiment, 28 Infantry DivisionSetup in hexes numbered 23-50 on/between hexrows N-KK.
16
8
3
6
26
6
10
6
210
8 2 2 4
123 5 5
3 ?(SBR 3)
(SBR 9) (SBR 8)
AMERICANS SET UP FIRST [545]
GERMANS MOVE FIRST [602] 72 83 94 105 1161
Special Battle Rules:1. See OS HBR. Weather is Overcast. 2. The Germans receive three bombardments per OS HBR 4 with a blast radius of 4 hexes.3. American MMC (and any SMC/SW set up with them) may set up in foxholes if in allowable terrain. The Americans may set up < two squad equivalents HIP and any SW/SMC set up with them.4. The Germans may set up < one MMC HIP with < 1 SMC and < 1 SW, and may set up in any building location not in the American set up area. This unit is considered offboard for American setup purposes.5. The Germans receive three OBA modules: 70+mm OBA (HE only), 80+mm OBA (HE only), and 100+mm OBA (HE and Smoke). Each radio/battery may only have contact with one radio/battery at a time.6. The Americans receive two OBA modules: 80+mm Battalion Mortar (HE and WP) and 100+mm (HE and SMOKE). Each radio/battery may only have contact with one radio/battery at a time. The observers may set up HIP.7. The Americans receive one module of 150+mm OBA (HE and SMOKE) directed by an Observation Plane (E7.6, OS 5); a SR/FFE of this module cannot be placed until Turn 4. One of the OB radios may (instead of the Observation Plane) gain access with this module starting on Turn 8; however, a radio may have contact with only one battery at a time.8. The Prisoners must be set up guarded by sufficient Guards (A20.5).9. The A-T mines must set up as Known Minefields (B28.45). Do not make the extra Dummy Minefield (B28.47) dr.
N
OPTIONS: Change MISSION to > 22 Replace a 7-0 with a 10-2 leader Change MISSION to < 26 Add an 8-1 AL
rdSchmidt, Germany, 4 November, 1944: After seizing Schmidt as darkness was closing in on 3 November, the 3 Battalion, th112 Regiment formed a perimeter defense. The cold, wet weather combined with the difficulty in negotiating the
treacherous Kall Trail had a wearing effect on the soldiers and the defenses were ill prepared. Sixty anti-tank mines were brought forward but instead of being dug-in were laid on top of the hard-surfaced roads. Soldiers barely scratched out foxholes. During the night K Company captured another 45 prisoners, stragglers who did not realize Schmidt had fallen into enemy hands. Meanwhile, the Germans were conducting a staff exercise at the Schlenderhan Castle west of Cologne.
th thGeneral Model, Army Group B Commander, led the exercise. The commanders of 5 Panzer and 7 Armies attended, as did several other division and corps commanders. The exercise had American forces attacking in the Hurtgen area in an attempt to seize the Roer River Dams. At around 0900, a call came that the Americans were actually attacking accompanied by an urgent request for troops. Model ordered the game to continue and the actual events were used to update the situation. This afforded the Germans a chance for immediate face-to-face coordination because all the commanders were present. Panzer
thRegiment 16 was attached to the 89 Division, which was ordered to attack to retake Schmidt the morning of 4 November.
Use hexes numbered 23-53
AAR: The Germans unleashed a massive bombardment at 0730 that hammered the town from south to north. The fire came from three directions and lasted for 30 minutes. I Company was the first element to sight the enemy. They called for artillery but it was initially unresponsive. Soon the HMGs of Company L were firing at advancing enemy soldiers. Their fire was joined by that of the 81mm mortar platoon using direct fire. The initial German attacks were uncoordinated and defeated quickly. However, these were only forward elements and soon a battalion of infantry supported by at least five AFVs came down the Hasenfeld and Harscheidt Roads. Another German battalion attacked from the Strauch Road. American artillery finally got rolling at 0823 when an air observer called in 12 rounds on the enemy in the vicinity of Harscheidt. At 0850, the artillery fire intensified: 216 rounds were fired on the advancing tanks. The tanks skirted the mines and began pumping rounds into buildings and foxholes. American bazooka fire was able to score a few hits, but it was ineffective in stopping the tanks. The German infantry pushed the ring tighter around Schmidt, fanatically continuing the attack directly through artillery concentrations until the American defense was broken. Wounded soldiers were abandoned and those still alive began a flight for the rear. Officers and NCOs had difficulty controlling their men. Less than 200 made it out, and roughly 140
stof them were able to make it to Kommerscheidt to assist the 1 Battalion. The rd3 Battalion met disaster at Schmidt, being destroyed as a fighting force.
Objective: Schmidt
© Bounding Fire Productions, LLC, 2017, all rights reserved
LMG
2-7
11PPBFP MG30
LMG
2-7
11PPBFP MG30
dm MMG
2PPBFP
07/12
dm MMG
2PPBFP
07/12
7-0
8-1
7-0
8-1
dm HMG
3-8
2PP
1
dm MMG
3-8
2PP
1
dm MMG
3-8
2PP
1
72 83 94 105 1161
DISASTER AT SCHMIDTOS-5
N
Designed By: Chas Smith
E
35 -3-7
BFP
dm MTR(r)
5PP
82mm
BFP
MMG(r)
4-10
5PP
B112B
FP
9-1
2nd
Lt
13Pz IVJ
75L 3/5/2
1
8
3
dm MTR
5PP
81mm
dmHMG
3-8
2PP
1
dm MTR(f)
60mm
3PPBFP
dm MTR(f)
60mm
3PPBFP
3
2
PSK
12-4
X101PP
dm MTR
3PP
50mm
LMG
2-5
12PP
B11
BFP 08/15
LMG
2-5
12PP
B11
BFP 08/15
Radio
8
1PP
Radio
8
1PP
8-1
1st
Sg
t
2-2-8
2-2-8
9-2
10-2
9-1
9-1
8-0
8-0
StuG IIIG (L)
75L -/4*/1*
13
1
8
3
13
105
StuH 42
-/-/2*
8
3
LMG
3-8
1PP
1
LMG
3-8
1PP
1
(SBR 5)
(SBR 5)
14 -6-7
1
14 -6-7
1
6
10
3
4-3-6
C
4-3-6
C
4-4-7
2
4-4-7
2
Reinforced elements of Grenadier Regiment 1055, Infantry Division 89Enter Turn 1 or later on the east edge.
