Field ManualNo. 31-20

*FM 31-20Headquarters

Department of the ArmyWashington, DC, 20 April 1990

DOCTRINEFOR

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONDistribution authorized to US government agencies only to protect technical or operationalinformation from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or byother means. This determination was made on 29 January 1988. Other requests for thisdocument will be referred to Commander, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centerand School, ATTN: ATSU-DT-PDM, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICEDestroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

*This publication supersedes FM 31-20, 30 September 1977.

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Table of Contents

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Preface

Field Manual (FM) 31-20 is the Special Forces (SF)principles manual. It is directly linked to andmust be used in conjunction with the doctrinalprinciples found in FMs 100-5 and 100-20 and theprojected FM 100-25. It describes SF roles,missions, capabilities, organization, command andcontrol, employment, and support across theoperational continuum and at all levels of war. Itprovides the authoritative foundation for SF sub-ordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition,professional education, and individual and collec-tive training. It supports the doctrinal requirementsof the Concept Based Requirements System.

This manual provides the doctrinal principles to planand prepare SF operational elements for commit-ment and to direct and sustain those elements aftercommitment. The user must adapt the principlespresented here to any given situation using hisown professional knowledge, skills, and judgment.Because this manual articulates the collective visionof the senior SF leadership, users must understandthat it describes emerging doctrinal requirements aswell as current operational capabilities.

This manual is unclassified to ensure its Armywidedissemination and the integration of SF into theArmy’s systems. As the preparing agency for thismanual and all SF doctrinal and training publications,

the US Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School (USAJFKSWCS) will publish aseries of subordinate field manuals to disseminatethe specific SF tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) necessary to plan and conduct SF operations.The provisions of this publication are the subject ofthe international agreements listed in the referencesin the back of this book.

There are numerous terms, acronyms, and abbre-viations found within this manual. Users should referto Parts I and II of the Glossary for their meaningsor definitions.

SF commanders and trainers at all levels should usethis manual in conjunction with Army Training andEvacuation Program (ARTEP) mission training plansto plan and conduct their training.

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters,Training and Doctrine Command (HQ TRADOC).Users of this manual should submit comments andrecommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recom-mended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: ATSU-DT-PDM, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculinegender is used, both men and women are included.

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SF operations occur across the operational continuum and at all levels of war. They are an integral part ofthe broader category, special operations (SO). This chapter provides an overview of the strategic environ-ment in which SF operations occur. It defines and describes the nature of SO. It discusses the principlesthat govern the design and execution of SO. It defines SF and discusses its roles in peace, conflict, andwar. By placing SF operations in contemporary perspective, this chapter provides the foundation for all SFdoctrine.

StrategicEnvironment

The threats to US national interests and objectivesare more diverse now than ever before. The USnational security policy and strategy are designed toprotect US national interests from these threats. ThePresident’s annual report, National Security Strategyof the United States, and the annual Secretary ofDefense’s Defense Planning Guidance outline USnational interests, major threats to those interests,

and major US national security objectives, policy,and strategy. Key US national interests include—

The survival of the United States as a free andindependent nation, with its basic values intactand its institutions and people secure.A healthy and growing US economy that providesindividual opportunity for prosperity and aresource base for US national endeavors.A stable world without major threats to USinterests.The growth of human freedom, democratic insti-tutions, and free market economies throughout

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the world, linked by a fair and open internationaltrading system.

Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

The Soviet Union still poses the main threat to USinterests worldwide. Its military power and activediplomacy continue to threaten our interests in manyparts of the world. However, the United States alsofaces other serious threats. These threats include–

Regional conflicts.Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical(NBC) and high-technology weapons.International terrorism.International drug trafficking.Radical politico-religious movements.Instability in countries that are important to theUnited States and its friends and allies.

National security strategy is the art and science ofdeveloping and synchronizing the political, military,economic, and informational elements of nationalpower to secure national security objectives. TheNational Security Council (NSC) assists the Presi-dent in formulating national security strategy. USnational security strategy appears in classified na-tional security directives (NSDs) and other classifiedNSC documents. In general, the goal of USpeacetime strategy is to deter aggression and acts ofintimidation against the United States and its allies.The goal of US national security strategy in conflictis to protect US and allied interests while precludingor limiting the direct employment of US combatforces. In war, the US strategic goal is to rapidly end

war on favorable terms at the lowest possible level ofhostilities. National security objectives include—

Securing the interests of the United States and itsallies.Encouraging and assisting US allies and friends todefend themselves against aggression, coercion,subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.Ensuring US access to critical resources, markets,the oceans, and aerospace.Defending and advancing the cause of democracy,freedom, and human rights throughout the world.Resolving peacefully those regional disputes thataffect US interests.Building effective and friendly relationships withall nations with whom there is a basis of sharedconcerns.

National military strategy is the art and science ofemploying the armed forces of a nation to securenational security policy objectives by the threat orapplication of force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)formulate national military strategy for the Secretaryof Defense. National military strategy appears in theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and otherjoint strategic planning documents. It supports thegoals of national security strategy. National militarystrategic objectives include—

Deterring Soviet direct and indirect expansionismworldwide.Defending North America and the WesternHemisphere.Promoting the collective security of WesternEurope.Promoting regional stability in Latin America,East Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, SouthAsia, and Africa.

ContemporaryPerspective

have stressed deterrence through preparation for warwith the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates.The effectiveness of US nuclear and conventionaldeterrence has made the likelihood of such a war

Historically, US national security strategy, national improbable. Nevertheless, the risks remain dispro-military strategy, and military force development portionately high.

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While the United States has successfully deterred The contemporary strategic environment dictateswar with the Soviet Union, conflicts short of war have that the US armed forces think in terms of an opera-become pervasive. These conflicts can directly affect tional continuum made up of three conditions: peace,each of the national security objectives stated above. conflict, and war (Figure 1-1).

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Peace is defined as nonmilitary competition betweenstates and other organized parties. Competitionamong foreign powers is inevitable in peace. Peacefulcompetition may promote conditions that lead toconflict or war. The military element of nationalpower supports the three nonmilitary elements bypreventing and deterring conflict and war.

Conflict is defined as a politico-military struggle shortof conventional armed hostility between states orother organized parties. It is often protracted andgenerally confined to a geographic region, but mayhave global implications. The parties to a conflictoften use military power in a strategically indirectmanner to support or counter subversion, sabotage,terrorism, and insurgency. However, they can alsouse military power directly in short-duration,limited-objective contingency operations by conven-tional military forces and special operations forces(SOF). The term low-intensity conflict (LIC) repre-sents the US perspective of a conflict. The termsuggests that the conflict does not directly threatenUS vital national interests. Another party to thesame conflict may consider it a struggle for national

survival. From the US perspective, LIC includes theactive support of parties to a conflict.

War, declared or undeclared, is defined as con-ventional, unconventional, or nuclear armed actionbetween states or other organized parties. It mayinclude any of the actions described in conflict, above.War may be general, involving the national survivaland the total resources of nations. However, it ismore commonly limited, with restraints on resourcesand objectives. The same war may be general for oneparty and limited for another party. War may includeany of the actions included in the description ofconflict.

The United States must have credible and competentmilitary options to protect its national interests acrossthe operational continuum. Strategic success re-quires a balanced force structure of strategic(nuclear) forces, general purpose forces, and SOF.These forces must deal with the full range of globalthreats—from the certainty of peacetime compe-tition and conflict to the unlikely but potentiallydevastating threat of strategic nuclear war.

Nature ofSpecial Operations

SO are actions conducted by specially organized,trained, and equipped military and paramilitaryforces to achieve military, political, economic, orpsychological objectives by nonconventional meansin hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Theyare cxmducted in peace, conflict, and war, inde-pendently or in coordination with operations ofconventional forces. Politico-military considerationsfrequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covertor low-visibility techniques, and oversight at thenational level. SO usually differ from conventionaloperations in their degree of risk, operational

techniques, mode of employment, independencefrom friendly support, and dependence uponoperational intelligence and indigenous assets.Public law (10 USC 167) states that SO activitiesinclude the following as far as they relate to SO:

Direct action (DA).Strategic reconnaissance, which the US Spe-cial Operations Command (USSOCOM) hasincorporated into a broader activity called specialreconnaissance (SR).Unconventional warfare (UW).Foreign internal defense (FID).Civil affairs (CA).Psychological operations (PSYOP).Counterterrorism (CT).Humanitarian assistance (HA).

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Theater search and rescue (SAR).Such other activities as may be specified by theNational Command Authorities (NCA).

SOF are those forces specifically organized, trained,and equipped to conduct SO activities or providedirect support (DS) to other SOF. They provide aversatile military capability to defend US nationalinterests. They are an integral part of the total

defense posture of the United States and a strate-gic instrument of national policy. These forces serveas force multipliers. They can function in aneconomy of force role to provide substantial leverageat a reasonable cost and effort. SOF thus providemilitary options for national response that canstabilize an international situation with minimumrisk to US interests (Figure 1-2).

SO Principles battle, the US Army’s keystone warfighting doctrine,explains how Army forces plan and conduct majoroperations battles, and engagements in conjunction

When conducting tactical combat operations, SOF with other services and allied forces. It does notconduct their operations in accordance with the address military strategy or the formulation offundamentals of AirLand battle (ALB). AirLand strategic guidance. However, it does favor a strategy

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that quickly and decisively attains the militarystrategic objectives of the war. (For a detaileddiscussion on AirLand battle, see FM 100-5.)

At the tactical level, SO often share many of thecharacteristics of light infantry combined arms oper-ations. However, the fundamentals of AirLandbattle doctrine focus primarily on conventional warfighting. The traditional objective of military powerin war has been to generate maximum combat powerat the decisive time and place to defeat hostilemilitary forces. The traditional dynamics of militarypower are inappropriate in a conflict environmentwhere—

Nonmilitary aspects of the situation dominatemilitary operations, or where

No clearly defined enemy or battlefield exists.

In such an environment, the focus of militaryoperations is different (Figure 1-3). Consequently,the contemporary dynamics of military power aremore subtle. Commanders must influence (ratherthan dominate) their operational environment tocreate favorable politico-military conditions forachieving specific national security objectives. Be-cause SO normally occur in such an environment,SOF commanders must adapt the fundamentals ofAirLand battle to account for the politico-militaryimplications of SO (Figure 1-4). They must learn toapply military power indirectly through the militaryand paramilitary forces of a foreign government orother political group or directly through the surgicaluse of combat power.

Application of thePrinciples of War

SOF commanders must apply the principles. of wardifferently than conventional commanders. SOFcommanders must recognize the effect of theiroperational environment and force capabilities ontheir application of the principles of war (Figure 1-5).

ObjectiveObjectives assigned SOF may often be as political,economic, or psychological as they are military. In warand protracted conflict, SO objectives usually focuson hostile military vulnerabilities. In other situations,SOF may be assigned objectives that lead directly toaccomplishing national or theater political, eco-nomic, or psychological objectives.

Offensive

SO are inherently offensive actions. SOF may beemployed as part of a strategic defensive, and hostileactivities may force SOF to assume a tactical

defensive posture. Nevertheless, at the operationallevel, SOF are an offensive capability.

Mass

In contrast to conventional forces, SOF cannot hopeto bring overwhelming combat power against a targetexcept at the lowest tactical level. They do notnormally seek dominance in size of force orfirepower. Instead, SOF focus on selecting andapplying sufficient military power to accomplish themission without adverse collateral effects. The appli-cation of minimum force is dangerous, but SOFcommanders must sometimes accept the higher riskassociated with not massing in the conventionalsense. They may have to compensate for their lackof combat power through the use of such combatmultipliers as surprise, superior training, and uncon-ventional tactics Nonetheless, SOF commandersmust concentrate their combat power, albeit subtlyand indirectly, so that the effects of their actions arefelt at decisive times and places. SOF must not be atthe margin of their operational capabilities at criticalpoints of mission execution. Care must be taken notto fragment the efforts of SOF by committing them

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against targets that are tactically attractive, butoperationally or strategically irrelevant.

Economy of Force

SOF are often employed as a strategic economy offorce measure to allow the concentration of otherforces elsewhere. Many SO are specifically designedto divert hostile forces into secondary theaters,preventing hostile concentration against the friendlymain effort. SOF are particularly effective whenemployed in combination with indigenous orsurrogate forces to create a force multiplier effect.

Maneuver

SOF do not maneuver against an enemy in the classicsense. Once committed, SOF often lack the tactical

mobility and reinforcement capability of the hostileforces opposing them. With respect to SO, maneuverimplies the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate deniedareas so as to gain a positional advantage from whichSOF can attack hostile vulnerabilities. They mustanticipate hostile reactions and pre-position combatpower to counter those reactions. This characteristicof SO dictates that SOF commanders accept calcu-lated high risks to achieve decisive results. Indecisionand hesitation may result in a lost opportunity,mission failure, or needless loss of life.

Unity of Command

To achieve unity of command, SOF organize jointlywith clean, uncluttered chains of command thatminimize the layering of headquarters. However, SO

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are often conducted as interagency activities of theUS government. In such cases the Department ofDefense (DOD) will often play only a supporting role,and interagency cooperation will be the only meansof achieving unity of effort. SOF commanders mustsynchronize their activities with nonmilitary membersof the Country Team. During combined operationswith indigenous military forces, SOF commandersmust stress the requirement for cooperation betweenindigenous military and civilian organizations.

Security

In SO, security is often a dominant consideration,rather than a supporting consideration as is often thecase in conventional operations. Because of thenature of many SO, a breach in security can affectnational credibility and legitimacy as well as missionsuccess. SOF commanders must emphasize securitythroughout mission planning, during execution, andpossibly for many years after the mission incomplete.As a result, SO may require compartmentationand/or deception measures. Active and passivecounterintelligence (CI) efforts must minimize thepotential for hostile penetration or accidentaldisclosure of sensitive information.

SOF achieveapproaches and

Surprise

surprise by exploiting indirectdoing the unexpected. SO often

require bold, imaginative, and audacious actions,particularly when applying combat power directly andwith surgical precision. In other SO, however,surprise can take on a more subtle meaning. SOFoften conceal not only their capabilities andintentions, but also their activities. Indirect SOexploit the hostile power’s inadaptability ormisunderstanding of the operational environment.These operations can create unsettling conditionswithin a hostile power’s environment withoutrevealing the source. The effects of surprise aremaximized when the hostile power cannot define themeans of the disruption and, therefore, cannotimplement effective countermeasures.

Simplicity

Although SOF often use sophisticated and un-orthodox methods and equipment, their plans andprocedures must be simple and direct. A complex andinflexible plan that relies on precise timing is lesslikely to withstand changing situations and the stressand confusion that accompany its execution.

SO Imperatives

While the principles of war characterize successfulSO, the SO imperatives discussed below prescribe keyoperational requirements. SOF commanders mustincorporate these imperatives into their missionplanning and execution if they are to use their forceseffectively (Figure 1-6).

Understand theOperational Environment

SOF commanders cannot dominate their environ-ment. They must assess and understand all aspects of

the environment-political, economic, sociological,psychological, geographic, and military-before act-ing to influence it. The conditions of conflict canchange based on military successor defeat, a changein hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels ofUS support. They must know who the friendly andhostile decision makers are, what their objectives andstrategies are, and how they interact. They mustinfluence friendly decision makers to ensure theyunderstand the implications of SO mission re-quirements and the consequences of not adequatelysupporting them. SOF commanders must remainflexible and adapt their operations to changingrealities. They must anticipate these changes in theirenvironment to exploit fleeting opportunities. They

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must also assist their supported indigenous militaryforces to adjust their strategy and tactics.

Recognize PoliticalImplications

SOF commanders must not anticipate a conventionalbattlefield environment where military concernsdominate. The role of SOF infrequently a supportingone that creates the conditions for decisive non-military activities to occur. Whether conducting SOindependently or in coordination with conventionalmilitary operations, SOF commanders must considerthe political effects of their military activities.

Facilitate InteragencyActivities

When participating in an interagency and oftencombined effort such as SO, commanders must strivefor unity of effort (synchronization), but recognizethe difficulty of achieving it. They must anticipateambiguous missions conflicting interests and objec-tives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity ofcommand. Lacking unity of command, SOF com-manders must facilitate unity of effort by—

Requesting clear mission statements and thedecision makers’ intent.

Actively and continuously coordinating theiractivities with all relevant parties (US and non-US, military and nonmilitary).

Engage the ThreatDiscriminately

SOF commanders have limited resources they cannoteasily replace. Their missions often have sensitivepolitical implications. Therefore, SOF commandersmust carefully select when, where, and how to employSOF (Figure 1-7).

Consider Long-TermEffects

SOF commanders must place each discrete problemin its broader political, military, and psychologicalcontext. They must then develop a long-termapproach to solving the problem. They must acceptlegal and political constraints (such as less thanoptimal rules of engagement [ROE]) to avoidstrategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOFcommanders must not jeopardize the success ofnational and theater long-term objectives by theirdesire for immediate or short-term effects. SOpolicies, plans, and operations must be consistentwith the national and theater priorities and objectives

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they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss oflegitimacy and credibility at the national level.

Ensure Legitimacy andCredibility of SO

There are significant legal and policy considerationsto many SO, particularly in conflict situations short ofwar. In modem conflict, legitimacy is the most crucialfactor in developing and maintaining internal andinternational support. Without this support theUnited States cannot sustain its assistance to aforeign power. The concept of legitimacy is broaderthan the strict legal definition contained in inter-national law. The concept also includes the moral andpolitical legitimacy of a government or resistanceorganization. Its legitimacy is determined by thepeople of the nation and by the internationalcommunity based on their collective perception ofthe credibility of its cause and methods. Withoutlegitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the

support of foreign indigenous elements, the USpopulation, or the international community. SOFcommanders must ensure their legal advisors reviewall sensitive aspects of SO mission planning andexecution.

Anticipate and ControlPsychological Effects

All SO have significant psychological effects. Somemay be conducted specifically to produce a desiredpsychological effect. SOF commanders must inte-grate PSYOP into all their activities to control theseeffects.

Apply CapabilitiesIndirectly

Whenever participating in combined operations, theprimary role of SOF is to advise, train, and assistindigenous military and paramilitary forces. Thesupported non-US forces then serve as forcemultipliers in the pursuit of US national security

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objectives with minimum US visibility, risk, and cost.SOF commanders must avoid taking charge whensupporting a foreign government or group. ‘heforeign government or group must assume primaryauthority and responsibility for the success or failureof the combined effort. All US efforts must reinforceand enhance the legitimacy and credibility of thesupported foreign government or group.

Develop MultipleOptions

SOF commanders must maintain their operationalflexibility by developing a broad range of options andcontingency plans. They must be able to shift fromone option to another before and during missionexecution.

Ensure Long-TermSustainment

SOF are currently engaged in protracted conflictaround the world. They must prepare to continue thiseffort for the foreseeable future. The US response toconflict varies from case to case. Resourcing of anyparticular US support effort may also vary. SOFcommanders must recognize the need for persis-tence, patience, and continuity of effort. They shouldnot begin programs that are beyond the economic ortechnological capacity of the host nation (HN) tomaintain without US assistance. US funded programscan be counterproductive if the population becomesdependent on them and funding is lost. SO policy,

strategy, and programs must therefore be durable,consistent, and sustainable.

Provide SufficientIntelligence

SOF normally cannot infiltrate denied territory anddevelop an ambiguous situation. They do not have thecombat power or the reinforcement and supportcapabilities of conventional forces to deal withunanticipated hostile reactions. The success of SOmissions often depends on the executors receivingdetailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligenceproducts. This need for national and theaterintelligence at the tactical level is unique to SOF.SOF intelligence requirements (IR) impose greatdemands on supporting intelligence capabilities. SOFcommanders must identify their IR in priority. Theymust note which are mission essential and which arejust nice to have. Without realistic priorities to guideit, the intelligence community can quickly becomeovercommitted attempting to satisfy SOF IR.

Balance Security andSynchronization

Security concerns often dominate SO, but compart-mentation can exclude key personnel from theplanning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve theseconflicting demands on mission planning andexecution. Insufficient security may compromise amission, but excessive security will almost alwayscause the mission to fail because of inadequatecoordination.

Special Forces supported by conventional forces. The role of SFvaries with the environment and the level of activity.

As a component of Army SOF (ARSOF), SF plans, SF is an unconventional combat arm. It combines atconducts, and supports SO in all operational envi- the lowest tactical level the functions performed byronments in peace, conflict, and war. SF operations several conventional branches of the Army. Inare normally joint and may be combined and/or part effect it is a combined arms branch. As a result,of an interagency activity. They may support or be neither SF nor the conventional Army has thought

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of SF operations as being combined arms operations.At best, SF commanders have employed the tacticsof supplementary or reinforcing combined arms.They have used PSYOP, lift assets, and otherresources to increase the effectiveness of independentSF operations. The old H-series table of organizationand equipment (TOE) supported this concept ofemployment by consolidating all combat support (CS)and combat service support (CSS) assets at grouplevel. Battalion commanders dealt only with opera-tional matters. Their CS and CSS assets were providedfrom external sources when required.

The L-series TOE and the concept of SF employ-ment in this publication recognize the comple-mentary combined arms nature of SF operations.They also shift the level of combined arms integrationfrom group to battalion. SF commanders must nowintegrate and synchronize their organic capabilitieswith those of other SOF and theater assets. By doingso, they generate sufficient military power toinfluence their operational environment. They applythis military power through indirect means orthrough the direct application of combat power in aspecific, usually surgical, economy of force operation.The Army uses seven battlefield operating systems(BOS) to analyze and integrate its activities (Figure1-8). These BOS represent a new way of thinkingabout war because they orient on functions ratherthan the units that perform them. The BOS focus on

battlefield functions performed in a combat zone byArmy units at corps level and below. In contrast, SFunits normally focus on functions performed in atheater of operations by joint and combined forces atechelons above corps (EAC). Therefore, SF com-manders must apply the BOS differently than con-ventional Army commanders do (see Appendix A).

The centerpiece of SF operations is the SF opera-tional detachment (SFOD) A, also known as the Adetachment. The SFOD A is a simple but versatilecombined arms organization. Its activities do notrevolve around a single weapon system (like a tankcrew) or a single battlefield function (like a riflesquad). They cut across all BOS functions,Detachment members are generalists with expertisein at least one specialty, not functional specialists.Each member performs multiple functions duringmission planning and execution.

Like the conventional Army, SF task organizes itselements into teams to execute a specific mission. AnSF team is any size operational element composedmainly of SF members and led by a member of an SFchain of command. An SF team may be organizedaccording to modification table(s) of organization andequipment (MTOE). It may be an SFOD A acomposite team of hand-picked individuals or acombined arms team organized for a specific mission.It may also be as small as a two-man team or as largeas a reinforced SF company.

Role of SpecialForces in War

of hostile states that threaten lines of communi-cation (LOC) in the friendly strategic rear. Theimpact of these operations may be felt throughout thetheater of war.

In a limited or general war, SF can perform itsmissions at the strategic, operational, or tactical level During war, the strategic role of SF focuses on theto influence, deep, close, or rear operations. How- hostile power’s long-term capacity to continueever, the primary role of SF is to conduct and support hostilities. This role has two aspects.deep operations beyond the forward limits of con- The NCA, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofventional military forces. Such operations may extend Staff (CJCS), may direct a unified commander tointo a hostile power’s homeland or into the territory conduct SO in pursuit of national strategic objectives.

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For example, SF teams may deploy into denied Disrupt the economy.territory to— Protect friendly strategic LOC threatened by

Collect and report information of national hostile regimes in the theater’s strategic rear.strategic importance. Accomplish other missions with decisive strategicDevelop and support insurgences in the hostile implications but with no near-term effect onpower’s strategic rear. conventional military operations.

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MYTH:

FACT:

SF operates at the strategic level andis not part of the AirLand battle.In war, SF conducts SO to support,complement, and extend con-ventional military operations. Theemployment of SF depends on themission, not the environment inwhich it operates or its location onthe battlefield. SF can be committedanywhere on the battlefield—deep,close, or rear (Figure 1-9).

SF also supports the unified commander’s theatercampaign plan by conducting deep operations inpursuit of theater strategic military objectives. Theunified commander may employ SF teams to inter-dict the advance of hostile forces to gain more timefor employing conventional forces. SF teams mayperform SR tasks at the theater strategic level toidentify hostile capabilities, intentions, and activitiesof importance to the unified commander. SF teamsmay also delay, disrupt, or harass the hostile power’sstrategic second-echelon forces (or divert them tosecondary theaters of operations) to—

Alter the momentum and tempo of hostileoperations.Prevent the hostile power from conductingcontinuous theater strategic operations.

SF also conducts SO as strategic economy of forceoperations in secondary theaters. These operationsmay include FID missions in the strategic rear of thetheater of war.

At the operational level, SF deep operations supportthe theater of operations commander and his sub-ordinate land, air, and naval force commanders. Atthis level, SF operations have a near-term effect oncurrent theater operations. By attacking hostileoperational follow-on forces, SF disrupts theircombined-arms operations and breaks their mo-mentum, creating opportunities for friendly decisiveaction. SF operations can also—

Collect and report military information ofoperational significance.Screen an operational land force commander’sopen flank.

Attack or secure (for limited periods) criticalfacilities of operational significance.Divert hostile forces from the main effort.

At the tactical level, SF supports (and is supportedby) conventional military forces whenever theiroperational areas converge. SF units lack thefirepower, tactical mobility, real-time communi-cations, and CSS capabilities to conduct sustainedclose combat operations. SF teams gain mobilityand protection advantages through stealth and theuse of restrictive terrain. They gain firepower ad-vantage through surprise and superior training. SFmissions generally rely on detailed pre-missionpreparation that is unsuitable for fluid closeoperations. An SF team may conduct a DA orSR mission of strategic or operational significance inthe corps main battle area. However, the priority ofthe mission and the nature of the target must justifythe diversion of SF assets to a mission more suitablefor conventional forces.During a limited or general war, SF units may con-duct operations in friendly rear areas. Friendly rearsecurity forces may be nonexistent, particularly whenUS forces are operating in liberated or occupiedterritory. Available HN rear security forces may needadvisory assistance or other support similar to thesupport SF provides in a FID mission. SF rearoperations are proactive rather than reactive. SFteams do not defend base clusters or perform militarypolice (MP) functions. They organize, train, andsupport (or direct) indigenous tactical combat forcesto actively locate and destroy hostile insurgent and/orSO forces in contested areas. SF teams only conductunilateral rear operations as an extreme measure.SF rear operations are proactive rather than reactive.SF teams do not defend base clusters or performmilitary police (MP) functions. They organize, train,and support (or direct) indigenous tactical combatforces to actively locate and destroy hostile insurgentand/or SO forces in contested areas. SF teams onlyconduct unilateral rear operations as an extrememeasure.Once hostilities end, SF plays an important role inUS posthostility consolidation activities. SF teamsfacilitate the early redeployment of US conventionalcombat forces by performing security assistance andFID missions that enhance the military capabilitiesof US allies in the region.

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Role of SpecialForces in Conflict

In conflict situations short of war, the commitmentof conventional combat forces may be premature,inappropriate, or infeasible. It may also increase therisk of further escalation to an unacceptable level. Inthese situations, when nonmilitary instruments ofnational power are inadequate to respond to a

conflict, SF provides the NCA with options fordiscriminate engagement that preclude or limit theneed to employ conventional combat forces. The lowvisibility of SF operations helps the United Statesand its allies to maintain diplomatic flexibility. SFoperations also allow other powers (friendly, neutral,and hostile) to accept the outcome of an operationbecause they avoid the publicity of a more obvioususe of military force. Some operations, such as overtDA and CT missions, may have high visibility andaffect the prestige of the nation.

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United States may undertake long-term operations

MYTH: SF is primarily a LIC force.

FACT: SF has great utility in conflict shortof war. However, it can perform anyof its five primary missions acrossthe operational continuum—duringpeace, conflict, or war (Figure 1-10).(For a detailed discussion of LIC,see FM 100-20.)

in support of selected resistance organizations thatseek to oppose or overthrow foreign powers hostileto vital US interests. When directed, SF units advise,train, and assist indigenous resistance organizations.These units use the same TTP they employ to con-duct a wartime UW mission. Direct US militaryinvolvement is rare and subject to legal and policyconstraints. Indirect support from friendly territorywill be the norm.

SF can conduct a FID mission to support a friendlygovernment against an insurgent threat. The SForganization and its capabilities and operationalmethods make it ideally suited to conduct or supportFID programs in a counterinsurgency environ-ment. The primary SF mission in FID is to advise,train, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces.

SF can conduct a UW mission to support an in-surgent or other armed resistance organization. The

SF can conduct a DA or SR mission in support of acontingency operation. Contingency operations arepolitically sensitive military operations normallycharacterized by the short-term, rapid projection oremployment of military forces in conditions short ofwar. Such employment can also require a large, high-ly visible buildup of military forces over extendedperiods. SF units task organize to participate incontingency operations either unilaterally or inconjunction with other military forces or governmentagencies.

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Role of SpecialForces in Peace

SF has both preventive and deterrent roles in peace.In its preventive role, SF participates in foreigninternal development efforts and other programsdesigned to improve Third World conditions. In itsdeterrent role, SF maintains strategic capabilitiesthat help convince hostile powers to respect US

national interests and refrain from acts of inter-national aggression and coercion.

In peacetime, many SF training activities also haveoperational real world significance. For example,they may provide US presence in a troubledregion, demonstrate US commitment, or otherwisecontribute to collective security. The strategic valueand political sensitivity of SF units make theminappropriate for employment in peacekeepingoperations.

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The threats to SF operations are global and vary with the geopolitical environment, the SF mission, andthe nature of conflict. Threat capabilities increase each year. The Soviets, their allies and surrogates, andnonaligned Third World countries continually improve the quantity and quality of their military capabilities.SF commanders must analyze the specific threats that exist in their particular operational areas. Theymust also recognize that threats considered under conflict also exist within the context of general andlimited war, making threat analysis even more difficult. This chapter examines the diverse nature ofthese threats in terms of what SF can expect to face in general war, limited war, and conflict.

General War Hostile rear area security operations directedagainst deployed SF teams.

In general war, the survival of the nation is at stake. Hostile interception and disruption of SF com-The use of chemical and nuclear weapons is probable. munnications.

Nature of the Threats Hostile NBC operations directed against SF basesand deployed SF teams.

General war poses the greatest threats to SF Hostile surveillance and deep attack of SF basescapabilities to infiltrate, communicate, and conduct and deployments in the continental United Statesoperations in denied territory. The primary threats to (CONUS) and overseas.SF in general war are— Infiltration and ExfiltrationHostile early warning, air defense, and coastal

security and border security systems encountered The threats to each method of infiltration andby SF teams during infiltration and exfiltration. exfiltration are different. The following paragraphs

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illustrate typical threats SF teams face when infil-trating and exfiltrating by air, land, and sea.SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by air must avoidan extensive and integrated air defense system. Thissystem provides complete coverage at medium tohigh altitudes with a high redundancy of coverage inheavily defended areas. The Soviets in particularhave made concerted efforts to improve low-altitudedetection by–

Increasing radar site density.Elevating radar antennas to overcome terrainlimitations.Using height-finding early warning radars.Exploiting new radar technologies.Employing airborne early warning systems todetect aircraft flying at low altitudes.

SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by sea mustpass through coastal security forces arrayed inoverlapping zones. The outer ring consists of hostilesurface craft and patrol submarines supported byland-based naval aviation. Closer to shore, coastalpatrol vessels protect the coast from clandestinedelivery and recovery. Fixed and mobile land-basedcoastal security forces defend key coastal installationsand frontiers.SF teams infiltrating and exfiltrating by land mustavoid hostile border security forces. These forcesemploy sensors, minefield, other barriers, patrols,checkpoints, and other populace control measuresto detect clandestine movement across closedborders. Once SF teams cross the border, they stillface the rear area security threats discussed below.

Hostile Rear Area Security

SF teams must be able to operate in a restrictivesocial environment. Hostile powers rely on active andpassive defense measures to protect their rear areasfrom disruption. They normally impose stringentpopulace and resources control (PRC) measures. IfSF teams threaten their rear, hostile powers maydislocate entire civilian populations and dedicatesignificant combat power to isolate and neutralizethe teams. In addition to regular military and internalsecurity units, hostile powers employ local defenseunits drawn from the civilian population in threat-ened areas. A variety of fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft normally support these ground forces and

pose a significant threat to SF. Hostile police activityand informer networks also make SF operationsdifficult, even with the use of clandestine techniques.Moreover, significant portions of the population arelikely to report any SF activity they detect.

Electronic Warfare

Hostile forces have an extensive electronic warfare(EW) capability. The Soviets in particular have largenumbers of EW systems with broad coverageat great distances. Because SF communications havea unique electronic signature, their detection com-promises the presence of an SF team even if thehostile force cannot locate it.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

Hostile forces have NBC weapons and plan for theiruse. Special Forces operational bases (SFOBs) havealways been likely NBC targets in general war. NowNBC weapons proliferation has greatly increased thelikelihood of these bases becoming targets in aregional conflict. Moreover, recent combat experi-ences in the Third World indicate that SF teamsdeployed in remote and denied areas may alsobecome targets. The risks for SF are significant.The principal nuclear risk to SF teams is from thecollateral damage effects of friendly nuclear bursts.There is also a danger of widespread fallout fromlarge battlefield and theater weapons.Biological weapons and toxins pose a significantthreat to SF teams and their indigenous forces inremote areas. These weapons effectively cover wideareas with minimal resources. Their use is hard toverify, and defensive warning systems and protectivemeasures are rudimentary.Chemical weapons are generally low technology,inexpensive, and militarily significant even inmodest quantities. The psychological impact of theseweapons is tremendous, even when they producerelatively few casualties. Use of these weapons causesuntrained or unequipped personnel to abandon theirmission and leave the area.

Surveillance and Deep Attack

Hostile SOF and intelligence and sabotage agentspose a significant threat to SF in and around US

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military installations, both in CONUS and abroad. and direct attack. Strategic sabotage may adverselyDuring their normal peacetime activities, SF units affect an SF unit’s transition to active operations.are vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, terrorism,

Limited War

From the US perspective, a limited war is generallyconfined to a specific region of the world. It is foughtfor limited objectives and does not threaten USnational survival.

Nature of the Threats

In a limited war, SF may face all the threats asso-ciated with general war. Many regional powers nowhave military capabilities similar to those previouslybelonging only to superpowers. The armed forcesof many Third World countries have a mix of Westernand Communist weapons. These countries blend US,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), andSoviet doctrine to meet their particular wartimeneeds and their existing technologies. As a result,their military capabilities are difficult to analyze.

Infiltration and Exfiltration

Most regional powers do not have border or coastalsecurity or air defense systems as integrated andcomprehensive as those of the Warsaw Pact nations.SF infiltration and exfiltration usually do not posethe same problem anticipated in general war.

Hostile Rear Area SecurityInternal security measures vary widely from countryto country. The threat faced by SF teams may besimilar to that discussed under general war, depend-ing on the following factors:

Density and capabilities of internal securityforces.Severity of hostile PSYOP and PRC measures.Attitude of the local population.

Electronic WarfareHostile EW capabilities may not be extensive orintegrated in a limited war. However, they still posea significant threat to the SF command and control(C2) system.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

The use of nuclear weapons in limited war isimprobable, but the likelihood of their use increaseswith Third World nuclear proliferation. The proba-bility of biological and chemical weapons use inlimited war varies from region to region. Chemicalproliferation has greatly increased the likelihood ofSF units becoming chemical targets during a conflict.Nonnuclear nations may use biological or chemicalweapons for their psychological effect or as weaponsof mass destruction.

Conflict easily identifiable. Much of the Third World isplagued by high population growth rates, social

Conflict encompasses a broad range of complex unrest, and political and economic instability. Theseenvironments for SF operations. The threats are not conditions provide fertile ground for banditry,

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terrorism, and insurgency. The Soviets and theirallies have developed an effective strategy thatsupports and encourages wars of national liberation.Their aim is to establish Marxist-Leninist regimesand obtain bases of geostrategic importance.However, the Soviet Union is not the only foreignpower exploiting Third World instability. Radical andreactionary states and other self-directed politicalgroups also use armed conflict to pursue theirinterests. These interests may either threaten orcomplement US national interests.

Nature of the Threats

When operating in hostile or denied territory, SFteams face threats similar to those found in a limitedwar. When operating in friendly or contestedterritory, SF units are still subject to acts of es-pionage, sabotage, terrorism, and insurgency. Thissection addresses only those threats not addressed in thepreviouus paragraph.

Insurgent organizations are the primary threats to SFin a counterinsurgency environment. Each insurgentorganization is unique. Nevertheless, insurgentorganizations can be categorized according to thegeneral strategy they pursue.

The subversive strategy employs both legal and illegalmeans to penetrate and seize control of theestablished political system. Subversive insurgencescan quickly shift to the critical-cell strategy whenconditions dictate. Examples of subversive insur-gences include Hitler’s rise to power and theCommunist takeover of Czechoslovakia.

The critical-cell strategy employs armed violence asa catalyst to create dissatisfaction and undermine thelegitimacy of the established government withoutextensive political organization. A critical-cell insur-gency may co-opt a mass popular revolution, asLenin did in Russia. The insurgency may insteadprovide an armed cell around which mass popularsupport can rally in an atmosphere of disintegratinglegitimacy. The Cuban revolution is an example.

The mass-oriented strategy emphasizes mobilizationof the masses and extensive political organization asa prerequisite for a protracted politico-militarystruggle. Examples of this strategy include the Maoist

revolution in China, the Communist insurgency inVietnam, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru.

The traditional strategy employs existing tribal, racial,religious, linguistic, or other similar groups as thebasis for a resistance organization. The traditionalinsurgency frequently seeks withdrawal fromgovernment control through autonomy or semi-autonomy, usually in response to governmentviolence or other very specific grievances. Examplesof this strategy include the Mujahideen inAfghanistan, the Ibo revolt in Biafra, and the Karenseparatists in Burma.

International terrorist organizations have sophis-ticated covert and clandestine infrastructures andsupport mechanisms. Many receive support fromforeign governments hostile to the United States andits allies. These organizations can inflict heavydamage and casualties that would preclude SF mis-sion success. They generally consider SF personnelto be lucrative and legal targets.

Terrorist strategies are usually shorter range thaninsurgent strategies. Terrorists frequently do notseek popular support. They exploit mass media topublicize a cause, obtain a policy change, or intimi-date a particular group.

Insurgences seldom follow precisely one of thesefour strategies. Terrorists and insurgents modify theirstrategies to fit their existing situation.

