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Do Social Movements Matter? J. Craig Jenkins – Ohio State University J. Craig Jenkins – Ohio State University Anna C. McCreery – Ohio State University Anna C. McCreery – Ohio State University Robert J. Brulle – Drexel University Robert J. Brulle – Drexel University Jason T. Carmichael – McGill University Jason T. Carmichael – McGill University

Do Social Movements Matter?

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Do Social Movements Matter?

J. Craig Jenkins – Ohio State UniversityJ. Craig Jenkins – Ohio State University

Anna C. McCreery – Ohio State UniversityAnna C. McCreery – Ohio State University

Robert J. Brulle – Drexel UniversityRobert J. Brulle – Drexel University

Jason T. Carmichael – McGill UniversityJason T. Carmichael – McGill University

Do Social Movements Matter?

Cluster of studies on whether the environmental movement matters

Key Questions:Do movements affect social

problems?What are the mechanisms?Are movement effects contingent and

complex?

What drives environmental public opinion?

Public perceptions: is climate change seen as a threat?

Weather Extremes?Media Attention?Science Information?Elites?Movement Actions?

What drives environmental policy adoption?

Movement Tactics?

Protest vs. Lobbying?Movement Organization Founding?

Organizational Instability?Public Opinion?Political Allies?Elections?

What drives environmental outcomes?

Media attention?Policy?

Implementation?

Movement actions?Political opportunities for the

movement?

Political Drivers of Air Pollution in the U.S.: A Time-Series

Analysis (1959-1998) Organization and Environment 2010

Dr. Anna C. McCreery

The Ohio State University

McCreery, A.C. 2010. “Media Attention, Political Processes, and Air Pollution in the U.S.: A Time-Series Analysis (1959-1998)”

Organization and Environment 23(3): 255-270.

What Affects Air Pollution?

Statistical Analysis of pollutant emissions:NOx

PM-10

Index of SO2, CO, VOCs

Air Pollution Trends

Driving Factors

Environmental movement actions

Political

opportunities

Driving Factors

Air pollution policy and implementation

Media attention

Significant Effects

Media Attention

Air Pollution Policy

Environmental Movement

Actions

Democratic Control

NOx Emissions

-

-

+

+

Significant Effects: SO2, CO, VOCs

SO2, CO, & VOCsMedia Attention -

Significant Effects: PM-10

Media Attention

EnvironmentalMovement

ActionsPM-10 Emissions-

Conclusions

Policy is ineffective on its ownEnforcement is crucialEnvironmental movement can

help enforce good policy

Conclusions

Environmental movement must rely on political opportunities to be effectiveDemocrats in government

provide opportunities

ConclusionsMedia Attention & the Political

AgendaIt’s not just public opinion: Public

attention is also importantAgenda-setting activities (like

publicity) can help achieve real results

Acknowledgements

Colleagues

Dr. J. Craig Jenkins

Dr. Robert Brulle

Dr. Jason Carmichael

Funding & Resources

Ohio State University Dept. of Sociology

Ohio State University Environmental Science Graduate Program

The Fay Graduate Fellowship Fund in Environmental Sciences

NSF Grant #SES-0455215, “Civil Society & the Environment”

Appendix

Public opinion about climate changeEnvironmental PolicyEnvironmental outcomes

U.S. Climate Change Threat Index

• 14 questions, 74 surveys

• 84,086 respondents 2002-2010

Major Findings: Public Opinion

NS

+

+

+/-

+/-

+/-

Usual Weather Events

Availability of Scientific information

Media Coverage

Elite Cues

Advocacy

Public Concern overClimate Change

Macro-EconomicFactors

% Victory on Environmental Bills, Senate & House, 1971-2004

% P

ro-E

nviro

nmen

tal o

utco

mes

Year (1970-2002)Senate House

Major Findings for the SenateProtest (NS)

Lobbying (NS)

Organization Founding (NS)

Organizational Instability(-)

Democratic Control (+)

Public Opinion (NS)

# Bills Monitored (+)Election Year (NS)

% Bill Victories

Results: Index of SO2 CO & VOCs

Base Variables Coefficient

Real GDP / capita 153.90

Real GDP / Capita, squared -276384

Democratic Unity -0.073

Congressional Hearings (Logged)

9.79 E-04

Corporate Taxes -1.66 E-02

Media Attention (Logged) -6.18 E-04 *

Air Pollution Policy -3.64 E-03

Implementation Funding 0.320

Movement Actions 3.72 E-03

Constant -6.106

Adjusted R-squared 0.110

Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.705

n = 38

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed

Results: NOx

Base Variables Coefficient

Real GDP / capita 102.45 *

Real GDP / Capita, squared -207073 **

GDP & GDP squared F-Test for joint significance (P > F)

**

Democratic Unity -0.038

Congressional Hearings (Logged) 5.94 E-04

Corporate Taxes 1.16 E-03

Media Attention (Logged) -2.05 E-04 *

Air Pollution Policy -3.93 E-03

Implementation Funding 0.080

Movement Actions 1.88 E-03

Constant -1.436

Adjusted R-squared 0.470

Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.618

n = 38

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed

Results: NOx Interactions

Interaction Variable Coef.

Adjusted R2

Main Effects Coef.

Movement actions * Air Pollution Policy

-4.30 E-04 ** 0.560 Movement Actions

2.15 E-03 aa

Air Pollution Policy

-3.04 E-03

Movement actions * Democratic Unity

-2.51 E-03 * 0.512 Movement Actions

1.44 E-03 a

Democratic Unity

-5.18 E-02

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailedaaa p < 0.001, aa p < 0.01, a p < 0.05; two-tailed.

Results: PM-10

Base Variables Coefficient

Real GDP / capita 60.92

Real GDP / Capita, squared -134973 *

GDP & GDP squared F-Test for joint significance (P > F)

Democratic Unity 0.030

Congressional Hearings (Logged) 2.55 E-04

Corporate Taxes 8.81 E-04

Media Attention (Logged) -1.96 E-04 *

Air Pollution Policy -4.40 E-03

Implementation Funding 0.184

Movement Actions 5.96 E-04

Constant -3.555 *

Adjusted R-squared 0.198

Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.762

n = 38

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed

Results: PM-10 Interactions

Interaction Variable Coef.

Adjusted R2

Main Effects Coef.

Movement actions * Media Attention

-7.09 E-06 ** 0.330 Movement Actions

1.12 E-03

Media Attention

-4.85 E-05

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed