Document - crime statistics

A Tangled WebWhy you cant believe crime statistics

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CIVITAS Institute for the Study of Civil Society55 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QLTel: 020 7799 6677 Email: [email protected]: www.civitas.org.uk

Crime is going down officially. The trouble is that most people dont believe it: they feel that society is becoming more crime-ridden. So whatcould explain the discrepancy between the claims made by politicians andthe everyday experience of citizens?

In this hard-hitting expos, Rodger Patrick, former Chief Inspector of West Midlands Police, shows how this has come about. He unpacks the gaming behaviours of police forces under pressure from central government to reducecrime rates and increase detection rates by any means including some that areunethical and even criminal.

A Tangled Web takes the reader into the arcane world of cuffing making crimesdisappear by refusing to believe the victims; nodding inducing suspects to nodat locations where they can claim to have committed crimes that will be takeninto consideration, sometimes in return for sex, drugs and alcohol; stitching, orfabricating evidence, which allows police forces to obtain convictions without evergoing to court; and skewing, or concentrating resources on offences that areused as performance indicators, at the expense of time-consuming investigationsinto more serious crime.

Rodger Patrick cites the now considerable number of official inquiries into policeforces that have uncovered evidence of these practices on such a scale, and oversuch a wide area, that they cannot be put down to a few rotten apples. He arguesthat the problems are organisational, and result from making the career prospectsof police officers dependent on performance management techniques originallydevised for the commercial sector. Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary has long taken a relaxed view of the problem, putting a generous interpretationon evidence uncovered in its investigations, although in a small number of casesofficers have had to resign or even face criminal charges.

Whilst the police continue to engage in the forms of perverse behaviour outlined in this book, the public will no doubt continue to draw their

own conclusions about crime levels. The criminal fraternity are the main beneficiaries of such a situation.

Rodger Patrick

A Tangled Web

CIV

ITAS

Rodger Patrick

A Tangled Web

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A Tangled WebWhy you cant believe

crime statistics

Rodger Patrick

CIVITAS

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First Published December 2014

Civitas 201455 Tufton Street

London SW1P 3QL

email: [email protected]

All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-906837-67-9

Independence: Civitas: Institute for the Study of CivilSociety is a registered educational charity (No. 1085494)and a company limited by guarantee (No. 04023541).Civitas is financed from a variety of private sources to avoid over-reliance on any single or small group of donors.

All publications are independently refereed. All theInstitutes publications seek to further its objective ofpromoting the advancement of learning. The viewsexpressed are those of the authors, not of the Institute.

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O, what a tangled web we weave,When first we practise to deceive!

Sir Walter Scott, Marmion

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Contents

Author viiiAcknowledgements xMethodology xiSummary xiii

Introduction: A Perverse Policing Model 11 Cuffing: The Art of Making Crime Disappear 72 Nodding: The Invitational Edge of Corruption 263 Skewing: What Gets Measured Gets Done 404 Stitching: Its a Fit-Up 48Conclusion 61

Bibliography 95Notes 104

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Author

Rodger Patrick, BA (Hons), MSc. (by research), PhD,Beta Gamma Sigma (awarded by Aston BusinessSchool) in an ex-Chief Inspector of West MidlandsPolice. He served for thirty years in the West MidlandsPolice before retiring in 2005. During his career hecarried out a variety of roles including training,personnel, CID, community relations and public order.However his greatest operational challenge waspolicing a large inner-city area including the BalsallHeath area of Birmingham during the 1990s whencommunity representatives came onto the streets inlarge numbers to challenge the drug dealers, pimps,kerb crawlers and street sex workers who, theymaintained, were responsible for making theneighbourhood unsafe for residents. Negotiating a waythrough this crisis of confidence in the police broughtabout a transformation in the way the local policeinteracted with the populace and heralded a sea-changein the way the area was policed. By 2000 the area hadceased to be Birminghams red light district.

This experience stimulated his academic interest in therelationship between police governance, policing styleand effectiveness and he completed a case study on theBalsall Heath experience as part of an MSc (by research)at Aston Business School in 2004. This quantification ofthe impact of changes in police accountability led to anattempt to assess the impact of performance management

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on police effectiveness as a piece of doctoral research.However, it quickly became clear that the data on policeperformance was being distorted by various gaming-type practices. This rendered any attempt to gaugeaccurately the impact of change on performance basedon official statistics virtually meaningless. The focus ofthe research then shifted to the identification,categorisation and measurement of gaming practicesand the implications for the governance and regulationof the police. This study was carried out at the Instituteof Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), Universityof Birmingham and completed in 2009.

The author applied for a position on the CrimeStatistics Oversight Committee in 2013 but his offer ofassistance was declined.

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xAcknowledgements

The statistics on which this report is based wereprovided by Her Majestys Government StatisticalOffice and the Home Office Research Development andStatistics Department. I would like to thank those whoparticipated in the anonymous refereeing process fortheir helpful comments on an earlier draft of this book.

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Methodology

This research is based on the observations of the author,who served as a chief inspector in the West MidlandsPolice during the introduction of New PublicManagement and the performance management regimethat accompanied it (1995 2005). In order to overcomethe limitations of a purely ethnographic study, the authors observations were triangulated withinternal and external police performance data anddocumentation, some made available under theprovisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Thepotentially distorting influence of researcher bias wasminimised by investigative triangulation,1 usingvarious specialists to provide their interpretation of thedata and documents under study. The specialists, eightin total, were all retired officers who had experience andknowledge of police performance frameworks, crimepolicy, diversity, public protection, crime analysis andpolice operations. Their ranks range from sergeant toAssociation of Chief Police Officer (ACPO) level, i.e.officers of Assistant Chief Constable rank and above,and two had worked for HMIC. The documentsreferred to can be obtained from the Freedom ofInformation officers of the police forces referred to. Thedata on recorded crime rates was collated from theannual Home Office Crime Bulletins for England andWales 1998/99 to 2011/12. 2

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Incidents or investigations involving the variousforms of gaming behaviour were identified and theimpact of the remedial action on the performance of theforce in question was examined to estimate the scale ofthe behaviours, before and after the event. Analysis ofsimilar events over time enabled patterns to beestablished, i.e. the statistical anatomy of perversity,many forms of which fit modern definitions of policecorruption, discussed later. This provides the basis fora range of gauges which could be used to estimate thelikely presence of perverse behaviour. The researchprocess also provided an insight into the response of thevarious police regulators and the Home Office andfacilitated an evaluation of their performance.

A national survey using the Freedom of InformationAct 2000 was also carried out in order to identify forcesemploying policies ostensibly designed to identify andeliminate the false reporting of crime. These are referredto as false reporting policies. It was suspected that thepresence of such policies and practices indicated thereturn of cuffing, facilitated by a re-interpretation ofthe National Crime Recording Standard introduced inApril 2002. This made it possible to analyse the recordedcrime patterns of those forces using such a policy. Oncethe patterns were established the academic literaturewas reviewed.

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Summary

This book assesses the reliability of police data inEngland and Wales, arguing that it is being manipulatedto such an extent that it serves little purpose inmeasuring crime levels or the performance of the policeservice. However, the data provides a rich and reliablesource of evidence on the impact of performancemanagement systems of control on the behaviour of police officers. Methodologically, it relies on agrounded approach, based on the participantobservations of a serving officer who identified andcategorised various forms of gaming behaviouremployed to improve reported performance byunethical and in some cases unlawful means. By examining the impact of known incidents, exposuresor scandals on the performance of the police forcesinvolved, it became possible to quantify the extent towhich such behaviours were distorting the data used to judge efficiency. The widespread occurrence andrepeated nature of incidents involving the samephenomenon suggests that this form of police devianceis organisational in nature. This in turn raises questionsabout the standard of police leadership and thoseentrusted with the governance, oversight and scrutinyof the service. A critique of both is woven into the fabricof this report.

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The book is structured with a general introductionfollowed by four chapters on the different forms ofgaming behaviours identified and a conclusion. Eachof these chapters outlines the evidence and ends withan assessment of Kent Police which was the first forceto be investigated after the introduction of Police andCrime Commissioners and the appointment of a non-police Chief Inspector of Her Majestys Inspector ofConstabulary. This will hopefully enable the reader toform a view on the effectiveness of the reforms.