Hostile Rear Area Security

In a friendly nation, the security threat takes the formof espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversiveactivity. The severity of the threat varies widely fromcountry to country.

Electronic Warfare

Hostile EW capabilities vary widely. SF must notequate intensity of conflict with sophistication of EWthreat. Even insurgent and terrorist organizationsmay have significant EW capabilities.

Hostile NBC Capabilities

Hostile NBC capabilities also vary widely fromconflict to conflict. Insurgents and terrorists mayacquire and use NBC weapons to advance their cause.

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SF plans, conducts, and supports SO in all operational environments and across the operational continuum.The US Army organizes, trains, equips, and provides SF to perform five primary missions– UW, FID, DA, SR,and CT. (For SF, CT is a primary mission only for designated and specially organized, trained, and equippedSF units.) Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. SF missions are dynamic because they are directlyaffected by politico-military considerations. A change in national security policy or strategy may radically alterthe nature of an SF mission. Indeed, a policy change may add or drop a mission. This chapter describes eachSF mission in detail. Although the missions are treated separately, they are all interrelated.

UnconventionalWarfare

UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitaryoperations, normally of long duration, predomi-nantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forceswho are organized, trained, equipped, supported, anddirected in varying degrees by an external source. UWincludes guerilla warfare (GW) and other directoffensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine opera-tions, as well as the indirect activities of subversion,sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion andescape (E&E).

MYTH: Insurgency differs from UW becauseinsurgency gives priority to infrastruc-ture and political development, whileUW emphasizes military operations.SF conducts UW only during war.

FACT: Successful UW combat employmentdepends on an insurgent infrastruc-ture resilient enough to withstand thehostile power’s retaliation. SF canconduct UW in conflict or war.

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UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of aninsurgency or other armed resistance movement.Armed resistance provides UW with its envi-ronmental context. UW is thus a protractedpolitico-military activity. SF units do not createresistance movements. They provide advice, train-ing, and assistance to indigenous resistanceorganizations already in existence. From the USperspective, the intent is to develop and sustain thoseorganizations and synchronize their activities tofurther US national security objectives. Whenconducted independently, the primary focus of UWis on politico-military and psychological objectives.Military activity represents the culmination of asuccessful effort to organize and mobilize the civilpopulation. When UW operations support conven-tional military operations, the focus shifts to primarilymilitary objectives. However, the political andpsychological implications remain. Regardless ofwhether UW objectives are strategic or operational,the nature of resistance and the fundamental UWdoctrine, tactics, and techniques remain unchanged.UW includes the following interrelated activities:GW, E&E, subversion, and sabotage.

GW consists of military and paramilitary operationsconducted by irregular, predominantly indigenousforces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is theovert military aspect of an insurgency or other armedresistance movement.

E&E is an activity that assists military personnel andother selected persons to move from an enemy-held,hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendlycontrol. The special operations command (SOC)plans and directs all E&E activities in the theater.

The SOC may task the SF group to conduct andsupport these special category (SPECAT) activities.(See FM 21-77A for a detailed discussion of E&E.)

Subversion is an activity designed to underminethe military, economic psychological, or politicalstrength of a nation. All elements of the resistanceorganization contribute to the subversive effort, butthe clandestine nature of subversion dictates thatthe underground perform the bulk of the activity.

Sabotage is an activity designed to injure or obstructthe national defense of a country by willfully dam-aging or destroying any national defense or warmateriel, premises, or utilities, to include human andnatural resources. Sabotage may be the most effec-tive or the only means of attacking specific targetsbeyond the capabilities of conventional weaponssystems. It is used to selectively disrupt, destroy, orneutralize hostile capabilities with a minimum ofmanpower and materiel resources.

In UW, intelligence collection is designed to collectand report information concerning the capabilities,intentions, and activities of the established govern-ment, or occupying power, and its external sponsors.In this context, intelligence collection includes bothoffensive and defensive low-level source operations.

Contemporary UW takes on new significance forseveral reasons. Historically, SF has focused on UWas an adjunct to general war. However, the new USpolicy of supporting selected anti-communist resis-tance movements requires SF to focus on UW duringconflicts short of war. Moreover, global urbanizationdictates a shift in emphasis from rural GW to allaspects of clandestine resistance.

Foreign InternalDefense

programs taken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion, lawlessness,andinsurgency. The primary SF mission in this inter-

FID is the participation by civilian and military agency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assistagencies of a government in any of the action HN military and paramilitary forces.

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MYTH: SF is the Army’s answer to counter-insurgency.

FACT: SF is well suited for FID missions in acounterinsurgency environment, butonly within the context of a larger effortthat is usually joint and interagency innature.

In a counterinsurgency environment, SF opera-tions may occur within or outside the HN. When

performing a FID mission, SF teams train, advise, andsupport HN forces conducting counterinsurgencyoperations. Other SF teams may conduct DA, SR,and CT operations in the HN, either unilaterally orwith indigenous personnel. Still other SF teams mayperform any or all of their wartime missions in hostileor politically sensitive territory near the HN.

In a limited or general war, SF units may conduct FIDmissions against armed resistance organizationsopposing friendly conventional military operations.SF may also conduct FID missions to counterinsurgences in the strategic rear of the theater.

Direct Action

DA operations are short-duration strikes and othersmall-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize,destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target or todestroy, capture, or recover designated personnel ormateriel. In the conduct of these operations, SOFmay—

Employ direct assault, raid, or ambush tactics.

Emplace mines and other munitions.

Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground,or maritime platforms.

Provide terminal guidance for precision-guidedmunitions.

Conduct independent sabotage.

SF DA operations are normally limited in scope andduration and have a planned exfiltration. They aredesigned to achieve specific, well defined, and oftentime-sensitive results of strategic or operational sig-nificance. They usually occur beyond the range (orother operational capabilities) of tactical weapons

systems and conventional maneuver forces. DAoperations typically involve the—

Attack of critical targets.Interdiction of critical LOC or other targetsystems.Capture, rescue, or recovery of designated per-sonnel or materiel.

MYTH: SF performed DA operations becausethe Army did not have any ranger units;now rangers are the primary DA force.

FACT: The roles of SF and rangers overlap inDA operations. SF DA operationsrequire unconventional tactics andtechniques, area orientation, and lan-guage qualification. Ranger DAoperations use conventional tacticsand specialized ranger techniques inplatoon or greater strength. Onoccasion, DA operations may requirea mix of SF and rangers. An SF teammay serve as an advance party for anoperation requiring ranger combatpower, or a ranger force may providesecurity for a surgical SF operation.

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SpecialReconnaissance

SR is reconnaissance and surveillance conducted bySOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or othercollection methods, information concerning thecapabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual orpotential enemy. SOF may also use SR to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,or geographic characteristics of a particular area.SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, andpost-strike reconnaissance.

MYTH: SR is essentially the same as thetactical reconnaissance performed bycorps long-range surveillance units(LRSUs), but SF teams conduct SRdeeper and for longer periods inhostile territory.

FACT: SF may employ battlefield recon-naissance and surveillance tech-niques similar to those used byLRSUs. However, SR is frequentlymore technology-intensive. SF teamsuse their UW tactics and techniques,area orientation, and language skillsto accomplish more difficult re-connaissance tasks. They may usesophisticated clandestine collectionmethods.

SF may conduct SR in any operational environmentin peace, conflict, or war. SF teams normally con-duct SR missions beyond the sensing capabilities oftactical collection systems.

SR typically seeks to obtain specific well-defined,and time-sensitive information of strategic oroperational significance. SF may use advancedreconnaissance and surveillance techniques or moresophisticated clandestine collection methods. Duringthe critical transition from peace to war, the NCA,JCS, and unified commanders may have priority in-telligence requirements (PIR) that only SF teams cancollect. During war, SF teams deploy to named areasof interest (NAI) to collect and report information inresponse to specific PIR of the unified commanderand his subordinate operational force commanders.

In a conflict, SF teams may perform SR missionsat the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Atthe strategic level, SF teams collect and report criticalinformation for the NCA, JCS, or unifiedcommander in crisis situations and in support ofnational and theater CT forces. SF teams performoperational-level SR missions in support ofinsurgency, counterinsurgency, and contingencyoperations. SF teams may also perform tacticalreconnaissance when the nature or sensitivity ofthe mission makes the use of LRSUs inappropriate.

Counterterrorism capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terror-ist incidents abroad. SOF involvement in CT islimited by HN responsibilities, Department of Justice

CT is offensive measures taken by civilian and mili- (DOJ) and Department of State (DOS) lead agencytary agencies of a government to prevent, deter, and authority, legal and political restrictions, andrespond to terrorism. The primary mission of SOF in appropriate DOD directives. When directed by thethis interagency activity is to apply specialized NCA or the appropriate unified commander,

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designated SOF units conduct or support CTmissions that include—

Hostage rescue.Recovery of sensitive material from terroristorganizations.Attack of the terrorist infrastructure.

Because of the very low profile of most terroristorganizations, identifying targets for CT missions canbe extremely difficult. While a preemptive strikeagainst terrorists may be preferred, CT missions mustoften be conducted after the terrorists have alreadyinitiated a terrorist incident.

For SF, CT is a special mission, not a generic mis-sion applicable to all SF units. SF participation in CTis limited to those specially organized, trained, andequipped SF units designated in theater contingencyplans. These designated SF units respond as directedby the NCA or unified commander to resolve specificsituations arising from a terrorist incident. As part ofthe counterterrorist enhancement program (CTEP),these designated SF units may also train selected HNforces to perform CT missions.

Many CT missions remain classified. Further dis-cussion of CT is beyond the scope of this publication.

Collateral Activities

In addition to their five primary missions, SF unitsperform collateral activities. These activities includeSA, HA antiterrorism and other security activities,countemarcotics (CN), SAR, and special activities.SF units conductor support collateral activities usingtheir inherent capabilities to perform their primarymissions. SF commanders should anticipate theircollateral requirements and ensure their unitsprepare for them.

Security Assistance

SA is a group of programs authorized by the ForeignAssistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, orother related US statutes. The US governmentprovides defense articles and services, includingtraining, to eligible foreign countries and inter-national organizations that further US nationalsecurity objectives. The primary SF role in SA is toprovide mobile training teams (MTTs) and otherforms of mobile training assistance. Public lawprohibits personnel providing SA services (to in-clude mobile training assistance) from performingcombatant duties. (See DOD 5105-38-M, AR 12-1,and AR 12-15 for detailed discussions on SAprograms.)

Humanitarian Assistance

HA is any military actor operation of a humanitariannature. These activities include disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, and support to and/orresettlement of displaced civilians. SF units arewell-suited to perform HA activities in remote areas,particularly in a conflict environment. Several pro-grams authorize the use of DOD resources forhumanitarian and civil assistance and for foreigndisaster relief. Combatants to include members ofcertain friendly resistance organizations, are eligiblefor assistance under some of these programs. All SFparticipation in such activities requires significantinteragency coordination.

Antiterrorism and OtherSecurity Activities

These activities ensure the physical security ofimportant persons, facilities, and events meets ac-ceptable security standards. Responding to requestsfrom the services and other government agencies, SFcan provide training and advice on how to reducevulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats.SF teams use their UW expertise to anticipate hostileactivity and evaluate the adequacy of existing physicalsecurity systems. When directed, SF capabilities canaugment existing security for important persons andevents.

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Counternarcotics

CN activities are measures taken to disrupt, interdict,and destroy illicit drug activities. The levels ofviolence used by the drug infrastructure dictate theincreased use of military and paramilitary forces inCN activities. A 1981 amendment to the PosseComitatus Act (18 US Code 1385) authorizes specificDOD assistance in drug interdiction and drugeradication. The primary SF role in this interagencyactivity is to support US and HN CN efforts abroad.The DOS’s Bureau of International NarcoticsMatters and the DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Admin-istration (DEA) are normally the lead US operationalCN agencies within a HN. When these agencies orthe HN requests military assistance, SF teams may bedirected to provide in-country or out-of-country(offshore) training to US and HN CN forces. SFadvisors may also assist CN staffs in planning,organizing, and conducting large-scale, long-termCN operations. When authorized and subject to legaland policy constraints, SF advisors may alsoaccompany CN forces on actual operations.

Search and Rescue

SF can participate in theater SAR efforts. Theseactivities are designed to locate, recover, and restore

to friendly control selected persons or materiel thatare isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, orcontested areas. They focus on situations that involvepolitical sensitivity and/or remote or hostileenvironments. These situations may arise from apolitical change, combat action, chance happening, ormechanical mishap. When directed, SF units performcombat search and rescue (CSAR) missions usingcollateral capabilities inherent in a DA recoverymission. SF does not employ standard CSARprocedures when executing such a mission.

Special Activities

Special activities require presidential approval andcongressional oversight. Executive Order 12333states that no agency except the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) may conduct any special activity inpeacetime unless the President so directs. Whendirected by the President, the DOD performs specialactivities during war declared by Congress or duringany period covered by a presidential report underthe War Powers Resolution. Whether supporting orconducting a special activity, an SF unit may per-form any of its primary wartime missions, subject tothe limitations imposed on special activities. Suchactivities are highly compartmented and centrallymanaged and controlled.

Other SO Activities

The categorization of SO activities as primary mis-sions and collateral activities focuses on what SOF do.In some cases, it is more important to focus on whySOF conduct SO. The physical result of SO may besecondary to some greater purpose. Deceptionoperations, demonstrations, and shows of force areexamples of such operations.

Deception Operations

SF can support and enhance a national or theaterdeception plan. SF deception operations distort,manipulate, or falsify facts to induce a foreigngovernment or group to react in a manner favorableto US interests. These operations also enhancefriendly operations security (OPSEC). SF may per-form deception as part of another mission or as anoperation in itself. Whenever possible, the SF

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deception role should be combined with other SO tomake the deception more credible.

Demonstrations andShows of Force

These operations are overt demonstrations ofnational intention or resolve. The NCA initiate themto influence another government or political group torespect US interests or to enforce international law.

They may involve the forward deployment of militaryforces, combined training exercises, and theintroduction or buildup of military forces in a region.Demonstrations and shows of force are not meant todeceive the target audience. These operations maymeet with a hostile response, so they must be plannedand executed to counter such a response. SF units arewell-suited for certain demonstrations and shows offorce because of their strategic capabilities.

Multiple andFollow-On Missions

Actual operational requirements often cut acrossdoctrinal mission lines. An SF team may conduct anoperation involving multiple missions. It may alsoreceive a follow-on mission after its initial mission.

Multiple missions are appropriate when opera-tional requirements demand the application of TTPsdrawn from more than one doctrinal mission. Forexample—

An SF team may acquire a target (SR mission)and then provide terminal guidance for precisionguided munitions launched against the acquiredtarget (DA mission).

An SF team may conduct an area assessment(SR mission) and then remain in the joint specialoperations area (JSOA) to develop an indigenousresistance organization (UW mission).

Follow-on missions are appropriate when the risk ofexfiltration is greater than the risk of remaining inthe operational area. They are also appropriate whenthe importance of the follow-on mission justifiesleaving the SF team in the JSOA. For example–

An SF team may conduct a DA mission against aspecified target, then link up with a resistanceorganization or a bypassed or cutoff conventionalforce to conduct a UW mission.An SF team conducting another mission may bedirected to recover a downed aircrew or otherdesignated personnel or materiel.

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SF group commanders routinely task organize companies and battalions to create mission-orientedteams and task forces. This chapter describes the formal organization of the SF group and its organicelements. Later chapters will expand on this chapter to explain how and why SF commanders taskorganize their units.

Special ForcesGroup (Airborne)

The Special Forces group (airborne) [SFG(A)] is amultipurpose and extremely flexible organization. Itsmission is to plan, conduct, and support SO in anyoperational environment in peace, conflict, and war.Figure 4-1 depicts the group’s organization.

The group’s C2 and support elements can function asthe headquarters for an Army special operations taskforce (ARSOTF) or for a joint special operations taskforce (JSOTF) when augmented by resources from

other services. The group’s C2 and support elementscan (see Chapter 5)—

Establish, operate, and support an SFOB andthree forward operational bases (FOBs).Provide three special operations command andcontrol elements (SOCCEs) to conventionalheadquarters at corps level or higher.Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.Direct, support, and sustain deployed SF teams.

The group’s SF teams infiltrate and exfiltratespecified operational areas by air, land, or sea. Theyconduct operations in remote areas and non-permissive environments for extended periods with

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minimal external direction and support. SF teams can Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.also— Train, advise, and assist other US and allied forces

or agencies.Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or Perform other SO as directed by the NCA or adirect indigenous military and paramilitary forces. unified commander.

Headquarters andHeadquarters Company,

SFG(A)The group headquarters and headquarters company(HHC) provides C2, staff planning, and staff super-vision of group operations and administration. Itsorganization is depicted in Figure 4-2.

Functions

The group headquarters commands and controlsassigned and attached forces. It—

Plans, coordinates, and directs SF operationsseparately or as a part of a larger force.

Trains and prepares SF teams for deployment.

Provides command and staff personnel to estab-lish and operate an SFOB.Provides advice, coordination, and staff assis-tance on the employment of SF elements to a jointSOC, JSOTF, security assistance organization(SAO), or other major headquarters.Provides cryptomaterial support to the SFOB andits deployed SF teams.

The headquarters company provides routine ad-ministrative and logistical support to the groupheadquarters. It depends on the group supportcompany for unit-level maintenance of its organicwheeled vehicles, power generation equipment, andsignal equipment. When the group establishes anSFOB, the HHC commander serves as head-quarters commandant under the direct supervision ofthe deputy group commander. As headquarters

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commandant, the HHC commander is responsiblefor the movement, internal administration (toinclude space allocation, billeting, and food service),and physical security of the group headquarters andthe SFOB operations center (OPCEN).

Command and StaffResponsibilities

The group commander exercises comnmand of thegroup and its attached elements. When the groupestablishes an SFOB, he is the SFOB commander.

The deputy commander performs those duties as-signed to him by the group commander. Heassumes commmand of the group in the com-mander’s absence. When the group establishes anSFOB, he serves as the OPCEN director. The groupcommander commands the group, but the deputycommander directs its day-to-day activities. Therelationship between the group commander and hisdeputy commander normally is such that the deputycommander can act for the commander when thecommander is absent or involved with moreimportant tasks.

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The executive officer (XO) performs duties similar tothose of a chief of staff. He directs the group staff andassigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans,orders, reports and other staff actions. When thegroup establishes an SFOB, he serves as director ofthe battle staff.

The S1 is the principal staff officer for all personnelservice support (PSS) matters and other admin-istrative matters not assigned to another coordinatingstaff officer. He may perform special staff officerduties, such as inspector general, provost marshal,public affairs officer, and special services officer.Additional duties include safety, postal operations,and the management of stragglers and hostileprisoners of war (PWs). His primary operationalconcerns are replacement operations, strength man-agement, and casualty reporting. He directlysupervises the group personnel section and exercisesstaff supervision over attached PSS and MP units.

The S2 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence.He plans for the collection, processing, and dis-semination of intelligence that is required for SFgroup operations. He advises the commander in theemployment of group intelligence assets. He pro-vides special security office (SSO) support to theSFOB. He provides the S3 with intelligence supportfor the OPSEC program, EW operations, and decep-tion planning. He exercises staff supervision over thegroup’s military intelligence (MI) detachment, theDS engineer terrain detachment (when attachedfrom the theater army [TA] engineer command), andattached MI units.

The S3 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to the organization, training, and opera-tions of the group. He has overall staff responsibilityfor PSYOP, OPSEC, EW, CSAR, and deception.He exercises staff supervision over organic andattached aviation and PSYOP units.

The S4 is the principal staff officer for all logisticsmatters. He is the group’s primary logistical plannerand coordinator. He exercises staff supervision overthe group support company’s service detachment andattached logistical units. He coordinates closely withthe four support company commanders, who are theprincipal logistical operators of the group.

The S5 is the principal staff officer for all CA matters.He plans and coordinates the group’s civil-militaryoperations (CMO), to include foreign nation support(FNS). He advises the commander on politico-military matters and assists him in meeting his legaland moral obligations to the local populace. Heexercises staff supervision over attached CAelements.

The signal officer is the principal staff officer for allsignal matters. He plans and recommends employ-ment of SF group communications. He is also thetactical command information systems (TCIS)management officer with staff responsibility forautomation. He assists the S3 in preparing EWplans and is responsible for electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). He supervises thegroup’s frequency manager and preparation of thegroup signal operation instructions (SOI). Hecoordinates and exercises technical supervision overtraining of organic and attached communicationspersonnel. He exercises staff supervision over theSFOB signal center (SIGCEN). He is also the groupcommunications security (COMSEC) officer andsupervises the group COMSEC custodian, whomaintains the group COMSEC account.

The budget officer is the principal staff officer for allmatters pertaining to programming, budgeting, re-ceiving, handling, safeguarding, and disbursing allprogram funds. These include special mission funds,intelligence contingency funds, foreign currencyoperations, and commercial accounts. He coor-dinates and exercises technical control over groupfinancial policies, plans, and services. If the budgetofficer is qualified and acceptable under theprovisions of AR 37-103, the supporting finance andaccounting officer may appoint him as a deputy orClass B agent officer.

The engineer is the principal advisor to the com-mander and staff on engineer matters. He exercisesstaff supervision over attached engineer units. Hecoordinates and exercises technical supervision overtraining of organic and attached engineer personnel.He plans and coordinates the group’s real estate andconstruction requirements and real property main-tenance. He establishes the group’s emergency actionfacility (EAF) and manages the group’s emergencyaction program (EAP).

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The chemical officer is the principal advisor to thecommander and staff for all matters concerningoffensive and defensive chemical operations. Heexercises technical supervision over group NBCactivities and staff supervision over attached chem-ical units.

The flight surgeon is the principal advisor to thecommander and staff for all matters affecting themental and physical health of the group, attachedelements, and its supported indigenous forces. Hedirectly supervises the group’s medical section andexercises staff supervision over attached medicalunits. He coordinates and exercises technicalcontrol over training of organic and attached medicalpersonnel.

The chaplain is the principal advisor to the com-mander and staff on moral, ethical, and religiousissues affecting the unit mission. He plans andcoordinates the activities of unit ministry teams(UMTs) to ensure comprehensive religious supportof all assigned and attached personnel and their

families. He assesses the religious attitudes ofindigenous populations to determine the impact ofthese attitudes on SF operations.

The judge advocate is the principal advisor to thecommander and his staff on legal matters. He adviseson matters involving military law, US domestic law,foreign law, status of forces agreements, intern-ational law, operational law, and ROE. He reviews allsensitive mission taskings, plans, and orders to ensurethey adequately address legal issues. He may performadditional duties as public affairs officer when nofull-time public affairs officer is attached to thegroup.

The command sergeant major (CSM) is the group’ssenior noncommissioned officer (NCO). He is theprincipal advisor to the commander and staff onmatters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He moni-tors policy implementation and standards on theperformance, training, appearance, and conduct ofenlisted personnel. He provides counsel andguidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Support Company,SFG(A)

The group support company (Spt Co) provides intel-ligence support, CSS, and signal support to the SFOBand its deployed SF teams. The company’s aviationplatoon provides general aviation support to theentire group. The company’s organization is shownin Figure 4-3. Its functions are discussed below.

The Spt Co commander commands all personneland elements assigned or attached to the company.His company headquarters provides routine adminis-trative and logistical support to the SFOB supportcenter (SPTGEN) and SIGCEN. He is the group’sprimary logistical operator. When the groupestablishes an SFOB, he serves as the SPTCENdirector. His duties require direct interface with TAlogistical support elements (see Chapter 14). In

coordination with the S3 and headquarters com-mandant, the Spt Co commander prepares the basedefense plan and supervises base defense operationscenter (BDOC) activities (see Chapter 6).

The MI detachment provides integrated all-sourceintelligence collection management, analysis, pro-duction, and dissemination in support of group-levelsituation and target development. These functionscorrespond to those performed by the tacticaloperations center (TOC) support element of aconventional MI unit. The detachment establishesand operates a tactical sensitive compartmented in-formation facility (SCIF) in the SFOB OPCEN andprovides sensitive compartmented information (SCI)communications between the SFOB and the de-ployed FOBs. It provides interrogation and CIsupport, to include CI support of the group’s OPSECand deception programs. The detachment com-mander works for the deputy group commander

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under the staff supervision of the group S2. When thedetachment is formally detached from the supportcompany, the detachment commander exercisesnormal company-level command. However, thedetachment remains dependent on the Spt Co foradministrative and logistical support.The service detachment performs unit-level supply,services, and maintenance functions for the groupHHC and Spt Co and their attached elements. Whenthe group establishes an SFOB, the service de-tachment commander coordinates and supemisesSPTCEN logistics. He works for the Spt Cocommander under the staff supervision of the S4.The signal detachment has two primary functions. Itinstalls, operates, and maintains secure SFOB radiocommunications with the FOBs and deployed SFteams. It also installs, operates, and maintainscontinuous internal SFOB communications. Thisbase communications support includes communi-cations center services, telephone communications,electronic maintenance, and photographic support.When the group establishes an SFOB, the signaldetachment commander serves as the SIGCENdirector. When the detachment is formally detachedfrom the Spt Co, the detachment commander exer-cises normal company-level command. However,

the detachment remains dependent on the Spt Cofor administrative and logistical support.

The aviation platoon provides limited general (non-tactical) aviation support to the group and its attachedelements. The platoon headquarters receives, pro-cesses, and coordinates all group general aviationsupport requirements. It also establishes andoperates the SFOB’s flight OPCEN. The aviationunit maintenance (AVUM) section maintains or-ganic aircraft and avionics equipment used by theflight section.

The medical section provides health service support(HSS) to the SFOB. This support includes unit-level medical support, medical supply (to includemaintenance of the Class VIII basic load), emergencymedical and resuscitative treatment for all classes ofpatients, emergency dental treatment, preventivemedicine support, and veterinary support.

The personnel section collocates with the supportingmilitary personnel office (MILPO). The sectionaugments the MILPO to perform personnelmanagement functions for the entire SF group.When elements of the group are supported by morethan one MILPO, members of the personnel sectionmay be attached to each supporting MILPO.

SF Battalion, SFG(A)Like the SF group, the SF battalion plans, conducts,and supports SO in any operational environment inpeace, conflict, and war. The SF battalion’s organi-zation is shown in Figure 4-4. Its functions arediscussed below.The battalion’s C2 and support elements can func-tion as the headquarters for an ARSOTF or for aJSOTF when. augmented by resources from otherservices. The C2 and support elements can—

Establish, operate, and support an FOB.Provide one SOCCE to a corps or higher head-quarters.

Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.Direct, support, and sustain deployed SF teams.

The battalion’s SF teams infiltrate and exfiltratespecified areas by air, land, or sea. They conductoperations in remote areas and hostile environmentsfor extended periods with minimal external directionand support. SF teams can also—

Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise ordirect indigenous military and paramilitary forces.Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.Train, advise, and assist other US and allied forcesor agencies.Perform other SO as directed by higher authority.

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HeadquartersDetachment (SFOD

SF Battalion

The SFOD C, also known as C detachment, providesC2, staff planning, and staff supervision of battalionoperations and administration. The detachment’sorganization is shown in Figure 4-5.

Functions

The SFOD C commands and controls assigned andattached elements. The detachment—

Plans, coordinates, and directs SF operationsseparately or as part of a larger force.Provides command and staff personnel toestablish and operate an FOB.Provides advice, coordination, and staff assis-tance on the employment of SF elements to a

4-8

joint SOC, JSOTF, SAO, or other majorheadquarters.

Command and StaffResponsibilities

The battalion commander exercises command of thebattalion and its attached elements. When the bat-talion establishes an FOB, he serves as the FOBcommander.

The executive officer performs duties similar to thoseof a deputy commander and chief of staff. He directsthe battalion staff and assigns specific responsibilitiesto prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staffactions. When the battalion commander establishesan FOB, he serves as FOB director and supervises theday-to-day base activities.

The S1 is the principal staff officer for all PSS mat-ters and other administrative matters not assigned toanother coordinating staff officer. His duties are

FM 31-20

similar to those of the group S1. Under his directsupervision, the battalion personnel administrationcenter (PAC) provides consolidated unit-level per-sonnel administrative support to the SF battalion.

The S2 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to intelligence and CI. His duties aresimilar to those of the group S2. He provides specialsecurity representative (SSR) support to the bat-talion. The SSR functions under the technicalcontrol of the supporting SSO. The supporting SSOwill be the group SSO only when the two head-quarters are collocated.

The S3 is the principal staff officer for all matterspertaining to the organization, training, and opera-tions of the battalion. His duties are similar to thoseof the group S3. When the battalion commanderestablishes an FOB, the S3 serves as OPCENdirector.

The S4 is the principal staff officer for all logisticalmatters. His duties are similar to those of the groupS4. He coordinates closely with the battalion Spt Cocommander, who is the battalion’s principal logisticaloperator.

The S5 is the principal staff officer on all CA matters.His duties are similar to those of the group S5.

The signal officer is the principal staff officer for allsignal matters. His duties are similar to those of thegroup signal officer.

The flight surgeon is the principal advisor to thecommander and staff for all matters affecting themental and physical health of the battalion, attachedelements, and its supported indigenous force. Hisduties are similar to those of the group flight surgeon.

The CSM is the battalion’s senior NCO. His dutiesare similar to those of the group CSM.

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Support Company, The battalion Spt Co headquarters provides routine

SF Battalionadministrative and logistical support to the battalionheadquarters detachment, the company’s organicelements, and the FOB SPTCEN and SIGCEN. The

The battalion Spt Co provides intelligence and EW company headquarters includes personnel tosupport, CSS, and signal support to an FOB and its maintain the battalion’s diving and marine equip-deployed SF teams. The company’s organization is ment. The Spt Co commander commands allshown in Figure 4-6. Its functions are discussed personnel and elements assigned or attached to thebelow. company. His duties are similar to those of the group

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Spt Co commander, except that his company has noorganic aviation platoon. When the battalion estab-lishes an FOB, he serves as SPTCEN director.

The battalion MI detachment mission and orga-nization are similar to those of the group MIdetachment, with five exceptions

The battalion MI detachment has more limitedcapabilities. It depends on the group intelligencedata base and other technical assistance from thegroup MI detachment.

The detachment has three organic special opera-tions teams (SOTs) A. The SOTs A deploy withSF teams to provide SIGINT and EW support.

When specifically authorized and directed, the CIteam participates in active CI operations.

The detachment does not have any organicinterrogation teams.The detachment commander works for the bat-talion commander under the staff supervision ofthe S2.

The battalion service detachment performs functionssimilar to those of the group service detachment. Itssections support the entire SF battalion and itsattached elements.The battalion signal detachment performs functionssimilar to those of the group signal detachment.When the battalion establishes an FOB, thedetachment Commander seines as SIGCENdirector. The base communications support sectionis smaller by TOE because it has no capability tocommunicate with subordinate bases. The detach-ment has no organic photo section.

SF Company,SF Battalion

The SF company plans and conducts SO in anyoperational environment in peace, conflict, and war.Its organization is shown in Figure 4-7.The SF company headquarters (SFOD B, also knownas B detachment) is a multi-purpose C2 element withmany employment options. It is organized as shownin Figure 4-8. It can command and control one to sixSFODs A. It cannot isolate and deploy SF teamsindependently without significant augmentation.

FunctionsThe SFOD B can—

Plan and conduct SF operations separately or aspart of a larger force.Rain and prepare SF teams for deployment.Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operationalareas by air, land, or sea.

Conduct operations in remote areas and hostileenvironments for extended periods with minimalexternal direction and support.Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise ordirect indigenous forces of up to regimental sizein SO.Thin, advise, and assist other US and allied forcesand agencies.When augmented, establish and operate anadvanced operational base (AOB) to expand theC2 capabilities of an SFOB or FOB.Serve as an SOCCE at a corps or higher head-quarters.Serve as a C2 element (area command) in aspecified operational area.Serve as a pilot team to assess the resistancepotential in a specified operational area.Establish and operate an isolation facility(ISOFAC) for an SFOB or FOB.Augment the C2 capabilities of an SFOB or FOB.Perform other SO as directed by higher authority.

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Command and StaffResponsibilities

The company commander exercises command of thepersonnel and elements assigned or attached to thecompany. When the company establishes an AOB,he serves as AOB commander.

The company XO directs the company staff andassigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans,orders, reports, and other staff actions. Incoordination with the company sergeant major, hedirects and supervises company administrative andlogistical activities.

The company technician has staff responsibility forall matters pertaining to the organization, training,intelligence and CI activities and combat operationsof the company and its SFODs.

The company sergeant major is the senior NCO ofthe company. He is the commander’s principaladvisor on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel.He supervises the daily training, operations, andadministration of the company.

The operations sergeant and assistant operationssergeant assist the XO and company technician inaccomplishing their duties. When the SF companyand its SFODs are uncommitted, they manage thecompany’s training program for the companycommander.

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The medical sergeant—Provides routine, preventive, and emergencymedical care.Establishes field medical facilities to supportoperations.Trains allied and indigenous personnel in basicemergency and preventive medical care.Gathers medical information.Provides mission related veterinary care.

The two communications sergeants—Advise the commander on communicationsmatters.Prepare communications plans and annexes.Assemble the SOI.Install, operate, and maintain frequency modu-lated (FM), amplitude modulated (AM), highfrequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultrahigh frequency (UHF), and super high frequency

(SHF) radio communications equipment to trans-mit and receive voice, continuous wave (CW), andburst radio messages.

Rain detachment members and indigenous forcesin signal equipment and procedures.

Manage unit frequencies.

The supply sergeant is the company’s principal logis-tical planner and operator. He coordinates closelywith the battalion S4 and service detachmentcommander to meet the unique needs of the companyand its SFODs.

The NBC NCO supervises, operates, and maintainsthe company’s NBC detection and decontaminationequipment. He also assists in establishing, adminis-tering, and applying NBC defensive measures.

All detachment members must be capable of ad-vising, assisting, or directing foreign counterparts intheir functional areas up through regimental level.

Operational Detachment(SFOD A), SF Company

The SFOD A, also known as A detachment, is thebasic SF unit. Its organization is shown in Figure 4-9.

Functions

The SFOD A is specifically designed to organize,equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenousmilitary or paramilitary forces in UW and FIDoperations. The detachment has two enlistedspecialists in each of the five SF functional areasweapons, engineer, medical, communications, andoperations and intelligence. The detachment canserve as a manpower pool from which SF com-manders organize tailored SF teams to perform DASR, or other missions. By TOE, each SF company has

one SFOD A trained in combat diving and oneSFOD A trained in military free-fall (MFF)parachuting. The SFOD A can–

Plan and conduct SF operations separately or aspart of a larger force.

Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operationalareas by air, land, or sea.

Conduct operations in remote areas and hostileenvironments for extended periods of time with aminimum of external direction and support.

Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise ordirect indigenous forces up to battalion size in SO.Rain, advise, and assist other US and allied forcesand agencies.

Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.Perform other SO as directed by higher authority.

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Command and StaffResponsibilities

The detachment commander exercises command ofhis detachment. He may command or advise anindigenous combat force up to battalion size.The detachment technician serves as second incommand and ensures that the detachment com-mander’s decisions and concepts are implemented.He assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans,orders, reports, and other actions. He prepares theadministrative and logistical portions of area studies,briefbacks, and operations plans (OPLANs) andoperations orders (OPORDs). He can recruit,organize, train, and supervise indigenous combatforces up to battalion size.The operations sergeant is the senior enlistedmember of the detachment. He advises thedetachment commander on all operations andtraining matters. He provides tactical and technical

guidance and professional support to detachmentmembers. He prepares the operations and trainingportions of area studies, briefbacks, and OPLANsand OPORDs. He supervises the preparation ofdetachment training products. He performs theduties of the detachment technician in his absence.He can recruit, organize, train, and superviseindigenous combat forces up to battalion size.The assistant operations and intelligence sergeantplans, coordinates, and directs the detachment’sintelligence training, collection, analysis, production,and dissemination. He also assists the operationssergeant in preparing area studies, briefbacks,OPLANs and OPORDs He field interrogates andprocesses hostile PWs. He briefs and debriefs friendlypatrols. He performs the duties of the operationssergeant in his absence. He can train, advise, or leadindigenous combat forces up to company size.The two weapons sergeants employ conventional andUW tactics and techniques as tactical mission leaders.They train detachment members and indigenousforces in the use of individual small arms, lightcrew-served weapons, and antiaircraft and antiarmorweapons. They help the operations sergeant preparethe operations and training portions of area studies,briefbacks, and OPLANs and OPORDs. Theyrecruit, organize, train, and advise or commandindigenous combat forces up to company size.The two engineer sergeants supervise, lead, plan,perform, and instruct all aspects of combat engi-neering and light construction engineering. Theyconstruct and employ improvised munitions. Theyplan and perform sabotage operations. They preparethe engineer and targeting portions of area studies,briefbacks, and OPLANs and OPORDs They canrecruit, organize, train, and advise or commandindigenous combat forces up to company size.The two medical sergeants provide emergency,routine, and long-term medical care for detachmentmembers and associated allied or indigenous per-sonnel. They train, advise, and direct detachmentmembers and allied or indigenous personnel inroutine, emergency, and preventive medical care.They establish field medical facilities to supportdetachment operations. They provide veterinarycare. They prepare the medical portion of areastudies, briefbacks, and OPLANs and OPORDsThey can train, advise, or lead indigenous combatforces up to company size.

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The two communications sergeants install, operate,and maintain FM, AM, HF, VHF, UHF, and SHFradio communications in voice, CW, and burst radionets. They advise the detachment commander oncommunications matters. They train detachmentmembers and indigenous forces in communications.They prepare the communications portion of areastudies, briefbacks, and OPLANs and OPORDsThey can train, advise, or lead indigenous combatforces up to company size.

All detachment members must be capable of ad-vising, assisting, or directing foreign counterparts intheir functional areas up through battalion level.

SFOD AStaff Assignments

In anticipation of a UW or FID mission and to ensurefunctional coverage of all pre-mission activities, theSFOD A commander organizes a detachment staffusing the staff assignment guide at Figure 4-10.The detachment communications sergeants performspecial staff functions related to their field or serveas assistant staff members, at the discretion of thedetachment commander. Detachment staff membersperform those duties outlined in FM 101-5 for theirparticular functional area.

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Chemical Detachment, SFOB. Its organic decontamination teams provide

SFG(A)NBC decontamination support to the SFOB andFOBs. The reconnaissance teams(s) perform NBCSR, to include chemical and biological agent samp-

When available, a separate SF chemical detachment ling and collection. A reconnaissance team maywill be attached to each SF group to provide deploy independently or may be attached to a largerdedicated NBC support. Under the staff supervision SF team. Both the decontamination and recon-of the group chemical officer, the detachment head- naissance teams can also perform foreign militaryquarters augments the NBC control element at the training and assistance missions when required.

