DL - The French Cavalry Corps in 1940

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    THE FRENCH CAVALRY CORPS IN 1940

    In 1932-1935, the first fully motorized/mechanized French unit, the 1e DLM (Division Lgre Mcanique = Light

    Mechanized Division), was born and developed. The 2eDLM was born in 1937 and the 3

    eDLM in February 1940.

    There will be 3 DLMs on May 10, 1940 (1eDLM, 2

    eDLM and 3

    e DLM) forming the French cavalry corps under

    command of General Ren Jacques Adolphe Prioux (1879-1953).

    General Prioux

    The DLM is more powerful than the DCR, faster and more mobile. It is a unit fully adapted to modern mobilewarfare. The term "light" referred to its speed and mobility.

    The 1eDLM and 2

    eDLM became very well trained divisions (even at the divisional and corps level) with efficient

    crews and specialists. Manoeuvres and trainings were organized at large scale in 1935, 1936, 1937 1938, 1939and the last divisional training in 1940. They included deep penetration behind fortifications, cooperation with closeair support and close inter-arms cooperation. The crew knew their tanks and how to operate them. The gunnerswere skilled and trained. The 3

    eDLM formed in 1940 had only reservists who did their military service on horse and

    some of them discovered their tank a short time before being engaged, except some officers and specialistsoriginating from the other DLMs.

    The cavalry corps and the corresponding HQ is created at the mobilization beginning September 1939. It is under

    the command of General Prioux until May 25, 1940 when he took command of the 1starmy and General Langloisreplaced him at the head of the cavalry corps. The cavalry corps contains initially only the 1

    eDLM and 2

    eDLM. The

    1eDLM is then attached to the 7

    tharmy to operate in the Netherlands on May 10, 1940. It is replaced in the cavalry

    corps by the 3eDLM on March 26, 1940. During the 1940 western campaign the cavalry corps will regroup 1, 2 or

    the 3 DLMs.

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    Each DLM included about 10,400 men and 3,400 vehicles:

    1 divisional HQ

    1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Lgre Motorise) with 2 armored cavalry regiments (RC =Rgiment de Cuirassiers or RD = Rgiment de Dragons).

    1eDLM: 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 1

    eBLM

    4eRC(43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)

    18

    e

    RD(43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)2eDLM: 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 3

    eBLM

    13eRD(43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)

    29eRD(43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)

    3eDLM: 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 5

    eBLM

    1eRC(43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)

    2eRC(43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)

    1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Lgre Motorise) with 1 armored reconnaissance regiment(regiment de dcouverte) and 1 RDP (Rgiment de Dragons Ports = mechanized cavalry regiment)

    1eDLM: 107 armored cars in the 2eBLM 6

    eRC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)

    4eRDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars)

    2eDLM: 107 armored cars in the 4

    eBLM

    8eRC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)

    1eRDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars)

    3eDLM: 107 tanks / armored cars in the 6

    eBLM

    12eRC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)

    11eRDP : 22 Hotchkiss H35 and 47 Hotchkiss H39

    1 divisional AT squadron (EDAC = Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char)

    1 divisional repair and recovery squadron1 motorized artillery regiment (with all-terrain tractors)

    1 motorized AT battery (BDAC = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Char)

    1 motorized AA battery (BDAA = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Arienne)

    1 engineer battalion (3 motorized companies plus a bridging company)

    1 telegraph company

    1 radio company

    1 carrier-pigeon detachment

    1 HQ motor transport company

    1 divisional quartermaster group

    1 divisional medical group

    During early June 1940, the remains of the 5 DLC were to be converted to a DLM "type rduit", a reduced DLM:

    1eDLC as 4

    eDLM

    2eDLC as 5

    eDLM

    3eDLC as 6

    eDLM

    4eDLC as 7

    eDLM

    5eDLC as 8

    eDLM

    The deteriorating military situation meant only 4eDLM and 7

    eDLM were actually formed.

    The 1eDLM, 2

    eDLM and 3

    eDLM are also reconstituted beginning June, as reduced DLMs, with men evacuated

    from Dunkirk and who returned to France after a transit in Great Britain. These 5 DLMs fought until June 25, 1940.

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    Cavalry corps"Premier et dernier au feu" means roughly "first in and last out"

    At the beginning of the 1940 western campaign, there are 83 French divisions in the north-east area (3 DLMs, 3DCRs, 5 DLCs, 72 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades). The 6 DCR/DLM armored divisions were never theequivalent in power and combined arms than a Panzerdivision. There are also 10 British divisions (BEF), 22Belgian divisions (but their real men strength corresponds only to 12 divisions) and 8 Dutch divisions. The alliedhad therefore a strength of 123 divisions (113 with the real strength of the Belgian divisions) to face a total of 136German divisions. There are the equivalent of 13 French divisions on the Maginot line and 6 French divisionsinitially left to face the Italians.

    The allied Dyle-Breda plan is to stop the German offensive in Belgium and the Netherlands with the French 1stand

    7tharmies and the BEF, using the Ardennes and the Sedan area as a hinge on their right flank. The 3 French DLMs

    have to delay the German troops of Armee Gruppe B (including 3.PzD and 4.PzD in Belgium and 9.PzD in theNetherlands). Their task is to establish contact with the Belgian and Dutch armies and to cover the allied infantrydeployment. The French have therefore a fast mechanical force but lacking AA protection and without serious aircover.The defense of the Ardennes and of the Meuse River is taken in charge by the 9

    thand 2

    ndFrench armies : 7 French

    divisions generally largely under equipped (sometimes no AA guns like for the 55eDI and 71

    eDI which had also

    respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns instead of 62) defended an overstretched front on the Meuse River (from Houxto Sedan - that is 15-30 km for each division whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a 5-7 km frontonly) facing 40 German divisions including 7 concentrated Panzerdivisionen, with about 1,500 aircraft concentratedon a small area during hours. The French troops can there only rely on a good artillery support but only on veryinsufficient fortifications. The Maginot Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg.

    General Blanchard (French 1st army) was opposed to the entry in Belgium, judging the Belgian army unable to

    delay the Germans long enough to enable the deployment of the French troops in Belgium. Indeed the Belgianneutrality obsession did not allow the allied troops to enter Belgium before the German invasion. He evaluated therequired time at about 1 week. The Belgians should also have prepared entrenched positions and anti-tank ditcheson the future French positions but roughly nothing was done except the beginning of an anti-tank ditch next toGembloux.General Gamelin, the commander in chief, nevertheless saw several advantages in the Dyle-Breda operation:

    Protection of the industrial area of north-eastern France

    Shortening the front between the Maginot Line and the North Sea by 70 km

    Offering better chances to rescue the Belgian army and integrate it in the whole allied deployment

    The British of course wanted the war as far as possible from the homeland.

    The generals Georges (commander in chief north-east) and Bilotte (1

    st

    army corps) thought that only a reducedversion of this operation, on the Escaut (Scheldt) River, was really possible and that the Dyle-Breda line was toofar. General Prioux, commander of the cavalry corps, which will have the task to delay the Germans in Belgiumwith the 2

    eDLM and the 3

    eDLM shared the same point of view and did not think that the Belgian army was able to

    face the German troops.

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    General Corap, commander of the 9tharmy on the Meuse River is also opposed to the Dyle-Breda operation and is

    worried about the weakness of his troops and the too huge front they have to defend (20-30 km for one divisioninstead of 5-7 km). General Giraud (French 7

    tharmy), known for his rather offensive spirit, is also opposed to the

    operation in Belgium. Nevertheless, Gamelin persisted and engaged not only French troops in Belgium on the Dylebut also the potential of the 7

    th army in an operation in the Netherlands, sacrificing troops that could have

    constituted a crucial reserve later.

    On May 10, 1940, the German army attacks the Netherlands, Belgium and the Luxembourg. Some 4,500 airbornetroops (paratroops and glider troops) and Brandenburg commandos seize several important bridges including 2

    bridges on the Albert canal, enabling the XVI.Panzerkorps to cross rapidly and capture Maastricht. The EbenEmal fort is quickly and easily defeated by a special assault group. During the night the German engineersestablish a bridge to cross the Albert Canal.

    Allied and German movements at the beginning of the 1940 western campaign (Militaria magazine)

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    1. THE CAVALRY CORPS IN BELGIUM

    The French cavalry corps (2eand 3

    eDLM) enters in Belgium on May 10 at 10h30, followed by the French 1

    starmy.

    They wished they could have moved before the German attack but this was not possible due to the Belgianneutrality. General Prioux sends captain Mtivier from his staff to makes liaison with General Krahe, commander ofthe 3

    rdBelgian corps. He reports the little will of cooperation of the Belgians. He also notes that the "Cointet" mobile

    AT obstacles planned around Gembloux are not deployed; they are completely dispersed several kilometres furtheraround Perwez. The future French infantry positions should have been fortified by the Belgians but except a shortportion of AT ditch absolutely nothing was done. The French troops will therefore have to defend on a completelyunprepared position. To add to this bad news, Belgian railroad workers went on strike and delayed the arrival ofarmored elements of the cavalry corps.

    General Prioux estimates that it will be difficult to fulfil the delay mission with the German massive air superiority.The operation on the Dyle was based on two hypothesises which appeared already wrong:

    The value of the defensive position at Gembloux

    The capacity of resistance of the Belgian armyHe contacts the high command to try to modify the operation into the less ambitious "Escaut" one since only the 3motorized infantry divisions of the French 1

    starmy were already moving in Belgium. Bilotte, Georges and Blanchard

    all disagreed with him. The French 1st army will move day and night despite the Luftwaffe. The mission of the

    cavalry corps is to delay the German troops around Hannut until May 14 before withdrawing behind the French 1st

    army deployed in Gembloux gap between the Dyle and the Meuse Rivers.

    On May 11, the 4.PzD crosses the Meuse River while the cavalry corps is deploying in the Ophelissem, Hannut,Huy area. On May 12, the Belgian army retreats to the Dyle River between Anvers and Louvain, exposing theflanks of the French cavalry corps.