This book is based on a series of articles published inthe Police Journal, 2011, vol. 84, numbers 1, 3 & 4, and anumber of written submissions to the Home AffairsSelect Committee 2011a , 2013a & 2013b and JusticeSelect Committee 2011 & 2012.

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IntroductionA Perverse Policing Model

Performance management

The Conservative governments of the 1980s and early1990s and the New Labour administration elected tooffice in 1997 introduced performance management asa means of enhancing political control over theprofessionals charged with the delivery of publicservices.1 It was envisaged that this system, based onmeasurement and accountability practices usedcommercially, would transform public services byreplicating the self-regulating mechanisms operating inthe market. For every public service, including thepolice, a raft of performance indicators were developed,all designed to deliver increased control over publicexpenditure, improved managerial competency andincreased accountability.2

Police governance

Structurally, the introduction of performancemanagement involved a shift in power within thetripartite arrangement of police governance enshrinedin the Police Act 1964: police authority; chief officer ofpolice; Home Secretary. The Police and MagistratesCourt Act 1994 represented a move towards centralcontrol, conferring powers on the Home Secretary to setpriorities.3 The performance measures on which chief

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officers were to be judged were primarily crimereduction and detection rates, based on data collectedby the police themselves. There has been a fluctuationin emphasis between detection rates4 and crimereduction since 1994, when the first national objectives were introduced,5 and different types of crimehave been prioritised.6 However, it was performance onthe reduction and detection of volume crime7 that could trigger central intervention if a force weredeemed to be under-performing.8 It should also benoted that reducing recorded crime has a positiveimpact on the detection rate, which is calculated as apercentage of recorded crime. This means that failing torecord unsolved crimes improves the percentage ofcrimes detected.

The British Crime Survey (BCS), now rebadged as theCrime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), is theother method used by the UK government to measurecrime levels. Statistically reliable at national levels, itexcludes large groups of the population, e.g. non-householders, businesses and people under 16, andincorporates a limited range of offences.

The threat posed by gaming

One of the greatest threats to performance managementis the phenomenon known as gaming, generallyaccepted as one of the failings of the Soviet centrallyplanned economy.9 Whilst acknowledging the advantagesof performance management, De Bruijn observed: Oncea system of performance measurement has beendesigned and introduced, the perverse effects will, inthe long term, force out the beneficial effects.10

The questionable reliability of data produced by thepolice had deservedly attracted the critical attention of

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social scientists: Nearly every social scientist, forinstance, is aware of the pitfalls of using the FBIsUniform Crime Reports or any other archival recordsbased on crimes reported by law enforcement agencies.11

Black (1970) and Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) went sofar as to argue that police data was of little use exceptfor monitoring the organisational behaviour of policeofficers. Maguire concluded:

Criminal statistics had to be analysed as the productnot of a neutral fact-collecting process, but of arecord-keeping process which is geared first andforemost to organisational (primarily police) aimsand needs.12

The dysfunctional effects of performance managementon the police were highlighted during the early days byLikierman (1993) and Rogerson (1995). Various types ofgaming were reported on at length in Her MajestysInspector of Constabularys (HMIC) thematic report onpolice integrity in 1999. Such perverse behaviourswould be encompassed by more recent definitions ofpolice corruption based on the motivation behind theactions.13 Peter Neyroud, the then Chief Constable ofThames Valley, referred to police gaming asadministrative corruption in his evidence to the PublicAdministration Select Committee (2003).

Despite a number of official reports endorsing thereliability of police data,14 the public continue to bemistrustful of recorded crime statistics, while individualpolice officers have regularly exposed the fact that theyare engaging in gaming behaviours designed to reducerecorded crime rates. One such revelation was made bySteve Williams, the Chair of the Police Federation, inMay 2013 when he expressed the concerns of police

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INTRODUCTION


officers seeking to expose such wrongdoing that theyrisk falling foul of the restrictions being introduced as aresult of Lord Levesons report (2012) on the conduct ofthe press, which condemned whistle-blowing byofficers to the press: The latest crime figures showed afive per cent fall but Im not sure that is the case. I dontthink the true story is getting out because of the fearfactor in the wake of Leveson.15

Whilst under-recording crime is the most commonform of police gaming behaviour, it is not the only one.However, it is likely to become the most prevalent, asthe coalition government elected in 2010 dismantled theplethora of centrally set targets and placed the focus onreducing crime.

The perverse policing model

An inquiry instigated by a Kent officer who blew thewhistle on collusion with offenders, motivated by adesire to improve detection rates,16 exposed thecontinued existence of the main forms of gamingbehaviours, all identified by the research on which this book is based.17 The categories can be described as follows:

l Cuffing: making crime disappear by failing torecord it. This is facilitated by a re-interpretationof the National Crime Recording Standardintroduced in 2002 to ensure the accuraterecording of crime and a pre-disposition to assumethat victims are falsely reporting crime in pursuitof bogus insurance claims. In effect, this treatsvictims as suspects; thus, by an Orwellian twist, itreduces the well used slogan tough on the causesof crime to getting tough on the victims who arecausing crime by reporting it.

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l Nodding: the practice whereby suspects nod atlocations where they claim (or can be induced toclaim) that they have committed crimes and arethereby able to have them taken intoconsideration without any risk of increasing theirsentence. This administrative procedure has a longhistory of abuse and there have been a number ofreported instances involving inducements in theform of reduced sentences and the supply of sex,drugs and alcohol in return for admissions.

l Stitching: fabricating evidence. Whilst the use ofsuch tactics to secure convictions in court haslargely been addressed by the Police and CriminalEvidence Act 1984, administrative procedures stilloffer the opportunity to obtain detections withoutsufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Theseprocedures are examined and evidence presentedwhich suggests stitching is still prevalent.

l Skewing: concentrating effort and resources onoffences subject to performance indicators. Itwould appear that more difficult and resource-intensive areas of police activity such as theprevention and investigation of serious crime (e.g.child abuse and sexual offences ) have suffered aspolice leaders seek to hit the targets set for them.The spread of resources, a by-product of the moveto local geographical policing, is also identified asa potential problem as officers are re-deployed tomore affluent neighbourhoods.

In aggregate, the above tactics represent what can bereferred to as the Perverse Policing Model. The evidencepresented at the conclusion of each of the following fourchapters will enable the reader to assess whether KentPolice could lay claim to such a perversity.

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INTRODUCTION


The crux of the matter

Whilst the scale and repeated nature of such behaviourssupports the body of theory on the organisationalnature of police deviance, chief constables have in thepast escaped sanction from those charged by theelectorate to govern the police. It is the view of theauthor that this is the cause of the re-occurring natureof police gaming behaviour. It has yet to be seenwhether the introduction of directly elected police andcrime commissioners will remedy or aggravate thesituation.

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1Cuffing: The Art of Making

Crime Disappear

A long history of distortion

Police forces in the United Kingdom are no strangers to performance management. Even during theestablishment of the service in the nineteenth century,chief officers were keen to demonstrate theireffectiveness by the use of statistics. In the case of thefirst and only commissioner of Birmingham City Police,the provision of data showing the increase in arrestsduring his period in office failed to secure him the postof chief constable.1 Whilst this may, in part, have beendue to an English abhorrence of over-zealous stateinterference on the French model, with its reliance onsurveillance, it does indicate that the police themselvesviewed performance data as a means of pursuing theirpolitical objectives.