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SF operates under many varied C2 arrangements. The exact C2 structure is determined by the requirements ofthe commander at each echelon of command. SF operations are inherently joint. They are directly controlledby higher echelons, up to the NCA, often with minimal involvement of intermediate headquarters. They mayrequire oversight at the national level. This chapter discusses C2 of SF operations from the unified commandlevel down to the organization within the operational area. It provides a number of generic commandrelationships that commanders may choose depending on the situation. This chapter also discusses the SFcommunications system that supports these C2 arrangements.

Joint understand the nature of joint operations because

Environmenttheir abbreviated chains of command place them infrequent contact with joint headquarters. Everyoperational headquarter above SF group level isjoint. Thus, dealing with a joint headquarters is as

SO require a responsive and unified C2 structure. common to an SF commander as dealing with aUnnecessary layering of headquarters within the SO division headquarter is to a conventional combatchain of command decreases responsiveness and arms commander. (See JCS Pubs 0-2 and 3-0 forcompromises security. All SF commanders must detailed discussions of joint operations.)

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Theater SpecialOperations Command

The NCA have established five regional unified com-mands with a broad strategic responsibility for USunified military operations in an area of responsibility(AOR). For the remainder of this publication, the USregional commander in chief (CINC) is assumed to bethe theater of war commander (theater CINC). (SeeJCS Pubs 0-2 and 3-0 for detailed discussions of jointtheater operations.)

The regional CINCs exercise COCOM over assignedSOF (Figure 5-l). Each regional CINC hasestablished a subordinate unified SOC to exerciseoperational control (OPCON) of his theater-leveljoint SOF (Figure 5-2). In wartime, this SOC maydevelop into a combined organization.

In some situations, the CINC may establish a JSOTFto support a subordinate area commander or toperform sensitive SO on a functional basis. TheJSOTF may be under the OPCON of the supportedarea commander, or it may remain under theOPCON of the theater SOC. With augmentation

from the other services, an SF group or battalionheadquarters can function as a JSOTF headquarters.

The SOC commander exercises direct OPCON ofassigned SOF. He begins SOF mission planning bydeveloping the theater CINC’s strategic guidanceinto a sequence of integrated SO that support thetheater strategy and campaign plan. The SOCcommander must maintain a theaterwide per-spective. He must fully understand the theaterCINC’s vision and how each conventional forcecommander intends to implement his aspect of thetheater campaign. He must identify and anticipatetheater operational and intelligence requirementsthat SOF can address. He must then develop andrecommend SO that satisfy those requirements. (SeeJCS Pub 3-05 for more information on joint SOdoctrine.)

The SOC commander may be dual-hatted as theCINC’s special staff officer for SO. In this case, theSOC commander places a special operations staffelement (SOSE) at the CINC’s joint operationscenter (JOC) to perform SO special staff functionsunder the SOC commander’s direction.

Army Special Operations ranger regiment or battalion. It includes a mix of SF,

Task Forceranger, and SO aviation; supporting SO PSYOP, CA,and signal assets; and other CS and CSS assets asrequired (Figure 5-3). The ARSOTF headquarters

The SOC or JSOTF commander may establish an performs functions similar to those of a conventionalARSOTF to function as the operational Army combined arms brigade headquarters. The ARSOTFcomponent headquarters. An ARSOTF is organized commander and staff coordinate directly with thearound the nucleus of an SF group or battalion or a supporting TASOSC to obtain required CS and CSS.

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5-3

F M 3 1 - 2 0

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FM 31-20

Theater ArmySpecial OperationsSupport Command

The TA commander exercises command of all Armyforces assigned or attached to a unified command,less OPCON of those Army forces operationallycontrolled by a joint or combined commander. Hemay exercise command directly (Figure 5-4) orthrough a subordinate area commander (Figure 5-5).The TA commander retains responsibility for CS andCSS of all assigned or attached Army forces, re-gardless of who exercises OPCON.

ARSOF depend on the TA for all DS- and generalsupport (GS)-level CS and CSS. The mission, theduration and scope of operations, and the operationalenvironment determine the actual requirements.The TA commander attaches appropriate TA ele-ments to ARSOF and/or tasks appropriate TAelements to support ARSOF on a task, mission, orarea basis. When deployed independently into an

undeveloped theater, ARSOF require significantaugmentation by attachment, MTOE, and/or tablesof distribution and allowances (TDA) until the TAbecomes established.The theater army special operations supportcommand (TASOSC) is a subordinate functionalcommand of the TA. The TASOSC mission is to planand coordinate the support and sustainment oftheater ARSOF conducting SO. By providing thevital link between the TA and theater ARSOF units,the TAOSC ensures that the TA meets itsadministrative, support, and sustainment responsi-bilities for ARSOF.The TASOSC has no operational mission and doesnot layer itself between the SOC and theater ARSOF(Figure 5-6). Rather, it functions as a supportingheadquarters, responding to the needs of the theaterARSOF as a division support command responds tothe needs of its supported brigades. (See FM 100-25for a more detailed discussion of the TASOSC.)The TNOSC commander anticipates, plans, and co-ordinates ARSOF support requirements with the

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FM 31-20

theater SOC and appropriate TA elements. Morespecifically, he and his staff—

Plan and coordinate Army CS and CSS forassigned and attached ARSOF and, whendirected, other service and allied SOF.

Plan, coordinate, direct, and supervise CS andCSS operations by assigned and attached Armysupport forces.

To accomplish his mission, the TASOSC commandernormally collocates his headquarters with the theaterSOC. He places a SOSE at the TA headquarters.The SOSE performs SO advice, planning, andcoordination functions parallel to those of a fieldartillery fire support element or other special staffelement at a tactical headquarters.

Because ARSOF need timely and detailed intelli-gence available only at the national and theater level,

the TASOSC commander collocates an intelligencesupport element (HE) at the theater CINC’s jointintelligence center (JIC) or at the TA MI brigade’sechelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC).The ISE performs intelligence collection manage-ment and dissemination, all-source intelligenceproduction, and SO target development in support ofARSOF intelligence requirements.

The TASOSC commander places SO liaisonelements at the appropriate theater army areacommands (TAACOMs). These liaison elementscoordinate ARSOF logistical, personnel service, andhealth service requirements within the TAACOMs’area of responsibility. The TASOSC headquarterscoordinates other ARSOF support requirementsdirectly with other TA functional commands andthe theater army materiel management center(TAMMC), exchanging liaison elements whenrequired.

SF Command andControl System

SF commanders employ the standard Army stafforganization and military decision-making processdescribed in FM 101-5. However, their C2 facilitiesdiffer significantly from those found in conventionalmilitary organizations. The SF group commanderexercises command and control through a networkof operational bases. These operational basescombine the functions of command post and unittrains into a single entity. They are normally locatedat secure and logistically supportable sites in thecommunications zone (COMMZ).

Special ForcesOperational Base

The SFOB is a command, control, and supportbase established and operated by an SF group fromorganic and attached resources. It is primarily aplanning and coordinating center. At the SFOB, the

group commander and staff develop the SOCcommander’s operational guidance into tactical mis-sions for the battalions to plan and execute. Thegroup commander assigns specific missions andoperational areas to the battalions, allocates SFODsand other resources among them, and synchronizestheir activities. He identifies and coordinates groupsupport requirements with the TASOSC. He alsoensures the sustainment of the battalions and theirdeployed SF teams. Appendix B provides a sampleSF group OPLAN. Specific SFOB functionsinclude—

Planning and directing SF operations, to includesynchronizing the activities of subordinate FOBs.Ensuring that subordinate battalions receivesufficient CS and CSS.Coordinating group activities with higher,adjacent, and supported headquarters.

At the SFOB, the group commander and staff alsoprepare, deploy, control, and support selectedSPECAT teams that require group-level control.When required, the group commander tasks an

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SFOD B to establish and operate an ISOFAC andsupervise SPECAT mission planning. When thenumber of SPECAT missions exceeds the C2capabilities of an augmented SFOD B, the groupcommander may collocate an FOB with the SFOB forplanning, execution, and support of SPECATmissions.

NOTE: A SPECAT team is an SF team with aparticularly sensitive mission requiring centralizedcontrol. Examples of SPECAT missions includeCT, E&E, national strategic SR, DA with specialmunitions, and special activities. Many of thesemissions use a SPECAT message handling systemfor communications, but the two uses of the termSPECAT are not necessarily related.

Group Battle Staff

To command effectively, the group commander mustfree himself from detailed mission planning and thedaily activities of the SFOB. He must instead focuson broader issues, such as the—

Current and future operational and intelligencerequirements of the theater CINC and theconventional force commanders that the SFgroup supports.Design, execution, and sustainment of sequen-tial and cumulative SF operations to support thetheater campaign plan and the major OPLANs ofthe conventional force commanders.Synchronization of battalion activities, to includeSupervising the battalions’ decentralized execu-tion of his operational and sustainment concepts.

To assist in these functions, the group commandermay establish a battle staff. Normally directed by thegroup XO, the battle staff operates out of the SFOBOPCEN but physically locates with the groupcommander. The battle staff thus functions in amanner similar to a conventional unit’s commandgroup or tactical command post. Anywhere the groupcommander travels, the battle staff can prepare anestimate or a fragmentary order. It keeps the SFOBOPCEN informed of new developments. It maydirect the OPCEN to begin planning for a newmission, reallocate available resources, or requestadditional assets.

The battle staff reflects the group commander’s per-sonal leadership style, but it must remain small,

mobile, and responsive to his needs. A type battlestaff could include the following:

Executive officer.S3 or assistant S3 (situation dependent).S2 or assistant S2 (situation dependent).Assistant S1.S4 or assistant S4 (situation dependent).S5 or assistant S5 (situation dependent).CSM.Signal officer or NCO with a secure tacticalsatellite communications (TACSATCOM) pack-age linking the battle staff to the SOC, TASOSC,SFOB, and FOBs.

ForwardOperational Base

The FOB is a command, control, and support baseestablished and operated by the SF battalion. Theorganization and functions of an FOB vary with themission, the duration and scope of operations, andthe security, communications, intelligence, and CSSrequirements. An FOB may be subordinate to or in-dependent of the SFOB. Command relationships,not physical location, determine whether the FOB isindependent of or subordinate to the SFOB. Eithertype may be collocated with the SFOB or establishedin another theater of operations.

The subordinate FOB is an intermediate base whosecommander reports directly to the group com-mander. It does not have the SFOB’s broad planningand coordinating responsibilities. The subordinateFOB commander and staff plan and executemissions as directed by the SF group commander.

The independent FOB is a separate base whosecommander reports directly to the SOC, a JSOTF,an SAO, or a major conventional headquarters. Itsorganization and functions are similar to those of anSFOB, except that the battalion commander doesnot coordinate the activities of other FOBs. Thecommander and staff of an independent FOBcoordinate directly with the SOC for operationalmatters and with the TASOSC for intelligence andCSS requirements. The SF group commander doesnot have OPCON of the FOB’s activities.

The SF battalion commander establishes an FOB toprepare, deploy, control, and support SF teams inspecified operational areas. The FOB may be

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organized on an area or functional basis. If the FOBis organized on an area basis, the battalioncommander plans, conducts and supports all SFoperations in a specific theater of operations or insupport of a specific conventional force. If the FOBis organized on a functional basis, the battalioncommander plans, conducts, and supports a specifictype(s) of SF operation(s) throughout the group’soperational area. Appendix C provides a samplebattalion OPLAN. Specific FOB functions include–

Planning and conducting SF operations asdirected by higher authority.Training, preparing, deploying, directing, andsupporting subordinate SF teams.Coordinating battalion activities with higher,adjacent, and supported headquarters.

AdvancedOperational Base

The AOB is a command, control, and support baseestablished and operated by the SF company. TheAOB is small, light, and mission-oriented. AOBelements perform functions similar to a conventionalunit’s jump TOC and/or combat trains. The SFcompany commander may establish an AOB tosupport a specific mission, such as a company-levelFID mission, when no FOB is required. He mayestablish an AOB to extend the span of control of anSFOB or FOB.

The organization and functions of an AOB vary withthe mission, the duration and scope of operations,and the security, communications, and CSS re-quirements. In general, the AOB may function as alaunch and recovery site, a radio relay site, or amission support base.

Launch and Recovery Site. Distances or othercircumstances, such as a shortage of lift assets, maypreclude direct infiltration from and exfiltration tothe FOB. In this situation, the group or battalioncommander may direct an SF company (SFOD B)commander to establish an AOB as a marshalingbase, intermediate staging base (ISB), or launch andrecovery site. At this AOB, the SFOD B receives SFteams after their isolation at an FOB and supportstheir activities before infiltration. It also receives theteams after exfiltration and transfers them to theFOB for debriefing and postmission activities. If

reinforced, the detachment may also be responsiblefor resupply and other sustainment operations duringmission execution and/or for initial debriefing afterexfiltration. The SFOD B commander must ensurethe following are provided at the AOB:

OPSEC for the supported force and its activitiesat the base.Compartmented mess, billeting, latrine, andshower facilities for the supported force.Access to secure communications and processedmission intelligence.Access to an airfield or other means of infiltrationor exfiltration, preferably with an all-weathercapability.Facilities for planning, maintenance, and otherfinal mission preparation (to include sites fortraining, rehearsals, and test firing of weapons).Facilities for conducting resupply and othersustainment operations, as required.

Radio Relay Site. Circumstances (for example, dis-tance, OPSEC, or political constraints) may precludedirect communication between deployed teams andthe operational base controlling their activities. Inthis situation, the group or battalion commander maydirect an SFOD B commander to establish and oper-ate an AOB as a radio relay site. Radio relay may bea primary or collateral mission for the AOB. If it isthe primary mission, the AOB will be much smallerthan an AOB established as a launch site, because ithas no requirement to support SF teams. The groupor battalion commander must attach an SF signalelement to the SFOD B at the AOB if communica-tions requirements exceed its organic capabilities.

Mission Support Base. When conducting SF op-erations in friendly territory, there may be no needfor an FOB. The FOB, if one exists, may be distantfrom where an SFOD B commander needs his ownmission support base. In either case, the group orbattalion commander may direct the SFOD Bcommander to establish an AOB to serve as com-mand post and unit trains for his subordinate SFteams and their counterpart HN forces. Such anAOB must have capabilities similar to those requiredat a launch site. A mission support base needs ahelicopter landing zone, a resupply drop zone, and/ora tactical airstrip as a means of air sustainment, plusaccess to the local surface (land or water) trans-portation system.

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The SF company may not have the organic resourcesto support an AOB. The SFOD B has excellent C2capabilities to establish and operate an AOB.However, it has only limited organic capabilities toprovide security, intelligence, communications, orCSS to a supported force. The group or battalioncommander must provide the required augmentationfrom internal assets or coordinate with the TASOSCor other appropriate commander to obtain requiredaugmentation from TA, HN, or commercial sources.Attachment of SF group or company resources may

reduce the capability to establish the SFOB or FOBs

Operational bases are normally fixed. However, theymay have to displace when their location becomesuntenable because of hostile activity or naturaldisaster. The group and battalion commanders andtheir staffs must carefully plan and coordinatecontingency displacement plans to ensure continuityof operations. They must shift minimum operationaland emergency communications to their alternatebase before displacement begins.

Command Relationshipsin the COMMZ

Command relationships are based on the mission,the duration and scope of operations, the CS andCSS requirements, the security considerations, thesignal capabilities, and the desired degree of controlover operations. The flexible nature of the SF groupallows it to be task organized as required. Thefollowing situations depict the most commoncommand relationships for SF operations.

The first four situations depict possible commandrelationships for wartime and contingency SFoperations when those operations do not directlyimpact on conventional combat operations.

Situation 1 (Figure 5-7) depicts one SF groupassigned to the TA of a unified command and underthe OPCON of the theater SOC. The groupcommander establishes an SFOB and threesubordinate FOBs to command, control, and sup-port all SF operations in the theater of war. Thisarrangement provides the SF group commander witha decentralized C2 system.

Situation 2 (Figure 5-8) depicts an independent FOBreporting directly to the SOC. The SOC commanderuses an independent FOB when total SF require-ments do not exceed the capabilities of a single FOB.He may also use an independent FOB when OPSECor other peculiar circumstances dictate that he

directly control a portion of the theater’s SFoperations.

Situation 3 (Figure 5-9) depicts the establishment oftwo AOBs to extend the span of control of theSFOB and an independent FOB. This arrangementpermits the SF group or battalion commander toprovide closer coordination of SF operations thanthe range of his communications system orinfiltration, exfiltration, or resupply means wouldotherwise permit.

Situation 4 (Figure 5-10) depicts a highly centralizedC2 system. The group commander establishes anSFOB and directly commands, controls, and supportsall SF operations in the theater. In this situation,the group commander may have to consolidategroup resources to expand normal SFOB capabilities.

The next three situations depict the commandrelationships when SF units conduct an SA or a FIDmission. Other SF units may simultaneously con-duct UW, SR, or DA operations to support the HNcounterinsurgency effort, using any of the commandrelationships previously discussed.

Situation 5 (Figure 5-11) depicts the deployment ofan SF team as a security assistance team (SAT) toconduct an SA mission in response to a potential orlatent insurgency in a HN. The in-country SAO isunder the combatant command (COCOM) of theregional CINC. However, the SAO chief servesunder the direction and supervision of the Chief of

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the US Diplomatic Mission (COM) to the extent coordinated with the COM and other members of theprovided by law and the presidential letter defining US Country Team.the COM’S authority and responsibility. In military NOTES: The generic term SAT encompasses allterms, the COM’s authority over the SAO chief DOD elements assigned to execute SA trainingroughly corresponds to OPCON. The SAO chief programs administered by the Defense Securitymust ensure that all SAO activities are fully Assistance Agency (DSAA). From the SF

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perspective, the most common forms of SAT are theMTT and the training assistance field team (TAFT).The generic term SAO encompasses all DODelements, regardless of actual title, assigned inforeign countries to manage SA programs admin-istered by DOD.The SAO chief is responsible for properly executingthose in-country SA programs administered by DODthrough the DSAA. When the SAO chief is desig-nated the US defense representative (USDR), healso provides oversight and in-country supervision ofall DOD personnel assigned to non-SA functions. AsUSDR, he serves as a channel of communication

between non-SA personnel and the HN governmentand the COM, the regional CINC, and other in-terested agencies.Whenever an SF team deploys on an SA mission,the SAO exercises operational and administrativecontrol of the team while it is in the HN. The SAOprovides all possible assistance so that the SAT canaccomplish its mission. The regional CINC exercisesCOCOM of the SAT through the SAO. The parentSF unit relinquishes command of the SF team forthe duration of its SA mission.Situation 6 (Figure 5-12) depicts the deployment ofan SF team on a non-SA FID mission in response to

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an active insurgency in the HN. In this situation, theregional CINC exercises COCOM through the op-erational chain of command. He places the SF teamunder the OPCON of the in-country SAO chief inhis capacity as USDR. The parent SF unit retainscommand (less OPCON) and supports the deployedSF team as required from a CONUS or third--countryFOB. The SF team’s activities are funded from

non-SA programs, and SAO personnel performingoversight and supervisory responsibilities for the SFteam may have to be identified as non-SA personnelon the SAO joint manning document.

Situation 7 (Figure 5-13) depicts the deployment ofan SF battalion to country A in response to a majorinsurgent threat. As in Situation 6, the regional

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CINC exercises COCOM of all DOD elements, to in- and one subordinate FOB. The FOB, collocated withelude the SAOs in each country. The SF battalion the SFOB in country B, conducts SF operations inestablishes an independent FOB under the OPCON country C, the hostile power sponsoring the insur-of the SAO chief in his capacity as USDR. The parent gency. The SF group is under the OPCON of theSF group retains command (less OPCON) of the SF SOC, which directs all SF missions not under thebattalion. The SF group has established an SFOB OPCON of an SAO.

Deployment C2 In a war or long-term conflict situation, the SF unitmoves from the home station to a port of embarka-

The overseas deployment of a CONUS-based SF tion. From there the SF unit moves by air or sea intounit involves the transfer of COCOM from the the gaining CINC’s AOR. At a predetermined pointUSSOCOM CINC (USCINCSOC) to the gaining (for example, upon crossing a specified latitude orregional CINC. Only the NCA can authorize such a longitude), COCOM formally passes to the gainingtransfer. The actual transfer can occur in one of two CINC. The gaining TA commander receives the SFways (Figure 5-14). unit at the port of debarkation (POD). The TASOSC

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assumes full command of the SF unit until it arrivesat its SFOB or FOB and becomes operational. TheTASOSC commander then passes OPCON to thetheater SOC commander.In a short-term contingency situation, the SF unitmoves from the home station to a remote mar-shaling base (REMAB), an ISB, or directly to theoperational area (Figure 5-15). The REMAB is asecure base to which the entire SF unit, includingorganic and attached support elements, deploys to

plan and prepare for a mission. The REMAB may bein CONUS, or it may be overseas in the gainingCINC’s (or another CINC’s) AOR. If the REMABis overseas, the NCA will specify in the deploymentorder when, and to whom, COCOM passes.The ISB is a secure base overseas to which the SFunit deploys to perform final planning, coordination,and task organization. An ISB is used when distanceor other factors preclude infiltration directly from thehome station or the REMAB.

Command Relationships or JSOTF commander assigns specific JSOAs (or

in the JSOA sectors of a JSOA) to an SF commander for missionexecution. The scope and duration of the SFoperation, the size and composition of indigenous

A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned forces, the hostile situation, and the politicalto a joint SO commander to conduct SO. The SOC situation all influence the number and composition

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of SF teams deployed into a JSOA. Additional SFteams may deploy later because of increased tempoin operations, expansion of existing resistance forces,or a change in the political situation. The three mostcommon methods of employing SF into a JSOA arediscussed below.A tailored SFOD A or B may deploy into a JSOAwhen the situation is not well known, when theindigenous force is small, or when the indigenousforce is so well developed that only minimumcoordination is needed. The detachment normallycoordinates directly with the FOB staff on alloperational, administrative, and logistical supportmatters (Figure 5-16).Two or more tailored SFODs A or B may infiltrateconcurrently, each establishing a separate sectorcommand. This arrangement is useful when the sizeof the JSOA, the hostile situation, or the nature ofthe indigenous force precludes effective operationsby a single SF chain of command in the JSOA. Eachdetachment coordinates directly with the FOBstaff on all operational, administrative, or logisticalsupport matters. There is normally no lateralcommunication between detachments (Figure 5-17).As activities in the JSOA expand, a tailored SFOD Bmay deploy to establish and/or advise an areacommand. The area command directs the activities ofthe SF teams in subordinate sectors. In this situation,subordinate SF teams coordinate all operationalmatters with the SFOD B, which in turn coordinatesdirectly with the FOB staff. Each subordinate SFteam continues to coordinate routine administrativeand logistical support directly with the FOB staff(Figure 5-18). When the situation dictates, a moresenior commander and staff may augment thedetachment’s organic capabilities.All external agencies must coordinate with the SOCor JSOTF before conducting any activities that mayaffect operations within the JSOA. The SF group orbattalion commander may recommend that the SOCor JSOTF commander designate a JSOA as arestricted fire area, depending on the situation.In addition to SF, other US or allied militaryorganizations and nonmilitary agencies may haveelements operating in the JSOA. The SOCcommander makes every effort to identify these

other elements. He coordinates to establish com-mand and support relationships and the properdegree of liaison, coordination, and cooperationamong elements.

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SF C2 at ConventionalHeadquarters

SF operations often require synchronization withconventional military operations. When directed, theSF group or battalion commander collocates anSOCCE (a reinforced SFOD B) with the supportedconventional force command post. The SOCCEcommander advises the supported commander onthe capabilities and limitations of supporting SFteams and provides required communications links.The SOCCE synchronizes SF operations withconventional force operational and intelligencerequirements. It coordinates conventional forcesupport of SF operations. It receives SF operational,intelligence, and target acquisition reports directlyfrom the deployed SF teams and provides them tothe conventional force commander and staff. TheSOCCE also deconflicts SF operations with theoperations of the supported conventional force.When linkup becomes imminent, the SOCCE assiststhe conventional force staff with linkup planning.The actual situation will dictate whether the SOC orconventional commander exercises OPCON of thesupporting SF teams.

When the area of interest of a conventional forcecommander encompasses a JSOA, mutual coor-dination must occur to identify SF missionrequirements and to synchronize all supporting SOwith conventional combat operations. In Situation8 (Figure 5-19), a field army area of interest encom-passes the JSOA, although SF operations are beyondthe field army’s area of operations. The SOCCEcommander identifies the field army’s SF missionrequirements and coordinates them with the FOBstaff. The FOB commander retains OPCON andprovides administrative and logistical support to theSF teams in the JSOA.

The theater CINC passes OPCON of deployed SFteams to a conventional force commander when—

The conventional force commander requests andreceives dedicated SF support on a mission basis.

The theater CINC commits the conventionalforce to an area in which SF operations areongoing.The conventional force approaches a JSOA andlinkup becomes imminent.

When the area of operations of a conventional forcecommander encompasses a JSOA, the conventionalforce commander normally exercises OPCONthrough the collocated SOCCE. In Situation 9(Figure 5-20), a corps area of operations encom-passes the JSOA. Conventional and SF operationsdirectly impact on each other. In this situation, theCINC directs the SOC commander to pass OPCONof appropriate SF teams to the corps commander.The SOCCE commander directly controls the de-ployed SF teams. The FOB commander retainscommand (less OPCON) of the deployed SF teamsand continues to provide administrative and logisticalsupport. The SOCCE commander keeps the FOBcommander informed of the status and activities ofSF teams under SOCCE control.If friendly offensive operations are successful, theconventional force will link up with SF teams andtake control of the JSOA. During this phase of theoperation, SF teams may be placed under theOPCON of the appropriate tactical commander. Thetactical commander then becomes responsible forintegrating the SF teams and their indigenous forcesinto his combat operations. He exercises OPCONthrough the collocated SOCCE at his command post.When assigned an SOCCE mission, the SFOD Bcommander task organizes into two shifts to conductcontinuous operations according to the standingoperating procedures (SOPs) of the supportedheadquarters. The XO and company technician arenormally the shift leaders, freeing the detachmentcommander and sergeant major to vary theirschedules as required. Each shift leader organizeshis shift to coordinate SF operations with the plans,current operations, intelligence, targeting, and CSScells of the supported headquarters. The operationssergeant supervises the routine activities of his shiftand ensures its efficient operation and adminis-tration. The communications sergeant managesSOCCE message traffic and supervises the attachedsignal element.

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In Situations 8 and 9, the SOCCE uses organic andattached radio and telephone equipment to enter thesupported unit’s communications system. It alsomaintains secure communications with the FOB orSFOB commander controlling its activities. InSituation 9, the SOCCE must also establish andmaintain direct communications with its subordinateSF teams.

SOCCE communications to its subordinate SF teamswill normally flow through the parent FOB. If themission requires direct communications between theSOCCE and its SF teams, the SF battalion com-mander must augment the SFOD B with a signalelement from the battalion signal detachment.

SOCCE communications to the parent FOB dependon the theater communications system (TCS).Organic long-range HF radio or UHF tacticalsatellite terminals will be used when the SOCCE isdeployed in an undeveloped theater before the TCSbeeomes operational.Administrative and logistical support for the SOCCEwill be provided on the basis of an agreement betweenthe supported headquarters and the TASOSC. Theparent FOB must provide DS and limited GSmaintenance of SF-peculiar equipment. The FOBmust continue to conduct mission preparation,isolation, infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration ofSF teams supporting the conventional force.

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SF Control ofConventional

Maneuver UnitsIn some situations an SF unit may receive OPCONor attachment of a conventional maneuver unit. Thisis most likely to occur—

In a counterinsurgency environment when anSF-supported indigenous combat force requires

additional combat power for a specific combinedarms operation.When SF teams performing DA or SR operationsrequire a conventional reaction or reinforcementforce.In linkup or postlinkup combat operations duringthe combat employment phase of an insurgency.During contingency operations when theARSOTF headquarters is the senior Armyheadquarters in the operational area.

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SF Communications ina Developed Theater

The SFOB and FOBs are normally located in theCOMMZ. The TCS provides area signal support tothe SF group and its subordinate elements. TheTCS may be an Army, Air Force, or Navy system. SeeFigure 5-21 for an example of SF communicationsin a developed theater.The SOC J6 coordinates the installation, operation,and maintenance of communications links from theSOC to subordinate elements (to include the SFOBand independent FOBs reporting directly to theSOC). These links include multichannel SHF andHF, single-channel HF and UHF satellite commu-nications (SATCOM), and limited wire and/or cablesupport. Dedicated JCS, Army (SO signal bat-talion), Air Force, or Navy communications assetsprovide this support to the SOC.

The TASOSC information management officer plansand coordinates TCS and defense communicationssystem (DCS) access for all ARSOF in the theater.He exercises technical control of all ARSOFcommunications. The TASOSC relies on area accessto the SOC’s dedicated communications package, orthe TA communications system, to communicate withits subordinate ARSOF elements.The SF group uses organic signal assets to providecommunications to subordinate FOBs and deployedSF teams. The SF group and battalion signaldetachments have the organic assets to—

Install, operate, and maintain two internalsingle-channel HF radio teletypewriter (RATT)nets: one for SCI and one for command,operations, and support. When HF multichannelequipment becomes available, it will replace theRATT systems.Terminate landlines connecting them to the TCS.The TCS provides the primary means for the

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SFOB, FOBs, AOBs, and SOCCEs to exchange required, the SOCCEs and AOBs can alsooperational and intelligence data. communicate with the SFOB, FOBS, and

deployed SF teams using these same systems.Communicate with their deployed teams using These systems also provide backup communica-HF burst and/or UHF SATCOM burst. When tions between the SFOB and FOBs.

SF Communications inan Undeveloped Theater

In an undeveloped theater of operations, no TCSis available. The SOC J6 and TASOSC informationmanagement officer provide or coordinate the samecommunications links established in a developedtheater. In an undeveloped theater, the TA signalbrigade or an SO signal battalion must augment the

SF group’s organic signal detachments. Theaugmentation package establishes secure com-munications links between the SFOB and itssubordinate elements until the theater develops andTCS becomes operational. If the responsible servicecannot provide the required communications, theSOC J6 must obtain JCS-controlled joint com-munications support element (JCSE) assets toprovide the support. See Figure 5-22 for an exampleof SF communications in an undeveloped theater.

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The SF group design permits SF commanders to task organize according to mission requirements and theoperational environment. Chapter 5 describes how SF commanders exercise C2 through a network ofoperational bases. This chapter describes how SF commanders establish, operate, and defend their bases.

BasingConsiderations

The group commander recommends SF baselocations to the SOC commander for approval. Themission will largely determine the number andconfiguration of bases. Based on the anticipatedduration and scope of operations, the groupcommander decides whether to employ an SFOBonly, an FOB only, or an SFOB with subordinateFOBs. The group commander must ensure that thebase locations provide him responsive C2 andsufficient OPSEC.

Base LocationThe group commander should locate the SFOB andFOBs at secure, logistically supportable locationswithin the COMMZ. They should be within areasonable distance of departure sites to simplifyinfiltration and resupply operations. Bases shouldprovide reasonable access to a main supply route,They should have a securable base perimeter,Locating bases within existing facilities enhancesOPSEC by reducing their visual and electronic signa-ture. However, their collocation with an airfield, portfacility, or major conventional headquarters mayincrease the risk of their total destruction.

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The SFOB and FOBs need not be located in theregion they support. They may remain at a CONUSbase, locate in a friendly nation outside the supportedCINC’s region, or be established at sea.The training of uncommitted SFODs continues afteractual SF operations begin. Uncommitted SFODstrain in basic and specialized SF skills between com-bat missions. SF base locations must thereforeprovide suitable training sites.Base activities may be consolidated at one site ordispersed at several smaller sites. Dispersal may

base, but dispersal also complicates base functions.The SF group and battalion are limited in their TOEcapability to support dispersed base facilities.

Base Organization

Each SF group and battalion commander normallyorganizes his operational base into an OPCEN,SPTCEN, and SIGCEN (Figure 6-l). All threecenters have their own organization and functions,but their activities are interdependent (Figure 6-2).A type arrangement of a consolidated operational

improve OPSEC by reducing the signature of the base is shown at Figure 6-3.

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OperationsCenter

unit’s TOC. The organization of a type OPCEN isshown in Figure 6-4.

OPCEN DirectorThe OPCEN is the functional activity that directs and Based on approved plans and guidance from the basecontrols SF operations in a designated operational commander, the OPCEN director supervises all op-area. It performs the functions of a conventional erational aspects of mission planning and execution.

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The OPCEN director ensures the total synchroni-zation of S2 S3, and S5 activities within the OPCEN.

S2 Section

Under the staff supervision of the unit S2 the baseS2 section is the focal point for all-source intelligenceproduction and intelligence collection management.The section includes both the unit S2 section andelements of the group or battalion MI detachmenttask organized into three branches.

The S2 operations branch directs and coordinates thedaily operations of the S2 staff. It exercises staffsupervision of the tactical SSO, the attached US AirForce (USAF) weather team, and the MI detach-ment’s all-source intelligence center (ASIC).

The S2 plans branch plans and coordinates intel-ligence support for future and contingent SFoperations. It physically locates with the S3 plansbranch or the consolidated plans section.

The S2 security branch develops unit security pro-grams and supervises their implementation. Underits staff supervision, the MI detachment’s CI sectionprovides CI support to the S3’s OPSEC program anddeception planning.

The attached USAF weather officer serves as aspecial staff officer on all matters related to weather.His team provides operational weather support tothe base, to include current and future weatherdata and climatic analysis and studies. The teamprepares weather briefings for all SF teams inisolation. It also prepares operational area weatherreports for deployed SF teams. When directed, theweather officer may attach USAF SO weatherpersonnel to SF teams to provide weather data fromdenied territory.

MI Detachment

The MI detachment commander is the unit’sprincipal intelligence producer and executor. He isresponsible to the OPCEN director and base com-mander for providing required intelligence support.The MI detachment commander establishes andoperates a tactical SCIF in the OPCEN. Within theSCIF, the unit S2 provides the SSO and exercisesOPCON of the ASIC. The MI detachment com-

mander serves as ASIC chief. In this capacity heresponds to formal taskings from the S2. In additionto his functions as ASIC chief, the MI detachmentcommander also directs and controls the technicalcontrol analysis element (TCAE) (formerly called theSOT B), the SSO communications team, and theinterrogation and CI sections. Proper intelligenceand electronic warfare (IEW) support depends ondirect daily contact and informal tasking andcoordination between the S2 staff elements and thevarious sections of the MI detachment.The collection management and dissemination(CM&D) section performs intelligence collectionmanagement for the S2 operations branch. TheCM&D section recommends PIR and IRs for thebase commander’s approval. It obtains the com-mander’s approved requirements from the unit S2,prioritizes them based on S2 guidance, and translatesthem into collection missions. It then prepares theunit collection plan and forwards the unit’s priori-tized requirements to the TASOSC ISE. The CM&Dsection has tasking authority over organic andattached MI collection assets, such as the organicSOTs A and any attached HUMINT assets. (The S3tasks those missions performed by SF teams or othersubordinate non-MI assets.) The section also dis-seminates combat information and intelligencewithin the base and to higher, adjacent, and lowerheadquarters.The all-source production section (ASPS) performsthe base’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB). The section processes, correlates, and inte-grates all-source intelligence in response to taskingsfrom the CM&D section. The ASPS is thus the focalpoint for all situation and target development withinthe base. It develops and maintains the unit’sintelligence data base, to include the intelligencejournal, order of battle (OB) information, IPBproducts, targeting data, and situation map. Itmonitors the CM&D collection plan and recom-mends revisions to close identified gaps. It receivesand processes intelligence products and combatinformation from higher, lower, and adjacent com-mands. It prepares intelligence estimates, reports,summaries, and briefs as required.The TCAE collocates with the ASIC in the SCIF.There it serves as the focal point for SIGINToperations. At group level, the TCAE provides

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centralized technical control over deployed SOTs A.It analyzes and correlates intercepted SIGINT datafrom the SOTs A with data from other sources andpasses the product to the ASPS and the TAOSCISE. It develops and maintains the SIGINT technicaldata base and the electronic order of battle (EOB)data base. It also links theater and nationalintelligence systems to integrate technical dataproduced by tactical units with data produced by theNational Security Agency. The battalion TCAErequires technical support (for example, SIGINTtechnical data) from the group TCAE to exercisedirect technical control over its deployed SOTs A.

The SSO communications section locates adjacent tothe ASIC in the SCIF to provide secure SCIcommunications between the SFOB and its deployedFOBs. Higher headquarters provide SCI com-munications to the SOC J2 and TASOSC ISE.

The CI section operates from the OPCEN in closecoordination with the S2 security branch and theASPS. The primary function of the section is toperform CI analysis in support of the ASIC and theunit’s OPSEC and deception programs. It performssource administration functions. It also supports theunit S2’s personnel security and information securityfunctions. Its CI teams conduct liaison with US andHN security organizations in the vicinity of the base.When provided by MTOE, counter-SIGINT teamsprovide communications monitoring and analysis forcommercial and military landlines and radio-telephones at the base. The CI section coordinateswith the supporting TA Cl unit for investigative,technical, and operational support.

The interrogation teams deploy from the SFOB asrequired. One team may be permanently located atthe theater’s joint interrogation facility. Interro-gators exploit PWs, line crossers, refugees, andinformants. They conduct initial exploitation ofcaptured documents. They also debrief friendlypersonnel who are returned PWs or who haveescaped from hostile or denied territory. Theyestablish liaison with other US, allied, or HNinterrogation services and interrogation centers.Interrogators can act as interpreters or translatorswhen other linguists are not available.

The supporting terrain team, while not part of thegroup MI detachment, collocates with and functions

as an essential element of the group ASIC. The MIdetachment commander, as ASIC chief, tasks theteam and controls its activities. The terrain teamcollects, compiles, and produces graphic and textualterrain data to support the group’s needs. It alsoassists the ASPS in its IPB function by producinggeneral and detailed terrain analysis, terrain studies,overlays, and overprinted maps.

S3 Section

Under the staff supervision of the unit S3, the baseS3 section is responsible for the unit’s organization,training, and operations. The section is organized intothree branches.