    The battle of Hannut (May 12-14) is the first big tank battle of World War 2 : 411 French tanks (3eDLM and 2

    e

    DLM) are facing 674 German tanks (4.PzD and 3.PzD). The battle takes place between the Petite Gette streamand the Mhaigne small river, in the area hold by the 3

    eDLM. The 2

    eDLM is far less engaged. On May 12 only the

    4.PzD is really involved, the 3.PzD having completely crossed the Meuse River only for May 13.The area is favorable to the tanks, therefore to the enemy whose tanks are more numerous. The Germans are alsostrongly supported by the Luftwaffe. The battle of Hannut shows that the Somua S35 tank can be at least the equalof the Panzer III and that the Panzer I and Panzer II are rather useless against the French tanks.

    During the battle of Hannut, General Prioux had the actual command of a real French tank corps facing a Germantank corps. They inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The use of such a French tank corps is unique during the1940 campaign except perhaps the formation of the "groupement Buisson" beginning June for the battles on theAisne and Retourne Rivers south of Rethel which grouped the 3

    eDCR and the 7

    eDLM.

    On May 14, having blocked the Germans as long as it was ordered, during 2 days, the cavalry corps moves backbehind the French lines at Gembloux. Prioux is ordered to let part of his artillery to the French 1

    starmy. During the

    battle of Gembloux (May 14-15), the XVI.Panzerkorps will again be blocked by the 1eDM (Division Marocaine =

    Moroccan infantry division) and the 15eDIM (Division d'Infanterie Motorise = motorized infantry division) which

    anchored their defenses on the Brussels-Namur railroad, the city of Gembloux and the town of Ernage. All theGerman assaults are repulsed and the XVI.Panzerkorps sustains heavy losses. Nevertheless the Germanbreakthrough at Sedan will force the rather successful allied troops in Belgium to move back.

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    1.1 The battle of Hannut (May 12-14, 1940)

    3. PzDPzBfWg : 29Panzer I : 117Panzer II : 129Panzer III : 42Panzer IV : 26

    armored cars : 56 (including 23 with a 2.0cm L/55 gun)3.7cm PaK L/45 : 482.0cm FlaK 30/38 : 248.8cm FlaK L/56 : 97.5cm leIG : 2415cm sIG : 810.5cm leFH : 2415cm sFH : 12infantry : 3 rifle battalions, 1 motorcycle battalion, 1 engineer battalion+ attached M.G.-Btl.7 : including 12 3.7cm PaK L/45+ attached II./Flak-Lehr-Rgt : 9 8.8cm FlaK L/56 and 24 2.0cm/3.7cm FlaK+ attached artillery : II./Art.Rgt.49 (with 12 15cm sFH)

    4. PzDPzBfWg : 15Panzer I : 141Panzer II : 111Panzer III : 40Panzer IV : 24armored cars : 56 (including 23 with a 2.0cm L/55 gun)3.7cm PaK L/45 : 482.0cm FlaK 30/38 : 248.8cm FlaK L/56 : 97.5cm leIG : 2415cm sIG : 810.5cm leFH : 24

    15cm sFH : 12infantry : 4 rifle battalions, 1 engineer battalion+ attached Pz.Jg.Abt.654 : 12 3.7cm PaK L/45+ attached M.G.-Btl.9 : including 12 3.7cm PaK L/45+ attached artillery : II./Art.Rgt.40, II./Art.Rgt.50 and s.Art.Abt.611 (adding at least 40 additional guns)

    TOTAL XVI. Panzerkorps tanks : 674 (including 132 Panzer III and Panzer IV)armored cars : 112 (including 46 with a 2.0cm L/55 gun)3.7cm PaK L/45 : 1322.0cm / 3.7cm FlaK : 728.8cm FlaK L/56 : 277.5cm leIG : 4812cm sIG : 1610.5cm leFH and 15cm sFH : 112++ 7 rifle battalions, 1 motorcycle battalion, 2 engineer battalions, 2 MG battalions = 12 battalions

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    2eDLM

    Hotchkiss H35 : 84Somua S35 : 88Light tanks : 66 Renault AMR35 ZT1 (+ 3 Renault ADF1 command tanks)Armored cars : 40 Panhard 178 (+ 4 radio armored cars + 4 reserve armored cars)47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 825mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 12

    25mm AA guns : 675mm M

    le1897 field guns : 24 (including also 1 Renault YS2 artillery observation tank)

    105mm C Mle1935 B howitzers : 12

    infantry : 3 infantry battalions and 1 motorcycle battalion (dragons ports) including alsoseveral 37mm infantry guns and 25mm AT guns

    3eDLMHotchkiss H35 : 22Hotchkiss H39 : 129Somua S35 : 88Armored cars : 40 Panhard 178 (+ 4 radio armored cars + 4 reserve armored cars)47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 825mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 12

    25mm AA guns : 675mm M

    le1897 field guns : 24

    105mm C Mle1935 B howitzers : 12

    infantry : 3 infantry battalions and 1 motorcycle battalion (dragons ports) including alsoseveral 37mm infantry guns and 25mm AT guns

    TOTAL French cavalry corpsHotchkiss H35 and H39 : 235Somua S35 : 176armored cars : 147 (including 80 Panhard 178 and 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1)47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns : 1625mm SA34/37 L/72 AT guns : 24

    25mm AA guns : 1275mm Mle1897 field guns : 48

    105mm field guns : 24+ 8 infantry/motorcycle battalions

    CONCLUSION

    France 411 tanks (including 176 Somua S35 and about 60 Hotchkiss with a 37mm L/33 SA38 gun)

    147 armored cars and light reconnaissance tanks

    40 AT guns

    12 AA guns

    72 field guns 8 infantry/motorcycle battalions

    Germany 674 tanks (including 132 Panzer III and Panzer IV)

    112 armored cars

    159 AT guns (including 27 8.8cm FlaK L/56)

    72 AA guns

    112 field guns (including 10.5cm leFH sometimes used in direct fire against the French tanks)

    54 infantry guns (lacking on the French side, and also more mortars)

    12 infantry/motorcycle/MG/engineer battalions

    The 3eDLM (General Langlois) will have to face directly 2 Panzerdivisionen: 3.PzD (General Stumpff) and 4.PzD

    (General Stever). The 2eDLM (General Bougrain) will be only partially implicated. Therefore the 674 German tanksincluding 132 Panzer III and Panzer IV will mainly be opposed to 239 French tanks including 88 Somua S35 tanks.Unlike the French troops, the Germans have a strong air support. The VIII.Fliegerkorps (General von Richtofen)with 300 Ju87 "Stuka" dive bombers and 42 Hs123 "assault" biplanes and about 130 Me109 supports Hoepner but

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    on May 13 it is engaged over the Meuse River. The IV.Fliegerkorps and IX.Fliegerkorps add some 280He111/Do17/Ju88 bombers and over 500 Me109 and Me110. On the French side each DLM has only 3 modernreconnaissance aircraft attached.

    Map of the Hannut and Gembloux area (Source : Gunsburg)

    On May 10, 1940, the reconnaissance elements of the 8e RC (Colonel Mario) of the 2

    e DLM and the 12

    e RC

    (Colonel Leyer) of the 3eDLM move towards the Albert Canal, Lige and Maastricht. The core of the cavalry corps

    is moving to the area of Hannut.

    On May 11, General Prioux chooses to wait for the enemy on the Tirlemont-Huy line, using the Petite Gette streamand the Mhaigne small river to anchor the defense. The northern part behind the Petite Gette stream and Hannut

    is defended by the 3eDLM, which will have to face the main assault. The southern part behind the Mhaigne smallriver is defended by the 2

    e DLM. During the morning the Belgian army is retreating, exposing the flanks of the

    cavalry corps; the actions of the different allies is not coordinated unlike the 136 German divisions under a sameand efficient high command.

    The French reconnaissance patrols are in contact with the German armored elements between Maastricht andLige and delay the German spearheads. The 12

    e Rgiment de Cuirassiers (Panhard 178 armored cars) for

    example has been split in 3 reconnaissance detachments: 2 commanded by capitaine Renoult and 1 led bycapitaine de Montardy. Capitaine de Montardy sends a patrol (Vasselot platoon) on the road of Maastricht to theAlbert Canal. They meet the first German elements and are the first of the 3

    eDLM to engage the battle. During all

    the day, the Panhard 178 armored cars from 12eRC will fight the Panzers to delay their advance.

    Around 12h00, the town of Tongres is surrounded by the enemy. The reconnaissance detachment of capitaine deMontardy moves a bit back to avoid the encirclement. The Vasselot platoon is deployed on the Ramkin crossing

    and destroys or immobilizes 5 German tanks, including 1 Panzer IV from Pz.Rgt 35. On the French side a Panhardhas a wheel damaged after a collision with a Panzer I and a motorcycle platoon has been captured by the enemy.On its side, capitaine Renoult moves back to Saint-Trond to hold the accesses of the town until night. There aremany such events with the Panhard 178 armored cars on May 11.

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    The area of the 3eDLM is divided in 2 sectors organized in depth with infantry strong points in each town, village or

    farm hold by the 11eRDP (Colonel des Revouy) supported by tank groups deployed on the rear, ready to counter-

    attack between the infantry positions.The northern sector is defended by the 6

    eBLM (Colonel des Loges):

    12eRC(40 Panhard 178 armored cars) whose elements are currently in reconnaissance patrols

    11eRDP(2 infantry battalions with 44 Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks)

    The 2nd

    battalion of the 11eRDP (II/11

    eRDP, Capitaine Brau) is deployed around Ophelissem and the 3

    rdbattalion

    of the 11eRDP (III/11

    eRDP, squadron commander Kientz) is around Marilles and Orp.