Distorting the data appears to have just as long ahistory. Malcolm Young, a retired chief superintendentwith experience in a number of police forces, presents apicture in which recorded crime levels could be reducedor increased at will. On the one hand, this involvedsuppressing crime levels in order to enhance publicconfidence in the services ability to control crime; onthe other, reflecting the true levels in order to supportthe case for increased resources.2 He goes on to describe

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a variety of tricks used to avoid recording a reportedcrime, collectively known as cuffing in reference to themagicians art of making something disappear up thesleeve or cuff. These tricks include failing to believe avictims account and therefore declining to investigateit. Young notes that the victims social status couldinfluence the likelihood of this occurring: recording atheft as a loss; recording the crime in an unofficialregister and thus avoiding the statistical returns; ormisrepresenting the circumstances as a less seriousoffence, e.g. converting robbery into theft from theperson or attempt burglary into criminal damage.3

Crime recording standards

The variations caused by such manipulations were knownto the Home Office and a number of studies had beenconducted by their researchers, Burrows et al. concluding:

The clear implication from this is that the exerciseof police discretion is the primary reason for therecording shortfall: the police will often apply anevidential standard to allegations of crime made to them.4

An evidential crime recording standard is one wherethe details of any incident will be challenged andvalidated in the same manner that might be expected ifthe case were to be presented in court in order to chargethe suspect.5 In effect, the victim has to convince theofficer that they are telling the truth.

Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)was also conscious of the threat such behaviour posedto public confidence in the police service, and their fearswere confirmed by the Channel 4 Dispatches programmein March 19996 that was based on the revelations of a

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detective chief superintendent from Nottinghamshire.This led HMIC to conduct a thematic inspection onintegrity.7 A sample of forces was examined andcuffing, nodding and skewing were identified asproblematic. HMIC appeared to minimise the scale ofsuch gaming behaviours:

Her Majestys Inspector of Constabulary hasconducted many detailed scrutinies of crimerecording systems and is satisfied in general there islittle evidence, today, that these practices are in anyway widespread. There are, though, still pockets of unethical crime recording which need to beeradicated to ensure the public has confidence inpolice performance figures.8

This trait of playing down the extent of problemsuncovered was demonstrated by the fact that asignificant rise in recorded crime was recorded in thefollowing year by the West Midlands Police, one of theforces in which cuffing, in the form of unofficial crimeregisters, had been discovered during the inspection:Crime increased by 16 per cent in 1999/2000, some ofwhich may be due to the introduction of policies andprocedures to ensure the integrity of crime recording.9

The 16 per cent increase is of interest as the forceadopted a prima facie crime recording standard inresponse to HMICs findings. A prima facie standardrequires the recording of alleged crimes as reported andwithout scrutiny. This figure was consistent with theestimated level of under-recording identified by HMICin Gwent in 1998.10 It should be noted that some offencesare more vulnerable to cuffing than others and, once anevidential standard is adopted, reported crime levels canbe distorted to a greater or lesser degree.

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CUFFING: THE ART OF MAKING CRIME DISAPPEAR


New Labour and the National Crime Recording Standard

In order for performance management control systemsto be effective, it was essential that reported crimes wererecorded accurately and to a common standard acrossthe board. The Labour Government elected in 1996 wasat that time committed to addressing the frailties of thesystem. Home Secretary David Blunkett stated: It isvital to measure crime accurately if we are to be able totackle it effectively.11

The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) wasintroduced in April 2002 in an attempt to ensure thatforces throughout England and Wales were recordingdata to a uniform standard.12 The NCRS aimed toenhance victim sovereignty by encouraging a victim-focused approach to crime recording and thusenhancing trust in the police. Whilst the initial guidanceon the NCRS encouraged the taking of victims accountsat face value a prima facie standard the actualwording of the NCRS is not so explicit:

Following the initial registration, an incident will berecorded as a crime (notifiable offence) if, on thebalance of probability:

(a) the circumstances as reported amount to a crimedefined by law (the police will determine this,based on their knowledge of the law andcounting rules), and

(b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary.13

The initial Home Office guidance on the NCRSsuggested the balance of probability test was to beapplied to reports of crimes made by third parties and,as such, fell short of a pure prima facie model:

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NCRS can be seen as a shift towards a prima facie-based model of crime recording, although it should bestressed that the NCRS does not imply pure prima faciecrime recording.14

Cracks start to appear in the NCRS

The original ambition to ensure that victims accountswere taken at face value did appear to be realised post-2002 and the Home Office carried out a study to testcompliance rates.15 The cross-checks carried out as partof the British Crime Survey (BCS) also confirmed thatrecording rates were improving.16 The Police StandardsUnit (PSU), established by the government to improvepolice performance and intervene where forces weredeemed to be failing, requested the Audit Commissionto carry out a series of tests on each force and report ontheir compliance.17 However, by 2004/5 evidencestarted to emerge that a return to an evidentialstandard and associated cuffing was occurring.18

An examination of Nottinghamshire Constabularysrecorded crime profile (Figure 1) demonstrates thesuddenness and scale of the change:

Figure 1: Total recorded crime in Nottinghamshire

Data supplied by the Home Office

Total crimes recorded

165,000

160,000

155,000

150,000

145,000

140,000

135,000

130,000

125,000

120,0001998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

False ReportingPolicy April 2004


In 2000 an HMIC inspection of the force had raisedconcerns about the reliability of this forces crimerecording procedures:

Some minor problems were found during theInspection and HMI suggests that the Forceconsiders a more comprehensive audit of bothcrime and incident recording to gain an accurateview of performance.19

The subsequent increase in recorded crime levels againexposes HMICs tendency to understate negative findingsas well as demonstrating the differences betweenevidential and prima facie standards. Such a conclusionsuggests that the equally dramatic fall in 2004/5 was alsolinked to a change in the recording standard. A Freedomof Information request submitted as part of a nationalsurvey established that Nottinghamshire had introduceda false reporting policy designed to deter thosesuspected of making fraudulent reports of crime inpursuit of bogus insurance claims.

False reporting policies: the thin end of the wedge

Policies and tactics designed to deal with the falsereporting of crime (false reporting policies) emergedduring the Street Crime Initiative instigated by PrimeMinister Tony Blair in response to the rise in streetrobberies. Twelve forces with higher-than-averagerobbery rates spearheaded a multi-agency response, co-ordinated by the Home Office. Whilst the operationstimulated partnership activity and innovative tactics,it did blur the boundary between the political andoperational spheres. On reflection, it may have bluntedthe desire or motivation for critical scrutiny, as both the

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executive and administrative arms of the state sharedequal responsibility for failure. That said, during thecourse of the initiative, anecdotal evidence emerged ofthe false reporting of mobile phone losses as robberies.This was believed to be fuelled by the nature of mobilephone insurance which required the owner to have beenthe victim of crime in order to claim a replacementphone. The intuition that there was a problem wasgiven further credence by the research of Smith (2003)who found that 16 per cent of those seeking to report apersonal robbery did so over eight hours after the event.He also noted that those late reports were more likelyto involve a mobile phone and to be made at the frontdesk of a police station rather than through anemergency call. This was flagged as a curious findingworthy of further investigation by the Street Crime co-ordinating group.20 Alternatively, this behaviour couldbe the outcome of the low propensity of victims toreport robberies to the police. Dodd et al. noted: It isestimated only 51 per cent of robberies and 57 per centof theft from the person were reported to the police.21

So it is quite possible that offences which wouldotherwise have gone unreported were being reportedlegitimately in order to qualify for insurance replacements.However, covert operations conducted by the NationalMobile Phone Crime Unit (NMPCU) uncovered evidenceof staff at mobile phone outlets encouraging customerswho had lost their phones to report them as robberies inorder to qualify for a replacement. Tilley et al. concluded:

According to guidance produced by the NMPCU,estimates of the extent of false reporting range fromless than five per cent of all street crime to as muchas 25 per cent. However, as described above, theresearch evidence is weak and these figures are

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largely based on anecdote. They should therefore betreated with a good deal of caution.22

However, Tilleys note of caution was ignored. It wasassumed there was a major problem with fraudulentreports, and the forces involved in the Street CrimeInitiative introduced policies and procedures designedto address the issue. They alleged high levels of falsereporting, with South Yorkshire Police claiming that:one in five victims were lying when reporting arobbery.23 This view was re-iterated by others:

West Midlands Police has pledged to take firmaction against people who falsely claim to be thevictims of crime. This followed research carried outin Coventry which indicated as many as 20 per centof reported robberies could be false. In Birminghamcity centre in February, 12 out of 70 reportedrobberies were discovered to be false after officershad spent many hours examining CCTV footage.24