The S3 operations branch directs and coordinatescurrent SF operations being conducted by sub-ordinate units. It exercises staff supervision of theISOFAC and, at group level, the tactical EAF.Other specific functions include—

Receiving, processing, and approving air supportrequests.Coordinating infiltration, exfiltration, resupply,and recovery operations.Monitoring training of uncommitted SFODs.Recommending employment of special weapons.Planning and coordinating offensive EW.Integrating PSYOP and CA into current opera-tions.Managing the Class V unit basic load (UBL).Preparing the unit readiness report.Preparing other reports to the SOC, JSOTF,TASOSC, and other higher headquarters.

The S3 plans branch coordinates and prepares theunit’s contingency plans. It also coordinates andprepares preliminary assessments (PAs) and missionconcepts (MICONs) in support of the targetingprocess. It reviews plans of subordinate elementsand coordinates plans with the other centers of thebase. It anticipates future SF operations as far inadvance as possible. This branch also maintains andrevises the unit MTOE and augmentation TDA.The S2 and S4 plans branches collocate, as needed,with the S3 plans branch to facilitate the planningprocess. This consolidated plans section operatesunder the direct supervision of the OPCEN director.

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In garrison, the area specialist team (AST) is anintegral part of the S3 plans branch. There should bean AST assigned to each battalion, with a fourth ASTto support those SPECAT missions controlled atgroup level. Each AST consists of an area specialistofficer (ASO), an area specialist sergeant, and anintelligence analyst. The ASTs are the focal points formission planning, targeting, and area study within thegroup. During actual operations, the ASTs normallyaugment the SFODs B that establish and operate theISOFACs.

The S3 training branch plans, programs, coordinates,and manages the unit training program. When thegroup or battalion is committed to actual operations,the training branch plans, programs, coordinates,and supervises training for uncommitted detach-ments and replacements for committed detachments.Although it is part of the S3 section, this branchphysically locates in the SPTCEN.

Isolation Facility

The ISOFAC is a maximum security facility estab-lished to isolate SF teams performing their missionplanning and preparation. OPSEC is paramountthroughout this period. SF teams committed toseparate missions and separate operational areas areisolated to preclude mission compromise.

An ISOFAC should be capable of isolating six SFteams simultaneously. The limiting factor is theinability of the base staff to plan and prepare morethan six missions at the same time. The ISOFACshould include—

Separate briefing, planning, billeting, and storageareas for each operational element in isolation.Dining, latrine, and shower facilities.A dispensary service.A recreation and exercise area.Staff administrative support.

The group and battalion commanders each task anSF company headquarters (SFOD B) to establish andoperate the ISOFAC under the direct supervision ofthe OPCEN director. The three-man peacetimeAST is attached to the SFOD B to provide itsexpertise in current OPLAN requirements, tar-geting, and area studies. The SFOD B commander

task organizes into three cells to conduct continuousoperations with two overlapping shifts.

The commander and sergeant major constitute thecommand cell. The cell ensures the SF teams receiveproper support from their initial commitmentthrough mission completion and debriefing. Itensures the proper degree of OPSEC and compart-mentation within the ISOFAC. This use of anSFOD B enables the group or battalion S3 to planand coordinate future operations while the ISOFACcommander supervises current operations under theOPCEN director’s control.

The XO, supply sergeant, NBC NCO, medicalsergeant, and two communications sergeantsconstitute the support cell. The cell provides theinterface between the ISOFAC and the SPTCENand SIGCEN. It ensures that the SF teams’equipment is mission-capable. It receives, con-solidates, and tracks support requests to ensure theSF teams receive the signal support and CSS theyrequire. The cell secures and maintains nondeploy-ing equipment for the deployed teams. It also assiststhe teams in preparing automatic and emergencyresupply bundles (Chapter 14). After the teamsdeploy, the support cell actively monitors theirsustainment posture and recommends resupply andreplacement actions as required.

The company technician, two operations sergeants,and the attached AST constitute the operations cell.This cell provides the interface between the ISOFACand the rest of the OPCEN. The cell ensures the SFteams receive sufficient operational guidance andintelligence. It also provides the OPCEN current up-dates on the teams’ status and situation. It helps theS3 prepare mission support plans and reviews theisolated teams’ concepts and plans before they arepresented to the OPCEN director. It coordinatesoperational activities that involve more than oneisolated team, ensuring proper OPSEC and com-partmentation is maintained throughout this process.It obtains training and rehearsal sites and ensures itsteams complete all predeployment training re-quirements. It prepares the isolation schedule andcoordinates the briefback schedule with the basecommand group. After its supported SF teamsdeploy, it tracks the missions, processes team mes-sage traffic, and recommends team mission taskings.

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Without augmentation, the SFOD B can isolate onlythree or four SF teams simultaneously. The group orbattalion commander can greatly improve thecapacity and efficiency of the ISOFAC operations cellby augmenting it with two additional AST NCOs(normally profiled or other nondeploying SFODmembers) for each isolated element. These ASTNCOs provide 24-hour interface between the iso-lated team and the ISOFAC cells. The AST NCOsactively participate in all aspects of mission planningand preparation for deployment. They process andtrack mission support requests. They act as escorts tomove the teams in and out of the ISOFAC asrequired. After infiltration, they actively monitormissions until their completion, track team messagetraffic, compile and maintain a written record of themissions, and assist the teams to ensure successfulmission execution. Upon mission completion, theAST NCOs assist in team debriefing and the prepa-ration of team after-action reports. In the process ofsupporting teams, the AST NCOs become intimatelyfamiliar with the teams’ plans of execution (POEs)and the personalities of team members. To preserveOPSEC, the AST NCOs cannot deploy on anothermission until their supported missions are complete.

Each two-man AST can normally support two orthree SF teams after deployment, depending uponthe complexity of the mission. A battalion thereforeneeds an augmentation package of 6 two-man ASTsto deploy 18 SF teams in three isolation cycles.

S5 Section

Under the staff supervision of the unit S5, the S5section is responsible for the CMO of the unit. TheS5 coordinates closely with the S3 to integrate CAconsiderations into all group operations. The S5also coordinates with the S2 to incorporate CAintelligence products and requirements into unitintelligence products and planning. The SOC com-mander may attach elements of a CA battalion(FID/UW) to the SF group. In this case, the S5exercises staff supervision and makes employmentrecommendations.

The group S5 may direct and supervise the activitiesof the consolidated plans section. By placing the S2S3, and S4 plans branches under S5 control, the group

commander creates a staff element corresponding tothe J5 element of the SOC or JSOTF.

Liaison Section

The liaison section is under the direct supervision ofthe OPCEN director. The group commander ex-changes liaison officers with the theater Air ForceSpecial Operations Command (AFSOC) and NavalSpecial Warfare Task Group (NSWTG). He mayalso exchange liaison officers with US nonmilitaryagencies and allied military organizations. The groupstaff coordinates closely with the appropriate liaisonofficers to ensure proper mutual support and tosynchronize joint SO. By TOE, the SF group is notauthorized any liaison officers. Without MTOE orTDA augmentation, the group commander must usepersonnel from uncommitted detachments.

NBC Element

The chemical officer establishes and operates theNBC element in the OPCEN. The NBC elementreceives and processes NBC reports from higherheadquarters and deployed SF teams. It maintainsthe current NBC status of the unit. It briefs andassists committed SF teams during mission prepa-ration. It also monitors unit NBC training.

Engineer Section

At group level, the engineer officer establishes andoperates the tactical EAF in the OPCEN. The EAFreceives and processes emergency action (EA) traffic.It manages and implements the group EA programusing additional duty EA-trained personnel locatedthroughout the OPCEN. It also monitors specialweapons training and proficiency. In addition tothese duties, the engineer performs the normalfunctions of a staff engineer, assists the S2 in thetarget development process, and monitors unitengineer training.

Signal SectionThe signal officer establishes and operates the sig-nal support coordination element (SSCE) in theOPCEN. The SSCE plans and coordinates all unitsignal support. It directs the activities of the unit’ssignal detachment. It exercises technical control overthe SSO communications section, subordinate units,

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and deployed SF teams. The SSCE maintains theunit COMSEC account. It also manages automa-tion within the unit.

PSYOP Element

Under the staff supervision of the unit S3, thePSYOP officer advises the commander and his staffconcerning the psychological implications of specificSF operations. He recommends how to integrate

PSYOP into SF operations, and he coordinatesexternal PSYOP support. He exercises staffsupervision over attached PSYOP units. The SOCcommander normally attaches a tailored PSYOPdetachment to the group to provide direct PSYOPsupport (Chapter 15). The group commander furtherattaches PSYOP teams to subordinate SF com-manders as required. At SF battalion level and below,the attached PSYOP commander also serves asPSYOP staff officer to the supported SF commander.

Support CenterThe SPTCEN is the functional activity that providesCSS to the base and its deployed SF teams. It per-forms the functions of conventional unit trains. Atype SF support center is shown at Figure 6-5. Atthe group SPTCEN, the group S1 and S4 planand coordinate CSS for the entire SF group andmonitor the CSS operations of the SFOB andsubordinate bases. The SPTCEN performs the fol-lowing functions:

Plans and controls the administrative activities ofthe base, to include the coordination of facilitiesengineering and other base operations support.Maintains the UBL of all classes of supply.Manages assigned stocks.Coordinates movements.Develops and manages the maintenance plan.Requests external CSS and coordinates CSS re-quirements with supporting CSS units.Maintains control of personnel management andrecords.Supports the training and preparation of uncom-mitted SFODs.

SPTCEN DirectorThe SPTCEN director is the support company com-mander. He is responsible to the base commander forthe execution of all base CSS operations. He is alsoresponsible for SPTCEN housekeeping details, to

include billeting, food service, space allocation, andinternal guard duties. The group SPTCEN directorhas no responsibility for the CSS operations of sub-ordinate FOBs and AOBs.

S1 SectionThe S1 supervises the S1 section of the SPTCEN.The S1 is responsible to the SPTCEN director andbase commander for administration and managementof personnel assigned or attached to the base. Heassists SF teams during their mission preparation.Once SF teams deploy, the S1 monitors and respondsto their support requests through the ISOFACsupport cell. His primary concerns include—

Personnel accountability and strength man-agement.Casualty reporting.Personnel replacement operations.Personnel actions for deployed SF personnel.Other personnel services, to include anyadministrative support of indigenous forces.Base administrative services, to include operationof the base distribution center. The centerprocesses all base correspondence except mes-sages to and from deployed SF teams.

S4 Section

The S4 supervises the S4 section of the SPTCENand exercises staff supervision over attached orsupporting logistical units. The S4 assists SF teams

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with logistical matters during their mission prepara-tion, to include any logistical support requirementsfor indigenous forces. Once SF teams deploy, the S4monitors and responds to their support requeststhrough the ISOFAC support cell. The S4 plansofficer collocates, as needed, with the S3 planssection in the OPCEN to prepare the logisticalportion of unit plans.

Service Detachment

The service detachment performs unit-level supply,services, and maintenance functions for the baseand its attached elements. It also coordinates basetransportation support.

The supply and transportation section performsconsolidated unit-level supply functions for the baseand its deployed SF teams. At group level itmaintains the property book and basic loads (lessClass I, VIII, and IX) for the group HHC and supportcompany. At battalion level, it performs thesefunctions for the entire battalion. The section alsoprocures nonstandard and SF-peculiar supplies andequipment. The section’s organic trucks provide localtransportation support to the base, but the sectiondepends on nondedicated drivers to perform thisfunction.

The food service section provides consolidated foodservice to the base. The section establishes andoperates a dining facility in the SPTCEN. In addi-tion to its 24-hour feeding operation to support bothbase shifts, the section conducts remote feedingoperations as required. The section also maintainsthe unit’s Class I basic load.The mechanical maintenance section performs con-solidated unit-level maintenance support for thebase’s organic wheeled vehicles and power gen-eration equipment. It also coordinates for DSmaintenance support, evacuates damaged items tothe supporting DS maintenance company, andmaintains the unit’s prescribed load list (PLL).The rigger-air delivery section provides personneland cargo parachute packing, unit-level mainte-nance of air delivery items, rigger support, andlimited air delivery support to the base. It alsocoordinates external rigger and air delivery supportwhen requirements exceed organic capabilities.

Uncommitted SFODsAll SFODs do not deploy simultaneously. Uncom-mitted SFODs prepare for contingency missions andrapid deployment in the event of a time-sensitiverequirement. Uncommitted SFODs should notperform housekeeping duties or support functions atthe expense of their combat readiness.

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The SFOB SPTCEN normally has no responsibility consolidated reports and requests. They may alsoto support the subordinate FOBs, except for pro- have to coordinate throughput distribution to thetiding technical assistance when required. If the FOB or even to its AOBs. When two bases collocate,SFOB and an FOB are supported by the same TA the group commander may decide to collocate orunits, the group S1 and S4 may have to submit consolidate their SPTCENs for mutual support.

Signal Center

The mission of the SIGCEN is to install, operate, andmaintain secure, reliable, long-range communica-tions between the base and its—

Higher, adjacent, subordinate, supporting, andsupported headquarters.Deployed SF teams.

The SIGCEN also installs, operates, and maintainscontinuous internal base communications. A typesignal center is shown at Figure 6-6.

Within the SIGCEN, the base station sectionprovides HF radio burst and UHF tactical satellite(TACSAT) communications between the base and itsdeployed SF teams. The section can use thesesame means to provide backup communicationsamong the SFOB and FOBs. The section establishesand operates separate receiver and transmitter sites.The transmitter site must be located away from therest of the SIGCEN for technical as well as OPSECreasons. The section’s telecommunications centercollocates with the receiver site. It receives andprocesses outgoing messages from the OPCENtelecommunications center for transmission to theSF teams. It also receives incoming messages fromthe receiver site for processing and forwarding tothe OPCEN communications center.

The base communications support section providesinternal communications support to the base. Toaccomplish this task, the section task organizes intotwo teams.

The OPCEN telecommunications center receives,processes, and distributes all incoming and outgoingmessage traffic. The center must be linked bymessenger or other secure means to the supportingarea SIGCEN. When augmented, the team alsooperates and maintains SATCOM, facsimile, andtactical radio equipment linking the OPCEN withother headquarters.The section’s switchboard team operates and main-tains the base’s internal telephone system. The signaldetachment has no dedicated wire teams because SFbases are fixed. The detachment task organizes toinstall the telephone system during the occupation ofthe base. The base switchboard must be connectedinto the switchboard of the supporting area SIGCENto obtain access to the TCS and DCS.The base communications support section alsomaintains secure single-channel HF RATT com-munications between the SFOB and FOBs. Whenavailable, HF multichannel equipment will replacethe section’s RATT system(s).

The electronic maintenance section provides unit-level and DS maintenance of signal equipment (toinclude COMSEC equipment) to the base and itssupported SF teams. The section also performslimited GS maintenance on SF-peculiar signal items.

At group level, the photo section provides limitedground and aerial still photographic support to theentire SF group. When the group’s requirementsexceed organic capabilities, the group signal officercoordinates through the TASOSC signal officer toobtain external support from the supporting echelonsabove corps (EAC) signal unit.

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Alternate BasesThe group commander always designates a sub-ordinate FOB as the alternate SFOB to assume theSFOB’s functions if the primary SFOB is destroyedor becomes untenable. He also designates analternate base for each deployed FOB and AOB. Thegroup commander ensures each alternate base isprepared to assume the primary base’s mission. Hepays particular attention to emergency communi-cations procedures, established intelligence links,and the provision of AST packages to the alternateISOFAC. He may have to arrange augmentation

of normal TOE resources. Alternate C2 arrange-ments depend on standardized internal procedures tomaintain continuity of operations should the primarybase become inoperable.

Operational bases are normally fixed. However, theymay have to displace because of hostile activity ornatural disaster. The group and battalioncommanders and their staffs must prepare displace-ment plans to ensure continuity of operations. Theymust shift minimum operational and emergencycommunications to their alternate base beforedisplacement begins.

Base DefenseOperational bases are subject to the full range ofhostile air and surface threats identified in Chapter2. Because of the austere nature of SF organiza-tions, they require dedicated security forces toprotect their operational bases from hostile actions.

Security Forces

There are three options for obtaining base securityforces: US unilateral, combined US and HN, orHN unilateral.

The preferred base defense option is for USelements to secure the group’s bases and activities.The bases may be located within the perimeters oflarger US installations. However, US installationsand base defense assets may not be available, and theHN may not authorize US unilateral securityoperations beyond the base perimeter.

In a combined US and HN option, US base defenseelements may provide physical security within thebase perimeter. A HN or combined US and HNmilitary or paramilitary force may provide security

beyond the perimeter (perhaps within the perimeterof a larger HN installation). If the supporting US basedefense element cannot fully perform the basedefense mission, the SF base commander may haveto divert operational and support personnel toaugment its capabilities. Any such diversion willrequire an MTOE or augmentation TDA change toprovide the affected SF unit with adequate basedefense weapons, communications, and othersecurity equipment. The diversion will reduce theoperational and support capabilities of the affectedSF unit.

In the third option, the supported HN force mayprovide physical security to the base. The SFcommander may also contract with the HN oranother (third country or commercial) source for adedicated security force.

Command and Control

The SPTCEN director, in coordination with the S3,headquarters commandant, and supporting basedefense element commander, prepares the basedefense plan. This plan provides options for thecoordinated defense of the base against surface or air

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attack, to include acts of sabotage and terrorism. Theplan employs active and passive security measures bypartitioning the base into security areas, assigningresponsibility for the areas, and establishing a BDOCto coordinate and control base defense operations.

The BDOC commander is normally the supportingbase defense element commander. If no supportingbase defense element is available, the headquarterscommandant serves as BDOC commander. In eithercase, the BDOC commander coordinates basedefense activities. He ensures that unit guards areintegrated into the base security plan. The BDOCmaintains continuous communications with sup-porting security forces, to include any HN forces. Itexercises OPCON of the designated base responseforce. In a combined US and HN effort, the BDOCcommander and his HN counterpart must considerlanguage capabilities. They must agree on—

Chain of command.Rules of engagement.Organization and manning of the response force.Areas of responsibility.Employment tactics and techniques.Exchange of liaison personnel.Standardized secure communications.

The close defense area (CDA) is the area within thephysical limits of the base perimeter. The perimetershould be large enough to accommodate basefacilities but small enough that it does not un-necessarily commit resources to force protection inthe CDA. Within the CDA, each SF unit develops asupporting base defense plan for its role in thecoordinated defense of the base. The dedicatedsecurity force—

Secures the perimeter itself and provides con-trolled access to the operational base.Defends critical facilities, to include the SCIF,EAF, ISOFAC, and SIGCEN.Provides controlled access to the OPCEN.Provides the primary response force in the eventof penetration.

The main defense area (MDA) extends beyond thebase perimeter to the projected maximum effectiverange of infantry indirect fire weapons and

man-portable air defense (MANPAD)situations where the dedicated security

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systems. Inforce is not

responsible for security operations in the MDA theBDOC commander coordinates with his MDAcounterpart to ensure effective coverage.

Outlying sites and surface transportation routesshould be considered extensions of the main base. Ifapplicable, they should be divided into security areas.

Detection andAssessment

Security forces in the MDA and CDA detect andassess threats by a combination of mounted anddismounted security patrols, electronic surveillanceequipment, listening and/or observation posts, andactive CI operations. If the security forces cannotprevent hostile penetration of the base perimeter,they destroy the hostile force or delay it until theresponse force arrives. The security forces then assistthe response force as required.

With the exception of designated critical facilities,units protect their own specific facilities within theCDA. The BDOC commander coordinates anddeconflicts unit security activities. Interior guardsman both fixed and roving guard positions to defendspecific buildings, sites, equipment, and personnelfrom intrusion and sabotage.

Delay

After detection occurs and an assessment is made,delay measures provide sufficient time for securityforces to respond. The BDOC commander mustdevelop a delay plan for each critical facility. Delaymeasures can be either passive or active. Passivemeasures include fences, lighting, wire obstacles,trenches, revetments, vehicle barriers, minefield,and other physical security barriers. Active measuresinclude road blocks, guard posts, and entry controlpoints. The combined effect of multiple measuresminimizes the hostile force’s freedom of action.

Response

The SF base commander establishes a response forcearound a nucleus of dedicated security personnel. Heaugments this nucleus with other base personnel

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designated and trained to perform response force Apprehend or destroy a hostile force that hasduties. The mission of the response force is to— gained access to a critical facility.

Interdict, disrupt, apprehend, or destroy a hostilepenetration force before it can disrupt a critical Regain control of the CDA and reestablish thefacility. integrity of the base perimeter as soon as possible.

NBC Defense is contamination with persistent chemical agents. SFbase commanders must harden critical base facilitiesagainst chemical attack. They must also develop

Operational base elements employ standard NBC contingency plans for decontaminating the base ordefense measures to protect themselves in an NBC displacing in the event of contamination with per-environment. The most likely NBC threat to SF bases sistent chemical agents.

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Detailed mission planning is vital to successful mission execution and SF team survival. SF missionplanning is distinctive in its degree of jointness, its dependence on operational intelligence, and the levelof participation by operators. This chapter describes the joint SO targeting process and how SF com-manders plan missions and prepare SF teams for deployment. It covers both deliberate and time-sensitiveplanning. It also discusses employment considerations for SF teams operating in an NBC environment.

Joint SOTargeting Process

The joint SO targeting process influences how SFcommanders plan and prepare for missions. Itprescribes how the TASOSC ISE and SF MI detach-ments develop targets. (See JCS Pub 3-05.5 andFM 100-25 for detailed discussions of the joint SOtargeting process.)Deliberate SO mission planning begins at theaterlevel with the joint SO targeting process (Figure 7-1).The CINC establishes a joint target board (JTB) to

direct the theater targeting process, to include SOtargeting. The board consists of members of theCINC’s staff and representatives of each subordinatecommand. The JTB ensures the effective employ-ment of all theater-level deep surveillance and attackresources. With regard to SOF, the JTB —

Establishes SO targeting objectives and prioritiesbased on the CINC’s SO targeting guidance andconcept of SOF employment.Receives, consolidates, deconflicts, and priori-tizes SO target nominations from subordinateforce commanders, to include the SOC com-mander and, if necessary, from supported alliedforce commanders.

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Tasks the SOC to assess, plan, and/or execute themission.Determines support requirements and tasks appropriate agencies to support the mission.Tasks the service intelligence production agencies(IPAs) through their respective components tosupport the targeting process.

When a target, a target system, or an objective areais nominated for attack by a SOF unit, the JTBforwards the nomination in a mission tasking package(MTP) to the SOC target panel. The MTP includestarget identity and location, desired results, and allavailable intelligence (Figure 7-2).

The SOC target panel designates the appropriateSOF unit as the mission planning agent (MPA) forthe nominated mission. In SF, the MPA is normallythe SF group responsible for the region where thenominated mission is to occur. The SOC target panelforwards the MTP to the MPA to perform a PA.

Upon receipt of the MTP, the SF group plans officerconvenes the group target assessment group (TAG)to assess the SOC mission statement and MICON.If the TAG determines that the nominated mission isa valid SOF target and looks feasible, it developscourses of action (COAs) for further analysis. Basedon the TAG assessment, the SF group commanderissues initial planning guidance and directs the groupstaff to prepare staff estimates for each COA. Thecommander uses the results of this estimate processto determine if the group can execute the missionwith an acceptable degree of risk.

The JTB also forwards the MTP through channels tothe appropriate service IPA. The IPA provides theMPA with any additional intelligence required toperform the PA. As a minimum, the MPA needsimagery, an area study, maps, and OB intelligence toperform a PA.

The group plans officer formalizes the group com-mander’s decision in PA format (Appendix D) andforwards the completed PA through the SOC targetpanel to the SOC commander. He concurs or non-concurs with the PA and forwards it to the JTB forapproval. If the PA determines that the target is validand feasible, the JTB adds the target to the approvedtarget list and assigns it a priority. The JTB then

directs the SOC to prepare a special operationsmission planning folder (SOMPF) for the target.

At the same time that it tasks the SOC to prepare anSOMPF, the JTB also tasks the appropriate serviceIFA to produce a target intelligence package (TIP)that supports the SOMPF. The TIP contains de-tailed information on the target, the operational area,and other aspects of the mission. The MPA cannotcomplete the POE until it receives the TIP. How-ever, TIP and POE development can and should beconcurrent activities to the extent possible.

The SOC commander directs the MPA to prepare aPOE and other appropriate SOF units to preparemission support plans. The SOC directive estab-lishes joint support relationships and designates theMPA as the coordinating authority for the mission.Joint planning sessions between the MPA andsupporting SOF units are essential if they are toproduce quality plans. The scope of the supportedMPA commander’s coordinating authority oversupporting SOF units is prescribed in the SOCdirective. Unless otherwise specified by the SOCdirective, the supported MPA commander has theauthority to exercise general direction of thesupporting effort, as prescribed in JCS Pub O-2.

The MPA prepares the POE (Figure 7-3). Basedon the complexity of the planning requirement, SFcommanders assign actual mission planning respon-sibility to the lowest possible level. An SF battalion,company, or SFOD staff may actually prepare thePOE. As the POE. planners refine the MICON,they develop a detailed list of specific operational,intelligence, and support requirements. The groupstaff forwards requirements beyond organic capa-bilities to the TASOSC or the appropriate supportingSOF unit for inclusion in its mission support plan.The POE planners periodically brief the SF battalionand/or group commander to ensure the planningeffort adheres to his intent. POE developmentconcludes with a formal decision brief to the SF groupcommander. The POE is then finalized and for-warded to the SOC target panel.

Concurrently and in close coordination with theMPA the TASOSC and supporting SOF units pre-pare their mission support plans. Mission supportplans must identify how the supporting unit intendsto meet the requirements identified by the POE

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planners. Depending on the nature of the mission,mission support plans and their annexes include butare not limited to—

Infiltration, resupply, and/or exfiltration.Signal, intelligence, and other combat support.OPSEC and deception.Basing and other CSS.

Upon receipt of the POE and mission support plans,the SOC target panel assembles the SOMPF (Figure7-4) and forwards it to the SOC commander forreview and approval. Once the SOC commanderapproves the SOMPF, he may direct the MPA toconduct a POE capability demonstration. This dem-onstration should simulate the approved POE as

closely as possible, subject to OPSEC and otherlimitations. Following the demonstration, the MPAcorrects identified shortfalls in the POE.

This deliberate targeting process must be modifiedto perform adaptive (time-sensitive) targeting duringcrisis or open hostilities. The key to adaptive target-ing is concurrent activity. Upon receipt of an MTP,the MPA treats it like an alert order under theJoint Operations Planning System (JOPS) crisisaction procedures. The MPA commander issues awarning order to the appropriate subunit and beginsPOE preparation as soon as the PA is complete. (SeeJCS Pub 5-02.4 for a detailed explanation of JOPScrisis action procedures.)

Assignment of Missions commander, he also selects the JSOA for each SFmission (Figure 7-5). Missions range from a specific

and Operational Areas task (such as the attack of a point target) to abroadcontinuing mission-type order (such as the con-

The SOC commander assigns missions to an SF duct of UW in a specified JSOA). Appendix Egroup on the basis of the joint targeting process provides a sample SOC mission letter to an SFdescribed above. In coordination with the group group.

SF Team all team members participate in the mission

Selectionplanning process. Factors influencing his selectionare shown in Figure 7-6.

Once the SOC commander assigns a mission and Special Missionselects the JSOA the base (group or battalion) Requirementscommander selects the SF team to execute themission. The commander should select the team Some SF mission taskings require capabilities thatand/or task organize as early as possible to ensure only certain SFODs have. These capabilities include

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area orientation; language, MFF, and scubaqualification special weapons skills; NBCreconnaissance skills; and specialized clandestinecollection skills.

Criticality or Sensitivityof Mission

Some SF missions may be so critical or sensitive thatthe SF group commander entrusts their executiononly to certain SFODs. Examples of such missionsinclude missions categorized as special activities.

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Situation in the JSOAThe topography, hostile situation, political rivalries,or ethnic or cultural differences within the JSOAmay require that two or more SF teams infiltratesimultaneously to independent sector commands.

Size and Compositionof the Resistance Organization

The SOC and SF group may not know the size andcomposition of the resistance organization. If the size

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of the resistance organization is unknown, a smallassessment or pilot team can infiltrate into the JSOAto establish contact with the resistance organization.The team determines the feasibility of developing thearea’s resistance potential. Once the pilot team hascompleted its area assessment, additional SF teamsmay infiltrate. The pilot team either exfiltrates orremains in the JSOA, as directed.If the resistance organization is known to be small andunorganized, but has the potential for expansion, atailored SFOD A may infiltrate to begin the initialdevelopment of the organization.If the resistance organization is already large andeffective, an SFOD B may infiltrate to coordinateexternal support and to synchronize resistanceactivities with those of the theater CINC.

Task Organizationand Tailoring

Just as conventional units task organize to performspecific missions, SF commanders also task organize

their SFODs in response to mission requirements.Some missions may require multiple SFODs underthe control of an SF company headquarters. Othersmay require a mix of skills not found in an integralSFOD. SF commanders can tailor their SFODswhen an integral SFOD is not the optimalorganization to perform a mission. They have twomeans of tailoring their SFODs: split teams andcomposite teams.The SFOD can divide into two operational ele-ments called split teams, each capable of conductingsustained operations on a reduced scale. The em–ployment of split teams is appropriate when–

The assigned mission does not require com–mitment of a complete SFOD.The hostile situation does not permit operationsby a complete SFOD.A change in situation requires a deployed SFODto split and execute an additional mission.

Certain SF missions require the organization ofcomposite teams drawing individual soldiers from

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established SFODs (or from outside the SF group) commander must balance mission requirementsto obtain the proper mix of skills and experience against the effects on unit morale, readiness, andneeded to execute the mission. The group OPSEC before organizing composite teams.

Support andSustainment Planning

ProcessOnce an SF group commander receives the SOCmission letter, his staff prepares a statement ofrequirements (SOR). The SOR consolidates andprioritizes all group requirements that exceed itsorganic capabilities. A complete SOR addresses indetail all aspects of CS and CSS, to include–

Logistics, including supply, services, mainte-nance, and transportaion.

Soldier support, including personnel services,legal services, finance services, postal services,and religious support.

Health service support.Intelligence and CI support.

Base defense, including NBC defense, air de-fense coverage, and MP support.Signal support, including frequency andCOMSEC requirements.General aviation support.Engineer support, including real estate, realproperty maintenance activities, base develop-ment, and construction of training and rehearsalsites.Sustainment training of uncommitted SF teams.CA and PSYOP support.

The group S3 forwards the SOR to the TASOSCdirector of plans and operations (DPO) for action.Based on guidance from the SOC, the TASOSCDPO validates, consolidates, and prioritizes theSORs of all theater ARSOF. The TASOSC staffthen plans and coordinates with the appropriatetheater and TA organizations to ensure that allmission-essential requirements can be met.

Deliberate MissionPlanning Process

plan. They must anticipate the unexpected andremain agile enough to modify their plans as requiredto achieve their higher commanders’ intent.

Based on the SOC commander’s MTP and other Deliberate SF targeting and mission planning re-mission guidance, SF commanders conduct their own quire days or weeks to complete an adequate IPBmission planning process. The objective of this and to prepare for commitment of an SF team.process is to develop a comprehensive plan with Team members must understand the political, social,contingency options that provide flexible execution. economic, and military situation in the JSOA. TheySF commanders must not tie themselves to a rigid must know the ethnic groups, customs, taboos,

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religions, and other essential data that could affectmission execution. The SF team can best achieve thislevel of area orientation through intensive area studybefore commitment.

Based on this planning process, SF group andbattalion commanders provide their subordinatecommanders with mission letters. These missionletters focus SF planning and training effortsbefore commitment. Appendixes E, F, and G providesample SF mission letters.

MYTH: An SFOD can maintain proficiency inall SF missions.

FACT: An SF group can conduct all fiveSF missions simultaneously, but anSFOD must focus its training on nomore than two SF missions at thesame time. SF commanders mustprioritize mission requirements anddevelop mission-essential task lists(METLs) that translate into realisticmission letters for their SFODs.

When the SOC receives an actual mission tasking,the SOC commander determines whether an existingSOMPF can be updated or modified to execute themission. If no SOMPF exists for the mission, theSOC commander must begin the time-sensitivemission planning process. In either case, he issuesan alert or execute order to the SF group com-mander and the appropriate supporting commanders(Figure 7-7a).

Based on the MTP or SOMPF he has been directedto execute, the SF group commander either retainsthe mission at group level or assigns the mission to asubordinate battalion commander for execution(Figure 7-7b). The appropriate commander thenselects an SF team to plan and execute the mission.

Upon selection to execute a mission, the SF team iscommitted. It moves into an ISOFAC, receives itsOPORD and mission briefing, and begins missionpreparation (Figure 7-8). All SF OPLANs andOPORDs use the JOPS format to facilitate joint co-ordination of support requirements. In the missionbriefing, the base commander and his staff providethe mission statement, the supported commander’sintent, and sufficient information to allow the SF

team to complete its detailed mission planning. TheSF team normally receives this information in anSOMPF before the mission briefing. Team memberscan then review the OPORD and SOMPF andprepare questions before the briefing.

At the end of the mission briefing, the ISOFACcommander and the AST NCOs provide the SFteam with a proposed isolation schedule and a listof requirements already requested and/or providedfor the team. These requirements may include–

Ranges.Training facilities.Rehearsal sites.Updated intelligence products.Air items.Accompanying supplies.Items for emergency resupply.Mission-peculiar equipment.Isolation expendable available to supplement theteam’s isolation kit.

Based on the base commander’s mission analysis, theSF team is given sufficient time to—

Continue area studies.Receive operational intelligence briefings.Refine the POE based on the actual situation.Conduct any required specialized training.Request and receive specialized mission-peculiarequipment.Rehearse its activities.Resolve legal or policy issues concerning themission.Commit the details of the mission to memory.Prepare a written OPORD.Prepare individual and team equipment for infil-tration.

Given a complete SOMPF, a committed SF teamneeds at least 96 hours to do the tasks listed above(Figure 7-9). The team must refine the MICONbased on the actual situation. It must then submitmission support requests to confirm or revise allsupport and sustainment requirements not alreadytoploaded by the ISOFAC staff and AST NCOs.The AST NCOs facilitate the coordination that mustoccur to ensure team requirements are properlyidentified and met.

About halfway through mission preparation, theSF team commander provides the base commander

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with a short and informal MICON brief to ensurehis team’s planning efforts meet the supportedcommander’s intent. At the MICON brief, the SFcommander presents employment options with arecommendation as to which option the base com-mander should approve.When mission planning is completed, the SF teamgives the base commander and his staff a missionbriefback. Appendix H provides a briefback check-list. The mission briefback seines three functions.It–

Ensures the team fully understands all aspects ofthe mission.Convinces the base commander that the SFteam is ready to deploy and execute its mission.Allows the base commander and his staff torecommend changes to the plan if required.

Before the mission briefback, the base commanderand his staff review the SF team’s OPORD and

prepare appropriate questions and other briefbacknotes. During this review, the base commanderand his staff ensure that air missions, operationalproject stocks, radio frequencies and all othersupport and sustainment requirements have beenconfirmed with the supporting organizations.After the formal briefback, the base commander mayconduct an unmarked map exercise to ensure thatteam members have committed to memory allpertinent mission information. He may also re-quire a dress rehearsal of critical mission events.After the mission briefback, the SF team needs timeto modify its plan as directed and prepare itsaccompanying supplies and equipment for infil-tration. It also needs at least 8 hours of uninterruptedrest between mission preparation and infiltration.When the base commander decides that the SF teamis ready, he moves it to a staging area for sub-sequent infiltration.

Time-Sensitive MissionPlanning Process

When preparing for an SF mission, time may be acritical factor. A time-sensitive mission may alsoimpose time constraints on planning and othermission preparation, particularly if no SOMPF ex-ists for the mission. Time is a significant factorbecause the success of the mission depends largely

on the quality of mission preparation. If there is notenough time for normal preparation, the SF basecommander determines minimum essential prepara-tion tasks. He then modifies the deliberate missionplanning process to do those tasks in the timeavailable (Figure 7-10). The SF base commandermust inform the SOC or the JSOTF commanderwhen he cannot accomplish these minimum es-sential tasks without an unacceptable degree of riskof mission failure.

Planning SFOB commander must consider the following

Considerationsfactors during initial mission planning:

Mode of employment (for example, low visibility

The organization, training, and equipment of an SF or clandestine).

team varies with the actual mission. The FOB or Method of infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration.

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Scope and duration of operation.Operational environment (permissive, semiper-missive, or nonpermissive).Availability of indigenous support mechanisms.Communications requirements based upon theelectronic threat, time sensitivity of transmission,and environmental conditions.Collection means (visual observation, photogra-phy, surreptitious entry, technical surveillance).Rules of engagement and other legal or policyconsiderations related to the mission.Cover (as required).

The use of foreign or commercial materiel, tactics,and techniques may permit the deployed SF teamto pass a cursory visual inspection by a hostileobserver, to avoid electronic identification, and toprevent identification by weapons signature. SFmissions may require procurement and use of foreignor commercial—

Weapons.Communications equipment.Clothing.Rations.

Maps.Other specialized items.

Other specialized materiel requirements may in-clude—

SATCOM and other specialized communicationsequipment.Suppressed weapons.Specialized equipment for collecting information,such as telescopes, night vision devices, elec-tronic surveillance and direction findingequipment, surreptitious entry devices, andremote sensor systems.Terminal guidance equipment, such as radartransponders and laser target designators.NBC defensive clothing or equipment.

The group commander must identify his contin-gency requirements for such equipment. He mustcoordinate with the TASOSC to procure sufficientquantities to properly train each SFOD in the equip-ment’s use and repair before the SFOD is committed.

All equipment that could indicate the nature oroperational area of the mission receives the samesecurity classification as the mission itself.

OperationsSecurity

OPSEC is a command responsibility. It must be anintegral part of every SF mission, to include plan-ning, training, preparation, and support activities.

The S3 provides staff supervision for OPSEC.OPSEC consists of signal security, physical security,and information security. All are interrelated; allmust be considered simultaneously.

Signal security protects operational information byimplementing communications security (for exam-ple, communications codes, secure voice equipment,

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communications procedures) and electronics security(for example, radio silence and antenna positioning).Physical security protects operational information oractivity by using security forces, barriers, sensors, andsecure containers to deny or limit access to facilities,areas, materiel, documents, or personnel.Information security prevents disclosure of opera-tional information by restricting access to or therelease of written, verbal, graphic, or electronicinformation.The commander must designate essential elementsof friendly information (EEFI). He must thenenforce appropriate OPSEC measures to protectthose EEFI from threats identified in the CIvulnerability analysis.