    The southern sector is defended by the 5eBLM (General de La Font):

    1eRC(43 Hotchkiss H39 and 44 Somua S35)

    2eRC(43 Hotchkiss H39 and 44 Somua S35)

    11eRDP(1 infantry battalion with 22 Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks)

    The first line around Hannut and Crehen is defended by the 1st battalion of the 11

    eRDP (I/11

    eRDP, Capitaine

    Lafargue). The 2eRC (Lieutenant-Colonel Touzet du Vigier) has the task to protect this first line with 2 Somua S35

    squadrons and 2 Hotchkiss H39 squadrons. The 1eRC (Lieutenant-Colonel de Vernejoul) is maintained in reserve

    in Jauche. There is a whole tank regiment in reserve, not in a linear defense.The 2

    eDLM has also organized an in-depth defense with the 3 infantry battalions and the 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1

    armored cars of the 1eRDP (Colonel de Bellefon), the tanks of the 13

    eRD (Lieutenant-Colonel Juin de Baisse) and

    of the 29eRD (Colonel Baruteau).

    May 12, 1940

    The reconnaissance elements of Colonel Leyer delay the 4.PzD until May 12 at 9h00 before moving back to thepositions of the 6

    eBLM. The Panhard 178 armored cars even knock out several German tanks. The 4.PzD attacks

    with strong support from the Luftwaffe. The Pz.Rgt.35 (Colonel Eberbach) supported by 1 infantry battalion is thefirst to attack the French troops. The Hannut area is attacked by Panzergruppe Eberbach. The I/11

    eRDP holds and

    strikes back despite heavy losses mainly due to the 2.0cm guns of the Panzer II with their high rate of fire. TheGerman tanks reached the center of Crehen where they are ambushed by the 5 camouflaged Hotchkiss H39 tanksfrom Sous-Lieutenant Geneste. 4 German tanks are immobilized but the German tanks are more numerous. The2.0cm projectiles bounce against the armor but Panzer IIIs knock the French tanks. A first counter-attack islaunched by the 3

    rdsquadron of the 2

    eRC (Hotchkiss tanks, Capitaine Sainte-Marie Perrin) and finally 11 French

    Hotchkiss tanks and 5 German tanks are destroyed. The 10 other Hotchkiss tanks are ordered to retreat. Theinefficiency of the 37mm SA18 L/21 gun of 80% of the Hotchkiss tanks is demonstrated; it is unable to destroy the

    Panzer III and Panzer IV at 50-100m.

    In Crehen, the Somua S35 tanks (Lieutenant Lotsisky) destroy 4 German tanks, 1 AT gun battery and severaltrucks. Next to Thisnes, despite heavy losses, the French troops stop the Germans and destroy the regimentalcommand tank of Colonel Eberbach (who will later be commander of the 4.PzD). The Somua S35 tanks launch areal charge against the enemy and stop the German advance in front of Crehen. Several German tanks areburning after the counter-attack of the Somua S35 tanks. At the end of the day, Crehen is evacuated by the Frenchdragons ports who move back to Merdorp, Jandrenouille and Jandrain, on their second line.

    A renewed German assault is launched between Crehen and Hannut at 20h00, after a strong artillery preparation.A French artillery preparation is followed by the counter-attack of 1 Somua S35 tank squadron (only 21 tanks) ofthe 2

    eRC led by captain de Beaufort. The Somua S35 tanks destroy meticulously every German tank and resist to

    the German guns. This attack inflicts heavy losses to the Germans who are forced to retreat. Many Somua S35

    tanks come back with 20-40 2.0cm and 3.7cm hits without any damage.The 4.PzD is also defeated more north on the Petite Gette stream, in front of Tirlemont. The German attempts tocross the Mhaigne River more south are defeated by the tanks of the 2

    eDLM which also supported the 3

    eDLM by

    firing on the tanks moving against the 3eDLM. During the rest of the night there are only artillery battles.

    During the night, General Hoepner realizes the inefficiency of his light tanks against the French tanks. He orders toengage the Hotchkiss tanks but to avoid combat with the Somua S35 tank. The French 47mm L/32 SA35 gun isable to destroy the German tanks at 800m but the 3.7cm KwK proved to be rather useless at standard range (300-400m) against the Somua S35. The reports from the Panzerbrigade 3 indicate that the 3.7cm gun is inefficientbeyond 200m. The Somua S35 tanks will have to be neutralized by the Panzer III, Panzer IV and AT guns at closerange and by the 8.8cm FlaK or 10.5cm leFH in direct fire at long range.

    May 13, 1940

    On May 13, the 3.PzD joins the 4.PzD. Nevertheless, at dawn the French troops are attacking and not the Germanones. 6 Somua S35 platoons of the 2

    eDLM (30 tanks), led by captain de Villle, attack at 5h30 the southern flank

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    of the 4.PzD. They slaughtered German tanks and their losses were very small and mainly due to the use of 8.8cmFlaK in AT role.

    At 9h00, the Luftwaffe attacks massively Jauche, Merdorp and Jandrain. At 10h00, the German assault islaunched. The German infantry clashes with the III/11

    eRDP and at 11h00 the tanks of the 3.PzD and 4.PzD attack

    concentrated on a front of less than 5 km wide. The 3.PzD moves towards Orp and the 4.PzD towardsJandrenouille. The French infantry strong points organized in hedgehogs are submerged, many Hotchkiss tanksare destroyed.

    At 13h30, the 1e RC (Colonel de Vernejoul) which was maintained in reserve in Jauche in engaged. The 2 ndsquadron of the 1

    e RC (21 Somua S35 tanks, captain Ameil) is launched in a north to south attack against the

    4.PzD positions north of Jandrenouille. The Somua S35 tanks stop in a hull-down position, at 800m of the Germanpositions. All the German tanks are crowded in a forest edge. The Somua S35 tanks open fire and slaughtersystematically the German tanks at long range. At the same time, the Somua S35 squadron led by captain deBeaufort (2

    eRC) launches a south to north counter-attack against the other flank of the 4.PzD. The 4.PzD looses

    many burning tanks and cannot deploy as it was planned.Elements of the 3.PzD are engaged to outflank the Somua S35 tanks of captain Ameil but on the way theyencounter the 1

    stsquadron (21 Somua S35, Lieutenant Mazeran) of the 1

    eRC, perfectly embossed and engaging

    them on the flank.About 50 German tanks are knocked out but the Somua S35 tanks have to abandon their position because of lackof ammunition. Only Lieutenant Racine's platoon manages to retreat without losses. 29 hits of 2.0cm and 3.7cmshells are numbered on his tank but without serious damage. Only 16 out of the 42 Somua S35 tanks of the 1

    eRC

    are still completely operational on May 13 evening, all covered with 20-40 impacts, the others have to be repairedor had been abandoned/destroyed. Many German shells had been wasted against the French tanks withoutsuccess at a too long range.The 3.PzD is more lucky, most of the Somua S35 tanks being already engaged against the 4.PzD. General Stumpffcommanding the 3.PzD, unlike the 4.PzD, doesn't try to reduce all the French infantry strong points but tries toinfiltrate in the rears of the French lines. Nevertheless, several tanks remain stuck in the Petite Gette stream andseveral tanks are lost in front of the strongpoint of Marilles hold by the II/11

    eRDP.

    Lieutenant-Colonel du Vigier (2eRC) engages against the 3.PzD his last 4 platoons: 10 Hotchkiss and 10 Somua

    S35 tanks. Jandrin is encircled, Jauche is close to the same fate but Marilles can be evacuated by the infantryunder the cover of the French tanks.

    The 3eDLM is ordered to move back on new positions at 16h00 and the 2

    eDLM, far less engaged, at 17h00. On

    May 12-13, the French cavalry corps is blocking the Germans about 30 km in front of Gembloux. General Priouxhas been ordered to delay the Germans until May 14 and moves 10 km back in the area of Perwez hold by the 4 eGRDI (Colonel Arlabosse), the reconnaissance group of the 15

    eDIM. The 4

    eGRDI includes motorcycle platoons

    but also 13 Laffly 50 AM and 12 Citron-Kgresse P16 Mle1929 armored cars. There are no natural elements really

    useful to build a defense, only several dispersed and rather useless "Cointet" mobile AT obstacles. During this timethe Luftwaffe attacks all the French rears, on the frontline the French and German troops are too closely mixed.Fuel supply issues force the XVI.Panzerkorps to stop on the Jauche-Ramilles line. At 21h00, the 3

    e DLM is

    deployed on its new positions and the 2eDLM is deployed early on May 14.

    According to the war diary of the 3.Panzerbrigade (3.PzD) commanded by Colonel Khne: "huge quantities ofammunition were used during the battles against French tanks because of the lack of power of the 2.0cm and3.7cm guns. In our brigade, all the 3.7cm and 7.5cm shells were used during a single battle on May 13. Our unithad to wait for ammunition supply to continue to fight." German sources agreed that the "only really effective"German tank weapon against French armor was the 7.5cm KwK firing APCBC shells. The same source from3.Panzerbrigade concludes that their 3.7cm gun was effective only at less than 200m range.

    May 14, 1940

    North of the French cavalry corps, the British troops move back behind the Dyle River. South of the French troopsthe Belgian army retreats on Brussels. Both flanks of the cavalry corps are exposed.During the morning the 3.PzD and 4.PzD attack strongly the center of the new French deployment, but they aredefeated by the French artillery and perfectly embossed tanks. The 2

    eDLM and 3

    eDLM block the enemy and start

    to move back behind the French 1st army around Gembloux during the morning. Mission accomplished for the

    cavalry corps of General Prioux.

    Germans never attacked with less than a tank battalion (about 80 tanks including 10 Panzer III and 6 Panzer IV)against French units of the strength of s squadron (about 20 tanks). The main reason is a better tactical regulationmainly due to more radio sets on the German side. French officers latter admitted that they were surprised by theGerman tank concentration.

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    The French tanks due to their 1-man turret were probably a bit more intricate to use and were more oftenembossed in a rather static position, firing on the German tanks at medium/long range, than engaged in a puremelee-like combat. Contrary to the 1

    eDLM and 2

    e DLM who had well trained crews, the 3

    e DLM (except some

    officers from the other DLMs) had only reservists who did their military service on horse and some of themdiscovered their tank a short time before being engaged. They had fired a few shells at Suippes and now, theywere facing a flood of German tanks ! (It is still amazing that they did not run away at this glance). To worsen thesituation, most of the Somua of the 3

    eDLM went to combat with 2 crew members instead of 3, many tankers were

    in permission at the beginning of the combats and therefore nobody was there to help the commander to reload. Inthese tanks the Somua had really a 1-man turret instead of a 1 one. This can explain why *one* German source

    (even not specified) is quoted in Gunsburg's article "battle of the Belgian plain" about the bad gunnery skills of theFrench tankers. The 3

    eDLM in Hannut which had a very high proportion of reservists sustained heavy losses while

    the more experienced crews of the 2e DLM (also less engaged) in the same battle had only light losses.