Prosecutions for offences relating to false reportsreceived high levels of publicity, which created the impression the problem was widespread.25

The following factors were believed to be indicative ofa potential false report:

l Late reporting to the police (several hours or dayslater)

l Allegations reported over the phone

l No contact with the emergency services via the 999 system

l Discrepancies in the account given to the reportingand investigating officer

l Lack of independent witnesses to the crime

l Victim unable to give detailed description of theoffender, or unable to identify them

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l Victim stating that they do not want any furtheraction by the police; they only want to get a crimenumber

l The type of property being reported stolen, e.g.

benefit money in order to obtain emergencycash payments through the benefit system inthe form of crisis loans

cash lost by children reported stolen toexplain the loss to a parent or guardian

student coursework in order to obtain anextension for a deadline

other high value items wages, designergoods, passports26

Whilst none of the above characteristics or triggerfactors were suspicious on their own, it was felt that thepresence of three or more factors was worthy of furtherinvestigation as a possible false report. The reduction inrecorded robberies during the period when the StreetCrime forces were developing and employing tactics toaddress false reports appeared to correspond with thelarge percentages of fraudulent reports being quoted inthe press. The West Midlands Police issued mock elevenpound notes outlining the trigger factors and warnedofficers to be on their guard.27 It was therefore assumedthat reducing these false reports made a significantcontribution to the overall reduction in robberiescommented on by Tilley et al.:

Two years into the initiative, figures for the year2003/4 show that robbery is 24 per cent lower in theten forces than it was in 2001/2 and 17 per centlower across England and Wales as a whole.28

However, it was specifically stated in the guidanceissued by the Home Office that mere suspicion should

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not prevent the recording and investigation of theinitial complaint:

All allegations of street crime must be recordedwhen indicators of possible false reports arepresent, the victim and secondary investigationshould be encouraged to attend the police station,or be visited by a police officer at their home orplace of work.29

Had this requirement in relation to crime recordingbeen complied with, then the forces reporting a highincidence of false reports should have been recordingcorrespondingly high levels of prosecutions for wastingpolice time and/or large numbers of recorded robberiesbeing de-classified as no crimes. So, for audit purposes,a robbery would be recorded, investigated and, if foundto be false, the offender reported for wasting police time.In these circumstances a new crime report would becreated for the offence of wasting police time and theoriginal robbery report de-classified as no crime. Inview of the level of bogus reports circulated to the mediaby the police, it was anticipated that something in theregion of 20 per cent of all robberies would be de-classified as no crimes.30 However, when the no crimedata of forces known to have introduced false reportingpolicies was examined, the levels were low, in line witha national average of three per cent.31 This findingsuggested that reports were not being recorded, thusindicating the application of an evidential crimerecording standard a conclusion unanimouslysupported by the panel of experts who reviewed thepolicy and associated recorded crime patterns:

Ironically, the old system was saying we dontbelieve you; the new system is saying, officially we

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dont believe you. So previously it was the CID whowere the guardians of this unofficial knowledge.Now its everybody, its official!

(Interviewee C: Retired ACPO officer)

It was also established that false reporting procedureswere being applied across the board, not just to street crimes, and that the forces involved, likeNottinghamshire, were posting impressive reductionsin recorded crime.32

Whilst it has been argued that false insurance claimsare a major problem for the insurance industry,33 theform they take appears more likely to involve inflatedclaims following a genuine crime rather thancompletely bogus reports. What limited research wascarried out by forces employing false reporting policiessuggested that the problem was minimal. BritishTransport Police reviewed 68,000 crime records in 2006 and found only 2,000 reports that were of concern.After a filtering and grading process, 221 werehighlighted as the worst examples of suspected falsereporting. These were subjected to further intelligencemeasures, including checks with the Association ofBritish Insurers, and 211 target packages were created.These were then actioned and 211 individuals wereseen. These investigations resulted in six arrests.Despite these results, British Transport Police stillintroduced a false reporting policy, indicating that themotivation was a desire to improve performance. Thelack of enthusiasm to extend such policies to reports oflost property, also an attractive means of pursuing abogus insurance claim, supports that conclusion. Letsnot get this reported as a crime, it keeps the figuresdown. That seemed to the emphasis. (Interviewee E)

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The Home Office response to the threat The suspicion that the NCRS was being interpretedliterally and the balance of probability rule applied toall reports was raised by the author with the NationalCrime Registrar at the Home Office in 2005. This seniorstatistician, whose role was to oversee and offer guidanceon the NCRS, was of the opinion that victim sovereigntywas still the overriding consideration, and the balanceof probability test was only to be used in relation to thirdparty reports when a witness reported a possible crime.However, at a further meeting in 2006, the sameindividual confirmed that the balance of probability testwas in fact being applied universally. It should be notedthat, at the time of the second meeting, the Home Officestatistician had been replaced as National CrimeRegistrar by a police superintendent on secondment. Atthe same time, the British Crime Survey was indicatingthat police recording rates were declining, thussuggesting that under-recording was re-occurring:Comparing with the previous year, there have beenreductions in the estimated recording rate for burglary(77 per cent to 64 per cent), bicycle theft (62 per cent to54 per cent) and robbery (53 per cent to 44 per cent).34

What is of particular concern is the fact that, after thisresult, the BCS cross-validation tests on the reliability ofpolice recorded crime rates were discontinued,suggesting that political expediency was hampering therole of those bodies charged with ensuring probity.Certainly it would appear that the panel invited toreview the way in which crime data was compiled andpublished35 was not made aware of the evidencesuggesting that cuffing had enjoyed a renaissance.

Whilst the Smith Report (2006) recommended thatresponsibility for compiling crime data should be

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18


19


Figure 2: Criminal Damage in Norfolk


Recorded crimes

20,00018,00016,00014,00012,00010,0008,0006,0004,0002,000

02000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

transferred to the Office for National Statistics (ONS),in order to increase public confidence in the waystatistics were prepared and presented, evidence ofpolice manipulation of the figures continued to emerge.Gaming was a subject of debate at the PoliceFederation Conference in 200736 and officers regularlyexposed such practices on police websites such as thePolice Oracle and The Thin Blue Line.

The lack of any intervention by the Home Office todefend the initial interpretation of the NCRS led to aforce-by-force adoption of the new interpretation, andthe associated cuffing spread like an infection. Theimpact on Norfolk, one of the forces which appeared toresist the practice for some time, is evident from a reviewof recorded levels of criminal damage (Figure 2) whichfell dramatically after it was revealed by a whistleblowerthat officers had been instructed to record criminaldamage as accidental unless there was irrefutableevidence that it had been caused deliberately:

Police officers are being ordered not to recordcriminal damage as crime. A leaked memo hasrevealed that rank-and-file officers in the Norfolkforce have been told that incidents such as carvandalism should not be classed as an offencewhen there is no idea how it happened.37


20

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A presentation of the authors findings to a NationalPolice Federation conference for detectives confirmedthat officers were able to circumvent the NCRS tocontrol recorded crime levels: Name any crime and Illtell you how it can be fiddled.38

The no crimes scam

One way in which the figures were being fiddled was bythe abuse of the no crimes procedures whereby asupervisor could declassify a crime recorded by anofficer. This device has a legitimate purpose, which is torectify a mistaken report such as someone assuming thattheir car has been stolen when they have confused the floor of a multi-storey car park on which they parkedit. However, audit checks overseen by the AuditCommission on behalf of the Police Standards Unitmade this a more difficult trick to employ. The results ofone such audit carried out in the West Midlands in 2004discovered that one Command Unit (D2) could onlyachieve a 37 per cent success rate on the category whena supervisory officer had to justify the declassification ofa recorded crime. However, these checks merely resultedin more pressure being placed on operational officers tocuff crime. The following email from a crime manager(E1 Command Unit), who had only achieved a 57 percent success rate from the same audit, demonstrates thepoint and confirms the continued application of thebalance of probability rule:

The counting rules boil down to one simple test, onthe balance of probabilities has a crime taken placeor not? If YOU do not think it has, then YOU shouldnot record it. Either have the log endorsedaccordingly or if need be submit a short report but


do NOT record it asking for it to be no crimed. Theonly way I can no crime something that has beenrecorded is if new evidence has come to lightshowing that a crime had not taken place I cannotsimply over rule your decision once you havecommitted pen to WC 200 [Crime Report].39

However the official stance that police-recorded crimerates were still reliable persisted, and the results fromthe British Crime Survey on the limited offences theymeasure appeared to confirm the downward trend.40

That said, a note of caution was starting to emerge insuch reports:

Despite the existence of the NCRS, the quality ofrecorded crime data will vary as there will alwaysbe an element of subjectivity in recording againstthe crime categories, and interpretation of theHOCR that guide that coding. Police recordingpolicies and processes may also vary, leading toinconsistencies in recording.41

By 2013 the cracks were certainly appearing, with areport from the Office for National Statisticscorroborating the findings presented in this paper:

Given the consistent pattern, one possiblehypothesis is that there has been a gradual erosionof compliance with the NCRS such that a growingnumber of crimes reported to the police are notbeing captured in crime recording systems. Thereare a range of possible drivers for this including:

l lack of awareness or adequate understanding ofthe NCRS as time passes from its launch leadingto some officers recording as charged or ifdetected which might result from staff turnoverand lack of sufficient on-going training;

21



l performance pressures associated with targets(e.g. to reduce crime or increase detection rates) acting as perverse incentives for somecrimes to be downgraded from notifiable intonon-notifiable categories or as ASB or as crime-related incidents (which are not captured in datareturned to the Home Office);

l though forces have continued with their owninternal audits, the cessation of independentaudits from 2006/07 onwards may have reducedthe focus on addressing non-compliance;

l the move to Neighbourhood Policing in recentyears may also have led to more low-levelcrimes being dealt with informally and outsidethe formal crime recording system; and,

l in the context of pressure on police budgets and a general policy shift to promote greaterofficer discretion, a return to a more evidentialrecording model.42

This appeared to contradict the findings of HMIC,which carried out a review of crime statistics in 201143 andin general found little of concern. This stands in contrastto the investigation into Kent Police44 followingallegations of abuses in relation to detections by awhistleblower in November 2013. It is not unusual for oneform of gaming practice to be employed in companywith other forms and, as can be seen from the followingchapters, this appears to have been the case in Kent.

An examination of Kent PoliceAn examination of the total recorded crime profile forKent Police (Fig. 3) shows an increase in reported crimein 2002/03 in line with the introduction of the NationalCrime Recording Standard (NCRS) in April 2002.

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22


23


The fall in the total recorded crime for Kent Policebetween 2006/7 and 2008/9 is consistent with a changein the recording standard observed in other forcessuspected of reverting to an evidential standard.45

This also corresponds with the period identified by thelocal police federation representative as the start of theperverse impact of performance management.46

A check of the Kent Police website in November 2012reveals that the balance of probability test is beingapplied to all individuals attempting to report a crime:This term is used to describe a record of an incidentwhere a report of an incident has come to policeattention which, on the balance of probabilities, wouldnormally amount to a notifiable crime.47 The suspicionthat Kent Police were cuffing reported crime in orderto enhance performance was strengthened by a reportby the BBC on the variations between forces of nocrime rates for offences of rape:

No crime figures by police force

l 2 per cent: Gloucestershire

Figure 3: Recorded crime in Kent


Total crimes recorded

160,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

2010/11


l 5 per cent: Humberside

l 10 per cent: Devon and Cornwall

l 15 per cent: Norfolk

l 22 per cent: Gwent

l 30 per cent: Kent

Figures are rounded and relate to offences in yearto March 2011.48

Whilst HMIC had at that time found little of concernregarding overall crime recording in Kent (January2012) they were concerned about no criming:

HMIC sampling indicates that Kent Police almostalways records crimes accurately as required by theNCRS. However, the approach to crime recordingtaken by Kent Police is inconsistent with theapproach adopted by other forces in the area of nocrimes. HMIC will undertake a more in-depthreview of Kents approach at the police authorityand forces invitation in order to resolve thisoutstanding issue.49

The revelations from the investigation of Kent Police,50

confirming the prevalence of cuffing in general andabuse of no criming in particular in this force, resultedin the new Chief HMIC reconsidering the methodologyemployed in the previous HMIC audit.

The human cost

Whilst the evidence presented in this chapter istechnical, the human cost of such perverse behaviourshould not be overlooked. The failure to record crimesprevents offences being investigated and offendersbrought to justice. In a number of cases this has allowed

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24


criminals free rein to commit serious crimes, includingmurder. In 2006 the IPCC investigated the contactColette Lynch had with Warwickshire police prior to herdeath. In this case it emerged that Warwickshire officershad failed to record and investigate a report of criminaldamage involving the victims estranged partner. The IPCC commented on the forces crime recordingprocedures: A review should be undertaken of theextent to which those who are required to implementthe policies on domestic violence, crime recording andcall handling are aware of their responsibilities.51

What is the true level of crime in England and Wales?

So what is the true level of crime? The answer to thatwould appear to be that we dont know. The police datais being manipulated to such an extent that it amountsto little more than sophistry and the Crime Survey forEngland and Wales (CSEW) only covers a limited rangeof offences such as burglary and vehicle crime. Thatsaid, we can be confident that some offences such ashomicide, burglary of dwelling houses and vehiclecrime are reducing, partly due to improvements inmedical services and target-hardening measures suchas car immobilisers and house alarms. However, it hasbeen suggested that criminals are changing theiroffending behaviour as new opportunities presentthemselves, such as credit card and internet fraud.Reluctance by the Home Office to include such offencesin the Crime Survey and leaving it to financialinstitutions and insurers to investigate these forms ofcrime (rather than the police) has denied citizens a truepicture of the state of crime in the UK.

25



26

2Nodding: The Invitational Edge

of CorruptionThe administrative procedures allowing offenders to admit additional offences to be taken intoconsideration (TIC) have a long history of abuse,1 firstexposed by PC Ron Walker of Kent Police in 1986. Thesehave featured twice in the BBC Radio 4 Law in Actionprogramme, the most recent being on 1 November 2011.Whilst a chief superintendent from South Yorkshireinterviewed on the programme was eager to consign thecorrupt practices associated with TICs to the 1970s, theevidence available suggests the problem remains. The Independent Police Complaints Commission wasalso keen to dismiss any wider systemic abuse whenthey investigated South Wales Police following the caseof a young offender being plied with cider in return foradmissions,2 but this may reflect their failings asopposed to any indication of reality. This chapter willexplain the administrative processes being manipulatedto facilitate what it is argued are corrupt practices.These include both pre- and post-conviction TICs(prison write-offs now being converted to TICs).

On the edge

The administrative procedures enabling offenders toadmit large numbers of offences either at the point ofsentence or later after incarceration both reduce the


27

NODDING: THE INVITATIONAL EDGE OF CORRUPTION

bureaucratic burden on the courts and allow offendersan opportunity to make a fresh start without the fear ofarrest for a past offence. These procedures arecommendable, but they do create an environment inwhich offenders and officers may be tempted tonegotiate or bargain to their mutual benefit. This mayresult in deals being struck which are not in the publicinterest, most notably where an offender avoids ajustifiably long custodial sentence. In some cases suchnegotiation amounts to perverting the course of justice.