DeceptionDeception purposely misleads hostile decision mak-ers by distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicatorsof friendly intentions, capabilities, or disposition.Deception is employed in concert with OPSEC tomask friendly activity.

The SF commander and his S3 must incorporatedeception into every SF operation. They determinethe deception objective, deception target, anddeception story at the same time they develop theirconcept for the actual operation. The deceptionobjective is the desired hostile activity-what the SFcommander wants the hostile force to do. Thedeception target is the hostile commander who hasthe authority to direct that activity. The deceptionstory is the perception of friendly activity that willcause the deception target to react as desired. For

example, the deception objective for an SF DAmission may be for a hostile commander to delaycommitment of his reaction force until after the SFteam has successfully withdrawn. The deception storymight be that a feint conducted in a secondarysector by an indigenous resistance element underthe control of another SF team is in fact the mainattack.

The S3 and S2 OPSEC personnel determine whatdeception measures will portray friendly capabilitiesand intentions in such a way that the hostilecommander will conclude that the deception story istrue. Examples of deception measures includecamouflage, smoke, ruses, feints, decoys, and dem-onstrations. Complete deception is not alwaysnecessary. It is often sufficient to create merelyan element of doubt in the mind of the deceptiontarget, thereby delaying his reactions.

PsychologicalImpact

In addition to developing deception plans for eachSF operation, SF commanders must consider thepsychological impact of each SF operation. If themission is to receive minimum publicity and operatewith low visibility, SF commanders must assess thepotential impact should the operation be exposedin a negative and sensational manner. If the negative

impact of failure outweighs the potential positivegain, the mission should be canceled. If the missionmust still be conducted, a cover story should bedeveloped to minimize embarrassment to keyfriendly personnel and countries. If an SF operationis designed to receive public recognition and openlyproject US interest and involvement in a country orsituation, SF commanders and their PSYOP advisorsmust determine how best to portray the event. Theymust also determine what media means are capableof extracting maximum advantage without over-playing US involvement.

SF Teams in anNBC Environment

commander makes a risk assessment based on thelevel of NBC threat and his commander’s planningguidance. During the risk assessment, the SF teamcommander weighs the danger posed by NBC attacks

A critical factor in the mission planning process is the against the increased burden caused by the weightdegree of NBC threat in the JSOA. The SF team and bulk of the NBC gear to be carried. For example,

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the weight of a protective mask may mean one less foot-mobile and carry all essential equipment withradio battery can be carried. The base NBC officer them. Therefore, extended wear of chemical protec-assists in considering such tradeoffs. tive clothing is unacceptable in most circumstances.

Deployed SF teams in remote and denied areas havethe same NBC defensive requirements as conven-tional units. However, a number of factors greatlycomplicate their ability to survive and operate underNBC conditions. The physical and psychologicaleffects of NBC weapons can be overcome, but onlyif SF commanders and soldiers plan for the NBCthreat in their operational areas and adjust theirtraining and operations accordingly. Deployed SFteams must modify conventional NBC defensivemeasures because they—

Do not have organic NBC defense specialists.Are not supported by NBC defense units.Have limited or no capability to replace con-taminated clothing or equipment.Can only use man-portable NBC defensiveequipment.May need to train and equip indigenous forces.Cannot easily retaliate in kind if targeted.

The principles of NBC defense are contaminationavoidance, protection, and decontamination. Con-tamination avoidance is even more important for SFteams than it is for conventional units. DeployedSF teams and their indigenous forces are normally

SF teams operating with indigenous forces indenied areas in an NBC environment must ensurethat NBC protective equipment is available to thoseforces. Possible sources of supply include battle-field capture of protective equipment, localmanufacture of expedient protective equipment, andresupply from the SFOB or FOB. The SF teamsmust also train indigenous forces in the use ofavailable NBC defensive equipment.

Deployed SF teams decontaminate to preventcasualties and enhance combat effectiveness. Theirmajor concern is the decontamination of personneland individual equipment. Decontamination meansinclude the standard US individual decontamina-tion kit, captured decontamination equipment, andlocally squired field-expedient decontaminants.Team personnel with specialized NBC trainingsupervise decontamination and use NBC monitoringdevices to ensure its completeness.

Evacuation of NBC (and other) casualties fromdenied areas may be impossible. SF medical ser-geants must be trained to recognize the nature andseverity of NBC injuries and to administerappropriate medical treatment within the opera-tional area.

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Infiltration and exfiltration planning is critical in SF operations. The sophisticated techniques andequipment available require detailed planning and coordination. This chapter discusses the basicconsiderations for air, water, and land infiltration and exfiltration. Although it discusses air, water, and landdelivery separately, some missions may require a combination of means. (For detailed techniques andprocedures, see TCs 31-19, 31-24, 31-25, and 57-1.) Mission planners should not feel constrained bythe means mentioned in this chapter. SF teams can infiltrate or exfiltrate by any means–no matter howunorthodox – as long as it offers a reasonable chance of success.

MYTH: We can get you in, but we’re not surewe can get you out.

FACT: SF teams are not expendable anddo not stay in denied territory forever.SF operations pass through threestages during the employmentphase–infiltration, mission execution,and exfiltration. Exfiltration mustreceive the same planning emphasisas infiltration.

PlanningConsiderations

Infiltration and exfiltration are almost always jointactivities. SF does not perform its own air or waterinfiltration and exfiltration planning. Mission plan-ners from the agencies providing the delivery orrecovery means must be brought into the planningprocess as early as possible. Successful infiltrationand exfiltration require—

Timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence.Detailed mission planning and coordination.

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Flexible mission planning that addresses theunexpected.Adequate preparation, training, and rehearsals.OPSEC.Precise execution.

The FOB or SFOB commander considers thefollowing factors when determining the mostdesirable method of infiltration or exfiltration for

a particular mission:Mission requirements, to include quantity andtypes of accompanying equipment and supplies.Hostile force capabilities.Train, weather, hydrography, and light data.Distance to the objective area.SF team capabilities.Capabilities of available delivery or recoverymeans.

Air Infiltration

Air infiltration is the most rapid means of clandes-tine infiltration. Techniques include static-line or

free-fall parachute entry and air-land operationsby fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. Rappel,fastrope, and hoist operations are also techniquesfor air infiltration. See Figure 8-1 for the advan-tages and disadvantages of air infiltration.

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Water Infiltration

Up to the point of debarkation, water infiltration isthe most secure and economical means of clandestinepenetration. SF water infiltration means include—

Water landing by freed-wing amphibious aircraftor properly prepared helicopters.Free drop from hovering helicopters.

Surface and subsurface swimming.Small boats.

SF teams use various combinations of these deliverymeans and techniques to create deception, to in-crease the range of the mission, or to decrease thetime required for transit. Naval aircraft, surface craft,and submarines may serve as intermediate deliveryvehicles to support water infiltration. SF may alsouse inland waterways (canals, lakes, rivers) in con-junction with land infiltration. See Figure 8-2 for theadvantages and disadvantages of water infiltration.

Land Infiltration infiltrate on foot or by land vehicle when the hostilesituation, geographic characteristics, or climate con-ditions prevent air or water infiltration. Overland

Land infiltration in wartime is usually the least desir- movement in wartime is best done under conditionsable means of clandestine penetration. SF teams of limited visibility and over difficult terrain. It has

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the greatest chance for success when hostile lines areoverextended, the combat zone is fluid, or portions ofthe country’s borders are inadequately secured. Onthe other hand, a well-organized defense mayprohibit land infiltration. See Figure 8-3 foradvantages and disadvantages of land infiltration.

In conflict situations short of war, land infiltrationmay offer less risk and greater mission security thanair infiltration. Personnel with appropriate cover,language skills, and cultural training can infiltrate byrail, vehicle, or commercial air for legitimate appear-ing business or personal reasons.

En Route Evasionand Escape Plan

The SF team commander and the delivery or recoveryvehicle commander are jointly responsible for devel-oping an en route E&E plan. The plan must enhancethe survivability of the SF team and crew membersafter emergency evacuation of the aircraft or vessel.Each mission presents its own peculiar problems.Commanders should develop their plan according towhere the emergency occurs. If it occurs—

In friendly territory, the planningmaintaining mission OPSEC.

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focus is on

In denied territory, the planning focus is on re-turning to friendly control.In proximity to the objective area, the planningfocus is on permitting the SF team to continue itsmission if it has a reasonable chance of success.

The plan must address C2 during evasion. The SFteam commander determines whether he can con-tinue the mission. If he can continue the mission, heassumes command of all survivors, regardless of rank,and senior aircrew members consider themselvesunder his control for assisted E&E. If the SF teamcannot continue the mission, then the senior rankingsurvivor assumes command for unassisted E&E. Ifthe senior ranking survivor is an aircrew member, heshould rely on the SF team commander for E&Eadvice and assistance.

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ExfiltrationThe planning considerations, preparations, tactics,and techniques for exfiltration are similar to thoseused for infiltration. However, several unique recov-ery means must be considered:

Fulton recovery system (MC-130).STABO and similar rotary-wing personnel ex-traction systems.Helicopter rescue hoist.Assisted E&E.

When SF operations are conducted deep in hostile ordenied areas, the distance to the JSOA normallyprecludes an all-land exfiltration. The initial phase ofthe exfiltration will normally be by land, terminatingin an air or water recovery. Aircraft, surface craft,submarines, or various combinations of these threemeans can be used for the recovery of—

Seriously ill or wounded SF personnel.SF teams following mission completion or abort.SF teams under direct hostile pressure.

Stay-Behind Operations These operations—Permit the SF teams to organize and train the

As an alternative to infiltration, stay-behind opera-resistance cadre or to prepare for unilateral SFoperations.

tions involve the pre-positioning of SF teams within Require less external support because caching istheir proposed JSOA before hostile forces overrun or possible.occupy the area. (See TC 31-29 for a detailed discus- Are highly vulnerable to compromise beforesion of stay-behind operations.) hostilities begin.

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UW is the most challenging of all SF missions because it involves protracted operations with indigenousforces in denied territory. Building rapport with and adapting to the ways of an indigenous resistanceorganization require carefully planned and carefully executed actions. This chapter focuses on the doc-trinal considerations for planning and executing such actions.

Resistance andInsurgency

A government’s inability or unwillingness to meetthe legitimate needs of its people may result inpopular frustration and dissatisfaction. People maylose their faith and confidence because the govern-ment lacks legitimacy. They may also simplyrecognize that the government is incapable ofeffectively providing internal security and devel-opment. (See JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20 fordetailed discussions of the nature of insurgency.)The following factors are important in explaining

why people resist their established government oran occupying power:

The people’s attitudes concerning the conditions.The nation’s political and cultural traditions,to include its experience with political violence.The degree of political participation by thepopulace.

Resistance may be either nonviolent or violent.Nonviolent resistance involves acts such as ostracism,tax evasion, boycotts, strikes, or civil disobedience.Violent resistance includes sabotage, terrorism, andguerrilla warfare. People usually resist nonviolentlyat first. However, they may willingly take up violent

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resistance if a subversive cadre provides them a causethey perceive to be both worthy and achievable.If the sociopolitical conditions are oppressiveenough, resistance may develop into an organizedresistance movement. A resistance movement is anorganized effort by some portion of the civil popu-lation of a country to oppose or overthrow theestablished government or cause the withdrawal of anoccupying power. The center of gravity in anyresistance movement is the people’s will to resist.The people bear the brunt of the establishedauthority’s retaliatory measures. While armedresistance may be LIC from the US perspective, itis total war for those who take up arms. Defeatmeans death or a life in exile.An insurgency is an organized resistance movementthat uses subversion and armed conflict to achieve itsaims. The central issues in an insurgency are controland legitimacy. An insurgency is a protractedpolitico-military struggle designed to weaken gov-ernment control and legitimacy while increasinginsurgent control and legitimacy.Each insurgency has its own unique characteristicsbased on its strategic objectives, its operationalenvironment, and available resources. Revolutionary

insurgences seek to overthrow the existing socialorder and reallocate power within the country.Other insurgences seek to–

Overthrow an established government withouta follow-on social revolution.Establish an autonomous national territorywithin the borders of a state.Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.Extract political concessions that are unob-tainable through less violent means.

An insurgency often results from a government’s un-willingness or inability to address social ills or thegrievances of its people. However, an effectiveinsurgent cadre with sufficient external support canmobilize causes as it does people and material re-sources. Few countries are stable and progressiveenough to withstand a concerted effort directedagainst its most vulnerable weaknesses.A resistance movement may also oppose anestablished government or occupying power withinthe context of a limited or general war. In thissituation, conventional military power will usually bethe decisive factor. UW operational objectives con-tribute to overall strategic success by supporting andcomplementing conventional military operations.

Three Phasesof an Insurgency

A successful insurgency generally passes throughthree phases. These phases often overlap. An in-surgency may move back and forth from one phase toanother in response to the counterinsurgent effortmade against it. Nevertheless, it is useful to view aninsurgency in terms of these phases.

Phase I

Phase I, latent or incipient insurgency, is the phasein which the resistance leadership develops the

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resistance movement into an effective clandestineorganization. The resistance organization employs avariety of subversive techniques to prepare the popu-lation psychologically to resist. These techniques mayinclude propaganda, demonstrations, boycotts, andsabotage. Subversive activities frequently occur in anorganized pattern, but there is no major outbreak ofarmed violence. In the advanced stages of this phase,the resistance organization may establish a shadowgovernment that parallels the established authority.During this phase, the resistance leadership (Figure9-1)–

Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres.Infiltrates key government organizations and civilgroups.

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Establishes cellular intelligence, operational,and support networks.Organizes or develops cooperative relationshipswith legitimate political action groups, youthgroups, trade unions, and other front orga-nizations to develop popular support for laterpolitical and military activities.Solicits and otherwise obtains funds.Develops sources of external support.

Phase IIPhase II, guerrilla warfare, begins with overt guerrillaactivity. The guerrillas in a rural-based insurgencynormally operate from relatively secure base areas inan insurgent-controlled territory. In an urban-basedinsurgency, the guerrillas operate clandestinely usinga cellular organization to maintain OPSEC. Ineither situation, subversive activities continue. Clan-destine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphletsopenly challenge the control and legitimacy ofestablished authority. Recruiting efforts expand asthe people lose faith in the established authority anddecide to actively resist it.

Phase III

Phase III, mobile warfare or war of movement,begins with the transition from GW to conventionalmilitary operations. If successful, this phase bringsabout the final collapse of the establishedgovernment or the withdrawal of the occupyingpower. Without direct intervention, a Phase IIIinsurgency takes on the characteristics of a civil war.The resistance organization may achieve legalbelligerent status. The resistance leadership becomesresponsible for the population, resources andterritory under its control. Specific actions includeestablishing an effective civil administration,providing balanced social and economic develop-ment, mobilizing the population to support theresistance organization, and protecting the popu-lation from hostile actions. In a limited or generalwar, conventional military forces may link up withthe resistance organization and conduct the war ofmovement. In either case, Phase I and II activitiescontinue and expand. If Phase III succeeds, theresistance organization begins posthostility consoli-dation activities. If it fails, the resistance organizationreverts to Phase II or even Phase I.

ResistanceOrganization

Armed resistance requires an organization to beeffective. A resistance organization includes bothoperational and support elements. The operationalelements of a resistance organization belong to theguerrilla force and the underground. The auxiliary isthe clandestine support element.The guerrilla force is the overt military or para-military arm of the resistance organization. Theguerrilla force conducts low-visibility combat opera-tions. It is normally rural-based. Its members may befull-time or part-time.The underground is a cellular organization that con-ducts clandestine subversion, sabotage, E&E, andintelligence collection activities. It may be rural-or

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urban-based and has its own clandestine supportorganization. This support organization can be urbanor rural.The auxiliary is the clandestine support element ofthe guerrilla force. Like the underground, theauxiliary is a cellular organization and can be rural-or urban-based. Auxiliary functions include—

Security and early warning.Intelligence collection.Counterintelligence.Recruitment of new personnel.Air or maritime reception support.Communications.Psychological operations.Populace and resources control.Support of evasion and escape mechanisms.Internal logistical and medical support.Fund raising.

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Classic UW doctrine distinguishes between a guer- clear distinction between a guerrilla force and anrills force and an underground. However, classic underground. Some modern insurgences, like therural insurgency is no longer the norm for Tupomaros in Uruguay and the Monteneros incontemporary political violence. There may be no Argentina, operated only in urban areas.

Seven Phases ofUS-Sponsored UW

The United States cannot afford to ignore theresistance potential that exists in the territories of itspotential enemies. In a conflict situation or duringwar, SF can develop this potential into an organizedresistance movement capable of significantly ad-vancing US interests. The strategic politico-militaryobjective of wartime UW is normally to influenceconventional military operations. In conflict, how-ever, the objectives may range from interdictingforeign intervention in another country, to opposingthe consolidation of a new hostile regime, to actuallyoverthrowing such a regime.

In a wartime resistance movement directed againstan occupying power, the critical-cell strategy (seeChapter 2) may be appropriate. Little politicalorganization is needed if the occupying power hasnot yet consolidated its gains and has mistreatedor alienated the civilian populace. However, thecritical-cell strategy has little chance of successagainst an indigenous communist government thathas consolidated its power. The mass-orientedstrategy is more likely to succeed against such anestablished government, but only if the resistanceorganization offers the population a credible alter-native to communist rule.

When directed, SF supports selected resistanceorganizations that enhance US national interests.In wartime, SF teams infiltrate hostile areas toorganize, train, equip, and advise or direct anindigenous resistance organization. In conflictsituations where direct US military involvement isinappropriate, SF teams may instead provide indirectsupport from an external location.

Although each resistance movement is unique, theUS sponsorship of a resistance organization gen-erally passes through seven phases. These sevenphases may not occur sequentially or receive thesame degree of emphasis. They may occur con-currently or not at all, depending on the specificsituation. For example, SF support to a large andeffective resistance organization may be limited toproviding logistical support. Nevertheless, describ-ing UW in terms of the seven phases improvesunderstanding of the mission. See Figure 9-2.

Psychological Preparation

The US government begins PSYOP as far in advanceas possible. PSYOP prepare the resistance organi-zation and the civil population of a potential UWoperational area to accept US sponsorship and thesubsequent assistance of SF teams. The USgovernment may accomplish this psychologicalpreparation through radio broadcasts, undergroundpropaganda, or the insertion of US-sponsoredclandestine resistance organizers. The population ofa recently occupied country may already be pre-pared to accept US sponsorship, particularly if thecountry was a US friend orally before its occupation.In other cases, psychological preparation may bemore difficult. Normal peacetime contacts betweenSF and indigenous elements contribute to thepsychological preparation of allied and friendlypopulations.

Initial Contact

Other agencies of the US government normallyestablish contact with a resistance organizationbefore an SF team infiltrates into the operationalarea to conduct UW. Contact is important to assessresistance potential in the operational area and thecompatibility of US and resistance interests and

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objectives. During the initial contact, arrange- should arrange to exfiltrate a resistance leader fromments are made for the reception and initial the operational area to brief the SF team in theassistance of the SF team. If possible, the SOC ISOFAC and accompany it during infiltration. This

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person is known as an asset. The lack of an asset doesnot prevent infiltration of an assessment team tomake the initial contact and assess the situation in thepotential operational area.

InfiltrationDuring this phase, an SF team, with its accompany-ing supplies, clandestinely infiltrates into the JSOA.The team makes contact with the resistanceorganization, establishes initial communications withthe FOB, and moves to the guerrilla base oranother secure location. Immediately upon infil-tration, the SF team begins a continuous areaassessment to confirm or refute information receivedbefore infiltration.

Organization

The SF team begins to establish rapport with theresistance leadership by showing an understandingof, confidence in, and concern for the resistanceorganization and its cause. The SF team explainsits capabilities and limitations and begins to assist theresistance leadership with the development of theresistance organization. The SF team must thenprove its value in actual operations. Building rap-port is a difficult and complicated process based onmutual trust, confidence, and understanding. It is notaccomplished overnight. (See page 9-11, SF-Resistance Relationships.)Before a resistance organization can successfullyengage in combat operations, the resistance leader-ship must organize an infrastructure that can sustainitself in combat and withstand the anticipated hostilereaction to armed resistance. During the organizationphase, the resistance leadership develops a resis-tance cadre to serve as the organizational nucleusduring the buildup phase. The SF team assists theresistance leadership in conducting a cadre trainingprogram to prepare for the eventual buildup of theresistance organization.

The resistance leader and SF team commander mustagree upon C2 arrangements. SF team membersnormally advise and assist counterpart resistanceleaders. In some situations SF team members mayactually direct some resistance activities.

The specifics of resistance organization depend onlocal conditions. UW requires centralized directionand decentralized execution under conditions that

place great demands on the resistance organizationand its leadership. Armed rebellion inherentlycreates an ambiguous and unstructured environment.No two resistance organizations need the samedegree or level of organization. The SF teamcommander should consider the following factorswhen advising the resistance leadership concerningorganization:

Effectiveness of existing resistance organization.Extent of cooperation between the resistanceorganization and the local population.Hostile activity and security measures.Political boundaries, natural terrain features,potential targets, population density, and othercharacteristics of the JSOA.Religious, ethnic, political, and ideologicaldifferences among elements of the populationand competing resistance organizations.Proposed type and scope of combat operations.Degree of US influence with the resistance orga-nization.

The C2 structure of the resistance organization mustprovide unity of effort. An area command is acombined (indigenous and SF) C2 structure thatdirects, controls, integrates, and supports all resis-tance activities in the operational area. The areacommander is the indigenous resistance leader.The size and composition of the area command varywith the considerations listed above. The areacommand is compartmented but should includerepresentatives from each resistance element. TheSF team commander serves as an advisor to the areacommand. A large area command may establishsubordinate regional, district, or sector commandsto provide a mechanism for centralized planningand decentralized execution. See Figure 9-3 foran example of a highly structured resistanceorganization reporting to a national government-in-exile. There may not be such a political struc-ture in existence. There may instead be a shadowgovernment in the country itself, or the politicalbasis for the resistance movement may be a looseconfederation of tribal or national groups withinthe country.An area command establishes an area complexto support resistance activities. The area complex isa clandestine, dispersed, and flexible network offacilities. It usually includes security, intelligence,and CI systems; communication systems; reception

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sites; logistical and medical facilities; training areas;guerrilla bases; and mission support sites (MSSs).

A guerrilla base is a temporary installation locatedin remote or resistance-controlled territory to sup-port the guerrilla force. A base can be large or small,elaborate or simple. Bases are usually scattered,inconspicuous, and well-hidden in inaccessible ter-rain. Clandestine LOC link the guerrilla bases toeach other and to their support. Despite anyimpression of permanence, guerrilla bases musthave at least one good escape route and analternate location to use when hostile forcesthreaten the primary base. Guerrilla bases must alsohave early warning and defense mechanisms toprevent hostile forces from surprising them and to

provide opportunities for the guerrillas to executetheir escape plan.An MSS is a relatively secure site that extendsthe operational radius of the guerrilla force. Theguerrilla force occupies an MSS, seldom for longerthan 24 hours, before or after an operation. Theguerrilla force uses it to prepare for or recover fromcombat operations. When possible, the guerrillaforce keeps the MSS under surveillance at least 24hours before and after use.The organization of the guerrilla force cannot befixed according to standard, conventional TOEs.Guerrilla force missions and tactics dictate a simple,mobile, and flexible organization capable of rapiddispersion and consolidation in response to the

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tactical situation. Each unit must be self-contained,with its own intelligence, communications, and logis-tical systems.

Guerrilla organization normally determines auxiliaryorganization. All auxiliary functions should be com-partmented from each other and from the guerrillaforce the auxiliary supports.

Buildup

During the buildup phase, the resistance cadreexpands into an effective organization capable ofsuccessful combat employment. The resistance cadrerecruits and trains new members. It organizes andequips new nets and guerrilla units. OPSEC is par-ticularly important because the influx of new recruitsgreatly increases the likelihood of compromise.

The resistance organization may conduct limitedoffensive combat operations to gain confidence andconfuse or harass the hostile power. However, theemphasis remains on developing the resistanceinfrastructure to support future operations. TheSF team assists with intelligence collection andtarey analysis. It also advises and assists withresistance logistics activities.

The resistance organization should not expandbeyond the point of effectiveness or for the sakeof sheer numbers. The SF team commander mustmonitor resistance recruiting to ensure that theresistance organization is not using SF support toprepare for a posthostilities conflict that is not in theUS interest. He must carefully balance the compet-ing demands of size and effectiveness against hismission requirements.

Combat Employment

During this phase, the resistance organizationinitiates combat operations to achieve its strategicpolitico-military objectives. The resistance organi-zation synchronizes these combat operations withPSYOP and subversive activities for maximumeffect. Resistance forces may conduct moreconventional military operations as the situationpermits, or they may revert to the buildup phaseif the hostile reaction warrants this withdrawal.The SF team commander ensures that resistanceactivities continue to support the objectives of the

US unified commander, but he must recognize thatresistance objectives will rarely be identical to thoseof the United States.Interdiction is the basic UW combat activity. In-terdiction operations drain the hostile power’smorale and resources, disrupt its administration,and maintain the civilian population’s morale and willto resist. By repeatedly attacking multiple andwidely dispersed targets, the resistance organizationconfuses, frustrates, and demoralizes hostile forces.Such attacks force the hostile power to divide itsreaction and reinforcement capabilities.The resistance organization should not attack targetsindiscriminately. Each target should contribute todestroying or neutralizing an entire target system.Interdiction is based on the assigned mission whichdirects, as a minimum, the results desired and thepriorities for attack. Based on this mission, the areacommander selects the specific target systems in hisoperational area. Major target systems vulnerable toUW interdiction operations include railway, highway,waterway, airway, communication, power, water sup-ply, fuel supply, and air defense systems. (See TC31-29 for a detailed discussion on target systems.)The resistance organization’s principal means ofinterdiction are raids, ambushes, and mining andsniping operations. Resistance forces can use miningand sniping alone to interdict LOC and hinderhostile repair efforts after a successful raid orambush. Mining and sniping can also support raidsand ambushes by—

Preventing the escape of hostile troops fromthe objective area.Covering the friendly force’s withdrawal.Delaying hostile reaction and reinforcementefforts.

In addition to combat operations, the resistanceorganization continues to collect, process, anddisseminate intelligence. Accurate, timely intelli-gence is essential. Before each combat operation,the resistance organization supplements its normalintelligence activities with an intensive effort tocollect detailed information on the specific targetand the objective area. This effort includes con-tinuous surveillance of the objective area withoutalerting the hostile power of friendly intentions.

The resistance organization’s intelligence systemmay also respond to external taskings from the

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government-in-exile and/or the theater CINC.When the SF team receives an intelligence collec-tion mission, it may request that the resistanceintelligence system execute the mission. If security orpolicy considerations preclude resistance participa-tion, the SF team conducts the mission unilaterally.

If the theater CINC initiates conventional militaryoperations in the operational area, the SF teamcommander closely coordinates resistance activitiesto complement and support those operations. Exam-ples of this coordination include—

Integrating resistance combat operations into thetheater campaign plan.Coordinating resistance target acquisition andterminal guidance missions in support of theaterinterdiction operations.Ensuring resistance intelligence collection effortssupport the theater intelligence collection plan.Ensuring resistance E&E, sabotage, and subver-sive activities further the objectives of both theresistance organization and the theater CINC.

Depending on its stage of development, the SF-supported resistance organization may be able toperform the following combat missions to supportconventional military operations

Conduct deception and economy of force opera-tions to allow the conventional commander toconcentrate his combat power elsewhere.Attack hostile air defense and deep attackweapon systems to support the conventionalcommander’s fire suppression plan.Interdict or block approach routes or exit routesfrom an objective area.Occupy and hold key terrain features or facili-ties for a limited time to support the conventionalforce’s scheme of maneuver.Seize and hold key installations (for example,bridges, tunnels, dams, and power and com-munications facilities) for a limited time toprevent their destruction by hostile forces.Harass and interdict hostile command and con-trol, logistical, and reserve elements as part ofthe conventional commander’s deep operations.Divert hostile attention and resources from themain battle area.

If conventional forces intend to link up with theresistance organization, the SF team coordinates

the linkup. When friendly conventional forcesencompass the JSOA, the resistance organizationmay perform linkup missions. Although not strictlyUW missions, these linkup missions include—

Conducting conventional combat operations inthe main battle area or rear area as an economyof force measure.Containing or destroying bypassed or cutoffhostile forces.Conducting tactical reconnaissance and surveil-lance missions.Screening difficult terrain and gaps betweenconventional units.Controlling tactical air strikes.Providing guides and interpreters to conven-tional units.Enforcing PRC measures to minimize civilianinterference with conventional militaryoperations.

After linkup, resistance forces revert to nationalcontrol. These forces may demobilize, or they mayreorganize as conventional combat forces for usein economy of force missions. Possible missionsinclude rear area security of critical installations andLOC chokepoints and employment as tactical com-bat forces in the rear area.

In a conflict situation, or a secondary theater ofoperations during war, US policy and strategy maypreclude the use of conventional military forces toassist an insurgency. In this case, the resistanceorganization may have to raise sufficient forces tochallenge the established government or occupyingpower in a war of movement. In this phase, SOCA and PSYOP elements normally augment theSF team advising and assisting the area command.These elements take over responsibility for advisingand assisting the resistance leadership on the politi-cal and psychological aspects of the insurgency,freeing the SF team to focus on combat operations.See Chapters 15 and 16 for more detailed discus-sions of CA and PSYOP support to UW.

Demobilization

Demobilization is an important and difficult phaseof UW, yet is often neglected in initial UWplanning. Demobilization planning should beginas soon as the US government decides to sponsor

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a resistance organization. Once the resistanceorganization accomplishes its objectives, itshould demobilize. Its shadow government maybecome the newly established government of thecountry. Resistance forces should be integratedinto the reconstituted national army, even if thisintegration is only a transition stage toward theireventual return to civilian life. The manner in whichthe demobilization occurs will affect the postwarattitudes of the people and the government towardsthe United States.

Perhaps the greatest danger in demobilization isthe possibility that former resistance membersmay resort to subversion of the new government,factional disputes, or banditry. The new governmentmust make every effort to reorient and absorbformer resistance members into a peaceful society

and gain their acceptance. To achieve this goal, thenew government must—

Bring arms and ammunition under gov-ernment control.Assist resistance members in returning tocivilian life.Take positive measures to prevent resistancemembers from beginning or participating in fur-ther political upheaval.

Because of their knowledge of resistance organiza-tion and history, SF teams initially remain in theiroperational areas to assist in demobilization. TheSF team commanders and their supporting CA andPSYOP elements ensure transfer of US responsi-bility without loss of control, influence, or propertyaccountability. The key to long-term strategicsuccess in UW is the planning and execution of SFpostconflict responsibilities.

SF-ResistanceRelationships

The commander of an SF team with a UWmission occupies a very sensitive position. To thearea commander, he is the direct representative ofthe US government. The SF team commandermust be a diplomat as well as a military advisor. TheSF team must establish a good working relationshipwith the resistance organization. This relationshipdevelops from a common goal against a commonenemy and resistance acceptance of US sponsor-ship and operational guidance. However, the SFteam must recognize political considerations,personal antagonism, religious beliefs, and ethnicdifferences that affect its mission performance(Figure 9-4). Team members must know and respectlocal traditions, customs, and courtesies. They mustbe able to explain the policies and strategies of theUS government and the theater CINC. They mustbe prepared to work with resistance members who

tolerate an SF presence only to obtain US materialassistance.Perhaps the most delicate responsibility of a de-ployed SF team commander is to ensure thatcompetent indigenous personnel occupy key re-sistance positions. He should attempt to improvethe knowledge, skills, and attitudes of resistanceleaders and staff members. If all efforts fail and theindividual’s performance threatens the future effec-tiveness of the resistance organization, the SF teamcommander should carefully try to influence theselection of a replacement. In this potentiallyexplosive situation, he must exercise extremecaution to avoid jeopardizing his mission.SF soldiers need a working knowledge of the locallanguage. When this is impossible to achieve, theymust select interpreters carefully and use themcautiously. An interpreter is in a very sensitive andpowerful position. He is the only person who knowswhat both parties to a conversation are saying. To beeffective, he must have the trust and confidence ofboth the resistance organization and the SF team.

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Psychological to the formal PSYOP program, the SF team

Operationscommander must ensure the resistance organiza-tion considers the psychological implications of itsactivities. The ability of the resistance organization

The resistance organization must have an effec- to obtain civilian support depends primarily upon itstive PSYOP program. Proper PSYOP create unity, psychological impact on the population. The adversemaintain resistance morale, and gain the sympathy effects of improper resistance activities may outweighand support of the civilian population. In addition any tactical benefits.

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DisciplineResistance operations are decentralized and widelydispersed. They generally involve actions that thehostile power considers illegal. Resistance membersmay appear unkempt or bedraggled because ofthe environment in which they operate. These fac-tors create opportunities for loose discipline andmisconduct. However, strict discipline is essentialto any resistance organization. Resistance leadersand members must understand that even minorinfractions against the civilian population canhave far-reaching consequences. Resistance mem-bers must know that their personal conduct mustbe above reproach when dealing with civilians.

To prevent ill-discipline and misconduct, the resis-tance leadership must develop and enforce a writtencode of discipline. Figure 9-5 provides a historic guide

for developing such a code. Each resistance membermust understand its provisions, to include thepenalties for violations. The resistance code ofdiscipline should be simple. It should prescribeharsh but fair punishments for what would beminor offenses in a conventional military force. Thecode should incorporate the provisions of the GenevaConventions to minimize hostile propagandapotential and enhance the legitimacy of theresistance organization.Although the resistance leadership is responsible formaintaining discipline in the resistance organization,the SF team commander may recommend measuresto ensure proper discipline. The SF team com-mander and area commander must also agree ondisciplinary and judicial authority over the SF team.The SF team commander will NOT give up hisdisciplinary or judicial authority over members of hiscommand.

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ResistanceLogistics

Each resistance organization must develop its ownlogistics system to meet its specific requirements andsituation. In general, however, a resistance orga-nization meets its logistical requirements by acombination of internal and external means.

The JSOA must provide the bulk of a resistanceorganization’s logistical requirements. The areacommander must balance his support requirementsagainst the need to gain and maintain civiliancooperation. Imposing excessive demands on thepopulation may adversely affect popular support.Logistical constraints may initially dictate the size ofthe resistance organization.

As the resistance organization expands, its logisticalrequirements may exceed the capability of theJSOA to provide adequate support. When thissituation occurs, an external sponsor providessupplemental logistical support or the resistanceorganization reduces the scale of its activities.External support is normally limited to the neces-sities of life and the essential equipment and suppliesrequired to conduct combat operations.

External support is an important means of dem-onstrating support and obtaining influence. Whencompared to a conventional unit, a resistanceorganization has fewer and more basic logisticalrequirements. External support requirementsinclude the following:

Food.Clothing.Shelter.Weapons.Ammunition.Demolitions.Communications.Medical support.Transportation.Storage.Maintenance.

Most areas suitable for guerrilla bases have somenatural foods, but these foods usually cannot sus-

tain the energy of active guerrillas. The areacommander must obtain high-calorie foods such asgrains, sugar, and meats.

Guerrillas need seasonal changes of clothing in thetemperate zone. Waterproof clothing is desirable.Guerrillas need sturdy, well-fitted shoes or bootsbecause they depend on their feet for mobility.

Guerrillas require natural or constructed protectionfrom the elements and hostile observation.

Captured weapons are initially the primary sourceof weapon resupply and replacement parts. Thearea commander must establish weapons account-ability by type to determine the required rate ofammunition resupply.During the organization and buildup phases, theresistance organization has minimal physical contactwith hostile forces and requires little ammunition.During the combat employment phase, the areacommander must impose strict fire discipline to con-serve ammunition.

The amount of demolitions required depends onthe number and types of combat operations to beaccomplished in a given period. The interdiction ofcomplex target systems by multiple attacks requiressignificant amounts of explosives.Initially, most resistance communications areclandestine and non-technical. During the combatemployment phase, resistance forces must rely onradios for tactical communication during combatoperations.The resistance organization requires basic medicinesand other medical supplies to treat its members.Preventive medicine is especially important to aresistance organization because it normally does nothave adequate facilities to treat diseases.

The area commander normally obtains transpor-tation support from the auxiliary on a mission basis.The guerrilla force may have its own organictransportation system to meet its immediate needs.In remote or undeveloped areas, the primary meansmay be human porters or pack animals.The area commander caches extra supplies andequipment throughout the operational area.

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Caching is not a haphazard affair. Caches mustsupport anticipated operational requirements orspecified emergencies.The resistance organization obtains repair materialfrom the local economy and through battlefieldrecovery to perform all maintenance and repairswithin its capability. It may establish repair facilitieswithin the area complex. The sponsor includesnecessary maintenance and repair items with allequipment it provides the resistance. Introducingsophisticated equipment into the JSOA may com-plicate the maintenance system.Internal sources of resistance supply include thefollowing

Battlefield recovery.Purchase.Levy.Barter.Production.Confiscation.

Successful offensive operations permit resistanceforces to satisfy some of their logistical require-ments by battlefield recovery. Capturing suppliesfrom hostile forces also avoids alienating civilians.The resistance organization normally limits its pur-chases to critical items unavailable by other means.Excessive introduction of external currency maydisrupt the local economy. Such disruption maynot be in the interest of the resistance organizationor the United States.The resistance organization may organize a levysystem to ensure an equitable system for obtainingsupplies from the local population. Under a levysystem, the resistance organization provides receiptsand maintains records of levy transactions to facilitate

reimbursement at the end of hostilities. Obstacles toa levy system include—

Chronic shortages among the local population.Hostile PRC measures, to include confiscation ordestruction of local resources.Competition from the hostile power or rivalresistance organizations.NBC or other contamination of local resources.

Barter may adversely affect the levy system.However, it may be the only method of obtainingcritical items (such as medical supplies) or services.Resistance forces often have to improvise their ownfield expedients. They may even have to plant andraise their own food, dig wells, and tend their ownlivestock. The area commander may considerestablishing clandestine factories to produce itemsthat are otherwise unobtainable.Confiscation alienates the local population. Theresistance organization should use confiscation onlyin emergencies or to punish individuals whorefuse to cooperate or who actively collaborate withthe hostile power. In all cases, resistance leadersmust strictly control confiscation to ensure that itdoes not deteriorate into looting.The deployed SF team commander is accountable forall equipment and supplies delivered to the JSOA.His control of US-provided material enhances hisability to influence resistance activities. He mustestablish positive control and maintain accountabilityfor sensitive items such as weapons, ammunition,explosives, radios, drugs, and funds. An SF teammember should be present at all deliveries of externalsupplies. The SF team should determine the quan-tities and disposition of sensitive items procured fromother sources. The information helps in determiningthe proper distribution of US material, assessment ofresistance capabilities, and demobilization.