    Nevertheless the 3eDLM reservists inflicted significant losses to the elite of the Panzerwaffe. Each counter-attack

    made by a small formation of Somua S35 tanks was seen as critical by the Germans. For this division, there was ofcourse the absence of tracer shells and the fact that roughly all the Hotchkiss tanks of the 3

    eDLM had 37mm SA18

    L/21 guns with only poor anti-tank efficiency. It is a miracle that they could fight so well against the elitePanzerwaffe in Hannut. They had better tanks (considering the armor and the armament of the Somua S35 tanks)than most of the German crews but mostly with crews lacking training.

    To actually hit a Panzer with the 1-man turret would prove to be difficult for the 3eDLM : German tanks were fast,

    training insufficient and tracer shells absent in the tanks ... But on the German side, the situation was not very goodas well : apart from the 7.5cm L/24 gun of the Panzer IV, no German shell could pierce the Somua S35 and theHotchkiss H39 at a comfortable range, they had to move to close range. German tankers went to duel the FrenchSomua S35 tanks at medium and long range (around 600-800m and up to 1000m) with both sides using too manyrounds for nothing but the 47mm L/32 SA35 gun of the Somua S35 was able to destroy the German tanks at thisrange unlike the German ones. The 4x gunsight of the Somua tanks was also adapted for such long rangetargeting. Even counterattacks led by 10 Somua S35 tanks were viewed as critical on the German side TheFrench would trade tanks for time. During the battle, the advancing German tanks were very often attacked on theflanks and the rear by the French tanks. The French tactics are therefore probably not that bad as often depicted.

    All along the battle, the French troops launched many counter-attacks despite being massively attacked by theLuftwaffe. The German Colonel Neuman wrote: "the admirable tenacity of the French troops, which did not loosean inch of ground, despite heavy losses left the battle indecisive. General Hoepner didn't know the real strength ofits opponent and the location of the core of the enemy armored forces."

    The losses are heavy on both sides. The French lost 105 tanks (75 Hotchkiss H35/H39 and 30 Somua S35tanks) and the Germans about 164 tanks, mainly due to the action of the Somua S35 tanks (despite being oftenmanned by crews lacking experience) but also several because of the Hotchkiss tanks or because of the infantrystrong points including AT guns and AT mines. Concerning the French tank losses a part was probably destroyedby the Luftwaffe and not at all by German tanks. A high proportion of the 75 Hotchkiss tanks were destroyed byenemy fire. A significant number of the 30 lost Somua S35 tanks is due to drivers' mistakes or mechanicalbreakdowns. Noteworthy here is clearly a better survival rate of the more powerful Somua S35 tank compared tothe Hotchkiss H39. The Somua tanks could engage the German tanks at longer range. Concerning the Frenchinfantry, the 11

    eRDP is reduced to 1 operational battalion.

    In tank battles, the one who hold the ground in the end has a tremendous advantage. German field workshopswould work during the night to repair some of the tanks that were knocked out during the battle. It is indeed rarethat with the projectile of 1940 a tank remains totally and definitely destroyed. But only the Germans could recovertheir knocked out tanks. During the battle the German tanks were several times out of fuel and ammunition. TheGermans organized air supply to provide fuel for their tanks.

    Three officers of the 3eDLM who fought against the German tanks during the battle of Hannut will play a role in the

    next part of the war:Colonel Leyer, future commander of the 4

    eDLM in June 1940, will command the Vichy French cavalry in Morocco.

    In 1942-1943, he will be one of the main actors of the creation of the French armored arm. Squadron commander Touzet du Vigier had in charge the "armored cavalry" course in the cavalry school atSaumur from 1931 to 1934. During his teaching and in various conferences in 1937-1938 he proved very open tothe innovative ideas concerning the tanks. His teaching influenced many officers like Capitaine de Hautecloque (asknown as Leclerc). Already in 1914, he led a cavalry raid deep behind the German lines during 5 days. In 1937, hetook part to the writing of the cavalry doctrine with General Flavigny. In 1940, Colonel Touzet du Vigier commandedthe 2

    eRgiment de Cuirassiers (3

    eDLM) and fought during the battle of Hannut. He commanded the 2

    ndmotorized

    cavalry brigade in North Africa until 1942-1943. In 1944, he became commander of the 1st

    French armored division(1

    eDB) included in the First French army.

    Colonel de Vernejoul, commander of the 1eRgiment de Cuirassiers (3

    eDLM) in 1940 will be commander of the

    5thFrench armored division (5

    eDB) in 1944.

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    One could also mention Lieutenant-Colonel Baillou, who was tank commander in the 3e DLM in 1940. He will

    command the "escadron hors-rang" (headquarters squadron) of the 12eRCA (Rgiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique), a

    regiment of the 2nd

    French armored division (commanded by Leclerc, who was captain in 1940) in North Africa andFrance. He will be instructor in France from 1945 to 1950.

    Munitionsschlepper auf PzKpfw I destroyed near Hannut

    Panzer I (4.PzD) knocked-out near Hannut

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    Panzer III F destroyed near Merdorp

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    1.2 The battle of Gembloux (May 14-15, 1940)

    The resistance of the cavalry corps (2eDLM and 3

    eDLM) from May to May 14, 1940 allowed the deployment of the

    1eDM (Division Marocaine = Moroccan infantry division - General Mellier) and the 15

    eDIM (Division d'Infanterie

    Motorise = motorized infantry division - General Juin) around Gembloux, on a front of 12 km. Note that during thisbattle each division had to defend a 5-7 km front as intended for a French infantry division instead of 20-30 km forthe infantry divisions around Sedan. The tanks of the cavalry corps were still involved on the beginning of the 14

    th

    of May and the artillery of the cavalry corps reinforced the French units at Gembloux. In Gembloux, the Frenchinfantry/artillery couple will face with success the German Panzer/Luftwaffe couple of the so-called "Blitzkrieg".

    French deployment around Gembloux (Source: Aymes)

    The battle of Gembloux is mainly opposing the French infantry to the German Panzerdivisionen and Luftwaffe. The

    tanks of the cavalry corps play only a role on May 14 and artillery elements of the cavalry corps are detached to theFrench infantry.

    The Germans troops are ordered to take Gembloux and to break through the lines of the French 1stArmy on May

    14. In the morning, after the battle of Hannut, the 5.Panzerbrigade (Colonel Breith) of the 4.PzD (Pz.Rgt.35 andPz.Rgt.36) forms the spearhead of the XVI.Panzerkorps and goes on. The core of the German troops is delayedduring about 1 hour in front of the "Cointet" AT obstacles in Perwez. The German engineers open passages for thevehicles and the trenches just behind are empty. They should have been occupied by Belgian troops. All theseconcentrated German troops are targeted by 9 Morane-Saulnier fighters MS.406 but in a short time 3 of the Frenchfighters are shot down by the FlaK and the others are pursued by numerous German fighters.

    Pz.Rgt.36 and elements of the divisional infantry (Schtz.Brigade 4 = Schtz.Rgt.12 and Schtz.Rgt.33) are blocked abit later around the town of Grand Leez and the woods next to this town by the fire of French tanks from the 2

    eDLM

    which are ordered to delay the advancing enemy. The intervention of Ju87 dive bombers does not change thesituation and the attackers are still blocked by the French fire. After an artillery preparation and a concerted attack,the town is finally taken. German engineers capture one French AT gun and knock out 4 French tanks with it. A fifthFrench tank is immobilized with an explosive charge in the tracks.

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    The 3.PzD on its side is delayed by the retreating 3e DLM north-east of Ernage. Like in Hannut, the

    3.Panzerbrigade complaints that too many shells are fired without effect against the French tanks and that only the7.5cm KwK of the Panzer IV is really efficient against them. The same source from 3.Panzerbrigade indicates thatthe German 3.7cm gun was effective only at less than 200m range. They are probably facing Somua S35 tankscovering the retreat of the 3

    eDLM. The infantry of the division joins the tank only at night and in the darkness one

    battalion is even fired at by German tanks.

    Due to this rearguard resistance, the German attack on the French infantry positions cannot be launched asplanned on this day and more tanks are lost on both sides. The French loose about 15 AFVs during these delaying

    combats. Because of the events in the area of Sedan, the retreating tanks from the 2eDLM and 3eDLM are first putin reserve but they are rapidly removed from the Gembloux gap and sent south to face new threats. Nonetheless,several AT guns and artillery units from the cavalry corps remain with the French infantry. The 1

    eDIM (deployed

    north of the 1eDM) is for example reinforced by 12x 105mm C howitzers, 24x 75mm field guns and 4x 47mm SA37

    AT guns from the 3eDLM.

    During May 14 and 15, 1940 the 3.PzD and 4.PzD will be blocked by the French infantry in the Gembloux gap,unable to pierce the French lines. Both sides will sustain heavy losses.

    1.3 Conclusion after the battles of Hannut-Gembloux (May 12-15, 1940)

    During 2 days the 3

    e

    DLM (and the 2

    e

    DLM) managed to stop 2 Panzerdivisionen and to inflict them heavy losses inHannut. The French losses in the 3e DLM are also significant: with more than 100 tanks out of 239 (since the

    French did not hold the ground) and high infantry losses in the 11eRDP. Regarding the losses on both sides the

    result is rather a draw. Both sides managed to fulfil their mission. The single mission of General Prioux was toresist enough to delay the German advance during 2 days. This mission was completely fulfilled, in this sense thebattle of Hannut is a French tactical success, but the damaged tanks could generally not be recovered. Of course,today we know that the German attack in Belgium had the aim to attract the allied troops in a trap but the XVI.Panzerkorps was not simulating its combats and the heavy German losses are real.Hoepner had actually the order to fix the cavalry corps but also to pierce the French line in Gembloux, in which hefailed. The 2 Panzerdivision supported by 2 infantry divisions were again blocked in Gembloux, by 2 Frenchinfantry divisions this time. On the overall strategic level of course the allies failed in May 1940, but Hannut andGembloux can eventually be seen as French tactical successes over the German army but it is rather a draw.Despite heavy aerial support, the advantage of the radio sets in their faster tanks etc. the Germans failed in face of

    the French cavalry corps and the 1

    st

    army which were devoid of aerial support.