The risk lies in the pressure on officers to obtaindetections, thus improving their performance bysecuring admissions to offences unlikely to be solved byconventional means. When a suspected offender isarrested for a criminal offence, such as burglary orvehicle crime, the interviewing officer will be consciousthat the suspect may have committed a number of otheroffences, some likely to yield forensic evidence enablingthe suspect to be prosecuted when the identification isconfirmed. The suspected offender is also likely to beaware of this. If there were no pressure to achievedetections, the officer would maintain the upper handas he/she would be able to explain to the suspect thatthere was an opportunity to admit more offences at thatstage and thus avoid arrest and prosecution foroutstanding offences which subsequently came to light.The choice would then be left to the suspect. However,there is also a good chance that further evidence will notbe forthcoming and officers may then be tempted orcoerced by senior officers to offer some inducement tothe suspected offender to admit further offences. Suchinducements could involve charging the offender witha less serious offence, e.g. the value of property stolenwas less than in other offences or no violence was used


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28

in the commission of the offence, and then TIC moreserious offences. The result of such a deal would, inmost cases, be a reduced sentence for the offender. Sucha conspiracy has obvious attractions for the offenderand, although such offers are illegal, they are unlikelyto come to light as they are usually made outside therestrictive environment of the formal interview wheretape recording and defence solicitors may be present.This was the substance of the complaints of defencesolicitors aired on the Radio 4 Law in Action programmeon 5 June 2007. Suspects may also try to initiate suchnegotiations. This situation could be viewed as aninvitational edge to corruption. Manning andRedlinger argued that the nature of some types ofpolicing such as under-cover operations and/or the useof informants put officers at risk of involvement indubious behaviour, as they were tempted to cross legalboundaries in pursuit of organisational objectives.3

A new take on an old trick

The same risks as detailed above apply to prison write-offs, where a deal may be struck before sentenceagreeing that the offender will admit a number ofoffences after they are imprisoned. However, theincentive to detect offences in this way was minimisedin 1997 when prison write-offs were relegated to thecategory of non-sanctioned detections. Non-sanctioneddetections are offences which have been solved bymeans other than charge or caution. They are of lessvalue as they are excluded from the nationalperformance league tables. However TICs remainedsanctioned detections. It was then discovered that itwas possible to convert prison write-offs into TICs byproducing prisoners from prison for interview when


police were investigating offences that had subsequentlycome to light as a result of, for example, forensicevidence. If there was sufficient evidence to charge anoffender serving a custodial sentence, the CrownProsecution Service (CPS) would be contacted toauthorise the most suitable means of disposal. The CPSwould take into account the sentence the offender wascurrently serving and the likelihood of that sentencebeing increased by a further court appearance. Mostlikely, the CPS would decide that no increase in sentencewould result and that it was therefore not in the publicinterest to pursue the charge against the offender atcourt. Home Office counting rules allow offences dealtwith in this way and any other offences the offender iswilling to have TICd to be categorised as sanctioneddetections. However, in many cases the CPS is not madeaware of the details of the TIC offences. Both offenderand investigating officer are aware of the likely outcomeof these post-sentence TICs and the incentive forcollusion and exploitation are increased. The practicewas explained by one experienced detective:

The second approach [was] where people wereserving time and interviewed regarding otheroffences and they were charged with a piddlinglittle offence and then all the rest were TICd. Therewas clearly no interest in a court case because theyknew if they consulted with CPS, as they weresupposed to have done, as far as national policy wasconcerned, CPS would say not in the public interestdiscontinue, get your detection. So they would onlysee the charges; so because this person has signedthe TICs and this person was subject of a charge, the reading of the Home Office counting rules totake them into the TIC remit as opposed to prisonwrite-offs. (Interviewee D)

29



Table 1: Detection rate of Greater Manchester Police

Source: HMIC 1997 Primary Inspection of Greater Manchester Police 1997, p.42

1996-97

291,62418.2 per cent

48,1729.7 per cent

33,1778.9 per cent

89,8987.9 per cent

1994-95

307,02333.3 per cent

53,51638.4 per cent

35,73123.4 per cent

99,12527.3 per cent

RecordedDetected

RecordedDetected

RecordedDetected

RecordedDetected

All crime

Home burglary

Burglary other

Autocrime

The procedures allowing prisoners to be taken fromprison into police custody also provide the opportunityto offer them a range of inducements in the form of mealsout, access to partners or alcohol in return for admissions.

A recurring problem.

The abuse of post-sentence procedures resulting inoffences being detected as prison write-offs was wellknown when the Chief Constable of Greater ManchesterPolice (GMP) ordered the cessation of prison write-offscirca 1995. This had a dramatic impact on detectionrates, particularly for burglaries and vehicle crime.GMPs overall detection rate fell from 33 per cent in1994/5 to 18 per cent in 1996/7. However, the impactvaried by the type of crime, as shown at Table 1.

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30

Her Majestys Inspector of Constabulary knew all along

Whilst the abuse of prison write-offs was apparentlyaddressed by designating such admissions as non-sanctioned detections, thus excluding them from


performance league tables, forces discovered a way ofconverting prison write-offs into TICs. This wasuncovered by HMIC during their inspection of the WestMidlands Police.4 The inspection commentedunfavourably on the over-reliance on TICs andidentified two problem areas: TICs which had beenclaimed as detections when they had not been acceptedby the defendant at court, and no follow-up action hadbeen initiated;5 and the conversion of prison write-offsto TICs:

It is recognised that there are potential pressurepoints within a performance culture and it isrecommended that a system be adopted similar tothat required under the Byford/Morris Rules forPSVs6 for the independent verification andauthorisation of detections obtained by TICs,particularly those relating to further charges andTICs of persons already serving custodial sentences.7

The conversion from prison write-offs to TICs wasquantified by HMIC:

Detections from post-sentence visits (PSVs), orprison write-offs have significantly decreased overthe last three years from representing 45 per cent ofall detections in 1995/96 (equivalent to 33,103detections) to 4.1 per cent of all detections in1998/99 (equivalent to 2,759 detections). Thisdownward trend has continued into the currentfiscal year and currently stands at only 0.9 per centof the total detections achieved in the first sixmonths (equivalent to 412 detections) However,the most significant change has been theexceptionally large increase in the proportion ofdetections achieved from TICs which accounted fora quarter of the total detections in 1997/98.8

31



The audit of detections conducted by HMIC staffofficers suggested that collusion, in the form of deals,was occurring between officers and suspects:

There are other examples where the moresubstantive and serious offences have been subjectof TIC with lesser offences being charged: letterfrom subject in custody on remand suggests thepossibility that some inducement may have beensuggested to the subject regarding bail orinterpreted by the subject in this fashion Wellwhat the f happened to bail? Im in court onMonday so if you could be there to get me bail I willcome with you straight from the Courts and TIC alloffences that I can remember.9

Whilst it is clear that HMIC staff were aware thatprison write-offs were being converted to TICs and thedangers that such procedures posed, they did notinstigate any action at a national level to address thisthreat and, in their thematic report on integrity,maintained that unethical practices were not widespread.10

Designating TICs as non-sanctioned detections wouldhave been a potential technical solution.

In the absence of any effective deterrent, incidentsinvolving the abuse of TICs and inducements in the formof alcohol, drugs and sex continued to surface:

1. Cleveland: drugs and alcohol, 200211

2. West Midlands Police: drugs, 200312

3. Greater Manchester Police, Stockport Division:access to relatives, 200413

4. Bedfordshire Police: sex, 200614

5. Merseyside: alcohol, 200715

6. South Wales Police: alcohol, 201216

7. Kent police, 201317

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32


A new meaning for drug enhanced performance

A closer examination of the incident involving officersfrom the West Midlands is informative. Officers hadproduced a suspect from prison in order to interviewhim about further offences. The officers entered a fastfood outlet for lunch (a practice strictly forbidden byforce procedures) and the prisoner was passedprohibited substances by a relative. Acting on a tip-off,the forces professional standards department had beenkeeping covert observations on the officers and theirprisoner. All the parties were arrested. The press werealerted and the story appeared in the local newspaper.18

None of the officers were charged with any criminaloffence. However, the incident resulted in the forcemanagement team instigating a review of theprocedures involving post-sentence TICs. This reviewfound similar abuses to those found by HMIC (1998)some six years earlier:

In a few cases, defendants are admitting to offencesthat they could not have committed due to being incustody. Those cases are still being subject to TICMore serious offences are often taken intoconsideration than those offences that have beencharged. There are examples in which the values onthe TIC schedules are consistently well below thoseon the crime reports. This would minimise theoffence in the eyes of the court.19

The motivation to improve performance washighlighted as the main contributory factor:

It should be noted that there was widespread concernabout the use of production20 prisoners with OCUs(Operational Command Units) effectively competing to