Enter Turn 1 or later on the south/west edges on/between A37 and U53.
Company 5/Battalion II, Panzer Regiment 16Enter Turn 7 within 4 hexes of RR30.
3 512
5
3
2
12 5
4
2
2
3
2
12
4
2
20
5
6
2
[ELR: 3] [SAN: 3]
2 2
36 2
8
*15JgdPz V
88LL 3/-
1
186
52
MISSION: The Americans win at game end by accumulating > 24 VP. Control of each one-hex stone building is worth 1 VP and control of each multi-hex stone building is worth 2 VP.
Use hexes numbered 23-53
OPTIONS: Change MISSION to > 22 Replace a 7-0 with a 10-2 leader Change MISSION to < 26 Add an 8-1 AL
AMERICANS SET UP FIRST [545]
GERMANS MOVE FIRST [602]
Special Battle Rules:1. See OS HBR. Weather is Overcast. 2. The Germans receive three bombardments per OS HBR 4 with a blast radius of 4 hexes.3. American MMC (and any SMC/SW set up with them) may set up in foxholes if in allowable terrain. The Americans may set up < two squad equivalents HIP and any SW/SMC set up with them.4. The Germans may set up < one MMC HIP with < 1 SMC and < 1 SW, and may set up in any building location not in the American set up area. This unit is considered offboard for American setup purposes.5. The Germans receive three OBA modules: 70+mm OBA (HE only), 80+mm OBA (HE only), and 100+mm OBA (HE and Smoke). Each radio/battery may only have contact with one radio/battery at a time.6. The Americans receive two OBA modules: 80+mm Battalion Mortar (HE and WP) and 100+mm (HE and SMOKE). Each radio/battery may only have contact with one radio/battery at a time. The observers may set up HIP.7. The Americans receive one module of 150+mm OBA (HE and SMOKE) directed by an Observation Plane (E7.6, OS 5); a SR/FFE of this module cannot be placed until Turn 4. One of the OB radios may (instead of the Observation Plane) gain access with this module starting on Turn 8; however, a radio may have contact with only one battery at a time.8. The Prisoners must be set up guarded by sufficient Guards (A20.5).9. The A-T mines must set up as Known Minefields (B28.45). Do not make the extra Dummy Minefield (B28.47) dr.
rdSchmidt, Germany, 4 November, 1944: After seizing Schmidt as darkness was closing in on 3 November, the 3 Battalion, th112 Regiment formed a perimeter defense. The cold, wet weather combined with the difficulty in negotiating the
treacherous Kall Trail had a wearing effect on the soldiers and the defenses were ill prepared. Sixty anti-tank mines were brought forward but instead of being dug-in were laid on top of the hard-surfaced roads. Soldiers barely scratched out foxholes. During the night K Company captured another 45 prisoners, stragglers who did not realize Schmidt had fallen into enemy hands. Meanwhile, the Germans were conducting a staff exercise at the Schlenderhan Castle west of Cologne.
th thGeneral Model, Army Group B Commander, led the exercise. The commanders of 5 Panzer and 7 Armies attended, as did several other division and corps commanders. The exercise had American forces attacking in the Hurtgen area in an attempt to seize the Roer River Dams. At around 0900, a call came that the Americans were actually attacking accompanied by an urgent request for troops. Model ordered the game to continue and the actual events were used to update the situation. This afforded the Germans a chance for immediate face-to-face coordination because all the commanders were present. Panzer
thRegiment 16 was attached to the 89 Division, which was ordered to attack to retake Schmidt the morning of 4 November.
AAR: The Germans unleashed a massive bombardment at 0730 that hammered the town from south to north. The fire came from three directions and lasted for 30 minutes. I Company was the first element to sight the enemy. They called for artillery but it was initially unresponsive. Soon the HMGs of Company L were firing at advancing enemy soldiers. Their fire was joined by that of the 81mm mortar platoon using direct fire. The initial German attacks were uncoordinated and defeated quickly. However, these were only forward elements and soon a battalion of infantry supported by at least five AFVs came down the Hasenfeld and Harscheidt Roads. Another German battalion attacked from the Strauch Road. American artillery finally got rolling at 0823 when an air observer called in 12 rounds on the enemy in the vicinity of Harscheidt. At 0850, the artillery fire intensified: 216 rounds were fired on the advancing tanks. The tanks skirted the mines and began pumping rounds into buildings and foxholes. American bazooka fire was able to score a few hits, but it was ineffective in stopping the tanks. The German infantry pushed the ring tighter around Schmidt, fanatically continuing the attack directly through artillery concentrations until the American defense was broken. Wounded soldiers were abandoned and those still alive began a flight for the rear. Officers and NCOs had difficulty controlling their men. Less than 200 made it out, and roughly 140
stof them were able to make it to Kommerscheidt to assist the 1 Battalion. The rd3 Battalion met disaster at Schmidt, being destroyed as a fighting force.