    In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and in Gembloux the French artillery indirect fire alonedestroyed about 50 German tanks, including 32 tanks in the Pz.Rgt.35. On May 15 evening, the 4.PzD had only137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from the initial 331 tanks.So there were 194tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux. Only 41 % of thetanks were operational.

    On May 16:

    The 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks thanon May 15. But 149 tanks remained unavailable; this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repairworkshops.

    The 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks . Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops

    one day after the battles.

    On May 16, 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore,including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. The Germans repaired more of their tanksduring the following days or weeks while the French could not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.

    After the battle of Gembloux, General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats thenext day. Indeed many tanks were not operational anymore and the artillery lacked now ammunition. The heavyguns had to await their supplies from Maastricht in the Netherlands; all the other dumps were empty. Hoepner'stroops are so exhausted that they cannot exploit the retreat of the French 1

    st Army on May 16-18, 1940 to

    disorganize it.

    The assault of 2 Panzerdivisionen supported by 2 infantry divisions have been stopped on an improvised line by 2

    French infantry divisions. Hoepner had actually the order to pierce the French line in Gembloux, in which he failed.The eventual French success in Hannut and Gembloux is only a short-lived victory and the human cost is veryhigh. On May 15 evening, the French 1

    starmy, although undefeated, is ordered to move back due to the collapse of

    the 9tharmy on the Meuse in the area of Sedan on May 13. This situation endangers greatly the rear right flank of

    the 1stArmy. The French troops will move back and deploy between Arras, Valenciennes and Tournai.

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    General von Bechtolsheim and captain von Jungenfeld judged the French deployment in Hannut as very linear andthe French units as poorly mobile. This was repeated by Henrich Bcheler, Hermann Zimmerman and B.H. LiddelHart in 1949 but is rather in opposition with the memories of General Prioux and the books of Genotte and Sarton.In fact the French deployment is everything but linear since the defense is organized in depth, but the Frenchdeployment is also therefore rather static. There were only local counter-attacks. There were no mobile attacklaunched involving e.g. all the tanks of a whole regiment.Indeed, when you look on a General map, the deployment of the cavalry corps seems rather linear, because it is adefensive deployment and because it is clearly on a north to south axis. But it is for sure an in-depth organization

    with infantry strong points supported by tank squadrons ready to counter-attack between the infantry hedgehogs;and a whole tank regiment in reserve.It seems poorly mobile because the 2

    e DLM could have been far more engaged against the XVI.Panzerkorps,

    instead of staying south of the 3eDLM. But, one has to be coherent and remember the context. For the French

    units this German attack was the main one, not a trap as we know it today. They knew that the German had 8 extraPanzerdivisionen available somewhere. They did not know how many more Panzerdivisionen were to be engagedin that battle. The 2

    eDLM could have been surprised on its flanks by 1 extra Panzerdivision.

    The 3eDLM accomplished the mission completely and has delayed the 2 German armored divisions for required

    time. It inflicted heavy losses since 164 German tanks were knocked out.Captain Jugenfeld judged probably not the mobility of the French tanks by themselves (although for sure theGerman tanks are faster) but the mobility of the French tank units. The French tanks launched many counter-attacks but indeed they also fought several times in rather static positions. They used hull down emplacements atmedium/long range to engage more numerous German tanks and meticulously fired at them from a safe position.They had not necessarily the need to move or they would probably have lost their advantage. They took advantageof the terrain to fulfil their mission. If engaged all the time in a pure mobile and melee-style combat, withoutsufficient radio sets and 1-man turrets, against more numerous enemy tanks, they would probably have lost morethan 105 tanks.The good armor (40mm on the hull and the turret) and the powerful 47mm L/32 SA35 of the Somua S35 tankcoupled to a 4x gunsight (higher magnification than the German tank gun sights but smaller field of view) made itable to engage safely German tanks up to 800-1000m. At this range it was roughly impossible for a German tank todestroy the Somua S35. The Somua S35 proved capable of continue to fight after having received up to about 40German hits but every German tanks were easily penetrated by the 47mm SA35 gun. Firing on the German tanksfrom a well chosen position was a better solution for the French tankers than to be engaged in a melee at closerange with a 1-man turret, especially for the inexperienced 3

    eDLM and especially because as explained most of

    the Somua S35 tanks of this units had only 2 crew members instead of 3. Captain von Jugenfeld probably judgedthe French tank units with his views of German tankers, for who the main advantages are speed and tacticalregulation thanks to the radio. The French tanks were used in a different way to exploit their own advantages. Theyproved to be rather successful according to the German losses, and unlike the German side without heavy airsupport or the use of powerful 8.8cm FlaK in AT role.The French deployment was aimed on defense and counter-attacks and the German one was focused on theoffensive, it was not a complete meeting engagement.

    The delay mission in Hannut was actually a perfect mission for the cavalry corps. Nonetheless, in 1940 the core ofthe French army remained the infantry associated with the artillery and they proved able to stand up against thenew German tank/aircraft couple in Gembloux. The French air force and the French tanks remain mainly auxiliaryunits meant to support this infantry in 1940, like in the 1918/1921 doctrine.The French tanks are not and independent arm and in combat they are rather employed to take specific andsuccessive objectives by piercing about 15-25 km deep in the enemy lines. The French tanks were not conceivedto pierce 100 km deep like the powerful and independent Panzerwaffe. Nonetheless, the French cavalry tanks hadthe ability to move fast to a far away deployment area and may have to execute pursuit and exploitation missions,other classical cavalry missions beside the reconnaissance and delay missions. Had the Germans frontallyattacked the 2

    e DLM instead of the inexperienced and incomplete 3

    e DLM, they would probably have sustained

    even higher losses.

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    2. THE 1eDLM IN THE NETHERLANDS

    While the 2eDLM and 3

    eDLM are engaged in Belgium with the 1

    starmy, the 1

    eDLM (General Picard) has to fulfil a

    similar mission in the Netherlands for the 7tharmy. The French 7

    tharmy has to deploy between Breda and Turnhout

    but this line was rather far away from the starting line in France. The 1e DLM was to move first, to provide

    intelligence and reconnaissance for the 7tharmy and to establish contacts with the Belgian and Dutch armies. Its

    mission was then to delay the German troops long enough to allow the 25eDIM (General Molini) and the 9

    eDIM

    (General Didelet) to occupy the position on the Marck River.

    The 1e DLM will have to face the XVIII.Armee (General von Kuchler) including the 9.PzD (General Hubrig) and the1.Kavallerie Division. The 9.PzD has to cross the Meuse River, to reach Tirlburg and to take Breda. It will then besplit in two groups:

    A first group reinforced by the SS Verfgung (mot) division

    A second group reinforced by the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) regiment and 2 airborne troops battalionsof the VII.Fliegerdivision with the mission to take Rotterdam

    The Dutch troops concentrated their armored cars, strong infantry and AA elements around their airfields. Theyinflicted significant losses to the airborne German operation. The Luftwaffe lost about 225 aircraft in theNetherlands due to the allied air forces but also because some 170-200 transport planes (mostly Junkers Ju52s)were destroyed, mainly on the ground by artillery fire.

    May 10, 1940

    The 1eDLM will be supported by 2 reconnaissance groups:

    one with the 2eGRCA and the 5

    eGRDI under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lestoquoi, which will operate with

    the 1eDLM

    one with the 2e GRDI, 12

    e GRDI and 27

    e GRDI under command of Colonel Beauchesne, which will operate

    independently

    Nevertheless these reconnaissance units are reduced; only the motorized elements are used, the horse mountedelements being to slow. All these reconnaissance groups include motorcycle platoons. The 2

    e GRDI is the

    reconnaissance group of the 9eDIM and includes also 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H39 tanks.

    The 5e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the 25

    e DIM and includes 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13

    Hotchkiss H35 tanks.

    The reconnaissance regiment of the 1e DLM is the 6

    e RC (Rgiment de Cuirassiers), commanded by Colonel

    Dario, with about 40 Panhard 178 armored cars. It is reinforced by the Lestoquoi group (2eGRCA and 5

    eGRDI).

    Together, they cross the Belgian border at 10h30 and reach the Albert canal east of Anvers during afternoon. Theymove beyond Turnhout during the night. The tanks of the 1

    eDLM arrive by train around Oosmalle, 15 km west of

    Turnhout.

    May 11, 1940

    To be sure to have troops as early as possible in the Netherlands, a landing of French troops has been organizedon the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands (Zeeland islands). This landing is known as operation F (F as

    Flessingue = Vlissingen).Channel boats from the Calais-Folkestone line like the "Cte d'Azur" and the "Rouen" are used to load the troops atDunkirk. The transport ships are escorted by 7 torpedo ships provided by the 2

    eDT (division de torpilleurs), 11

    eDT

    and 14e DT. Other ships were present like French submarine chasers, French "aviso" ships and several British

    vessels. The "Diligente" is a second class "aviso" but it was used to supply seaplanes. This ship arrives with 15,000litres of fuel. At 9h00 a Heinkel He-111 bomber attack the harbor of Flessingue but without result.On May 11, there are 2 landings: one at 4h15 and a second one at 13h40. The French troops landing in theNetherlands are the 224

    eRI from the 68

    eDI (General Beaufrre), supported by 1 artillery group (12 75mm M

    le1897

    field guns) provided by the 89eRA from the 60

    eDI (General Deslaurens).

    The reconnaissance elements reach Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven. 400 German paratroops held the Moerdjikbridge next to Breda. They have occupied the previously Dutch fortifications and are equipped with MGs, mortarsAT rifles and AT guns. 1 Panhard 178 platoon (5 armored cars) and 2 motorcycle platoons are ordered to prevent

    the Germans to move towards Breda which is the final objective of the 1eDLM. They block the Germans with thehelp of Dutch infantry units.