Resistance Health and to secure the support of the local populace.

Service SupportResistance HSS must be mobile, responsive, andeffective in preventing disease and restoring thesick and wounded to duty. The resistance organi-

The goals of resistance HSS operations are to zation normally has no safe rear area to treat itsconserve the fighting strength of resistance forces casualties. Wounded and ill personnel become a

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tactical rather than a logistical problem. The SFteam commander will find that HSS is a majortactical consideration in all operations.Abroad range of medical support may be available inthe JSOA. Historically, some resistance organiza-tions have developed highly organized and effectiveHSS systems. In most cases, however, the localpopulation cannot support the area command withqualified medical personnel. For the SF team, HSScan be an effective way to establish rapport withthe resistance organization. The SF medical sergeantis uniquely qualified as a physician substitute orindependent duty medic. He can deliver a sophis-ticated level of medical care when physician care is

not available. Upon initial contact, he providesalmost immediate access to the resistance mem-bership. Each medical act can be an effectivepresentation of SF credibility.

As the requirement for doctors and other medicalspecialists increases, an SF medical team mayinfiltrate to establish and operate a clandestinehospital in the JSOA. An SF clandestine hospital isa medical treatment facility, or complex of facilities,providing in-patient medical care to resistancemembers. The SF medical team should infiltrate assoon as possible during the building phase so that itsclandestine hospital is fully operational when thecombat employment phase begins.

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FID is not exclusively an SF mission. It is a joint and interagency activity of the US government. This chapterdiscusses employment considerations for SF teams conducting FID missions. It discusses the considerationsfor a transition to support a conventional expeditionary force. The chapter uses the term Insurgency forconsistency with JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20. In practice, SF teams may conduct FID missions to counterany armed resistance movement.

Internal Defenseand Development

Internal defense and development (IDAD) are allthe measures taken by a nation to promote itsgrowth and protect itself from subversion, lawless-ness, and insurgency. IDAD is an overall strategy forpreventing or defeating an insurgency. It focuseson building HN institutions that are responsive to

the needs of the society. Successful IDAD pro-grams eliminate problems before an insurgency canexploit them. The US IDAD strategy assumes thatthe HN government is responsible for preventing ordefeating any threat to its own control and legiti-macy. The primary US objective is to support a levelof HN internal security that permits economic,political, and social growth through balanceddevelopment programs. (See JCS Pub 3-07 andFM 100-20 for detailed discussions of US supportto counterinsurgency.)

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Special ForcesFID Operations

The primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train,advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces.The intent is to improve the tactical and technicalproficiency of these forces so they can defeat theinsurgency without direct US involvement. The capa-bilities that SF employs to perform its FID missionare those inherent to its UW mission. Only theoperational environment is changed. To accomplishits FID mission, SF participates in the following typesof operations:

Training assistance.Advisory assistance.Intelligence operations.Psychological operations.Civil-military operations.Populace and resources control.Tactical operations.

Training Assistance

SF teams may develop, establish, and operatecentralized training programs for the supported HNforce. SF teams can also conduct individual, leader,and collective training programs for specific HNunits. Subjects can range from basic combat train-ing and leader development to specialized collectivetraining. SF training assistance often develops a HNcadre that can then train the rest of the HN force ona sustained basis.

Whenever possible, SF soldiers should be able toconduct the training in the indigenous language or athird language common to both trainers and students.If this is impossible, the SF unit must obtaincompetent and trustworthy translators.

Advisory Assistance

SF may provide advisory assistance in two ways.SF teams may provide operational advice andassistance to specific HN military or paramilitaryorganizations. Individual SF soldiers may be assignedor attached to the SAO to perform advisory

assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis.In either case, SF provides advisory assistance underthe OPCON of the SAO chief in his role as in-country US defense representative.

The SF advisor must understand the total scope ofSAO activities. He must know the functions,responsibilities, and capabilities of the other USagencies in the HN. Many SF activities cross thejurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of otherCountry Team members. The SF advisor should seekout other Country Team members to coordinate hisportion of the overall FID effort.

The SF advisor is first and foremost a representativeof the United States in a foreign country. His missionis to implement established US policies. His func-tions and duty requirements are often quite differentfrom those performed by conventional US militarypersonnel. SF advisors frequently find themselvesdealing with HN counterparts of quite differentcultural, educational, and military backgrounds.Together they must resolve problems by meansappropriate to the HN, without violating US lawsand policies in the process. SF advisors operateunder very specific ROE. The purpose of the ROEis to ensure the advisors remain advisors. The ROEare strictly enforced and violations normally result inthat advisor’s immediate removal from the HN.

Successful advisory assistance depends more oneffective cross-cultural communications and closepersonal relationships than on formal agreements.To advise a HN counterpart effectively, the SFadvisor must understand the HN’s sociological,psychological, and political makeup. Advice may bethe least desired assistance that SF offers. HNmilitary leaders may tolerate it only to obtain ma-terial and training assistance. Even when they acceptadvice, they may not act upon it immediately. TheSF advisor must realize that his counterpart willnormally act within the context of his ownsociopolitical experience. Political objectives andconstraints, rather than military capabilities, oftendictate the roles, missions, and force developmentof HN military and paramilitary forces. The SFadvisor must always remain sensitive to the HN

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environment in which he and his counterpartoperate.While refusing US advisors, HN military leaders mayrequest and receive US mobility and fire support ifthe insurgency worsens. To coordinate this supportand ensure it is properly employed, US liaison teamsshould accompany HN ground maneuver unitsreceiving US direct combat support. Language-qualified and area-oriented SF teams are especiallysuited for this mission.

Intelligence Operations

An insurgency relies on secrecy and surprise toconceal itself and to overcome the HN government’ssuperiority in military power and other resources.Effective intelligence operations penetrate theinsurgents’ screen of secrecy and permit the HNgovernment to take advantage of its superiorresources. HN and US intelligence operationssupport counterinsurgency planning and operationsby providing information on the operational area andthe insurgent organization. Intelligence operationsmust not focus only on obtaining military OB infor-mation. Of particular importance are intelligenceoperations that seek to neutralize or destroy theinsurgents’ political and intelligence infrastructure.

Psychological Operations

To defeat an insurgency, the HN government mustretain or regain the confidence and support of itspeople. The objective of an IDAD program shouldnot be to kill or even capture the insurgents. It shouldbe to convince them to abandon a hopeless orworthless cause and support the HN government.PSYOP must therefore be an integral and vital partof an IDAD program. SF soldiers may have toeducate their HN counterparts in the value and roleof PSYOP in FID. They must then advise and assistHN forces in developing and implementing aneffective PSYOP program. (See Chapter 15 for amore detailed discussion of PSYOP support of SFFID operations.)

Civil-Military Operations

CMO enhance the relationship between militaryforces, civilian authorities, and the population. SFadvisors assist HN military forces in developingeffective CA programs that mobilize the civil

population in support of the HN government’sIDAD programs. SF CMO include civil assistance tothe HN government and military civic action. (SeeChapter 16 for a more detailed discussion of CAsupport of SF FID operations.)

Populace andResources Control

PRC measures mobilize the human and materialresources of the HN and deny these resources to theinsurgents. PRC measures include personneldocumentation, curfews, travel restrictions, rationingand price controls, licensing, and checkpointoperations. The enforcement of PRC measuresshould be primarily a HN police or paramilitaryresponsibility. HN military forces may assist in PRCoperations. PRC operations may support militaryoperations.

The HN government must integrate PSYOP intoPRC operations to explain that PRC measures are theresult of insurgent activity. The people must bepersuaded that—

The insurgents and not the HN government areto blame for the inconvenience of PRC measures.The government acts for the long-range benefitof the people.The activities of the insurgents are harmful to thepeople and require the imposition of PRC mea-sures.Insurgents are the enemy of the people and mustbe denied support and supplies.Loyal citizens must declare themselves, theirfamilies, and their communities on the side of thegovernment by full and voluntary compliance withthe program.The government will reduce and eliminate thePRC program as the insurgent threat decreases.

The civil population is more likely to accept PRCmeasures enforced by HN personnel. SF teamsshould normally limit their participation to advice,training, and indirect support of PRC operations. SFadvisors may accompany HN military or paramilitarypersonnel conducting PRC operations. However,they must convey to the population that they are onlysupporting a HN program rather than implementinga US-directed program.

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Tactical OperationsBecause of its extensive UW training, SF is par-ticularly qualified to advise and assist the HN in suchtactical operations as consolidation, strike, remotearea, border, and urban area. The objective oftactical operations in FID is to provide a secureenvironment where balanced development canoccur. Tactical operations should not be independentmilitary actions aimed only at destroying insurgentcombat forces and their base areas. They should be anintegral part of a synchronized IDAD effort to gainbroader strategic objectives. The SF team com-mander must convince his counterpart to integrateintelligence, CA and PSYOP activities into everytactical operation. SF advisors and their HN counter-parts must know the impact their tactical operationshave on the populace and other IDAD programs.

Consolidation Operations. Consolidation opera-tions are long-term population security operationsconducted in territory that is generally under HNgovernment control. Their purpose is to—

Isolate the insurgents from the civil population.Protect the civil population from insurgentinfluence.Neutralize the insurgent infrastructure.

The people are unlikely to support the HNgovernment fully until the government providessufficient long-term security to free its people fromthe fear of insurgent reprisals. Consolidationoperations are designed to accomplish theseobjectives. They typically pass through the fourstages shown in Figure 10-1.

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Strike Operations. Strike operations are short-duration tactical operations conducted in contestedor insurgent-controlled areas. They supportconsolidation operations by preventing insurgentforces from contesting HN pacification efforts. Theirpurpose is to—

Destroy insurgent forces and base areas.Isolate insurgent forces from their support.Interdict insurgent infiltration routes and LOC.

Strike operations are primarily offensive operations.They are characterized by small, highly mobilecombat forces operating in dispersed formations tolocate and fix the insurgent force. Once the insurgentforce is located, strike force commanders attack,pursue, and destroy it. If contact with the insurgentforce is lost, strike force commanders resume aggres-sive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy theforce before it can rest, reorganize, and resumecombat operations. (See FM 90-8 for a detaileddiscussion of tactical counterguerrilla operations.)

SF advisors must advise against strike operations thatovershadow and dominate the nonmilitary aspects ofcounterinsurgency. Counterinsurgent, like insur-gency, requires a balanced approach in which tacticaloperations often play a supporting role. To defeatan insurgency, the HN government must isolate theinsurgents from the population on which theydepend for manpower, supplies, funds, and intel-ligence. When denied access to the population,the insurgents must do one of the following:

Stand and fight for control over the population,subjecting themselves to the superior combatpower of the established government and itsallies.Retreat to their remote base areas, whereisolation from the population diminishes theirinfluence and reduces the relevance of the insur-gency to the legitimate needs of the population.Revert to an earlier phase of insurgency andresume low-level subversive activities untilconditions become more favorable.

Remote Area Operations. Remote area operationsare operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled orcontested areas to establish islands of popularsupport for the HN government and deny support tothe insurgents. They differ from consolidationoperations in that they are not designed to establish

permanent HN government control over the area.Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious,or other isolated minority groups. They may be in theinterior of the HN or near border areas where majorinfiltration routes exist. Remote area operationsnormally involve the use of specially trainedparamilitary or irregular forces.SF teams support remote area operations to interdictinsurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas inthe remote area, and demonstrate that the HNgovernment has not conceded control to theinsurgents. They also collect and report informationconcerning insurgent intentions in more populatedareas.PSYOP and CA programs assist in obtaining localsupport for remote area operations. Success is morelikely if—

A significant segment of the local populationsupports the program.The HN recruits local personnel for its remotearea paramilitary or irregular force.

HN forces may conduct remote area operations tointerdict infiltration routes in areas nearly devoid ofany people. In this case, SF teams advise and assistirregular HN forces operating in a manner similar tothe insurgents themselves, but with access to superiorCS and CSS resources.Border Operations. Border security should be theresponsibility of HN police, customs, or paramilitaryborder forces. However, the threat may requirecombat-type border operations, particularly inremote areas. SF teams advise and assist HN forcesassigned to prevent or interdict the infiltration of in-surgent personnel and material across internationalboundaries. The intent is to isolate insurgent forcesfrom their external support, to include externalsanctuaries. Secondary purposes are to—

Locate and interdict insurgent land infiltrationroutes.Destroy insurgent forces and base areas in areasadjacent to the border.Collect and report information concerning insur-gent capabilities and intentions.

Border operations normally require restrictive PRCmeasures that are particularly annoying to bordertribal and ethnic groups who do not recognize theinternational boundary. The HN government must

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make a continuing PSYOP effort to gain and maintainthe loyalty of the affected population.Urban Area Operations. Clandestine insurgentactivity may be extensive in urban areas. It caninclude terrorism, sabotage, and PSYOP in additionto political, organizational, intelligence, and logisticaloperations. This insurgent activity may strain thecapabilities of police and other civil authorities.Police, internal security, and other HN governmentorganizations will be high priority targets for theinsurgents. The insurgents normally try to exploitlocal civilian organizations by subverting their goalsand objectives to serve the insurgent cause. Theinsurgents strive to create situations that cause HNpolice and military forces to overreact in a mannerthat adversely affects the civil population.SF teams, with assistance from assigned andattached MP and CI personnel, advise and assistHN forces engaged in urban area operations.The purpose of these operations is to—

Eliminate the centralized direction and controlof the insurgent organization.Create insurgent disunity.Destroy the insurgent infrastructure thatthreatens the HN government.

When military forces reinforce police in an urbanarea, their operations must be even more closelycontrolled and coordinated to minimize collateral

damage and prevent hostile propaganda victories thatoccur when US or HN military forces overreact toinsurgent actions. As a result, the need for PSYOPand CA support greatly increases in urban areas.

Support of US Combat Forces. If the HNgovernment’s situation deteriorates to the point thatvital US interests are in jeopardy, the NCA maycommit US forces in a combat role to effect a decisivechange in the conflict. Direct US military inter-vention can provide HN forces with the time andspace to regain the strategic initiative and resumecontrol of tactical operations.

In this situation, the committed US combat force islikely to find in-country SF teams with a myriad offormal and informal arrangements. The US con-ventional commander should treat this situation likea UW linkup operation. He should fully exploit SFexperience and contacts during the critical transitionperiod when his forces are deploying into the country.He should immediately exchange liaison personnelwith the appropriate SF headquarters to exploit SFadvice and assistance. The SF headquarters shouldprovide all possibile advice and assistance, toinclude—

Situation and intelligence updates for incomingconventional commanders and their staffs.Use of in-place SF elements for initial coordi-nation with HN and US Mission agencies.

SF Organization forFID Operations

When an SF unit is committed to a FID mission, itnormally receives appropriate CS and CSS augmen-tation and may be designated as a security assistanceforce (SAF). The SF unit may instead be assigned toa SAF organized around another military organiza-tion. The SAF is similar to a conventional unitcombined arms task force, but is specifically designedto support counterinsurgency. The composition and

command relationships of a SAF depend on itsspecific circumstances. A SAF is flexibly organizedwith the wide range of skills needed to augment thecapabilities of the in-country SAO. When an SF unitis designated as the nucleus of a SAF, its normalaugmentation includes—

A CA element.A PSYOP element.A medical element.An engineer element.An MP element.An MI element.

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A signal element.Other combat, CS, and CSS elements as required.

An SF FID mission may require assets ranging froma single SF team to a reinforced SF group. In the earlystages of an insurgency, the level of SF Participationmay be as small as one SFOD under the directOPCON of the SAO. In the more advanced stages,an SF battalion or company may establish anoperational base (in or out of country) and exerciseOPCON of SFODs for the SAO. Operational andsupport elements may be assigned to the base on arotational or a permanent basis. When an entire SFgroup is committed, it normally establishes an SFOBand one or more FOBs. For OPSEC purposes, thesebases should be established in CONUS or a thirdcountry, if possible.

When the entire SF group is committed, the SFOBcommander and staff are primarily concerned withsynchronizing SF activities with the activities of theHN and other US Country Team agencies. TheFOB elements prepare, deploy, control, and supportSAF operational elements. The SAP commandermay assign missions to the FOBs on either afunctional or a regional basis. In addition tosupporting SF tactical operations, the SAP mustbe able to support intelligence, PSYOP, CA, PRC,and other operations. See Figure 10-2 for an exampleof a highly structured organization for counter-insurgency.An SF team must coordinate its activities with theappropriate HN government officials and other USadvisory elements in its operational area. There

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may be an area coordination center (ACC) tofacilitate this coordination effort. An ACC is a HNor combined (US/HN) civil-military headquartersresponsible for planning, coordinating, and direct-ing all IDAD activities within its jurisdiction. Theintegration of operational, intelligence, and supportactivities is its most critical function. The seniorHN political or military official is the ACC director(chief), but he usually delegates normal day-to-day coordination to his deputy. A civilian advisorycommittee composed of leading citizens provides acommunications link between the ACC and the localpopulation. The SF commander may be the seniorUS advisor to the HN official directing the ACC.The SF team may coordinate its activities through

an interagency US advisory assistance team assignedto the ACC. See Figure 10-3 for a type provincialACC organization.

If the US and HN establish a combined C2 organi-zation, the SAO or SAF may be directed to passOPCON of the SF team to the appropriate combinedarea commander. In this situation, the parent SAOor SAF—

Retains command less OPCON.Provides all support and sustainment not providedby the area commander.May retain tasking authority for SF missionsperformed beyond the area commander’s juris-diction.

SF RearOperations

During war, the theater CINC commits his assignedSF units primarily to deep operations. However,when hostile insurgents or hostile SOF present asignificant threat to friendly rear areas, the theaterCINC may commit SF elements to rear operations(Figure 10-4).

Conventional CSS units in the rear area establish, orare assigned to, mutually supporting base clusters forlocal defense. MP units secure the LOC betweenbase clusters, conduct area reconnaissance to detectrear area threats, and fight to defeat threats thatexceed base cluster defensive capabilities. When athreat exceeds MP combat capabilities, the MPs delayor disrupt the hostile force until a tactical combatforce is committed to defeat it. (See FM 90-14 for adetailed discussion of rear operations.)

The MP rear area security mission outlined abovemay exceed MP capabilities within the theater ofoperations. MP capabilities are most likely to beinadequate under the very circumstances where therear area threat is greatest-in hostile territory or

during Third World contingency operations when USLOC are extended. The bulk of MP activity may berestricted to the vicinity of the LOC and base clusters,conceding to hostile forces almost complete freedomof action in the more remote areas of the friendlyrear. Even if HN internal security forces areavailable, they may require US advisory and trainingassistance to effectively counter the threat of a well-organized and popular insurgency.

When directed, SF teams organize, train, equip, anddirect foreign combat forces to conduct offensive rearoperations against a hostile insurgent or SOF threat.Under the OPCON of the appropriate TAACOM orcombat unit (normally corps or higher), these forcesoperate in platoon or company strength in the remoteareas of the friendly rear (Figure 10-4). They adoptcounterinsurgent organization, tactics, and tech-niques. They live and fight for extended periods withminimal external support. Their activities include—

Saturation patrolling of likely and suspected baseareas.Upon detection of a base camp, employing raidsand ambushes against it or reporting its locationso that a conventional combat force can attack anddestroy it.

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Establishing ambushes along likely hostile infil- Depending on the nature of the specific situation,tration routes to friendly base clusters. these SF-directed combat forces may require addi-

tional CS and CSS resources. Such support mayReacting to hostile attacks by trailing and hunting include artillery, combat aviation, and close air sup-down the attackers. port (to include AC-130 gunships) on a mission basis.

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Unlike UW and FID, DA operations do not rely on the indirect application of military force through aforeign power. DA operations are directed and controlled by an SO headquarters. They are predominantlyconducted by SOF. This chapter discusses the nature of DA operations. It provides employmentconsiderations for DA operations. It also discusses CSAR as an SF collateral activity.

Nature of DAOperations

DA operations are combat operations conductedbeyond the range of tactical weapons systems orthe area of influence of conventional military forces.In the conduct of DA operations, SF teams mayemploy direct assault, raids, ambushes, or sniping.They may emplace mines and other munitions.They may provide terminal guidance forprecision-guided munitions. They may also performmore subtle forms of DA such as independentclandestine sabotage.

SF can use conventional or special munitions toneutralize or destroy a designated high payoff tar-get or to attack the critical nodes of a designatedtarget system. The SF capability to employ specialmunitions expands delivery options and permits thepre-positioning of special munitions in denied areas.In addition to target attack, SF teams also conductrecovery missions. SF teams can—

Capture selected hostile personnel or obtainselected hostile items of materiel.Rescue US or allied PWs, political prisoners, orother selected personnel being detained by ahostile power.

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Locate, identify, and recover downed aircrews,political or military leaders seeking to comeunder US control, or other designated person-nel not being detained by a hostile power.Locate, identify, and recover nuclear or chemi-cal weapons, downed satellites, classifieddocuments, or other sensitive items of materiel.

SF executes DA operations in four modes:Unilaterally, with pure SF teams.

Unilaterally, with a mix of SF, other SOF, andconventional US forces.

As a combined operation, with SF-led foreignteams.

As a combined operation, with SF-trained anddirected foreign teams.

UW and DA are interrelated activities, particularlywhen the DA mission involves the use of foreign

teams or clandestine sabotage techniques. Threecriteria distinguish DA from UW:

DA operations are controlled and directed by aSOF chain of command, not by an indigenousresistance organization with SOF advice andassistance.DA operations do not depend on the popularsupport of the indigenous population.DA operations are short-term, with specific andwell-defined objectives.

The SF generic capability to conduct DA operationscuts across all operational environments. The targetmay be a high-level military headquarters, anindustrial plant, an insurgent base camp, or aterrorist training facility.The mission determines the size of the SF team,mode of employment, and tactics and techniquesemployed. DA operations can range from a two-man SF team performing a clandestine sabotagemission to a reinforced SF company performing anovert raid or ambush.

Command and Controlof DA Operations

In situations short of war, the NCA directs theappropriate regional unified commander to plan andexecute contingency DA operations. If the NCAdesires more positive control, it may directUSCINCSOC to plan and direct the operation. TheNCA may also direct USCINCSOC to establish aJSOTF reporting directly to the NCA or the CJCS.

During war, the theater CINC has the authority toconduct DA operations that support the theatercampaign plan and the major operations of hisconventional force commanders. He exercises thisauthority by providing the SOC commander acombination of—

Mission-type orders.Specific mission taskings.Rules of engagement.Other mission guidance.

CSAR the SOC commander dedicate a number of SF teams

Operationsto conduct time-sensitive CSAR missions. Even if nodedicated CSAR teams exist, the theater JointRescue Coordination Center may request SOC assis-

The SOC is responsible for CSAR within its assigned tance in CSAR operations when—JSOAs. Operational requirements may dictate that A CSAR incident occurs close to a SOF asset.

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Special circumstances make the use of conven-tional CSAR forces inappropriate or infeasible.CSAR requirements exceed the capability of thetheater CSAR force.

If SF teams can be made available withoutjeopardizing their primary mission, the SOCcommander will release them for CSAR missionexecution. These SF teams can facilitate thecontact, authentication, security, medical treatment,

movement, and exfiltration of distressed personnel.They can clandestinely recover evaders to safeguardthe integrity of designated evasion areas.

SF teams can also perform precautionary CSAR.Their use is particularly appropriate during contin-gency operations short of war. The sensitivity ofparticular air missions may justify the deployment ofSF teams to provide precautionary CSAR assistancealong the flight routes.

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SR operations are similar to DA operations except for actions in the objective area. Like DA operations,they are normally unilateral in nature and limited in scope and duration. This chapter discusses the natureof SR operations. It also provides employment considerations for SR operations.

Nature of SpecialReconnaissance

SR operations encompass a broad range ofintelligence collection activities, to include recon-naissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Theymay involve combined activities with foreignpersonnel. Long-term SR intelligence collectionefforts are very similar to UW intelligence collection.As with DA, the difference between SR and UWlies in the direction and control of SR operations bythe SOF chain of command. The SR collection effortemphasizes US unilateral (or alliance) intelligencerequirements, not the requirements of an indigenousresistance organization. SR complements other

national and theater collection systems (such as highaltitude imagery or SIGINT) that are more vul-nerable to weather, terrain masking, and hostilecountermeasures.

SR operations can be broken into two broadcategories-battlefield reconnaissance and surveil-lance and clandestine collection. (See TC 31-29 andFM 34-60A for detailed discussions of procedures.)Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance involvesthe use of standard patrolling tactics and techniques.Such missions are often for extended durationsbeyond or in the absence of conventional fire sup-port and sustainment means. They may be conductedby personnel using clothing and equipment thatcannot be traced.

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Clandestine collection is complex and sensitive.Clandestine collection involves the use of SIGINTand HUMINT techniques normally reserved to theUS intelligence community. SF teams may conductunilateral clandestine collection missions in crisissituations, in support of national and theater CTforces, or in other conditions short of war. In wartimeor as a special activity, SF teams may conductunilateral clandestine collection missions in hostileareas where the threat precludes the use of otherHUMINT means. Clandestine collection mayrequire oversight, interagency coordination, and/orcontrol of SF teams by the US intelligencecommunity. Typical SR missions include—

Initial contact with an indigenous resistance orga-nization and assessment of resistance potential.Collection of strategic political, economic psy-chological, or military information.

Collection of critical military OB information (forexample, NBC capabilities and intentions,commitment of second-echelon forces, andlocation of high-level headquarters).Collection of technical military information.Target acquisition and surveillance of hostile C2systems, troop concentrations, deep strike weap-ons, LOC, and other military targets of strategicor operational significance.Location and surveillance of hostage, PW, orpolitical prisoner detention facilities.Poststrike reconnaissance.Meteorologic geographic, or hydrographic re-connaissance to support specific aerospace, land,or maritime operations.

As with DA operations, SF has a generic capability toconduct SR missions. The target may be a high-levelheadquarters, a chokepoint used by follow-on mili-tary forces, or an insurgent infiltration route.

EmploymentConsiderations

A single SF team can usually accomplish thereconnaissance and surveillance of a fixed facility orother point target. However, collecting and reportinghostile troop movements and other OB data nor-mally requires the coordinated effort of a significantnumber of SF teams. The controlling FOB mustestablish a network of named areas of interestarranged in depth to increase the reliability of the

effort and estimate movement rates. When taskedto perform this sort of SR mission, the FOBcommander identifies the Possible hostile courses ofaction that concern the supported friendly com-mander. For each course of action, the ASPSdetermines where SF teams could reasonably observethose indicators and report the information in timefor the supported commander to react to it. Basedon this IPB, the S2 develops NAIs for targetdevelopment. The tasked SF teams identify specificsurveillance sites within the NAIs and plan the restof their mission around these sites.

Communications user of the information. Even more important, SF

Requirementsteam members must know what specific informationthe user requires and in what priority. Using thisknowledge, the team does not endanger itselfunnecessarily by collecting and reporting the wrong

Communications requirements are particularly criti- information. The team must weigh the user’s needcal in SR operations. The SF team must be able to for specific near-real-time information against thereport near-real-time information directly to the risk of compromise.

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The SF group and battalion Ml detachments provide dedicated IEW support to their respective bases. Thischapter discusses the IEW support these detachments receive from the SOC and TASOSC. It then describesthe detachments’ employment in terms of four primary IEW missions: situation development, targetdevelopment, electronic warfare, and counterintelligence.

IEW Support FromHigher Headquarters

The SOC J2 is primarily concerned with in-theaterIEW policy formulation, planning, and coordination.He ensures that sufficient intelligence support isavailable for each mission tasked by the SOC. Hemust rely on the theater service IEW organizationsto collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence tomeet SOF requirements. He coordinates joint SOintelligence collection operations and the productionand dissemination of TIPs to support SO targeting(see Chapter 7). He tasks subordinate SOF units tocollect and report information in support of SOFintelligence requirements. The SOC J6 coordinatesto obtain secure SCI voice and data communications

among the headquarters of the SOC, its componentcommands, and the TASOSC.

The TASOSC Director of Intelligence (DOI) pro-vides all-source IEW support to all in-theaterARSOF. He validates, consolidates, and prioritizestheir standing and routine IR and other requests forinformation (RFI). He then forwards them to theTASOSC ISE collocated at the TA MI brigade’sEACIC. Under the staff supervision of the TASOSCDOI, the ISE responds to RFIs by integrating theminto the EACIC requirements list. The ISE thenmonitors RFI status until the appropriate collectionassets respond. The ISE maintains an intelligencedata base to support ARSOF requirements. It alsosupports the targeting process by producing TIPs(see Chapter 7).

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SituationDevelopment

Situation development is the collection and inte-gration of intelligence and combat information intoan all-source product that provides an estimate ofthe situation and a projection of hostile capabilitiesand intentions. The product must enable com-manders to see and understand the operationalenvironment in sufficient time and detail to employtheir forces effectively.The IPB process and the intelligence cycle are theprincipal tools of situation development. IPB usesa series of templates (overlays) to portray hostilecapabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. (SeeFMs 34-1 and 34-3 for more detailed discussions onthe IPB process.) It also shows the effects ofweather, terrain, the population, and allied forces onfriendly courses of action. The ASIC performs theIPB and continually updates it by processinginformation through the intelligence cycle. In thefuture, automation of the group’s intelligence database will provide near-real-time intelligenceproducts to support both situation and targetdevelopment.Because their operational environment allows littlemargin for error, SF teams must have detailedinformation about the operational area before theydeploy. SF area study is of three types: generalarea study, operational area intelligence, and areaassessment.General area study provides the broad backgroundknowledge of an area, region, or country. Each

uncommitted SFOD periodically performs a generalarea study to orient its members on potentialoperational areas. With ASIC support, the groupand battalion ASTs manage the unit area studyprogram and assist the SFODs with their generalarea studies. Appendix I provides a sample outlinefor a general area study.

Operational area intelligence is the detailed intelli-gence of a designated JSOA. The group andbattalion ASTs maintain libraries of approvedSOMPFs. With ASIC support, they continuallyreview and update TIPs to provide the latestoperational area intelligence to SF teams. Once anSF team deploys, the supporting AST continuesto search for intelligence of interest to the SF team.The AST also monitors RFI submitted by thedeployed SF team, and ensures timely answers to theteam’s questions.

Area assessment is a continuous process that confirms,corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligencegained before infiltration. By conducting an areaassessment, a deployed SF team continually adds toits knowledge of the JSOA. The SF team begins itsarea assessment as soon as it enters its operationalarea. The area assessment serves as the basis forthe commander’s estimate of the situation. He usesit to modify plans made during isolation. The SFteam transmits the results of the area assessment toits operational base only when there is newintelligence that differs significantly from thatreceived before infiltration. There is no rigid formatfor making an area assessment, but the area studyoutline at Appendix I provides an excellent guide.

Target targeting information to support the SO targeting

Developmentprocess described in Chapter 7. In addition todeveloping targets nominated by the theater CINCand his component commanders, SF group and

Target development depends on situation develop- battalion commanders also participate in the targetment. It provides targeting data and correlated nomination process. They use target development

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to select targets and target sets for nominationthrough the SOC to the JTB.

The current deliberate targeting process emphasizesfixed targets. However, most wartime targets aremobile. They move frequently and disperse to avoiddetection and to enhance survivability. The redun-dancy built into modem combat systems makes itdifficult to identify critical nodes for attack. Only thecumulative effect of multiple attacks on such systemscan achieve significant results.

Conventional targeteers approach this dilemma withthe mind-set of a hunter. They seek out and acquiretargets and then task weapon systems to attack them.SF teams do not have the mobility or responsivenessneeded to use this approach against mobile targets.Instead, SF targeteers must approach their taskwith the mind-set of a trapper. They must —

Identify what mobile targets they want to attack.Anticipate the movements of those targets.Determine where to place SF teams to create anetwork of traps with the greatest chance ofsuccess.

SF targeteers in the ASIC begin this process byanalyzing hostile combat systems and developinggeneric target data that describe how to disrupt eachsystem by attacking critical nodes or components.The targeteers use the IPB process (situation andevent templating) to determine—

Where these components are most likely to be.When the theater CINC is most likely to want eachcombat system disrupted.

The product of this process is not a series of individualtargets but a network of box-lie JSOAs. Thisnetwork provides the SOC commander with a menuof SF targeting options. The options representbranches or sequels of the SF group’s basic OPLAN.The SOC commander determines which options toexecute, and when to execute them, as the actualsituation develops. During mission execution, SFteams deploy to planned JSOAs. Guided by thegeneric target data, near-real-time operational areaintelligence, and JTB target priorities, deployed SFteams attack those critical mobile targets that actuallyenter their JSOAs. The cumulative effect of theirtactical successes will have an operational impact attheater level.

ElectronicWarfare

EW is a shared responsibility of the S2 S3, signalofficer, and MI detachment commander. EW canbe either defensive or offensive in nature.

Defensive EW, or ECCM, protect friendly C2systems. ECCM include such passive proceduresas emission control and terrain masking. They alsoinclude the immediate identification and reporting ofmeaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference(MIJI) on a friendly command, control, andcommunications (C3) facility. The signal officer hasstaff responsibility for ECCM. However, ECCM arethe responsibility of every soldier who uses orsupervises the use of communications and noncom-munications emitters.

Offensive EW exploits or disrupts hostile C2 systems.There are two types of offensive EIM electroniccountermeasures (ECM) and electronic warfaresupport measures (ESM).

ECM systematically disrupt hostile C3 systems byjamming and deception. Jammers can also preventhostile intercept of friendly communications by jam-ming known hostile SIGINT systems on the samefrequency. The S3 has staff responsibility for ECM.The SF group has a very limited tactical jammingcapability. It relies primarily on theater systems toprovide ECM support for its operations. The S3 EWofficer (normally an additional duty) plans andcoordinates this support.ESM intercept, identify, and locate hostile emitters.ESM provide information required for ECM,ECCM, targeting, and combat operations. The S2has staff responsibility for ESM. The SOTs A of the

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battalion MI detachment provide an organicSIGINT/ESM capability to the SF group. The SFgroup commander controls EW operations throughthe group MI detachment commander and the groupTCAE. The group TCAE translates each EW mis-sion tasking into a technical tasking and forwards itto the appropriate battalion TCAE. The battalionTCAE tasks a SOT A to execute the mission. If nodeployed SOT A is capable of collecting the in-formation, the battalion S3 commits and deploys aSOT A to perform the tasking.Because of its small size, a SOT A is incapable ofconducting independent operations in a hostileenvironment. The battalion commander normallyattaches a committed SOT A to an SF team and

assigns responsibility for all but the technicalaspects of the mission to the SF team commander.The SOT A may infiltrate to join a deployed SF team,or the SF team and its attached SOT A may isolate,prepare, and deploy as a single element. In eithercase, the SF team provides security, CSS, and othermission support to the SOT A. The SOT A leaderprovides technical advice to the SF team com-mander. The SOT A leader is responsible for thetechnical aspects of mission execution. The SOT Atransmits its collected information to the battalionTCAE for decryption, processing, analysis, and dis-semination. The TCAE forwards the informationthrough the group TCAE to the group CM&Dsection and the TA TCAE.

Counterintelligence

CI detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents hostileintelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, or ter-rorism. The organic group and battalion CI sectionsprimarily perform CI analysis in the ASIC. SFcommanders normally receive their CI investigative,special operations, and technical (for example,technical support countermeasures and counter-SIGINT operations) support from the supporting CIunit of the TA MI brigade. (See FMs 34-60 and34-60A for detailed discussions of CI investigative,operational, and technical support.)

The CI section is the CI analysis element (CIAE) ofthe ASIC. It conducts multidisciplined analysis tosupport ASPS situation and target development. Italso develops detailed assessments of hostile in-telligence and security threats near SFOBs and inJSOAS. These hostile threat assessments are criticalto the group’s OPSEC, deception, and base defenseprograms. The CIAE compares its threat data basewith the friendly force profiles provided by S3OPSEC personnel to determine actual friendlyvulnerabilities. The CIAE then recommendsappropriate OPSEC measures to reduce thesevulnerabilities. To the extent possible, the CIAE

evaluates the effectiveness of those measures thatare implemented.The CI section briefs deploying SF teams duringmission preparation on the latest threat data. Italso provides SF teams with technical advice andassistance to prepare them to establish and operatedefensive source nets during long-term UW andFID missions.The CI section supports SF deception operations bydetermining hostile vulnerabilities to deception. Itprovides the S3 with recommendations for decep-tion measures and evaluates their effectivenessthrough CI analysis. It may also request that thesupporting CI unit conduct offensive tactical CIoperations to evaluate the hostile reaction to friendlydeception operations.When directed, the SF group’s CI teams mayparticipate in CI tactical agent operations. They mayconduct CI investigations of suspected sabotage,subversion, and espionage activity directed againstthe SF group. They may also deploy with the group’sinterrogation teams to conduct CI interrogationsand debriefings of line crossers, refugees, infor-mants, and repatriated friendly personnel. Theseactivities must be specifically authorized under theprovisions of AR 381-20 and other applicableregulations and directives.

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The SF group is part of the TA and depends on the TA CSS system to sustain its operations. In sometheaters, an SF group or battalion may instead depend on the CSS system of another service. This chapterdescribes how the internal SF CSS system interacts with the TA CSS system to meet SF requirements. Whenbeing sustained by another service, the SF commander and his Iogisticians must modify Army doctrine toconform to the CSS procedures existing in the theater.

Theater ArmyThe TA is responsible for supporting assigned USArmy forces and, if directed, other US services andallies in a theater. A theater is organized into acombat zone and a COMMZ. The combat zonebegins at the rear boundary of the senior combatechelon in the theater (normally a corp or field army)and extends to the forward limit of the theatercommander’s area of operations. The COMMZ ex-tends rearward from the combat zone rear boundaryand includes the area necessary to support forces inthe combat zone (Figure 14-1).

The TA has two types of support organizations inthe COMMZ. TAACOMs provide CSS and desig-nated CS on an area basis to forces passing throughor located in the COMMZ They have area respon-sibility for rear operations in the COMMZ TAfunctional commands provide specialized support(such as personnel, engineer, transportation, andmedical) to forces throughout the TA’s AOR.Two TA agencies are key to the command andcontrol of these organizations. The TAMMC pro-vides centralized management of most supply andmaintenance operations. It serves as the primary TAlink with the CONUS sustaining base. The theater

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army movement control agency (TAMCA) providestheaterwide movement management and control oftransportation assets.

