Muqarrab AkbarPhD student, Glasgow School for Business and Society

Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UKMuqarra.akbar@gcu.ac.uk

DronesUnmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance

(ISR)

most modern technology with wide range of capability

areas where American forces cannot operate overtly

Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan

First time in 2002 Yemen in 2002 ,Salim Sinan al-

Harethi,

suspected in 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden

numbers increasing dramatically

in 2001 almost 50

in 2002 167

in 2009 over 250

in 2011 7,000

Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen

Before September 11, US had criticised and condemned the

Israeli policy of target killing.  

one of the most dangerous and isolated region of PakistanMountainous barren and deep valley areas

Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan

poorest regions of the world per capita income about US $250 per year 60 percent living below poverty line

code of conduct “Pakhtunwali” hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride, compensation and retaliation

FATA and Drone Attacks

Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban

training camps and recruitment centres

exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations

Pakistan military launched operations in FATA

captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban

peace agreement to pardon local leaders

US started Drone attacks in 2004

central element of defence and counter-terrorism strategy

most appropriate response

no prospect of negotiation or compromise

Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an operation

US forces were prohibited to operate

first drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004

target Nek Mohammad

an influential member of TTP

Pakistani military credited itself

fear of public retaliation

Initially the covert drone -“personality strikes”

Bush era

High value target-senior Al-Qaeda members

Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.

Success of drone caused the increase its number

Last era of Bush

Less signature strikes

33 in 2008

Entrance of Obama

frequency of drone attacks proliferated further

“signature strikes” based on “pattern of life” analysis.

43 in first ten month of 2009

Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud

more than half of top ranking and high value targets

without endangering American marines or pilots

“the only game in town considered to be the most effective

tool and weapon against Al-Qaeda in the war on terror by the

intelligence community particularly in the areas across the

Pakistani borders.” (Leon Panetta, director of CIA)

From 2004 to 2010

60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliates

groups targeted

Drone: A Successful Campaign

attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces

a plausible prima facie rationale to counter such

Drone is effective because

least obstructive and most precise mean

greater surveillance capability

greater precision to hit the target

avoiding collateral damage

Drones only work and gather surveillance on the basis of

‘pattern of life’ information

Their human operators distinguish terrorists from civilians

accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence

Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators

Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed unknown

Till June 2011-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed

Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased

Against Drone attacks

Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA

During Obama regime

less than 13% of drone killed a militant leaders

only 2% are militant leaders in all fatalities from drone

Pakistani sources –in last three years

about 700 civilian causalities

@ 2 percent with one militant for every almost 50 civilian

UK failed to support drone openly

Germany supports the Pakistani stance

Never been criticized before its expansion

causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan

provoking retaliation against the United States

Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity

No transparency and accountability

call of drones due to high civilian causality

(David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus)

Doubt about estimation of civilian causalities

militants collect and buried the dead and told that all of

them were innocent civilians

Initially no resentment

Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments

March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute)

2010 – 75 % (New America Foundation)

2011 – 97 % (Pew research Center)

2012

17 % supports killing of militants by drones94 % considers killing innocent civilians74% unnecessary to defend Pakistan from extremist organisations

(Pew research Center)

Public Response

Opposition within US

Anne Patterson (US Ambassador to Pakistan)

Cameron Munter (US Ambassador to Pakistan)

Adm. Mullen

Andrew M. Exum (Center for a New American Security)

David Kilcullen (former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to

General Petraeus)

No empirical evidences on civilian and militant deaths

Differences in media reports

Killing of already killed

Ilyas Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011

Pak- US DriftFrom 2004 to 2007 , Pakistan denied US involvement

Shamsi Air Base was provided

Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support

Bilateral relations affected byRaymond Davis episode (January 27, 2011 )

Drone strike at Datta Khel ( 38 civilian deaths, March 17, 2011 )

Salala Check post attack on Pak Army

US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people.

Pentagon and State department favour restrictions

CIA wants to continue

Drone strikes as counter productiveSuicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge

Emergence of “accidental guerrilla” Phenomenon

survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people)

Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in AfghanistanSuicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad

Pakistani civilians, army targeted

Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base

No empirical data only anecdotal evidence

Drone attacks and International Lawprocedure, operations, criteria of target choosing secret

“the worst kept secret in the history of U.S. foreign policy”

(Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow)

legal and moral status under US domestic and international law

Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination

No specific International Law describe about drones

Drone similar as other weapons

American government justifies attacks to eliminate threat to US

security.

Violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations

No use of force against political independence or territorial

integrity of any state

Two exemptions

State give consent to use force on her territory or

Presently not with Pakistan’s consent as objected repeatedly

Host state unwilling to target the threat to attacking state

Launched operation in Swat, Wana and FATA

Even if Pakistan consented

Illegal to kill suspected and innocents without prosecution

Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and

International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

No threat to US from these people

On domestic legal perspective

Violation of Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)

these elements are not involved in September 11

“whether killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in

response to [events] in 2001.” (Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)

“they undermine the essential foundations of human rights law”.   ( Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary

executions)

ConclusionLetter of 26 congressmen to Obama regarding drone

Drones are

Strategically important

technical sound

wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily

Collateral damage of drones is

Accelerating violence

Instability in the region

Creating more enemies than eliminating

Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan

Complicating US policy of withdrawal

Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan

Both partners must be eloquent on the issue

Effective use

Minimising the civilian or suspected deaths

Trust building

ReferencesIan Henderson, “Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the

Use of Armed Drones.” In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13, edited by M.N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu and T.McCormack, 134-136. Hague:Springer, 2010.

Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?”, International Affairs 86, no.2 (2010):342.

Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War”, Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 3(2011):123.

Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the CIA’s Covert Drone Program? New Yorker, 2009, October 26: 5;

References cntd....Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, “Tracking the

Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan”, International Studies Perspectives (2012):1–22.

M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research Paper 43, no. 9 (2009): 2-26.

Brian Williams, “The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–10.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871–892.

New America Foundation.International Republican InstitutePew Research Center

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