    Motorized German elements are moving north-east of Tilburg and skirmish with French advanced elements. OneGerman tank is destroyed. Around 21h00, detachment Dudognon (Panhard 178 armored cars from the 6

    eRC)

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    defend the Moergestel Bridge over the Reussel River. At 23h00, 3 German armored cars accompanied by 3 side-cars and a truck full of troops appear. Marchal-des-logis (NCO rank) Gaulthier recalls: "the leading 2 Germanarmored cars do not see me and head for the Panhard 178 "La Varende". The first German armored car crushes 2of our side-cars and barely dodges the "La Varende" (tearing off a mudguard on the way) and crashes into acement pole. The second German armored car (an 8-wheeled Sd.Kfz.231 probably) stops to my left and opens fire.Meanwhile the third German armored car turns out in front of me on the bridge. I open fire with my 25mm SA35gun and I hit it square on. The German armored car rolls for several extra meters before stopping to my right. Atthe same time, the explosive charges placed under the bridge explode as the German truck is on the bridge. I wasin the turret so the deflagration stunned me and I fell inside. When I recovered and went back to the hatch I saw the

    second German armored car still firing on my left. I pivoted the turret and fired point blank with both the main gunand MG (with AP bullets). It quickly ceased firing. The whole action only lasted a quarter of an hour. The enemylost around 20 dead and drowned. The 6

    eCuirrasiers detachment has captured 4 men including 2 wounded. The

    three German armored cars whose motors cannot be started again are scuttled as well as a German side-car. Twomore intact BMW side-cars will replace the 2 that were crushed and we used them up to Dunkirk." The Frenchtroops had only a few lightly wounded men.

    The 2eGRCA deploys in Breda and the 5

    eGRDI is in Tilburg after the loss of 1 armored car in an ambush. The

    infantry of the 1eDLM is deployed on the Reussel River between Tilburg and Turnhout, north-west of the Belgian

    18thinfantry division. The deployment would be satisfactory but the Belgian and Dutch troops retreat rapidly and the

    1eDLM is suddenly alone to face the German troops. The Belgian army abandoned a triangle formed by 3 canals

    (Turnhout, Campines and Albert). The right flank is completely unprotected and German troops are infiltrating.Tilburg, Breda, Turnhout and Oostmalle are bombed by the Luftwaffe.

    May 12, 1940

    The 9.PzD has crossed the Meuse River at Gennep and moves towards Breda. The French reconnaissanceelements retreat to the Wortel Merxplas Turnhout Desschel line after having skirmished with Germanarmored elements. The movement of the 7

    th army towards Breda is cancelled to reconstitute a continuous front

    after the retreat of the Belgian army on the Berg op Zoom Anvers line. The 25eDIM is deploying in Wortel. The

    infantry of the 1eDLM and Belgian troops are in contact with the enemy on the Turnhout canal and are reinforced

    by the 9e DIM on May 13 only. The pressure of the 9.PzD is increasing in the area of Turnhout and a German

    infantry division crosses the canal but cannot advance more.

    On May 12, two additional convoys unload French troops in the Zeeland islands. The Luftwaffe is now very activeand attacking the harbor every 2 hours. The ships are not hit but these bombings have the effect of hampering theunloading of the equipment and fuel supplies. A truck is thrown on the "Diligente" by the explosion of a Germanbomb. The ship is still full of fuel but there is no explosion. The "aviso" is nonetheless blocked and will leave theharbor on May 13 only. All the other ships leave except the submarine chasers "chasseur 6" and "chasseur 9".

    May 13, 1940

    The 1e DLM is strongly attacked by the Luftwaffe and the 9.PzD. Movements through the Anvers tunnel are

    delayed because Dutch employees in charge of the air intake went on strike !General Picard launches 2 Hotchkiss squadrons of the 18

    eRD (42 tanks) in a counter-attack against the German

    troops who managed to cross the Turnhout canal. The objectives are Moll and the bridges on the Turnhout canal.An other canal has to be crossed and only one, 8 meters long, engineered bridge enables the crossing of tanks butonly the lighter ones. The Somua S35 tanks cannot be engaged. 1 German battalion is forced to retreat from Mollbut the bridges are strongly defended by AT guns and infantry. Without infantry the French attack cannot go on.Several German AT guns are destroyed or crushed and the enemy infantry sustained losses. Several French tanksare damaged but only when engaged at close range. At the end of the day, receiving no infantry support to openthe way, the French tanks have to move back.

    During the night, the French troops in the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands are reinforced by the 271eRI,

    motorized elements of the 68e GRDI and 1 engineer company from the 60eDI. These troops crossed the Escaut

    (Scheldt) River thanks to ferries.

    May 14, 1940

    The 1

    e

    DLM is attacked south of Berg op Zoom and defeats the Germans. Because of the context of the Germanbreakthrough in Sedan and the very advanced position of the French 7tharmy and of the 1

    eDLM, the French troops

    are ordered to retreat towards Anvers. The 9eDIM and the 25

    eDIM are sent to the south to reinforce the French 1

    st

    army.

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    During this day 1 tank battalion of the 9.PzD, reinforced by German infantry, AT guns and supported by artillery fireencircles and destroys the 12

    eGRDI and several armored cars of the 6

    eRC in Berg op Zoom, west of Tilburg.

    May 15, 1940

    Rotterdam and La Haye have been captured by the Germans. On May 15, the Dutch army capitulates.The 1

    e DLM is deployed in the area of Kontich and begins to move back at 21h00. The 1

    eDLM will fight hard

    delaying combats. In one week the division moved on more than 600 km, managing to defeat all the German

    encirclement attempts before being trapped around Dunkirk.

    A strong German attack (including SS-Standarte Deutschland) is launched against the French troops still in theZeeland islands. The French 271

    e RI is in Zuid Beveland and the French 224

    e RI (B reserve regiment) is in

    Walcheren. The French troops are completely cut from the 7tharmy and encircled by the Germans. The 271

    eRI

    launches a counter attack but without success. The regiment is destroyed, only 300 survivors retreat to the islandof Walcheren to defend the Sloedam (a small dam between Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland). The canal betweenWalcheren and Zuid Beveland is a poor defence since it is completely dry at low water.Walcheren is defended by the 224

    eRI supported by 1 group (12 75mm M

    le1897 field guns) of the 89

    eRA and the

    remains of the 271eRI who are completely demoralized. These troops are nevertheless supported by the fire of the

    French torpedo boats from the 2eDT and 6

    e DT and by several French submarine chasers. The Loire-Nieuport

    LN.401 dive bombers from AB.2 squadron (French fleet air arm) support the ground troops by attacking theGerman forces and the Potez 631 twin-engine fighters from AC.2 squadron (French fleet air arm) provide air cover.The French troops will resist until May 17.

    Sd.Kfz.260 destroyed by French troops near Anvers

    May 17, 1940

    The French defense collapses slowly and the troops have to retreat to the harbor of Flessingue to be evacuated.The first French troops evacuating Flessingue have the luck to still find several ferries. These ferries are ordered toreturn to Flessingue to evacuate additional troops but they will never do that. The Royal Navy lost the destroyer"Valentine", and had the destroyer "Winchester" damaged whilst protecting these ferries.

    The 14e DT (division de torpilleur) reinforces the French troops and takes part to the evacuation. The torpedo boat"Cyclone" fires 80 shells of 130mm on the main road of Zuid Beveland where German troops are concentrating. Itis replaced for the fire mission by the "Siroco" and later by the British ships "Wolsey" and "Vimiera". During the

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    same time, the 12 guns of the 89eRA fire 3,000 75mm shells. Nevertheless that does not prevent the Germans to

    cross the little canal separating the 2 islands, mainly thanks to the support of the Luftwaffe.

    General Deslaurens (commander of the 60e DI and of the operation) is killed in Flessingue (Vlissingen) while

    fighting, a carbine in his hands. Most of the French troops are embarked by the French navy (Chasseur 5, 6, 10, 41and 42) but operation F is a failure. The General commanding the operation has been killed, the 271

    eRI doesnt

    exist anymore as operational unit and 2 battalions of the 224eRI have been captured. The 12 guns of the 89

    eRA

    group have been destroyed or scuttled. Concerning the navy it proved able to land and to embark troops underheavy German air attacks; only 1 British ship was sunk.

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    3. THE FRENCH CAVALRY CORPS AFTER MAY 15, 1940

    After the combats in Belgium and in the Netherlands, General Prioux wants to concentrate the 1e, 2

    eand 3

    eDLM in

    the cavalry corps. Nevertheless it seems not possible, all the time the tank brigades are being ordered by the armycorps to support different infantry units. Prioux cannot control the fate of his tanks; they are dispersed and cannotbe grouped as wished. On May 26, General Prioux takes command of the 1

    starmy and is replaced by General de

    La Font. After Dunkirk, the tank crews, who are the French troops evacuated in priority reconstitute the cavalrycorps but it is only the shadow of the previous one.

    3.1 The grouping of the DLMs in the north (May 16-20, 1940)

    On May 16, the 3 DLMs move back to France.

    Situation on May 16, 1940

    The 1eDLM is deployed south of Valenciennes and Cambrai, attached to the 9

    tharmy. The Somua S35 tanks are

    deployed at Quesnoy and will soon meet German mechanized elements reinforced by AT guns during short butviolent engagements. Rear guard elements of the French 9

    th army are engaged in the forest of Mormal, east of

    Quesnoy. The 7.PzD (General Rommel) has trapped them in the woods and goes on with its advance, letting the5.PzD (General von Hartlieb) reduce them.

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    Today's map showing Quesnoy (the city in orange) he Mormal woods as well as the towns of Jolimetz and Landrecies.