The TASOSC is the TA functional command respon-sible for planning and coordinating CSS to theaterARSOF. The TASOSC and SF group staffs cooper-ate to identify and prioritize SF CSS requirements.The TASOSC staff then plans and coordinates withthe other TA subordinate commands to meet thoserequirements by a combination of—

MYTH:

FACT:

Earmarking TA (or other service) resources forsupport of or attachment to SF groups or bat-talions.

Arranging for foreign nation support.Submitting MTOE or TDA changes to aug-ment the organic SF support companies.

SF requires its own dedicated logisticssystem to meet its mission-peculiarrequirements.Normal Army CSS organizations andprocedures are adequate for the bulkof SF requirements. Non-standardprocedures are in place to handle thefew requirements that are truly SF-peculiar.

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Combat ServiceSupport at theSFOB and FOB

SF CSS planners and operators apply their knowl-edge of conventional CSS operations to meet thespecific CSS requirements generated by SF units.The SF sustainment imperatives in Figure 14-2 applyto most SF operations. (FM 100-10 is the Army’scapstone manual for CSS operations.)The SFOB and FOB support centers provide orcoordinate CSS on a unit-support basis for all ele-ments assigned or attached to their respective bases.This CSS normally includes—

Requisition, receipt, storage, and distribution ofall classes of supply.Procurement of nonstandard supplies and itemsof materiel.Bath facilities, laundry, and clothing exchange.Graves registration (GRREG) service.Production and/or distribution of potable water.Unit and DS maintenance for all wheeledvehicles, power generation equipment, signal

equipment, diving and marine equipment, andsmall arms.Aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) and aviationintermediate maintenance (AVIM) for assignedaircraft.Limited GS maintenance for SF-peculiar ma-teriel.Airdrop equipment rigging, supply, and repair.Salvage collection.Transportation service.Health service support.Personnel service support.

The SF group and battalion support companies mayrequire MTOE or TDA augmentation to provideCSS support during sustained operations. This isespecially true when—

The SFOB and/or FOBs are established in un-developed theaters in support of contingencyoperations.The SFOB and/or FOBs are not established atfixed facilities.A high percentage of SFODs are committedsimultaneously.

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Sources ofSupply

The SF group draws its supplies from a variety ofsources. The relative importance of each source istheater-dependent. SF commanders must anticipatetheir logistical requirements. They must thencoordinate with their supporting TASOSC todetermine which source of supply can best meet theirneeds. Among these sources of supply are—

Pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets(POMCUS).Operational project stocks.War reserve materiel stocks.Foreign nation support.

POMCUS

Some SF units have Department of the Armyauthorization to receive POMCUS equipment whenthey deploy from CONUS to their theaters ofoperation. The TA usually stores and maintainsthis equipment in the vicinity of the unit’s pro-posed SFOB or FOB. Deploying units mustdetermine existing POMCUS shortages beforedeployment and deploy with those items as well aswith those items not authorized for pre-positioning.Units should update their deployment plans uponreceipt of their annual POMCUS authorizationdocument.

OperationalProject Stocks

SF units use operational project stocks to obtainrequired supplies and equipment above their nor-mal allowances (MTOE, supplemental TDA, levelsauthorized by AR 11-11, and special letters ofauthorization) to support contingency operationsand war plans. These stocks include supplies andequipment for operations in extreme environmentsand for the sustainment of indigenous forces. Theymay also include supplies and equipment that SFunits clandestinely cache in potential operationalareas to support stay-behind operations.

The TASOSC establishes and maintains non-POMCUS operational project stocks to supportARSOF operations. The theater CINC may alsoestablish and maintain operational project stocks tosupport joint SO. Operational project stocks arerestricted to the minimum essential types andquantities of supplies and equipment required tosuccessfully execute the total plan or a prescribedportion of the plan. Stocks normally include onlystandard items listed on the war reserve stockagelist (WRSL). The SF group commander must justifythe inclusion of nonstandard items in project stocks.(AR 710-1 delineates the procedures for requestingand establishing operational projects.)

War ReserveMateriel Stocks

The TASOSC commander, in coordination with theSF group commander, should attempt to obtain ade-quate pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks(PWRMS) in the theater and fill shortages inexisting war reserve materiel stocks (WRMS).Alternatives include—

PWRMS afloat adjacent to the theater of opera-tions.PWRMS in a third country support base (TCSB).WRMS in tailored packages for deployment withthe SF group.

Foreign Nationsupport

FNS is the preferred means to meet unresourcedCSS requirements, within acceptable risk limits. Itcan include almost every aspect of CSS. Foreignpersonnel and organizations can perform many CSSfunctions as well as or better than their UScounterparts. The SF group commander, in coordi-nation with the TMOSC commander, mustdetermine the functional types and levels of FNS hecan accept without unduly jeopardizing OPSEC andmission accomplishment. The TASOSC Director ofLogistic (DOL) provides the SF group S5 with pointsof contact (POCs) of specific foreign nation agenciesor organizations providing support in the theater.

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Developed TheaterLogistics

In a developed theater, the theater sustainmentbase is established. PWRMS and operational projectstocks are in place. FNS agreements exist. Thefollowing paragraphs outline how a SPTCEN in adeveloped theater performs its four logisticsfunctions: supply, field services, maintenance, andtransportation.

SupplyThe service detachment’s supply and transportationsection requests, receives, and stores standard Class

I, II, III, IV, VI, and VII supplies (Figure 14-3) fromthe supporting DS supply and service company in theTAACOM area support group (ASG). All theseclasses of supply (except bulk Class III) are demanditems. The using unit submits a request through theservice detachment to the direct support unit (DSU).The DSU either fills the request from its existingstocks or forwards the request to its supportinggeneral support unit (GSU). The DSU uses a com-bination of supply point, unit, and throughputdistribution. When fixed or mobile post exchangesare unavailable, the supply and transportationsection requests and receives Class VI ration supple-ment sundry packages the same way it does Class Isupplies.

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Bulk Class III is a scheduled item. Based on inputfrom the battalions, the SF group S4 forecasts unitrequirements through logistics channels to theTAMMC. Based upon fuel availability and unitpriorities, the TA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics(DCSLOG) and TAMMC develop a distribution planto allocate fuel to subordinate units.

The supply and transportation section requests andreceives nonstandard SF-peculiar items through theTAMMC. The TAMMC fills the request fromtheater or TA operational project stocks or (in thecase of certain non-DOD items) obtains the itemsthrough the SOC J4.

The supply and transportation section requests,draws, and stores conventional Class V supplies fromthe supporting ammunition supply point (ASP). TheASP is operated by an ordnance conventionalammunition company of the TA ammunition group.It uses supply point distribution. Class V supply isscheduled, not demanded. Based on input from thebattalions, the SF group S3 must determine thegroup’s operational requirements (primarily theUBL and required supply rate [RSR]) and submitthem through operational channels for approvaland allocation by the TA Deputy Chief of Staff forOperations and Plans (DCSOPS). Based on guid-ance from the TA DCSOPS, the TA DCSLOG andTAMMC allocate scarce Class V items by computinga controlled supply rate (CSR). Once the SF groupcommander receives his Class V allocation, he sub-allocates it among his subordinate elements. Basedon these suballocations, the SF group and battalionS3s approve unit Class V requests before the S4scan fill them.

The group or battalion medical section requests andreceives its normal Class VIII supplies from thesupporting DS medical treatment facility (MTF) ofthe TA medical command (MEDCOM). The MTFuses a combination of unit and supply point distri-bution. Class VIII resupply is demanded. The usingunit submits its request to the medical supplysergeant. He forwards the request through medicalchannels to the MTF. The MTF either fills therequest from its existing stocks or forwards therequest to its supporting medical logistics(MEDLOG) unit. For bulk issue of Class VIIIsupplies to fill SF operational requirements, the

MEDCOM normally authorizes direct requests fromthe MEDLOG unit.

The service detachment’s mechanical maintenancesection requests, receives, and stores Class IXsupplies from the supporting DS maintenancecompany in the ASG. The DSU uses supply pointdistribution. Class IX resupply is demanded. Theusing unit submits its request to the mechanicalmaintenance section. It forwards the request to theDSU. The DSU either fills the request from itsexisting stocks or forwards the request to theTAMMC.

The supply and transportation section receives andstores Class X supplies from the CA brigadesupporting the TAACOM. The CA brigade uses acombination of unit, supply point, and throughputdistribution. The using unit submits its requestthrough the base S5. He forwards the requestthrough CA channels.

The supply and transportation section obtains pota-ble and nonpotable water from local sources usingorganic equipment. When water requirements ex-ceed the local supply, the section requests and drawswater from a water supply point established by thesupporting DS supply and service company. The DSUuses supply point distribution.

The supply and transportation section requests andreceives unclassified maps from the supporting DSsupply and service company. The DSU obtains itsunclassified maps from the appropriate TA mapdepot. Using units submit their requests to the S2,who consolidates them and forwards the requestthrough supply channels. The S2 requests andreceives classified maps and other classified intel-ligence products through intelligence channels.

lb meet their operational requirements during thetransition to active operations and during unan-ticipated breaks in normal resupply operations, SFunits maintain UBLs of Class I, II, III, IV, V, VIII,and IX supply items. Commanders should reviewthese UBLs at least annually to ensure theyadequately address current operational require-ments. Commanders should also inspect their UBLsperiodically to ensure they are being properly main-tained, rotated, and secured, and that replacementsupplies and equipment have been requested.

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Field Services

Field services include GRREG, airdrop, clothingexchange and bath, laundry, bread baking, textile andclothing renovation, and salvage. GRREG andairdrop are primary field services because they areessential to the sustainment of combat operations.All others are secondary field services.

Whenever possible, SF teams sustaining fatalcasualties identify the human remains and place themin human remains pouches. They then evacuate theremains to the service detachment for furtherevacuation to the supporting GRREG collectingpoint. If the remains are contaminated, they and thepouches should be so marked. When an SF teamcannot evacuate its dead, it conducts an emergencyburial and reports the burial to the group orbattalion. The group or battalion S4 submits a recordof interment through GRREG channels. Wheneverpossible, a unit chaplain or the SF team commanderconducts an appropriate service to honor the dead.

The group and battalion rigger-air delivery sectionsdo not have the capability to conduct sustainedairdrop support for SF operations. The TAACOMairdrop supply company augments the group’sorganic capabilities by providing the group andbattalion service detachments with dedicated supportteams or by providing GS on a mission basis.

The SFOB and FOBs may not have fixed facilities orcivilian contractors to provide secondary field ser-vices. In this situation, the supporting DS supply andservice company provides these services as soon asthe situation permits.

Maintenance

The service detachment’s mechanical maintenancesection performs consolidated unit-level mainte-nance of wheeled vehicles and power generationequipment. It also performs vehicle recovery. Thesignal detachment’s electronic maintenance sectionperforms consolidated unit- and DS-level mainte-nance of signal equipment. It also performs limitedGS maintenance on SF-peculiar signal equipment.Unit armorers perform decentralized or consolidatedunit-level maintenance of small arms.

When the required maintenance on an item ofequipment exceeds unit capabilities, the mechanical

maintenance section or, electronics maintenancesection evacuates it to the supporting DS main-tenance company or requests on-site repair by amobile maintenance support team from thatcompany. The DS maintenance company performsDS maintenance to return unserviceable equipmentto the user. It evacuates to intermediate GSmaintenance units those items it cannot repair. Italso provides direct exchange service and maintainsa limited operational readiness float (ORF).

There are exceptions to these procedures. Therigger-air delivery section evacuates unserviceableairdrop equipment to the TAACOM airdrop equip-ment repair and supply company. The medicalsection evacuates unserviceable medical equipmentto the supporting DS MTF or MEDLOG unit.The group aviation platoon evacuates unserviceableaircraft and components to the TAACOM AVIMcompany.

For those items of SF-peculiar equipment that theArmy maintenance system cannot repair, the SFgroup must rely on civilian specialists and technicians(US, HN, or third country) and on SF personnel whohave attended civilian maintenance training. Suchequipment may require evacuation to CONUS forrepair at the manufacturer or other selected facility.

Transportation

The service detachment commander is primarilyconcerned with transportation mode operations (air,motor, rail, and water transport). The supply andtransportation section provides the trucks to supportsupply point distribution and other normal CSSactivities. However, it does not have dedicateddrivers for these trucks. The base commander mayorganize a provisional transportation section byassigning dedicated drivers to these trucks. The TAtransportation command (TRANSCOM) may attachappropriate motor and water transportation assets tothe support company for abnormal CSS operations.Otherwise, TRANSCOM supports abnormal trans-portation requirements on a mission basis with its GSassets. The unit S4 coordinates for TRANSCOMsupport through the regional movement control team(RMCT). When the SFOB and FOB(s) are servicedby the same RMCT, the RMCT may require thegroup S4 to consolidate support requests.

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Developed TheaterPersonnel Service

SupportPSS consists of five related areas: personnelmanagement, public affairs, legal services, financeservices, and religious support. SF units plan andconduct most PSS using standard Army systems andprocedures. SF group and battalion S1s deal directlywith their supporting personnel service company(PSC). When the SFOB and FOB(s) are serviced bythe same PSC, the PSC may require the group S1 toconsolidate reports.There are three critical military personnel activitiesthat directly support SF operation strength man-agement, casualty reporting, and replacementoperations.Strength management determines personnel re-placement requirements and influences personnelcross-leveling and replacement distribution deci-sions. The group and battalion S1s use the deliberateArmy personnel accounting and strength reportingsystem to maintain the unit’s personnel data base.They forward their daily personnel summaries andpersonnel requirements reports to the supportingPSC. The battalion S1s provide copies of their reportsto the group S1 so that he can prepare a consolidatedreport for the SF group commander and forwardinformation copies to the SOC J1 and TASOSCDirector of Personnel and Administration (DPA).The supporting PSCs use these reports to submitrequests for individual replacements to the TApersonnel command (PERSCOM).The Army’s casualty management system providesHeadquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA),with information used to notify next of kin andsupport appropriate casualty and survivor assistanceprograms. By-name casualty accounting and report-ing has far-reaching effects on the morale of themilitary and civilian populace and the image of theArmy. Casualty reporting must be 100 percentaccurate, even at the expense of speed of reporting.Nevertheless, reporting should be as rapid as thesituation permits. The losing SF unit submits casual-ty feeder reports and, if required, witness statementsto the battalion or group S1. The S1s consolidate

casualty reports and forward them to the supportingPSC. They manage open cases (for example, soldiersmissing in action) until final disposition is made andprepare letters of sympathy for the appropriatecommander. The PSC verifies and reconciles theinformation before initiating a formal individualcasualty report. The battalion S1s provide informa-tion copies of all by-name casualty reports to thegroup S1.SF replacement operations involve the receipt,processing, and allocation of individual and smallunit (SFOD) replacements. The SF group obtains itsindividual replacements from the supportingPERSCOM using normal replacement procedures.The SOC commander coordinates with the TASOSCcommander to establish priorities of personnel fill.The SPTCEN director receives, billets, and providesmessing for replacements. The S1 and CSMdistribute replacements based on the base com-mander’s priorities. The appropriate AST isolatesand orients replacements for deployed SFODs untilthe ISOFAC director certifies them as prepared forinfiltration.The SF group S3 requests small unit replacements(SFODs) through the TASOSC DPO. The TASOSCDPO arranges an intratheater transfer of SFODs orcoordinates to obtain SFODs from CONUS. Oncethe SFODs arrive at the gaining operational base,they are assigned to the SPTCEN as uncommitteddetachments until the SPTCEN director certifiesthem as operationally ready for a mission.Postal operations move, deliver, and collect personaland official mail. A DS postal platoon normallycollocates with the supporting PSC. The group andbattalion S1s establish internal procedures to collectand deliver mail. These procedures must includeprovisions for redirecting the mail of deceased,missing, and evacuated personnel. The S1s must alsomake provisions for deployed SF personnel whocannot receive or send mail for operational reasons.Finance operations provide normal finance supportto SF personnel. They also provide the operationalfunds that SF teams may require to execute theirmissions. A finance support unit (FSU) normallycollocates with the supporting PSC to provide the fullrange of finance services. These services normallyinclude special mission fund accounts, intelligence

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contingency fund accounts, foreign currency teams to obtain and account for operational funds.operations, and commercial accounts. The group Each SF officer entrusted with government fundsbudget officer, in coordination with the supporting must fully understand what payments are authorizedFSU commander, establishes procedures for SF and how to account for each transaction.

Developed TheaterHealth Service Support

Each SF group and battalion surgeon establishes andoperates an SFOB or FOB dispensary capable ofproviding routine and emergency Level II medicaland dental treatment to assigned and attachedpersonnel. Medical section personnel in thedispensary also provide sustainment training forcombat lifesaver personnel and SF medics.

NOTE: Class II medical treatment is routine andemergency care designed to return the patient toduty or prepare him for evacuation to the support-ing MTF for resuscitative surgery (Class III) or to ahospital for definitive and restorative care (Class IV).The SFOB and FOB dispensaries provide preven-tive medicine services. These services include pestcontrol, water quality surveillance, immunization anddrug prophylaxis activities, and the general surveil-lance of military environments to identify actual orpotential health hazards. SF preventive medicinespecialists train and provide technical supervision of

unit field sanitation teams. They can also participatein military civic action programs.

The SFOB and FOB dispensaries provide veteri-nary services. These services include food qualityassurance inspections, dining facility sanitary inspec-tions, and health services to military animals. SFveterinary specialists assist in the unit preventivemedicine program. They can also participate inmilitary civic action programs.

The TASOSC health service section, in coordinationwith the group surgeon, coordinates TA HSS for theSFOB and FOBs. The TA MEDCOM designatessupporting MTFs and provides the SFOB and FOBdispensaries with–

Medical evacuation capability.Additional preventive medicine, veterinary, anddental support.Medical laboratory services.Hospitalization.Medical intelligence.Medical supply and equipment maintenance.

Undeveloped into an undeveloped theater, it must bring sufficient

Theater CSSresources to survive and operate until the TA estab-lishes a bare base support system and/or makesarrangements for HN and third country support.

An undeveloped theater does not have a significant The bare base support system may function fromUS theater sustainment base. PWRMS, in-theater CONUS, afloat (amphibious shipping or mobile seaoperational project stocks, and FNS agreements are bases), or at a TCSB. It will probably rely heavily onminimal or nonexistent. When an SF unit deploys strategic airlift and/or sealift for resupply.

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CCS Options

Deployed SF units in an undeveloped theater mayhave to bypass normal CSS echelons. They maymaintain direct contact with their parent units inCONUS, or they may requisition directly from theCONUS wholesale logistics system. They may rely onTASOSC contracting and CA expertise to obtainFNS. In practice, the solution may be some com-bination of all three options.

SupportRelationships

The TASOSC commander should arrange habitualsupport relationships between the SF group and theTA elements providing its support package. The sup-port package should be provisionally organized as acomposite support battalion or company, so that thegroup commander does not have to deal with acollection of teams, detachments, and companieswithout a parent control headquarters.

Supply

Normal basic loads are inadequate for SF operationsin an undeveloped theater. For example, an SF unitmay have to deploy with 30 days of supply (15-dayorder-ship time, 10-day operating level, 5-day safetylevel). Because this quantity of supplies exceeds theSF group’s capacity to move and store them, thegroup and battalion S4s normally divide these loadsinto accompanying supplies and preplanned follow-on supplies. Accompanying supplies are normallylimited to the unit’s basic and prescribed loads, plusadditional Class I, III, and V supplies critical to theoperation. The group and battalion S3s must includeaccompanying supplies in all their predeploymentload planning.

Supply procedures for most classes of supply vary inan undeveloped theater. Except for field rations, theSF group may rely heavily on local contract supportfor fresh Class I supplies and dining facility operation.To reduce demand on the CSS system, the SF unitmay purchase Class II, III, IV, and VI supplies locallyor from third party contractors. The SF unit normallyreceives Class V and IX supplies through thestandard US system, but with greater reliance onALOC. The SF unit may be authorized to stocklow-density, high-dollar repair parts not normallyauthorized at unit maintenance level. Class VII

supplies may include a combination of military andcommercial equipment from US and foreign sources.Replacement of unserviceable US militaryequipment depends upon the duration of theoperation, theater GS repair capability, loss rates,and the availability of ORF or PWRMS. The SF unitmay include water supply in an overall contract forcustodial support of the SFOB and FOBs, or it mayobtain water from local sources or from US watersupply points.

Field ServicesThe SF group normally receives appropriate TAaugmentation to perform the primary field ser-vices-GRREG and airdrop-until these capabilitiesbecome available in the COMMZ on an area basis.The SF group may contract for general custodialservices, to include laundry, barber, and PX services.If laundry services are unavailable, the group S4 mustarrange for clothing exchange through the standardUS system.

MaintenanceThe SF group commander must emphasize preven-tive maintenance checks and services in the extreme(tropical, arid, or arctic) environments that typicallyexist in undeveloped theaters. He may adjust thefrequency of periodic services to assist in equipmentreadiness.The SF group normally deploys with attached TA DSmaintenance support teams. The group commandermay contract for supplemental maintenance supportof its Army and commercial equipment.In an undeveloped theater, fixed repair facilities maynot be available and the SF group may be authorizedto perform repairs not normally performed at unitlevel. The SF group commander should review theMTOE to determine what additional tools; specialtools; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipmentitems; and repair parts he needs to meet increasedmaintenance demands caused by dispersed opera-tions in an undeveloped theater.

Transportation

Because undeveloped theaters typically have poorground LOC, Army aviation units habitually deployearly to support CSS operations. If the SF groupreceives additional aviation assets in attachment, thegroup commander must ensure they include an

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adequate maintenance support package. The SFgroup commander may contract for foreign transpor-tation assets to meet his unresourced transportationrequirements.

Personnel ServiceSupport

PSS remains essentially unchanged in anundeveloped theater. The TASOSC DPA developspreplanned replacement packages to maintain SF

unit strength until normal replacement operationscan begin.

Health ServiceSupport

The SF group may have to deploy with an HSSpackage to provide dedicated support until normalTA health services are established. The group sur-geon should consider the use of HN or third countrymedical facilities to augment the medical capabilitiesof the group and battalion medical sections.

ReconstitutionReconstitution operations are specific actions takento restore units that are not combat effective to thedesired level of combat effectiveness. Reconstitutioninvolves more than a surge in normal sustainmentoperations. The reconstitution decision is heavilyinfluenced by unit and individual training, unitorganization, and human factors that build cohesionand esprit. The commander two levels above theattrited unit makes the reconstitution decision. Forexample, the SOC commander, in consultation withthe TSOSC commander, decides how toreconstitute an attrited FOB. The SFOB or FOBcommander decides how to reconstitute an attritedSFOD.

Commanders have two reconstitution options: reor-ganization and regeneration. A commander canexecute them separately, but most often executesthem in combination.

Reorganization is the measures taken within anattrited unit to restore its own combat effectiveness.These measures include reestablishing commandand control, cross-leveling resources between sub-units, matching surviving weapons systems withsurviving crew, and combining two or more attritedsubunits to form a composite combat-effectivesubunit. The senior surviving member of an attritedunit assumes command and immediately begins

reorganization pending the reconstitution decision ofhigher headquarters.

Regeneration rebuilds an attrited unit through thelarge-scale replacement of personnel and materieland the conduct of mission-essential training.Replacement personnel and materiel may comefrom redistributed resources reserves, or theresources of higher or supporting echelons.

When a commander determines that he cannotobtain the resources to restore an attrited unit tocombat effectiveness, he may resort to redistributionas an alternative to reconstitution. Redistributionreduces an attrited unit to zero strength and transfersits remaining resources to other units. Redistributionis the least desirable option.

If the SOC commander decides that he cannotimmediately restore the operational effectiveness ofan SFOB or FOB, he must assign its mission toanother SFOB or FOB until the TASOSCcommander can regenerate the base or obtain areplacement unit from CONUS. Surviving assets ofthe attrited base may move to that base to augmentexisting SFOB or FOB assets. If the SF groupcommander decides that he cannot immediatelyrestore the combat effectiveness of an attritedSFOD, he normally commits another SFOD toassume the mission. He may attach survivingmembers of the attrited SFOD to the new SFOD,particularly if the SFOD was operating in deniedterritory.

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Resupply of SF Teamsin the JSOA

An SF team, in coordination with the SFOB or FOBstaff, determines the quantity and types of equip-ment and supplies with which it will infiltrate. Thefollowing factors influence the decision on accom-panying supplies:

Assigned mission and scope and duration ofoperations.Resistance force size, capabilities, logisticalneeds, and responsiveness to US control.Hostile capabilities.Availability of resources in the operational area.Method of infiltration.Operational posture (low-visibility or clan-destine).Difficulty of repairing or replacing critical items inthe operational area.

Based on the same considerations, the SFOB or FOBstaff establishes supply levels for each class of sup-ply in the JSOA and determines the sequence,method, and timing of delivery. Once deployed,the SF commander may recommend changes tothe resupply schedule.

The SFOB or FOB schedules three types of resupplymissions: automatic, emergency, and on-call. TheSPTCEN service detachment requisitions and re-ceives the supplies and equipment for these missionsfrom theater or TA operational project stocks or warreserve stocks.

An automatic resupply replaces lost or damagedequipment and provides additional items that couldnot accompany the SF team during infiltration.Automatic resupply provides essential subsistence,training, and operational supplies to the SF teamand its indigenous force on a prearranged schedule.It is preplanned as to delivery time, location,contents, and identification marking system andauthentication. The SFOB or FOB delivers itautomatically unless the deployed SF team cancels,modifies, or reschedules the delivery.

An emergency resupply contains mission-essentialequipment and supplies to restore operationalcapability and survivability to the SF team and itsindigenous force. An emergency resupply is pre-planned like an automatic resupply. The SFOB orFOB delivers an emergency resupply when either ofthe following conditions exist:

Radio contact has not been established betweenthe deployed SF team and the SFOB or FOBwithin a predesignated time after infiltration.The deployed SF team fails to make a pre-determined consecutive number of scheduledradio contacts.

An on-call resupply provides the deployed SF teamwith equipment and supplies to meet operationalrequirements that cannot be predicted or scheduledduring mission preparation. On-call supplies are heldin readiness at TAACOM depots or the SPTCEN forimmediate delivery when the SF team requests them.

To ease handling and transportation within theJSOA, the SPTCEN service detachment normallyrigs equipment and supplies in appropriate deliverycontainers weighing 500 pounds or less. The contentsof each container are—

Packaged in waterproofed and man-portable (50pounds or less) loads.Marked with a prearranged code to identifycontents.Fitted with carrying straps or mounted on pack-boards for easy transport.

SF uses the Catalog Supply System (a brevity codesystem) to expedite on-call resupply requests,ensure accurate identification of supply items, andminimize message length. The Catalog SupplySystem catalog lists equipment and supplies by classof supply. It groups associated equipment andsupplies into convenient unit sets. It then assignscode words to each catalog item and set. The SOCJ4, in coordination with the TNOSC DOL,prepares the theater supply catalog and configuresoperational project stocks into unit sets. The SOC J6or TASOSC signal officer reproduces the catalog asan SOI item.

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PSYOP are an integral part of all SF activities. The mere presence of SF has a psychological impact onthe attitudes and behavior of foreign military forces and civilian populations. To develop desirableattitudes, official activities must be wisely conceived, and individual conduct must be sensible. Thischapter focuses on PSYOP strategies that can achieve such attitudes and benefit SF operations. Italso discusses PSYOP planning and employment considerations for SF missions.

PSYOP in a ConflictEnvironment

PSYOP are planned operations to convey selectedinformation and indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objective rea-soning, and ultimately the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, and individuals.The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforceforeign attitudes and behaviors favorable to theoriginator’s objectives. (See FM 33-1 for a detaileddiscussion of PSYOP.)

In a conflict environment, PSYOP take on an addedsignificance. Modem conflict encompasses allspheres of national activity political, military, eco-nomic, social, and cultural. Noncombat activities canbe as decisive in conflict as combat operations are inconventional warfare. Failure to engage properly onthe noncombat fronts can mean defeat, regardless ofthe outcome of military operations.

Modem conflict is frequently a protracted politico-military struggle between political systems. Allmilitary, economic, psychological, and social activitiesare effective only insofar as they support the political

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objectives. PSYOP serve as a major weapon in thispolitico-military struggle by—

Building and sustaining belief and support forthe friendly power’s political system, includingits ideology, infrastructure, and political pro-grams.

Attacking the legitimacy and credibility of thehostile power’s political system.

Mobilizing popular support for military, para-military, security, and intelligence operations.

Mobilizing popular support for political, social,and economic programs.

Publicizing anticipated reforms and programs tobenefit the populace once the hostile power isdefeated.Shifting the loyalty of hostile forces and theirsupporters to the friendly power.

In a conflict environment, the initial and primaryPSYOP operator is the individual SF soldier. Hemust understand that there is more to PSYOP thanloudspeakers and leaflets. He must be able to useindividual and group motivation, perception man-agement, cross-cultural communications, and similarPSYOP techniques to influence foreign audiences inhis daily face-to-face-contacts.

PSYOPPlanning

PSYOP are particularly important to SF. SF unitsoften cannot accomplish their mission without thesupport of foreign military or paramilitary forces andthe indigenous population. The earlier PSYOPpersonnel advise and assist SF units in missionplanning, the greater the chances of success.PSYOP personnel advise and assist SF units inobtaining and sustaining the support of the neutraland uncommitted segments of a foreign power.They develop and execute PSYOP that supportSF objectives and exploit hostile vulnerabilities inthe operational area. They design PSYOP fordeployed SF teams to execute. They recommendand plan such actions as civil disobedience, rallies,and demonstrations that degrade or neutralizehostile influences on the target audiences. Theyalso review SF plans to identify potentially adverseeffects on target audiences that could affect missionaccomplishment. PSYOP personnel train SF soldiersin the customs they must honor in the operationalarea to avoid offending the indigenous population.They identify influential population segments(clans, tribes, and sects, for example) that may

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affect the mission. They also provide basic andspecial PSYOP assessments that add to the overallintelligence effort in the operational area.

PSYOP planners also advise SF commanders andtheir staffs on the psychological impact of militaryoperations on target audiences within the operationalarea. For example, PSYOP personnel can advise anSF team in a denied area where the local populacemay turn the team into the authorities because ofreprisals or economic disruptions. During targetassessments of bridges, electric grids, and similartargets of economic or social significance, PSYOPpersonnel can assist in determining the impact onlocal support.

An SF commander can make an operation moreeffective if he determines its probable psychologicalimpact in advance and then exploits it during theoperation. Any operation has the potential toproduce a negative psychological impact on thepopulation. PSYOP advisors should evaluate pastcombat operations (conducted by US forces, SOF-trained forces, or allied forces) that have created anegative psychological impact to determine whatfactors were at fault so they can be avoided in futureoperations. Other operations, such as civic actionprograms, have a positive psychological impact.

FM 31-20

These operations create goodwill with the local Permanent presence of hostile security forces inpopulace that can be exploited in future operations. populated areas.SF planners should consider the psychological impact Relationship between hostile security forces andof the following four factors: civilian populace.

Effects of combat operations on morale ofImpact of noncombatant casualties. friendly and hostile forces.

PSYOP Organization forSpecial Operations

The SOC integrates all PSYOP support of jointSO. PSYOP elements that support a SOC mayfunction under varied C2 arrangements. The exactorganizational structure is determined by themission, the resources available, and the preroga-tives of the SOC commander. The SOC commandernormally decentralizes his PSYOP assets tosubordinate SO elements (Figure 15-1).

At SF group level, a tailored PSYOP detachmentnormally supports SF requirements under the staffsupervision of the organic PSYOP staff officer. Thegroup PSYOP detachment comes from the theaterPSYOP force, normally the EAC PSYOP groupassigned to TA. It normally includes capabilitiesfor target analysis, propaganda development, andlimited media production. The group PSYOP de-tachment does not normally have its own strategicdissemination means. When conducting battlefieldor consolidation PSYOR, it may have its own tac-tical dissemination means. The detachment forwardsrequirements beyond its organic capabilities throughthe SOC PSYOP staff element to the theaterPSYOP force. The theater PSYOP force provides GScapabilities that include—

The PSYOP group’s research and analysiscompany (target analysis and propaganda devel-opment) and strategic dissemination company(radio, print, TV).

The PSYOP battalion’s operational supportcompany (target analysis, propaganda devel-opment, counterpropaganda, interrogation anddebriefing, print, audiovisual, loudspeaker).

Taildored DS PSYOP elements may also support SFrequirements at SF battalion level and below. ThePSYOP element commander serves as PSYOP staffofficer to the supported SF commander. The ele-ment may range in size from a small two-man teamsupporting a deployed SF team, to a three- toeight-man PSYOP assessment team, to a fullyoperational support detachment similar to thatnormally found at SF group level. These PSYOPelements, whatever their size, have access to thesupport capabilities of a larger PSYOP unit. Forexample, a two-man PSYOP team deployed withan SF team can send requests back to its parentPSYOP unit for assistance in developing themes,messages, and media products for use in theoperational area. The parent PSYOP unit can alsointegrate these themes and messages into strategicPSYOP such as radio or TV broadcasts into theoperational area.

During mission preparation, the SF commandershould request a PSYOP assessment team todetermine what PSYOP assets are necessary tosupport the mission. The SF commander mayhave to limit the size of the team. The supportingPSYOP unit commander then organizes the teamwith the correct mix of PSYOP personnel, subjectto personnel constraints.

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PSYOP Area should also request a copy of the current basicPSYOP study concerning their operational area. A

Assessment basic PSYOP study addresses in detail the political,military, economic, and social situation in a given

Committed SF teams should request a PSYOP area. PSYOP units can also develop special PSYOPassessment of their operational area. At a mini- studies for specific situations or operational areas.mum, this assessment will include information about These PSYOP assessments and studies are also use-all major target audiences. Deploying SF teams ful for general area study and IPB.

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PSYOP in Supportof UW

A resistance organization plans and conducts PSYOPin support of its own needs and objectives. The SFteam and its PSYOP advisors must convince theresistance leadership to support US national PSYOPobjectives in the region. They must also persuade theleadership to support themes and messages devel-oped at the supporting operational base. In addition,the SF team must convince the resistance leaders toconduct PSYOP that create popular support for theresistance organization, both in and out of the JSOA.

By their presence in a particular country, SF teamsserve as tangible evidence of US interest and sup-port. Through daily face-to-face meetings with localleaders, SF soldiers strengthen mutual respect,confidence, and trust. They gain valuable insightsinto the problems of the resistance organization.They also improve rapport by sharing the same liv-ing and fighting conditions. These shared associationsand mutual respect promote a favorable climate toconduct UW operations. However, SF soldiers mustavoid identifying so closely with the resistance orga-nization that they ignore US interests and objectives.

Deployed SF teams and their PSYOP advisors train,advise, and assist the resistance organization intarget analysis, media selection, and propagandadevelopment. Conventional PSYOP techniques areequally applicable during UW operations. However,PSYOP personnel must be aware of those UWemployment considerations that differ significantlyfrom conventional PSYOP employment (AppendixJ). There are normally four major UW targetaudiences that PSYOP must address: the uncom-mitted, hostile sympathizers, hostile military forces,and resistance sympathizers.

The general population may initially be neutral oractively oppose the resistance organization becauseof fear or uncertainty about its aims or the likeli-hood of its success. PSYOP support must thereforestress that—

The resistance organization shares the political,economic, and social goals of the population.

The United States and its allies, in supporting theresistance organization, support these same goals.The resistance organization will be successful.

Hostile sympathizers include willing collaborators,unwilling collaborators who collaborate under du-ress, and passive hostile sympathizers. PSYOP seekto instill doubt and fear in this target audience.PSYOP may be conducted in conjunction withpositive political action programs that identify anddiscredit hostile collaborators or weaken their beliefin the strength and cause of the hostile power.Punitive action against such collaborators may resultin hostile reprisals and a loss of broad civilian sup-port for the resistance organization. However,hostile overreaction can be exploited to buildpopular support for the resistance organization.Hostile military forces may be of the same na-tionality as the population, or they may representan occupying power or one assisting the hostilegovernment. PSYOP focus on the hostile soldier’sfrustrations to lower his morale, reduce his effective-ness, and create feelings of inadequacy, insecurity,and fear. These feelings increase his susceptibility toPSYOP and make him more vulnerable to persua-sion to surrender, malinger, show disaffection, ordesert. PSYOP directed against this audience seek tomake the members feel—

Isolated.Improperly supported.Doubtful of the outcome of the struggle.Distrustful of each other.Doubtful of the morality of their cause.

Resistance sympathizers are sympathetic to thegoals of the resistance organization but are notactive members of it. PSYOP directed at this targetaudience stress appeals to provide active (thoughgenerally clandestine) support or to cooperate pas-sively with the resistance organization. Inherent inthese appeals is enforcement of a rigid personal codeof conduct by resistance members. The resistanceleadership must ensure strict respect for the people,their sensitivities, culture, customs, and needs. Thewords and deeds of the resistance organization mustassure the people that it will help protect them fromthe hostile power and that it is the instrument ofpolitical, social, and economic progress.

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PSYOP in Supportof FID

PSYOP elements normally deploy in support of SFunits as part of a SAF. PSYOP objectives in FIDinclude—

Assisting the HN in gaining or retaining thesupport of its people.Assisting the HN in defeating the insurgents.Establishing a favorable US image in the HN.Favorably presenting US actions and intentionsto neutral groups and the internationalcommunity.Assisting the HN in supporting defector reha-bilitation programs.Providing close and continuous PSYOP supportto increase the effect of CA operations.

Deployed SF units and their PSYOP advisors train,advise, and assist the HN in target analysis, mediaselection, and propaganda development. Con-ventional PSYOP techniques are equally applicableduring FID operations. There are normally fivemajor PSYOP target audiences in FID: insurgents,civilian population, HN and allied forces, neutralgroups, and external hostile powers.

PSYOP seek to discredit insurgents and to isolatethem from the population; to create disruption, dis-sension, and low morale; and to cause defection

within insurgent ranks. PSYOP should emphasizenational programs that attempt to win the insurgentsover to the government side and, most important,to maintain their continued support.

Since popular support is essential, PSYOP seek togain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support forthe government, its leaders, and its programs.PSYOP personnel should also make a significanteffort to win popular support for the presence of USand allied forces in the HN.

PSYOP seek to build and sustain the morale of HNand allied forces. The loyalty, discipline, andmotivation of these forces are key factors inaccomplishing the FID mission.