33



become the first to obtain the visit and thereby boosttheir own detection figures, even if the prisoner wasbeing dealt with already by another OCU. Force recordsare being trawled to gain an advantage in such matters,with little organised collaborative effort.21

The impact on the West Midlands Police detections forburglaries of dwellings demonstrates the point:

Similar patterns are evident in the performance profilesof all the other forces experiencing similar incidents,suggesting that the phenomenon is organisational.22

The finger is pointed

Following the October 2003 incident involving WestMidlands Police officers, the Assistant Chief Constable(Crime) Stuart Hyde publicly addressed the reversal ofhis forces performance on detections by indicating that probity came at the cost of reduced performance:We have very rigorous and ethical methods of detectionand set ourselves the highest possible standards. We will not record something until it comes back from

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34

Figure 4: West Midlands Burglary Dwellings Detected: Total & TIC


Number of Burglary

Dwellings Detected

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

West MidlandsTotal BurglaryDwellingsDetected

West MidlandsBurglaryDw TICs


court whereas other forces will record it as a detectionfrom the point it has been signed for by the defendant.23

He was explaining that the force no longer allowedTICs, post- or pre-sentence, to be recorded as detectedunless the defendant/suspect had actually admittedthem before a court of law. Of course, this courtadmission posed the risk of an increased sentence forthe suspects and, not surprisingly, they were reluctantto comply with the new arrangements. The proceduralchange also curtailed the negotiating position of officersseeking to offer inducements to offenders. His commentalso explicitly questioned the integrity of other policeforces and by implication that of the West MidlandsPolice force, which had relied on such questionablemethods since at least 1997.

It would appear that his assessment was accurate, asfurther incidents involving TICs and inducementscontinued to surface, Kent police being but one of anumber of forces caught up in such revelations.However there have also been indicators relating toother forces. Essex officers were quick to highlight anincreased emphasis on TICs when a new chief constablewas appointed24 and the earlier Law in Actionprogramme25 indicated that intelligence interviewswere being conducted by Metropolitan Police officers.It is known that these unrecorded interviews providean opportunity for negotiations involving TICs tooccur.26 A corresponding increase in the use of TICs inthe Metropolitan Police is evident from an analysis ofits performance profile (Figure 5).

The Law in Action report27 also highlighted the largevariations between forces in the use of TICs, with WestYorkshire, South Yorkshire and Gloucestershiredetecting approximately four per cent of all reported

35



crime by this means compared with the one per cent forforces which had experienced problems. However theIndependent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) stillappeared blind to the organisational nature of the abuse:

The IPCC investigation also looked at whether whathappened to Sean was indicative of a widersystemic abuse by South Wales Police officers andfound no evidence to suggest that this was anythingmore than two officers acting completelyinappropriately. There are clear rules andsafeguards governing how police forces can getsomebody to admit to other offences so that thecourt can take them into consideration, but theywere ignored in this case.28

The IPCC investigation compared the number ofdetections obtained by TIC by South Wales Police withthose from similar forces and concluded that, as theywere not out of kilter with those forces, then the abusewas not organisational. This methodology is flawed inthat it excludes the possibility that the abuse isoccurring in the other forces. Comparing their TIC

36

Figure 5: Met. Burglary Dwelling Detections: Total & TIC, 20002007


Number of Burglary

Dwellings Detected

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

MetropolitanPolice Total BurglaryDwellingsDetected

MetropolitanPolice Burglary Dw TICs

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levels with other forces known to have experiencedsimilar issues is a much more illuminating exercise.29

Kent Police: 25 Years on and nothing changes

In November 2012 five officers from an offendermanagement unit in Kent were arrested followingallegations by another officer about the abuse of TICprocedures. An examination of the number of detectionsof burglaries of dwellings (Figure 6) and theft from motorvehicles (Figure 7) by detection type suggests that thepractice emanates from 2006, thus corroborating theclaims made by the Police Federation representative thatthe abuses stemmed from this period.30 The fall in TICs forthe period following the disclosure by the whistle blowerin 2012 is of note, particularly as the figures include TICsboth before and after the arrests in November 2012. Theforce was also graded poor/red for the standard of TICsin the HMIC Detections Audit for the year 2006/07.31

37


Figure 6: Burglaries of dwellings detectedby Kent Police, 2002 2013


1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

0

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

400

200

2008/09

2009/10

2010/11

2011/12

2012/13

Kent Detected All BurglaryDwellings

TICS


In June 2013 HMIC published the results of itsinvestigation into this matter and its concerns aboutother forms of gaming being employed by the Kentforce. Whilst the report confirmed and condemned theother forms of gaming, it was fairly muted on the issueof TICs other than to say an internal investigationcarried out by the force failed to uncover any criminaloffences.32 The nature of the allegations made by theofficer are not included in the report, which appears toaccept the findings of an internal investigation that nocriminal offences were disclosed. HMICs investigationamounted to an audit of 30 cases:

We examined 30 cases of TICs and found that 25complied with all of the requirements. Three failedto comply because there was no record that thevictim had been informed that the crime had beendetected in this way. In the other two cases, we could

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38

Figure 7: Thefts from motor vehicles detectedby Kent Police, 2002 2013


1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

0

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

1,800

400

2002008/09

2009/10

2010/11

2011/12

2012/13

Total TFMVDetections

TFMV Detected as TICS


not find evidence of a clear and reliable admissionto the specific offence that had been detected.33

This approach is consistent with HMICs previousperformance in addressing this type of abuse.34 Onewould expect any credible investigation into anallegation of this type of abuse to check the seriousnessof the TICs relative to the seriousness of the offencescharged and whether the offences were recorded asdetected as a result of being taken into account at acourt appearance or post-sentence after the CrownProsecution Service had agreed no further action.Interviews with local judges would discover if policeofficers are making representations for non-custodialsentences when large numbers of TICs are admitted.Local prison governors would also be able to testify toany abuse of the production process, whereby prisonersare produced at police stations for further offences to be investigated.

39



3Skewing: What Gets Measured Gets Done

A methodological dilemma

One might imagine that it would be a relativelystraightforward process to test the hypothesis that crudeoverall detection targets were achieved byconcentrating effort and resources on easy-to-detectoffences. It would involve comparing the detectionrates for more serious offences such as robberies andsexual assaults with those for less serious and easier-to-detect offences. However the gaming of recordedcrime and detection rates makes such an exercise oflittle value. This conclusion was reinforced by theexperience of Her Majestys Inspectorates ofConstabulary (HMIC) and Crown Prosecution Service(HMCPSI) when they tried to gain an understanding ofthe low convictions rate for rape:

Failure to adhere to the relevant HOCR (HomeOffice Crime Recording) criteria is not only skewingrecorded crime figures for rape but is alsoundermining the ability to gain accurateunderstanding of attrition.1

That said, it was noted that the sudden improvementsin the overall recorded crime and detection rates by oneforce, West Yorkshire, were not accompanied by similar

40


improvements in the detection rates for sexual offences.These improvements were therefore attributed to a re-interpretation of the NCRS, indicated by theintroduction of a false reporting policy and an increasein offences detected as TICs.2

A different approach is adopted

In order to overcome this methodological obstacle, itwas decided to undertake a review of HMIC reports andindividual investigations into serious cases by the IPCCwhere police action was being reviewed. The object wasto detect any evidence that under-resourcing or lack ofprioritisation were contributing factors. The reviewconfirmed that skewing was a consistent theme.

Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary reportedon the dangers of skewing as early as 1999 and viewedthe practice as unethical:

The drive for continuing improvements in detectionsshould, however, be controlled to ensure high-volume crimes are not unnecessarily pursued at theexpense of proper investigation of more seriouscrime. There was evidence in one force that adivisional commander refused to allow his detectivesto put more than minimal resources into a serioussexual crime investigation, preferring instead theyconcentrate their efforts on less serious crime such ascar theft. This occurred because whether they solveda rape or the theft of a car radio, the division wouldonly be credited with one detection.3

Deadly consequences

The deaths of Police Constable Malcolm Walker, a policemotorcyclist killed whilst trying to stop a vehicle driven

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SKEWING: WHAT GETS MEASURED GETS DONE


by gang members in 2001, and of Letisha Shakespeareand Charlene Ellis, caught in a hail of bullets in 2003,exposed the failure of the West Midlands Police torespond to the rise in gang-related criminality asneighbourhood policing took priority over theallocation of officers, and specialist units such as mobilesurveillance were not increased in response to thisemerging threat. The force had been warned aboutskewing by HMIC in 20014 and patrolling officers werereporting exchanges of fire between rival gangs prior tothese deaths. Similar deployment trends were apparentfrom the reports on Nottinghamshire Police followingthe Chief Constables declaration that his force couldnot cope with a rise in murders:5

Resources were devolved to the BCUs officers andstaff were realigned with community beats andresponse teams. Detective capacity at headquarterswas reduced and this included the disbandment ofthe force drug squad. In March 2003 HMIC notedsome aspects of the reorganisation had not beenhandled well and the challenges were exacerbatedby a rise in serious crime, both in terms of drug-related gun crime and an abnormal level of murderscommitted in 2002.6

The rise in organised crime, particularly gang- and gun-related activity, led HMIC to undertake a thematicstudy of this threat.7 The resulting report felt able tocommend only three forces (Avon and Somerset,Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan PoliceService) for their investment in measures to countermore serious crime.

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The Independent Police ComplaintsCommission remains blind to the obvious

The IPCC had also investigated a number of caseswhere skewing appeared to have been a feature. A focus on easy-to-detect crimes was proffered as afactor in the lack of resources attached by DerbyshirePolice to the investigation of the brutal beating androbbery of riding instructor Tania Moore.8 The report onthe forces handling of the case prompted the followingmedia response:

A police force failed to investigate properly theviolent robbery of a show jumper which led to hermurder because its officers were busy inquiring intostolen chickens.9

The IPCC investigation into the fatal shooting of PeterWoodhams in East London in 2006 also uncovered apoor level of response to an earlier stabbing by the sameassailants (IPCC 2007). Whilst the standards ofsupervision were commented on, the lack of prioritygiven to this type of crime was not identified as a majororganisational issue, although operational officers in theMet were raising concerns about the lack of focus on theinvestigation of serious crime:

Every borough is playing the game; those that arenot are seen as under-performing. Policing hascompletely lost its way. We only investigate crimesthat matter in terms of performance data.10

Further investigations overseen by the IPCC alsoindicated a lack of priority and/or resources devoted to the investigation of more serious crimes. Theinvestigation into the death of Craig Hodson-Walker,

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the postmasters son, in Bromsgrove, Worcestershirefound that evidence of involvement in armed robberiesagainst some of those responsible had been available toWest Mercia Police prior to the murder but this had notbeen pursued with due diligence.11 The investigationinto the way the Met dealt with the handling of theserial rapist Kirk Reid also indicated that otherperformance-related priorities had hampered the case.12

As in earlier cases, the IPCC refrained from criticisingthe leadership of the forces involved, being content tohold operational officers responsible for the failings:

There was pressure on the borough in relation toperformance and the targets set by the centre, whichat the time were robberies, street crime andburglary. Investigating sexual assaults was never apriority on the borough. But in my view none ofthese factors provides real mitigation for the actionsof those senior supervisory officers.13

The IPCC exposed

It did appear that the IPCC was unwilling to considerthe organisational nature of the failings that they wereuncovering, despite the consistent pattern that wasemerging. It was therefore thought beneficial toexamine one of their investigations in more detail. Theinvestigation into the contact that West Midlands Policeofficers had with the killer of Jordan McGann prior toher death provided an opportunity to explore thistendency in more detail.14

Jordan McGann was 16 months old when she wasmurdered on 6 August 2004 by her mothers boyfriend.The case was referred to the IPCC in 2006 afterpublication of a serious case review revealed failings by

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a number of statutory agencies, including the police.Released on licence from a prison sentence imposed foran assault on a mother and her child, the murderer hadnot been subject to the interagency monitoringarrangements normally associated with such offenders.Soon after release from prison, he assaulted a womanand child. The child protection officers assigned toinvestigate this offence contacted him by telephone totry to arrange for him to attend the police station forinterview. He did not keep these appointments and theofficers did not make vigorous efforts to track himdown or circulate him as wanted. By this time he hadmoved in with Jordans mother. A few days prior toJordans death, he was stopped by police and checkedon the Police National Computer. Had his details been circulated as wanted he would have been arrestedfor the previous assault. The IPCC took up the case and indicated an intention to look more widely at theway the West Midlands Police dealt with childprotection issues.15

Jordans case appeared a relatively straightforwardinvestigation. HMIC had criticised the West MidlandsPolice for under-resourcing child protection unitsduring their inspection of the force.16 This criticism waspre-dated by two internal reports on child protection:one examined staffing levels and found that in 22 percent of cases (122 out of a sample of 563) the level ofinvestigation was unsatisfactory;17 the other includedthe following comment:

The results of the HMIC Thematic Audit wouldappear to indicate vulnerabilities in strategicdirection, force ownership, and force trainingstrategy. To reinforce the above concerns we arenow met with an increasing amount of serious

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case management reviews into the death andserious injuries of children where the Force is beingfound wanting.18

The officers interviewed by the investigating officerappointed by the IPCC cited high workloads as reasons for their deficiencies. However the IPCCconcluded that:

The actions taken and the resources committed byWest Midlands Police demonstrate an open-mindedapproach to learning and improved working by agenerally high-performing force, which is goodnews for the public of the West Midlands.19

The failings of the IPCC were the subject of a HomeAffairs Committee review and critical report in 2013.20

It has yet to be seen whether any improvement ensued.

What deployment trends tell us

The geographical skewing of police resources in theform of the deployment of officers from deprived areas,traditionally more difficult to police, to more affluentsuburbs again came to the fore in the aftermath of the2010 riots.21

Tarique Gaffur, a former Assistant Commissioner ofthe Metropolitan Police Service, suggested that astrategy to respond to the threat of gangs byconcentrating police resources on the deprived areas ofthe capital had not been implemented as it would havetaken officers away from the politically favoured policyof neighbourhood policing.22 Councillors in theLadywood Ward of Birmingham had disclosed prior tothe riots, in which three young men from that warddied, that the local police command unit responsible for

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policing the area had seen officer numbers reduced byseventy when the force was restructured in 2010.23

Whilst the impact of that particular deployment hadbeen reversed prior to the riots, it did confirm thefindings of an earlier study of police deployment trendsin the West Midlands which showed how this forcesystematically re-deployed officers from inner-city areasto more affluent suburbs.24

The problem persists

The investigation into Kent also found evidence thatskewing still persisted, with evidence of: some officersactively seeking out cannabis users to administer formalwarnings; and a proactive policing team, set up to tackleburglary, being inappropriately redeployed to deal withcases of shoplifting.25

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4Stitching: Its a Fit-up

Something from the past?

The withholding of evidence supporting a suspectscase or the fabrication of evidence, known as stitching,resulted in a number of high-profile cases of miscarriageof justice which led to the 1984 Police and CriminalEvidence Act (PACE) designed to counter such policemalpractice.

HMIC (1999) was of the opinion that the fabricationof evidence or the false attribution of admissions tosuspects was something from the past. Cases beingconsidered for charge and appearance before the courtsare subject to stringent quality controls maintained bycustody officers and the Crown Prosecution Service(CPS), who check the evidence before deciding onwhether to prosecute or not. Not all investigations resultin an appearance before a court, although they canresult in the crime being recorded as detected. Theseadministrative forms of detection present opportunitiesfor stitching. Offering a suspect a caution when theevidence is weak is one way of obtaining a detection, asthe suspect can be persuaded to accept this outcome inorder to secure their freedom and avoid defendingthemselves in court, despite conviction being unlikely.1

Again, operational officers were making public theirconcerns about abuses of this method of detection:

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The police service is criminalising people. A so-called crimes been reported so you have to crime itin accordance with the National Crime RecordingStandards. You cant get rid of it. Theres anoffender so the way you resolve it i

Documents

Document - crime statistics