    On May 17, the 1e DLM is ordered to block the German tanks. There is also a fierce battle in and around the

    Mormal forest. The 1eDLM meets the 5.PzD and elements of the 7.PzD. The 1

    eDLM is far from having all its units

    but the counter-attack starts at 18h30 from Quesnoy towards Landrecies. The tanks of the 4e

    RC (Colonel Poupel)and the 18

    eRD (Colonel Pinon) are incomplete, inferior in number and forced to disperse to control the assigned

    area. Nevertheless the morale and the determination are high. During the counter-attack many Hotchkiss tanks aredestroyed by 10.5cm field guns used in AT role. The French counter-attack will significantly delay the 5.PzD.

    On May 17, 1940, the platoon of Lieutenant Andr De Conigliano from the 3rd

    Squadron of the 4e RC meets

    elements of the the 4e RDP (Rgiment de Dragons Ports - infantry) in Englefontaine (also on the map) and at

    18h00 the platoon received the order to establish a bridgehead at Landrecies. Arriving next to a level/gradecrossing in Landrecies the Somua S35 of lieutnant De Conigliano is under intense fire from German AT weaponsambushed at point blank range. His tank is knocked out. The driver, brigadier-chef Fresnais, is killed and theLieutenant is killed too only the radio/loader is rescued. The 4 other tanks of the platoon, under the command ofmarchal des logis-chef Lger, break the engagement around 19h15 and pull back towards Englefontaine. Theyestablish a defensive position on the Englefontaine-Landrecies road.

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    Insignia of the 4eRgiment de Cuirassiers

    A Somua S35 tank and a Panzer 38(t), both destroyed. The photo was probably taken in Landrecies.

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    The Somua S35 tank of the photo is perhaps the one of Lieutenant Andr De Conigliano but the location of thescene on this photo is not completely sure. New elements enabling to locate the scene are welcome.The town of Landrecies was in German hands with the French tanks arriving. The first French tank was apparentlyquickly destroyed in an ambush. There is no mention of German tanks in Landrecies in the journal of the 4

    eRC but

    all the area was hold by elements of the 7.PzD (explaining the Panzer 38(t)) and by the 5.PzD. The Panzer 38(t) onthe photo was perhaps knocked out by the Somua S35 tanks before or during their movement back towardsEnglefontaine.

    On May 18, 12 Somua S35 tanks of the squadron of Capitaine De Segonzac from the 4eRC are holding the town

    of Jolimetz along with one company of Moroccan tirailleurs in support. During all the day they faced half of the5.PzD (about 120 tanks and massive infantry, field artillery, AT guns and aviation support) on the move in this area.1 Somua S35 tank (Marchal des logis Enfroy) is damaged during a reconnaissance and sent back to Quesnoy.Only 11 French tanks are then controlling the town. The German attack is launched and after a few losses theGermans sent preferentially the heavier Panzer IVs in the town itself. At the end of the day the town wascompletely surrounded. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French have lost 10 tanks (destroyed or abandoned) and the Germans26 tanks, mostly Panzer IVs. That is a perfect example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.

    Map of Jolimetz with the position of the French Somua S35 tanks before the battle (in dark gray the Mormal forest)

    On May 19, the 1eDLM is again under command of the cavalry corps.

    On May 20, the 5eDINA (General Agliany) supported by the 1

    eDLM and the 39

    e BCC (45 Renault R35 tanks)

    attack the German 8.ID, 20.ID (mot), 4.PzD and 5.PzD. The combats last all the day long and on the eveningseveral French troops are trapped in the Mormal forest after having sustained heavy losses.

    On May 21, the French move back to Englefontaine. At 8h00 one battalion of the 24eRTT (Rgiment de Tirailleurs

    Tunisiens) of the 5eDINA, trapped in the forest, launches a bayonet charge under German MG and artillery fire to

    break the encirclement. At 12h00, 300 men of the battalion are KIA and only around 100 men manage to pierce theGerman lines. The 39

    eBCC has lost all its 45 tanks and the 18

    eRD of the 1

    eDLM has only a few operational tanks.

    The 2eDLM and 3

    eDLM on their side covered the retreat of the French 1

    stArmy from May 16 to May 19. On May

    18, they launched several violent but limited counter-attacks in the area of Douai.

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    3.2 Difficult battles in the Flanders and the road to Dunkirk (May 21-29, 1940)

    On May 21, there is an allied counter-attack at Arras. The British brigade (General Martel) leading the main attackon the Arras-Bapaume on 15h00 consists in:

    Right column:

    7thRoyal Tank Regiment (23 Matilda I and 9 Matilda II tanks)

    8thbattalion, the Durham Light Infantry

    365

    th

    battery, 92

    nd

    regiment, Royal Field Artillery (12 25 Pdr howitzers) 260

    thbattery, 65

    thanti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT guns)

    One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns

    One motorcycle platoon from 4thNorthumbrian fusiliers

    Left column:

    4thRoyal Tank Regiment (37 Matilda I and 7 Matilda II tanks)

    6thbattalion, the Durham Light Infantry

    368thbattery, 92

    ndregiment, Royal Field Artillery (12 25 Pdr howitzers)

    260thbattery, 52

    ndanti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT guns)

    One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns

    One motorcycle platoon from 4thNorthumbrian fusiliers

    General Martel and is headquarter staff

    That makes a total concerning the equipment of:

    60 Matilda I light tanks

    16 Matilda II heavy tanks

    21 armored cars

    24 25 Pdr howitzers

    24 2 Pdr AT guns

    6 French 25mm AT guns

    The battle of Arras on May 21, 1940 (Karl-Heinz Frieser)

    The British troops faced mainly the 7.PzD and the SS Totenkopf (mot) division, the 5.PzD was arriving from theeast but too late to take part to the battle. The Matilda II heavy tank spread some panic in the German ranks,

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    mainly in the SS Totenkopf positions where several troops disbanded, without sufficient mean to destroy theMatilda II. But the 8.8cm Flak and the use of artillery in direct fire rapidly solved the problem.

    The French troops began their attack later, covering the western flank of the British attack and later the Britishretreat. They faced the SS Totenkopf (mot) division and the Pz.Rgt.25 from the 7.PzD. The French forces werecomposed of elements from the 3

    eDLM but in fact mainly of the 13

    eBCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength).

    The French had a total of about 60 tanks in this battle, therefore probably about 15 Hotchkiss H39 and Somua S35tanks from the 3

    eDLM itself. They were soon confronted to direct 10.5cm artillery and Flak fire as well as PaK and

    tanks. They were even fired at by British AT gunners. The French tanks destroyed at least 3 Panzer IV and 6

    Pz38(t) from the Pz.Rgt.25 while covering the British retreat. There is no precise data concerning the French lossesbut after the whole battle the 13

    eBCC had lost about 10 tanks and the 3

    eDLM itself lost also probably about 10

    tanks. The 11eRDP (Rgiment de Dragons Ports) had only light losses.

    The British lost 62% of the tanks (47 tanks) before retreating and had about 50% losses in the infantry. 75% of thereconnaissance vehicles (16 from 21), mainly from the Northumbrian regiment were also lost.

    Concerning the whole German losses, the 7.PzD lost 89 KIAs, 116 WIAs and 173 MIAs as well as about 20 tanksand many AT guns and various vehicles. According to K.H. Frieser, from the 173 MIAs, 90 men integrated againquickly their units in the 7.PzD.The SS Totenkopf (mot) lost about 100 KIAs and 200 POWs. The advance of the7.PzD is stopped for the rest of day, therefore only for several hours.

    Elements of the SS Totenkopf (mot) division are facing a British unit defending a bridge on the Scarpe River in thetown of Aubigny-en-Artois (15 km west of Arras). In reprisal for this resistance, 98 people from the town areexecuted by the Germans. The officer in charge, Obersturmbahn Fritz Kuchenlein will be hung on January 28,1949 for his war crimes.

    The attack started on 15h00 and on the evening it is rather a tactical failure after only 3 km of progression. After thesurprise effect, the attack is defeated by the 8.8cm FlaK, the Luftwaffe and counter-attacking German tanks. Itillustrates also the inter-allied communications issues because it was a British initiative. The west cover assured bythe French tanks went deeper towards Amiens but it was a very limited and secondary action. These troopsnevertheless covered the British retreat and inflicted losses to the German tanks.The counter-attack at Arras by itself is secondary regarding the General situation. It blocked indeed the 7.PzDduring a few hours but it is very localized and limited in strength. The core of the German troops went on with theirmovements towards the northern harbors regardless of the battle that was fought.

    On May 22, the 25eDIM supported by the 38eBCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength) drives the German32.ID from the field near Cambrai on the Escaut River, east of Arras. The French breakthrough is important and theGermans engage massive air support to stop it. 18 Dewoitine D520 fighters from GC 2/3 in patrol in the areaintercept a Stuka group and 11 Ju87 dive bombers are shot down. But, the French attack is stopped by theintensity of the bombings.The same day, General Prioux decides to regroup the cavalry corps in the area of Arras. The I/4

    eRDP supported

    by the 18eRD (1

    eDLM) leads a brilliant counter-attack which allows to take Mont-Saint-Eloi north-west of Arras.

    During this attack, the 2eDLM and 3

    eDLM covered the flanks of the attack.

    On May 23, the 158eRI (Colonel Pucinelli) launches a bayonet charge, between Mons and Valenciennes, against

    the German 269.ID and takes Thulin despite the numeric superiority of the Germans. Many German soldiers arecaptured during the assault. Thulin is then shelled by the heavy German artillery. The French troops entrenched inThulin are finally submerged, Colonel Pucinelli is WIA and captured. The last French troops surrender only afterhaving used all their ammunition.On the same day, the 7.PzD outflanks Arras by the west and the 5.PzD tires to progress by the east after havingreduced several infantry resistances.General Prioux has deployed the 1

    e DLM east of Arras. The division is strongly and frequently attacked by the

    Luftwaffe. One Stuka makes a lucky hit on the tank of Colonel Pinon, commander of the 18eRD. The Colonel is

    heavily wounded, the two other crew members (captain Beaussant and the driver) are dead.The 3

    eDLM tries to lengthen the position of the 1

    eDLM to the north, up to Notre Dame de Lorette. But, west of

    Arras, the 7.PzD turns frankly to the east and heavy combats take place south of Bthune. The 3eDLM retreats

    towards Lens. The Germans capture again Mont-Saint-Eloi to the 1eDLM, which moves north of Arras.