PSYOP seek to gain the support or at least the con-tinued neutrality of neutral groups inside and outsidethe HN. PSYOP programs are normally positiveand constructive, stressing the tangible accomplish-ments of the HN government. The PSYOPcommunications effort, in part, should discouragepublic apathy and all activities that assist theinsurgents.

PSYOP seek to convince external hostile powerssupporting the insurgents that—

It is not in their best interests to continue theirsupport.The insurgents will fail.They should redirect their support to the HN.

PSYOP in Support of Ongoing strategic PSYOP may make the indige-

Other SF Operationsnous population more supportive in the event ofchance contact.

SR, DA and CT missions normally involve minimal These SF operations, like those in FID and UW,contact between SF soldiers and the indigenous also have psychological impact. In particular, DApopulation. However, when contact is required, or and CT operations should be planned and exe-when chance contacts do occur, SF soldiers must cuted to maximize their negative impact on hostileapply their PSYOP skills to accomplish their mission. target audiences.

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Successful SF operations depend upon the support of the civilian population. Without popular support, aUW or FID mission will fail. SF teams must therefore help their supported indigenous forces to mobilize thecivilian population to support their mission. They must also consider the impact of all their activities on thecivilian population. This chapter discusses how civil-military operations support SF operations. (SeeFM 41-10 for a more detailed discussion of CA support of SO.)

Command SupportOperations

Elements of a CA battalion (FID/UW) normallysupport each committed SF unit assigned a UW orFID mission. These CA elements conduct thefollowing activities in support of SF commanders:

Train and advise members of the supported SFunit in CMO and the political, economic, social,and cultural factors that influence SF operations.Identify and squire foreign resources to assist theSF unit in accomplishing its mission.Coordinate with other agencies to minimizecivilian interference with SF operations.

Assist the SF commander in meeting legal andmoral obligations to the local population, familiesof supported indigenous forces, and persons dis-placed by SF operations.Supplement the intelligence effort by collectinginformation during CMO.Act as staff focal point for cultural considerationsthat affect SF operations.Coordinate and integrate CA activities withPSYOP activities.Provide technical advice and assistance on civilassistance, military civic action, and humanitarianassistance programs.

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Role of CAin UW

The supporting CA element trains, advises, andassists deploying SF teams in CMO. The element alsoadvises the teams on the political, economic, social,and cultural factors they must understand beforedeploying into the JSOA. CA planning and trainingfor UW must consider the following factors:

The theater CINC’s politico-military mission (forexample, restore the government-in-exile) andits effect on the resistance organization duringand after hostilities.The strengths, weaknesses vulnerabilities, andlikely intentions of the hostile political orga-nization.Likely hostile countermeasures to isolate theresistance organization physically or psycho-logically from the population.Resistance activities that the hostile power canexploit to neutralize US support or mobilize worldopinion against the resistance.Organization and potential development of theresistance organization.The political, social, economic, and security needsof the various segments of the population.

Once the SF team deploys into the JSOA, theCA element at the operational base provides CAadvice and assistance as required. It may also assistin the administration of refugee camps that serve asrecruiting and/or training bases for the resistanceorganization.Selected CA members or teams may accompanydeploying SF teams when the mission requirestheir immediate presence in the JSOA. Normally,however, CA teams do not infiltrate into the JSOAuntil the resistance organization develops and

establishes relatively secure base areas underresistance control. Deployed CA teams advise andassist the area command and the SF team by—

Expanding the influence of the resistance orga-nization into areas not under its control.Developing the area command structure, re-sistance political organization, and effectiveadministration of resistance-controlled terriroty.Developing the auxiliary to support and sustainsufficient combat forces.Providing CA input to operational planning ofthe area command.Assisting in the transition and consolidation ofpower in the JSOA after the end of hostilities(for example, transition of the shadow gov-ernment into an actual government or its mergerwith a government-in-exile).Demobilizing the resistance force.

Deployed CA teams assist the supported SF teamby assuming responsibility for advising and assistingthe auxiliary. Specific functions include developmentof—

Means and procedures to finance, pay, andaccount for locally procured resources.Production facilities and supply distribution sys-tems.PRC measures within resistance-controlled ter-ritory.

Deployed CA teams also provide operational adviceand assistance to the area command and the SF team.Specific areas of concern include advising on—

The impact of resistance tactical operations andlikely hostile countermeasures (for example,reprisals, forced relocations, confiscation of re-sources) on the civilian population.Appropriate standards of conduct and behaviorfor resistance forces.

Role of CA support of the HN government. CA support mayrange from staff advice and assistance to the

in FID commitment of CA units. Activities may include—

The primary objective of CA in FID is to help HN Coordinating SF operations with appropriate HN,forces mobilize the people and other resources in US Mission, and international agencies.

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Minimizing civilian interference with SF opera-tions.

Providing civil assistance to HN governmentagencies.

Serving as the SF unit’s focal point for communityrelations.

Advising and assisting SF units conductingmilitary civic action or humanitarian assistanceprograms.

Advising and assisting SF units in planning andimplementing a civil defense program.

Supplementing the SF intelligence collection ef-fort.

Supporting displaced person operations, to in-clude advising or assisting the HN government inthe establishment and operation of camps.Advising and assisting HN government agenciesin the implementation of PRC programs.

Civil assistance programs improve the capabilities ofHN civil authorities to deal with the political, eco-nomic, and social aspects of IDAD. Civil assistancemay be temporary or it may involve activities of amore permanent nature.

SF units participate in military civic action projectsthat enhance HN economic and social developmentand gain the active support of the population. Suchparticipation should always emphasize the HN role.

Role of CA will be a civilian presence in the objective area that

in DA and CT could interfere with the SF operation, a CA elementmay accompany the SF team. This CA element

The primary role of CA in these activities is to establishes and operates collecting points forprovide CA input during pre-mission planning and displaced civilians, rescued hostages, or non-preparation. If the situation indicates that there combatant evacuees.

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APPENDIX A

Operating Systems

This appendix introduces the concept of function-oriented operating systems as a means of describinghow SF commanders accomplish the vertical andhorizontal integration of their activities. It begins byproviding a combined arms perspective that is muchbroader than the traditional focus on combat armsmaneuver at the tactical level. The appendix thendescribes the Army’s conventional operating systems.Finally, it applies the BOS to SF capabilities in amanner that is useful to SF commanders duringmission planning and execution.

CombinedArms

The combined arms concept stresses the use ofdifferent arms and services in combination tomaximize their survival and combat effectiveness.

The combined arms concept has existed for centuries,but the nature of the combination and the organi-zational level at which it occurs has varied greatlyamong armies over time. In World War I, the USArmy’s square division stressed the tactics ofsupplementary or reinforcing combined arms. Artil-lery, engineers, and tanks were used to increase theeffectiveness of infantry in close combat. In WorldWar II, the US Army shifted its level of combinedarms organization to the regimental combat team andarmored combat command (the brigade in today’sterminology). The Army also changed its tactics toemphasize complementary combined arms. Thestrengths of each arm compensated for theweaknesses of the others to create a synergistic effect.

Since World War II, the growing complexity ofmodem conventional warfare has led to greaterspecialization within the combat arms. Combinedarms commanders now recognize that all CS and CSSelements are equally important. They can no longersimply concentrate their combat forces on thebattlefield. To be successful in sustained combatoperations today, they must synchronize the effectsof their total force.

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Army OperatingSystems

To further refine the combined arms concept, theArmy has adopted a Blueprint of the Battlefield foreach level of war. Each blueprint defines a numberof operating systems that integrate all combat, CS,and CSS activities by function, rather than by mis-sion, branch, or unit (Figure A-l). This approachrepresents a new methodology for how to think aboutwar and other military operations. This methodologydemands that commanders and their staffs think interms of integrated systems, rather than orienting onthe units that compose those systems.Each operating system represents a hierarchy offunctions (Figure A-2). By design, each functionappears in only one operating system and thedefinition of each operating system clearlydistinguishes its modular functions. together, the

operating systems provide a framework for analysisand integration.The application of these blueprints and theiroperating systems depends upon the stated purposeof the analysis or integration effort. Among thepurposes of the blueprints are—

Mission area analysis, to identify capabilitiesissues.Concepts and doctrine development, to identifyfunctional interdependencies and eliminateduplication of effort.Force analysis and integration, to identify missionessential tasks and the capabilities of units toexecute them.Training development, to provide a systematiccombined arms perspective for the developmentand evaluation of unit training programs.Mission planning and execution, to ensure thatthe capabilities of the total force are addressedand fully integrated.

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ApplicationOf BOS

The tactical-level BOS and operational-level theateroperating systems (TOS) are shown in Figures A-3and A-4. (The strategic-level global operatingsystems [GOS] are still under development.) TheBOS focus on Army units at corps level and below andon battlefield functions performed in a combat zoneby Army units at corps level and below. The TOSmore closely approximate SF functions bemuse theTOS focus on functions performed in a theater of

operations by joint and combined forces at EAC.However, the TOS do not have the degree of detailrequired to analyze or integrate SF operations at thetactical level of execution. Additionally, the Army hasintegrated the BOS into its tactical doctrine, but hasnot yet included the TOS in its EAC doctrine.Therefore, SF commanders must apply the BOSdifferently to (Figure A-5)—

Portray SF functions in terms that are useful tothem.Provide linkages that permit combat developers,doctrine developers, and training developers toportray SF functions in terms that areunderstandable to the conventional Army.

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NOTE: For ease of use, the BOS are presentedbelow in the same order that they would beaddressed in an OPLAN or OPORD.

Intelligence

The SF intelligence system performs the samefunctions as conventional intelligence systems. (SeeChapter 13.) It includes the—

Planners and coordinators in the group andbattalion S2 sections.Producers and collectors in the group andbattalion MI detachments.SFOD members who are involved in thecollection, processing, and dissemination ofinformation.

SF commanders rely heavily on theater and nationalintelligence systems. SF operations often require thedissemination of near-real-time strategic intelli-gence down to the tactical level of execution. Thisrequirement places unique demands on theintelligence system.

Maneuver

The SF maneuver system includes the SFODs and,when applicable, their indigenous combat forces.These forces move, navigate, engage hostile forceswith direct fire, control terrain, and influence thepopulation.

The SF group and battalion commanders employ themaneuver system by directing and synchronizing theactivities of independently deployed SF teams. Theseteams infiltrate their operational areas to gainpositional advantage in the operational or strategicrear of a hostile power. There they conduct SFoperations unilaterally or by recruiting, organizing,training, equipping, advising, and/or leadingindigenous combat forces. There are normally noadjacent friendly forces capable of providing mutualsupport.

Army, Air Force, and Navy infiltration andexfiltration means provide mobility to the SFmaneuver system. Once deployed in its operationalares, an SF team usually depends on indigenoustransportation for movement, although it may haveorganic tactical mobility (for example, the desertvehicle mobility system or over-snow vehicles).

Fire SupportThe primary SF fire support system is the terminalguidance capability of the SFODs. SF teams do notnormally have organic fire support means (exceptlight mortars). They often operate beyond the rangeof field artillery and close air support. As a result, SFcommanders must often coordinate with higherheadquarters for operational fires to obtain the SFequivalent of fire support. During FID operationsand certain DA missions SF teams may receive firesupport from armed helicopter field artillery, navalgunfire, and/or close air support aircraft (to includeAC-130 gunships). In other SF operations, organicfire support means may be provided to the indigenouscombat forces of the SF maneuver system.

The BOS categorize PSYOP as nonlethal firesupport. All SF operations have psychologicalimplications. For this reason, PSYOP support is asvital to most SF operations as artillery support is toconventional military operations. SF units routinelyemploy PSYOP against hostile, neutral, and friendlytarget audiences. (See Chapter 15.) Therefore, SFconsiders PSYOP a major subsystem of the firesupport BOS. The SF PSYOP subsystem includesthe—

Planners and coordinators in the group andbattalion PSYOP staff elements.Producers and disseminator in attached andsupporting PSYOP units.All SFOD members.

SF commanders rely on organic or attached PSYOPstaff elements to ensure the total integration ofPSYOP, from the earliest phase of mission planninguntil mission completion. The TA’s PSYOP group andother theater PSYOP assets employ strategicdissemination means to support SF operations. Whenappropriate, but particularly during FID operations,tactical PSYOP units may be attached to SF down tocompany or even SFOD level.

Because SF teams attack hostile air targetsoffensively as well as defensively, SF defines theoffensive counterair function as a function within thefire support BOS. This definition eases verticalintegration with the TOS operational fires system.

Air DefenseBy TOE, SF units do not have an organic air defensesystem. They mainly employ passive air defense

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measures to protect their elements. They rely onconventional theater air defense systems to provideactive protection of their operational bases. SelectedSF elements organize and train MANPAD teams toprovide point air defense. If required, SF com-manders must coordinate with higher headquartersfor additional air defense protection. This protectionmay include provision of an organic air defensecapability to the indigenous combat forces of the SFmaneuver system.

Mobility andSurvivability

This BOS includes two major subsystems engineerand NBC. It also includes those measures thatenhance force protection.

SF commanders do not have a separate engineersubsystem to perform mobility functions. The SFmaneuver system performs mobility functions on anondedicated basis as part of its normal operations.SF commanders must coordinate with higherheadquarters for dedicated engineer support toaugment organic capabilities when required. Thissupport may include provision of an organic engineercapability to the indigenous combat forces of the SFmaneuver system.

SF units rely on the same measures as conventionalunits for their survivability. (See Chapter 7.) Thesemeasures include—

Stationing the bulk of their C2 and supportelements deep within the COMMZ.Employing OPSEC, deception operations, andcounterintelligence activities to conceal true SFcapabilities and intentions.Maintaining standard defensive NBC capabilities.Providing physical security to SF operationalbases.

Combat ServiceSupport

The SF CSS system performs the same functions asconventional CSS systems. (See Chapter 14.) Itincludes the—

Planners and coordinators in the group andbattalion S1 and S4 sections.Operators in the group and battalion supportcompanies.SFOD members who are involved in CSS.

The SF commanders rely heavily on the TA CSSsystem. The organic CSS capabilities of the SF groupand battalion are similar to the unit-level capabilitiesfound in a conventional combat arrns brigade. The TACSS system normally provides all DS-level CSSsupport to SF units on an area basis by nondedicatedCSS units. When area support is inappropriate orinfeasible, the TA provides CSS on a unit basis bydedicated CSS units. This nonstandard arrangementis most likely to occur in undeveloped theaters orduring contingency operations.The BOS categorize CMO as a subsystem of CSS.However, CMO pervade every aspect of UW and FIDoperations. (See Chapter 16.) As a result, CMObecome operationally significant to an extent onlyrarely found in conventional military operations.Therefore, SF considers CMO as a major subsystemof the CSS BOS. The SF CMO subsystem includesthe—

Planners and coordinators in the group andbattalion S5 sections.Operators in attached and supporting CA units.All SF members engaged in combined activities.

All SFOD members must be area-oriented andlanguage qualified to function effectively. Thefull-time CA planners, coordinators, and operatorsnormally support SF efforts with technical advice,training, and assistance. When appropriate, CAteams may be attached to deployed SF teams to takeover some of their noncombat CMO functions.

Command andControl

The SF C2 system performs the same functions asconventional military C2 systems. (See Chapters 5, 6,and 7.) It consists of the—

SF group battle staff.SF operational bases at group, battalion, andcompany level.SF command and control elements collocatedwith supported conventional headquarters atcorps or higher level.SFOD command groups.Communications systems that connect all C2nodes.

The SFOD command group is the only element of theSF C2 system that integrates all seven BOS toconduct its operations. All other SF C2 elementsdirect or support the SFOD and integrate its activitieswith those of appropriate friendly TOS and BOS.

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NOTE: In this and subsequent appendixes, the following acronyms apply: APPENDIXSACATLDEFCOM-Supreme Allied Commander, Alantis Defense CommandATLDEFCOM-Alantis Defense CommandCINCUSATL-Commander-in-Chief, US Alantis CommandUSATLCOM-US Alantis CommandCOMSOCATL-Commander, Special Operations Command AlantisSOCATL-Special Operations Command Alantis

B

Sample GroupOperation Plan

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APPENDIX C

Sample BattalionOperation Plan

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APPENDIX D

PreliminaryAssessment Format

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APPENDIX E

Sample SOCMission Letter

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APPENDIX F

Sample GroupMission Letter

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APPENDIX G

Sample BattalionMission Letter

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APPENDIX H

Special ForcesMission Briefback Format

This appendix provides an outline format for an information about a specific SF mission. The basicSF mission briefback. It can also be used by a outline is general but is flexible enough to be usedgroup or battalion staff to prepare an initial mission for any doctrinal SF mission. The user must modifybriefing. It is a systematic means for presenting the outline by deleting portions that do not apply.

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APPENDIX I

Area StudyOutline Format

This appendix provides an outline format for an area coverage of a given operational area. As time is madestudy. This format provides a systematic means for available for further study, various subjects should becompiling and retaining essential information to subdivided and assigned to selected detachmentsupport SF operations. Although the basic outline is members to produce a more detailed analysis ofgeneral, it is flexible enough to permit detailed specified areas of interest.

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APPENDIX J

PSYOP Supportof a US-Sponsored

Resistance Force

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Glossary

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Part II. Definitions

antiterrorism - Defensive measures used to reducethe vulnerability of individuals and property toterrorism. Also called AT. (JSC Pub 1-02) (See alsocombatting counterterrorism and terrorism.)

area assessment - In unconventional warfare, thecollection of specific information prescribed by thecommander to commence immediately after in-filtration. It is a continuous operation, and itconfirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to intelligenceacquired from area studies and other sources priorto infiltration.

area command - In unconventional warfare, theorganizational structure established within a jointspecial operations area to command and control re-sistance forces. It consists of the area commander,his staff, and representatives of the resistance ele-ment, to include Special Forces after infiltration.

asset (intelligence) - (DOD, IADB) Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation,or supply—at the disposition of an intelligenceorganization for use in an operational or supportrole. Often used with a qualifying term such as agentasset or propaganda asset. (JCS Pub 1-02)

auxiliary -In unconventional warfare, that elementof the resistance force established to provide theorganized civilian support of the resistance move-ment. (AR 310-25)

chemical warfare - (DOD) All aspects of militaryoperations involving the employment of lethal andincapacitating munitions/agents and the warning andprotective measures associated with such offensiveoperations. Since riot control agents and herbicidesare not considered to be chemical warfare agents,those two items will be referred to separately orunder the broader term chemical, which will be usedto include all types of chemical munitions/agentscollectively. The term chemical warfare weaponsmay be used when it is desired to reflect both lethal

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and incapacitating munitions/agents of either chem-ical or biological origin. (JCS Pub 1-02)

civil affairs - (DOD, IADB) Those phases of theactivities of a commander which embrace the rela-tionship between the military forces and civilauthorities and people in a friendly country or areaor occupied country or area when military forcesare present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: a. mattersconcerning the relationship between military forceslocated in a country or area and the civil authoritiesand people of that country or area usually involvingperformance by the military forces of certain func-tions or the exercise of certain authority normallythe responsibility of the local government. Thisrelationship may occur prior to, during, or sub-sequent to military action in time of hostilities orother emergency and is normally covered by a treatyor other agreement, expressed or implied; andb. military government: the form of administrationby which an occupying power exercisesexecutive, legislative, and judicial authority overoccupied territory. (JCS Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations - The complex of activitiesin support of military operations embracing theinteraction between the military force and civilianauthorities fostering the development of favorableemotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly,or hostile groups. (FM 41-10)

clandestine operation – (DOD, I, IADB) An activityto accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, andother similar activities sponsored or conducted bygovernmental departments or agencies, in such awayas to assure secrecy or concealment. (JCS Pub 1-02)

collateral mission activities - The inherent capa-bilities of all military forces may periodically beapplied to accomplish missions other than those forwhich the forces are principally organized, trained,and equipped. Collateral activities in which specialoperations forces, by virtue of inherent capabilities,may be tasked to participate include humanitarianassistance, security assistance, search and rescue,counternarcotics, antiterrorism and other securityactivities, and special activities. (USCINCSOC)

combatant command - The authority to performthose functions of command involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives and giving authoritative direc-tion necessary to accomplish the mission. COCOMincludes directive authority over all aspects ofmilitary operations joint training, and logistics.COCOM should be exercised through the com-manders of assigned normal organizational units orthrough the commanders of subordinate commandsand forces. COCOM provides full authority toorganize and employ forces as the CINC deemsnecessary to accomplish assigned missions and toretain or delegate operational control or tacticalcontrol as necessary. COCOM does not, of itself,include such matters as administration, discipline,internal organization, and unit training. COCOM isexercised solely by the commanders of unified andspecified commands. (JCS Pub O-2)

combatting terrorism - Actions, including antiter-rorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vul-nerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, andrespond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorismthroughout the entire threat spectrum. (JCS Pub1-02)

compartmentation - (DOD) Establishment andmanagement of an intelligence organization so thatinformation about the personnel, organization, oractivities of one component is made available to anyother component only to the extent required forthe performance of assigned duties. (JCS Pub 1-02)1. In unconventional warfare, the division of anorganization or activity into functional segments orcells to restrict communication between them andprevent knowledge of the identity or activities ofother segments except on a need-to-know basis.2. Restricting the use of specific cryptovariables tospecific users for the purpose of limiting access tothe information protected by these cryptovariablesand limiting the adverse impact of a compromise ofthese variables. (AR 310-25)

consolidation - The combining or merging of ele-ments to perform a common or related function.(JCS Pub 1-02)

counterinsurgency - (DOD) Those military, para-military, political, economic, psychological, and civicactions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.(JCS Pub 1-02)

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counterintelligence - Information gathered andactivities conducted to protect against espionage,other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassi-nations conducted for or on behalf of foreignpowers, organizations, or persons or internationalterrorist activities, but not including personnel,physical, document, or communications securityprograms. (DOD Directive 5240.1)

counterterrorism - Offensive measures taken bycivilian and military agencies of the government toprevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Theprimary mission of special operations forces in thisinteragency activity is to apply specialized capa-bilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terroristincidents abroad. Also called CT. See alsoantiterrorism, terrorism, terrorism counteraction.(USCINCSOC)

Country Team - Senior members of US governmentagencies assigned to a US diplomatic mission over-seas and subject to the direction and supervisionof the Chief, US Mission (ambassador). Normally,such members meet regularly (weekly) to coordinateUS government political, economic, and militaryactivities and policies in the host country.

deconflict - To reconcile or resolve a conflict ininterests as in targeting.

direct action - In special operations, a specified actinvolving operations of an overt, clandestine, or lowvisibility nature conducted primarily by special opera-tions forces in hostile or denied areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

direct action operations - Short-duration strikes andother small-scale offensive actions by special opera-tions forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on aspecified target; or to destroy, capture, or recoverdesignated personnel or material. In the conductof these operations, special operations forces mayemploy raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics;emplace mines and other munitions; conductstandoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or mari-time platforms; provide terminal guidance forprecision guided munitions; and conduct indepen-dent sabotage. (USCINCSOC)

diversion - (DOD, NATO) The act of drawing theattention and forces of an enemy from the point of

the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint thatdiverts attention. (JCS Pub 1-02)

electronic counter—countermeasures - That division ofelectronic warfare involving actions taken to ensurefriendly effective use of the electromagnetic spec-trum despite the enemy’s use of electronic warfare.(JCS Pub 1-02)

electronic countermeasures - That division of elec-tronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent orreduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromag-netic spectrum. Also called ECM. (JCS Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare - (IADB) Military action involvingthe use of electromagnetic energy to determine,exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of theelectromagnetic spectrum and action which retainsfriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (JCSPub 1-02)

evasion and escape - (DOD, I, NATO, IADB) Theprocedures and operations whereby military per-sonnel and other selected individuals are enabledto emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area toareas under friendly control. (JCS Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape net - (DOD, IADB) The organi-zation within enemy-held or hostile areas thatoperates to receive, move, and exfiltrate militarypersonnel or selected individuals to friendly control.(JCS Pub 1-02)

executive order - Order issued by the President byvirtue of the authority vested in him by the Con-stitution or by an act of Congress. It has the forceof law. (AR 310-25)

exfiltration - (DOD) The removal of personnel orunits from areas under enemy control. (JCS Pub1-02)

foreign intelligence - Information relating to thecapabilities, intentions, and activities of foreignpowers, organizations, or persons, but not includ-ing counterintelligence, except for information oninternational terrorist activities. (DOD Directive5240.1)

foreign internal defense - (DOD) Participation bycivilian and military agencies of a government inany of the action programs taken by another

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government to free and protect its society fromsubversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JCS Pub1-02)

foreign nation support - Civil resources identifica-tion, negotiation, and procurement from availableresources within a foreign nation in support of theUS military mission during wartime, preparation forwar, or peacetime.

foreign power - Any foreign government (regard-less of whether recognized by the United States),foreign-based political party (or faction thereof),foreign military force, foreign-based terrorist group,or any organization composed, in major part, of anysuch entity or entities. (AR 381-10) Foreign powersmay be classified as friendly, neutral, or hostile.

guerrilla warfare - (DOD, I, NATO, IADB) Militaryand paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantlyindigenous forces. (JCS Pub 1-02)

host nation - A nation in which representatives ororganizations of another state are present because ofgovernment invitation or international agreement.The term particularly refers to a nation receivingassistance relevant to its national security.

hostile power - See foreign power.

human intelligence - (DOD, NATO) A category ofintelligence derived from information collected andprovided by human sources. (JCS Pub 1-02)

infiltration - (DOD, NATO, IADB) 1. The move-ment through or into an area or territory occupied byeither friendly or enemy troops or organizations.The movement is made either by small groups orby individuals at extended or irregular intervals.When used in connection with the enemy, it infersthat contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage,placing an agent or other person in a target area inhostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontieror other guarded line. Methods of infiltration areblack (clandestine), grey (through legal crossingpoint but under false documentation), white (legal).3. A technique and process in which a force movesas individuals or small groups over, through, oraround enemy positions without detection. (JCS Pub1-02)

information - (DOD) In intelligence usage, un-evaluated material of every description that may beused in the production of intelligence. (NATO) Inintelligence usage, unprocessed data of everydescription which may be used in the production ofintelligence. (JCS Pub 1-02)

insurgency - (DOD, I, NATO, IADB) An organizedmovement aimed at the overthrow of a constitutedgovernment through use of subversion and armedconflict. (JCS Pub 1-02)

insurgent war - A struggle between a constitutedgovernment and organized insurgents frequentlysupported from without, but acting violently fromwithin, against the political, social, economic mili-tary, and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bringabout its internal destruction or overthrow. Such warsare distinguished from lesser insurgences by thegravity of the threat to government and the insur-gent object or eventual regional or national control.(AR 310-25)

intelligence reporting - (DOD, IADB) The preparationand conveyance of information by any means. Morecommonly, the term is restricted to reports as theyare prepared by the collector and as they aretransmitted by him to his headquarters and bythis component of the intelligence structure to oneor more intelligence-producing components. Thus,even in this limited sense, reporting embraces bothcollection and dissemination. The term is applied tonormal and specialist intelligence reports. (JCS Pub1-02)

internal security - (DOD, I, IADB) 1. The state oflaw and order prevailing within a nation. (JCS Pub1-02) 2. The prevention of action against UnitedStates resources, industries, and institution and theprotection of life and property in the event of adomestic emergency by the employment of allmeasures, in peace or war, other than militarydefense. 3. Condition resulting from the measurestaken within a command to safeguard defense infor-mation coming under its cognizance, includingphysical security of documents and materials. (AR310-25)

international narcotics activities - Refers to activi-ties outside the United States to produce, transfer, orsell narcotics or other substances controlled in

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accordance with Title 21, United States Code, Sec-tions 811 and 812. (AR 381-10)

international terrorist activities - Activities under-taken by or in support of terrorists or terroristorganizations that occur totally outside the UnitedStates, or that transcend national boundaries interms of the means by which they are accomplished,the persons they appear intended to coerce orintimidate, or the locale in which the perpetratorsoperate or seek asylum. (AR 381-10)

joint doctrine - (DOD) Fundamental principles thatguide the employment of forces of two or moreServices of the same nation in coordinated actiontoward a common objective. It is ratified by all fourServices and may be promulgated by the Joint Chiefsof Staff. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint operations - Operations carried on by two ormore of the Armed Forces of the United States(Army, Navy, Air Force). (AR 310-25)

joint special operations area - That area of land, sea,and airspace assigned to a joint special operationscommand to conduct SO.

limited war - (DOD, IADB) Armed conflict short ofgeneral war, exclusive of incidents, involving theovert engagement of military forces of two or morenations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

low intensity conflict - (DOD) A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social,economic, or psychological objectives. It is oftenprotracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic,and psychosocial pressures through terrorism andinsurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generallyconfined to a geographic area and is often char-acterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, andthe level of violence. Also called LIC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

low visibility operations - (DOD) Sensitive operationswherein the political/military restrictions inherentin covert and clandestine operations are either notnecessary or not feasible; actions are taken asrequired to limit exposure of those involved and/ortheir activities. (JCS Pub 1-02)

military civic action - (DOD, I, IADB) The use ofpreponderantly indigenous military forces on projects

useful to the local population at all levels in suchfields as education, training, public works, agricul-ture, transportation, communications health,sanitation, and others contributing to economic andsocial development which would also serve to im-prove the standing of the military forces with thepopulation. (DOD, I) (US forces may at times adviseor engage in military civic action in overseas areas.)(JCS Pub 1-02)

mobile training team - (DOD, IADB) A mobiletraining team consists of one or more US personneldrawn from Service resources and sent on tempo-rary duty to a foreign nation to give instruction. Themission of the team is to provide, by training-instructor personnel, a military service of the foreignnation with a self-training capability in a particularskill. (JCS Pub 1-02) Trains foreign personnel tooperate, maintain, and employ weapons systems andsupport equipment or teach other special skillsand/or procedures related to military trainingprocedures.

National Command Authorities - (DOD) The Presi-dent and the Secretary of Defense or their dulydeputized alternates or successors. (JCS Pub 1-02)

national intelligence - (DOD, IADB) Integrateddepartmental intelligence that covers the broadaspects of national policy and national security, is ofconcern to more than one department or agency, andtranscends the exclusive competence of a singledepartment or agency. (JCS Pub 1-02)

national objectives - (DOD, IADB) Those funda-mental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation—asopposed to the means for seeking theseends—toward which a policy is directed and effortsand resources of the nation are applied. (JCS Pub1-02)

national policy - (DOD, IADB) A broad course ofaction or statements of guidance adopted by thegovernment at the national level in pursuit of na-tional objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

national security - (DOD) A collective term encom-passing both national defense and foreign relations ofthe United States. Specifically, the condition pro-vided by: a. a military or defense advantage over anyforeign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable

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foreign relations position, or c. a defense posturecapable of successfully resisting hostile or destructiveaction from within or without, overt or covert. (JCSPub 1-02)

national strategy - (DOD, IADB) The art and scienceof developing and using the political, economic, andpsychological powers of a nation, together with itsarmed forces, during peace and war, to securenational objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

overt operation - (DOD, IADB) The collection ofintelligence openly, without concealment. (JCS Pub1-02)

paramilitary forces - (DOD, I, IADB) Forces orgroups which are distinct from the regular armedforces of any country, but resembling them inorganization, equipment, training, or mission. (JCSPub 1-02)

psychological operations - (DOD) Planned opera-tions to convey selected information and indicatorsto foreign audiences to influence their emotions,motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately thebehavior of foreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose of psycho-logical operations is to induce or reinforce foreignattitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’sobjectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

psychological warfare - (DOD, IADB) The planneduse of propaganda and other psychological actionshaving the primary purpose of influencing the opin-ions emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostileforeign groups in such a way as to support theachievement of national objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

real time – (DOD) The absence of delay, except forthe time required for the transmission by electro-magnetic energy, between the occurrence of an eventor the transmission of data and the knowledge ofthe event or reception of the data at some otherlocation. (JCS Pub 1-02) The absence of delay inacquisition, transmission, and reception of data.(AR 310-25)

refugee - (DOD, IADB) A civilian who by reason ofreal or imagined danger has left home to seek safetyelsewhere. (JCS Pub 1-02)

resistance movement - (DOD, IADB) An organizedeffort by some portion of the civil population of acountry to resist the legally established governmentor an occupying power and to disrupt civil order andstability. (JCS Pub 1-02)

sabotage - (DOD, IADB) An act or acts with intentto injure, interfere with, or obstruct the nationaldefense of a country by willfully injuring ordestroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, anynational defense or war material, premises, orutilities, to include human and natural resources,(JCS Pub 1-02)

safe area - (DOD, IADB) A designated area inhostile territory that offers the evader or escapeea reasonable chance of avoiding capture and ofsurviving until he can be evacuated. (JCS Pub 1-02)

sector - That portion of a JSOA assigned by a jointSO commander to a subordinate SO commander forthe conduct of a specific SO mission.

security assistance - (DOD) Group of programsauthorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of1976, as amended, or other related statutes by whichthe United States provides defense articles, militarytraining, and other defense-related services, bygrant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of na-tional policies and objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

security assistance organizations - SAOs encompassall DOD elements located in foreign countrieswith assigned security assistance responsibilities.They may be known as joint US military advisorygroups, joint US military groups, US militarymissions, US military advisory groups, US militaryassistance advisory groups, or US military groups.Security assistance organizations also include de-fense liaision offices or groups, defense fieldoffices, offices of defense cooperation, and defenseattache offices with personnel designated to performsecurity assistance functions. The specific title of anSAO is dependent on the number of personsassigned, the functions performed, or the desiresof the host nation. (See FC 100-20 and DOD5105.38-M.)

special activities - Activities conducted in support ofnational foreign policy objectives abroad, which are

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planned and executed so that the role of the USgovernment is not apparent or acknowledged pub-licly, and functions in support of such activities, butwhich are not intended to influence US politicalprocesses, public opinion, policies, or media, and donot include diplomatic activities or the collectionand production of intelligence or related supportfunctions. (DOD Directive 5240.1)

special operations - (DOD) Operations conductedby specially trained, equipped, and organized DODforces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuitof national military, political, economic, or psy-chological objectives. These operations may beconducted during periods of peace or hostilities.They may support conventional operations, or theymay be prosecuted independently when the use ofconventional forces is either inappropriate or in-feasible. (JCS Pub 1-02)

special operations - Actions conducted by speciallyorganized, trained and equipped military andparamilitary forces to achieve military, political,economic, or psychological objectives by non-conventional military means in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas. They are conducted inpeace, conflict, and war, independently or in coor-dination with operations of conventional forces.Politico-military considerations frequently shapespecial operations, requiring clandestine, covert, orlow visibility techniques, and oversight at the nationallevel. Special operations differ from conventionaloperations in degree of risk, operational techniques,mode of employment, independence from friendlysupport, and dependence on detailed operationalintelligence and indigenous assets. (USCINCSOC)

special reconnaissance - SR operations are recon-naissance and surveillance actions conducted byspecial operations forces to obtain or verify, byvisual observation or other collection methods,information concerning the capabilities, intentions,and activities of an actual or potential enemy or tosecure data concerning the meteorological, hydro-graphic, or geographic characteristics of a particulararea. It includes target acquisition, area assessment,and post-strike reconnaissance. (USCINCSOC)

strategic intelligence - (DOD) Intelligence that isrequired for the formation of policy and military plansat national and international levels. Strategic

intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarilyin level of application but may also vary in terms ofscope and detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)strategic psychological activities - (DOD, NATO)Planned psychological activities in peace and warwhich normally pursue objectives to gain the sup-port and cooperation of friendly and neutralcountries and to reduce the will and the capacity ofhostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war.(JCS Pub 1-02)technical control - The executive authority to regu-late and supervise technical activities by providingspecialized or professional guidance and direction.terrorism - (DOD) The unlawful use or threateneduse of force or violence against individuals orproperty to coerce or intimidate governments orsocieties, often to achieve political, religious, orideological objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02) The calculateduse of violence or the threat of violence to attaingoals, political, religious, or ideological in nature.This is done through intimidation, coercion, orinstilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act thatis often symbolic in nature and intended to influ-ence an audience beyond the immediate victims.(AR 190-52)

terrorism counteraction - See combatting terrorism.third world - Refers to those countries withunderdeveloped but growing economies, often withcolonial pasts, and low per capita incomes.threat - The ability of an enemy to limit, neutral-ize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current orprojected mission organization or item of equip-ment. (TRADOC Reg 381-1)unconventional warfare - A broad spectrum ofmilitary and paramilitary operations conducted inenemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensi-tive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, butis not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrillawarfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage,and other operations of a low visibility, covert orclandestine nature. These interrelated aspects ofunconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly orcollectively by predominantly indigenous personnel,usually supported and directed in varying degrees by(an) external sources(s) during all conditions of waror peace. (JCS Pub 1-02)

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unconventional warfare - A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally oflong duration, predominantly conducted byindigenous or surrogate forces who are organized,trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varyingdegrees by an external source. It includes guerrillawarfare and other direct offensive, low visibility,covert or clandestine operations, as well as theindirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intel-ligence collection, and evasion and escape.(USCINCSOC)

underground - A covert unconventional warfareorganization established to operate in areas deniedto the guerrilla forces or conduct operations notsuitable for guerrilla forces. (AR 310-25)

US Country Team - The senior, in-country, UnitedStates coordinating and supervising body, headedby the chief of the US diplomatic mission, usually anambassador, and composed of the senior member ofeach represented United States department oragency. (See also Country Team.)

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R e f e r e n c e s

RequiredPublications

Required publications are sources that users mustread to understand or to comply with this publication.

Field Manuals

Joint Publications

Related Army Regulations

PublicationsRelated publications are sources of additional infor-mation. They are not required to understand thispublication.

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Field Manuals

References-2

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Training Circulars

Army Training andEvaluation Program

Army Publications

US Army Communications Command-IntermediateDistance Skywave Propagation Charts

NATO StandardizationAgreements

STANAGs are available, upon request, from NavalPublications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue,Philadelphia, PA 19120

References-3

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ProjectedPublications

Projected publications are sources of additional in-formation that are scheduled for printing but are notyet available. Upon print, they will be distributedautomatically via pinpoint distribution. They maybeobtained from the USAAG Publications Center untilindexed in DA Pamphlet 25-30.

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Index

Index-1

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Index-2

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Index-3

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Index-4

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Index-5

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Index-6

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Index-7

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Index-8

FM 31-2020 APRIL 1990

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States Army

The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirementsfor FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations (Qty rqr block no. 531).

✩ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 - 406-421 (52240)