    The 2.PzD reaches Boulogne, the 1.PzD reaches Calais, the 6.PzD is near Saint-Omer and the 7.PzD is in thesuburbs of Bthune. The allied units in the north are completely encircled.

    On May 24, the salient of Arras is evacuated and a new frontline is established on the canals between Arleux andBthune. The 3 DLMs will be replaced by infantry units.

    On May 25, the whole cavalry corps (1e, 2

    eand 3

    eDLM) has only 75 operational tanks left out of the 585 initial

    ones. General Prioux is replaced by General Langlois and takes command of the French 1starmy.

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    4. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY CORPS

    Beginning June, the cavalry constitutes 5 DLMs, but reduced ones. All the possible equipments are used: brandnew tanks from the factories or very old ones taken in dumps, parks and schools or training centers. Several ofthese tanks are completely exhausted. Several Panhard 178s went in combat without turret: with home-madearmor plates (16-20mm) forming a casemate (40 would have been produced during June 1940) and armed with25mm SA35 or 47mm SA34 guns and a LMG or completely without turret/casemate and simply armed with a LMG.One Panhard 178 armored car had a modified turret with a 47mm SA35 gun and a coaxial MG (Renault turret).This version took part to combats of late June 1940 in the area the Loire River. It proved very efficient and knockedout numerous German AFVs.

    The new 1e, 2

    eand 3

    eDLM (created west of Paris) are under the direct command of the cavalry corps but not the 2

    others. The remains of the 5 DLCs were to be converted to a DLM "type rduit", a reduced DLM:

    1eDLC as 4

    eDLM

    2eDLC as 5

    eDLM

    3eDLC as 6

    eDLM

    4eDLC as 7

    eDLM

    5eDLC as 8

    eDLM

    The deteriorating military situation meant only 4eDLM and 7

    eDLM were actually formed.

    1e

    DLM(Colonel Beauchesne): ready on June 10 at Pacy-sur-Eure. It includes: 10 Somua S35 tanks

    10 Hotchkiss H39 tanks

    5 Panhard 178 armored cars

    2 motorcycle squadrons

    2 dragons ports battalions

    2eDLM(General Bougrain): ready on June 10 at Dourdan. It includes:

    about 20 tanks

    2 Panhard 178 squadrons (42 armored cars if at full strength, actually probably around 20 only)

    2 motorcycle squadrons

    2 dragons ports battalions

    3eDLM(General Testard): ready on June 10 at Conches. It includes:

    2 Somua S35 squadrons (42 tanks if at full strength, actually probably around 20 only)

    2 Panhard 178 squadrons (42 armored cars if at full strength, actually probably around 20 only)

    1 dragons ports battalion

    1 group of 75mm Mle1897 field guns (12 guns)

    4eDLM (General Leyer): created east of Paris with remnants of the 1

    eDLC, 17

    eGRCA, 2

    eGRDI and reinforced

    with a motorcycles and armored cars group coming from Montlhry where is based the COMAM (Centred'Organisation de Motocyclistes et Automitrailleuses). The 4

    e DLM is attached to the 7

    th army on June 10 and

    includes: 10 Somua S35 tanks

    10 Hotchkiss tanks

    the 1eRAM (armored car regiment) with about 12 Panhard 178 armored cars

    2 infantry regiments (1eChasseurs and 5

    eDragons)

    2 batteries of 75mm Mle1897 field guns (8 guns)

    1 engineer company

    1 signal company

    1 HQ motor transport company

    1 divisional quartermaster group

    1 divisional medical group

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    7eDLM(General Marteau): created already on June 5 with remnant of the 4

    eDLC, it is attached to the 2

    ndarmy.

    The order of battle of the 7eDLM is as follows:

    14eBLM(Brigade Lgre Mcanique) : Lieutenant-Colonel Grvy

    o 4eRAM(Rgiment d'Auto-Mitrailleuses) : Commandant Chapel

    2 squadrons with armored cars and motorcyclists (10 Panhard 178, 14 AMR-33/35)o 8

    eRD(Rgiment de Dragons) : Commandant Deron

    4 Hotchkiss tank squadrons with 22 very old Hotchkiss H35 tanks and 20 new Hotchkiss H39 tanks with the37mm SA38 gun.

    o 4eEDAC(Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char) : Capitaine Hapette Saint-Martin

    (12 25mm SA34/37 AT guns)

    4eBCM(Brigade de Cavalerie Motorise) : Colonel Praudo 14

    eRDP(Rgiment de Dragons ports) : Commandant Sonnery

    1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly 50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm mortars)1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)

    o 31eRDP(Rgiment de Dragons ports) : Commandant De Villers

    1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly 50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm mortars)1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)

    o 4eescadron de rparation divisionnaire (recovery/repair squadron) : Capitaine Palies

    77eRATT(Rgiment d'Artillerie Tracte Tout Terrain) : Lieutenant Colonel Baratchart

    (12 75mm M

    le

    1897 guns, 12 105mm C guns, 5 47mm SA37/39 AT guns, 3 25mm AA guns) 33/1 compagnie de sapeurs mineurs (engineer company)

    1 divisional quartermaster group

    1 divisional medical group

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    4. THE LAST BATTLES OF THE CAVALRY CORPS

    From June 10to June 25, the 5 reduced DLMs will fight the German army uninterrupted, delaying them on each

    River or stream. The Panzerwaffe nevertheless favoured movement to combat and avoided as often as possibleother battles like Hannut and Gembloux. The foot infantry units of the Heer were in charge of neutralizing theFrench pockets. The French cavalry crews will sacrifice themselves to cover the retreat of the French infantry units.

    Fall Rot launches the Germans on the Somme and Aisne Rivers on June 9, 1940. The French lines are alsoattacked on the Seine and Marne Rivers. The cavalry corps (1

    e, 2

    eand 3

    eDLM) covers the retreat of the army of

    Paris (General Hring) by delaying the Hoth Panzerkorps from Pacy to Louviers. The 4eDLM will have the samekind of mission for the 7

    tharmy from Epernay to Meaux.

    4.1 The 7eDLM on the Retourne River (June 10-11, 1940)

    South of the Aisne River is created a "groupement cuirasse" (armored group) with the 3eDCR and the 7

    eDLM

    under the command of General Buisson. They will have to face the tanks of the XXXIX. Panzerkorps (GeneralSchmidt) with the 1.PzD and 2.PzD. On the morning of June 10, the "groupement Buisson" is the single unit able tolead a counter-attack in the area of Rethel. But it is south of the Retourne River and has first to cross it. The tanksreach their base line only at 14h00. At this moment the German bridgehead's size has already considerablyincreased. After refuelling, the unit is ready to attack at 15h00 but is only launched at 17h00.

    The French counter-attack is launched without artillery or aviation support. The movements of the "groupementBuisson" are spotted by the Luftwaffe and will be stopped mainly by the numerous guns installed in anti-tank roleby the 21.ID. The "groupement Buisson" is split in 2 parts:

    1)One part crosses the Retourne river more on the east and attacks the Germans from an east / south-east axis :

    Northern attack on the Annelles - Perthes axis (groupement of Lieutenant-Colonel Matre) with elements ofthe 3

    eDCR: 17 Hotchkiss H39 (2/42

    e and 3/42

    eBCC), 9 Renault B1bis (2/41

    e BCC) and the 3 infantry

    companies of the 16eBCP (bataillon de chasseurs ports).

    Southern attack on the Juniville - Tagnon axis (groupement of Lieutenant-Colonel Salani) with elements ofthe 3

    eDCR: 25 Hotchkiss H39 (45

    eBCC), 10 Renault B1bis (1/41

    eBCC) and of the 7

    eDLM : reduced 31

    e

    RDP (Rgiment de Dragons Ports).

    A few B1bis tanks from the 3/41eBCC remain in Annelles as protection and take not part to the attack.

    2)One part south of the Retourne river, composed of the 10eBCC (40 Renault R35) and of the 7

    eDLM attacks on

    the Mnil-Lpinois - Alincourt - Le Chtelet axis.

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    The 7eDLM order of battle is slightly modified during this battle :

    14eBLM(Brigade Lgre Mcanique) : Lieutenant-Colonel Grvy

    o 4eRAM(Rgiment d'Auto-Mitrailleuses) : Commandant Chapel

    2 squadrons with armored cars and motorcyclists (10 Panhard 178, 14 AMR-33/35)o 8

    eRD(Rgiment de Dragons) : Commandant Deron

    4 Hotchkiss tank squadrons with 22 very old Hotchkiss H35 tanks and 20 new Hotchkiss H39 tanks with the37mm SA38 gun. But only about 25 tanks will reach the deployment area, most of the exhaustedHotchkiss H35 tanks have been immob ilized during the move.

    o 4eEDAC(Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char) : Capitaine Hapette Saint-Martin

    (12 25mm SA34/37 AT guns)

    4eBCM(Brigade de Cavalerie Motorise) : Colonel Praudo 14

    eRDP(Rgiment de Dragons ports) : Commandant Sonnery

    1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly 50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm mortars)1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)

    o 31eRDP(Rgiment de Dragons ports) : Commandant De Villers

    1 motorcyclists / armored cars squadron (7 Laffly 50AM, 16 LMGs, 1 60mm mortar)3 infantry squadrons (54 LMGs, 12 MMGs, 3 60mm mortars)1 support squadron (4 25mm SA34/37 AT guns, 4 81mm mortars, 8 MMGs)But the 2/31e RDP and 5/31e RDP squadrons are engaged north of Juniville, with the groupementSalani. They are not available for the 7

    eDLM.

    o 4eescadron de rparation divisionnaire (recovery/repair squadron) : Capitaine Palies

    77eRATT(Rgiment d'Artillerie Tracte Tout Terrain) : Lieutenant Colonel Baratchart

    (12 75mm Mle1897 guns, 12 105mm C guns, 5 47mm SA37/39 AT guns, 3 25mm AA guns)

    33/1 compagnie de sapeurs mineurs (engineer company)

    1 divisional quartermaster group

    1 div